The original documents are located in Box 18, folder "Foreign Policy Address to Congress - Drafts (1)" of the John Marsh Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DRK

April 2, 1975

1.) good words - reads well

2.) Substantive problems -
1.) should start out by crushing the Cong.
2.) Should be no fear oriented - too closely tied to what's gone before
~~3.) Break w/ the past -~~
do
3.) Doesn't articulate a broad foreign policy - doesn't spell out long range goal - U.S. role in the world -

FOR: DON RUMSFELD

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT BS

Here is an early draft of the President's speech. It still needs a great deal of work, but I think the basic framework is there.

Attachment

Starts w/ endorsement of "foreign

What is the purpose of the speech?
What do we hope to achieve?
Does it lay out the Ford approach to foreign policy?
Does it seek to persuade, to build support?
What will be its impact abroad?

Hill 4/2/75

ADDRESS BY
PRESIDENT GERALD R. FORD
TO THE JOINT SESSION OF CONGRESS
April 9, 1975
ON FOREIGN POLICY

Mr. Speaker, Mr. President, my colleagues in the Congress:

The foreign relations of the United States require our most urgent and earnest attention.

The course which our country elects to pursue in the world has never been of greater significance than it is today -- for ourselves as a nation and for the future of the international community.

Today, I will speak about the serious problems which beset our (foreign policy) NATION and their implications for the future; I will set forth the concrete measures we must urgently take if we are to repair our situation and move forward again.

America is a great nation. Our presence in the world has sustained peace and stimulated prosperity throughout most of this century.

But our role in the world is now being questioned: by ourselves and by other nations. The time has come to ask why -- to take a hard look at what has happened and what we must do.

We must do this because we live in times of unprecedented complexity. The problems we face are deeply troubling: the threat of horrifying weapons inadequately controlled; of national rivalry and war; of faltering social justice and unequal economic development. At the same time we face a new dimension of problems created by an interdependent world: issues of energy, food, environment and population.

But despite a decade of domestic disruption and doubt about our role in the world, we have gone far in fashioning a foreign policy capable of managing the problems which we and the world face. We emerged from the turmoil of the 1960's with great resilience and typically American readiness to take on new challenges.

doesn't fit w/ Mid-East regional He's ambivalent the part ?

Our foreign policy is sound, well-structured and well We have much going for us.
under way. / In the past few years we have strengthened our ties with our old allies, the industrial democracies, on a basis of consultation and equity. We have begun to fashion more stable relations with our adversaries to reduce the danger of global nuclear war. We have commiited our influence and resources to contain regional conflicts and build for the stable and peaceful settlement of differences.

In response to the new challenges of interdependence we have constructed policies on food, energy and trade with the goal of progressing toward new global arrangements of equilibrium -- a system in which all humanity may benefit, free from exploitation or threat.

In sum, the United States has made a strong start toward dealing with the challenges of the future. The international structures we seek have begun to take shape. A new age of progress, peace and prosperity is on the horizon if only we can perceive our common interest and act boldly to serve it.

But during the year past a chain of events began which has affected our nation's capacity to respond to the challenges we face. A series of misguided, detrimental, or negative measures has seriously deteriorated our ability to act with conviction and confidence in the international arena.

The fabric of the new foreign policy we so laboriously have begun to construct threatens to unravel. If our ability to influence the international environment continues to diminish, the result may be a changed world for America and, ultimately, a changed America.

At the time of our country's first international crisis -- the American Revolution -- Samuel Adams spoke words that should guide us in the crisis we face now. "The necessity of the times, more than ever, calls for our utmost circumspection, deliberation, fortitude and perseverance."

In that spirit, we now need some plain and candid talk about where we stand; not to point the finger of blame, but to repair the damage where we find it; to get our foreign policy going and ready for the future.

Most immediately distressing has been the series of actions which have undercut our allies, leading both our friends and our antagonists around the world to regard the U.S. as an increasingly unreliable friend.

Indochina

I must start by speaking about Indochina. A great human tragedy has taken place in Vietnam and Cambodia over the past several weeks. We have also seen there a setback to our position that can affect our interests all over the globe.

To start, I want to remind the Congress of the price that we paid in Vietnam and of what we achieved. Fifty thousand Americans died there; hundreds of thousands were wounded; many tens of billions of dollars were spent. In the process, we engaged for years in a bitterly divisive internal debate. After years of effort, we negotiated a settlement under which we could

leave with our heads held high. We withdrew our forces; we got back our prisoners; we left a nation that was able to defend itself; we arranged a cease-fire that could have led to a political settlement.

The 1973 agreement was based on two premises: that the United States would be able if necessary to help enforce its terms; and that the United States would provide adequate economic and military assistance to South Vietnam. The agreement itself specifically provided for replacement of military equipment and supplies.

From the beginning, the North Vietnamese violated the cease-fire and the other provisions of the Armistice. They infiltrated over 170,000 troops into the South, tripled their armored strength, improved their logistic lines, and expanded their stockpile of weapons. They steadily increased their military pressure on

areas unequivocally held by South Viet-Nam at the time the Paris Agreement was signed. They refused to agree to a political settlement that included free elections.

On our side, however, the assumptions underlying the agreement were not being realized. The United States lost the ability to enforce the agreement, and the levels of assistance provided began to decline substantially.

While the North Vietnamese continued to receive massive and steady assistance and encouragement from their communist allies, American help became increasingly inadequate and reluctant.

Despite this, the South Vietnamese forces for a long time continued to fight exceedingly well. They carried on when our troops were no longer there to fight beside them, and even as our support was dwindling.

During the last fiscal year, our military aid to South Vietnam, in constant dollars, was little more than one-third of the previous year. This fiscal year it is down another 40 percent, though costs in general have increased sharply and the cost of fuel has quadrupled. In practical terms this means that stocks of ammunition, fuel and medicines could not be replenished. Aircraft, tanks and other major equipment items lost in combat could not be replaced. Entire squadrons of aircraft were grounded because there were not enough fuel supplies or spare parts to keep them flying. Dozens of small and isolated outposts were abandoned because there was insufficient ammunition for them. A large percentage of South Vietnam's armored vehicles was put out of action because worn-out parts could not be replaced.

Moreover, the evidence of this decline in our support was reinforced by the treatment accorded the Chairman of the Vietnamese Senate, Tran Van Lam on his recent visit here and by events such as the recent vote in the Democratic caucus rejecting all aid to Vietnam.

The North Vietnamese, encouraged by these developments, sent several of their own home reserve divisions into South Vietnam. They launched a massive offensive. The Government of Vietnam, short of funds and assistance and attempting to accommodate to its perception of drastic declines or termination of U.S. support, tried to protect its heartland by withdrawing its military forces back into more defensible enclaves. Without the time for careful preparation, this extremely difficult maneuver could not be carried out properly and panic set in. The results are painfully obvious.

The plight of Cambodia is equally stark. The United States has made major efforts to end the war in Cambodia through negotiation. But because of their military successes -- to which insufficient levels of American economic and military aid contributed -- the communist side has indicated no interest in negotiation, in compromise, or in a political solution to the conflict.

The lessons are clear: When we cut our assistance to friends who are defending themselves, we do not produce peace; instead, we produce more war.

The North Vietnamese are now in brutal, total violation of an agreement signed by the United States with the three Vietnamese parties, and sanctified by eleven nations.

We must have an end to military operations by the North Vietnamese and a return to the terms of the cease-fire agree-

ment. The United States has sent notes to all members of the Paris conference, including the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, to insist on enforcement of the Paris Accords.

Turkey

But Viet-Nam and Cambodia are only the most dramatic examples of what threatens to become a pattern in our relations with our allies. The decision of Congress to cut off aid and supplies to Turkey has led to additional questions about our constancy. It could lead Turkey -- an ally who has stood firmly by our side since the Korean conflict -- to qualify the extent of her reliance upon us, and collaboration with us.

Although Congressional action in cutting off aid and supplies to Turkey was intended to pressure Turkey to negotiate on the issue of Cyprus in a more forthcoming way, the cut-off itself

became a focal point of the intercommunal negotiations, served to impede progress in this forum, and ultimately caused the breakdown in the talks. Turkey, which lies between the Soviet Union and the Middle East, is vital not only to our security interests in the eastern Mediterranean, but also to the framework of the NATO alliance. Now, Turkey, a tried and valued friend, is being systematically driven out of that alliance.

There has been a marked deterioration in US-Turkish relations since the suspension of US military assistance. The Turks have halted negotiations on implementing a bilateral defense agreement. Turkish armed forces liaison personnel have been withdrawn from our Military Assistance Mission in Ankara. Visits by ships of the Sixth Fleet are no longer welcome at Turkish ports, and the Turkish Government has

stated that the continued presence in Turkey of key US defense installations would be incompatible with the continuation of an arms embargo that precludes even their buying for cash the spare parts for equipment we previously supplied them. More immediately critical is the possibility that our cut-off may be increasing pressure on Turkey to resort to further military moves before the lack of spare parts diminishes their capability to act.

Trade and Economic Sanctions

The recent record of America's treatment of our allies is not the only source of concern in our foreign policy. Our use of trade and economic sanctions as weapons to compel the conduct of other nations also has damaged the larger interests of the United States. The result has been an impediment to our policy of detente as well as to our effort to strengthen ties with our allies.

The Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the Trade Act of 1974 prohibits most-favored-nation treatment, credit or investment guarantees, or commercial agreements with the Soviet Union for so long as the emigration policies of the USSR remain basically unchanged.

Not surprisingly, the Soviet Union informed us that it could not accept a trading relationship based on legislation which they consider as contravening the principle of non-intervention in domestic affairs. Consequently, the Soviets refused to put into force the 1972 Trade Agreement between the US and the USSR, leading some to question America's intentions and ability to proceed with the policy of detente.

The moral adherence of this Administration to the principle of the right of peoples of the world freely to emigrate is not in question. But the result of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment has been to make the question of Soviet policy on Jewish emigration more unclear than before. Indeed, it may have set back a favorable trend.

Other provisions of the 1974 Trade Bill also have had an unfortunate impact on our relations with Latin America, the area of the world with which the U.S. has the longest historic ties of friendship and cooperation.

The Trade Act included a provision which excluded members of OPEC from the generalized system of trade preferences in the Act. It thereby excluded two old friends of the U.S., Ecuador and Venezuela, as well as other nations outside the hemisphere who, although OPEC members, continued to supply us with oil throughout last year's embargo.

This exclusion caused a major reaction in Latin America. It led to a resolution of the OAS Permanent Council and to the cancellation of a meeting of Latin American Foreign Ministers with Secretary of State Kissinger -- a meeting which was to

have been the next important step in our policy of a new dialogue with Latin America. Later this month, Secretary Kissinger will visit Latin America to discuss the issues between us in the hope of continuing the development of stronger ties between the U.S. and the rest of the hemisphere.

In addition to the U.S. Trade Bill's exclusions, another source of irritation has been the automatic sanctions applied against Latin American nations by the Hickenlooper Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act and the Gonzalez Amendment to the Inter-American Development Bank Act of 1972. While the Administration firmly opposes the illegal acts of economic expropriation which these amendments are designed to counter, the automatic nature of the sanctions required

seriously reduces the flexibility we need to respond to the wide variety of cases which fall with the act's purview. It means the U.S. often has been compelled to react in a manner disproportionate to the actions of other nations.

The Wider Implications

Quite frankly, the accumulating effect of these problems of our foreign policy is coming to be taken by many nations of the world as an index to the rate of America's decline as a world power. The reverberations of the problems I have mentioned are being felt elsewhere in the world, creating new problems in their turn. The Middle East is an example of this.

The interests of America are vitally affected by what happens in the Middle East. We need and want close and mutually beneficial relations with the nations of the Arab world and with Israel. Those relations, however, are hostage to the conflict between our Arab and Israeli friends, and, so long as that conflict continues, it also threatens to weaken our alliances and disrupt progress toward detente.

Until recently, the dilemma seemed insoluble, because there was no ground for compromise between Israel's right to exist and Arab denial of that right. Today, however, moderate voices have spoken out in the Arab world in support of peace with Israel -- a peace which Israel has set as its primary objective since it achieved statehood. The issue is no longer posed in terms of existence, but of how to reconcile Israel's legitimate concerns for its security with the Arabs' legitimate concern to recover occupied territory and to meet the legitimate aspirations of the displaced Palestinian people.

It is by now evident that the risks to our interests and to world peace of yet another war in the Middle East are intolerable. Because our relations with the parties to that conflict place us in a unique position to help them move from war to peace, we have at their request been engaged for the past year and a half in a peacemaking effort unparalleled in the history of diplomacy. In pursuing that effort, we have recognized that the issues dividing the parties are seen by them as vital to their national security and are not susceptible to easy or quick solutions. We have therefore sought to help them move a step at a time toward peace, in the belief that each step would bring new perceptions that would make further steps easier to take.

It has been a remarkably successful policy. Last year two major disengagement agreements -- one between Israel and Egypt

and one between Israel and Syria -- were negotiated and implemented. Peace in the area was given a new lease on life, contending military forces were withdrawn from face-to-face confrontation and the United Nations was asked to step in to assure that the terms of disengagement are met.

Unfortunately, the latest attempt to reach a further disengagement between Israel and Egypt did not succeed. Secretary Kissinger's latest trip for peace was unsuccessful largely because the parties directly involved, despite the substantial progress made toward narrowing the differences between them, were unable to compromise their remaining few differences. Shortsightedness and lack of vision and a sense of history also played a part -- a tragic part -- but the principal stumbling block was clearly one of substance.

What is the view of the United States now that the step-by-step process has ended?

First, we remain committed to a just and lasting peace in the area.

Second, we continue to believe that such a peace cannot be achieved without a continuing and persistent effort by the United States.

Third, we will not be blackmailed or threatened into taking positions we think unfair to the parties concerned or unwise in terms of the objectives we seek.

Fourth, the momentum toward peace that has been achieved over the course of the last 18 months must be maintained. The United States remains ready to do whatever it can to assure that peace finally comes to all the peoples of the Middle East.

Today we are again at a time of potential stalemate. It must not be allowed to continue, for if it does our leadership of the peacemaking effort will be challenged, the momentum toward peace will be replaced by a drift toward war, and all we have accomplished in calming the situation and improving our relationships in the area will be placed in jeopardy.

Our future role in negotiations will be critical. As I have said, there can be no peace unless the United States is prepared to play its part, and it is in this context that we must recognize the danger that our efforts will be hampered by the fact that our national purpose and public support for our foreign policy objectives seem confused and uncertain. The weight of our influence and the credibility of our commitments has been impaired by events in Indochina, Turkey and elsewhere; the

currency of our assurances is no longer taken at its former value. There is a potential cost, not only to the cause of peace in the Middle East, but to world peace.

The Middle East is not the only region that now feels the reverberations of our changing world position. In Europe, developments in Portugal could reflect in part a crisis of confidence in the

strength and staying power of the western democracies. The possibility that Portugal may represent the first major alteration in the East-West Balance in Europe since the end of World War II could convey a message to other nations under similar pressure. It is crucial that the people of Portugal and elsewhere in Southern Europe be made aware that the great democracies care what happens to them and that we strongly oppose the substitution of a dictatorship of the left for a dictatorship of the right.

* * * * *

The actions which have contributed to our present global predicament can be traced to many sources -- to errors by the Executive, by Congress, to the domestic upheaval in

many areas of American life over the past decade. But it will serve no good purpose if we now expend our energies in such analysis. I believe that the decisions which have led us to this point were taken patriotically, in good faith and in the hope of achieving good ends; indeed, in many cases they were taken for the highest moral objectives. I do not and have never doubted that.

What must concern us now is that our recent actions and decisions, however well-motivated, have lacked unity, credibility, and coherence. The foreign policy of a great nation must not be merely a collection of individual interests and special goals -- whether regional, economic, ethnic or ideological.

The time has come once again in our nation's history when the central purpose of our work in the world must be defined. If we are to continue to be a factor in the world -- and I believe we must do so to be true to ourselves -- then Congress and the Executive must work together. Our constitution requires that our foreign policy be determined by both our branches; that it be divided and yet shared. We must not let this source of national liberty become a force for national disunity.

Without unity, we will have no authority in the world. Our goals will recede until unattainable, our influence and self-esteem will decline. But in calling for unity and purpose I want it understood that I am not asking for wide powers designed to usher in a new era of American predominance in the world. Like President Harry S. Truman, I believe

that, "the responsibility of the great states is to serve and not dominate the world."

The Need for Urgent Action

Urgent and comprehensive steps are necessary to restore our nation's ability to affect the forces now at work in the world. Until these steps are taken, America's progress in international affairs cannot resume; unless these steps are taken, the crisis in world leadership will worsen.

-- The situation in Vietnam is in flux. I cannot at this time give the Congress assurance of the eventual outcome. We must, however, provide the emergency assistance necessary to stabilize the military situation and provide humanitarian relief for the millions of refugees who are fleeing in agony from their homes in the face of this merciless aggression. I call upon the Congress to approve, within the next two weeks, an emergency appropriation of $._____

million in military assistance and $_____ million in humanitarian assistance to accomplish these interim tasks. At the same time, I ask the Congress, against the backdrop of the American investment of blood, agony, and treasure in Vietnam, to work with me in divising a solution for the tragedy there of which we need not be ashamed.

-- With respect to Cambodia, I urge the Congress to provide, in the week remaining before ammunition runs out, the assistance without which the brave Cambodians cannot defend themselves. Let it not be said that the United States consigned its ally to extermination by literally taking the bullets from the rifles with which they are struggling to protect themselves.

[For the Administration's part, we are consulting the parties to the International Conference on Viet-Nam to determine whether it could be usefully reconvened. In addition to the original participants in that Conference, we would propose that the combattant forces in Cambodia be represented. The purpose of this Conference would be to obtain effective ceasefires both in Vietnam and Cambodia, and to restore international sanction for equitable settlements in both countries--objectives which the original Conference tragically failed to achieve.] NOTE: This paragraph suggested by Assistant Secretary Habib.

In addition, I have urged the Secretary General of the United Nations to organize a United Nations effort to assist the refugees in South Viet-Nam and Cambodia.

In order that we may regain the momentum of our foreign policy progress elsewhere in the world:

-- I call upon Congress to lift the U.S. arms embargo against Turkey by passing the Scott-Mansfield Bill, now before the Senate. This bill will make it possible once again to work toward creating a negotiating framework on the key Cyprus issues which must be be resolved in order to restore peace and build stability. I especially welcome the bill's requirement for monthly reports to the Congress on progress toward a peaceful settlement for Cyprus. These reports can

provide an opportunity for the kind of substantive give-and-take on foreign affairs we will require if we are to create a new era of cooperation in our foreign policy.

#

So that progress be maintained in the vital process of detente,

-- I propose that Congress and the Executive meet as soon as possible to discuss ways by which the development of trade relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union may proceed -- as well as to address the concerns of Congress as expressed in the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the Trade Act of 1974.

To promote the new dialogue between the U.S. and Latin America,

-- I call on Congress to provide the Executive with the authority, when required by the national interest, to waive the provisions of the Gonzalez and Hickenlooper amendments, as well as those sections of the 1974 Trade Act which impose automatic economic sanctions against hemispheric nations.

Finally, let me mention the issue of our nation's strength and security. It should be evident from the matters I have raised today that our policy is directed toward peace, accommodation, and cooperation with all the nations of the world. But accommodation in the absence of strength is an invitation to oppression. I urge the Congress maintain a strong national defense through a defense budget which will lead no foreign power to doubt our abilities or test our resolve.

And in talking of our national security, I must mention a most sensitive but vital issue. The effective conduct of our foreign affairs demands that we have the most competent, imaginative, and dedicated intelligence effort possible. We cannot meet our obligations abroad if we react blindly or without the insight which a first-class intelligence system provides.

For over 20 years the nation has been well-served by the cen-
t rally-directed intelligence effort established by President Truman.

It is entirely proper that this system be scrutinized by the Congress at this time. But we cannot afford a protracted public debate over extremely sensitive intelligence activities.

The Congress has a responsibility to conduct its investigation with the maximum discretion and conclude with all due speed lest this process demoralize or destroy our intelligence agencies.

Further, if Congress is to effectively oversee intelligence activities--as it should--it must put its house in order. It is impossible for virtually the entire Congress to supervise the daily activities and operations of our intelligence agencies. In particular, mechanisms must be devised to let Congress be advised

of covert operations without risking compromise through public disclosure.

Throughout history, nations have been compelled to go beyond conventional methods of international relations to ensure their security and advance their purposes. It is not in our interest to pretend otherwise.

I urge Congress to focus its efforts not on what may have happened in the past, but on what kind of intelligence service our nation requires for the future; whether we are properly organized to meet our requirements and what resources and safeguards will be needed. In doing so, Congress will perform a great service to the nation.

CONCLUSION

Not since the post-war Marshall Plan days has the free world been so desperately in need of American leadership. And never before in history have crises had such truly global implications, requiring strong, steady leadership. In a way that has rarely if ever been experienced in the past, our nation and the world confront the same problems. Yet the United States, whose leadership is crucial in these times now faces a growing dissarray in the conduct of its foreign affairs.

Peace, stability, prosperity, democracy--all these will be at risk if the United States fails to meet today's central challenge. We have a basically sound design for our foreign policy. We have the assets to carry forward the major achievements of recent years. What is now required is a fresh sense of shared enterprise, mutual respect, and larger vision.

I ask the Congress and the people to join in repairing the mistakes of our recent past, in overcoming the fragmentation and confusion which we now experience. Let us make America once again, and for centuries to come, a beacon of liberty and opportunity for the world.

President Eisenhower in his second inaugural gave the call we all can follow:

"May we pursue the right--without self righteousness;
May we know unity--without conformity:
May we grow in strength--without pride of self.

May we in our dealings with all peoples of the earth, ever speak the truth and serve justice."

If we are to carry on in this spirit, then we must join together to give America a new sense of direction.

I pledge that the foreign policy of this Administration will be coherent, constitutional and aimed at objectives of which

Americans can be proud. We will work with Congress to set the overall direction of our policy; we will consult with and inform Congress of the detailed implementation of that policy.

I ask that the Congress work to ensure that the issues of the moment do not deflect us from our larger goals; and to keep America's word good in the world community.

I ask the American people to unite in setting our nation's course for the future. I believe that the solution to many of our problems has been too long delayed by the prolonged absence of just pride in what we have attempted and what we have accomplished in the world. It is time to recognize the nature of our problems, regain our composure, consolidate our strengths, and get going on the job again with the confidence, ingenuity and common sense that have marked our