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CAMBODIA EVACUATION

FYI ONLY: The following exchange took place during the State Department briefing yesterday. It may be of use to you if you are pressed further on evacuation questions.

Q. Bob, there were some Cambodians who were pulled out too. I was just wondering about them.

A. What were you wondering about?

Q. Well, whether there was any plan, whether you would rule out any evacuation of other Cambodians?

A. No. The question of the Evacuation of the Cambodians that came out with our Americans, David, that was done -- as my statement on Saturday night very clearly stated -- this was an evacuation of Americans. And to the extent that space was available on aircraft involved in the leftout of American citizens, we would do everything we could to help Cambodians also to be included. But this was not a separate evacuation of Cambodians, and I would not expect any such evacuation to take place of Cambodians.

This would be part, obviously, of the clarification that the President is now seeking in Congress, when you get into the question of the possible evacuation of third-country nationals.

17. Why didn't the President talk about evacuating Cambodians, who have been associated with the United States? Does he plan to evacuate any Cambodians? If so under what authority? Why didn't the President ask for a clarification of the law relating to military forces in connection with an evacuation of Americans from Phnom Penh?

Cambodian evacuation - We do not foresee arising the question of a special effort to evacuate large numbers of peoples with military force.

4/15/75

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 12, 1975

Dear Mr. Speaker: (Identical copy to President of Senate)

As you and other members of Congress were advised, in view of circumstances in Cambodia, the United States had certain contingency plans to utilize United States Armed Forces to assure the safe evacuation of U. S. Nationals from that country. On Friday, 11 April 1975, the Khmer Communists forces had ruptured Government of the Khmer Republic (GKR) defensive lines to the north, northwest and east of Phnom Penh and were within mortar range of Pochentong Airfield and the outskirts of Phnom Penh. In view of this deteriorating military situation, and on the recommendations of the American Ambassador there, I ordered U. S. military forces to proceed with the planned evacuation out of consideration for the safety of U. S. citizens.

In accordance with my desire that the Congress be fully informed on this matter, and taking note of Section 4 of the War Powers Resolution (P.L. 93-148), I wish to report to you that the first elements of the U. S. forces entered Cambodian airspace at 8:34 P.M. EDT on 11 April. Military forces included 350 ground combat troops of the U. S. Marines, 36 helicopters, and supporting tactical air and command and control elements. The Marines were deployed from helicopters to assure the security of helicopter landing zone within the city of Phnom Penh. The first helicopter landed at approximately 10:00 P.M. EDT 11 April 1975, and the last evacuees and ground security force Marines departed the Cambodian landing zone at approximately 12:20 A.M. on 12 April 1975. The last elements of the force to leave received hostile recoilless rifle fire. There was no firing by U. S. forces at any time during the operation. No U. S. Armed Forces personnel were killed, wounded or missing, and there were no casualties among the American evacuees.

Although these forces were equipped for combat within the meaning of Section 4(a)(2) of Public Law 93-148, their mission was to effect the evacuation of U. S. Nationals. Present information indicates that a total of 82 U. S. citizens were evacuated and that the task force was also able to accommodate 35 third country nationals and 159 Cambodians including employees of the U. S. Government.

The operation was ordered and conducted pursuant to the President's Constitutional executive power and authority as Commander-in-Chief of U. S. Armed Forces.

I am sure you share with me my pride in the Armed Forces of the United States and my thankfulness that the operation was conducted without incident.

Sincerely,

(signed Gerald R. Ford)

The Honorable
The Speaker
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Ron

Contact point at the Pentagon tonight:

from now until 12 midnight:

Col. O'Brien
OX 7-5131
or OX 5-0192

after midnight:

Commander Black
OX 7-5131
or OX 5-0192

patty

ASSUMPTION: THAT STATE HAS ALREADY ANNOUNCED THIS OPERATION

A: Can you confirm that evacuation of Phnom Penh is underway?

A: We can confirm that US military ^{personnel} ~~operations~~ are ~~now underway~~.

¹⁴⁹ ~~We~~ evacuate American citizens from Phnom Penh. This action ~~was~~

~~requested by the Department of State after consultation with the~~

~~US Ambassador in Phnom Penh and~~ is being conducted to withdraw

US citizens from ~~the~~ dangerous environment ~~in Cambodia~~. The

evacuees are to be taken to safehavens designated by the Department

of State. ~~As you know, we have already furnished evacuation airlift~~

~~for some Cambodians and for a number of other foreign nationals~~

~~in Phnom Penh~~. We anticipate that this current effort will include,

for humanitarian reasons, some ~~additional~~ Cambodians and foreign

nationals. There are no specific details of the operation available

at this time.

For DOD use as appropriate;

DOD guidance following
10:00 pm State announcement

EAGLE PULL

- Initiation of evacuation of Phnom Penh will begin at 2030 EDT 11 April (0730 Local 12 April Phnom Penh) with launch of first helicopter from LPH in Gulf of Thailand/Ubon AFB Thailand.
- First Helicopter will arrive Phnom Penh 1 hour 30 minutes later at 2200 EDT (0900 Phnom Penh time).
- One landing zone will be used (Hotel)
 - Close to Embassy
 - Will accommodate 3 helicopters at once
- First 12 helos will carry a 346 man marine ground security force (GSF).
- A total of 33 helos will be used.
 - 30 for evacuation
 - 3 airborne spare or search and rescue
 - Single lift operation - No recycle of Helicopters
 - Total time from 1st launch to last recovery approx 4 hrs 20 min.
 - Total on ground time Phnom Penh approx 1 hr 30 min
 - Location of Helicopters for operations.
 - 9 - Thailand
 - 12 LPH (Okinawa)
 - 12 CVA (Hancock)
 - GSF from LPH Okinawa
 - Airborne Support Forces ^{ON} Station
 - 2 EC-130 Airborne Command & Control
 - 3 HC-130 Helicopter Controller, Rescue, Refueling
 - 3 OV-10 Forward Air Controller of TAC AIR if needed
 - 6 A-7 TAC FTR & Airborne Search and Rescue

- 4 F-4 TAC FTR

- 2 AC-130 Gunships

- Sufficient additional TAC FTR aircraft are on groundalert in Thailand

Potential Evacuees

US Citizens: 146

DOD	51
Other USG	21
Residents	24
Transients	25
Press	25

ALIENS 444

Diplomatic	2
Dependents of US Cit	5
TCN	5
Key Khmer	200 (Est)
TCN Press	7
USG Employees	225

TOTAL 590

346

936

STATEMENT

In view of the seriously deteriorating military situation around Phnom Penh, the evacuation of all U. S. Mission personnel is taking place. We regret this development because of its obvious implications for the Government of the Khmer Republic.

This evacuation is taking place in an effort to ensure the safety of U. S. citizens in Cambodia. To the extent we have the capability in the airlift we are also undertaking to evacuate third country nationals working for the U. S. Government, U. S. press services, voluntary agencies, etc., as well as Cambodian employees of the U. S. Mission and their families, and as many other Cambodians who have been associated with us as circumstances permit.

Because of the effective interdiction of Phnom Penh airport now by Khmer communists' rockets, artillery and mortars, this evacuation is being carried out by U. S. military helicopters from landing zones near the American Mission in Phnom Penh. The evacuation operation is being protected as necessary by a security force of U. S. marines. Tactical aircraft are in the vicinity in the event they are needed. There is no intention to use force but if necessary it will be applied only to protect the lives of evacuees.

The evacuees will be taken temporarily to Thailand before being moved onward to their destination of choice.

U. S. Mission personnel

Government of the Khmer Republic

Because of the U. S. Ambassador's efforts in the past few weeks to reduce the number of potential evacuees to the barest minimum, we are not certain that we have up-to-date figures on the numbers likely to be involved. However, we anticipate that there will be several hundred people involved, including some 150 Americans.

April 11, 1975

O.B.E.

SUGGESTED DOD RESPONSE

ASSUMPTION: THAT STATE HAS ALREADY ANNOUNCED THIS OPERATION

Q: Can you confirm that evacuation of Phnom Penh is underway?

A: , We can confirm that U.S. military personnel evacuating American citizens from Phnom Penh. This action is being conducted to withdraw U.S. citizens from a dangerous environment. The evacuees are to be taken to safehavens designated by the Department of State. We anticipate that this current effort will include, for humanitarian reasons, some Cambodians and foreign nationals. There are no specific details of the operation available at this time.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Cambodia
Evacuation

This is a sensitive subject. To avoid panic in Phnom Penh turn all questions over to State. ^{Amb.} Dean and State communicate regularly so State is in a much better position to answer any questions. F.Y.I In any event there are few dependents or non-essentials! ^{Some have left,}
^{Some are still there.}

Q Do you know what the President's scores were yesterday, Ron?

MR. NESSEN: I read in paper what it was. I know that everything I read in the paper is accurate. (Laughter)

Q Ron, there is an impression that the President is reluctant to say anything by way of a committal on Vietnam. Is that the case? He was asked at Bakersfield and except for the statement yesterday on the fall of Da Nang, we have had very little out of here.

MR. NESSEN: The President is getting full information from Washington as many facts as are available. He did voice his feelings yesterday about the refugee problem. I know, from talking to him today, that he is concerned. He feels a great deal of compassion.

He has seen the television stories and the newspaper stories about the situation there. He will be meeting later in the week with General Weyand and Secretary Kissinger, as you know. They will both be coming here.

Q Will President Ford meet with Lon Nol if he comes to the United States?

MR. NESSEN: I do not have any indication that he is coming to the United States.

Q Is he welcome to come to the United States?

MR. NESSEN: Why wouldn't he be welcome to come to the United States.

Q I am asking if he would be welcome to come.

MR. NESSEN: He is an elected leader of a foreign government. I see no reason why he would not be welcome in the United States.

Q Ron, has the President been in direct contact with General Weyand?

MR. NESSEN: He has not.

Q Has the President talked to Kissinger today?

MR. NESSEN: I am not sure of that.

Q Can you explain why he ran at the airport at Bakersfield? Was he trying to avoid the questions on Vietnam?

MR. NESSEN: I would not think so. I think you know him better than that.

Q How much time is accorded to Vietnam?

MR. NESSEN: He spent from about 7:00 until he left for the golf course on business. As soon as he returns, he has a full afternoon of business, all afternoon.

Q Ron, I think we have asked every day whether or not the President has talked to Secretary Kissinger and each day, you say something to the effect that you have not checked. Can we assume that you are not going to answer that question?

MR. NESSEN: He talks to a lot of people in Washington. I don't think it has been our policy to give a phone log of who he talks to. He is keeping fully informed on this. I don't understand why there is any doubt that he is keeping fully informed.

Q I am asking, can we assume you are not going to tell us if he has? That is the only question I am asking.

MR. NESSEN: I don't think I am going to give a run-down on the President's phone log each day.

Q Is there an assumption that Lon Nol will come to Washington eventually?

MR. NESSEN: There is very little information that we have on Lon Nol's plans. I understand that he is going to Indonesia for a rest and then he will come to Hawaii, I understand, for medical treatment.

This is a private, unofficial visit, and beyond that, we have very little details of what he plans to do. I am also told -- and again I suppose all I am doing is relaying to you a news report -- Sihanouk has said in Peking that this makes no difference; that there will still be no negotiations. He does not plan any negotiations despite the departure of Lon Nol.

Q Ron, that raises another question.

MR. NESSEN: I am relaying to you a news report, Peter.

Q Do we regard Sihanouk as head of the Khmer Rouge now?

MR. NESSEN: I was only relaying to you a news report.

Q Why? Because it confuses the matter?

TO: RON NESSEN - WHITE HOUSE FROM: JOB LAITIN

HERE IS SUGGESTED NEWS RELEASE WE ARE DEXING
TO FOREIGN AID OFFICIALS AT STATE FOR RELEASE THRU
NORMAL CHANNELS AT EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY.

The Department of State has accepted the findings of State and Defense Department auditors that there is remaining in the Cambodian Military Assistance account \$21,500,000 (M) to cover costs of providing ammunition to the Cambodian government.

Nine months ago, the Defense Security Assistance Agency directed an audit of the Cambodian account for fiscal year 1974, shortly before the fiscal year ended on June 30, 1974. As a result of this audit, State and Defense Department auditors concluded on the basis of price adjustments that there should be an additional credit of \$21,500,000 (M) to the Cambodian account. The Department of the Army then reviewed the findings and on March 10, 1975, certified the validity of the auditors' findings to the Department of Defense. In effect, this meant that \$21,500,000 in additional assets were due from U.S. Army ammunition inventory ^{FOR} Cambodia.

As a consequence, the Office of the Secretary of Defense on March 11 directed the movement of these assets to Cambodia and delivery is now taking place.

The additional authorization amounts to approximately 9000 tons of ammunition.

The Department of State's Inspector General for Foreign Assistance, John Constandy, performs audits and reports periodically to the Congress on the propriety of charges to Foreign Assistance appropriations. He also is charged by law with review of management of the military assistance and economic programs. The Department of State has the authority to determine whether or not there is to be a military assistance program and the dollar value of that program within the appropriations made available to the President by the Congress.

CAMBODIA PERSPECTIVE

In Cambodia, the offensives of the Communist insurgents continue with unabated fury. They are directed by some 10,000 North Vietnamese cadre and are backed by large quantities of Soviet and Chinese military supplies. Villages, towns, schools, marketplaces, hospitals, pagodas and refugee camps are the daily targets of the Communists' indiscriminate terror attacks. In the areas occupied by the Communist forces, executions and terror are widespread. In the face of these intense attacks, and deeply hurt by the cuts and restrictions on American assistance imposed by the U.S. Congress, Cambodia's defenders are now virtually out of ammunition, fuel and food.

The Government of the Khmer Republic has made every possible effort toward peace in Cambodia. It has repeatedly called for a cease-fire and for unconditional negotiation. But the Communist side brags that it does not need to negotiate because Congressional cuts in U.S. assistance to Cambodia will assure the Communists a total victory. The Communists have, therefore, refused to negotiate with any of the non-Communists leaders of Cambodia and have instead stepped up their total war against the Cambodian people.

The U.S. Congress has been requested by the Administration to appropriate the assistance so urgently needed by the Cambodian people. The fate of seven million Cambodians is thus in the Congress's hands. But the stakes are also high beyond Cambodia, for around the world, America's allies and adversaries alike will be profoundly affected by the choice to be made. If the American Congress cuts off the Cambodians at their knees, what assurances can any other country have -- whether in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, or anywhere else -- in the face of aggression, and what incentive will any terrorist army have to negotiate steps toward a just peace?

Opposition to providing the aid essential if the Cambodians are to have a chance to defend themselves, is based largely on a serious misunderstanding of the basic issues involved in the war in Cambodia. Opponents allege, for example, that the United States began the war in Cambodia, that the Government of Lon Nol is illegal and that the Cambodian Government is responsible for the continued warfare.

The facts of the matter, as outlined in the following background papers, disprove these and similar allegations of Cambodia's opponents. They demonstrate clearly that it is the Communist side which initiated and stepped up the war in Cambodia and that the people and the legitimate Government of Cambodia, having made every possible effort toward peace, deserve the assistance so urgently required for their efforts to defend themselves against the Communists' terror offensives.

CAMBODIA AID

Question:

The President read a letter from Saukham Khoy last night in which the Acting Cambodian President urgently requested American aid for his country, yet the President did not mention any aid request. Does this mean he has abandoned the hope of getting American assistance for Cambodia?

Answer:

Quite the contrary. President Ford read the letter to point up the urgency of the Cambodian appeal for U.S. assistance. President Ford's request for \$222 million is still awaiting Congressional action. But because the situation in Cambodia is so grave and the need for aid so immediate, President Ford cannot be optimistic that the funds will be voted in time to save that country from being overrun.

Les Row

SUMMARY OF NEGOTIATING EFFORTS ON CAMBODIA

We have made continual and numerous private attempts, in addition to our numerous public declarations, to demonstrate in concrete and specific ways our readiness to see an early compromise settlement in Cambodia.

-- Throughout the negotiations that led to the Paris Agreement on Viet-Nam in January 1973, the United States repeatedly indicated -- both in these negotiations and through other channels -- its desire to see a ceasefire and political settlement in Cambodia, as well as in Viet-Nam and Laos. In later discussions concerning the implementation of the Paris Agreement, the United States conveyed its ideas and its desire to promote a negotiated settlement between the Cambodian parties.

-- A number of major efforts toward negotiation were made in 1973. By the summer of that year, these efforts were extremely promising. Just as they appeared to be approaching a serious stage they were thwarted by the forced bombing halt in August that was legislated by the Congress.

-- In October 1974, we broached the idea of an international conference on Cambodia with two countries having relations with the side headed by Prince Sihanouk (GRUNK). We also discussed the elements of a peaceful settlement. We

received no substantive response to these overtures.

-- In November 1974, we again indicated with specificity our readiness to see a compromise settlement in Cambodia in which all elements could play a role to a government with relations with the GRUNK. Our interlocutors showed no interest in pursuing the subject.

-- In December 1974, we tried to facilitate a channel to representatives of the Khmer Communists through a neutralist country with relations with the GRUNK. Nothing came of this initiative.

-- In December 1974 and early January 1975, we concurred in an initiative to open a dialogue with Sihanouk in Peking. Sihanouk at first agreed to receive an emissary, but later refused.

-- In February 1975, we tried to establish a direct contact with Sihanouk ourselves. We received no response.

-- Also in February 1975, we apprised certain friendly governments with clear interests and concerns in the region, and with access to governments supporting the GRUNK, of our efforts to move the conflict toward a negotiated solution and of the degree of flexibility in our approach. They could offer no help.

Unfortunately, none of these attempts have had any result. The reactions we have gotten so far suggest that negotiating prospects will be dim as long as the Cambodian Government's military position remains precarious.

We are continuing to pursue our long-stated objective of an early compromise settlement in Cambodia. In this process we are, and have been, guided by the following principles:

1. The United States will support any negotiations that the parties themselves are prepared to support.
2. The United States will accept any outcome from the negotiations that the parties themselves will accept.
3. As far as the United States is concerned, the personalities involved will not, themselves, constitute obstacles of any kind to a settlement.

8. What has happened to aid to Cambodia? The President said that "it may be soon too late." Does he still want \$222 million in assistance for Cambodia?

Aid to Cambodia. While recognizing that it may be ^{soon} too late, the President satnds by his request for aid to Cambodia that has been pending with the Congress since January.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Two planes of World Airways landed at Yakota Air Base in Japan today. They were a DC-8 and a 727. The landing there was unauthorized and they have been told to move out. *Orythana.*

The only ~~XXXX~~ plane of World Airways that was under contract was the DC-8. It was flying rice and ammo to Cambodia along with several other carriers. On April 11 all flights were stopped. On April ~~14~~ 14, the State Department directed termination of the airlift except for Bird Air which is engaged in air drops.

World Airways was paid out of AID funds under a contract that specified that on termination of the contract the airlines involved had several hours to move the airplanes to safety and that the government would pay for loss or damage incurred in performance of the contract until the aircraft was safely back to place of origin. In World Airways case that was Oakland.

Three other airlines were also told of the cancellation of the contract-- they were Airlift International, Seaboard/World, and Flying Tiger.

8

OAKLAND, CALIF. (UPI) -- WORLD AIRWAYS PRESIDENT ED DALY SAID YESTERDAY HE HAD \$22 MILLION WORTH OF PLANES AND EQUIPMENT FOR FLYING FOOD TO CAMBODIA, BUT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAD CANCELED HIS INSURANCE AND PUT HIM OUT OF BUSINESS.

"THERE IS NO WONDER THAT THE PEOPLES OF THE WORLD HAVE LOST THEIR CONFIDENCE IN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AND ITS PEOPLE," DALY SAID IN A TELEGRAM SENT FROM SAIGON AND RELEASED HERE.

THE TELEGRAM WAS ADDRESSED TO PRESIDENT FORD, MEMBERS OF HIS CABINET, ALL MEMBERS OF CONGRESS, AND THE GOVERNORS OF ALL STATES.

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CAMBODIA NEGOTIATIONS

The attached is a press conference by Thai Foreign Minister Chatchai on Khmer peace negotiations.

Q. How does the U.S. view the efforts of the Thai initiatives to bring about negotiations in Cambodia?

A. Naturally, we welcome these efforts by the Thai. As we have said before, it has been the publicly stated wish of the Khmer government to negotiate a settlement to end the war and we too desire a peaceful resolution of the conflict.

On Cambodian Evacuation:

Refer to guidance of yesterday, pointing out that we always have contingency plans when the lives of Americans are at stake.

CAMBODIAN AID

You may find the ~~a~~ comment the President made during the meeting with the Congressisonal delegation to be useful in defending his request for the \$222 million for Cambodia. The meeting was last Wednesday.

"All of you know of my deep personal conviction that we should have a strong, world-wide policy of helping those who want to help themselves."

SUBJECT: Administration Attitude Regarding Cambodian Aid Bill
Compromise

QUESTION: Is the Administration now ready to accept a compromise bill on Cambodia aid, which includes a cut-off date of June 30?

ANSWER: No. The Administration's view has not changed with reference to the issue of a cut-off provision of June 30. There are many reasons for opposing the cutoff. It's most obvious effect -- to remove any incentive for the enemy to negotiate -- should be clear to everyone. Nevertheless, I feel very strongly that the whole Congress should be permitted to consider the vital issue of aid to Cambodia. Thus, I believe that the bill ought to be permitted to come to the floor of the House for a vote. Therefore, I feel it would be most helpful if the Committee would favorably report the bill -- including the Hamilton-Dupont Amendment if necessary -- in order to provide an opportunity for both debate and amendment on the floor.

QUESTION: So you are in effect overruling Mr. Ingersoll's opposition to the Hamilton-Dupont Amendment expressed last Thursday before the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

ANSWER: That is not the case. As I have already indicated, the Administration continues to oppose a cut-off provision. When Mr. Ingersoll took that position last Thursday, it was at the Committee's initiative that the bill was voted down. It is in view of that action that I have now asked the Committee to reconsider the measure, and report it out, so that the entire House membership can debate this vital issue.

The Khmer Communists' Systematic Use of Execution and Terror:
Why Cambodians flee from the Khmer Rouge

On March 12, Prince Sihanouk himself said that the Khmer Communists will be in complete control of all "internal policies" after the fall of Phnom Penh. So there is no question whose policies will be applied to the population under a new government. The following examples of systematic terror lead to the conclusion that a widespread purge will follow the capture of Phnom Penh by the Communists:

- Refugees who fled to South Vietnam said that infringements of even minor Communists rules were often punished by death. One refugee from Svay Rieng Province said that thousands of villagers had been killed for not toeing the Khmer Rouge line. (source: Wash. Post, November 24, pg. K 1)
- At the Tuol Trach Refugee Camp, the Communists killed 10 refugees, six of whom were young children under 10 years of age. They were brutally executed by knife and bayonet. (source: Jack Anderson, Wash. Post, March 3, 1975)
- Meak Son Ham, chief of a village in Kampong Thom Province which fled the Communists said: "They (the Communists) killed people by beating them and shooting them. They said people were enemy agents and led them to the woods and shot them." (source: Chicago Tribune, July 14, 1974, Section 2, pg. 3)
- Um Chum, a refugee in Kampong Thom, said "Sometimes they killed one member of a family as an example, or they killed whole families. They led people to the forests in chains for executions. They put five people at a time in graves. People had to dig their own graves." (Chicago Tribune, July 14, cited above)
- Another refugee at Kampong Thom said: "The Communists forbid people to worship or be monks without their permission. They are very cruel to monks." (source: Chicago Tribune, July 14, cited above)
- Sanguon Preap, a refugee at Tuol Sampeou said: "I saw the Khmer Rouge saw off the neck of a civilian with the sharp edge of a sugar palm leaf. They spent three days cutting his head off. They sawed a little one morning, and then in the evening and the following day in the morning and the evening, and finally the following day in the morning and night."

"They made the victim stand up while they were cutting in front of hundreds of people. Then they held him up when he could no longer stand."

Reporter Donald Kirk added that this episode was not an isolated case but "one of many I heard during visits to refugee camps. Khmer Rouge soldiers have also used the knife like edges of sugar palm trees to lop off heads of Cambodian officers captured while overrunning towns." (source: Donald Kirk in the Chicago Tribune, July 14, 1974)

- Another refugee, Lach Pech, said in his village Buddhist monks were forced to dig up roots of large trees and then throw bodies into the ground where the roots had been. (Kirk, Chicago Tribune, July 14, cited above)
- The Khmer Communists overran the town of Ang Snoul around New Year, 1975. After the town was recaptured the bodies of 52 civilians, including 10 children, were found with wounds indicating they had been shot and bayoneted. (source: Christian Science Monitor: January 6, 1975)
- Mias Penh, of Phnom Tragn, said 10 people of his village were murdered with an ax during the years of Communist rule. He said "people who protested against the Communist policy of food distribution were taken into the forest and beheaded and mutilated with ax and hammer." (source: Wash. Star News, April 10, 1974)
- Correspondent Tammy Arbuckle interviewed refugees in several parts of Northern Cambodia and "it was the same story . . . always the same story. Murders, houses burnt, conscription, hardly any food given to the villagers . . . " (Tammy Arbuckle in the Wash. Star News, April 10, 1974)
- In Pursat Province the Communists formed a special unit in February 1974 to execute villagers and officials who did not conform to their policies. Within four months there had been nine executions, almost all by stabbing. (U.S. Embassy report)
- Monk Phra Kou Ath, chief of the Wat Tha Phuay pagoda who fled from Cambodia to Sithandone Province of Laos, said "Those who do not obey Khmer Communist orders are executed." Monks are forced to leave their monasteries, forced to join the Army. (XAT LAO Newspaper, Vientiane Laos, August 9, 1974)

- On July 1, 1974 approximately 700 civilians and surrendered soldiers were executed at Ta Hen in Battambang Province by Khmer Communist. All inhabitants of Ta Hen were moving overland when they were ambushed by the Communists. About 75 people, mostly women and children, were killed in this initial contact. The remaining people all surrendered. Five minutes after the surrender, the Communists began firing indiscriminately into the group killing another 200 people.

Following that, all of those remaining men alive were marched away and then systematically executed as follows. The group was subdivided into two smaller groups: one made up of men, the other, women and children. The men were made to sit on the ground with their hands tied behind their backs. They were then executed by being stabbed with bayonets. The women and children were marched off and put to work in the fields. (source: Reports by U.S. Embassy officials who spoke to refugees who escaped from this group and Communist prisoners who admitted taking part in the atrocity.)

- Captured Communist orders reveal that the following actions will be carried out during attacks on Phnom Penh: "We will burn and destroy everything. For sure, we will burn down the markets, ration stocks, etc. We will kill politicians as well as officers, ministers, and national assembly members who have no way to defend themselves. We will use arson. We will burn homes and markets." (source: Captured Communist documents)

CAMBODIAN COMMUNIST LEADERSHIP

-- On 5 May 1970, two months after his ouster as Cambodia's Chief of State and subsequent arrival in Peking, Prince Norodom Sihanouk announced the formation of the Royal Government of National Union (GRUNK or RGNU) and its affiliated political front organization, the National United Front of Cambodia (FUNK).

-- As currently constituted, the RGNU is little more than a front for the Khmer Communist Party (KCP). Originally, the RGNU Cabinet was composed mainly of men who were based in Peking with Sihanouk and were either loyal to him or convinced that he would eventually triumph. More than half of the original 12 portfolios were held by individuals considered non-Communist in orientation.

-- In the intervening five years, the Communists have assumed control of the overwhelming majority of the Cabinet posts.

-- Fourteen of the seventeen Cabinet posts are held by people inside Cambodia who, except for the Justice Minister, Prince Norodom Phurissara, are probably all Communists.

-- Two of the three Cabinet members still based in Peking, Prime Minister Penn Nouth and Foreign Minister Sarin Chhak, are not Communists. Nouth, who is old and in poor health, is on the sidelines and has little influence. Khieu Samphan, the RGNU Deputy Prime Minister, who is in Cambodia, was appointed Acting Prime Minister in November 1973.

-- Many of the 13 Communists in the Cabinet are believed to be members of the KCP Central Committee. Khieu Samphan is apparently an important KCP officer, although his preeminence in the party has not been established.

-- A number of the RGNU Ministers have probably received training in North Vietnam and possibly also in the People's Republic of China.

-- All available evidence indicates that Khieu Samphan, Saloth Sar, Ieng Sary and Son Sen are the dominant figures on the Central Committee of the Khmer Communist Party. It does seem clear that Ieng Sary is Hanoi's man. While this present orientation is unclear, there is good reason to believe that the three principal RGNU figures Khieu Samphan, Hou Yuon and Hu Nim were installed by Hanoi in the spring of 1970. Hou Yuon is RGNU Minister of Interior and Hu Nim is Minister of Information.

-- Khieu Samphan, although holding the impressive titles of Army Commander-in-Chief and GRUNK Deputy Prime Minister, is probably neither the leading KCP figure nor the actual military commander.

August 3, 1973

Office of the White House Press Secretary

THE WHITE HOUSETEXT OF A LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT
TO SPEAKER CARL ALBERT
AND SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD

August 3, 1973

Dear Mr. Speaker:

By legislative action the Congress has required an end to American bombing in Cambodia on August 15th. The wording of the Cambodia rider is unmistakable; its intent is clear. The Congress has expressed its will in the form of law and the Administration will obey that law.

I cannot do so, however, without stating my grave personal reservations concerning the dangerous potential consequences of this measure. I would be remiss in my constitutional responsibilities if I did not warn of the hazards that lie in the path chosen by Congress.

Since entering office in January of 1969, I have worked ceaselessly to secure an honorable peace in Southeast Asia. Thanks to the support of the American people and the gallantry of our fighting men and allies, a ceasefire agreement in Vietnam and a political settlement in Laos have already been achieved. The attainment of a settlement in Cambodia has been the unremitting effort of this Administration, and we have had every confidence of being able to achieve that goal. With the passage of the Congressional act, the incentive to negotiate a settlement in Cambodia has been undermined, and August 15 will accelerate this process.

This abandonment of a friend will have a profound impact in other countries, such as Thailand, which have relied on the constancy and determination of the United States, and I want the Congress to be fully aware of the consequences of its action. For my part, I assure America's allies that this Administration will do everything permitted by Congressional action to achieve a lasting peace in Indochina. In particular, I want the brave and beleaguered Cambodian people to know that the end to the bombing in Cambodia does not signal an abdication of America's determination to work for a lasting peace in Indochina. We will continue to provide all possible support permitted under the law. We will continue to work for a durable peace with all the legal means at our disposal.

I can only hope that the North Vietnamese will not draw the erroneous conclusion from this Congressional action that they are free to launch a military offensive in other areas in Indochina. North Vietnam would be making a very dangerous error if it mistook the cessation of bombing in Cambodia for an invitation to fresh aggression or further violations of the Paris Agreements. The American people would respond to such aggression with appropriate action.

I have sent an identical letter to the Majority Leader of the Senate.

Sincerely,

RICHARD NIXON

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August 15, 1973

Office of the White House Press Secretary

NOTICE TO THE PRESS

Statement by Jerry Warren, August 15 Bombing Halt.

As you know, combat air operations by United States aircraft have ceased in Cambodia. In order clearly to explain our position concerning this action and to avoid any misunderstanding by others, I would like to make the following points:

-- As the President indicated in his letter to Congressional leaders on August 3, this Administration is terminating combat activity in Cambodia in compliance with a specific, direct and binding instruction from the Congress. The President continues to hold grave reservations about the wisdom of this legislative action. He is concerned that by its action the Congress has eliminated an important incentive for a negotiated settlement in Cambodia, has weakened the security of Cambodia's neighbors in Southeast Asia and has eroded the structure of peace in Indochina laid down in the agreements of January 27. Most importantly, this Congressional act undermines the prospects of world peace by raising doubts in the minds of both friends and adversaries concerning the resolve and capacity of the United States to stand by international agreements when they are violated by other parties.

-- While noting the dangers of this legislative action, the President most reluctantly accepted the August 15 cut-off date as a necessary compromise to avoid a major disruption in United States Government operations and to allow the Khmer Republic more time to adjust to the new situation. You will recall that at the time this law was enacted, the President faced the alternative of accepting a June 30 cut-off date or halting all governmental operations through a veto of the Appropriations Bill to which this legislation was attached. To have terminated immediately all combat support for the Khmer Republic in the face of a massive enemy attack would have been an irresponsible act depriving the Cambodian Government of the essential time to prepare for the future. In light of these extreme alternatives, the only viable course

was to reluctantly accept the date of August 15.

-- During the six weeks which have ensued, our combat air support coupled with Cambodian efforts to improve and strengthen their forces, have left the Khmer Republic in better shape to defend itself. We hope that the government will be able to defend itself and to hold its own against the insurgents and their North Vietnamese sponsors.

-- In the meantime, the United States will stand firmly with the Khmer Republic in facing the current challenge and will continue to provide the maximum amount of economic and military assistance permitted by present legal constraints.

-- We continue strongly to support a ceasefire through negotiations among the Khmer parties. An end to the fighting and respect for Cambodia's sovereignty and neutrality are our principal goals there. Despite the efforts of many interested parties and the goodwill of the Khmer Republic, the Communist side remains intransigently opposed to any compromise.

-- I should also recall the President's warning in his August 3 letter that the leaders of North Vietnam would be making a very dangerous error if they mistook the cessation of United States combat activity in Cambodia for an invitation to pursue a policy of aggression in Southeast Asia. It should be clearly understood in Hanoi that the President will work with Congress in order to take appropriate action if North Vietnam mounts an offensive which jeopardizes stability in Indochina and threatens to overturn the settlements reached after so much sacrifice by so many for so long.

Rm: FYI

12 February 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR CORRESPONDENTS

The Secretary of Defense has approved measures to implement, on a temporary basis, supplemental commercial cargo airlift for Cambodia which will augment Bird Air efforts. The purpose of this supplemental, entirely commercial, airlift is to provide as an interim measure the most vitally needed supplies for Cambodia until the Bird Air expansion levels have been reached. The added cost of \$1.2 million dollars for the commercial augmentation will be charged to the military assistance program and is within the prescribed MAP ceiling for Cambodia.

Further details will not be available until bids have been received from commercial carriers.

Q's and A's attached

Lee

- Q.1. Will these be U.S. flag carriers?
A.1. Yes.
- Q.2. How long will the supplemental commercial requirement be needed?
A.2. Approximately 10 days, with provisions for extension if necessary.
- Q.3. What is the total cost?
A.3. \$1.2 million has been granted; this includes ground handling support.
- Q.4. Will these planes stage from Thailand?
A.4. These arrangements are not yet firm.
- Q.5. What will they be carrying?
A.5. Ammunition.
- Q.6. What is the requirement these commercial planes are to fulfill?
A.6. Number of daily flights has not been determined.
- Q.7. How much is Bird Air supposed to deliver under the original Sep 74 contract and the Feb 75 contract modification?
A.7. As previously stated, up to 20 flights a day.
- Q.8. Why couldn't Bird Air handle this additional requirement?
A.8. Bird Air could not provide sufficient air crews rapidly enough to meet this immediate requirement.
- Q.9. Who pays for this contract?
A.9. It will be charged to the military assistance program.
- Q.10. What kind of aircraft will be used?
A.10. We won't know this until bids have been received from commercial carriers and a contract let.
- Q.11. Who is handling the contract arrangements?
A.11. The U.S. Air Force.

3

Following is text of letter dated February 14 being sent individually to all American citizens having dependents in Khmer Republic. This letter will also be posted in hotels where transient Americans are known to stay:

QUOTE: The Embassy wishes to express to all American citizens temporarily or permanently resident in the Khmer Republic its concern for their well-being and safety under current conditions prevailing in the country. As you are aware, hostilities are now taking place only a few kilometers from Phnom Penh and its airport; there have been a considerable number of rocket attacks against the city itself, and rocketing of the airport has led to the curtailment of all commercial international flights except those of Air Cambodge. Shortages of fuel, electricity, and other essential products for the consumer are apparent and are liable to continue for some time.

In view of the present situation, the Embassy has evacuated all of its dependents from Phnom Penh, and it is strongly recommended that you take steps to do likewise. We are very much aware of the good works which are performed by many of the American dependents in Phnom Penh. Prudent concern, however, for their safety and well-being must, we feel, outweigh such considerations.

We would also recommend that those Americans visiting here on tourist visas or who have no essential reason for being here at this time should make plans to leave as soon as possible.

The Embassy will be able for a limited period of time to assist you with transportation as far as Bangkok or to Saigon, if required. This will not preclude you having or obtaining valid passports and other travel documents; and the United States Government will not assume any financial or other obligation in connection with your travel. You may make inquiries regarding transportation by calling the United States Embassy (Telephone No. 24511, Ext. 143). For your own safety and welfare, we urge you to act now. UNQUOTE.

FEBRUARY 25, 1975

Office of the White House Press Secretary

THE WHITE HOUSELETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT TO
THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES

February 25, 1975

Dear Mr. Speaker:

I wish to convey to the House of Representatives my deep concern over the present critical situation in Cambodia. An independent Cambodia cannot survive unless the Congress acts very soon to provide supplemental military and economic assistance.

Unless such assistance is provided, the Cambodian army will run out of ammunition in less than a month.

The Cambodian people are totally dependent on us for their only means of resistance to aggression. The Communist forces now attacking have a constant, massive outside source of supply from the North as has been demonstrated by their ability to sustain the current heavy offensive.

If additional military assistance is withheld or delayed, the Government forces will be forced, within weeks, to surrender to the insurgents.

The economic situation is almost as difficult. Refugees forced to flee their homes by the Communists' repressive measures and scorched-earth policies have poured into Phnom Penh and other cities. Severe food shortages are already beginning. If the Congress does not provide for continued deliveries of rice and other essential supplies, millions of innocent people will suffer -- people who depend on us for their bare survival.

The Government of the Khmer Republic has demonstrated on countless occasions its willingness to negotiate a compromise political settlement to bring peace to its tormented land. It has been proven over the past two years that the progressive cutbacks of American support have only undercut the possibilities of negotiation by encouraging a ruthless enemy in the hope of obtaining a total victory.

These are the harsh realities which the Congress must bear in mind as it considers the Administration's request for supplemental assistance to Cambodia.

It has been a basic policy of this Government to give material support to friends and allies who are willing and able to carry the burden of their own self-defense. Cambodia is such an ally.

This is a moral question that must be faced squarely. Are we to deliberately abandon a small country in the midst of its life and death struggle? Is the United States, which so far has consistently stood by its friends through the most difficult of times, now to condemn, in effect a small Asian nation totally dependent upon us? We cannot escape this responsibility. Our national security and the integrity of our alliances depend upon our reputation as a reliable partner. Countries around the world who depend on us for support -- as well as their foes. will judge our performance. It is in this spirit and with this sense of responsibility, Mr. Speaker, that I urge rapid and favorable action on my request for additional assistance to Cambodia.

Sincerely,

/s/ Gerald R. Ford

Honorable Carl Albert
Speaker of the House of Representatives
Washington, D.C.

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CAMBODIA PERSPECTIVE

A number of erroneous allegations are frequently made by opponents of U.S. assistance to Cambodia. The following are some of the basic facts ignored by those who make these allegations:

I. Cambodia, the Communists and Sihanouk - to 1969

Warfare in Cambodia did not begin in 1970 with the fall of Prince Sihanouk or with the Cambodia Incursion, as some critics allege. Rather, as Prince Sihanouk has repeatedly pointed out in the past, the war in Cambodia results from the campaign conducted for many years by the North Vietnamese, and the Cambodian Communists they direct, to impose a Communist system on Cambodia by force.

II. Sihanouk and the U. S. Bombing in Cambodia - 1969

Some critics alleged that the U. S. bombing begun against the North Vietnamese base areas in Cambodia in 1969 marked a unilateral American escalation of the war and was undertaken without Prince Sihanouk's permission. In fact, however, the bombing (which was kept secret at Sihanouk's insistence) was undertaken with Sihanouk's acquiescence and reflected a response to intensified Communist attacks in South Vietnam and Cambodia. Following the initiation of the bombing, Cambodia's relations with the U. S. substantially improved and Sihanouk restored diplomatic relations with the United States.

III. The Fall of Sihanouk, the Cambodia Incursion and New Elections in Cambodia - 1970-1972

Some critics allege that the United States overthrew Prince Sihanouk, put Lon Nol into power and expanded the war with the Cambodia Incursion in 1970. In fact, however, Lon Nol was appointed Prime Minister of Cambodia in August 1969 by Prince Sihanouk, Sihanouk was deposed by the unanimous vote of the Cambodian parliament in March 1970, and the Incursion of May/June 1970 was a limited response to major Communist offensives in South Vietnam and Cambodia and to Cambodia's appeals for help. Subsequently, a new Constitution was written and new elections were held in Cambodia for the Parliament and the Presidency. In the 1972 elections, Lon Nol won a competitive three-man race and became President of the Khmer Republic.

IV. The Paris Accords, the UN Resolution and Other Steps for Peace in Cambodia -- All Rejected by the Communist Side

A number of major efforts have been made to obtain peace in Cambodia. These efforts include the Paris Accords of January 27, 1973 (underwritten by an International Guarantor Conference and the UN), the Cambodian Government's cease-fire proposals of January 28, 1973 and the initiation of a U. S. bombing halt on the same date; the Cambodian Government's peace proposals of March 6, 1973, July 6, 1973 and July 9, 1974; the Cambodia bombing halt of August 15, 1973; and the United Nations Resolution of November 29, 1974. Regretably, each of these public efforts and all other efforts, including the special, private U. S. efforts cited by the Administration on March 5, 1975, have all been rejected by the Communist side.

V. The Current Communist Role in Cambodia

The North Vietnamese and the Cambodian Communists they equip and control have rejected all negotiations and are continuing their massive violation of the Paris Accords forbidding foreign troop presence, of the United Nations Resolution calling for negotiations and of internationally accepted humanitarian standards. As Sihanouk often has pointed out, the North Vietnamese Communists direct this war -- some 10,000 North Vietnamese combat and logistics cadre in Cambodia are currently buttressing the insurgents. The Communists are waging a total war against Cambodia's civilian population with a degree of systematic terror perhaps unparalleled since the Nazi period -- a clear precursor of the blood bath and Stalinist dictatorship they intend to impose on the Cambodian people.

Cambodia PerspectiveTHE PARIS ACCORDS, THE UN RESOLUTION AND OTHER STEPS
FOR PEACE IN CAMBODIA -- ALL REJECTED BY THE COMMUNIST SIDE

A number of major efforts have been made to obtain peace in Cambodia. These efforts include the Paris Accords of January 27, 1973 (underwritten by an International Guarantor Conference and the UN), the Cambodian Government's cease-fire proposals of January 28, 1973 and the initiation of a U.S. bombing halt on the same date; the Cambodian Government's peace proposals of March 6, 1973, July 6, 1973 and July 9, 1974; the Cambodia bombing halt of August 15, 1973; and the United Nations Resolution of November 29, 1974. Regretably, each of these public efforts and all other efforts, including the special, private U.S. efforts cited by the Administration on March 5, 1975, have all been rejected by the Communist side.

1. The Paris Accords of January 1973 - Article 20

The Paris Accords of January 27, 1973 established an international framework for peace in Indochina, including Cambodia. The Accords were signed by North Vietnam and the three other parties to the Vietnam conflict, including the United States. They were underwritten by eight guarantor nations, including the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, France and Great Britain in the presence and with the support of the Secretary General of the United Nations.

Article 20 of the Paris Accords called for an end to all foreign military activities in Cambodia, for the withdrawal of all foreign military personnel from Cambodia (there were some 40,000 North Vietnamese troops there at the time), and for the cessation of the use of Cambodian territory to encroach on neighboring countries. (Similar provisions applied in Laos.)

2. A Cease-Fire and Negotiations Proposed by the Cambodian Government -- Rejected by the Communist Side - January 1973

In the spirit of the Paris Accords, the Cambodian Government took what was surely a dramatic step for peace in Cambodia. Following the signing of the Accords on January 27, 1973, the Cambodian Government with full U.S. support on January 28, 1973 unilaterally stopped all offensive operations and urged the Communist side to join in a cease fire. They also offered to negotiate with any authorized representative of the other side and they undertook to explore other channels that might bring peace to their war-torn country.

At the same time, the United States stopped all bombing operations in Cambodia for one week.

The Communist side rejected these steps and thousands of North Vietnamese troops stepped up their attacks together with the insurgent forces they equipped and directed. As a result, the Cambodian armed forces were compelled to continue to defend Cambodian towns and supply lines being attacked and the Cambodian Government had to seek continued U. S. military assistance .

3. Other Steps for Peace and Communist Rejections

Other major steps for peace undertaken by the Government of Cambodia and by other parties include the following, all rejected by the Communists:

-- On March 6, 1973 the Cambodian Government broadcast an invitation to North Vietnam to begin negotiations anywhere on the withdrawal of Hanoi's troops from Cambodia in accordance with the Paris and Geneva Accords and to discuss the exchange of prisoners. (The Communists rejected these proposals and stepped up their attacks.)

-- The June 13, 1973 Joint Communiqué signed by North Vietnam and the United States reaffirmed Article 20 of the Paris Accords.

-- On July 6, 1973, Cambodian Foreign Minister Long Boret announced a six-point peace plan calling for (1) an immediate cease-fire, (2) talks with the other side on a cease-fire and on national reconciliation, (3) the implementation of Article 20 of the Paris Accords, (4) the withdrawal of all foreign forces, (5) the reactivation of the International Control Commission established at the Geneva Conference of 1954, (6) assistance from the United Nations and the signatories of the International Guarantor Conference protocol on the Paris Accords. (The Communist side on July 10 rejected this initiative, with Sihanouk adding that he would refuse to meet with Dr. Kissinger during the latter's projected trip to Peking.)

-- On August 15, 1973, following legislation passed on July 3, by the U. S. Congress, all U. S. bombing ceased throughout Cambodia, a step described by many American critics as likely to encourage negotiations. (In Peking, Khmer Cambodian leader Penn Nouth described the bombing halt as a victory for his side, but warned of the danger that the halt would increase pressure for negotiation, compromise and national concord, all of which he rejected as unacceptable.

-- On August 29, 1973 and on December 28, 1974 and on several subsequent occasions, the Cambodian Government repeated its negotiations proposal of July 6, 1973, but the Communist side continued to reject these efforts.

-- On July 9, 1974 the Cambodian Government called for unconditional negotiations with the other side at any time and in any place. This offer dropped the Cambodian Government's July 1973 requirements for a cease-fire, withdrawal of foreign troops and reactivation of the ICC prior to the beginning of peace talks. (The Communist side categorically rejected this proposal, ruling out any talks whatsoever.)

-- On November 29, 1974 the General Assembly of the United Nations once again rejected the claims of Sihanouk and the Cambodian Communists and voted to retain the Cambodian Government (the Government of the Khmer Republic) as Cambodia's official representative in the United Nations. At the same time, the Assembly called on "powers influencing the two parties...to use their good offices for conciliation..." and asked the UN Secretary General to consult and to lend assistance to the contending parties in bringing peace to Cambodia. (Sihanouk and the Cambodian Communists totally rejected the UN's call for negotiation, terming the UN resolution gross interference in their affairs.)

4. The Current Negotiation Situation - March 1975

It must be noted that the Cambodian Government welcomed the UN resolution and has continued to reaffirm its July 1974 proposal for unconditional negotiations. In addition, Cambodia's President, Lon Nol, has confirmed his personal readiness to take any step which would be productive of negotiations bringing peace to Cambodia.

Regretably, all efforts by the Cambodian Government, the United Nations, the United States and other parties, have thus far been categorically rejected by the other side. These efforts include the special private American efforts made public by the Administration on March 5, 1975. *

Instead of responding with reciprocal steps for peace, the Communist side has stepped up its terror offensives. The Communists assert that cuts in American assistance to Cambodia assure their side a total victory and that they thus do not need to negotiate with Cambodia's non-Communist leaders, at least seven of whom they have publicly consigned to the gallows.

In spite of the Communist side's intransigence, the Administration and the Cambodian Government will continue to make every possible effort for peace in Cambodia. They believe, however, that the other side will have little, if any, incentive to negotiate if the American Congress unilaterally cuts off Cambodia's defenders at their knees.

* See Attachment for summary of these U.S. efforts.

THE CURRENT COMMUNIST ROLE IN CAMBODIA

The North Vietnamese and the Cambodian Communists they equip and control have rejected all negotiations and are continuing their massive violation of the Paris Accords forbidding foreign troop presence, of the United Nations Resolution calling for negotiations and of internationally accepted humanitarian standards. As Sihanouk often has pointed out, the North Vietnamese Communists direct this war -- some 10,000 North Vietnamese combat and logistics cadre in Cambodia are currently buttressing the insurgents. The Communists are waging a total war against Cambodia's civilian population with a degree of systematic terror perhaps unparalleled since the Nazi period -- a clear precursor of the blood bath and Stalinist dictatorship they intend to impose on the Cambodian people.

1. The Communist Violations of the Paris Accords

Although Article 20 of the Paris Accords of January 27, 1973 provided for the cessation of fighting by foreign troops in Cambodia, for their withdrawal from Cambodia and for the territorial integrity of Cambodia and her neighbors, the North Vietnamese completely ignored the Accords.

-- The North Vietnamese and the Cambodian Communists did not reciprocate the Cambodian Government's action of January 28, 1973 ceasing offensive operations and calling for a cease-fire and they did not respond to the U.S. bombing halt initiated on the same date.

-- In violation of the Paris Accords, the North Vietnamese have continued to maintain many thousands of their forces in Cambodia and they continued to direct the militant strategy and to underwrite the stepped up offensives of the Cambodian Communists. They are thus snubbing the Paris Agreements and the parties to the International Guarantor Conference and the United Nations which underwrote the Agreements.

2. The Current North Vietnamese Role in Cambodia

The North Vietnamese Communists continue their control and direction of the Cambodian Communist insurgency. Hanoi supplies the insurgencies essential war materiel and its logistics cadre move these supplies to the front. Through their long-time control of the insurgency's principal cadres it directs the militant strategy being carried out by the insurgents.

-- As of January 1975, an estimated 10,000 Vietnamese Communist troops were permanently stationed inside Cambodia. These included some 2,000 North Vietnamese infantry "liaison" cadre working directly with Cambodian Communist combat units and targeted on Cambodian operations. They also included some 7,000 administrative/logistics personnel and some 1,000 Viet Cong troops backing up the insurgent's war effort.

-- The North Vietnamese continue to provide vast quantities of ammunition, artillery, mines and other military hardware. This aid is massive and vital as Sihanouk noted in a telegram of February 15, 1975 to Hanoi's Premier Phan Van Dong following Sihanouk's recent visit to Hanoi. In the telegram, which was broadcast over the Cambodian Communists' radio from Hanoi on February 21, 1975, Sihanouk expressed the Insurgent's gratitude, saying: "The Democratic Republic of Vietnam has constantly provided the most important multiform support and assistance as a timely and powerful contribution to the victory of our national liberation struggle."

-- The Cambodian Communist cadre taken to North Vietnam in the 1950's and the three leading pro-Communists who left Sihanouk's government for Hanoi in the mid-sixties (Khieu Samphan, Hou Youn and Hu Nim) are dependent upon and obedient to Hanoi's directives. They, not Sihanouk, who often called them traitors and country-sellers, are in charge of implementing Hanoi's policies in Cambodia. It should be noted that the Insurgent's Front first surfaced in Hanoi in 1970 and that its radio and some of its cadre training facilities are in North Vietnam.

-- In the large base areas they occupy, especially in eastern Cambodia and which they are in some cases colonizing and collectivizing via Vietnamese families brought from North Vietnam, The Vietnamese Communists rule the local Cambodian population in a rigid Stalinist pattern, press-ganging the people and killing and terrorizing peasants and monks. Occasional uprisings against them, sometimes even involving local insurgent units, are suppressed ruthlessly by the North Vietnamese forces.

3. The Cambodian Communist Leadership

The formal organizations on the insurgent side are the Royal Government of National Union (GRUNK or RGNU) and its affiliated political front, the National United Front of Cambodia (FUNK) formed in 1970 in Peking and Hanoi. As currently constituted, both are little more than fronts for the Khmer Communist Party (KCP).

-- Originally, the RGNU cabinet was composed mainly of men based in Peking with Sihanouk and loyal to him. More than half of the original 12 Cabinet portfolios were held by individuals considered non-Communist in orientation.

-- Especially since November 1973, when the portfolios of most of the Peking-based RGNU cabinet members were reassigned to the "Resistance of the Interior" i. e. the pro-Hanoi Communists in Cambodia, the Communists have assumed virtually total control of the RGNU cabinet. Of the RGNU's seventeen current cabinet posts, fourteen are now held by the Cambodia-based insurgents. Of these, all except one, Prince Norodom Phurissara, are considered Communists and are believed to be members of the KCP's Central Committee.

-- The KCP's Central Committee's leading figures include Khieu Samphan, Hou Youn, Hu Nim, Saloth Sar, Son Sen and Ieng Sary. Ieng Sary, who is thought to be Hanoi's man, is constantly with Sihanouk in Peking in a watchdog role much resented by Sihanouk.

-- Three of the seventeen cabinet members are still based in Peking with Prince Sihanouk. Two of these are considered not to be Communists -- Penn Nouth, who is old, in poor health and with little influence, and Foreign Minister Sarin Chhak. Although Penn Nouth was the nominal RGNU Prime Minister, in fact the Deputy Prime Minister, Khieu Samphan, who leads the insurgents in Cambodia, has been Acting Prime Minister since November 1973.

-- Sihanouk's role in relation to the Cambodian Communists is clearly one of little influence. While the Communists are currently exploiting him as an international figurehead, they have little use for his princely ways and his neutralist predilections. Sihanouk, who has frequently stated that he would have no power in a Communist Cambodia, has noted that: "the RGNU is now Red Khmer and the power already belongs to the Cambodian Communist Party." (September 26, 1970). Sihanouk has described his own probable fate with the Communists as follows: "when they no longer need me they will spit me out like a cherry pit" (July 20, 1973). As Sihanouk has noted: "If I go on as chief of state after victory, I run the risk of being pushed out the window by the Communists, like Masaryk, or that I might be imprisoned for revisionism or deviationism..." (December 10, 1971)

4. Cambodian Communist Terror

The record of the indiscriminate terror attacks launched by the Communist forces against Cambodia's civilian population is by now widely known to the world. It is perhaps unparalleled since the Nazi era.

The evidence of Communist terrorism is massive. The press and television each day bring vivid new examples of the villages, towns, schools, market places, hospitals, pagodas and refugee camps which are the daily targets of the Communists' terror attacks. Additionally, eyewitness accounts tell of the widespread terrorism and executions carried out by the Cambodian Communists in the so-called "liberated" areas.

The fate of all Cambodians is now at stake. The evidence is clear that a large-scale blood bath -- far larger than anything thus far in the war -- would surely be the Communists' policy following a Communist victory in Cambodia.

CAMBODIA BACKGROUND

The Fall of Prince Sihanouk and the Cambodia Incursion

1. Sihanouk Appoints Lon Nol as Prime Minister - August 1969

During the fall of 1969, some 40,000 North Vietnamese troops were illegally occupying Eastern Cambodia at the southern terminus of the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The road from the port of Sihanoukville to the Parrot's Beak area near South Vietnam was a logistics highway for the Communist forces. At the same time, North Vietnamese cadre were directing the developing insurgency of the Communist Cambodians, the Khmer Rouge, against the government of Prince Norodom Sihanouk.

The increasing Communist pressure and a deteriorating economic situation led Prince Sihanouk in August 1969 to appoint Lon Nol, a widely recognized and effective Cambodian general, as his Prime Minister. Lon Nol was given a mandate by Sihanouk to deal with Cambodia's pressing problems.

In January 1970 Sihanouk decided to leave his hard-pressed country for a period of several months of rest and relaxation in Europe. In Cambodia meanwhile, the Communist pressure increased and the mood of the Cambodians called for steps against the Communist forces. Sihanouk echoed this Cambodian mood on March 13, 1970, announcing in Paris that: "I am going to Moscow and Peking to ask them to curb the activities of the Viet Cong and the Viet Minh North Vietnamese in my country."

2. The Vote Against Sihanouk - March 1970

In Cambodia, Sihanouk's parliament and the general population were distressed by Sihanouk's continued ineffectiveness and his long absence. Following a number of anti-Sihanouk demonstrations in Phnom Penh, the Cambodian National Assembly and the Council of the Kingdom, in a joint plenary session, voted unanimously, on March 18, 1970, to remove the still absent Sihanouk from his duties as Chief of State. Their vote was 92 to 0. The deposition was legal and highly popular throughout Cambodia. In accordance with the Cambodian Constitution, Lon Nol continued as Prime Minister and as Minister of Defense.

3. Communist Offensives and Cambodia's Call for Help -
March/April 1970

Following Sihanouk's overthrow, the Cambodian Government appealed to the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops to leave Cambodian territory. But the Vietnamese Communists responded by stepping up their attacks and moving out of their base areas toward Cambodia's population centers. In March and April, Hanoi ordered major attacks throughout Eastern Cambodia and the Communist forces also threatened to cut off the routes leading to the capital, Phnom Penh. Cambodia urgently needed help.

4. The Cambodia Incursion - May/June 1970

In the face of these Communist offensives, Cambodia appealed to the world for help. It was in this context, of stepped-up Communist offensives and of Cambodia's appeal, as well as in the context of the Vietnamization program -- which involved the substantial phased withdrawals of U.S. forces from South Vietnam -- that the Cambodia incursion of May and June 1970 took place and that the U.S. military assistance program for Cambodia began.

The U.S. and South Vietnamese forces countered the Communists' offensives by conducting a limited incursion for a limited time (30 kilometers and 60 days) against the North Vietnamese base areas along the Cambodian/South Vietnamese border. Even under those restrictions, these operations were a serious setback for the Communist forces both in Cambodia and in South Vietnam; they ensured the continued phase-down of U.S. forces under the Vietnamization program.

Ron —

hon Nol was
democratically elected
first president of the
Khmer Republic in
June 1972 with 55% of
the vote. He had
two opponents. It was
a perfectly legit.
contested election.

3. BEGIN TEXT. AMERICAN EMBASSY PHNOM PENH PRESS RELEASE.
THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IS ISSUING THIS STATEMENT TODAY,
MARCH 3, TO CORRECT A COMPLETELY ERRONEOUS STORY FILED
FROM PHNOM PENH BY UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL REGARDING
THE AMERICAN RICE AIRLIFT AND THE RICE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM.
THE STORY ALLEGED THAT THE KHMER REPUBLIC GOVERNMENT HAD
ISSUED A DECISION RESTRICTING RICE BEING AIRLIFTED INTO

PHNOM PENH BY THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT TO CAMBODIAN
SOLDIERS AND THEIR FAMILIES. THIS STORY IS WITHOUT
ANY FOUNDATION IN FACT, AS THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WILL
MAKE CLEAR.

THUS FAR NO RICE WHICH HAS BEEN AIRLIFTED INTO PHNOM
PENH (THE AIRLIFT BEGAN FEB 27) HAS BEEN DISTRIBUTED TO
ANYONE. IT IS ALL BEING STORED, THROUGH A COMPLETELY
CIVILIAN OPERATION, IN SONEXIM WAREHOUSES, WITH VERIFICATION
BY THE SOCIETE GENERALE DE SURVEILLANCE UNDER A
CONTRACT WITH USAID. THIS AIRLIFTED RICE WILL NOT
BEGIN TO BE DISTRIBUTED UNTIL SONEXIM'S PRE-AIRLIFT
STOCKS OF LOCALLY-PRODUCED AND IMPORTED AMERICAN RICE
HAVE BEEN EXHAUSTED. WHEN THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE
AIRLIFTED RICE BEGINS, IT WILL BE COMPLETELY IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM CURRENTLY IN
EFFECT, AS DETAILED IN THE PARAGRAPH BELOW.
DURING FEBRUARY OFFICIAL RICE DISTRIBUTION IN PHNOM
PENH AVERAGED 570 METRIC TONS PER DAY. THE RICE
WAS SOLD TO THE FOLLOWING CATEGORIES OF PEOPLE IN THE
AVERAGE QUANTITIES SHOWN:

MILITARY AND THEIR DEPENDENTS--200 METRIC TONS

CIVIL SERVANTS AND THEIR DEPENDENTS--70 METRIC TONS

REST OF CIVIL POPULATION--280 METRIC TONS

THE REMAINING APPROXIMATELY 20 METRIC TONS PER DAY ARE
DISTRIBUTED FREE OF CHARGE TO REFUGEES BY THE SEVERAL
VOLUNTARY AGENCIES WORKING IN THE KHMER REPUBLIC.
WE HAVE CHECKED WITH SONEXIM (THE PURCHASER AND STORER
OF RICE) AND OFFINACO (THE DISTRIBUTOR OF RICE), AND
NEITHER ONE HAS RECEIVED ANY ORDER FROM ANYONE CHANGING
THE CURRENT OR FUTURE RICE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM
OR PATTERN.

ONCE AGAIN THE EMBASSY IS OBLIGED TO REQUEST ITS
FRIENDS IN THE PRESS TO CHECK THEIR FACTS WITH THE
EMBASSY BEFORE FILING STORIES INVOLVING U.S. GOVERNMENT
ACTIVITIES IN CAMBODIA. WE ARE WILLING TO RESPOND
TO QUERIES AT ANY TIME IN AN EFFORT TO AVOID THE
MUTUALLY EMBARRASSING INACCURATE STORIES SUCH
AS THE ONE FILED IN THIS INSTANCE.

DEAN

BT

Congressional Restrictions on US Assistance to Cambodia

Until early 1970, Cambodia had remained relatively free of the conflict with North Vietnam in which Laos and South Vietnam were engaged, although North Vietnamese troops had used Cambodian territory for many years in that conflict. Following the removal of Prince Sihanouk, ^{by unanimous vote of the parliament} the Cambodian Government reaffirmed its neutrality and sought to negotiate the withdrawal of Communist troops. Faced with a Cambodian Government no longer willing to acquiesce in their presence, the North Vietnamese troops launched a direct assault on the country, and began to expand their control in the eastern and southern portions of the country from which the war against South Vietnam had long been supplied and directed. Repeated requests by the Cambodian Government for negotiations with Hanoi were rebuffed. At the same time the United States, desiring to support and protect Cambodian neutrality and territorial integrity, responded to Cambodia's appeals for military supplies to enable it to resist the increasing North Vietnamese attacks.

Following the withdrawal of American troops from Cambodia in mid-1970, the Cambodian Government moved with courage and resilience to assume the burden of their self-defense effort. A new Constitution was adopted, internal political reforms undertaken, and with the help of

its neighbors, South Vietnam and Thailand, Cambodia was able to utilize American material support to expand its armed forces from under 40,000 in March 1970 to nearly 200,000 in early 1971. The United States also supplied limited air support at the request of the Cambodian Government against enemy troop concentrations, supplies and lines of communication in Cambodia.

The signing of the Vietnam Peace Accords in January 1973 raised new hopes for Cambodia. That Agreement provided for the cessation of military activities and the withdrawal of all foreign troops in Cambodia. On January 28, the Cambodian Government ordered a ceasefire and repeated its offers for direct, unconditional negotiations for a settlement. The United States accordingly suspended its air operations in support of Cambodian forces. But the Communist side rebuffed this gesture as it has all subsequent efforts by the government to negotiate an end to the fighting.

In contrast to the United States, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, which had long been allies of the United States, had not been involved in the Vietnam conflict. The United States had been the only major power to supply military aid to South Vietnam, and the Soviet Union and China had been the only major powers to supply military aid to North Vietnam. The United States had been the only major power to supply military aid to South Vietnam, and the Soviet Union and China had been the only major powers to supply military aid to North Vietnam. The United States had been the only major power to supply military aid to South Vietnam, and the Soviet Union and China had been the only major powers to supply military aid to North Vietnam.

REF ID: A66048

March 3, 1975

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Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger
Interviewed by Newsmen
Following Appearance
Before House Budget Committee
Wednesday, March 6, 1975

Q: Mr. Secretary, you were asked this morning about Thailand's request that U.S. forces be withdrawn from that area, and you referred to that as I understand it as an anticipatory domino. Could you explain what you meant by that?

A: That was something of a pun as you recognize. It is clear that the Thais have taken the attitude or expressed the attitude that they do not expect the United States to live by its commitments in Southeast Asia. I trust that they're wrong on that score; that the forces in Southeast Asia can never be employed again because of the Congressional mandate and as a consequence they do not put much confidence in the American commitment. They have drawn their own conclusions. In referring earlier to the overly discredited domino theory, I refer to this as an anticipatory domino.

Q: Mr. Secretary, House action yesterday apparently made it unlikely for emergency aid to be approved by Congress before April 1, before the deadline. Do you agree with that assessment and if so, what will that do to the entire picture in Cambodia?

A: I would hope that we could get the aid before April 1. Unless we have additional assistance in Cambodia, Phnom Penh must inevitably fall because of the lack of ammunition.

Q: But do you agree that the action yesterday may have put that beyond the scope of possibility?

A: I do not know. I have not been to the office this morning as yet so I have not had an opportunity to review the legislative situation. You fellows have the advantage over me.

Q: One of our commercial flights was hit today in the rice airlift. Have you heard about that? What is your reaction to that, sir? If we lose lives over there -- if American lives are lost in this commercial airlift, what should our reaction be to that?

A: I think that I'll have to go back and review just what the precise circumstances are. We expect that the FANK should be able to provide reasonable security for Pouchentong airport and it is incumbent upon them to do so.

Q: What if they can't and we lose a plane, we lose people?

A: As I indicated, we will have to consider our policies in this context.

Q: What would that policy be, sir?

A: Well, as I indicated, we would have to consider the range of options.

Q: Mr. Secretary, the Pentagon always has a way of finding money out of some pocket when you're in a tight situation. What is your absolute deadline for Congressional action providing this additional aid?

A: It is very near term.

Q: April 1?

A: I hesitate to say that so late a date would permit us to take the appropriate response.

MORE

Q: Mr. Secretary, there's a story that apparently has come out of sources of the Pentagon bearing the evacuation plan for Cambodia. It mentions the use of Marines. Under what circumstances would we use troops in Cambodia to protect our citizens?

A: We always have contingency plans and it's the obligation of the Government to protect the lives of Americans. We would be prepared under circumstances to use the Marines to extricate Americans if the need arises.

Q: There apparently is a carrier in the Gulf of Thailand with helicopters and Marines, etc. Can you confirm that and tell us when they might be employed and how?

A: I prefer that you address that question to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs). I do not know the present state of classified information. We do not normally comment on operations.

Q: If they can't secure their airport in Phnom Penh, how close are they to employing troops to bring our people out?

A: I can't answer that question.

Q: Mr. Secretary, how vital to the American national interest is the survival of the Lon Nol government in Cambodia?

A: I think that it is very important that if the regime goes down, that it be perceived to go down as a result of something other than the failure of the United States to provide the necessary resources. If the regime fails through ineptitude, that is an entirely different set of circumstances from what might be read as American faithlessness.

Q: Would that go to the national interest; would that be a vital part of our national interest if they drew that conclusion, if our Allies said that we couldn't meet our commitment?

A: Of course. Unquestionably, the position of the United States, the estimate of the world for its creditability and fidelity is an important asset of the United States not to be lightly sacrificed.

E N D

March 10, 1975

DISCUSSION ON CAMBODIA
WITH RON NESSEN
AND MEMBERS OF THE PRESS

3:00 P.M. EDT

MR. NESSEN: The reason I did considerable research on Cambodia today was primarily because I thought there would be interest in Hubert Humphrey's statement that he had seen some cables which indicated to him that he thought that the Embassy in Phnom Penh was saying, that even with the aid there was no hope for saving Cambodia, and that is not right.

I think the strongest thing that my research showed today was that what the President and Kissinger and others have been saying publicly is precisely what the Embassy has been saying privately; that is, to sort of sum it up, that without additional aid, there is no likelihood that Cambodia will survive this dry season, that with the aid there is a chance that they will survive, and it is very difficult to put the odds on what the chances are.

It is possible that a 50-50 chance with the aid might be right, but it is a reasonable chance that they will survive this dry season if they get the additional aid.

Q Survive in what time frame, Ron?

MR. NESSEN: I say through this dry season and into the rainy season.

Q There is no accuracy saying June 15?

MR. NESSEN: You know, it varies, really, but somewhere.

Q Mid-June?

MR. NESSEN: Yes.

Q More like late or early July in Cambodia?

MR. NESSEN: Yes. Steve has been there. He knows about it.

The circumstances in which Humphrey saw the cables were that he met with Phil Habib and he was shown some cables.

Q You mean at the Hill or somewhere else?

MR. NESSEN: I believe he went to the State Department, although I am not absolutely sure of where the meeting was.

I think it is fair to say that the President has seen all the cables and other reports relating to the situation in Cambodia, and it is based on that that he has said publicly that without aid, there is no chance of survival; with aid there is a reasonable chance of survival, and that the purpose of this aid is not to enable the government there to win a military victory, but the purpose of the aid there is to convince the rebels that they cannot win a military victory.

There are indications that the rebels are having trouble with their own resupply problems and manpower problems, and the hope is that if the Cambodian government can survive this dry season and into the wet season that there would then be an incentive for the rebels to negotiate a settlement, and I say that is a hope that that would happen.

Q Where are you getting the rebel assessment?
Their own problems?

MR. NESSEN: That has been reported from the Embassy in Phnom Penh.

Q Supply and what was the other?

MR. HUSHEN: Manpower, I think.

Q Are they having supply problems?

MR. NESSEN: This is just more generally worded that the rebels have been weakened.

Q By what?

MR. NESSEN: By their own losses.

Q That is from a cable?

MR. NESSEN: Yes.

Q Ron, hasn't the Administration in fact been having two positions? One is a private position that it is possible to save the government into the rainy season, but it is a long-shot and that if the Administration would like to take the public position, as the President stated, a reasonable chance. Now, there is a lot of difference in that.

MR. NESSEN: I know that John and I want to assure you that it is not true.

Q Don't say that unless you know what you are talking about, about what has been said on the Hill in committees by Schlesinger and Kissinger and others.

MR. HUSHEN: I think the President echoed that view in his press conference.

MR. NESSEN: Let's go off the record here.

(Off-the-record discussion.)

MR. NESSEN: Back on the record.

Q Ron, can you tell us if there is anything in the wind for any change in the administration in Phnom Penh? Would that make negotiation more likely?

MR. NESSEN: You know, I think the government here in the United States has always taken the position that that is something for the Cambodians to decide, and I think the President -- I mean, if you read his statement the other night, and I think he emphasized it again in answer to a question, he said the personalities should not or would not stand in the way of a settlement.

Q Has there been any pressure, though, from our Embassy and representatives there to suggest that?

MR. NESSEN: I am not aware of that. One thing to keep in mind here -- and I have been meaning to do this for a couple of days, but the question never seemed to come up -- is how Lon Nol came to power. There is a feeling that somehow Lon Nol is a military dictator who seized power. The fact of the matter is that Lon Nol was appointed Prime Minister by Sihanouk, if you recall, in August of 1969.

Sihanouk appointed Lon Nol to be Prime Minister, and then on March 18, 1970, the National Assembly of Cambodia voted Sihanouk out of office as chief of state. That was during one of his frequent absences. The vote was 92 to zero, and that is considered to have been a legal deposing of Sihanouk.

The Cambodians do have a constitution, and under that constitution, Lon Nol, who had been appointed by Sihanouk, stayed on as Prime Minister and Defense Minister.

Lon Nol was then elected as the first President of the Khmer Republic in June 1972. He had two opponents in that election, it was a contested election, and he got 55 percent of the votes. The other two opponents got 45 percent of the vote, so it was not any sort of put up deal where he won 99 percent of the votes.

The only reason I mention that is that he is a legally and constitutionally elected leader of that country, and they do have a constitution and laws and ways of changing their government, and the United States feels it is up to them if they want to now.

You know, you have seen some of the moves that their Parliament has made in the past few days, so they do have the machinery to do that if they want to do it, and it should not be up to the United States to depose a legally elected President of Cambodia.

Q Lon Nol did come in with a big burst of public support if you are talking about the Phnom Penh intellectual-leadership-oriented public. Nonetheless, the parliament you are talking about now is a very different animal. It is a rubber stamp organization made up of people who have, like Lon Nol, been declared candidates for a firing squad by the other side which brings me back to my question that I asked the other day at the briefing.

Just this whole idea that if ever a man violated a public trust and threw away the support of all his countrymen, here is your prime example. The rampant corruption in that regime, the troops that cannot get paid, all the other things that are documented over and over again, Lon Nol does not have that kind of support anymore; in fact, when I was there the North Vietnamese had to do all the fighting for them or the Viet Cong coming over from the other side -- now they have pulled clear back.

When we were there, you could not get a Cambodian to pick up arms with them except for a few hundred Khmer Rouge up in the Elephant Mountains, and now you have Cambodians running around all over the country trying to throw him out.

MR. NESSEN: Well, they have a method, Steve, and they have a constitution. Just by analogy and nothing more, remember all the flack there was in charges that the United States had overthrown the legitimately elected government of Chile.

You certainly would not want the United States Government to be accused of overthrowing another legitimately elected government.

Q Has the President changed his position on this at all since Hubert Humphrey told him that he could not support him on this?

MR. NESSEN: John, the President truly is doing what he believes right and I think he is doing it in an unemotional and non-strident way. He has weighted the facts and read the cables and talked to people and he truly believes that what he is doing is right.

Q Has the President objected outright to the suggestion by Representative McCloskey that enough aid be given to hold the perimeter and have a mass evacuation of Phnom Penh?

MR. NESSEN: I have not heard it discussed.

Q Without having any role in Lon Nol's overthrow, doesn't the President think that the U.S., at some point, can say, "Given the conduct of your government, any commitment we have no longer exists." Don't we at least have the right to say we don't or do give you more aid based on your performance?

MR. NESSEN: Well, Steve, about the performance, the Embassy in Phnom Penh has looked into the matter and the last figures that are available -- and granted, this is a somewhat tightly based survey -- but it goes to some of the things you asked about.

In the month of February, there were 570 metric tons of rice distributed a day in Phnom Penh. Military and their dependents got 200 metric tons of that. Civil servants and their dependents got 70 metric tons of that and the rest of the civilian population got 280 metric tons of that. The remaining 20 metric tons a day were distributed free of charge to refugees by various voluntary agencies.

Q Is this a denial that large amounts of our aid of that nature ends up on the black market of inflated prices, the kind of thing that has triggered the anti-Chinese riots in Battambang?

MR. NESSEN: I just don't know enough about that, Steve, except that the Embassy has looked into it to this extent and I thought I would pass this along to you.

Q Ron, can you tell us who the President conferred with in drawing up this statement that he had at the press conference the other night, who were the officials who were involved in the conference with him?

MR. NESSEN: Brent Scowcroft, Rumsfeld, Marsh, and Nessen, among others.

Q What would your specific answer be to Scott?

MR. NESSEN: Let's see. Scott says the government should use as much pressure as necessary in order to obtain an immediate change of leadership of the deceased government in Cambodia. Scott said the aim of that policy is the urgent necessity of securing an agreement with the transition Cambodian government for the release of the many thousands of refugees he said would otherwise be slaughtered.

I think the answer would be what I said, that Cambodia has an elected government, elected by 55 percent of the population against two opponents. It is just not the American role to overthrow or pressure out of office a legitimately elected legal government.

At the same time, I call your attention to the President's remarks the other night that a solution in Cambodia did not depend on any particular personalities.

Q So that in other words, the President rejects the idea of using our continued aid as a leader?

MR. NESSEN: You will have to word it the way you want to, Steve. I am just saying that it is a legitimately elected government.

Q He didn't confer at all with Kissinger in connection with this Cambodian statement?

MR. NESSEN: Kissinger had gone already, although I am sure they were in touch by cable or phone.

Q Just one other thing. I don't quite understand why apparently the Administration believes that even with the aid after they get them, say, through the rainy season, that chances are adverse to the Lon Nol government continuing. Is that a fair assessment?

What I mean, are you saying it is a 50-50 chance to get them into the rainy season, which is to get them through the rainy season?

MR. NESSEN: With the aid.

Q Then, what about after the rainy season?

MR. NESSEN: During the rainy season.

Q Once the rainy season is over, once they get to where they can fight again.

MR. NESSEN: I just think there is a hope that the other side would decide to negotiate a settlement.

Q A lot of this stuff gets hung up on that time-frame there that people talk about.

Q What kind of role can the U.S. -- or is the U.S. willing to -- play that we agreed to all of this about Kissinger's reluctance to bargain from a lack of strength? I don't think anyone, even your Embassy there, is suggesting that the Cambodians are going to have any renewed strength.

MR. HUSHEN: Let me throw something in here that Kissinger said in his meeting last week, and that is as long as the insurgents feel they have military options they will use those, and when they feel those have run out, they will look to the political solution.

Q But this begs the question that it has not been any problem for them to wait for one dry season after the next for God knows how many years already, and all of Indochina and nearly all of Cambodia are each year getting a little stronger, going a little further. What pressure is there so everybody gets a chance to rest, relax, recruit, resupply and each year, they have done better than the year before? Why is there going to be any more pressure on them to negotiate after we get to this wet season than any other?

MR. NESSEN: There is the feeling that they may be hurt, also. Nobody here has ever claimed that if they just get through this dry season and we have got a negotiation -- there is the hope of one. To turn that around, Steve, if Cambodia does not survive the dry season, then clearly there is not going to be any negotiations. It is going to be settled voluntarily. If they get through the dry season without it, then there is the hope or the possibility of a negotiated settlement.

Q Do you admit it is a rather slim hope?

MR. NESSEN: I can't put any measurement on what the possibility is of a settlement during the wet season, or a negotiated settlement.

Q Is the 50-50 chance a reasonable chance, as the President stated -- is that in the cables or is that the President's assessment from reading the cables?

MR. NESSEN: I am not sure that those exact words appear in here. Let's see.

"It can hold its own against the offensive and survive until the end of the current fiscal year."

The sentence starts, "The best current estimate here is that if they receive the additional funds, both military and economic, it can hold its own."

And the other one says basically the same thing: with sufficient military and humanitarian assistance, it has a chance of getting through the dry season.

So, these, plus other things that he has read and been told, leads the President to that assessment.

Q Ron, I don't want to dwell on a single point too long, but in view of the Gallop Poll released yesterday and the seeming reluctance of Connors to go along with this aid or stepped-up aid next year, is there anything that you see that says to the Administration that the Khmer Rouge have any motivation for negotiation during this wet season, as Steve asked earlier? They must get a hold of that poll and know that the American people are not going to continue playing that war forever.

MR. NESSEN: I think there is one interesting line in here that says that the -- let's go off the record on this if we can just to give you the background.

(DISCUSSION OFF THE RECORD.)

Q Has there been any feedback from the other side -- diplomatic or any other channels -- as to their stage of morale, readiness, fighting ability, position?

MR. NESSEN: I don't know whether there has been any feedback. There is a reference in here to the possibility that the other side is seriously weakened, also.

Q This is from the Embassy?

MR. NESSEN: Yes.

Q Ron, is there any contact, diplomatic or otherwise, that you can tell us about?

MR. NESSEN: Not that I am aware of, but that is really something that Habib will talk about. I am just not completely up to date on what, if any, additional diplomatic efforts may be made. He went into that at some length the other day on this.

Q Ron, we never really answered the question as to what the U.S. can do in the way of initiating, encouraging or taking part in negotiations.

MR. NESSEN: Habib gave a pretty good rundown on what efforts there have been in the past, and I think you need to ask him where it stands now or what could possibly happen in the future.

Q Did anyone ever answer that story we had seen in the paper, the Schanberg story about the effort was made and this was a recommendation by the Embassy? Was that ever answered by anyone?

MR. NESSEN: No; it was not, and you are going to need to get that answer at the State Department. I am told that they pulled together the background on that episode, and you should talk to them about it.

Q While we have got you here, can you tell us what the President's view was in this last meeting here?

MR. NESSEN: Was that the pay raise for the Judiciary?

MR. HUSHEN: Yes.

MR. NESSEN: I was busy trying to get this together. I will have to check.

Q Can you give us any reaction to the Gallup poll that 70 percent oppose?

MR. NESSEN: I think that Gallup poll was taken toward the end of January or the middle of January, if I am not mistaken. There were two polls; one was taken early February, and one was taken last January.

MR. HUSHEN: The Yankelovich poll was then in late January.

Q Are you saying it is outmoded?

MR. NESSEN: No, it is very difficult to react to something that is that old.

Q Gallup says this publication was ten days behind his poll.

MR. NESSEN: Most of those polls have dates in them, and one was late or mid-January. The other was early February.

MR. HUSHEN: I don't know the date of the Gallup, but the Yankelovich poll was done in late January.

Q Is the White House putting any special hope now on that possible way to bypass the Senate having to approve military funds to go to the contingency and get it up from \$50 to \$125,000 or \$1 million?

MR. NESSEN: The President's feeling is that if this aid is going to get there and have any chance of affecting events, it needs to be done in ten days to two weeks, and he is for whatever legislative method will get that done.

Q Which would not rule out this approach?

MR. NESSEN: No.

Q Do you plan any special effort to convince Congress?

MR. NESSEN: I think the President has made a statement at the news conference and he talked to Humphrey, Case and Sparkman the other day. I think he has made his views pretty clear.

I feel sure he will be talking to other Members of Congress, too. He saw the delegation that came back from Indochina. He has seen a fair number of people on this already, and probably will see others.

Q Does he have any meetings on it tomorrow?

MR. NESSEN: No, I don't see anything specifically on the schedule right now to deal with that.

Q Could we just ask if you have anything to add to this morning along the lines of the three questions you were left with?

MR. NESSEN: Let's see. There were seven major unanswered questions on the CIA, and I just have not gotten the answer yet.

Q Not even on what our present policy is?

MR. NESSEN: I mean, we are pretty clear to at least one of the wires. I forget which one. I mean certainly Don Rumsfeld is not talking off the top of his head.

Q But you still don't want to go on the record saying the same thing?

MR. NESSEN: I mean, Don is a senior adviser and Assistant to the President. I will see if I can get the President's own words, but I think for the moment that is it.

Q What about that memo on the Arab boycott?

MR. NESSEN: Oh, God.

Q They seem to all have lapses. It can't be that hard.

MR. NESSEN: I just have to find it and find out where it stands.

Q Press a button.

MR. NESSEN: Yes, that is right.

MR. HUSHEN: Pick up the phone.

MR. NESSEN: Pick up the phone, as Les would say.

I am glad you were curious about Cambodia because I did have some time.

THE PRESS: Thank you, Ron.

END (AT 3:35 P.M. EDT)

March 11, 1975

DISCUSSION WITH RON NESSEN
AND MEMBERS OF THE PRESS

4:13 P.M. EDT

MR. NESSEN: Everybody had a chance to talk with Schlesinger. He more or less, I understand, said he agreed with the assessment we have been given here, did he not? That is what he told me back here.

Q The assessment of what?

MR. NESSEN: With the adequate aid and time there was a chance that it wouldn't fall.

Q I just want to differ with you on one point, Ron, a new point that you injected this morning. You said the insurgents were having --

MR. NESSEN: I said the cables from Phnom Penh suggested that they might be having supply and manpower problems.

Q He said, unless I missed the tailend, they are in much better shape this year than they were last year.

Q He says they ~~always~~ have some support problems.

MR. HUSHEN: You missed the tailend because he added to that that they were having some supply problems.

Q Did he say that? I didn't hear that.

Q I didn't hear that either.

Q He talks so softly that they ought to have microphones all the time.

Q They ran out of steam on February 6 of last year.

Q But he said they are much better off this year than they were last year.

MR. NESSEN: I am sure by now you have all read the Tower story more carefully. You will see that Tower made it clear to reporters he was giving his views of the situation and that Schlesinger confined himself to discussing the consequences of the U.S. failure to aid Cambodia.

The meeting with the President, I want to make sure you understand, was not a Cambodia crisis meeting or even a Cambodia meeting. It was a very broad, general review of a couple of situations in the world.

Apparently, Schlesinger started and moved from West to East, so he started out talking about Europe and a couple of places in Europe and the Middle East.

Q Portugal?

MR. NESSEN: He did talk about Portugal.

Q What does he know about Portugal?

MR. NESSEN: I didn't ask for a detailed rundown on that.

He ended up in Southeast Asia, and he said a very, very minor portion of the conversation was about Cambodia and that there was no new information exchanged between him and the President.

Now, that takes care of that.

There is one other thing. This morning -- and it was probably my fault -- for possibly giving the impression that there had been some kind of evacuation suggestion made by the Ambassador. The fact is that Ambassador Dean sent a letter to the American community in Phnom Penh on February 14, which was nearly a month ago -- these were the businessmen; I don't know who else is there, I don't know what Americans do in Phnom Penh -- suggesting that if you were there on nonessential business and you really didn't have to stay, maybe it would be a good idea to leave. That was February 14.

So, I think some of the stories probably seemed to make it appear that this happened today or yesterday, and that it was something new, but it is really nearly a month old.

Q Schlesinger did discuss that, too. He indicated that it extended to American personnel, and he talked about people who were not necessary for the accomplishment of our mission had left.

Q That means wives and children?

MR. NESSEN: Yes.

Q That was some time ago.

Q Schlesinger made it a more encompassing thing than you did. It was not just a casual thing.

Q Ron, we don't get any picture of Presidential involvement in this. You say that he has hardly talked about it. Here is a country that we have fought for for I don't know how many years, supplied, and so forth, and we get no feeling that the President -- all I can say is the news stories are very, very tragic in a sense, and we don't know what the President is doing.

MR. NESSEN: You have worked here a lot of years, and I did before, too. There have been times when there was a kind of crisis atmosphere, but in this case, the President's basic action at this point is to ask Congress for the money he feels is needed.

He is speaking out for that money, and he talks to people on the Hill about it. As far as anything beyond that, I don't know what you expect him to be doing.

Q I expect him to use a lot of initiatives in ten different directions, you know.

MR. NESSEN: At the moment, it depends on the money, Helen. That is up to Congress.

Q The wire copies you are speaking of has Tower also saying that Schlesinger -- Tower said that Schlesinger said -- in talking about additional aid -- said the Secretary regards aid to South Vietnam of greater importance than aid to Cambodia.

MR. NESSEN: Schlesinger?

Q When I asked Schlesinger about that, I got an answer that I regarded as confirming. It was one of those with diplomatic replies, which was that we have more involvement in Vietnam than we do in Cambodia. To paraphrase it, I thought he was answering yes, but how does the White House feel about that?

MR. NESSEN: The question was, does the President feel that aid to South Vietnam is of greater importance than aid to Cambodia.

I certainly haven't gotten that feeling from the President, John. The situation in Cambodia at the moment appears to be more critical than the one in South Vietnam, but he still feels that \$300 million is needed for South Vietnam, too.

Q This morning, before you had a chance to talk to Schlesinger, I think that you said that the chances were 50-50.

MR. NESSEN: I said a reasonable, or maybe 50-50, chance.

Q As a matter of fact, I think you said there was a 50-50 chance, perhaps better, if given help, that they could survive through the present dry season into the rainy season.

MR. NESSEN: I don't think that I said better than 50-50. I wouldn't like to say better than 50-50.

Q That is what I wanted to ask you about.

MR. NESSEN: I certainly wouldn't. I would rather say a reasonable chance, but not even get into 50-50.

MR. HUSHEN: Ron, on that point, we concluded by saying there is a 50-50 chance to get through the crises and into the rainy season. We never said to negotiations.

MR. NESSEN: We are hoping for the negotiations during the wet season, but I think I made clear that is a hope.

Q Ron, has the President discussed with leaders on the Hill a dollar figure less than \$222 million, provided it is made available and immediately?

MR. NESSEN: I think that he said himself, or Humphrey said, that they had talked last week about some other figure, yes.

Q Can you say anything about a dollar figure?

MR. NESSEN: He really thinks that the \$222 million was needed to be adequate. He is trying to work with Congress, and speed is the most important thing.

Q Secretary Schlesinger said outside that the \$222 million figure includes some equipment, that the primary thing now is ammunition, and that the ammunition could be taken care of with a lesser figure, which he did not specify.

Can you give us any guidance on that?

MR. NESSEN: No, other than he is working with Congress, and speed at the moment is the most important part of it.

Q The possibility is open thmt a smaller figure would be acceptable, provided it is forthcoming?

MR. NESSEN: He thinks \$222 million is what is needed to be adequate, but he thinks speed is the most important thing.

Q Ron, hasn't the Administration indicated that it would go along with the plan to raise the draw-down figure on existing stocks, to raise that from \$75 million to \$200 million.

MR. NESSEN: I have heard that that is one of the ways being discussed on the Hill to get this over there fast.

Q The figure is \$50 million to \$125 million, isn't it?

MR. NESSEN: I think there is another \$50 million somewhere.

Q To make it \$175 million?

MR. NESSEN: That is right.

Q Schlesinger told us outside that he was figuring two to three weeks at best, without the Congressional aid. I think you told us ten to twelve days in the briefing this morning.

MR. NESSEN: The number I got from the President was ten to twelve days. These are not very precise things. You get a feel of the ball park area that we are talking about.

Q Has the Administration decided how it will go, in fact, asking Congress to simply lift the restrictions on the use of that aid, that general aid appropriation, which would then allow the President to make the decision that the aid should be taken away from some other countries and given to Cambodia?

MR. NESSEN: That is one of the ways being discussed, and that is the fastest way to do it.

Q It is being discussed where -- between Friedersdorf and the people on the Hill, or here?

MR. NESSEN: We discussed it with people on the Hill. Speed is really the thing.

Q Is anybody at the White House with the markup session up on Capitol Hill today on this \$222 million?

MR. NESSEN: You mean at the session?

Q Yes.

MR. NESSEN: I don't know.

THE PRESS: Thank you, Ron.

END (AT 4:37 P.M. EDT)

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

March 12, 1975

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

On behalf of the Senate Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect To Intelligence Activities, Senator Tower and I want to thank you for the opportunity we had on March 5 to discuss the work of the Committee. I want to express my personal appreciation for the direct and forthright manner in which you addressed some of the initial questions that lay before the Select Committee, and your willingness to assist the Committee to meet its responsibilities under the mandate of S. Res. 21.

We are in agreement that the work of the Committee should proceed as expeditiously as possible and the Committee is gratified at the full and complete cooperation that we have received from the Executive agencies up to this point. In every respect thus far, the agencies have been fully cooperative with the Committee and the staff and I believe this augurs well for a constructive and expeditious conclusion to our inquiry.

At our meeting on March 5th with you, we discussed the general areas in which the Committee would need initial documentation. As we discussed, our first requirements are to determine the legal basis for the activities for the intelligence agencies of the United States Government. In this regard, it will be helpful to the Committee to receive from whomever you may designate, the documents, files, and other papers that might be required to fully determine the legal basis for the activities of United States intelligence agencies. With the unanimous approval of the Committee, I respectfully request that the documents on the attached list directly relevant to the inquiry authorized by S. Res. 21, be supplied to the Committee at the earliest opportunity.

With kind regards,

Sincerely,

Frank Church

ATTACHMENT

1. The report furnished to the President by Director Colby in January 1953
2. All Executive Orders, National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDMs) or Intelligence Directives (NSCIDs), and other White House* directives pertaining to the charter, structure or guidelines for any overt or covert foreign or domestic intelligence agencies or activities.
3. All Executive Orders, National Security Council memoranda and directives, and other White House instructions pertaining to the structure, functions or organization of intelligence policy organizations within the Office of the President, including the Forty Committee and the Washington Special Action Group (and their predecessor organizations, e.g., the Operations Coordinating Board, Special Group, 54/12 Group, 303 Committee, etc.).
4. Organization charts and staffing patterns (for the present and, to the extent reasonably convenient, back to 1947) for all intelligence-related organizations within the White House (NSC, Forty Committee, OEP, OSAG, etc.) including names of key officials and staff personnel.

*"White House" as used in this listing is meant to include the President, the Office of the President, including the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the National Security Council and the Office of Management and Budget.

JOHN L. BURTON
5TH DISTRICT, CALIFORNIA

SELECT COMMITTEE ON AGING

COMMITTEE ON
HOUSE ADMINISTRATION

COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

SUBCOMMITTEES:

CONSERVATION, ENERGY AND
NATURAL RESOURCES

INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS AND
HUMAN RESOURCES

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

March 19, 1975

1513 LONGWORTH HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515
(202) 225-5161

DISTRICT OFFICES:

450 GOLDEN GATE AVENUE
Box 36024

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94102
(415) 556-1333

910 D STREET
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SAN RAFAEL, CALIFORNIA 94902
(415) 457-7272

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

mf
Just as you sent a special fact-finding commission to Cambodia, we request that you send a fact-finding commission throughout this country to give you a first-hand report of conditions in America today.

Our military commitment in Southeast Asia ended in 1973 with pledges from bipartisan leaders that full attention would be paid to the serious problems facing our country.

It is therefore disheartening and discouraging to hear you calling those of us who would reject your \$222 million request for Cambodian aid "isolationists."

In a time when so many Americans need our help, it might be said that if we ignore their needs we are isolating them from the ideals and dreams upon which this country was founded. This is the time to spend that \$222 million on our own people.

We ask that you reconsider your request for aid to Cambodia and instead send your fact-finding commission to Appalachia and other poverty-stricken areas of rural America; to the inner cities; to the farmlands where small ranchers and farmers are being forced off family farms and a great American tradition is dying; to senior citizens barely surviving on shrinking incomes, some eating dog food to nourish themselves; to mental health institutions, so underfunded that patients are lying in their own excrement; to schools where children are in danger because buildings are unsafe and deteriorating; and perhaps saddest of all, are the long lines of able-bodied men and women waiting for emergency job interviews, which only 10% of them have any hopes of obtaining.

March 19, 1975

We feel confident that when you receive first-hand reports on the conditions which exist in this country today from those you trust, that you will stop calling us isolationists and begin using all of the resources this country can afford to help the people of this nation who deserve and need our help.

Very truly yours,

Charlie Rose

Mark W. Humphord

William D. Hughes

James A. Hill

F. Jay Fithian

Mike Camp

Adrian Jones

P. W. Gray

Jim Lloyd

Pat Schroeder

Pete Stark

Christopher J. Dodd

John L. Burton

Norman E. Borlaug

Paul Simon

Richard Holm

Arthur Schlesinger

Albion T. Magruder

Robert F. Kennedy

Tim L. Hall

George Miller

James Buckley

Robert W. Edgar

Edward Weisberg

March 19, 1975

To: M. J. M. J.
 Kenneth L. Halland
 Ronald V. Johnson
 Sean P.
 Chaity L. L.
 Cardiss Collins
 Philip Buntin
 Thomas F. Downing
 Shirley Christensen
 Ronald H. H.
 Bella L.
 Tom M. C. C.

Coone D. D.
 John K. K.
 Jim Weaver
 Bob Traylor
 Guy H. H.
 Andrew Maguire
 Com. H. H.
 Edward P. B. B. I.
 John W. J. J.
 Martha Keys
 John K. K.
 John F. F.
 Robert N. C. N.
 Bob Carr

List of Congressmen who co-signed letter to the President:

Charles Rose
Mark Hannaford
William Hughes
Edward Pattison
Floyd Fithian
Andrew Young
Philip Sharp
Jim Lloyd
Patricia Schroeder
Pete Stark
Christopher Dodd
Toby Moffett
Cardiss Collins
Phillip Burton
Norman Mineta
Bella Abzug
Joseph Gaydos
Shirley Chisholm
Andrew Maguire
Gerry Studds
Bob Traxler
Norman D'Amours
Paul Simon
Richard Nolan
Stephen Solarz
Abner Mikva
Tim Hall
Robert Cornell
George Miller
Jerome Ambro
Robert Edgar
Edward Mezvinsky
Tom Harkin
Edward Beard
John Jenrette
James Florio
Martha Keys
Robert Nix
Donald Riegle
John Krebs
James Weaver
Yvonne Burke
John Burton
Michael Blouin
Ron Dellums
Leo Ryan
Kenneth Holland
Martin Russo
Thomas Downey
Bob Carr

Aid Rejected By Sihanouk —Waldheim

NEW YORK TIMES

March 29, 1975

New York Times News Service

UNITED NATIONS Secretary General Kurt Waldheim has advised the United States that Prince Norodom Sihanouk has turned down his offers to bring together the warring Cambodian sides and try to restore peace to the country.

Waldheim's statement, according to U.N. sources, was made in reply to a letter from Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger. Kissinger had asked Waldheim early this month what progress he was making in offering his help to the contending Cambodian factions as requested to do by the General Assembly last fall.

The situation is complicated further, according to U.S. officials, by uncertainty about the insurgent leadership. It is uncertain, they say, whether Sihanouk's exile government in Peking can actually speak for the insurgents or whether they are led in fact by the Khmer Rouge, the Cambodian Communists, who have their closest ties with Hanoi.

Waldheim's efforts appeared to be restricted by the terms of the assembly resolution, which clearly recognized only two parties — the Lon Nol government in Phnom Penh and Sihanouk's Royal Government of National Union.

Waldheim made a number of attempts to offer his aid. U.N. officials said only that there had been several moves through governments friendly to the prince.

IN MOSCOW, meanwhile, diplomats from the embassy of Lon Nol's government said the Soviet Union has asked the government to close down the mission and remove the embassy staff.

Their departure for home, which one Cambodian diplomat expected would take place in about two weeks, will leave only Sihanouk's government in exile to represent Cambodia in Moscow, and resolve the diplomatic confusion of allowing two rival Cambodian missions to function there for the last five years.

It was not clear whether the Soviet move represented a final, formal break in relations between Moscow and the Lon Nol regime. The Soviet foreign ministry refused to reply to any questions about the matter. A Cambodian diplomat representing Lon Nol said the foreign ministry offered "no reason at all" for closing the embassy and set no deadline for its departure.

See CAMBODIA, A-4

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

APRIL 12, 1975

Office of the White House Press Secretary

THE WHITE HOUSE

STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY

The President has asked me to express his concern over some reports that his speech on Thursday night, April tenth, indicated that he was withdrawing or otherwise not renewing his request for urgent assistance to Cambodia.

The President's proposal for aid to Cambodia is still before the Congress. We maintain the request we have consistently and emphatically urged upon the Congress for three months.

The letter from Cambodian leader Saukham Khoy, cited by the President, reemphasized that request. The President's statement that it might soon be too late pointed out the urgency of the need.

The President still hopes that the Congress will act quickly to approve assistance to Cambodia.

#

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O R 071330Z APR 75
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

Assen/Savage

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2423

INFO AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH 5333

UNCLAS BANGKOK 5855

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PFDR, TH, CB

SUBJ: ~~THAI FOREIGN MINISTER ON KHMER PEACE NEGOTIATIONS~~

THAI FOREIGN MINISTER CHATCHAI CHUNHAWAN GAVE A PRESS CONFERENCE
ON THE AFTERNOON OF APRIL 7 IN WHICH HE DISCUSSED THAILAND'S
EFFORTS TO CONVENE THE CONTENDING KHMER FACTIONS FOR PEACE TALKS
IN THAILAND.

THE FOLLOWING IS AN INFORMAL USIS TRANSLATION OF HIS
REMARKS ON THIS SUBJECT.

BEGIN EXCERPTS:

WE TALKED OF GREAT EFFORTS WE ARE MAKING TO THE UTMOST OF OUR
ABILITY FOR NEGOTIATIONS TO BE HELD BY ALL CAMBODIAN FACTIONS,
NEGOTIATIONS TO RESTORE PEACE TO CAMBODIA. OUR REASONS
ARE BECAUSE WE DO NOT WANT TO SEE THIS REGION FACED WITH
TRAGEDY, CAUSED BY HARDSHIPS SUFFERED BY THE PEOPLE IN
EVERY NOOK AND CORNER, AND BECAUSE WE WANT PEACE TO BE
RESTORED AS SPEEDILY AS POSSIBLE, AS WELL AS BECAUSE WE
WANT A CEASEFIRE TO BE AGREED ON. ANOTHER EFFORT WE HAVE
MADE IS THE OFFER FOR THAILAND TO BE USED AS THE SITE
FOR ALL CAMBODIAN FACTIONS TO HOLD A MEETING IN, IF
THEY WISH. THEY CAN FLY HERE AT ONCE TO MEET ANY TIME.
A MEETING OF ALL CAMBODIAN PARTIES AND FACTIONS WILL
MOST PROBABLY BE HELD IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE.

REPORTER: WHERE?

CHATCHAI: I OFFERED BANGKOK AS THE SITE.

REPORTER: DID HE ACCEPT THE OFFER?

CHATCHAI: PREMIER LONG BORET'S SIDE HAS ACCEPTED
IT, BUT I WILL HAVE TO MAKE CONTACT WITH THE OTHER SIDE.

REPORTER: HAVE YOU CONTACTED SIHANOUK'S SIDE?

CHATCHAI: NO INFORMATION CAN BE GIVEN YOU NOW BECAUSE
THE OFFER HAS NOT BEEN ACCEPTED YET. FURTHERMORE, THE
WISH OF ALL SIDES MUST BE ASCERTAINED FIRST.

*****WHSR COMMENT*****

VANDERHYE

Shack

PSN:054721

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*****U N C L A S S I F I E D*****S COPY



REPORTER: DO YOU THINK THAT THERE IS ANY HOPE?
 CHATCHAI: THERE SHOULD BE. WE ARE CONTINUING OUR EFFORTS, BUT WHETHER THEY ACHIEVE SUCCESS OR NOT IS NOT IMPORTANT. WHAT IS IMPORTANT IS OUR DESIRE FOR A CEASE-FIRE IN CAMBODIA, FOR IT TO STOP FIGHTING AND KILLING AMONG CAMBODIANS THEMSELVES.
 REPORTER: WHAT DO YOU MEAN BY THE STATEMENT THAT WHETHER SUCCESS IS ACHIEVED OR NOT IS NOT IMPORTANT?
 CHATCHAI: THIS IS THE SITUATION. THE CONTACTS I AM MAKING MIGHT ACHIEVE SUCCESS OR NOT, BUT EFFORTS MUST BE CONTINUED STEADILY IN ORDER...
 REPORTER: THROUGH WHOM ARE YOU MAKING CONTACT?
 CHATCHAI: THERE IS NO NEED TO MAKE CONTACT THROUGH ANYBODY. DIRECT CONTACT IS MADE WITH EVERY SIDE.
 REPORTER: WITH SIHANOUK OR KHIEU SAMPHAN?
 CHATCHAI: WITH EVERY AND ALL SIDES. I CONTACT THEM ALL.
 REPORTER: DOES THAT MEAN THAT THERE ARE WAYS TO MAKE CONTACTS?
 CHATCHAI: YES, THERE ARE SOME WAYS.
 REPORTER: IS CONTACT BEING MADE THROUGH INDONESIA?
 CHATCHAI: DIRECTLY.
 REPORTER: HOW ARE YOU MAKING CONTACT?
 CHATCHAI: FROM THAILAND.
 REPORTER: THROUGH THEIR REPRESENTATIVES HERE IN THAILAND?
 CHATCHAI: I CAN'T TELL YOU EVERYTHING... GOOD HEAVENS...
 REPORTER: WITH HOW MANY SIDES MUST CONSULTATIONS BE HELD NOW?
 CHATCHAI: WITH CAMBODIANS ONLY. IT IS AN ISSUED AMONG CAMBODIANS THEMSELVES ONLY.
 REPORTER: BUT THEY ARE SPLIT INTO SEVERAL GROUPS.
 CHATCHAI: THERE ARE TWO GROUPS ONLY -- ONE WHICH IS ANTI THE GOVERNMENT AND THE OTHER WHICH SUPPORTS THE GOVERNMENT.
 REPORTER: HAS THE GOVERNMENT SIDE ALREADY AGREED TO HOLD NEGOTIATIONS?
 CHATCHAI: YES. I SAID... HE GAVE A NEWS CONFERENCE YESTERDAY EVENING IN WHICH HE SAID ALREADY HE WANTS...
 REPORTER: HAS ANY CONTACT BEEN MADE WITH SIHANOUK'S SIDE YET?
 CHATCHAI: NO COMMENT.
 REPORTER: KHIEU SAMPHAN AND SIHANOUK ARE THE SAME GROUP, BUT FEEL IT IS NOT CERTAIN WHO IS THE LEADER.
 CHATCHAI: THAT DIRECTLY CONCERNS THE KHMER ROUGES. I UNDERSTAND THAT THEY ARE ALL OF THE SAME SIDE.
 REPORTER: DO YOU THINK THERE IS HOPE FOR SUCCESS TO BE ACHIEVED?
 CHATCHAI: WE HAD TO MAKE THE OFFER FOR THE SAKE OF HUMANITY. SHOULD ANYBODY NOT ACCEPT IT IS UP TO THEM.



IT IS NOT OUR AFFAIR. THE REASON WHY WE WANT THE FIGHTING AND KILLING TO BE STOPPED IS BECAUSE SUCH A VERY LARGE NUMBER OF SMALL CHILDREN ARE BEING KILLED. SOLDIERS MIGHT NOT DIE IN A GREAT NUMBER, BUT THERE IS HEAVY LOSS OF LIFE AMONG THE PEOPLE AND CHILDREN WHO ARE NOT INVOLVED IN THE FIGHTING IN ANY WAY AT ALL.

REPORTER: DO YOU MEAN THAT YOU WILL MAKE EFFORTS TO THE VERY END?

CHATCHAI: YES.

REPORTER: SHOULD IT NOT OKAY, IT WOULD MEAN AS LONG BORET SAID YESTERDAY EVENING THAT IF THE OTHER SIDE WOULD NOT SIT DOWN AROUND THE SAME TABLE AND NEGOTIATE, THEN THEY WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE...

CHATCHAI: YES. THAT'S CORRECT. WE ARE MAKING EFFORTS TO THE UTMOST ALREADY. YOU YOURSELVES HAVE SEEN THAT PREMIER LONG BORET IS A GOOD MAN.

REPORTER: HAS ANY TIME LIMIT BEEN FIXED FOR A MEETING BETWEEN SIHANOUK AND LONG BORET? HOW LONG WILL THEY WAIT?

CHATCHAI: IN SOLVING THIS KIND OF PROBLEM, MOVES HAVE TO BE MADE STEP BY STEP AND GRADUALLY. NOTHING CAN BE DONE IN A HURRY. THEREFORE, IT IS SAID THAT I AM TOO IMPATIENT, THOUGH I AM MAKING EFFORTS STEP BY STEP.

REPORTER: DOES THAT MEAN THAT CONTACT HAS BEEN MADE?

CHATCHAI: YES. CONTACT HAS BEEN MADE ALREADY.

REPORTER: WAS IT DIRECT CONTACT WITH KHMER ROUGE?

CHATCHAI: YES. IT WAS DIRECT CONTACT, NOT THROUGH A THIRD PERSON.

REPORTER: HOW LONG AGO DID YOU START MAKING CONTACT?

CHATCHAI: THAT IS A SECRET. MY VIEW IS THAT IF EVERY SIDE PLACES THE COMMON INTERESTS OF THEIR COUNTRY AND HUMANITARIANISM ABOVE ALL ELSE, THERE IS HOPE.

REPORTER: IN REGARD TO CONTACT YOU HAVE MADE WITH THE OTHER SIDE TO CAMBODIA...

CHATCHAI: THERE IS NO OTHER SIDE TO CAMBODIANS AT ALL. THAILAND IS A FRIEND OF EVERY AND ALL PARTIES AND KNOWS ALL OF THEM. I OFFERED THE GOOD OFFICES OF THAILAND TO THEM AS THE SITE FOR A MEETING, AND IF THEY ACCEPTED THE OFFER I WOULD MAKE PREPARATIONS FOR IT... WE MUST CONTINUE WAITING.

REPORTER: WHAT IS THE ATTITUDE OF THE SIHANOUK GOVERNMENT TOWARD THE THAI GOVERNMENT AT PRESENT?

CHATCHAI: IT IS GOOD. NO STATEMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE ATTACKING US AT ALL.

REPORTER: HAS NO ANSWER AT ALL BEEN MADE TO THIS CONTACT?

CHATCHAI: PLEASE BE PATIENT. IT IS STILL VERY RECENT.

REPORTER: DO YOU THINK THAT THEY WILL FEEL CONFIDENCE IN THAILAND AS THE SITE FOR THEM TO COME AND



HOLD NEGOTIATIONS IN...

CHATCHAI: I THINK THAT THEY WILL FEEL SUFFICIENT CONFIDENCE.

REPORTER: ... IN SPITE OF ALLEGATIONS THAT THERE ARE TRANSPORTATIONS OF WEAPONS?

CHATCHAI: BUT WE HAVE STOPPED THAT.

REPORTER: DO YOU THINK THAT RESULTS WILL BE OBTAINED?

CHATCHAI: I THINK SO. THE EFFORTS WE ARE MAKING ARE WITH GOOD INTENTIONS TO EVERY SIDE, AND ESPECIALLY TO CAMBODIA AS A WHOLE, INCLUDING ALL THE CAMBODIAN PEOPLE, REGARDLESS OF WHICH SIDE THEY SUPPORT.

REPORTER: BUT THE RED CAMBODIAN RADIO BROADCAST A STATEMENT MADE BY KHIEU SAMPHAN ON APRIL 2, IN WHICH HE ATTACKED THE UNITED STATES AND ITS STOOGES, INCLUDING THAILAND ALSO...

CHATCHAI: THAILAND IS NOT A STOOGES OR A SATELLITE OF THE UNITED STATES.

REPORTER: THAILAND WAS MENTIONED BY NAME. HE SAID THAT EFFORTS MADE AND BARGAINING FOR NEGOTIATIONS, ETC., TO BE HELD ARE A METHOD USED TO MAKE THE FIGHTING CONTINUE AND DRAG ON...

CHATCHAI: OUR PROPOSAL FOR A CEASEFIRE, FOR EVERY CAMBODIAN PARTY TO TURN TOWARD ONE ANOTHER AND HOLD TALKS, IS A PLAN OF THE THAI GOVERNMENT, NOT OF ANYBODY ELSE. IT IS BECAUSE WE WISH THIS NEIGHBORING COUNTRY TO ENJOY PEACE AND HAPPINESS. I GUARANTEE THIS ON THE PART OF THIS GOVERNMENT, ESPECIALLY THE PRIME MINISTER WHO HAS EMPHASIZED MANY, MANY TIMES THAT HE WISHES PEACE TO BE RESTORED TO CAMBODIA.

REPORTER: THERE IS A NEWS REPORT STATING THAT THE PRESIDENT OF THE CAMBODIAN SENATE, WHO IS ACTING PRESIDENT DURING THE ABSENCE OF LON NOL, HAS HELD CONSULTATIONS WITH EVERY PARTY IN ORDER FOR NEGOTIATIONS TO BE HELD. DOES THAT MEAN THAT PHNOM PENH WILL BE TURNED OVER TO THE RED CAMBODIANS?

CHATCHAI: EVERY AND ALL PARTIES ARE MAKING EFFORTS FOR THE FIGHTING TO BE STOPPED, FOR CEASEFIRE, IN ORDER TO HOLD NEGOTIATIONS. I AM NOT IN A POSITION TO ANSWER YOUR QUESTION WHETHER THIS MEANS THAT PHNOM PENH WILL BE TURNED OVER TO THE OTHER SIDE. THAT IS UP TO THE CAMBODIANS THEMSELVES. SINCE THAILAND AND CAMBODIA HAVE A COMMON BORDER AND GOOD RELATIONS HAVE EXISTED BETWEEN THEM SINCE ANCIENT TIMES, SHOULD IT NOT BE CONVENIENT FOR NEGOTIATIONS TO BE HELD IN CAMBODIA, WE HAVE OFFERED FOR THEM TO BE HELD IN BANGKOK, OR ANYWHERE IN THAILAND AS DESIRED. THAT IS ALL.

MASTERS:

BT