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April 29, 1975

Dr. Theodore Marrs  
Special Assistant to  
the President  
The White House  
Washington, D. C. 20500



Dear Dr. Marrs:

Thank you very much for hearing me out yesterday afternoon on my efforts to make some contribution in these last moments of our assistance to the Vietnamese people.

As you can see from the attached biography, I have had some experience in Vietnam and Southeast Asia. What the biography does not indicate is that in 1969 and 1970, when I was working for CORDS, I was in effect working quite closely with Bill Colby on the general program of decentralization of power in the villages. Then in 1970 and 1971, while working in our Embassy in Saigon, I was special assistant to Chuck Cooper who, as you know, is now Assistant Secretary of the Treasury.

The biography also does not reveal that while attending Harvard Law School I was Chairman of the Board

Dr. Theodore Marrs

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April 29, 1975

of Student Advisers which is a rough equivalent to a student government at that school.

I am also including for you a copy of a piece which was published in the Op-Ed page of the New York Times and another short article I wrote last year when the illusion of adequate Congressional support for the South Vietnamese was still tenable. The article includes the substance of my manuscript on Vietnamese nationalism which is the first work in a Western language to analyze Vietnam's political culture based on original Vietnamese sources. The impact of my book, if it ever gets published, will be to completely undercut the assumptions on which the anti-war movement was based. Perhaps if some scholar had done this work twenty years ago the South Vietnamese would still have a country to call their own.

My politics are those of a Roosevelt, Truman, Kennedy Democrat alienated from his party in the last 10 years by its swerving to the academic and radical chic left, alienated in effect by the rise to power within the party of our country's new intellocracy.

I do not expect that the firm here would raise any objection to my taking off some time to work on the

Dr. Theodore Marrs


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resettlement of refugees. However, since I acquired over the weekend sixteen new dependents, being my wife's immediate family, I will not be in a position to donate my time to the government. Should you like additional information please write or call me at the office, phone number 212-483-9000.

With hopes for the complete success of the Presidential Commission, I am

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Steve Young". The signature is written in a cursive, slightly slanted style.

Stephen B. Young

SBY:pvg

BIOGRAPHY OF STEPHEN B. YOUNG

Education:

International School of Bangkok, 1963;  
Harvard College, 1963-1967;  
Harvard Law School, 1971-1974.

Ethnographic  
Field Work:

Chiapas, Mexico with the Harvard Chiapas project,  
1965;  
Individual field work in villages of Northeast  
Thailand, 1966.

Languages:

French, Thai, Tzotzil Maya, Vietnamese.

Employment:

USAID, 1967-1971;  
1967-1968-Viet Nam Training Center,  
Department of State, Washington  
1968-1969-Deputy District Advisor  
Vinh Long Province  
1969-1970-Chief, Village Development  
Branch, CORDS  
1970-1971-Special Assistant, Minister/  
Counselor for Economic Affairs, U.S.  
Embassy, Saigon

Publications:

Monographs:

"Their People's Servants: Public  
officials in a highland Maya community."

"Authority and Identity: A study of the legitimacy  
of power."

"Mandarin Mercantilism: a study of the Vietnamese  
economy."

Articles:

"Public Office as a Public Trust: a suggestion that a fiduciary standard is implied in Impeachment for High Crimes and Misdemeanors" - Georgetown Law Journal May 1975.

"The Northeastern Thai Village: a non-participatory democracy" - Asian Survey, November 1968.

"The Mandate and Elections" and "Local Development in Viet Nam, 1968-1970" - two chapters in Electoral Politics in South Vietnam, a collection of essays edited by John Donnell and Charles Joiner.

"The Law of Property and Elite Privileges Under Viet Nam's Le Dynasty, 1948-1788" - Journal of Asian History, Spring 1975.

Book:

"The Dragon's Children: Vietnam's Struggle for National Integrity", unpublished manuscript.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, MONDAY, FEBRUARY 24, 1975

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# Vietnamese Nationalism

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By Stephen B. Young

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nationalists in Vietnam is a consequence of this conflict of values.

## THERE WAS ANOTHER WAY

The other way to have fought the Vietnam war would have been to rely more directly on Vietnamese nationalism. Just as we came to the aid of England, France, Russia and China in World War II and to the aid of Korea in the Korean War, we wanted to help the Vietnamese defend their culture, their territory and their national integrity. Only our guns and men were less effective in Vietnam than they had been previously. As with Churchill, our Vietnam policy had begun with a desire to give our ally the tools so that it could finish the job. But in 1965 when the tools were being misused, Lyndon Johnson decided that America would finish the job itself. But George Patton, Jr. could not use his tanks to win the Vietnam war the way his father had crushed German armies two decades previously. In a war of attrition, where the enemy had secure rear areas, direct American participation raised costs but could not bring the conflict to a decisive conclusion. When the burden of combat became intolerable for the American people, we were forced to turn the struggle back over to the South Vietnamese. Fortunately, by 1969 they were up to the task. The war could be won. And it was, by Vietnamese.

At bottom, our commitment ran to the Vietnamese people themselves, not out of any real understanding and intimate sympathy with their nationalism, but rather out of a principle of global strategy. Our effort was to uphold in practice the norm of world peace, that principle which allows men to live mutually with one another and maintain the species; that notion that the integrity of every nation, no matter how small, must be respected by every other nation. Because the powers of the world had allowed that principle to be repeatedly violated in the 1930's, world order had disintegrated and a world war had resulted. After World War II, America's political leadership understood at last that the long-run national interest of the United States demanded as the first and highest order of business a balance of power among the nations of the world such that no nation would violate the essential integrity of any other. Since the major efforts at destabilization in the post-war years came from the Soviets, our balance-of-power foreign policy could be presented as a simple anti-communist posture. Such a presentation had domestic political advantages because those Americans in the heartland who were traditionally opposed to sacrifices on behalf of foreigners were also nativistic anti-communists. A foreign

policy couched in anti-communist terms could attract the necessary popular support. Thus Truman and Acheson built "bi-partisanship in foreign affairs" on a bedrock of opposition to Soviet imperialism with overtones of a moralistic crusade against an evil inherent in Communist doctrine.

The marriage of sophisticated statesmen and nativistic politicians was not completely blissful. For example, sophisticated Democrats saw that it made no sense to seriously oppose Mao's triumph over the inept nationalists in China and no present threat to the balance of power was visible to them. Yet the nativists were outraged and voted the Democrats out of the White House as Richard Nixon began his odyssey in presidential politics. Dulles re-formed the marriage; he talked like, and perhaps was, a nativist crusader, but acted more with the restraint of a statesman who balanced interests among nations. Kennedy continued in the Dulles tradition where rhetoric exceeded action and the primary concern was balance of power to preserve a principle of world order, not a roll-back of Communist hordes.

When Lyndon Johnson and his advisors decided in 1965 that Hanoi's conquest of South Vietnam by force and the inevitable extirpation of the autonomous vitality of a people who did not seek Communist domination would

so violate the basic terms of international order that the nations of the world would no longer be able to rely upon that order with any confidence, they thought in the familiar patterns of principles of world peace and gave scant attention to the internal details of the Vietnamese conflict. They focused on the job to be done, the standard to be upheld, and not on who best should shoulder the burden. When the South Vietnamese faltered, we stepped into the breach. The other way would have been to realize that, although it was our fight as well, the quick of the matter involved the survival of South Vietnamese nationalism. Under those conditions, our role would have been limited to assisting the South Vietnamese to maximize the power and capacity of their nationalist potential without crossing the line to direct combat intervention.

Since our objective was the preservation of South Vietnam as an independent nation, our success depended ultimately on the capacity of the South Vietnamese to sustain the coherence and effort necessary for their national defense. Injecting American ground forces into the situation could only delay the moment when success or failure would be determined. But in 1965 no one in our government, in our press, or in our universities, knew the first thing about Vietnamese nationalism. Thus there was no one to give apt advice on how best to help the South Vietnamese. President

Johnson had before him only two alternatives: to commit America to direct participation or to watch South Vietnam disintegrate under the incompetent leadership which then held sway in Saigon. Given the logic of American foreign policy, our people's distaste for defeat, and the lack of knowledge about Vietnamese nationalism, the decision to commit ground forces was unavoidable.

The inability of our nation to focus at all on Vietnamese nationalism resulted from several factors. First, the anti-communist rationale used to cement popular support behind expensive efforts to maintain an appropriate balance of power had conditioned many of us to overlook the specifics of particular nations and to fit the facts of each case as it arose into the fixed mold of our global assumptions. Locating to our satisfaction the borders of South Vietnam, the addresses of government offices and the names of anti-communist leaders (or anti-government leaders) exhausted our curiosity; by then we already knew enough to apply our general principles.

Second, our scholars and intellectuals looked upon Vietnam as nothing more than a smaller version of China. If nationalism had failed in China, it was doomed in Vietnam as well. After Mao's ascension in China, Americans did not take Vietnamese nationalism seriously.

Third, French scholarship since the 19th century has completely misunderstood the Vietnamese. The French were taken in by Vietnam's mid-19th century Confucian appearance and overlooked the ancient national tradition which thrived in the villages. When the villages became bastions of revolt against French colonial power, ingenious explanations were offered by French savants to account for the fact that simple peasants (whose world supposedly extended no farther than the village hedge) were taking up arms against the French almost on an annual basis somewhere in Vietnam. The economic or administrative impact of colonialism was usually held out as the cause of this disequilibrium in the village community. That nationalism could be the driving political force in the villages was impossible. American thinking about Vietnam has been shaped by this prior French mythology. Ho Chi Minh's success in using nationalism to defeat the French colonial enterprise was ascribed to the fact that Ho "sparked" nationalism among the Vietnamese. Since he embodied Vietnamese nationalism, it followed that no regime in Saigon could ever successfully compete with him. Thus on the basis of French images, many Americans concluded that our effort in South Vietnam was hopeless. They urged withdrawal and accepted Communist domination as the wave of the future.

Fourth, it was easier for Americans to apply our cultural values to Vietnam than it was for us to learn about

Vietnamese values. Since our own revolution had been triggered in part by concern over high taxes on tea, we found it only natural to ascribe to the Vietnamese a similar fixation about material property. The struggle in Vietnam was often seen as one between rich and poor. We thought that the loyalty of Vietnamese farmers could be bought by a Saigon government which distributed more "goodies" than the Communists did, or that if the house of a South Vietnamese farmer was blown up, his sense-of-self would be consequently shattered. We had no one who sufficiently understood Vietnam's literary masterpiece, the Kim van Kieu; no one who could tell us that loyalty is not bought in Vietnam, that their material goods have little relation to anyone's sense-of-self, and that a death feud existed between Communism and Nationalism.

Once there was a time when our government did understand something about Vietnamese nationalism. During the Viet Minh war, our effort had been to support those Vietnamese who were neither Communist nor supporters of the French. But this amorphous "Third Force" of nationalism always eluded us. Graham Greene mocked our naivete in The Quiet American-as old colonial hands knew, there was no "Third Force", only the Communists and the lackies, and we were condemned to sustaining the lackies until we grew tired and gave up, doing great damage in the process. We were

naive only because we didn't know in those early days how to attach form and substance to the Third Force, how to identify leaders and locate directions of movement.

However, when Ngo Dinh Diem came to power on the invitation of Bao Dai, many Americans thought they glimpsed something genuine, something appropriately Vietnamese, a political force with purpose and resolve and which commanded loyalty. Under Diem, the non-Communist Vietnamese army fought and defeated the Binh Xuyen bandit gang. Ed Lansdale in Saigon, my Dad with Foster and Allen Dulles in Washington then threw their weight behind Diem. In 1954 that meant dollars to keep his government financed and armed and diplomatic assistance to keep the French from toppling him. Our Vietnam policy in those days was to provide Diem with the necessary tools provided that he fostered an effective, nationalist regime which could engage the hopes and aspirations of his people.

But Diem failed, primarily because he relied upon the Confucian pattern of the 19th century Nguyen Imperial court and not upon the national ethic in the villages. He could not foster the effective nationalist regime which was a precondition for our aid. With the failure of the Saigon regime by the early 1960's, Washington shifted its Vietnam policy. The objective remained the same - to support the non-Communists in South Vietnam - but the terms of the policy

changed. Now we would provide assistance even though an effective nationalist regime did not exist to engage the hopes and aspirations of the Vietnamese people. Once that shift was made, it was then a simple matter to slide from a few advisors and millions of dollars to many divisions and billions of dollars. When we shifted from provided that to even though, we subordinated the insight which had brought us to Vietnam in the first place, the understanding that our support was only effective to the extent that it stoked Vietnamese national fires, that we could only succeed in our terms to the extent that they succeeded in theirs.

What then is to be said at this late date about Vietnamese nationalism? A very great deal. The social and cultural history of an entire people and the events of thousands of years are still waiting for a fit exposition. More importantly, the ability of the South Vietnamese to resist Hanoi's 1972 Easter offensive, to pacify successfully most of the populated countryside, to reinvigorate village institutions, to build a political system where every significant faction has some share of power, arises from their nationalism.

Vietnamese use the term tin han dan toc- "elan of the people"- to define their nationalism. Such a nationalism is primarily ethnic, more akin to the communal feeling of Jews than to the geographic identities of modern France

and Italy. Vietnamese nationalism, which has existed as long as the Vietnamese have thought of themselves as a unique people, is not a modern, urban, middle-class phenomenon. It is a tradition and thrives best in the rural villages where the colonial impact was weakest. Prof. Nguyen Dang Thuc has written the most thoughtful exposition of Vietnamese nationalism in his book Tu Tuong Viet Nam - "The Vietnamese Imagination" - which tells us about cults and village rites, Buddhist poems and ancient oral myths.

Along with ethnic overtones, Vietnamese nationalism has religious aspects. The Vietnamese people look upon themselves as having a special relationship with the Supreme Power of the Universe. In a way, they feel they are a chosen people for Heaven has created for them a homeland. To be a good Vietnamese is to be faithful to Heaven. In the last quarter of the 11th century A.D., while Europe was crawling out of the dark ages, a Vietnamese general inspired his troops to defeat the Chinese with the following words:

"In the rivers and mountains of the southern  
 nation, (Vietnam) the Southern King holds sway;  
 This elemental destiny has been fixed in Heaven's  
 Book.

What possible cause do these marauders have to  
 invade?

The spectacle of their complete defeat will come  
 to pass."

With Heaven on their side, the Vietnamese had little to fear from the Chinese.

A central part of the Vietnamese nationalism, therefore, is adherence to the values ordained by Heaven. These values are not Confucian. They reflect an amalgam of Buddhist and Confucian concepts such that Vietnam's unique destiny is accounted for. The religious outlook which distinguishes a Vietnamese who is true to the tin than dan toc of the Vietnamese people is phuc duc.

Phuc duc combines Buddhist notions of merit with Confucian images of virtue. When the Buddhist monks opposed Ngo Dinh Diem and argued that all Vietnamese except the Catholics were Buddhists, they had in mind that most Vietnamese, including many Catholics, believe in phuc duc which in turn is very Buddhist. The concept behind phuc duc is simple: if you lead a life of duc or virtue, you will receive phuc or good fortune. At bottom this is the Buddhist theory of karma where good deeds bring a more favorable incarnation in the next cycle, but it has Confucian overtones in that filial piety, a Confucian virtue, also brings one phuc and that the phuc one earns as an individual can bring good fortune to one's family and descendants. Thus Vietnamese are great believers in the power of the individual. The famous poem and literary masterpiece, Kim van Kieu, teaches that Buddhist acts of compassion can indeed bring release

from this veil of tears. Each person has a talent, tai, which can blossom in the presence of an auspicious fate when one's good deeds are properly arranged.

The rigid conformity of a Communist state, with its "single talent" (doc tai) in the party, does not give Vietnamese the freedom they desire to maximize their individual potentials. Neither does a Communist state provide opportunities for being virtuous in the accepted sense. It flouts the way of Heaven. As Vietnamese villagers say, Communism is "khong troi, khong dat, khong thanh, khong than." - "without Heaven, without earth, without saints, without the spirits."

The essential part of duc or virtue is selflessness. Those who strive to assert themselves at the expense of others, or those who are consumed by greed, have no duc and can generate no loyalty. That is why corrupt officials in Saigon have never been able to organize effective popular support; why the self-sacrifice of Buddhist monks provided leadership to precipitate the end of Diem's regime; and why the Communists have studiously hidden their drive for power behind front movements which only exist to sacrifice themselves for the fatherland. But since Vietnamese are aware that the aim of the Communists is to exclude all from power save themselves and their minions, the Communists are seen as greedy, selfish and lacking in duc. The 1968 mass murders in Hue and, the previous butchery of nationalists leaders in

1946 and 1947 damn Vietnamese Communists as being beyond the pale of tinh than dan toc. Persons without duc can never lead the Vietnamese except through repression.

For reasons which have little to do with the Confucian mandate of Heaven but which do relate to the origin myths which preceded Confucian thought, Vietnamese respond to individuals rather than to organizations or to programs. That is why Vietnamese politics is so chaotic, why there are so many groups and factions with so few ever amounting to very much. Vietnamese seek the perfect man to follow and are very quick to find fault. Few in that country have the requisite attributes. It is no coincidence that the crucial turning points of the '72 Easter Offensive were battles won by superior South Vietnamese officers who could rally their men into unusual exertions and that those officers are some of the few men in the South Vietnamese army possessed with the characteristics of nationalist leadership. They were Gen. Ngo Quang Truong who halted the North Vietnamese advance on Hue and recaptured Quant Tri; Col. Nhut who directed the defense of An Loc and Co. Chuc who used local forces to defend Binh Dinh Province against North Vietnamese regulars. When the right man comes along, Vietnamese respond.

There is also a convergence in Vietnam of men who have the necessary attributes of leadership and men who remain faithful to Vietnam's tinh than dan toc. Since the

duc required of a leader requires belief in phuc duc and dedication to the cause of the people, Vietnam can find leaders only among those steeped in the nationalist tradition. Consider the two best units of the South Vietnamese army as a case in point. The Marines and the Airborne have consistently defeated Communist units; they have elan, discipline and will. Marine officers are invariably offspring of Dai Viet or Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang (VNQDD) families from North Vietnam. The Dai Viets and the VNQDD are the two nationalist parties which had their leadership murdered by the Communists in 1946. The founder of the Marines was Col. Pham van Lieu, a Dai Viet from North Vietnam. Similarly, Airborne officers come from Dai Viet or VNQDD families in central Vietnam. Competence and nationalism go together, bound by the umbilical cord of duc and tin than dan toc.

The simple explanation why the Saigon regime could not for years provide effective leadership for the people of South Vietnam is that few of the leaders in Saigon's army or administration had any duc or any devotion to Vietnam's tin than dan toc. The Communists, on the other hand, buried their ideology under layers of nationalist rhetoric to align themselves with the tin than dan toc of the people and thereby acquire duc. Or at least that is their intent for the bloody hand of these relentless power-seekers has always shown through. Whatever duc the Communists might have gained by their opposition to the French and the Americans has been

substantially vitiated by their repression of fellow Vietnamese. Yet the non-Communist side has been unable to provide leaders with appropriate duc to rally the people against Hanoi. Thus the war drags on - with right and left, unable to gain significant loyalty from the bulk of the population, using foreign money and guns to sustain regimes based on the self-interest of greedy minorities and with the majority of the people waiting for the emergence of fit leadership.

The dilemma of nationalism in South Vietnam is reflected in the political rivalry between President Thieu and General "Big" Minh. Many Vietnamese think that "Big" Minh possesses duc and that Thieu does not. Therefore, they prefer "Big" Minh as leader on the assumption that all Vietnamese, including the Communists, would willingly follow a man of duc and the war could end. The virtuous man would emerge in true Confucian fashion to bring harmony and end discord.

Simultaneously, "Big" Minh is thought to be closer to the Buddhists and the tin than dan toc of the people while Thieu is seen as too close to the rich Catholics and the foreigners to be a good nationalist. But support for "Big" Minh is really very shallow, limited mostly to urban intellectuals who are the remaining reservoir of the Confucian tradition. The An Quang Buddhist opposition has never committed itself to "Big" Minh; the failure of the monks to provide Minh with campaign assistance in the 1971 Presidential

election was the real reason for his withdrawal. An Quang leaders know that Minh is too closely tied to a despicable figure of French Colonialism, Mai Huu Xuan, the former police chief and alleged murderer of Diem and Nhu.

Furthermore, the An Quang leaders, steeped in Vietnam's tinh than dan toc, know that the duc required of a Vietnamese leader is not the duc of Confucian teaching. The Vietnamese are not Chinese; they have their own autonomous tradition. Vietnamese leaders must have something called uy tin which combines duc with ability, tai. "Big" Minh is not considered to be an accomplished man. His tai is not overwhelming. As Chief of State after the coup against Diem he was unable to act with any great effect. But Thieu, it seems, has considerable tai. The An Quang leaders have not seriously opposed Thieu since he came into power in his own right after the Tet Offensive in 1968. They have rather responded to the opportunity set by Thieu to build their political power through local elections in Central Vietnam.

Thieu's reputation for ability rests primarily on the successful pacification and land reform programs his administration has implemented. If he would only disassociate himself from the corrupt generals and politicians who are hang-overs from Ngo Dinh Diem's power-structure, he would acquire sufficient duc to gain unquestioned uy tin.

As Vietnamese, the Communists know the importance of leadership and uy tin. In 1946 they cleared their way to

power by murdering the leaders of all other political parties, knowing that without leaders with uy tin their nationalist rivals would fade into disorganized impotence. After Diem showed himself possessed with both tai and duc by defeating the Binh Xuyen, Hoa Hao and Cao Dai warlords in French pay and by evicting the French, the Communists organized struggle movements at the village level to demonstrate that Diem could not control his countryside. A leader who could not so master the villages had to be a leader without tai, without uy tin. By compromising South Vietnam's leadership, the Communists would create chaos and find themselves the best organized minority. In the negotiations to end the war, the Communist objective was Thieu's removal. Without a leader, the Vietnamese would scramble for their own self-interests and the Communists could come to power. Diem responded to the challenge to his uy tin in a Confucian fashion by emphasizing his personal duc and by fostering the ideology of "personalism" to provide a moral basis of duc for his officials. His government, increasingly unable to provide the substance of rule, turned hollow, into gestures and postures of definance. Upon his demise, the government fell into the hands of men who had neither tai nor duc and Hanoi moved in for the kill.

At that point, in mid-1965, the United States dispatched an expeditionary corps to hold the fort and buy time.

The South Vietnamese were to be insulated from foreign pressure and put upon the road of more open political development in the hope that some day they would pull themselves together and resume the burden of their national defense. American determination to buy as much time as might be necessary would convince Hanoi that its prospects for victory were slim and that it should give up. But Hanoi realized that America's determination would rather quickly become as hollow as Diem's uy tin.

If we had taken the other road in 1965, if we had understood that only nationalism could bring purpose and will to South Vietnam and that only men of uy tin could galvanize the nationalist instincts of the people into coherent action, we could have used our aid and influence to bring men of uy tin to power. They would have organized the people and the villages as was finally done in 1969 and 1970 and we could have avoided a costly and a bitter war. If only we had understood, if only we had understood.

Had we taken the other road, our policy would have appeared as one of aiding a determined people to defend their heritage. There would have been little room for anti-war leaders to argue that we had imposed the war on the Vietnamese, that at bottom that war was an immoral struggle of Americans against the Vietnamese people. Domestic support for the war would have remained high. And of course, with

the Vietnamese fighting for themselves, the cost to us in blood and treasure would have been far less. Our people would have been asked to support a far lower level of sacrifice. Since the flashpoint of the war always lay in Vietnamese aspirations and ambitions, it would have been more appropriate if Vietnamese nationalism had been made the operational focus of our global policy as it applied in Vietnam.

We could have learned more from the nationalists about winning the war than the absolute necessity of leaders with uy tin. We could have learned about the village as a nationalist political community and the foundation of firm national government. In the villages the myths and the cults have survived from days immemorial. The villages were the source of one subversive effort after another against French colonial rule. The villages cradled not only the people, but more importantly, the most precious political dynamic of the race. No man or party could build an effective national government without tapping the potential of the villages. The Communists successfully used mobilization against the West to provide themselves with village energy and manpower. Diem, on the other hand, tried to impose his will and his officials on the villages. His government failed. Diem modified the Confucian pattern of rule he had learned in the Nguyen Dynasty court in Hue. But the Nguyen Dynasty had failed to organize

effectively, the nation against the French. Nguyen Emperors used Confucian morality and the imported law code of Ch'ing China to hold themselves in a superior fashion above the villages. A gap arose between the people in the village communities and the central government because the people continued to follow the laws and customs of the previous Le Dynasty. Village customs under the Nguyen Emperors was based largely on the Le law code of 1473. The saying therefore arose that "the Emperor's law bows before village custom." Unfortunately, the French never noticed that melange custom reflected an older pattern of ethnic nationalism and that the Emperor's law was little more than the trappings of a well-set stage, acknowledged for form and style but only infrequently consulted for substance. The French assumed that life within the villages was as Chinese and as Confucian as it was within the Nguyen Imperial court.

The real village tradition, one which can be found in the laws of the Ly, Tran and Le Dynasties (1010-1788), saw the individual citizen linked directly to the central government in the fashion of modern nationalism. The village was not an autonomous state unto itself. Not until 1460 did the villages have a say in selecting their own officials. There was no village communal land until 1711. Public land belonged to the King whose officials divided it among the

people according to the degree of merit they achieved in serving the state. Each individual owed taxes and service directly to the central government. The political unit of consequences was the state, or the quoc. Yet beginning about 1650, during the wars between the Trinh and Nguyen clans, the power of the central government eroded and the villages emerged as semi-autonomous political entities with their own leadership, men largely accountable neither to the people nor to the officials. At the same time as this decay infected the political system, neo-Confucian thought was adopted from China by Vietnam's elite as the country developed a scholar-gentry class tied to the bureaucracy and examinations along Chinese lines. The development was nearly complete by the mid 1700's. Shortly thereafter, Nguyen Hue led a movement to revitalize the realm along the lines of more ethnic traditions and less in the Chinese pattern. Nguyen Hue adopted the Vietnamese script of nom for all official documents. And he listened more to geomancers and prophets like La Son Phu Tu than to erudite Confucian scholars. When the Nguyen clan defeated Nguyen Hue and founded their own Dynasty in 1802, they adopted the Chinese model for Vietnam. Village autonomy and Confucian morality were the foundation of rule. The ethnic tradition of national coherence and organic unity under a great patriotic leader was left to wither.

Then the uy tin of both the Chinese model and the Nguyen Confucian elite was shattered by the victory of French colonialism. In asserting an instinctive urge for self-determination, Vietnam's political leaders rediscovered the national tradition which had been slumbering in the villages. Vietnam's first modern revolutionary, Phan Boi Chau, began the process of renovation, calling his movement the "Restoration Movement." The VNQDD, Dai Viets, Cao Dai, and Hoa Hao then contributed to the re-emergence of authentic national traditions. A close look at the two religious sects - Hoa Hao and Cao Dai - will disclose more nationalism in their teachings than universalistic religiosity. Each of them attempts to perpetuate in its own way the tin than dan toc of the Vietnamese people. And so do the Buddhists, who began a revival in the 1920's and 1930's along with the other nationalist groups. Nhat Linh's novels in the early 1930's shattered for many any lingering appeal of Confucian formalism. Thus by World War II the pattern for a modern Vietnam was clear to most Vietnamese: The country had to be independent and it had to incorporate the villages directly into national political life to form a single unified political community of patriots.

The odd men out in this development were the Communists and the Catholics. Both groups looked for their

rationale to Western assumptions about life. Both groups relied heavily on foreign assistance for survival. Yet Catholics and Communists together were only a small minority of the population. In 1945 the Communists had something like 5,000 followers in a nation of millions. It would seem that the nationalists had the power to achieve their reinvigorated Vietnam. But they miscalculated twice.

First they supported the Japanese as fellow Asians against the white colonialists. At the end of the war the nationalists were thereby discredited at home because they had backed a loser and abroad because they were assumed to be mere creations of the Japanese. With the nationalists on the defensive, Ho Chi Minh, thanks to his Comintern ties to Moscow and the Allies, had a chance to seek leadership as the local agent of the victorious powers. The nationalists did not oppose his claim for pre-eminence in Hanoi, Hue and Saigon.

It was their second miscalculation. Ho then made a secret deal with the French in early 1946 and turned on the nationalists with French assistance to liquidate their leaders with uy tin. Ho lost his duc but the nationalists now had no leaders who could oppose him. The Communists moved to pick-up the nationalist cause and fight the French. The French used money to support the Catholics and build a following wherever it could be bought. With the "Bao Dai

solutions," they made a cosmetic attempt to rally a nationalist following. Neither protagonist had much tinh than dan toc but the Communists were better able to mobilize the villages. The Vietnamese people evinced no strong enthusiasm for either side. The French, when they finally accepted the fact that they could not win, again negotiated privately with the Communists to cut-up the country, leaving the nationalists furiously impotent. Diem, who came to power in a divided country with nationalist support, turned to the Confucian pattern of the Nguyen Court and further delayed the emergence of a political system incorporating the villages in a nationalist community. Nhu's Can Lao party knitted up the American financed import trade and the rich Catholic economic elite into a power base for the regime. The villages were not necessary for his continued rule.

In line with nationalist traditions, what was needed for South Vietnam was a decentralized political system where all persons of tinh than dan toc could participate in a joint effort where government power would not be used for the exclusive benefit of a particular faction. Such an approach was proposed by the government which took power in the coup of January 1964. The coup was engineered by the Dai Viets to remove from power the high ranking generals of French breeding who had presided over the November coup

against Diem (which in fact had been executed by the Dai Viets and their allies). The Hoa Hao and the Cao Dai were brought into support of the government. The leading lay political strategist of the Buddhist opposition was brought into the cabinet. Most importantly, village elections were called for and a pacification plan was drawn up to provide both security and participation for the rural people.

The effort went awry when General Nguyen Khanh allied himself with the remains of the Can Lao economic power-elite and used corruption to build a clique of selfish and unscrupulous officers around him in the armed forces. With this base, Khanh turned on the Dai Viets and forced them from the government. A series of coups and crises followed until Khanh was driven from the country in early 1965. But the villages had been forgotten, the uy tin of the government had been seriously tarnished with covetous leadership, and Khanh's monied cronies were in power under Nguyen Cao Ky. Under these circumstances, we dispatched our army to fight yet another foreign war. No American official knew that the Dai Viet pacification plan (which had now vanished) was the embodiment of an ancient tradition which could effectively organize the people of South Vietnam.

Luckily, the drafters of the 1964 pacification plan are men of talent and capacity. They are also men of uy tin. They were not overtaken by events, but re-emerged after the

Tet Offensive in alliance with President Thieu. Tet was a major turning point in the war. It shattered Hanoi's uy tin as a victor; it shocked the Vietnamese with the mass murders in Hue and reminded them of the issue of state-nationalism; it drove Ky and his faction from power; and it convinced the Americans that they should disengage. Thieu then emerged as the pre-eminent figure in the Saigon regime. He formed an uneasy ruling triumvirate among a new Dai Viet party, the Tan Dai Viets, himself and the Can Lao economic elite. The Tan Dai Viets were given a chance to implement their 1964 pacification ideas. Fortunately, American thinking on pacification by mid-1968 had come around to where the Tan Dai Viets had always been. With full American support, the face of rural Vietnam was changed within 2 years. Power was decentralized to village leadership, a village development program and a village credit program put economic resources in village hands, elections were held to get new village leaders, a general mobilization law drew the countryside's manpower into the government's army, a people's militia was organized for each village, and mud forts sprang up over the countryside to bring security to over 80% of the population. The Communist fish were finally separated from the water of the people. The NLF evaporated as most of its followers came over to the government's side

through the Chieu Hoi program. By 1972 the Communist effort in South Vietnam rested on the conventional backs of North Vietnamese divisions and soviet weaponry. Hanoi had lost the political struggle.

Increasing opportunities for the rural people to participate in the national political community and manipulate their own destinies in time-honored Vietnamese fashion were complimented by economic prosperity. Land reform cut the country's economic elite off from the villages. Former landlords were now urban businessmen and had little interest in returning anyway, but the peasantry was converted into a class of small-holders- the most conservative political force yet known to man. Rising prices and a rice-deficit economy combined with new capital inputs and high-yield strains of rice allowed the farmers quantum jumps in income. Prosperity and security in 1971 showed that Thieu had Lai and the government had uy tin.

On the electoral front, Thieu's instinct for accommodation and the Tan Dai Viets political ambition of forging a majority working coalition of nationalist factions combined to draw most every faction into the political process. Seats on village and provincial councils and in the Lower House were actively contested in a surprising number of elections. The An Quang Buddhist opposition, thanks to encouragement from the Tan Dai Viets, entered the electoral

arena and saw their slate finish first in the 1970 Senatorial elections. So profound was the change introduced into Vietnam's political system by the programs of 1969 - 1970, that by late 1974 leading Catholics went into opposition against Thieu over the issue of corruption. To have Catholics in the streets protesting that the government lacked duc was to finally bring the Catholics into harmony with the nation's tin than dan toc. One of the serious wounds inflicted by the French in Vietnam's political cohesion was being healed. Under Thieu, there had been a slow but steady erosion of the power of the Catholic economic elite. Catholics had to seek out alliances with nationalists. Money was becoming a less important source of power than village constituencies.

The theme of Thieu's administration has been the old Dai Viet slogan of tu luc tu cuong, "self effort, self strength." A coherent political community has been created where cross-cutting alliances and shifting factions obscure the fact that every group in the society, except those who follow Hanoi, has some access to power and good fortune. The crushing inflation brought about by the reduction in American aid and the quadrupling of oil prices has made it difficult to incorporate the poor into this effort at achieving phuc-duc, but the government has continued to make what efforts it could in that direction.

With far less firepower than the American divisions had, Vietnamese units could hold the balance of power against the NVA in 1974. Good officers from nationalist backgrounds now commanded where venal incompetents so often had failed before. South Vietnam was defending itself. America's war aims had been achieved.

By 1974 one could see that the original assumptions behind our Vietnam policy had been correct: there was a vibrant nationalism in Vietnam, the people had will and capacity, they did not want to be conquered by the Communists in Hanoi, if we gave them the tools, they could do the job. Putting those assumptions to the test had been a difficult trauma. But we could have proved their validity the other way.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

May 2, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR:

DR. MARRS

FROM:

L. DEAN BROWN

Ted:

Here are two people who have approached me.



Bio sketches on:

Jessica Cato  
Jeanne Ferst

May 2, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. MARRS  
FROM: L. DEAN BROWN

Ted:

Here are two people who have approached me.

Bio sketches on:

Jessica Cato  
Jeanne Ferst

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

May 2, 1975

MEMORANDUM TO: L. Dean Brown  
FROM: Margo M. Boyle *MMB*  
SUBJECT: Mrs. Jeanne Ferst

I have attached biographical information on Mrs. Jeanne Ferst for consideration for any advisory committee which may be formed for aid to Vietnamese refugees.

As I mentioned to you, Mrs. Ferst has a great deal of energy which she has at times expended on our behalf and would like to continue to do so. Listed below are her State Department public service activities:

Member, U.S. Delegation to the 8th  
Governing Council UNDP - 1969

Member, U.S. Delegation to the 12th  
Governing Council UNDP - 1970

Member, President's Advisory Council  
on South Asian Relief Assistance - 1971-73

Member, Advisory Committee on Voluntary  
Foreign Aid - 1973 to present

Mrs. Ferst was also extremely helpful to the Department in the arrangements that were made for the OAS meetings in Atlanta last Spring. She has consistently proven herself to be a diligent worker, and I know she is most anxious to help in any way possible in our efforts to assist the new refugees.

Attachment:  
As stated

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
Resume	Resume for Jeanne Rolfe Ferst, 2 pages.	N.D.	C

File Location:

Theodorre C. Marrs Files, Box 12, Folder: "Indochina Refugees - Presidential Advisory Committee - Suggested Members (2)" SMD - 7/21/2015

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by applicable Executive order governing access to national security information.
- (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
- (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

JESSICA CATTO (PRON. CAT' - TOE)

BORN IN HOUSTON, TEXAS 1938

ATTENDED CHATHAM HALL, BARNARD COLLEGE

MARRIED 1957, 4 CHILDREN

MEMBER:

- (1) BOARD OF DIRECTORS, HOUSTON POST COMPANY
- (2) BOARD OF DIRECTORS, 'READING IS FUNDAMENTAL
- (3) PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE OF KENNEDY  
CENTER FOR PERFORMING ARTS
- (4) BOARD OF TRUSTEES AT TRINITY UNIVERSITY
- (5) BOARD OF TRUSTEES - ASPEN MUSIC ASSOCIATES
- (6) BOARD OF SOCIETY FOR A MORE BEAUTIFUL  
NATIONAL CAPITAL
- (7) BOARD OF DIRECTORS, WASHINGTON PERFORMING  
ARTS SOCIETY

FORMER MEMBER OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE HEMISFAIR 1968

FORMER EDITOR OF THE RIVER OAKS TIMES, (HOUSTON)

FORMER ART CRITIC OF THE SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS

MRS. CATTO'S HUSBAND IS A FORMER DEPUTY AMBASSADOR TO THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES (OAS), AND FORMER AMBASSADOR TO EL SALVADOR. HE IS CURRENTLY THE UNITED STATES CHIEF OF PROTOCOL.

APRIL 1975



*With the Compliments  
of the  
Chief of Protocol*

April 29, 1975

Dean:

For your information. Per  
conversation.

Henry E. Catto, Jr.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

May 3, 1975

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: JACK MARSH  
FROM: JERRY JONES  
SUBJECT: Presidential Advisory  
Committee on Refugees



The President has reviewed your memorandum of May 2nd on the above subject. He approved the concept of your memo as presented at Tab A. He also initialed the approve line by the following names suggested for his consideration as chairperson.

Anne Armstrong  
Peter Frelinghuysen  
John Harper  
*hand* ~~rec~~ Kirkland  
Eugene McCarthy  
Sargent Shriver

Finally, he made the following notation:

-- I have approved above (names), not as Chairperson, but as members. (Chairperson) Should be "male and female" Co-Ch./ Dem and G.O.P. Also, Business, Labor, etc. on Committee. Bess Myerson could be potential.

*BT*

cc: ~~Theodore~~ Marris  
Brent Scowcroft  
Donald Rumsfeld  
William Walker

## Presidential Advisory Committee on Refugees

**Purpose:** To advise in regard to an expeditious and coordinated orientation and resettlement of refugees from Southeast Asia. This role will be one of facilitating and convening to insure obtaining resources not otherwise available, overcoming legal and governmental barriers and providing general backup support.

**Composition:** The Committee will be chaired by a private American citizen with prestige. He will be assisted by a group of about twenty well known people from a broad spectrum of the private sector, including businessmen, educators, labor leaders, civil rights leaders, and private citizens, including members of the Vietnamese/American community. An executive staff would be established to facilitate the operations of the Committee and to supervise the allocation of resources to reception sites located in the United States.

**Liaison:** Will establish lines of communication with the Interdepartmental Task Force, with the voluntary agencies who will play a leading role, the Domestic Council, Naturalization and Immigration Service and the Vietnamese-American community and others as needed to enhance understanding and coordination.

**Scope:** Will give consideration to the following:

1. Moral responsibility.
2. Economic impacts.
3. Community reaction to the refugees and refugee reaction to the community.
4. Food--adequacy and appropriateness.
5. Transport and geography of resettlement.
6. Social and traditional factors.
7. Health and environmental matters.
8. Interrelationship of governmental and volunteer roles.
9. Education - bilingual, work oriented and other.

10. Housing -- temporary and permanent.

11. Cultural understanding.

The Committee should call upon all Americans to contribute time, money, and resources to this effort. The Committee would not be designed to coordinate evacuation and resettlement activities, but would act only to locate and elicit and help distribute the private resources which will be available to assist Cambodian and Vietnamese refugees in this country, to assist the activities of the voluntary resettlement agencies, and to provide advice and guidance on refugee resettlement matters generally.

Administration: Meetings to be arranged through Office of Public Liaison.

"Up front" administrative support from OMB and other White House offices should be directed to insure the prompt development needed for effectiveness. Staff office should be in EOB.

Financing for this Committee is expected to be provided with funds appropriated under the Vietnam Humanitarian Assistance and Evacuation Act of 1975.

Meetings will be in accord with legal requirements for advisory groups and Counsel will provide a specific point of contact.

Public understanding will be supported by keeping the White House Press and Congressional Liaison offices informed as well as by contact with civic and other private associations.

Refuges-

May 5, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

THRU: COUNSELLOR NARSH

FROM: TED MARRS

SUBJECT: Membership of Presidential Advisory  
Committee on Refugees

The attached list has been developed in conjunction with the Personnel Office. It represents a broad spectrum of this country's interests.

Assuming a committee membership of about 25, an asterisk has been placed beside the 25 names deemed most preferable. The remaining names are alternates.

Recommend you approve for membership those individuals denoted by an asterisk.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Approve as changed \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_



Authorization is requested to make direct contact with those approved and alternates as needed.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

May 6, 1975



MEMORANDUM FOR:

JERRY JONES

FROM:

TED MARRS

In accord with our discussions the following listings are provided:

At Tab A, the Presidents of major Service Clubs.

At Tab B, a proposed slate of incumbent governors, and mayors.

At Tab C, a group of volunteer agencies, working with refugees.

Enclosures

ALTRUSA INTERNATIONAL, INC.	Miss Muriel Mawer
ASSOCIATION OF JUNIOR LEAGUES	Mrs. Mary C. Poole (505) 255-9744
CIVITAN INTERNATIONAL	Mr. M. M. Richards
COSMOPOLITAN INTERNATIONAL	Dr. Mahlon Fairchild
DELTA SIGMA THETA	Miss Lilliam Bembow
GYRO INTERNATIONAL	Mr. Warren Schram (519) 434-5787
KIAWANIS INTERNATIONAL	Mr. Roy W. Davis
LINKS	Mrs. Pauline Ellison
LIONS INTERNATIONAL	Mr. John Balbo
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NATIONAL FEDERATION OF BPW CLUBS	Ms. Marie Bowden
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SERTOMA INTERNATIONAL	Mr. Thomas Bruckman
SOROPTIMIST FEDERATION OF THE AMERICAS, INC.	Mrs. Ruth Klotz
THE UNITED JAYCEES	Mr. David Hale L'enfant Plaza Hotel Info.
ZONTA INTERNATIONAL	Ms. Eleanor Jammel

INCUMBENT GOVERNORS AND MAYORS - POSSIBLE MEMBERS

Mayor Joseph Alioto (D-San Francisco)

Governor George R. Ariyoshi (D-Hawaii)

Governor Reubin Askew (D-Florida)

Governor Daniel Evans (R-Washington)

Governor James Longley (I-Maine)

Mayor Richard Lugar (R-Indianapolis)

Governor William Milliken (R-Michigan)

Governor David Pryor (D-Arkansas)

The Presidents of the following organizations which are currently engaged in resettlement efforts could also be used on the President's Committee. In view of their operational responsibilities, I would recommend that a liaison role be maintained on a very close basis if they are not included.

U.S. Catholic Conference Migration and Refugee Services

American Fund for Czechoslovak Refugees

Church World Service Immigration & Refugee Program

Lutheran Immigration & Refugee Service

United Hias Service, Inc.

Tolstoy Foundation, Inc.

International Rescue Committee

American Council for Nationalities Service

Travelers Aid-International Social Services

May 6, 1975



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FROM:                       TED MARRS

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Tolstoy Foundation, Inc.

International Rescue Committee

American Council for Nationalities Service

Travelers Aid-International Social Services

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 7, 1975

MEMO FOR: JOHN BORLING

FROM: KEN QUINN

I have now discovered that the names listed below and which I discussed with you earlier this morning were proposed by Frank Kellogg of the State Department to Dean Brown for consideration by the White House to be appointed to the President's special commission on resettling Indochinese refugees.

Mr. Joseph E. Johnson  
Glen E. Haydon  
Maxwell M. Rabb  
Mrs. Jeanne R. Ferst  
James A. Perkins

~~✗~~  
~~✗~~ Jessica CATO



~~✗~~ Recommended by Dean Brown

ALT USA INTERNATIONAL, INC

ASSOCIATION OF JUNIOR LEAGUES

CEVITAN INTERNATIONAL

CEMOPOLITAN INTERNATIONAL

May 6, 1975

DELTA SIGMA THETA

ETRO INTERNATIONAL

FIJAWANIS INTERNATIONAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: JERRY JONES

LINKS FROM: TED HARRS

LIONS INTERNATIONAL

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NATIONAL FEDERATION OF BPW CLUBS

NATIONAL TRIST

Enclosures

NEEDLEWORK GUILD OF AMERICA

OPTIMIST INTERNATIONAL

PILOT CLUB INTERNATIONAL

QUOTA INTERNATIONAL

ROTARY INTERNATIONAL

RURTEAN NATIONAL

SANTOMA INTERNATIONAL

SOBPTIMIST FEDERATION OF THE AMERICAS, ETC.

THE UNITED JAYCEES

YONTA INTERNATIONAL

Miss Marie M...

Mrs. Mary C. Poole (505) 255-9744

Mr. M. M. Richards

Dr. Nahlon Fairchild

Miss Lillian Barbow

Mr. Warren Schran (519) 434-5787

Mr. Roy W. Davis

Mrs. Pauline Ellison

Mr. John Balbo

Mr. Rodney K. Smith

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Mrs. Clayton Melcher

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Mr. David Hale L'enfant Plaza Hotel Info.

Ms. Eleanor Jemel

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Tolstoy Foundation, Inc.

International Rescue Committee

American Council for Nationalities Service

Travelers Aid-International Social Services

REPRESENTATION ON THE REFUGEE COMMITTEE

AGRICULTURE

Tony T. Dechant, President of the Farmers Union  
William J. Kuhfuss, President of the American Farm Bureau  
John W. Scott, Master of the Grange  
Oren Lee Staley, President of the National Farmers Organization

BUSINESS

Joe Danzansky, President, Giant Foods  
John Harper, former Chairman of the Board, ALCOA  
Edgar Kaiser, Chairman of the Board, Kaiser Industries  
Gordon King  
Tom Watson, former Chairman of the Board, IBM  
Walter Wriston, Chairman of the Board, CITICORP  
John McCormack, former Speaker of the House

EDUCATION

Kingman Brewster, President of Yale University  
William Friday, President, University of North Carolina  
David Matthews, President, University of Alabama

ELECTED OFFICIALS

Mayor Joseph Alioto (D-San Francisco)  
Governor George R. Ariyoshi (D-Hawaii)  
Governor Reubin Askew (D-Florida)  
Governor Daniel Evans (R-Washington)  
Governor James Longley (I-Maine)  
Mayor Richard Lugar (R-Indianapolis)  
Governor William Milliken (R-Michigan)  
Governor David Pryor (D-Arkansas)  
Governor Calvin Rampton (D-Utah) (Chairman, National Governor's  
Conference)  
Mayor Maurice Ferre (D-Miami)  
Mayor Carlos Romaro-Barcelo (R-San Juan) (President, National  
League of Cities)

ENTERTAINMENT

Pearl Bailey  
Raymond Burr  
Karen Carpenter  
John Denver

ENTERTAINMENT (Continued)

Peter Duchin  
Bob Hope  
Martha Raye  
John Wayne

HERITAGE

Joe Benites, President, League of United Latin American Citizens  
Fran Van Chuong, former Ambassador to the United States (Vietnamese)  
Minor George  
Mike Novak  
David Riesman  
John Slezak  
Ngo Dinh Tu, U.S. Citizen, Clarion State College  
Than Trong Tuy-Cam Bullington

LABOR

Peter Bomarito, President, Rubber Workers Union  
Ernie Lee, Director, International Section, AFL/CIO  
Lane Kirkland, Secretary-Treasurer, AFL/CIO

MEDIA

Helen Copley, Owner, San Diego Union  
Marshall Field, President, Field Enterprises (Chicago)  
Oveta Culp Hobby, Houston Chronicle  
Ernesta Procope, Amsterdam News (Black Newspaper, NYC)

OTHER PROMINENT CITIZENS

Ashby Boyle, National Youth Chairman, March of Dimes  
Alton Clausen  
Gaetana Enders  
Peter Frelinghuysen, former Congressman from New Jersey  
Jeanne M. Holm  
Ethel Kennedy  
Bess Myerson, Commissioner of Consumer Affairs, NYC  
Ellie Peterson  
Clarke Reed, Republican National Chairman, Mississippi  
George Romney  
Jack Valenti  
James Fellers, President, American Bar Association  
Jeannie Ferst  
George Feldman, former Ambassador

MEDICAL

Dr. Kazumi Kasuga, Director, Indian Health Service (Albuquerque)  
(experienced in refugee matters)  
Dr. Richard Meiling, past President, Ohio State Medical School  
Dr. Howard Rusk, prominent Humanitarian  
Dr. Malcolm Todd, President, AMA, Long Beach, California

RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS

Archbishop Joseph Bernardine, United States Catholic Conference  
Reverend W. Sterling Cary, President, National Council of  
Churches  
Philip Klutznick, former President, B'nai Brith  
Elder A. Theodore Tuttle, Church of Jesus Christ of the  
Latter Day Saints

SERVICE CLUBS

Miss Muriel Mawer, President, Altrusa International, Inc.  
Mrs. Mary C. Poole, President, Association of Junior Leagues  
Mr. M. M. Richards, President, Civitan International  
Dr. Mahlon Fairchild, President, Cosmopolitan International  
Miss Lillian Bembow, President, Delta Sigma Theta  
Mr. Warren Schram, President, Gyro International  
Mr. Roy W. Davis, President, Kiwanis International  
Mrs. Pauline Ellison, President, Links  
Mr. John Balbo, President, Lions International  
Mr. Rodney K. Smith, President, National Ambucs  
Ms. Juanita Brown, President, National Association  
of Colored Women's Clubs  
Mrs. Rosalie McGuire, President, National Association of  
Negro BPW Clubs  
Dr. Porter L. Fortune, President, National Exchange Club  
Ms. Marie Bowden, President, National Federation of BPW Clubs  
Mrs. Clayton Melcher, President, National Tri T  
Mrs. Walter Thompsen, President, Needlework Guild of America  
Mr. Ralph Glasscocks, President, Optimist International  
Mrs. Phyllis Manning, President, Pilot Club International  
Mrs. Lynette Oliver, President, Quota International  
Mr. William Robbins, President, Rotary International  
Mr. U. L. Lee, President, Ruritan National  
Mr. Thomas Bruckman, President, Sertoma International  
Mrs. Ruth Klotz, President, Soroptimist Recreation of the  
Americas, Inc.  
Mr. David Hale, President, The United Jaycees  
Ms. Eleanor Jammel, President, Zonta International

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 7, 1975

MEMO FOR: JOHN BORLING

FROM: KEN QUINN



I have now discovered that the names listed below and which I discussed with you earlier this morning were proposed by Frank Kellogg of the State Department to Dean Brown for consideration by the White House to be appointed to the President's special commission on resettling Indochinese refugees.

Mr. Joseph E. Johnson  
Glen E. Haydon  
Maxwell M. Rabb  
Mrs. Jeanne R. Ferst  
James A. Perkins

~~✗~~  
~~✗~~ Jessica CATO

~~✗~~ Recommended by Dean Brown