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Secretary of Defense
James R. Schlesinger
before Sperling-Godfrey Group
Tuesday, July 1, 1975

Q: The first question that occurs to me is ~~that whether or not~~ what your reaction is to ~~XXXXX~~Solzhenitzyn's speech last night? ~~I gather you were present therefore I don't need to raise~~

A: It was *A TOUR DE FORCE*

One was impressed by the personality of the man, *HIS VERVE AND FORCE, THE STRENGTH OF HIS CONVICTIONS.*
~~to his condition~~

Q: *Do you think it'd BE A GOOD IDEA IF HE'D*
~~go back to writing now?~~

A: I think that he demonstrated that he had considerable effectiveness as a public speaker; perhaps more in the Russian style than in the American style.

Q: What did you think of the message? ~~that~~

A: I think that one must listen carefully to his message in light of his experiences, which he feels very deeply, quite naturally given those experiences. On the other hand, one should be aware of the necessity to discriminate ~~against~~ amongst different periods of Soviet history that we cannot, I think, treat it necessarily him as an undifferentiated mass. With regard to the issue of detente, I think that *it's plain THAT* Solzhenitzyn, like everybody else, is in favor of a true detente. His requirements for true detente are more rigorous than those of others, but I think that we, ourselves, irrespective of his state^D~~ment~~ requirements for a true detente have got to discriminate between a detente that does indeed lead to an *ALLEVIATION* ~~de-escalation~~ of tensions and a hope for a settlement on the one hand and one that is simply a () on the other.

Q: Getting down to *business* now, following up on John Finney's interesting piece yesterday, I wonder what changes, aside from style perhaps, that you can see for the Marine Corps during the next four years? What's going to happen to Marine Corps aviation? Can you see restructuring of Marine Corps *Roles* ^{AND} ~~missions~~ and look into, ~~the~~ *NOT THE* CRYSTAL BALL, BUT PERHAPS THE CRYSTAL GLOBE

A: I think that it's too early to tell, ^{Though} Col Arnold and you say get down to serious business I know that you can't talk about the large foreign policy issues of the United States or the ~~ARMY, NAVY AND AIR FORCE~~ ~~Marine Corps~~. Serious business refer^S to less than 200,000 men, but they need a few good men.

I think that the nature of the Marine Corps is that it is part of our general purpose ^F forces. That under the pressures of the budget of the last seven or eight years, that it is become increasingly necessary that these forces be capable of general purpose activities as opposed to highly specialized. Now the Marine Corps, in fact, has always been a general purpose force. In the definition of its missions it ~~is~~ ^{HAS} tended to be more specialized, but as we look to the future, I think that we have to recognize that the maximum demand on our general purpose forces would be involved in a hypothetical war between the Warsaw Pact and NATO and that under those circumstances the Marine Corps would have to be available for employment in such a ~~CATAclysm~~ ^{CATAclysm} that would strain the capacity of the United States and its Allies rather than being off in the western Pacific waiting for something to happen.

I think that the Marines ^{will} ~~were~~ geared ⁱⁿ that direction, quite obviously the role of the United States ⁱⁿ the Pacific is undergoing alterations. In addition, the Middle East has become more and more of the potential ¹ tinderbox of the world and that as a consequence the Marine ^S will be undergoing those kinds of alterations. With regard to details, within the Corps, I think that General Wilson could think the matter through and make his judgments on these issues without ~~attempting~~ ^{attempting} to prejudge them.

Q: Mr. Secretary, i would like to return to trivial business, and that is the question was raised at the press conference at the White House the other day ² about nuclear weapons. ^Q ~~IT~~ ^{IT} stated that it was consistent American policy not to keep open the option of first use ~~would-you~~ ^{is} that an accurate statement, and if not, what has been consistent?

A: I'm glad you raised that question.

Q: Anybody who doesn't want to know the answer can leave the room.

Q: Are we on the record this morning?

Voice: It's all on record, yes, including the ~~insults~~ ^{so}

A: The question included a faulty premise ~~that~~ ^{so} we reached a faulty conclusion.

The United States has consistently refrained from ~~disallowing~~ ^{disallowing} the first use of nuclear weapons. It has been under pressure from various quarters basically for more than twenty-five years to ~~disallow~~ ^{disallow} first use. I will mention a bit of the history here and I have some quotations if any of you are interested, but they show a consistent pattern of either direct endorsement of first use or a refusal to rule out first use. The American ~~policy~~ ^{policy} on this has been unchanged for many years. The changes that we do, in fact, know, have been a gradual evolution towards increasing stress on the conventional components, ^{to} a diminution on the threat of immediate recourse ~~to~~ ^{to} nuclear weapons. ~~this~~ ^{this} has, I think, been an evolution that has been followed for the past twenty years, but under no circumstances could ~~we~~ ^{we} ~~allow~~ ^{allow} the first use of nuclear weapons. If one goes back to the 1950's, ~~and terms of the statement of national strategy that~~

DISALLOW

...one finds in terms of the statement of national strategy that enshrined in the redefinition of massive retaliation, ^{OF} graduated response, ^J by Secretary Dulles ^E that we would ^{USE} nuclear weapons at times and in places of our own choosing. At the same time, on the military side, Secretary Wilson as well as President Eisenhower indicated that nuclear weapons were being introduced and were becoming ~~■~~ virtually conventional ^A weapons in the force structure, ^J that the distinction between conventional and nuclear weapons should be abridged. I think from that period of time, there has been a gradual movement away from the tendency to erode the distinction between ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ nuclear and conventional weapons but we have always retained in all of our strategies ~~■~~ the necessity of not declaring against first use. NATO strategy since the 1950s has been based either on the so-called trip-wire strategy, which prevails into the 1960s and formerly ^{AL} ~~■~~ prevailed to 1967 when it was shifted to flexible response. The trip-wire strategy ^T sometimes called the plate ~~glass~~ glass window, was designed to have a small force sometimes referred to as a corporal's guard up front so that the nuclear bell could ~~■~~ rung. The intention was to respond to conventional attack ^S with a nuclear response. Throughout the period since the 19⁵⁰60s we have put emphasis upon the availability of tactical nuclear weapons ^{BUT} ~~that~~ I think that the emphasis has gradually shifted towards conventional without, in any way, reducing the role that nuclear ^{WEAPONS} ^A plays in deterrence.

Q: Do you want to keep a substantial firebreak between the ~~Tac~~/nukes and conventional weapons?

A: I think that we should keep in mind the distinction and that we should be careful and all aware of the firebreak. The

purpose of this Administration's military strategy⁺ has been to increase the nuclear threshold, to raise the nuclear threshold in the only way that it can be effectively be ~~xxx~~ raised, which is to have a solid, conventional posture~~with~~. Without a solid conventional posture^o you are driven willy-nilly to the threat of early recourse to nuclear weapons which this Administration, and the President specifically has rejected. What we want to do is to raise ~~xxx~~ the nuclear threshold and you can only do that by improving the conventional posture.

Now let me add just a few more words on this subject. If one looks back, one sees that in the early 1950s the Soviets pressed us very hard for a declaration against first use, that was in a period in which they had, or were perceived^{To have,} overwhelming conventional strength in Europe and they were in a relatively insignificant posture in terms of nuclear weapons. In that period of time they pressed us hard. In the 1960s their interest in such a declaration waned as ~~they~~ their nuclear posture improved and perhaps as they became aware of the intractable difficulties associated with with their southeast frontier. So, that pressure has disappeared. On the other hand the Chinese now, for obvious reasons, have begun to talk about no first ~~use~~ use. ~~if one accepts the no~~ if one accepts the no first use doctrine, one is accepting ~~xxx~~ a self denying ordinance that weakens deterrence. The underlying purpose and premise of U.S. military policy is to deter attack and part of the deterrent, a major part of the deterrent, is the existence of our tactical nuclear force. Consistently in Europe we have stated, as we recently restated in the ministerial guidance, the close relationship between conventional capabilities and tactical nuclear capabilities^c as

well as strategic capabilities in the NATO triad^y and the mutual reinforcement amongst these we felt was ~~was~~ what deterred any possibility of Warsaw Pact *PROBING*Ⓞ

Q: How is this Chinese *PRESSURE* manifested, is it directed only at us or ~~AT ALL POWERS?~~

A: It's directed at all superpowers.

Q: How is it manifested? Is this an item of continued dialogue?

A: I would say it is reflected in Chinese statements repeatedly and has been repeatedly stated ever since the detonation of their first nuclear device in 1964.

Q: Mr. Secretary, do you make a distinction between first ~~use~~ ^U use and first strike? ^Λ confusion seems to come in *ESPECIALLY AT THE PRESENT* ^{Time} about first strike and first use, one being the strategic *RESPONSE* ^{AND THE} *OTHER* more tactical. Do you make that distinction, or ~~does~~ does first use in your mind include the possibility of first strike?

A: First strike in this case is a term that has been applied in the strategic area. I think that the distinctions between the ^A strategic and theater area ^S have probably been somewhat overdrawn but one needs for example a higher degree of invulnerability in the theater nuclear forces just as we need them in the strategic forces. But I do draw that distinction, I think that it is ^a *relevant* ^Λ distinction to the extent that it applies to the strategic forces. Let me say that there is a problem in this area that the terminology has ~~become~~ become somewhat confused and hard target kill, first strike, ^y disarming first strike are all used interchangeably. What the United States Government has said of late is that neither side can acquire a disarming first strike capability. That the nuclear forces of ~~of both~~ of both superpowers are so extensive

that irrespective of the deployments of additional forces for the foreseeable future, neither side could hope to eliminate the retaliatory capability of the other side against its own cities. So there is no possibility, ^{AS} we would see it, of a disarming first strike. Now, we also have added that it is desirable that both sides avoid seeking a disarming first strike capability. ~~_____~~ I think that this is the underlying point that the questions are designed to elicit, I'm not referring to these questions, ~~_____~~ that the United States does reject the notion that acquisition ^{IF} of the disarming first strike capability by either side is desirable. What we have said is ~~_____~~

— . more -

in your own mind, there has been no Soviet cheating ^{ON} SALT I? Are you satisfied ~~with~~ ^{THAT} verification procedures for SALT II will be adequate?

A: I think what the President indicated was that we have no ~~concrete~~ ^{FIRMED} evidence ^{OF PROOF} ~~the truth~~, that the Soviets have indeed violated the SALT I Agreement ~~when~~ ^{AND} when questions arise they go to the standing Consultative Commission. A number of ambiquities have arisen) ~~AND~~ have gone to the Commission for review. Some of the answers that we have received ~~have~~ have been satisfactory up to a point ~~other~~ ^{AND} other answers are yet to be delivered, but, as yet, we have no demonstrated case of violation by the Soviet Union. There have been ambiquities in a number of areas. I think that with regard to the second half of your question, one must recognize that verification in the forthcoming SALT Agreement cannot be absolutely foolproof. What we must have is a verification ~~procedure~~ procedure that gives us very high confidence that any significant amount of testing of violation overtime would be detected by our intelligence apparatus ~~and~~ and therefore by insuring that verification would preclude significant violation, we diminish substantially the incentive for those very small violations that might have not ^Y affect on the strategic balance.

Q: But what about the replacement of the SS-11 with the 19? The President said that the Russians have not ^{Exploited} the loopholes, you said the 19, in your testimony, ^{THROW-WEIGHT} ~~was~~ ^{three to four} ~~times~~ ^{OF THE} ~~SS-11~~, which ^{would certainly} represent a significant increase, ^{OUR} ~~as defined by~~ ^{unilateral} ban on . . .

A: It is plain, I think, that the deployment by the Soviets of the SS-19 is inconsistent with the American unilateral statement, that was made in Moscow in 1972. It is wholly inconsistent with that statement. The Soviets did not then accept that statement, witness the fact that it was a unilateral statement by the United States. Consequently, the Soviets ^{ARE NOT BOUND} by their treaty or agreement ^Y obligations ^Y to refrain from this deployment of this larger missile which we very much regret. I think that it does the question as to the inherent worth of unilateral statements.

Q: The President's *while DEBATE RAISES ANOTHER QUESTION*

~~that~~ about the credibility of public officials. ~~you~~ ^{ADVANTAGES} you have one on the Senate side saying that there have been violations, there have been ~~evidence~~ of loopholes ~~yourself~~ and others in the Administration say there is no evidence of it, who do we believe? A former Secretary of Defense has joined the debate on the side of the Senate?

A: I think that Pete you will have to examine your soul and conscience be your guide in this matter.

Q: My soul and conscience are totally empty on this issue.

A: I'm glad that that emptiness is confined only to this issue.

Q: Mr. Secretary, I'd like to follow up that question on the 19⁷⁵ ~~wasn't~~ that anticipated in the ^{VIADAVOSTOK} Accords?

A: Anticipated may be the wrong verb, but

Q: We assumed they were going to do this, didn't we?

A: By that time, it was evident that they were moving ahead in light of their ^{R+D} testing of the SS-19 and the 17, which had a ~~max~~ throwweight very substantially in excess of the U.S. definition of what constituted a light missile in 1972, and that they were going ahead with that.

Q: WASN'T IT THE VOLUME THAT WAS THE TEST?

A: In the Agreement, the volume is the test. I think you may have missed what I said just a moment ago. The American unilateral statement in 1972 declared that any missile that was larger than the largest light missile then deployed would be construed by the United States as a heavy missile. That was the American unilateral statement. As you indicate, the Agreement itself referred only to increasing the silo dimensions.

Q: Does it help in this public discussion to have a former Secretary of Defense make flat charges against Russia as he has and then have the President come out and deny them? How can the public reach any understanding or any conclusion about

the accuracy of this? Who do you agree with, Mr. Laird or the President?

A: Of course, I support the President's position. I think that I stated that position as I understand it a moment ago. I think that what we have repeatedly said, is that there are ambiguities that must be resolved by reference ^{THROUGH} the ~~the~~ standing Consultative Commissions and there are ambiguities. Those who are too impatient to allow the deliberative processes of ~~consultative~~ processes established by the Moscow Agreement and Treaty in the form of the standing Consultative Commission are not patient enough to wait for those processes to work themselves out and therefore they are prepared to leave ^R the conclusions but ~~let me~~ ^{REASON} let me reason that all of the issues are ambiguous and for that reason they must be discussed in the negotiating framework if we are to make any kind of an Agreement on Arms Control work.

~~Q: Yesterday saying that the SET had cleared this bill?~~

~~A: They have a~~

Q: On another area of allegations ^{OF} ~~and~~ violations ~~THAT WAS NOT ADDRESSED~~ by the President; there was an allegation made by Mr. Laird that one of the violations of the Soviet Union had to do with the deployment of radar systems that could be used for a heavy ABM system which would be , if it was deployed for that purpose, ~~might be~~ a violation of SALT I. Apparently, this is based upon some intelligence in the change in the structure of radar systems, do you have any information on that?

A: Once again, I think that one must read the American unilateral statement ^Y the ~~unilateral~~ statement indicated that ~~testing would be acceptable~~ range ^{SAFETY} and instrumentation testing would be acceptable indicated in the unilateral statement. So there is an inherent ambiguity ~~in the fact~~ at that point ^Y also I believe, and Joe will check it out for you, that ⁱⁿ this particular case we have had a satisfactory resolution.

Q: Well that ^{Simply} ~~what he really~~ means ~~is~~ that ^{IF THERE WAS} a violation, it has stopped ^{AS MR. LAIRD SAID} that system was ^{WE} if ~~it~~ had a satisfactory answer ^Y isn't it apparent ^Y that

turned on in violation of the '72 AGREEMENT?

A: First let me reiterate, there's an American unilateral statement which indicates that ^{FOR} ~~the~~ range safety and instrumentation, there is a lack of clarity ^{AS TO} whether some thing or the other is indeed a violation or not. Secondly, you are, I think, employing the term violation in a stricter way than probably it is interpreted. The Treaty establishes a set of procedures ~~it~~ ^{it} says if a question arises that there will be a method of adjudication of the differences between the two parties, hopefully ^{as-via-} to resolve these questions, ~~now~~ ^{now} what you've said here, what you described as a violation, I think others would describe as a question has arisen which in this case, has been satisfactorily resolved as I recall.

Q: Could you resolve some ambiguities about that first use? ^{YOU HAVE HELD OUT} ~~THAT WE WILL NOT~~ ^{DISAVOW.}
first use ^{Does This} ~~first~~ apply the first use in a tactical sense could ~~it~~ involve a ^J TRIDENT missile from Charleston, S.CAR. on the one hand and on the other hand, would you tell us where the target would be, ^{WOULD} ~~where~~ the Soviet Union itself would be included or excluded in the target area in tactical use?

Q: Does this imply that first ~~XXXX~~ use, in a tactical sense,
 ✓ Would involve a Trident missile from Charleston S.C. on the one
 hand, and on the other hand would you tell us where the target
 would be -- would the Soviet Union itself be excluded or included
 as a target area, *in a tactical use?*

A: I think that this is fairly clear in terms of ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~
 our nuclear doctrine in the posture statement and elsewhere. First
 use could conceivably, let me underscore conceivably, involve
 ~~strategic~~ what we define as strategic forces and possibly,
 possibly, underscore possibly, involve selective strikes at the
 Soviet Union. We do not necessarily exclude that but it is indeed
 a very, very *low* ~~remote~~ probability.

Q: Did you say selective or selected?

A: Selective.

Q: Could you just tell us how this ~~Consultative~~ Commission
 ~~that~~ would adjudicate differences on these questions, how it works?

A: Each side raises questions about possible violations or
 ambiguities as it sees them, that the other side has undertaken. The
 parties then return to their respective governments and bring back
 whatever response or clarification of the practice, is made available
 by the governments and the other party sees whether this indeed
 resolves the issue, removes the ambiguity sufficiently so that the
 useful ~~commission~~ can be withdrawn.

Q: Who is on the Consultative Commission?

A: The U.S. *Commissioner* ~~Chairman~~ is *Royce* I believe. *Mr. Laiter*

You can get back to *him* with the precise structure of the committee.

Q: Mr. Secretary, in light of the discussion perhaps this
 morning it would be helpful if you could one, characterize for us

kind of the Soviet attitude and conduct in carrying out the SALT agreement. Are you pleased with it, are you alarmed by it, are you ~~xxxxx~~ satisfied with it dissatisfied with it, in view of these ambiguities though not violations, ^Aand secondly; ~~xxx~~ against this backdrop, could you give us some sense of what do you think the immediate outlook is for a new SALT agreement this fall? One gets signs that would seem to indicate that the original timetable may have to slip very far and there are some suggestions that ~~x~~ in the arms control community that indeed another agreement is very unlikely.

A: ~~Well~~ ^Qlet me state that I think there is a good chance that we will have an agreement this fall, I do not think ^{but} it is necessarily in the workd, on the other hand, I think that the negotiations have not been unpromising. Now I very carefully used a double negative there. I wouldn't call them so promising that ~~xxxxxxxx~~ one can necessarily say now that there will be an agreement but they have been making reasonable progress. What was the first question Dick?

^Q: I was wondering, sir, if you could characterize your view of the spirit in which the Soviets have carried out the present SALT agreements. We've been focusing on the details here and we get into a debate over violations vs ambiguities, ~~is it~~ ^Aare they pressing to the very limits repeatedly, are you dissatisfied in this sense with their performance under the agreement or how would you characterize that?

A: I think that the Soviets have been inclined to probe a little bit more into gray areas than we would prefer. But, generally, overall, they have been respectful of the broad outlines of the Agreement

not only in letter but I believe generally in spirit. In certain areas they have not been overly ~~meticulous~~ meticulous and those are areas in which ambiguities have arisen which are a disappointment to us and we are seeking clarification.

Q: Would you give us a boxscore on ambiguities -- so many ambiguities; ~~so many resolved; so many unresolved.~~ ^{so many resolved; ~~so many~~ unresolved.}

Q: What are some of the resolved ones?

A: No we look upon this more in terms of an ~~earned~~ ^{they} earned run average than we do

Q: I'll take that.

A: I can't discuss that.

Q: ~~Mr. Secretary,~~ Mr. Secretary, on that selective strike statement you made earlier,

A: You mean earlier to day?

Q: ~~Just a few minutes ago~~ ^{Yes} that you didn't rule out first use or selective strikes involving strategic weaponry against the Soviet Union. I can read it back to you but basically you said it low probability but you did n't exclude it.

A: There were to low probabilities multiplied together.

Q: What makes you think that a selective strike is a feasible option as distinguished from your predecessors who rejected the concept that you could keep the firebreak ~~from~~ between nuclear and conventional weapons ~~in~~ from getting out of hand? In other words, their conclusion was there is no such thing as a small nuclear war; President ~~for~~ ^{Ford} told a couple of reporters yesterday that he regarded your nuclear strategy as "no serious change" which ^{would} indicate there's been some change and do you intend to push fallout shelters because if there's a selective strike against the United State a lot

people could well get killed with the fallout. Are you going to push fallout shelters beyond what you've done already?

A: I think I indicated in my last press conference that I have always felt that civil defense was a serious matter and that it is regrettable that since President Kennedy's abortive attempt in this area that there has been such a disinclination to move ~~xxx~~ ahead. But, I would say here that if you look back at what has been said by prior Secretaries of Defense or prior Presidents, that you find very little evidence, if any, to support the position which you have outlined as a characteristic position in the past. ~~That~~ The notion that a nuclear firebreak if ever breached must inevitably ~~to~~ lead to escalation ~~to~~ to the top has been supported ~~in~~ in either in American military planning nor doctrine nor ~~xxx~~ policy statements. ~~And~~ you can check back through the years and you will find that that the various Secretaries of Defense might have been more or less optimistic with regard to interfering with the process of escalation but none of them thought that the probability was so small that it was not desirable to take advantage of it. Now, the notion that if one ~~uses~~ nuclear weapons that inevitably it must go all the way is one that I understand psychologically but I do not understand the underlying logic or presumed logic of that statement. Presumably escalation is a conscientious choice; there will be very powerful incentives as have been pointed out by Secretary McNamara; Secretary Clifford; Secretary Laf, very powerful incentives. Under such circumstances to avoid further escalation ^{and} for the parties to compose their difference without further damage. I would point out that in the case of Vietnam, that even though nuclear weapons were not involved and were

never, so far as I know, seriously considered, that there was ^{very} very great restraint on the ~~max~~ pace of escalation outside of the nuclear sphere. But I think that it demonstrates ~~xxx~~ ^{that} conscious policy choice indeed ^{as} on occasion ~~has~~ controlled escalation; perhaps wisely, perhaps unwisely, but it has controlled that escalation and it certainly indicates that it can do so in the future, the possibility cannot be dismissed.

Q: Since your reading the record back, just one last point. Secretary Larid has said, even in recent weeks, that he very definitely tried to avoid the appearance of preparing for a first strike, ^{that} he did not want to let the Russians read our preparations into that, ~~and~~ ^A are you saying there's no change in your policy because ~~xxx~~ you're changing the targeting of your missiles to, ... ?

A: You've got two things here, a moment ago you were taking about nuclear threshold

Q: I'm ^{asking} ~~talking~~ about first strike appearances?

A: I think that if you read the letters to Senator Brooke that the underlying thrust of those letters was that the United States would not seek a disarming first strike. As I've indicated, we would prefer that neither side move in the direction of major counterforce capabilities or ~~disarming~~ ^{ing} first strike ~~xx~~ if that were attainable, but that the United States is not prepared to see the Soviet Union unilaterally attain that option and that capability and that we will not be second in this regard. To that extent if you define the letters to Senator Brooke as excluding ~~ing~~ American response to a major Soviet movement towards counterforce capabilities, then the policy has changed. But as you phrase the policy -- Secretary Larid indicated that he would prefer not to move in this

direction in order to avoid giving this appearance to the Soviet Union; Presumably so that they would not feel obliged to respond to an American initiative. In this case, as the questions earlier indicated, the questions about the increase ^{of} ~~about~~ the throw-weight of the SS-19 or SS-17 by a factor of three or four, ~~in~~ the questions ^{reportedly} in violation of the SALT agreement, the Soviets are plowing ahead toward the acquisition of major counterforce capabilities and if you study Soviet doctrine there is no inhibition whatsoever on going after U.S. strategic ~~and~~ capability. That inhibition is something that one sees in U.S. arms controllers; ~~xxxxxxx~~ but in Soviet military doctrine they indicate that they are going first and immediately after U.S. strategic forces silos and the rest.

There is no question about that, their military doctrine states that they are going after our strategic forces; they are reaching for more powerful counterforce capabilities, I don't think that Secretary Laird's desire to avoid tempting the Soviets in this direction would preclude American R&D reaction when the Soviets are beginning to deploy ~~and~~ systems that have very major counterforce capabilities inherent in them.

Q: What is the U.S. reaction, what is the ^{parameter} ~~parameter~~ that you're talking about?

A: We have developed a number of R&D options, ~~and~~ ^{as} you know, there are accuracy improvements which we are developing. There is some small increase in the possible yields of U.S. weapons, I say ~~xxx~~ small increase because the yields of U.S. weapons are a small fraction, a very small fraction, of the yields of Soviet weapons, ^{and} of course, we are building in the hedge of larger throw-weight missiles ~~xxxx~~ both ^{for} ~~the~~ land based version ~~and~~ or in the case of the

Trident submarine, because of the very large tube in that boat,
the possibility of a larger missile, the Trident II ^{D-5} ~~III~~ missile. }???

A I should reiterate that last year when the issue came up, we offered a kind of a swap with the Soviets. We offered in the posture statement and outside of it, to restrain the growth of our own strategic forces if they would exhibit some restraint, Restraint within the guidelines permitted by ~~the treaty~~ within the Agreement. As has been indicated they have stated that they are going to go ahead with anything that is not precluded by the Agreement or Treaty and in the case of throw-weights they have increased their throw-weights by three or four fold in conflict at least with the American unilateral statement on that at Moscow.

Q: Mr. Secretary, do you have any differences, fundamental or otherwise, with Kissinger on these questions

Q | DO YOU HAVE ANY DIFFERENCES, ^{ON} fundamentally or otherwise, ^{ON} with KISSINGER, ~~FOR~~ these questions, particularly the question about the VERIFICATION ~~OF~~ OF THE MIRV-1B?

A: I think that its probably better not to discuss anything with regard to verification of details that have to be negotiated for a future agreement. In general, I think that with regard to the importance of the military balance, on the evolution of the military balance, the importance of continuing American defense effort that SECRETARY KISSINGER AND I AGREE ENTIRELY

Q: You ~~say~~ ^{SEEMED TO IMPLY} in your reply to Charley Corddry ABOUT the possibility of the ^{FIRST} use of nuclear tactical weapons which would include ^A strategic ^C device under ~~some~~ circumstances, ~~that~~ ^{AND} would include a target in the Soviet Union, " " " , a blurring of the line between tactical and strategic weapons that I haven't heard before, could you expand on that a bit?

Q: Are you planning to flag on ^{PLOWING NEW GROUND IN} that statement, Mr. Secretary?

A: No, I'm not planning ^{TO PLOW NEW GROUND} to flag on that. Your fellows are always charging NEW GROUND TO BE PLOWED OR BEING PLOWED ^{I'm} bound to be flogged, or being flogged ~~to~~ restating what has been stated before.

Let me reiterate that any use of nuclear weapons ~~would~~ ^{AND} would be a most agonizing decision for any political leader. That the purpose ~~is~~ ^{AND} thrust of U.S. military strategy in recent years has been to raise the nuclear threshold so that we have serious conventional options that will not drive us to early recourse to nuclear weapons. That is the main thrust. We cannot exclude the possibility but our thrust has been towards ^{RELIANCE} the ~~lives~~ upon conventional capabilities to the extent that we can. Therefore, I would not expect, given any reasonable ^{WAR} stal~~w~~tness of our conventional capabilities, early recourse of nuclear weapons--either strategic or tactical. We however, will ^Lmake use of nuclear weapons should we be faced with serious aggression likely to result in defeat in an area of very great importance to the United States in terms of foreign policy. This has clearly been the case in Western Europe for many years and has been stated again and again by all Secretaries and all Presidents goin

going back to the 1950s with regard to NATO.

~~As you know, in addition, certain of the~~ I don't know whether this ^{blurs} the distinction between tactical and strategic nuclear forces, but ^{as you know} certain of ^{OUR} Poseidon force has ^S been assigned to SACEUR for his general strike plan, or for selective use if that should be necessary. ^{BUT} the target in Eastern Europe ^{NOT THE HOMELAND!}

^{AS QUITE RIGHT} But the point that I was making is that one cannot sharply distinguish between ^{ESSENTIAL} ~~defensive~~ strategic ^{THEATER} weapons and weapons in what have been described as ^{ESSENTIAL} ~~defensive~~ strategic capabilities of the United States in terms of ^S employments as opposed to terms of deployment. Now with regard to the selective strikes ^{ON} of the Soviet Union, I attempted to indicate first that that was a very low, ^{low} probability event, ^{secondly} that we desire to raise the nuclear threshold to have a ^{stallwart} conventional capability that would permit us to have option ^S other than recourse to nuclear weapons and, of course, the possibility you mentioned would be ~~the~~ the most serious possible use of nuclear weapons.

Q: If the policy hasn't changed, then apparently our appreciation of Soviet efforts and capabilities ^{HAS} ^{IF} Secretary Laird ^{FEARED} exciting the Russians to ^{NEW} research and development efforts in his letters to Senator Brock, we seemed to have come around a full circle now for you ^{ARE} casting the United States' role as one responding to ^{THE} Soviet ^{could you chart that 180 degree turn from Laird's concern about exciting the Soviet Union to our current posture now of what following their initiative} ^{IN RESPONDING} When did that appreciation start to change?

A: I would say that our perception of the Soviet ^{PROGRAM} ~~Union~~ began to emerge after the SALT Agreements in May 1972. There was an explosion, ^{an explosion of} an explosion of R&D activity at that time, in the strategic area. Whether it was ^{planned} that way or not, it happened ^{considerable expansion,} ^A ^A dramatic expansion of R&D activity took place after May of 1972.

Q: By the Soviet Union?

A: By the Soviet Union, and you have indications of ~~the~~ the seriousness of

their efforts with regards to the FOUR new ICBMs; the SSN8, the Delta Class, Stretch Delta Class, The Soviet Union is pursuing a very substantial effort in the strategic area which has been so characterized over the last several years.

I think that ~~it has been~~ ^{UP + DESCRIBED} taken ~~out~~ in various publications in those terms. major misgivings

Laird certainly expressed with regard to the intent and the capabilities ~~of labor~~ ^{THAT LAY} behind the SS9 program in the 1969-1970 timeframe.

Q: Can you amplify the ~~what the President did not say~~ ^{AND} ~~did not say~~ what you have said about the

nuclear situation with regard to Korea which is very much in the minds of people at that ^{laymen} ~~the~~ Presidential news conference of last week? We [^] assume we're talking

about tactical weapons when we talk about Korea obviously, maybe we're not but can you ^{CLARIFY} ~~amplify~~ that at all? ~~clarify that~~

A: Yes, I though I might reiterate what I did say at that press conference, ~~and~~ I indicated that the ground forces balance in the Korean peninsula was not unsatisfactory. I reiterated the significant fact that since 1945 no nuclear weapons had been fired in anger; I stated then, as I have stated today that the purpose and ~~thrust~~ ^T of our military policy has to been to raise the nuclear threshold and I also indicated that we cannot foreclose the nuclear option, ~~and~~ I think that what one is saying here is that that the President of the United States should not disclose what he intends to to and he should not disclose his ~~plans~~ -- he will refrain from doing. It is, I beleive, ~~knows~~ that we have deployed nuclear weapons in Europe and Korea along with our forces and that those nuclear weapons are available as options to the President but I reiterate that the main ~~xxxxxx~~ thrust of U.S. policy has been to raise the nuclear threshold. We will not foreclose the use of nuclear weapons.

Q: May I shift ground for a moment, ~~is~~ ^{what} is your view on the ~~Mix~~ ^{Mix} Murphy Commission's report ~~to~~ to recommend that a non-agency ^(unavailable) for the CIA?

A: I think I'll refrain from commenting on that.

Q: *another* aspect of that Mr. Secretary, disregarding personalities whether the same man should occupy the job of Secretary of State and National Security Council. *advised?*

A: I think I'll go back to David's question. Let me be serious about that. I think that we must recognize that every President has a right to organize his *A* Administration as fits his convenience and that he will proceed one way or another to do so either through double-hatting of various individuals or calling on individuals for advice in a number of areas, ~~and~~ I think that these issues with regard to the structuring of the staff arrangement should be resolved by the President of the United States. *A* I think that ~~both Dr. Kissinger~~ *at* both the President and Dr. Kissinger have indicated that the dual-hat arrangement is something that should not be permanent. I think that it has structural weaknesses but I reiterate that these are arrangements that must be decided best to serve the needs of the incumbent in the Presidential Office.

Q: Let me go further away from the nuclear *(candidate)* ~~occupied it~~
Do you see any possibility or are you interested in a Navy *Carrier* configured model of the F-15 as a possible alternate to the F-18, and perhaps more meeting Congress' desire *for* commonality in airplanes?

A: That's a relatively easy question, ~~but~~ it's difficult for me to answer *because* I just have to draw on my memory but my recollection is that we took a good hard look at the carrier version of the F-15 and found that it was unsuitable and *I think* that that ~~final~~ conclusion *still holds.*

Q: Mr. Secretary, to what extent have NATO leaders been consulted and acquiesced in the first use doctrine that you've just outlined this morning?

A: As I've indicated, first use has been NATO strategy ~~for~~ back to the 1950s. *If* there were any hint from the United States Government that we were to accept the blandishments of a few people in the arms control community or a few people on the Hill that we would refrain from first use, that would have a devastating

effect on NATO because NATO depends, in large degree, psychologically as well as in terms of force structure, on nuclear reinforcement of conventional capabilities should that be necessary. It is agreed NATO strategy. *I* It was reiterated in the Ministerial guidance that reflects the shift to flexible responses in 1967. With regard to the strategic aspect of things, the change in doctrine announced a year and a half ago ~~kw~~ towards greater selectivity and flexibility has been universally welcomed in Europe for obvious reasons and it serves to recouple to the extent that ~~it~~ *it* had been decoupled our strategic and tactical nuclear forces.

Q: Very briefly, what seems to be the timetable on the Soviet installation at Berbera and does this mean the Soviets are moving into position to at some point interdict our western oil ~~supply~~ *supply?*

A: Well, the timetable may or may not be undergoing some readjustment at the present time. *You* have an embarrassment of ~~riches~~ *riches* in this area. ~~or~~ *If* you follow radio Moscow the Soviets are indulging in no construction activity in Somalia. *The* MOD Ministry of Defense newspaper states that they are building wharves, meat packing plants, hydrotechnical facilities and the like. There has been all sorts of discussion, I think, in the area of what the Soviets have been doing in Berbera. The point is that ~~the~~ *the* bait now is getting down to the semantics as to whether a Soviet facility with a Somalia base commander ~~if~~ if there is indeed one, is a Soviet facility or whether it's a Somalian facility. We have ~~not~~ *not* been ~~so~~ *so* precise in ~~drawing~~ *drawing* distinctions with regard to facilities Americans use overseas which are not extra-territorial. *I* I think that the missile ~~rework~~ *rework* facility is about 95% complete ~~or~~ *or* was about 95% complete; that they are moving into a position ~~which~~ *which* they can do work in the area. What the Soviet intentions are is difficult to surmise the main point that has been made is that the Soviet logistical capabilities for the support of operation ⁵ in the Indian Ocean ~~is~~ *is* has been improved significantly by the development at Berbera. I guess that

one has got to recognize that there has been some disappointment. The original arguments in the United States were that the Soviets recognized that ~~the~~ Indian Ocean's ^{own} peace and that there couldn't be a facility there and then the next view was that there ~~would~~ might be a little facility there but it wouldn't ~~to~~ involve missiles or missile handling equipment; and now I think the argument ~~is~~ has been reduced to it's a facility ~~that~~ but only a little one. I think it's significant that this is the first of such facility on the Indian Ocean, ^(limited) ~~limited~~ and there are few zones of peace that have been marked at so early a stage of life with the monument represented by a missile handling facility of this type.

Q: Could the cruise missile make the SALT agreement unverifiable? What's the advantage to us of deployment (inaudible), ... ?

A: Very briefly, the cruise missiles are not inherently easy to verify, they are not. The advantage in deployment, from the standpoint of the U.S., is that it enhances the penetrability and the utility of the bomber force which faces defenses unlike our missile forces or ~~the~~ their missile forces. It complicates ^{very} dramatically their airdefense problems, that is the ~~is~~ significance of the cruise in a strategic role. In the future, a cruise missile could have significance in a tactical role.

Q: One question about the Middle East before we depart. Given what you said about ~~foreign policy~~, lack of foreign policy, and first use of nuclear weapons, ^{a security} Can one assume that if we give ~~the~~ guarantee to Israel that it would be a nuclear umbrella such as we assure the Japanese?

A: If you could back and read what President Johnson said at the time of the signing of non-proliferation treaty, that was at least the hint of ~~an~~ nuclear umbrella provided by the U.S. for any non-nuclear weapon state that was prepared to sign that treaty and was subject to attack ^{or} threat from a nuclear weapons state. So there was a move in that direction under President Johnson and incidentally for good reason.

One of the major constraints on the spread of nuclear weapons and the ^{limited} desire

for acquisition of nuclear weapons has been the predominate role of the US/ and the Soviet Union. To the extent that those roles shrink in terms of nuclear protection, the size of nuclear capability, the incentive to acquire nuclear weapons increases. So that President Johnson's observations match directly the responsibility of the nuclear weapons states to the ^{willingness} ~~willings~~ of the non-nuclear states to forego the attempted acquisition. We have such a tentative commitment. I think that it would be inappropriate at this time to go much beyond that with regard to Israel ^{and} ~~and~~ to say that the U.S. would view greatly the use of nuclear weapons by any state and that reiterating what I said earlier, since 1945 no nuclear weapons have been used in anger. That is a most desirable historical development; surprising, I think, it would be surprising to many in the 1950s that this non-nuclear use has continued ^{for} ~~so long~~ ^{so long} ~~we~~ would give view with grave concern/ anybody breaking that historical...

Q: Do you consider Israel a non-nuclear state?

~~Q:~~ Q: They would have to sign the treaty before anything that you said would apply, wouldn't they?

A: Yes sir.

Q: ~~Theyx~~ Do you consider that they have nuclear weapons?

A: I'm not in position to say that.

Q: ~~Letx~~ Before we break up, I'd like to mention that if any of you wish to Call Mr.

Laitin's office, he has prepared a compilation of ~~w~~ official statements on nuclear ~~policy~~ ^{made by Presidents and} Secretaries of State, Secretaries of Defense and others. Its available

I would like to thank you Mr. Secretary for being with us today.

END

Ron Nease

Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger
Interviewed on ABC-TV "Issues and Answers"

By Robert Clark, ABC News Correspondent,
and Frank Tomlinson, ABC Pentagon News Correspondent,
Sunday, July 6, 1975

Voice: Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, here are the issues:
Is the danger of nuclear war increasing despite efforts to slow the nuclear
arms race? Could the U.S. make first use of nuclear weapons without risking
full scale nuclear war? Can South Korea hold the line against new Communist
aggression from the North without American nuclear weapons?

Mr. Clark: My guest is Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger; with me
is ABC's news Pentagon correspondent Frank Tomlinson. We're not sure, Mr.
Schlesinger, whether it's possible to talk rationally and responsibly about
the emotional and politically explosive issue of using nuclear weapons, but
we're going to try. Our first question is one that's bothering some people
this Fourth of July weekend and that is, is the danger of nuclear war increasing
despite the efforts to slow down the nuclear arms race?

Secretary Schlesinger: Let me start by picking up your reference to
the Fourth of July, because I think it is worth while for us to reflect about
the changes in this 200 years since the Battles of Lexington and Concord.
From a small collection of 13 colonies the United States has now become
one of the two superpowers. In terms of maintaining worldwide military
balance for the protection of freedom, the United States today is the only
nation that can serve as the appropriate counter weight to Soviet power and
that is a considerable role in the questions that we are about to discuss.
Why don't you take off from that point?

Mr. Clark: All right, I'll just ask that other question again. Is there
an increasing danger of nuclear war in the world despite all the efforts made
by the Soviets and the United States to slow down the nuclear arms race?

A: I believe the answer to that is that for major nuclear conflict the
answer is unequivocally no. By and large the agreements that have been
reached with the Soviet Union, including the Nixon-Brezhnev Agreement at
San Clemente, on the prevention of nuclear war, helped to diminish what was
already a very low probability of major nuclear conflict occurring.

Mr. Clark: You have been accused, Mr. Secretary, of making alarming
and irresponsible statements, accused by Democratic Presidential candidates
of making alarming and irresponsible statements, when you said that we might
possibly make the first use of nuclear weapons against targets in the Soviet
Union. Would you begin by explaining precisely what you meant when you said that

A: Well, I think that there has been no fundamental change in American
strategy in that regard save that we have over the past fifteen years steadily
attempted to diminish the emphasis on the nuclear threat and on the first use
of nuclear weapons. We all recall, I think, the policy of massive retaliation
which Secretary Dulles described as striking at times and in places of our
own choosing. Since the early 1960's we have attempted to reduce the reliance

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on those nuclear weapons by improving our conventional forces and keeping the nuclear threshold high. There is the residual possibility that in the event of major aggression against the United States and its allies, that the United States may have to employ nuclear weapons, but the thrust of our policy has been in the other direction to attempt to raise the nuclear threshold rather than to lower it.

Mr. Tomlinson: I think a lot of people will get excited about that statement that's attributed to you, and several newspapers and programs that you would not exclude the possible first use, but we run into semantics here, I think. What's the difference between first use, first strike and what we call a disarming first strike?

A: Well, let me start with the first use question. For many years the United States has relied for deterrence purposes on the possibility of employing nuclear weapons. As I indicated, we've tried to reduce the likelihood of that to raise the nuclear threshold but first use has been U.S. policy and we have been under pressure in the past from other countries to disavow the first use of nuclear weapons because it would undermine deterrence. No Administration has ever done that. No Administration has seriously contemplated moving them in that direction.

In the case of Europe, the strategy in the 1950s and up until 1967 was largely in terms of a thin conventional force and if that force was penetrated that nuclear weapons would be immediately employed. So the U.S. has consistently had a policy of refraining from disavowing first use and I think that the question that was addressed to the President may have led to some misconception in that area. An erroneous conclusion was drawn from an erroneous premise. We have had a policy of avoiding the development of what is called a disarming first strike that could remove from the Soviet Union or if the Soviets move in that direction, hypothetically remove from the U.S. the ability to retaliate. Development of major counter force capabilities on both sides which threaten a disarming first strike would be disadvantageous to both sides and we've discouraged that development but I do not think, given the technological possibilities that there is any real threat of that. We still lean against that.

Mr. Tomlinson: You were talking -- I believe the words were "an all-out nuclear war." What's the possibility and many people say there is no possibility of limited nuclear response by either side?

A: I think that there are very powerful incentives if, and this is a very low probability event, nuclear weapons were actually employed, there would be very powerful incentives to suppress the conflict before it became destructive. I think as one looks at the Vietnam experience, even without any suggestion of the use of nuclear weapons, there were powerful forces that prevented major escalation.

Mr. Clark: You said a moment ago in the event of major aggression by another power the U.S. might possibly make first use of nuclear weapons. I think that's an area of misunderstanding in your meeting with reporters this past week. Some of them reported it as if there could be first use nuclear weapons by the U.S. even though we were not involved in a war already with

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the other country. Did you mean that it could come only after there had been major conventional aggression by another power?

A: Absolutely. That's clearly a misunderstanding. I think most of the newsmen who were there understood that entirely. The United States, of course, has been a member of the NATO Alliance. We have indicated for many years that the strategic forces of the United States are available for the protection of the United States and its allies. NATO is a defensive alliance. Only in the case of major aggression in which there was the threat or the reality of the overwhelming of conventional forces would nuclear weapons have to be employed.

Mr. Clark: If this condition occurred, would the response, even then, be limited to military targets whether it was a missile launching site or other specific military targets as opposed to cities or industrial targets?

A: I think you are referring there to strategic forces.

Mr. Clark: As you did in your session with reporters, giving it a very limited concept.

A: Right, but the primary emphasis was on tactical nuclear weapons at that time which are essentially designed to go after military targets. What we do is to retain the options for a President at such an occasion if aggression were to occur to determine what response would be appropriate. I cannot exclude, of course, going after other than military or economic targets but I think that once again there would be powerful disincentives to start with such other classes of targets.

Mr. Tomlinson: You seem to be talking almost like John Foster Dulles did twenty or twenty-five years ago, almost talking about going to the brink. Is this a warning to other nations that we have this equipment and we will use it need be?

A: Absolutely not. I think that what we are saying here is to reiterate what is established American military policy. As I've indicated, in the 1950's, nuclear weapons were regarded as the equivalent of conventional weapons. It was said at that time by the President that nuclear weapons had become conventional. We want to draw a very sharp distinction between conventional and nuclear weapons and retain that distinction. Moreover, what we have attempted to do is to increase the nuclear threshold to provide us with alternatives other than early recourse to nuclear weapons.

It would be desirable if this were more widely understood because there have been people who have argued that we should remove our forces from Europe -- our conventional forces -- and that would drive us in the direction of greater reliance on nuclear weapons and, of course, implicitly coming closer to first use. That is undesirable.

Mr. Tomlinson: In other words, then as long as we keep up that force in Europe, in NATO, there's a lot less chance of a nuclear confrontation coming about?

A: That is precisely right and that is the heart of the ministerial guidance on NATO strategy. We must retain a major stalwart conventional capability and the United States plays its role in that.

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Mr. Tomlinson: Have you been able to sell this to the people on Capitol Hill who were calling for a pullback in Europe?

A: I think that there is a far better atmosphere on Capitol Hill this year than there was, say two years ago, with regard to that issue. And that generally speaking as Vietnam has faded as a consideration, more and more people on the Hill recognize the importance of NATO to the survival of the United States as a free nation.

Mr. Clark: Mr. Secretary, the mere mention of nuclear weapons still brings a loud alarm bell here in the Capital. As you recall I'm sure, in the 1964 Presidential campaign, Lyndon Johnson very successfully used the public concern that Barry Goldwater would somehow be the first to order the use of nuclear weapons, the first since World War II, and he used to wave his finger at political crowds and say, "Whose finger do you want on that nuclear trigger?" Are you and President Ford in even daring to discuss use of nuclear weapons risking the serious political peril?

A: I think that there are two aspects to that. First, that nuclear weapons have arrived. They have not been employed since 1945; they have not been employed in anger or otherwise and we intend to keep it that way through effective deterrents. That is a continuation of the policies of prior Administrations. Now in the particular issue that was raised by President Johnson with regard to Senator Goldwater, what President Johnson was insisting was that the American President retain control over the authorization of the use of nuclear weapons. That issue was resolved then. I think that it has been effectively resolved and of course in this regard President Ford agrees entirely with the position that President Johnson took then.

Mr. Clark: We want to talk more about nuclear problems and nuclear perils; we'll be back in just a moment with more issues and answers. You said this week, Mr. Secretary, and I'd like to quote your precise words on this, you said we'd use nuclear weapons if we were faced with serious aggression "likely to result in defeat in any area of very great importance to the United States." Does that specifically include Korea?

A: We cannot exclude Korea, but of course the main emphasis of American policy with regard to nuclear strategy has been our common involvement with the nations of Western Europe in NATO.

Our pledges, of course, deal there with what has been perceived to be major, and some would say overwhelming, Soviet and Warsaw Pact conventional forces. In the Korean Peninsula, as I've indicated, conventional balance is not unsatisfactory. While we cannot dismiss the possibility I think that that is a very unlikely event.

Mr. Tomlinson: What about Korea? How serious is the situation there?

They claim that the North Koreans are moving towards the border with airfields and tanks; they're digging tunnels, and we have approximately 40,000 men there. How serious is that situation? Do we face the possible war situation there?

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A: I would say that whatever possibilities there were, which were basically low, have receded in recent weeks. I think that the fall of Vietnam, which caused the reverberations all around the world, led to some view that the United States might be collapsing in Asia and that this might be an opportunity for North Korea to complete what it started in 1950. I think that they have recognized that the United States forces and commitment to Korea remains strong and I would believe that they will continue to be deterred from any outright aggression.

Mr. Tomlinson: What's going to happen if the U.N. accepts that proposal to end the U.N. Command in Korea? Is that just sort of prior planning there because it looks like the U.N. is going to vote it out anyway and just make it an American Command, what it really is?

A: I think that this, assuming that it develops, is just an adjustment from the formal structures of twenty years ago and would not have a significant impact on our deterrent posture. Let me say that the purpose once again of America's military deployments are to deter war across an entire spectrum of risk and we have been successful in that in the past, in Korea, and in Europe and in Europe and I would expect that would continue to be the case.

Mr. Clark: You have emphasized, Mr. Secretary, that we are trying to raise nuclear threshold, meaning that we are trying to maintain such strong conventional forces that we reduce the risk of nuclear war. Doesn't Korea present a special problem in that regard, in that we have a small conventional force of 38,000 American troops reduced to that level because hardly anybody believes the American people would support a commitment of a large American force to another Asian ground war? Doesn't that make it more difficult to rely on conventional (inaudi

A: To the extent that conventional capabilities are inadequate, of course, that would be the case. But as I indicated, the conventional balance is not unsatisfactory. On the ground, the South Koreans maintain major forces. The biggest problem with regard to Korea is that Seoul lies so close to the demarcation line and as a consequence a rapid thrust towards Seoul might take it and that might be tempting, but overall the conventional balance is reasonably satisfactory.

Mr. Clark: Would we permit the fall of Seoul without resorting to at least tactical nuclear weapons?

A: I could not prejudge that question. I would have to say that the President of the United States must examine the situation at the time that it develops. As I have indicated many times, the decision to use nuclear weapons would be an agonizing decision for any political leader.

Mr. Clark: Frank mentioned those tunnels that the North Koreans have been building. Some of those are between Seoul and the 38th Parallel where the Communists have had ever since the Korea War a very extensive network of tunnels. I was rather fascinated in rereading former President Eisenhower's memoirs the other night that he had been warned by General MacArthur at the time that he was trying to get us out of the Korean War, warned about those tunnels and said the tunnels would make it difficult to employ tactical nuclear weapons

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and for that reason we would probably have to go to the use of limited strategic weapons attacking staging areas in North Korea and even in China. Now that's a long question but that essentially is the plan that President Eisenhower bought. He sent that warning to the Chinese and to the North Koreans that we would have to go to nuclear weapons. Couldn't that be a scenario for what would happen again if we saw new Communist aggression from the North?

A: I could not prejudge once again what the President would determine to do under the hypothetical circumstances that you've outlined. I think that all Presidents have been exceedingly careful about the application of American power and particularly concerned about the application of nuclear power. Nuclear weapons would be employed only under cases of outright aggression and where circumstances were indeed so desperate that there seemed to be no other alternative.

Mr. Tomlinson: I'd like to follow up again, to go back to that low probability of the use of such weapons against the Soviet Union. You were, were you not, speaking strictly of a war situation, not a first strike where the United States would attack anyone?

A: Of course. The United States, once again, has always been in a defensive posture. The commitments to NATO are commitments to a defensive alliance. I think that it should be restated unequivocally that what we are talking about is a response to an aggression and that the purpose of a projected response is to deter. Deterrence is intended to make a recourse to force by somebody hostile to use an unattractive alternative.

Mr. Tomlinson: I believe you mentioned that we do have tactical nuclear weapons in Korea and also didn't you mention in a news conference recently that new orders or new envelopes had been given to some crews of the Strategic Air Command? Are we changing our defense posture any?

A: No, I think I have not mentioned any such thing. About eighteen months ago we did discuss the change in U.S. strategic doctrine with an emphasis on flexibility and selectivity as opposed to the prior emphasis on large-scale, massive, strikes which struck us as too destructive and consequently the spectrum of options open to the President should be broadened. There has been some training, some discussion of these things but there has not been new instruction envelopes issued to crews.

Mr. Clark: We wanted to talk to you also, Mr. Secretary, about the special problem of proliferation of nuclear weapons to other countries, some of which might be very irresponsible in their use. The predictions are now that anywhere from five to ten more countries, I think there are six in the nuclear club now who have nuclear weapons, anywhere between five and ten more will soon have the technical knowledge and capacity to build them. Do you stay awake at night worrying about that?

A: I've worried about nuclear proliferation for many years and for the past ten to fifteen years a number of countries have had the technical base to build nuclear weapons. They have not had the incentive in the past and one of the reasons they have lacked that incentive is that they have felt that

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nuclear umbrella provided by the U.S. is satisfactory. That's one of the reasons that we must approach the problem of clarity of thought. Merely ignoring the existence of nuclear weapons in the U.S. might be an inducement to others to go in the direction of acquiring nuclear capability.

Mr. Clark: Should we use the promise of our nuclear umbrella, the protection of our nuclear umbrella to pressure countries that have not signed the nuclear proliferation treaty into signing it?

A: I think that some thought could be given to that. But generally speaking, the attitude of the American government has been clear; that we would urge other countries to sign the nonproliferation treaty; that nuclear proliferation will be a menace all over the world.

Mr. Clark: I'm thinking about Israel which has never signed the non-proliferation treaty and presumed to be one of those countries that has nuclear capacity, if indeed, it has not already built a nuclear device. Would that be a quid pro quo that would help settle Middle East crises if we would assure them the protection of our nuclear umbrella, the protection against annihilation so that they would not use nuclear weapons themselves?

A: I think that in part that has been done. You will recall President Johnson's words at the time of the signing of the non-proliferation treaty in which he indicated that the U.S. would be prepared to take action in support of non-nuclear powers that were under threat of attack.

Mr. Clark: Let me be clear about this. Do you think our nuclear umbrella now covers Israel?

A: I stick to the words that President Johnson employed at that time. I think that the U.S. has felt an obligation to non-nuclear weapons States that were under threat of nuclear attack. That is different from our unequivocal pledges to use the nuclear forces of the U.S. to protect the U.S. and its allies in the case, for example, of NATO.

Mr. Clark: This has been a fascinating discussion. Thank you for being with us on "Issues and Answers."

Secretary Schlesinger: A pleasure to be here.

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TELEVISION PROGRAM TO "NBC'S MEET THE PRESS."

M E E T T H E P R E S S

Produced by Betty Dukert

SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 23, 1975

GUEST:

JAMES R. SCHLESINGER - Former Secretary of Defense

MODERATOR:

Bill Monroe

PANEL:

John Cochran - NBC News

John Finney - New York Times

Henry Trewhitt - Baltimore Sun

Richard Levine - Wall Street Journal

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MEET THE PRESS



1 MR. MONROE: Our guest today on MEET THE PRESS is former
2 Secretary of Defense, James R. Schlesinger. Three weeks ago
3 President Ford dismissed Mr. Schlesinger as Defense Secretary,
4 a post he had held for more than two years. Before that he had
5 served during the Nixon Administration as Director of the CIA
6 and as head of the Atomic Energy Commission.

7 We will have the first questions now from John Cochran
8 of NBC News.

9 MR. COCHRAN: Mr. Schlesinger, as I believe you know, the
10 House Intelligence Committee has voted to cite Secretary
11 of State Kissinger for contempt, partly on the grounds that he
12 refused to turn over a letter that you allegedly wrote about
13 a year ago to the National Security Council, asking for top-
14 level discussion of Soviet violations of the SALT I agreement.
15 There seems to be some doubt whether you ever wrote such a
16 letter. Did you?

17 MR. SCHLESINGER: I do not recall any such letter. I
18 have asked my staff to check, and they report that there is no
19 such letter. I have not had access to my files.

20 MR. COCHRAN: Well, now I know that you perhaps are not
21 personally close any more to Secretary Kissinger,
22 but the fact is, do you think he is taking a bum rap on this
23 contempt citation?

24 MR. SCHLESINGER: Well, I am not familiar with the details.
25 I think, with regard to the letter, clearly that is not



1 an accurate charge.

2 MR. COCHRAN: Now that committee is concerned about
3 the fact that the Ford Administration may be concealing docu-
4 mentation of Soviet violations of the SALT I accord. You re-
5 portedly have complained in private, whether you wrote this
6 letter or not, about such violations, and you said the other
7 day you felt the Soviets have not lived up to the spirit of
8 the SALT I agreement. Can you be more precise?

9 MR. SCHLESINGER: Well, I don't want to go into details with
10 respect to that, but I think that one must anticipate that the
11 Soviets will test the dimensions of any agreement that they
12 sign. In a number of respects, if they have not violated
13 the letter of the agreement, they have clearly violated
14 what we said would be a violation of the agreement in our
15 unilateral statements, so they have failed to meet our expecta-
16 tions. But there are sufficient ambiguities in the agreement
17 that one cannot demonstrate conclusively that any particular
18 action on their part is a violation.

19 MR. COCHRAN: Do you think the United States and President
20 Ford in particular have been tough enough in dealing with the
21 Russians on these violations, whether they are violations or
22 ambiguities or whatever?

23 MR. SCHLESINGER: I would have preferred to see a represen-
24 tation to the Soviets through the SCC more rapidly in some
25 cases than actually occurred.

* * *



1 MR. FINNEY: Mr. Schlesinger, I would like to turn to the
2 problem of the budget, which I suspect was one of the underly-
3 ing causes for your dismissal.

4 You recall that after you said that the House of Representa-
5 tives made savage cuts in the Defense budget, George Mahon,
6 the Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, responded,
7 "I believe that most Americans would agree that \$90." b 11
8 for the Defense Department is, if managed and spent wisely,
9 adequate at a time when no United States military forces are
10 engaged in combat and the nation is faced with a huge deficit
11 and an increase in the national debt of \$80 billion this year."

12 Now, how would you respond to Mr. Mahon's comment?

13 MR. SCHLESINGER: I think that the underlying point is
14 that if we want to stay at peace and we want to maintain a
15 stable world order, that we must maintain an adequate military
16 balance. The trends are starkly adverse over the last seven
17 or eight years with respect to U.S. and Soviet military
18 capability.

19 The first claim on our resources, it seems to me, should
20 be to keep the form of society that the United States has
21 secure, and consequently I would think that we are prepared to
22 make adequate defense expenditures.

23 The other aspect that you mention is this illusion
24 that has transfixed us back for 25 years, that somehow there
25 are some techniques of management that will transform the



1 Department of Defense. It is an illusion that came over us
2 after World War II, when Secretary Johnson talked about cutting
3 the fat and not muscle, just before the Korean War.

4 We are not going to be in a position dramatically to cut
5 manpower, procurement, year after year, and hope that through
6 some miraculous rise in productivity we can maintain a Defense
7 establishment equivalent to that of the Soviet Union.

8 MR. FINNEY: Let's get to the question of management then,
9 sir. Why should the American people have any confidence
10 that the Pentagon is wisely spending their money when the
11 Defense Department spends, invests \$7.5 billion developing
12 an ABM system and then when the one station goes into opera-
13 tion, you decide to close it down?

14 MR. SCHLESINGER: I think the answer to that is very clear.
15 The development of the ABM system, and only the advanced
16 U.S. technology in that area permitted the United States to
17 arrive at an ABM treaty with the Soviet Union that has precluded
18 this type of weapons development. If we had not gone into
19 the development of an ABM system, there would be no ABM treaty
20 today, and consequently the opportunity to criticize the
21 management of the Department of Defense would be absent.

22 MR. LEVINE: Mr. Schlesinger, President Ford, your succes-
23 sor at the Pentagon, Donald Rumsfeld, insists that the U.S. is
24 and must remain second to none militarily. My question is,
25 are we No. 1, today?

MR. SCHLESINGER: In a number of aspects we are.



1 We still have an edge in strategic nuclear power, though that
2 will diminish as the Soviets deploy their new generation of
3 weapons. We probably have a qualitative edge in tactical air.
4 In terms of naval forces, we have equivalent naval forces to the
5 Soviet Union, but the demands upon us are much stronger.

6 The great problem of the United States and its allies
7 are the very powerful ground and attack forces and growing
8 mobility forces of the Soviet Union that can be used around the
9 periphery.

10 There is some question whether the forces of the United
11 States and her allies are equal to a military challenge.

12 MR. LEVINE: Mr. Schlesinger, you have also said that
13 President Ford and the Office of Management and Budget in plan-
14 ning the Fiscal 77 Defense budget were indicating that some
15 \$10 billion should be cut from that budget, from the original
16 projections made a year ago. Can the United States maintain
17 adequate military forces if that \$10 billion comes out of the
18 budget in Fiscal 77?

19 MR. SCHLESINGER: Well, I trust that the Administration
20 will not make such a decision ultimately, but the effect of
21 that would be to submit a budget that is 5 or 6 percent lower
22 in real terms than a year ago. And the outlay reductions
23 associated with that would force us to remove 200,000 men or
24 more from our military establishment, and we would have to start
25 removing them about February 1st in order to get the full year



1 savings next year.

2 Now, a shrinkage of the force structure of that sort is not
3 consistent with maintaining a military balance in a period of
4 time in which the Soviets have expanded in every conceivable
5 area.

6 MR. LEVINE: Given your very substantive policy difference
7 with the President over this issue of budget for the Defense
8 Department, can you as a Republican, as a former member of
9 the Ford Cabinet, support the President in the upcoming 1976
10 election?

11 MR. SCHLESINGER: Well, I have always been inclined to
12 support the Republican candidate. There are, as you point out,
13 some very important issues, central issues to the security of
14 the United States. But we would have to see how those issues
15 shaped up in the election.

16 I do not recall at the last election that the Democratic
17 Party offered a candidate more dedicated to national security
18 problems than the Republican candidate.

19 MR. TREWHITT: Mr. Schlesinger, from what you know of
20 the military and political positions of both the United States
21 and the Soviet Union, do you think a new Strategic Arms
22 Limitation Agreement is possible before 1977?

23 I would point out to you that, officially for the
24 record, the possibility is still open. But does it seem
25 realistic to you?



1 MR. SCHLESINGER: I am always hopeful there may be such
2 an agreement, but because of the changing attitudes
3 in the Soviet Union and perhaps the beginning of a start of
4 a succession crisis in the Soviet Union, I think that the
5 likelihood of such an agreement has diminished.

6 MR. TREWHITT: Would you care to put a scale of value on
7 that? Is it likely? Is it unlikely?

8 MR. SCHLESINGER: It is less likely, and I would
9 think that it is probably less than 50/50, now.


10 MR. TREWHITT: The President has never really said why he
11 let you go, Mr. Schlesinger. He said merely that he was uncom-
12 fortable with the sort of argument he perceived between you and
13 the Secretary of State.

14 Do you get the sense that the President is depriving him-
15 self of a sort of cross-fertilization of views which are
16 essential in the decision-making process?

17 MR. SCHLESINGER: I think it would be inappropriate for me
18 to comment on that. I think that the President must seek the
19 kind of counsel that he finds valuable to him.

20 The question of significance that I do know was the '77
21 budget and I am not really in a position to speculate on all
22 the currents or cross-currents that may have occurred in the
23 White House.

24 MR. MONROE: Was the '77 Defense budget the chief reason
25 why the President dismissed you, Mr. Schlesinger?



1 MR. SCHLESINGER: I cannot speculate on just what the total
2 pattern of motivation was. I think it was the chief substan-
3 tive issue that I discerned as we marched along through these
4 last months.

5 MR. MONROE: Did differences between you and Secretary
6 Kissinger over concessions toward detente enter into the
7 picture?

8 MR. SCHLESINGER: I think you would have to address that
9 question to somebody else. So far as I can see, there is value
10 to President -- as Mr. Trewhitt indicates -- to have differing
11 points of view with regard to the issues that he must ulti-
12 mately decide.

13 MR. MONROE: Do you find it inappropriate for the President
14 to appoint politically active men to head up the Defense Depart-
15 ment and the CIA?

16 MR. SCHLESINGER: I think I would prefer to refrain from
17 comment with regard to the CIA. The President should have in
18 these positions men in whom he has personal confidence, and
19 that is the purpose of appointing Mr. Rumsfeld, I believe.
20 And I think that Mr. Rumsfeld, with his backing, can do a very
21 capable job at the Pentagon.

22 MR. COCHRAN: Mr. Schlesinger, the other day when your
23 successor, Donald Rumsfeld was being sworn in on the Pentagon
24 grounds as Secretary of Defense, President Ford spoke and
25 he said "You all know where I stand on defense."



1 Now, some people in this town aren't so sure they do under-
2 stand where he stands on defense, especially with an election
3 year coming up. Do you know where the President stands on de-
4 fense?

5 MR. SCHLESINGER: Well, I think the President has the best
6 of will toward the military establishment. He has a severe
7 budget problem that he is facing, and consequently there may
8 be reductions in the Department of Defense requests which I
9 would regard as unwise, given the trends that I have referred to
10 So there could be differences of views with regard to that.

11 MR. COCHRAN: I know you have said you don't want to discuss
12 personalities when it comes to President Ford, you want to dis-
13 cuss issues, only. However, there are reports that Mr. Ford
14 found you intellectually arrogant and he was uncomfortable to
15 have you around. I won't ask you to comment on that, but do
16 you feel President Ford has the capacity to deal with complex
17 issues of national security? Are you confident in his ability?
18 You have dealt very closely with him, and in private.

19 MR. SCHLESINGER: I think that the President has the capa-
20 city to build on a prior base of knowledge and to reach good
21 judgments with regard to national policy issues.

22 MR. FINNEY: I would like to come back to a point you
23 made earlier, Mr. Schlesinger. Are you saying that the
24 Defense budget for next year as you saw it shaping up before
25 your departure would require a 200,000 man cut in our active



1 duty forces?

2 MR. SCHLESINGER: If we had gone down to the \$97 billion
3 of outlays that was one of the marks that was being examined,
4 that would have required a substantial cut in Departmental
5 personnel, both civilian and military. And I think that we
6 are facing inevitably, unless there is an alteration in the
7 present plan, a significant cut at least in manpower.

8 MR. FINNEY: What would you consider an adequate level
9 of budget for next year?

10 MR. SCHLESINGER: I think that, given the possibility of
11 a pay cap, and given an alleviation of inflation, something on
12 the order of \$115 billion in program, \$114 billion in program,
13 and \$102 billion or \$101 billion in outlays would be sufficient.

14 MR. FINNEY: In other words, you are advocating about a
15 \$10 billion increase next year in outlays, aren't you?

16 MR. SCHLESINGER: I think that it is about a \$9 billion
17 increase in outlays, yes.

18 But that, of course, is a consequence of our cutback in
19 this year of outlays relative to program. If we ask for new
20 weapons systems, then the outlay effects are going to come
21 in subsequent fiscal years.

22 MR. FINNEY: Would you be willing from a budget standpoint
23 to cut back on military aid in order to have more budgetary
24 latitude for our own forces?

25 MR. SCHLESINGER: Well, I can't generalize on that.



1 I think that the program as between military assistance and
2 our own program must be balanced, and I would not be inclined
3 to make that kind of tradeoff.

4 I think we must face up to the fact that we face serious
5 foreign policy problems, that the world is becoming increasingly
6 precarious. If you look down the Mediterranean you discover
7 state after state becoming less stable and less friendly toward
8 the United States. That is the heart of the American interest
9 overseas.

10 In the Middle East, the peace remains precarious. The
11 possibility of war continues in the Middle East, it continues
12 to be a tinderbox. And these are not circumstances in which
13 the United States should be self-absorbed, or follow the
14 inclination to do less simply because the threat is perceived
15 to be less as a result of detente.

16 MR. LEVINE: Mr. Schlesinger, you seem to be implying that
17 even the budget levels that you were suggesting a moment ago
18 of \$115 billion or \$114 billion for next year might be inade-
19 quate in your own personal view, if there were no political
20 considerations. Given these very substantial threats that you
21 see to our conventional posture in Europe, what would be an
22 adequate force for the United States? Should we have instead
23 of the present 2.1 million men in uniform, 2½ million, or
24 3 million?

25 MR. SCHLESINGER: Well, I think that depends upon the



1 growth of the Soviet forces, the deployment of Soviet forces
2 in Eastern Europe in the months and years ahead.

3 What one does with a budget is gradually to make adjust-
4 ments, recognizing that one's own force structure can increase
5 only slowly as new procurement occurs and new manpower is
6 trained. So I don't think that we can say more than we have
7 declined to the minimal point, as compared to the pre-Korean
8 period. We have a smaller percentage of men under arms, of
9 our population under arms than we have had since before Pearl
10 Harbor, and we ought not to reduce further.

11 It is important, it seems to me, that we not substitute
12 rhetoric for reality with regard to our force structure and the
13 maintenance of a military balance.

14 MR. LEVINE: Let me ask you now about the strategic side
15 of that military balance. If, as you say, the chances for a
16 SALT II agreement seem less than 50/50 at this point, and let's
17 assume now we do not get a successful conclusion to those nego-
18 tiations, what should happen to the U.S. strategic budget, in
19 your view? What weapons should we develop more rapidly than
20 we are now, or start deploying?

21 MR. SCHLESINGER: Well, I think there has been less of a
22 slow-down in the deployment of Soviet weapons systems. That
23 we have since 1972 -- we have built in appropriate hedges,
24 and we can make the adjustments. I don't think the immediate
25 impact on our strategic budgets would be significant.

And one must remember until 1977 both sides are bound, for



1 what it is worth, by the interim agreements with regard to
2 offensive forces, so I don't think the immediate impact need
3 to be very substantial.

4 MR. TREWHITT: Mr. Schlesinger, this question really flows
5 out of your answer to Mr. Finney's question, and I suppose
6 it is essentially philosophical. Putting military-
7 political factors together, including domestic political will,
8 do you regard the United States as now being second-place in
9 stature in the world with the Soviet Union?

10 MR. SCHLESINGER: If one includes the question of political
11 will -- and this is reflected in sensitive barometers such
12 as the attitude of the nations represented in the United
13 Nations -- there is a grave question about the stability of
14 the United States, the effectiveness with which it can reach
15 decisions, political will, the cohesions. I hope these questions
16 do pass. But for the moment, the Soviet Union is in a position
17 in which it has the initiative.

18 MR. TREWHITT: Do you think it is exercising that initiative,
19 with the actions we see now in Europe and in Africa, for example?

20 MR. SCHLESINGER: I think if you look at the situation
21 in Portugal, if you look at the attitude towards the Communist
22 parties in France and Italy, if you look at the pressures that
23 are being applied to Norway, if you look at what has been
24 happening in Berlin, in which the Soviets clearly are
25 whittling away the obligations into which they entered in the



1 Four Power Agreement, that in Europe, you have serious causes
2 for concern.

3 And one might add to that, that over the last decade
4 the Soviets have dramatically improved their conventional force
5 posture in Eastern Europe, adding 140,000 men roughly to
6 their deployments in Europe.

7 In the Middle East they have been sponsoring the rejection-
8 ist front in the attempt to upset the Sinai Agreement. All
9 of these I think are indications of a nation that is not as
10 yet willing to live and let live.

11 MR. MONROE: We have about two minutes, gentlemen.

12 Shouldn't the American people do what they often do, dis-
13 count to some extent what is said about arms by a Secretary of
14 Defense, in the sense that Secretaries of Defense come in and
15 immediately begin arguing for larger arms budgets? And we
16 have critics saying that we already have overkill, we can de-
17 stroy Russia many times over, that additional weapons don't
18 make any sense?

19 MR. SCHLESINGER: Bill, that is almost a traditional kind
20 of question. So let me state first that my expression of
21 concern antedated my two jobs, the one that I recently
22 vacated. These are matters of fact. If you look at the
23 trends there is no question about it. We as a nation are
24 indulging in an ostrich syndrome, in burying our heads in the
25 sand and not observing what is going on.



1 The Soviets have increased their military establishment to
2 over 4 million men. Today they have twice as many men
3 under arms as we have. They have, in recent years, produced
4 four times as many subs and surface combatants as we have.
5 They are producing 70 percent more tactical aircraft. In
6 ground forces equipment, it is seven and eight to one produc-
7 tion ratio.

8 As a share of their national effort they are at about 15
9 percent compared to about 5 percent for the United States.
10 If you convert that into dollar terms, they are outspending us,
11 leaving pensions aside, by some 45 percent, and the trend is
12 worsening.

13 What we have is a desire for a flight from reality, and
14 I regard that as most unfortunate for the United States.

15 The question about the Department's views on these matters
16 is ritualistic. I have said these things in the past, but
17 the press picks up these questions at the time of budget
18 issues and says we are waving the flag of alarm.

19 MR. MONROE: I am sorry to interrupt, but our time is up.
20 Thank you, Mr. Schlesinger, for being with us today on MEET
21 THE PRESS.

22 * * *

23 NEXT WEEK: Congressman Morris Udall of Arizona,
24 Candidate for the Democratic Presidential
25 Nomination.

