

The original documents are located in Box 11, folder “Defense - General” of the John Marsh Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

Copyright Notice

The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald R. Ford donated to the United States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections. Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

File
DOD

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 10, 1973

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SECRETARY WILLIAM P. ROGERS
SECRETARY ELLIOTT RICHARDSON
MR. WILLIAM E. TIMMONS
DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM:

THE PRESIDENT

I am sending this memorandum "Eyes Only" not because it has Top Secret information in it, but because it would not be helpful to have a memorandum of this type hit the press and thereby raise an issue with the Congress that we are trying to lobby the Congress on our Defense budget.

I see a massive problem developing within the Congress with regard to the Defense budget and the Foreign Assistance budget. Part of this problem is already showing itself insofar as the statements that have been made about aid to North Vietnam. The other part shows itself when Congressmen and Senators come in and say that they are for our ceiling on spending but they want to change the priorities.

We have the Congress in the hard place. They know they will be on the wrong side of the issue if they vote for spending above our ceiling which could lead to a price increase or a tax increase or both. Consequently, in order to support their pet domestic projects, they are going to have to take it out of the Defense and Foreign Assistance budgets.

Too often in the past four years, the primary responsibility for getting the votes on the ABM and the other tough issues has been left to the Congressional Liaison Office of the White House with, of course, very strong assistance from the State Department and the Defense Department. Both the Defense Department and the State Department have done a superb job over these past four years in working the members of the Committees who handle their affairs. What we need now is to have both State and Defense work on the entire Congress rather than concentrating primarily on their Committees. It means a great deal more to a Congressman or a Senator who is not on the Foreign Relations Committee, for example, to be talked to by the Secretary of State or one of the Under Secretaries or an Assistant Secretary, for that matter. By the same token, it means

a great deal more to some Congressman or Senator who is not on the Armed Services Committee to have the Secretary of Defense or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs or one of the Assistant Secretaries or Deputy Secretaries of Defense talk to him.

What is really involved here is the possible success or failure of our entire foreign policy and of our initiatives toward peace which have had such great momentum in 1972. Our SALT talks with the Russians and the MBFR talks later in the year will be disastrous if we have substantial cuts in the Defense budget prior to that time. And, of course, the whole peace settlement in Vietnam depends upon our ability to hold Foreign Assistance at its present level and to defeat any attempt to cut North Vietnam out of the Foreign Assistance recipients.

Timmons should make a thorough study, in cooperation with the Congressional Liaison people in both State and Defense, of every member of the House and Senate who could potentially be enlisted on our side in these issues. Then, on a man-to-man basis, it is essential that each one be covered, and covered soon. What is important is to keep them from making statements or writing letters which will commit them on making huge cuts in Defense or opposing aid to North Vietnam so that we will find it impossible to turn them around later.

The primary targets, of course, should be the Republicans and Southern Democrats. Then try to pick up as many Northern Democrats as possible, as well as some of the Liberal Republicans.

I think the best way to handle this is for the Secretary of State to chair a group made up of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense and Bill Timmons, and whatever other people you want from these various offices. Let's get a game plan and then see to it that it is followed up. Timmons will have the responsibility for doing the technical work. As far as the contacts are concerned, the primary burden must be borne by the State Department and the Defense Department.

Kissinger's office can be helpful with several of the individuals involved but, generally speaking, we would like to have this effort carried on outside of the White House rather than from the White House alone.

5:25 to bed

Rhodes

Anderson

Scott

Giffin

Rankin

~~SECRET~~ (H16)

Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger
Interviewed by Newsmen
Following Appearance before
Senate Armed Services Subcommittee
Tuesday, August 13, 1974

Q: Mr. Schlesinger, there's obviously going to be a new effort by the Congress to cut the size of the military forces. What did you tell the Committee this morning along that line?

A: I pointed out that our military manpower is 40 percent below the FY 68 level; that it's 20 percent below the pre-war level of 1964. We have shrunk by 600,000 men compared to pre-war; we are lower than we were in the 1950's. We are at the lowest point that we have been since prior to Korea and that at the same time the external capabilities that we seek to balance have grown and that, consequently, we should not have further reductions in military manpower.

Q: How then can you enable President Ford to cut spending? He's trying to get a balanced budget and he's asking for help from all his Cabinet officers. How can you help him?

A: I'm afraid that we are getting a little bit more help from the Congress in that respect than we desire. As you know, the markup by the House Appropriations Committee cut the Department of Defense by about \$3.7 billion. In recent years what we have discovered is that in any economy drive the Department of Defense is asked to take a disproportionate share of the reductions. We would seek to avoid that this year.

Q: Since more than half of your budget is for personnel, do you think that's where any cuts could come, if it did come?

A: I would think that the reductions in military personnel over recent years have been substantial and that the Congress would be careful in further cuts in that area. As you know, we have a 32,000-man reduction already authorized for civilians.

Q: There was some talk in the session this morning that the all volunteer concept may just become too expensive to continue. What were your thoughts along that line?

A: That is an issue that we hope that we do not have to face. What the Chairman of the Committee suggested was that against tight budgets we might reach a point that we could not buy equipment for our forces and continue to pay our men market rates. Under those circumstances we would be faced with a hard choice about the all volunteer force, but I do not think we have reached those conditions yet.

Q: Even if you went back to the draft, if there was new legislation to authorize the draft again, you wouldn't save any money would you unless you reduced the salaries of the people who are coming in?

A: That is correct and we would need substantial changes in legislation. We would be able to avoid for the draftees further increases, but even that would require legislative changes.

Q: A close friend of President Ford, Congressman Cederberg, told us on Sunday after meeting privately with the President that possibly a cut of



MORE

50 to 75,000 military personnel would be in the offing if the President is really serious about reducing federal spending because otherwise the President only cuts social programs; there would be liberals who will say you want to keep the generals happy but you're not willing to help out the needy. If the President came to you and said, "Can we absorb a reduction of 50,000 people?", in spite of your earlier comments, do you think you could possibly find a way?

A: A President is very persuasive when he talks to you in those terms. I would hope he would not put the question in those terms.

Q: The President seems to agree with you that strength is the way to detente. How do you maintain strength without the manpower?

A: I think that is an excellent question. We cannot. We must recognize that the President stated last night that the U.S. should remain the premier power in the world; that we should not become a second class power and that the American public will have to be prepared to pay the costs of maintenance of American military strength.

Q: During the months of the Watergate problem, did you notice any indication by the Soviet Union that their policies toward us were affected by their view of our domestic political situation?

A: I think that one could only speculate on Soviet motives with regard to such a possibility. What they perceived in the United States, they were not particularly forthcoming. Whether that is a reflection of their underlying policy or whether that reflected a tendency to wait until the clarifications of uncertainties in the U.S., is a question that I'm in no position to answer.

HANG

I should take this opportunity though to say that in this recent period of domestic turmoil and tribulation that the Military Services have performed magnificently. They have been an element of stability in the American political fabric; they have not only been an element of stability but because they were there and stable that they were a stabilizing element for the community at large and that it has been a privilege to observe how thoughtfully the military establishment has behaved during this period of uncertainty.

Q: The other day you assured the President that you would stay. Were you thinking of during the transitional period or (inaudible)?

A: There is no particular termination date to my present position.

Q: Since that New Republic article, has there been any change of feeling in the President? He seemed to indicate that if he became President, you may not stay too long. Have you noticed a change?

A: I don't know, I think that's part of the article you referred to. The other part was that he had very high regard for the performance in the job. He was concerned about the relations with Congress. You would have to inquire of the President whether his attitude has changed in that regard.

Q: He has asked you to stay though?
A: He has.

E N D



This was dropped off by Dick Larry and he would like to talk to you about it.

His number is: 412 281-4910

Bonnie

11/07 11:35 a.m.

To: JACK MARSH
From: DICK LARRY

November 1, 1974

TRIDENT MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM
AND SUBMARINE BASE

File

The Pacific Legal Foundation is moving to intervene in litigation which threatens the viability of one of our country's highest priority defense programs.

A national coalition of "environmentalists", headed by "Concerned About Trident", has filed suit against the Department of Navy in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to halt the Trident missile defense system and construction of the Trident missile submarine support site in Bangor, Washington.

The Trident submarine is the Navy's latest system for national defense. It represents the next evolutionary step from the polaris and poseidon class submarines which are now obsolete in comparison to the latest Soviet submarine advances.

"Concerned About Trident" argues that the Navy has failed to file a sufficient environmental impact statement pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act. The fact is that the Navy has developed a massive five-volume environmental impact statement covering all reasonable environmental impacts of the submarine base.

It is the Pacific Legal Foundation's position that the plaintiffs' claims are spurious, that preservation of national defense has priority over NEPA, and that congress' constitutional power to maintain the Navy is plenary and not subject to judicial interference. Should plaintiffs win in this case, the Foundation anticipates similar suits against other national defense programs, using this case as a precedent.

Thus, the Foundation intends to take all action necessary to ensure that this suit does not threaten the Trident missile defense system and does not hinder the speedy completion of the Trident submarine base in Bangor, Washington.

ROY A. GREEN JR.
EX. VICE PRES.
PACIFIC LEGAL FOUNDATION
455 CAPITOL MALL
SUITE 465
SACRAMENTO, CALIF. 95814
PHONE 916-444-0154



MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 27, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: JACK MARSH
MAX FRIEDERSDORF

FROM: LES JANKA *les*

SUBJECT: Mini-LIG on DOD Budget Debate
in the Senate, Wednesday, May 28,
11:00 a.m., Situation Room

To prepare for the Senate debate on the Defense Department Authorization Bill scheduled for June 2-6, we have scheduled a mini-LIG meeting between White House and DOD Congressional liaison offices. The specific objectives of the meeting are:

-- To brief White House staffers on the key issues and amendments under consideration.

-- To ensure that DOD has fully prepared necessary supporting materials.

-- To work out jointly a strategy for winning key votes and mobilizing all possible resources to defeat undesirable amendments.

-- To identify swing Senators and develop target lists for contacts on specific issues.

-- To provide an opportunity for the White House staff and NSC staff to review the speeches and fact sheets prepared by DOD to ensure proper quality and policy consistency.

The DOD delegation will be headed by Dick Fryklund and in addition to Don Sanders, will include one of the top Congressional liaison officers from each of the Services.

defense function will be busted to the tune of \$5.4 billion authority and \$4.1 billion in budget discipline is needed—certainly is—then the place to raising it is here and the time is this vote.

of us who worked for a more set of priorities in the budget; those of us who argued to devote more of our all-out budgetary resources to people programs; to programs in agriculture, health, education and man- programs that would create aid the economy; we were told that the deficit we face is that the threat of inflation is rising, that now is not the time instances when we do get the to vote for a set of priorities different from the President's, re responsive to social and ecods, to human needs—as often get hit with another White we get told that we are cross- deficit line that the President Congress drew some lines too. st concurrent resolution we own deficit line, and we also e lines indicating where we priorities to be. And, if we conference report and sanction sive and unnecessary military t calls for, then we are crossing se lines—we are crossing our t line as well as the President's. couple of months, we are go- debating a Second Concurrent on the Budget. If we do not in exercising the discipline re- trect relatively close to the first we had better be prepared to icit that is also very different in the first one. I trust that vote for his conference report nize that this is where it all ust that they will not be look- use of us on the Budget Com- d asking us, "Where did that e from?"

sident, I believe we need an farm program more than we bomber. I believe we need the nt of our natural resources cularly our potential for en- renewable sources more than a SAM-D missile. I believe we elp solve the problems of our ple more than we need MARV dded to the abundance of nssiles we already have. I be- eed to work on rural develop- the problem of rural housing we need an expensive and vul- lying radar station called I believe we need to upgrade r's transportation system and nergy-efficient and economi- ent more than we need a new clear strike cruisers. I also be- we need to give the taxpayers onomy a fair shake—especi- in this period of economic d I know that every time we itagon and the Administration gh a new record spending bill is called "national defense" ng to have that much less meeting those needs that I be- to be our top priorities.

I thought this military procurement bill was too big when it left the Senate. And, it returns to us bigger still. Let us give the taxpayers and the human needs of this nation an endorsement on this vote. Let us make it clear to the other body and to the public at large that we are serious about this new budgetary process—that we are not just playing games. Let us reject this conference report.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the conference report.

The yeas and nays have been ordered. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I announce that the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. EASTLAND), and the Senator from Wyoming (Mr. McGEE) are necessarily absent.

I further announce that the Senator from Rhode Island (Mr. PELL), and the Senator from Illinois (Mr. STEVENSON) are absent on official business.

I further announce that, if present and voting the Senator from Illinois (Mr. STEVENSON) would vote "nay."

Mr. GRIFFIN. I announce that the Senator from Hawaii (Mr. FONG), the Senator from Arizona (Mr. GOLDWATER), the Senator from New York (Mr. JAVITS), the Senator from Illinois (Mr. PERCY), and the Senator from Ohio (Mr. TAFT), are absent on official business.

I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Arizona (Mr. GOLDWATER) would vote "aye."

On this vote, the Senator from Illinois (Mr. PERCY) is paired with the Senator from Ohio (Mr. TAFT).

If present and voting, the Senator from Ohio would vote yea and the Senator from Illinois would vote nay.

The result was announced—yeas 42, nays 48, as follows:

[Rollcall Vote No. 374 Leg.]

YEAS—42

Allen	Helms	Scott
Baker	Hruska	William L.
Bartlett	Inouye	Sparkman
Brock	Jackson	Stennis
Buckley	Laxalt	Stevens
Byrd	Long	Stone
Harry F., Jr.	McClellan	Symington
Byrd, Robert C.	McClure	Talmadge
Cannon	Montoya	Thurmond
Curtis	Morgan	Tower
Fannin	Nunn	Tunney
Garn	Pastore	Welcker
Griffin	Pearson	Williams
Hansen	Ribicoff	Young
Hathaway	Scott, Hugh	

NAYS—48

Abourezk	Domenici	Magnuson
Bayh	Eagleton	Mansfield
Beall	Ford	Mathias
Bellmon	Glenn	McGovern
Bentsen	Gravel	McIntyre
Biden	Hart, Gary W.	Metcalf
Brooke	Hart, Philip A.	Mondale
Bumpers	Hartke	Moss
Burdick	Haskell	Muskie
Case	Hatfield	Nelson
Chiles	Hollings	Packwood
Church	Huddleston	Proxmire
Clark	Humphrey	Randolph
Cranston	Johnston	Roth
Culver	Kennedy	Schweiker
Dole	Leahy	Stafford

NOT VOTING—9

Eastland	Javits	Percy
Fong	McGee	Stevenson
Goldwater	Pell	Taft

So the conference report was rejected. Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I move to reconsider that vote.

Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, point of order.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I move to lay the motion on the table.

Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, is a motion to reconsider in order coming from the Senator from Maine?

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator is qualified to make the motion.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I move to lay that motion on the table.

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Is there a sufficient second on the motion to table the motion to reconsider? There is a sufficient second.

The clerk will call the roll. The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, as long as the Members are here, may we have a 10-minute rollcall?

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The clerk will continue calling the roll. The assistant legislative clerk resumed the call of the roll.

Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, there are Members conversing in the aisles, and staff members. I think we ought to have order in the Senate before we proceed with the rollcall.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Let there be order in the Senate, please, before we proceed with the rollcall.

Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, there are Members back here who did not hear the gavel, and some over there, too.

The VICE PRESIDENT. May we have order in the Senate, please?

Mr. NELSON. There is a Member at the rear, at the door, who did not hear the gavel, Mr. President.

The VICE PRESIDENT. I will give it to him again. I have a bigger gavel in my office.

Mr. NELSON. There are two Members on the other side, including the minority leader, who did not hear the gavel.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Will the Members please take their seats before the rollcall continues?

Mr. NELSON. There are Members, Mr. President, in the center aisle who have not heard the gavel.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, will the Senator from Wisconsin use his microphone?

Mr. NELSON. I think, Mr. President, that the rollcall ought to be held.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Debate is not in order during a rollcall. The Senator has made the point. I shall hit the gavel once more and ask the Senators to please take their seats. Then the rollcall will proceed.

The assistant legislative clerk resumed and concluded the call of the roll.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I announce that the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. EASTLAND), and the Senator from Wyoming (Mr. McGEE), are necessarily absent.

I further announce that the Senator from Rhode Island (Mr. PELL), and the Senator from Illinois (Mr. STEVENSON) are absent on official business.

Mr. GRIFFIN. I announce that the Senator from Tennessee (Mr. BROCK), the Senator from Hawaii (Mr. FONG),

104 -
~~MO~~
Norton
file

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON



June 18, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: JACK MARSH

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *BSC*

In reply to your memorandum of this date concerning Jack Norton's urging that a number of pending general officer nominations should be expedited, I have taken the liberty of passing the matter on to Jim Connor who is responsible for staffing military nominations in the White House. I agree with your assessment that every effort should be made to move promptly on these nominations.




THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 18, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM:

JACK MARSH 

A mutual friend, General Jack Norton, whom I have known for a number of years, called me from Naples to advise me that he will be retiring. Jack pointed out that there is pending in the White House a list of general officers and flag rank nominations, which if sent to the Senate and acted on prior to July 4th, would have a very favorable impact on achieving an orderly transition of these nominees into their new NATO posts.

He indicated that if the confirmations did not occur prior to July 4th, their reporting date would be substantially delayed, thereby making their move into their new assignments more difficult.

Can you give me any guidance on this?

Many thanks.



M

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 12, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: JOHN MARSH, JR.

THROUGH: MAX FRIEDERSDORF *M.F.*
VERN LOEN *V.L.*

FROM: TOM LOEFFLER *T.L.*

SUBJECT: Status of the House Armed Services
Committee Hearings on Military
Involvement in Drug Testing

The Subcommittee on Investigations of the House Armed Services Committee, under the direction of Chairman F. Edward Hebert (D. -La.) held an initial hearing on September 8, 1975 in an effort to ascertain the scope of military involvement in drug testing. This hearing is the first in a series of hearings to be held by the Subcommittee on the general topic of drug experimentation by the armed services.

On September 8, Mr. Charles Ablard, General Counsel for the Army, appeared before the Subcommittee as the Administration witness and in behalf of the Army. Future hearings will require the appearance of witnesses representing all the services, the office of the Secretary of Defense, and possibly persons outside the government.

These hearings are viewed by the Committee counsel as being a "long term affair". In view of Chairman Hebert's recently incurred injury and hospitalization, subsequent hearings will be further delayed until the Chairman is able to resume a full schedule.

L/D

November 12, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: MAX FRIEDERSDORF
FROM: JACK MARSH

Sometime this week I think it would be helpful to set up a meeting of the Defense LIG inasmuch as we have the Appropriations bill for Defense coming to the Floor next week.

The significant changes that have occurred in the last ten days may mean that we will have to make a more determined effort on this bill. Perhaps you and I can put together a checklist of things we will want to accomplish in such a LIG meeting.

JOM/di



Cong. related

November 12, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: DON RUMSFELD

FROM: JACK MARSH

In the Steering Group meeting with the President on Tuesday morning, the suggestion was made by several of the Senators present, including Brock, that there should be changes in the structure of the Department of Defense budget in order to move out of the Defense budget certain significant items that are really not Defense related.

The suggestion was made that perhaps OMB should give consideration to this. Therefore, I am sending Jim Lynn a copy of this memorandum.

cc: Jim Lynn

JOM/dl



Cong

November 12, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: MAX FRIEDERSDORF
FROM: JACK MARSH

Sometime this week I think it would be helpful to set up a meeting of the Defense LIG inasmuch as we have the Appropriations bill for Defense coming to the Floor next week.

The significant changes that have occurred in the last ten days may mean that we will have to make a more determined effort on this bill. Perhaps you and I can put together a checklist of things we will want to accomplish in such a LIG meeting.

JOM/dl

W/11/11/85
12/4/85



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 17, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR

JACK MARSH

FROM:

MIKE DUVAL *Mike*

SUBJECT:

CHARLIE KIRBOW

Charlie would like your advice as to whether or not he should gear up a "letter writing" campaign, showing the support he has among Senators for the Assistant Secretary job at Defense.

He says he needs your advice now, because he has another offer and needs to know whether he's under active consideration and, if so, how he should go about it.

*R/M to
Cheel*



cc: B. Walters 12/18

MAR 25 1976

MEMORANDUM

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

3/25

Jack,

MAR 25 1976

SECDEF asked me
to send these two
papers to you.

Staser

M. Staser Howard
Rear Admiral, USN
Military Assistant

File



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

File
MAR 23 1976

Honorable John L. McClellan
Chairman, Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This responds to your request for an assessment of the implications of recent trends in the military balance between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

Forecasting the future inevitably involves great uncertainty. This is especially the case in considering the future overall military balance between the United States and the Soviet Union, since that balance will be determined by the actions taken or not taken by both nations in the context of what is desired of their military forces. One cannot easily calculate a "crossover point," a specific point in time when an objective judgment could be made that one nation had moved unambiguously ahead in the overall military balance. The question becomes more manageable, however, if each of the key balances is considered separately.

For each of the key balances, I will summarize some of the major indications of the trends to date, and discuss their implications for the future. And since the future military balance will depend greatly on the level of resources devoted to the defense programs, and especially research and development, of the United States and the Soviet Union, I will also briefly discuss the trends in the military investment balance between the two nations.

The Strategic Balance

We seek to maintain essential parity in this most critical of the military balances. We believe such parity presently exists, and that the forces we maintain and the development and deployment programs proposed will ensure that it continues to exist.

The crucial considerations are the ability to deter the Soviet Union, preservation of our retaliatory capacity, its adequacy to inflict desired levels of damage, and the flexibility to preserve a measure of deterrence even after the onset of nuclear warfare if initial deterrence should fail.



We must respond to the increasing possibility that major asymmetries will develop between U.S. and Soviet strategic forces because of the momentum in Soviet offensive and defensive programs, and that the Soviet strategic capability could come to be viewed as superior to that of the United States. In terms of quantitative measures, the Soviets lead in numbers of delivery vehicles, megatonnage, and throw weight, while the U.S. has an advantage in number of warheads. Qualitative factors such as accuracy, reliability, survivability, and command and control probably have as much impact on overall force effectiveness as the more obvious quantitative factors.

Over the past year the Soviets have begun the deployment of three new larger ICBMs and appear ready to deploy a fourth. The new ICBMs, with accurate MIRVed warheads, will improve the capability of the Soviet Union to threaten the survivability of our existing land-based ICBM forces. The Soviets are also going to considerable lengths to protect and harden their new generation ICBMs and their launch control and communications facilities. Every new SS-17, SS-18 and SS-19 missile they deploy is going into modernized hard silos, and associated launch control facilities are in silos rather than bunkers. In SLBMs the Soviets have deployed missiles whose 4,200 nautical mile range exceeds that of any deployed U.S. SLBM. Soviet production and deployment of the Backfire heavy bomber enhances their capabilities in long-range bombers.

Meanwhile Soviet advances in technological aspects of weaponry in which the United States has customarily held a substantial lead, such as accuracy and MIRVing, threaten to erode or eliminate that lead in the future. In modernizing our own strategic nuclear forces, we must ensure that there could be no real or fancied Soviet advantage in a first strike attack against the United States, and that no significant real or imagined asymmetry favoring the Soviet Union exists in overall strength and capabilities.

A major possible asymmetry does exist with respect to civil defense. The Soviets have devoted very substantial resources to a civil defense program which includes evacuation of urban populations in advance of hostilities, construction of shelters in outlying areas, and compulsory training in civil defense for much of the Soviet population. They have energetically sought to achieve survivability in their command and control systems through dispersal, redundancy, hardening, concealment and mobility. And the military industrial base of the Soviet Union is not only expanding, it is being systematically dispersed and features unutilized capacity which constitutes a substantial "surge" capability. The cumulative impression one gains from these activities is that of a nation preparing to fight and win a nuclear war.

I have indicated where we believe the Soviets to be ahead, and where they are making gains. If present trends continue, the U.S. will become clearly inferior in strategic power at some point in the coming years, and the U.S. would likely be seen as being inferior or becoming inferior some time prior to the crossover point. My concern is that we act now to arrest

the unfavorable trends of the past decade, and to lay the base for a sustained program of increases and improvements in our own capabilities so as to prevent that crossover point from being reached, and to demonstrate clearly our determination to continue to maintain our position.

Naval Balance

Assessing the future implications of present trends is more difficult in the naval balance because historically the navies of the U.S. and USSR have had different missions--that is, each nation has, in the past, developed its naval forces for different purposes. Because of our geopolitical position, the U.S. Navy has been charged with two missions: sea control, and projection of power ashore at a distance. The Soviet Union, historically basically a land power, has charged the Soviet Navy with the missions of sea denial, and control of waters peripheral to the homeland. But recent expansion of the Soviet Navy, both qualitatively and quantitatively, indicates that the Soviets may increasingly assign missions to their navy similar to those of our Navy. It is important to keep this point in mind as we attempt to deal with the future.

Sea control and projection of power at a distance require surface ships and submarines. Sea denial requires the sinking of surface ships and submarines, and this task can be carried out in many ways, including a mix of aircraft, submarines, and surface combatants. Although we cannot predict a "crossover" point when the U.S. Navy would be unable to fulfill its missions, assuming the recent trends were not arrested, the cumulative impact of this prospect can be seen by examining a few key indicators.

The U.S. has concentrated its sea-based standoff offensive weapons in its aircraft carriers. The Soviets, on the other hand, have developed an impressive number of surface and submarine-launched anti-ship guided missile systems. The twelve-to-one advantage which the Soviet Union currently has in numbers of sea-based platforms which can deliver such weapons would be essentially eliminated by the mid-1980s if the programs we are proposing are approved.

While the Soviets will continue to expand their amphibious forces in the future, we do not expect them to eliminate the present U.S. lead in amphibious warfare. They may, however, develop a capability to project power ashore at a distance which is very different from our own. For instance, they may choose to develop some combination of airborne assault and naval forces rather than mirror our Marine Corps and amphibious force. As the future unfolds, we will need to pay attention to the nature of their capability, and to exactly how they go about developing it.

Although there may be a degree of uncertainty regarding the Soviets' plans to develop a power projection capability, the future in the areas of sea denial and sea control seems clearer--and more ominous. Unless arrested,

the trends in surface combatants and attack submarines, when combined with the modernization of the Soviet Naval Aviation force with the Backfire bomber, suggest that by the early 1980s the Soviets will possess more than sufficient numbers of modern and capable naval units to effect sea control missions as well as sea denial missions in those ocean areas of importance to them.

In the last seven years, our active fleet has fallen from over 900 to about 490 ships, and we have gone from 23 to 14 aircraft carriers, with one additional carrier scheduled to retire from the active fleet this year. The Soviet Union currently leads the U.S. in numbers of major surface combatants--the Soviets have about 210 while the U.S. has about 175. Although this lead is small at present, a continuation of the recent trends would mean that the Soviets could increase their margin to roughly a two-to-one advantage in this area by the early 1980s. The U.S. shipbuilding program proposed in the FY 1977 Defense budget would provide for rough parity in numbers of ships of this type by the 1980s. Meanwhile, the Soviets will continue to modernize their force with newer and more anti-ship and anti-submarine capable combatants which are able to operate for extended periods at great ranges from the Soviet Union.

The trends in the area of attack submarines are more subtle. The Soviets have long maintained a larger submarine force than has the U.S.; over the last decade, they have held a greater than three-to-one advantage over the U.S. in numbers of attack submarines. The quality of their submarines has also been steadily improving. For instance, in 1965 about 10% of the Soviet attack submarine force was nuclear-powered; by 1975, about 30% of this force was nuclear-powered. Further, they have deployed a large number of anti-ship missile-equipped submarines, some of which can launch while remaining submerged. We expect the Soviets to continue to replace their older diesel submarines with new, sophisticated units in the future; and, should the recent trends continue, we could expect them to maintain their present numerical advantage. The proposed U.S. shipbuilding program would, however, reduce their margin to a two-to-one advantage by the early 1980s.

The Central European Balance

In the Central Front the past decade has witnessed improvements in the capabilities of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. NATO advances in the quantity and quality of tanks, anti-tank weapons and aircraft have led to a force which provides both a conventional and a nuclear deterrent. The Pact, on the other hand, has substantially increased its manpower, even considering that the addition of Soviet troops to Czechoslovakia was somewhat offset by the breakup of national Czechoslovakian forces. Most importantly, the Pact has made major improvements in the quality of its weapons and support for those weapons, markedly improving its ability to conduct Blitzkrieg war.

Forecasting the future balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact contains many complexities. First, in the Central Front the balance involves many nations, east and west. This is especially so for NATO, where the United States contributes less than half of NATO's standing forces, whereas the Soviets contribute more than 60% of the Pact's manpower and equipment and exert, as we know, far greater influence over the rest. Second, numerical indicators--numbers of tanks, men, aircraft, etc.--do not by themselves provide a high confidence basis to evaluate the balance. History has many examples of seemingly superior forces being defeated by an adversary who used better tactics, achieved surprise, or had a plan that exploited the weaknesses of his opponent.

But in comparing the overall manpower and number of weapons, NATO and the Warsaw Pact appear currently about equal, and in the future only marginal changes should occur. The Pact has a 1.2:1 edge in troops, which should remain unless a slackening of Sino-Soviet tensions or political crises in Eastern Europe, similar to Czechoslovakia, result in Soviet soldiers being sent to the Central Front. Each side has some numerical leadership in the weapons essential to its primary missions. The Pact leads in tanks by 2.6:1 and also in artillery, both required to support a Blitzkrieg offensive. In the future it will continue to lead in these areas, but the gap will not increase substantially. A change that is expected is an increase in the number of Pact armored personnel carriers, a prerequisite for rapid combined arms warfare. NATO currently has more APCs, but this could be reversed to the Pact's favor. From NATO's perspective it leads in weapons such as anti-tank guided missiles and ground attack aircraft, which are major elements of its defensive strategy. Improvements in ATGMs will continue. The comparative number of the close air support aircraft on both sides may change, however, as the Soviets acquire more of these aircraft while NATO's numbers remain relatively constant.

The trend in the quality of weapons is less favorable to NATO than the quantitative balance. The Soviets have, in the past decade, made great improvements in the technological quality of their equipment. They are closing a gap that has been historically a major source of NATO strength--our qualitative leadership in weaponry. The seriousness of the narrowing of this gap--or the loss of leadership in some areas--is unclear at present. In some cases NATO produces superior weapons and will continue to do so: for example, in combat aircraft, guided weapons and anti-tank missiles. In other areas the Soviets have introduced superior equipment--multiple rocket launchers and tactical air defense systems--which pose threats to our air support capabilities or will provide even greater firepower. In the future, unless changes occur, three trends will continue to operate that are adverse to NATO's position: while the U.S. will lead in laboratory technologies, the Pact will have better weapons in the field; the Soviet force structure will increase in overall capabilities although the numbers of weapons remain unchanged; and Soviet expectations of achieving success in Blitzkrieg war will improve.

A major element of the balance which is not frequently treated is the tactical and operational aspect. This has many components--the tactical advantages accruing to the defensive or offensive role of each side, the reliability of the respective allies, the importance of mobilization and surprise, command and control, the capabilities of logistics and the quality and training of manpower. NATO has an edge in several of these--for example, our pilots are better trained and more capable, our communications systems are more advanced, and our logistics organization is more substantial. The Pact has the advantage of a more homogeneous mix of equipment and the choice as to the timing and nature of the attack. This latter advantage cannot be overstated, for the Pact, in focusing on a rapid, one-time major surge into Europe, can gain significant advantages by using surprise, and is now acquiring the type equipment designed to enable it to execute this plan. In the future the Soviets will probably be making changes in their training, logistics and doctrine to exploit their new technical advances. Their pilots, for example, are already training in ground attack roles; they are already beginning to improve their logistics support to front line forces; and their exercises have been testing more variants on war than a simple theater nuclear conflict. NATO will also be improving its forces through standardization and rationalization.

Overall, NATO and the U.S. face a number of challenging tasks in the coming years. A crucial point in the balance may occur in the 1980s when the Warsaw Pact is numerically equivalent to NATO, technically as sophisticated, and tactically proficient in launching and sustaining its force of attack. Whether the United States will maintain an advantage overall--one that will deter both conventional and nuclear war--will depend on whether programs are supported here and in NATO to deal decisively with these emerging Soviet capabilities.

Military Investment Balance

To a very large extent, where the U.S. stands relative to the Soviet Union in the military balance today is the resultant of decisions which were made many years ago. The future will be similarly dependent on those decisions we will now make, as well as on the decisions made and actions taken by the Soviet Union. In the most general terms, the future military balance will be a function of the overall level of investment we make in future military capabilities, represented in the present by the procurement and RDT&E portions of our overall defense program.

Over the last decade, the annual total allocation of resources to the Soviet military has increased by approximately 3% per year in real terms. During the same period, and in the same real terms, U.S. defense programs rose to a wartime peak in 1968, but have declined continuously since then at an annual rate of about 5%, falling below the 1965 level in 1973 and each year thereafter. As a result of these contrasting trends over the decade, the total real resources devoted annually to the Soviet military came to exceed the U.S. counterpart in 1970, and have done so in every

subsequent year; in 1975 the Soviet programs were more than 40% greater than those of the U.S.

The present pattern of the Soviet military effort outstripping that of the U.S. is reflected in practically every military mission area and resource category. Of major concern are the contrasting trends in Soviet and U.S. investments for future military capability. By approximately 1970 the Soviets' military systems procurement, facilities construction, and RDT&E had exceeded the U.S. counterparts in total, and in the major parts. Moreover, support for our forces in Southeast Asia caused our expenditures, particularly on procurement, to swell out of proportion to their effects on our present military capability. Had it not been for these expenditures, the contrasting trends would be even more apparent. As early as 1967, however, Soviet procurement of weapon systems began to grow absolutely and in relation to the U.S. counterpart, surpassing U.S. procurement by approximately 13% in 1970, and standing approximately 95% above U.S. procurement in 1975. Particularly notable in the Soviet growth have been:

- The procurement of a new generation of Soviet ICBMs. In 1975 the estimated dollar procurement costs for Soviet ICBMs were about three and one-half times those of the U.S.
- The procurement of new and more sophisticated Soviet aircraft at a rate which, in 1975, was about 30% higher than the U.S. counterpart.
- The procurement of naval ships and boats which, over the 1965-1975 period, exceeded the U.S. by 70%; and by 90% in 1975.

The foregoing systems procurement trends are reflected in the mission categories which those systems are designed to support:

- Over the 1965-1975 period as a whole, the resources devoted to the Soviet Intercontinental Attack program exceeded the U.S. counterpart by more than 50%; by 70% in the 1970s; and by 100% in 1975.
- Soviet resources allocated to General Purpose Forces increased continuously from 1965 through 1975, while, by 1971, the U.S. counterpart had declined from its Vietnam era maximum to the level of 1965. As a result, the estimated dollar costs of Soviet General Purpose Forces surpassed the U.S. level in 1970; over the 1970s they have been 40% greater than the U.S., and 70% greater in 1975.

All available quantitative measures indicate that Soviet investment in military and space RDT&E, however it is measured, reached the level of the corresponding U.S. RDT&E investment at least five years ago, has been growing at a consistently greater rate, and now exceeds the U.S. effort by a substantial margin. The dollar cost of the Soviet RDT&E program--a

particularly rough measure--has increased continuously in real terms over the past decade, while the U.S. RDT&E program has declined through the 1970s. As a result, the Soviet program measured in these real terms matched ours in 1970, and has exceeded ours in every year since; by roughly 65% in 1975. In more concrete terms, during the period 1970 through 1974, the Soviet Union increased the number of scientists and engineers in research and development from approximately 600,000 to approximately 750,000. Over the same period, our total R&D force decreased from 550,000 to 528,000. Moreover, about one-quarter of the U.S. R&D personnel are engaged in military projects, but the proportion of Soviet R&D personnel directed to military projects is estimated to be much larger, perhaps as high as 70%.

The intensive effort to advance Soviet military technology has had a dramatic impact upon the new generations of Soviet weaponry which have been fielded since the mid-1960s, and with increasing tempo in the 1970s. In all major categories--strategic missiles, aircraft, major ground force weapons, and naval vessels--the new Soviet weapons are significantly more capable than their predecessors. Indeed, one of the most important things that has been happening is the degree to which the newer generation of Soviet weapons has closed the earlier large qualitative gap with individual U.S. weapons. Indeed, for the first time there are a few areas where Soviet weapons are distinctly better than anything available in the West. The traditional missions of the Soviet military can now be performed better, and new, more demanding missions can be undertaken.

The ability to exploit technology has been an historic U.S. advantage. Indeed, in maintaining a military balance with the Soviet Union, the U.S. has relied upon the superiority of our military technology to offset the quantitative superiority of the Soviet forces in a number of important areas. That favorable technology lead has not yet been erased, but it is being eroded steadily. If the U.S. is to maintain the military balance over the long haul, we will need to sustain a continuing, aggressive effort in research and development. It would be exceedingly unwise to restrain ourselves from exploiting new technologies, for in the case of the U.S., to do so would be to cause us to struggle to maintain the balance without the use of one of our greatest competitive advantages.

We cannot predict with certainty how the Soviets will employ the industrial capacity which is devoted to military hardware production. Yet on the basis of DoD planning within current constraints, and our most recent intelligence estimates of Soviet procurement planning, Soviet operational deployed inventories of most major weapon systems will, over the next 18 months, increase the already substantial quantitative leads they now possess. As I have pointed out, these new Soviet weapons are not crude. They embody the results of an intensive Soviet effort to advance their military technology, and provide significant improvements in military capability over the preceding generation of Soviet weaponry. In most areas of military technology, with certain significant exceptions, the U.S. maintains the lead we have relied upon in the past to achieve a satisfactory military balance. It is true, for example, that the Soviets

cannot field an AWACS, strategic cruise missiles, or precision guided munitions of the quality available to the U.S. However, much of our technological advantages remain on the laboratory bench. Our procurement rates for most major systems are substantially less than those of the Soviets, and procurement affords the only method of deploying technology to the operational units. Therefore, as a result of the combination of Soviet procurement momentum and technological advances, we are in danger of losing the advantage in deployed military technology in the 1980s. It would then be of small comfort to us that we possess potential superiority in military capability.

Conclusions

To say that the future is bleak would be wrong, because to do so would be prejudging the decisions and investments the U.S. will be making in the near term. On the other hand, to say that the future is rosy would also be wrong, because to do so would be to ignore the manifest fact of the trends to date. What can be said is that, in large measure, the future is ours to influence. If the future were ours to control, we would ensure an appropriate and stable military balance through the efficient mechanism of equitable arms limitation agreements, as is our goal for SALT and MBFR. But the future is uncertain, and so complex that even successful agreements will only control some factors that determine the overall military balance. Thus; it is essential that we make those decisions and investments necessary to ensure that the United States will be able to deal effectively with the Soviet Union as future uncertainties unfold.

A question which understandably lingers in the minds of many who consider the future has to do with whether the programs the President has proposed for the future are sufficient. Put another way, if the trends are of such concern, shouldn't we be taking drastic, or at least more dramatic, steps? Both the President and I, among others, agree that what the U.S. defense programs need is not some massive "shot-in-the-arm," but rather a sustained effort which will allow us to use resources efficiently and effectively and, as importantly, which will give the U.S. the flexibility to respond to the future as the major uncertainties unfold.

We now have "rough equivalence" in the military balance with the Soviet Union. I think the American people clearly have the will to maintain the balance through any foreseeable future. What the U.S. needs now is to begin to arrest the trends, and to make the commitment for the long haul.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Paul Rumsfeld". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a large initial "P".



NEWS RELEASE

OFFICE OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PUBLIC AFFAIRS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. - 20301

PLEASE NOTE DATE

HOLD FOR RELEASE
UNTIL DELIVERY OF ADDRESS
EXPECTED ABOUT 9:00 P.M. (EST)
WEDNESDAY, March 24, 1976

NO. 116-76
OXford 7-3189 (Copies)
OXford 5-0192 (Info)

REMARKS BY
THE HONORABLE DONALD H. RUMSFELD
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
BEFORE ELECTRONICS INDUSTRIES ASSOCIATION DINNER
MAYFLOWER HOTEL, WASHINGTON, D.C.
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 24, 1976

I am pleased to have the opportunity to join you this evening. Your industry plays a truly essential part in our national security.

The talent of the electronics industry for invention and the application of invention has made our country the world's leader in this vital area of technology. As you know well, modern electronics has changed dramatically the nature of today's military capabilities. Information and data can be processed in ways which were not thought of twenty, or even ten years ago. And, with the advent of more powerful and more accurate weapons have come more dependable command and control, strategic and tactical surveillance, and rapid, reliable communications. These technological developments are contributing substantially to our efforts to maintain world stability -- however imperfect that stability may be -- and to the security of our country. And that, after all, is what the United States Defense establishment is about.

To achieve our goal of a more stable world, effective, reliable and modern military forces are needed, in sufficient quantity and quality. That is the clear lesson of history. The power of our principal adversaries to attack and to intimidate is growing, both absolutely and relative to ours, and the fact that rather sudden technological breakthroughs have occurred and will continue to occur should tell us that we must work for even greater technological progress.

As the Queen told Alice: "You must run hard just to stay in the same place; if you want to go anywhere, you must run twice as fast."

The Soviet Union's expanding military capabilities -- across the board -- are cause for concern for the United States and for all nations that value their independence and seek to live in peace.

MORE

Thirty years ago we were the world's foremost military power. Today our military capability has slipped to what is described as "roughly equivalent" to the capabilities of the Soviet Union. The fact of this massive shift of power should come as no surprise. For the last 10 to 15 years, Soviet capabilities have been expanding. Ours have not. Their trend has been one of growth. Our trend has been one of retrenchment. The combination of these trends has been decidedly adverse to the United States.

We have no choice but to consider, now, the unpleasant -- indeed, unacceptable -- consequences of a continuation of these trends relative to our national security, the strength of our alliances, and the future stability of the world. What is at stake is the future of this nation and, in a very real sense, freedom in the world. The decisions we make unquestionably will give shape to our history and the world's history for the rest of this century, and more.

In short, if the trends in relative military power between the United States and the Soviet Union continue, as they have in past years, peace, stability in the world, and our security will be in jeopardy. I am convinced that the American people will not allow this to happen. I believe we will be wise enough to take the steps necessary to halt these adverse trends.

It is well to understand clearly why we need to maintain "rough equivalence" . . . why we cannot allow wishful thinking and repeated Congressional cuts in the Defense Budget, coupled with steady Soviet expansion, to move us to a position of inferiority. At the most basic level, it ensures our country's physical safety against the most likely source of danger. There are other reasons as well:

The principles of liberty and independence must be given the weight and the importance they merit in our dealings with those who are hostile to political freedom and the God given rights of individuals.

Further, our allies must know that they can, with our help, withstand either overt attack or the more subtle, indirect diplomatic and economic pressures that can erode the ability and the will to resist when confidence is lacking.

Also, we must not discourage the support of those nations whose resources and cooperation we desire, but who, lacking a strong commitment in either direction, might see it to their advantage to establish closer relationships with our potential adversaries.

MORE

Finally, we must, ourselves, know that the values and ideals which America embodies are important to us and to the world -- however uncertain the world may be -- and we must make clear to ourselves and to the world our determination to defend and support them.

Today, we have what most knowledgeable observers agree to be an acceptable balance. "Rough equivalence" means we have parity in some aspects of power, marked superiority in others, and a degree of inferiority in still others -- adding up to an overall military balance with the Soviet Union.

In strategic nuclear force, we possess -- and the Soviets know we possess -- a secure second-strike capability that can survive any attack of which they are currently capable and can inflict unacceptable damage in return -- a capability necessary to ensure a strong deterrent.

Our general purpose forces are capable and flexible. Our Navy is adequate to the task of securing the most vital sea areas and, with our Allies, is capable of ensuring the essential sea lines of communication, although initial losses may be heavy. In Central Europe, U.S. and Allied forces are, we believe, capable of an adequate response to an attack by Warsaw Pact forces.

In short, "sufficiency" is fact today.

But the message of President Ford's budget is one that we won't have "sufficiency" if we keep on the way we have been going. The trends are clearly adverse. To maintain "rough equivalence" will require that we do something about the trends -- now. That effort must draw its strength from a public understanding of what we stand for and the continuing, fundamental difference -- in interests, values and ideals -- between ourselves and the Soviet Union.

At times in past years, we have allowed ourselves -- as have other free peoples -- to be lulled into a false sense of security. The Soviet Union has chosen not to indulge in some of the more flamboyant forms of provocative and aggressive behavior that, in earlier periods, had kept us alert. Democracies, historically, prefer to direct their efforts and attention to domestic concerns when no clear-cut threat is imminent. As a result, we have engaged in what, in retrospect, must be called wishful thinking. Acting on the unrealistic assumption that a relaxation of some tensions with the Soviets, somehow lessened the need for continued strength and preparedness, we have seen repeated and substantial reductions in our defense budget -- cuts which have amounted to more than \$38 billion over the past six years alone.

The Soviets have never deviated from the basic conflict between their views and our belief in freedom, despite some relaxation of tension. Just last month, for example, at the 25th Communist Party Congress, General Secretary Brezhnev made clear that there would be no change in their present

MORE

allocation of national resources. Military capabilities will continue to receive preference, as has been the case over the past 15 years. To further make the point of the growing strength of the military in the Soviet Union -- and the extent to which it dominates their society, the successful arms czar, Dimitri Ustinov, was given full Politburo status. His promotion, an unprecedented move, means that all five members of the Soviet Defense Council are now full members of the Politburo.

In short, the Soviets have successfully undertaken a determined and massive buildup of their forces. The result has been an unmistakable shift of power in the world. Here are the facts -- the trends. They speak for themselves:

First, the United States has been devoting consistently less real resources to defense; the Soviet Union has been devoting consistently more. By almost any indicator, the size of their military program exceeds our own now, and has done so for some years. In constant dollars, eliminating inflation--speaking only of real purchasing power -- the United States defense budget is about 14% lower now than it was in the early 1960s before the Vietnam buildup. Yet, while our defense program has dropped in real terms, the Soviets, with a smaller and poorer economy, have increased the size of their defense program steadily in real terms--by about a third over the past ten years. Estimating the extent of Soviet defense activities is complex for a number of reasons, including the secrecy of their closed society. But their defense program--in real terms--is now larger than our own by the most conservative estimates. This holds true for their military program in total, and for most major categories: they have more military manpower, they procure more military hardware systems, and their defense research and development program is larger.

Second, U.S. military manpower has declined, while Soviet manpower has increased. Today, the Soviets have 4.4 million men under arms, not counting some 400,000 security forces and border guards -- more than double our 2.1 million. Their forces have grown by a third in the past decade. Ours have dropped.

Third, the U.S. Navy has been shrinking; the Soviet Navy, expanding. We have half as many active ships in our fleet today as we did ten years ago. In those ten years, the Soviets have expanded their fleet dramatically and are apparently developing the ability to challenge United States control of the high seas. Since 1962, the Soviets have built more than 1,300 ships for their Navy -- the United States has built about 300.

Next, our active tactical aircraft force levels have dropped by more than 40% since 1968. During the same period, the Soviets have increased theirs and have built a production base which is estimated to be half again as large as ours.

MORE

Further, the Soviets have been making quantitative and qualitative improvements in their strategic nuclear forces. Today, they have a third again as many ICBM's as we do, and they have equalled us in the SLBM count. We, however, are still ahead in bomber forces, although our lead is diminishing. The Soviets have long been superior in throw-weight and megatonnage, but have been qualitatively inferior. Now they are advancing in the critical areas of accuracy and MIRV technology, where we long held the technological advantage.

Certainly, no one indicator of relative military effort tells the whole story. Taken together, however, the trends present a clear picture of a shifting military balance. To fail to arrest the adverse trends would mean that we would find ourselves, in the years ahead, faced with a rival who doesn't believe in what we believe in, and who is able to threaten or intimidate much of the world.

Indeed, if we were to allow our position to erode beyond the "rough equivalence" we have today, we would find that an adversary no longer needs to resort to physical force to damage our interests. A faltering of our alliances, a weakening of our ability to assure access to critical raw materials, or a growing sense of beleaguerment in a fragmented and threatening world could accomplish these purposes more economically for them than the blunt instrument of war. And, if we were to fail to protect our own interests, we would find that there is no one else in the world who could, or would, do it for us.

To my amazement, there are some -- even in the Congress -- who profess to be unalarmed at the notion of this nation's slipping to second-rank. I can only assume that they have ignored the lessons of history and some obvious hard facts about the world today. Are we so accustomed to having power and being secure that -- as with good health -- we sometimes fail to recognize where we would be without them? Were the United States to lose the ability to influence events, we could not assume that our own well-being would be untouched. We would suffer economically and politically as our status declined, even before our security was threatened.

The United States relies on imports for many critical raw materials, not to mention the billions of dollars we have invested overseas. Economically, therefore, we are quite vulnerable if we cease to possess the power to make our voice heard and have our views given weight.

Nor may we assume that the world would remain multipolar were U.S. power to slip below that of the Soviet Union. The more cordial relationship we now share with the People's Republic of China -- as well as the continuation of the Sino-Soviet split -- are heavily dependent on Peking's conviction that the United States is an effective counterweight to the Soviet Union. Were they to conclude otherwise, they would have powerful incentives, both military and ideological, to patch things up with the Soviets -- a development that would pose both Communist giants in direct opposition to our interest and objectives.

MORE



Western Europe, anxious and doubtful of the strength, steadiness and reliability of the United States, were these trends to continue, could be driven by the pressures of geography and force towards increasing accommodation -- making their wealth, resources and technological know-how increasingly accessible to the Soviet Union. Already we see a growing acceptance of Communist parties in Europe. The explanation clearly cannot be genuine admiration for the way human beings are respected in the Soviet Union nor can it be their ability to provide their people with consumer goods or agricultural products.

Finally, the oil producing countries of the Middle East, especially the Persian Gulf, could become increasingly vulnerable to Soviet influence and pressures. They are wealthy but they remain militarily weak. Our allies in Western Europe and Japan are critically dependent upon Middle East oil and, as a result of our unwillingness to enact a sound national energy policy, we have been importing more and more each year ourselves and thereby increasing our vulnerability. None of the Free World economies could afford to see the Soviets acquire the ability to block the flow of vital supplies of petroleum.

The long and short of it is that the meaning of military power in our age goes far beyond its use in combat. Indeed, if our power is challenged to the extent that we must use it, it may correctly be said that our power was insufficient in the first place. The highest purpose of military preparedness is peace. If we remain militarily strong, we are far less likely to be forced to prove it. This is what deterrence is all about.

I am confident that the American people understand these facts and will see the necessity to arrest the trends now evident. President Ford has committed himself to a defense budget that will arrest the downtrends I have described. He made this decision after careful study and in a year when there was monumental pressure to hold down federal spending. The facts drove him to the conclusion that we must not wait another year. He is right. I am confident that the American people will reach the same conclusion. At issue now in the Congress is whether or not the people's Representatives will reverse the pattern of the past six years -- of cutting billions and billions from Defense -- in time to avoid injecting a fundamental instability into the world situation.

The President's budget proposes a real increase in budget outlays over the amount provided by the Congress last year. It is a solid budget, prepared in full awareness of the need for economy and efficiency in the use of defense resources. It is a restrained budget, in which a deliberate attempt was made to devote more resources to investment and readiness, rather than to items which don't contribute to defense or deterrence. It represents the first step in what must be a steady effort, over a period of years, to maintain the balance so essential to our hopes for stability and peace.

In this effort, the electronics industry will continue to play a vital part. This will require research, development, imagination, and practical application. The President's budget proposes nearly \$11 billion, almost 10%

MORE

of the total, for research, development, testing, and evaluation -- across a broad spectrum of technologies, including electronics. At least two of the four overseeing Committees of Congress have fully supported that request. One did not. This investment in the future is clearly necessary to assure the momentum of U.S. technology.

We must apply our technological know-how to the challenge of reducing costs with the same vigor that we increase performance. We are taking steps to consolidate requirements common to all the Services, to avoid redundant efforts. You can help us by concentrating your resources and technological expertise.

The promise of electronics for improving our future defense posture depends, in large measure, on the continued close cooperation between the Defense Department and private industry. This close relationship has helped us develop and retain our lead in advanced electronics and has, literally, worked a pocketful of miracles.

With respect to that relationship, let me digress for a moment.

As you know, there has been a series of disclosures alleging improper activities stretching over fifteen years or so, and involving private corporations and a number of Defense Department employees, both past and present, military and civilian. The Department of Defense is taking measures to deal with improprieties and to establish and administer appropriate standards of conduct to keep those relationships constructive and in accord with the public trust.

In applying standards of conduct, I recognize that we are dealing with human beings who have rendered, and continue to render, dedicated and valuable service to this Department and to the country. I also recognize that public officials are not error-proof, that the rules, directives, and regulations can be complex, and that from time to time the norms of our society shift somewhat. However, understandably, public officials are held to a higher standard and must strive to live up to it.

MORE



The test of an "arms length" relationship is not easy. To do their jobs, those in Government must deal with those outside of Government on a daily basis. Such a relationship is necessary to assure that Government is serving the nation well. The task -- and it is not an easy one -- is to see that the interactions between those in Government and those with whom they will deal are extensive enough to assure the necessary exchange of information, but at the same time to see that they are not so intimate that, in fact or appearance, they improperly affect the decisions of Government. The appearance of impropriety alone, however innocent, can so adversely affect public trust that the effectiveness of Government is diminished.

However, we must seek to balance those various factors so that we do not so unduly complicate or inhibit the process of Government that good men and good women refuse to participate -- either as Government employees or as contractors for the Government -- out of fear that their integrity will be impugned by allegations involving an appearance of impropriety where none existed.

I am determined that the conduct of every military and civilian employee of the Department be consistent with requirements of law and regulations. I am convinced that Government must be able to attract the most talented of our nation both as employees and as contractors. The responsibilities of our nation's security and the public we serve require no less.

The challenges of the years ahead will require all of our talent and dedication. This is not a friendly world for free people. This is not a time when democracy is thriving. Indeed, free peoples are being challenged around the world, and the outcome is by no means assured.

The problem I have emphasized this evening -- the matter of arresting the adverse trends -- stands at the top of the national agenda. I am confident that the American people, as before in our history, will prove capable of the wisdom and determination the task requires. We are a people who thrive on challenge. We are sometimes wrong on lesser things, but the American people have been consistently right in their thinking on major matters. Building a safer world and sustaining the strength to keep it so, is an honorable task.

I thank all of you for your important contributions.

END

FLASH
PRECEDENCE

UNCLAS
CLASSIFICATION

FOR COMMCENTER USE ONLY

FROM: JACK MARSH
TO: DICK CHENEY

DEX 1809
DAC _____ GPS _____
LDX _____ PAGES 3
TTY _____ CITE _____

INFO:

DTG: 122230 may 76

RELEASED BY:

TOR: 122240 Z

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

76 MAY 12 PM 6.42

1976 APR 12 22 26



Dick, some background info.

Announcement of
Treaty of Underground Nuclear Explosions
for Peaceful Purposes (PNE Treaty)

The United States and the Soviet Union have signed the Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes to complement the treaty limiting nuclear weapons. The treaty, the result of intensive negotiations since October 1974, permits for the first time American observers inside the USSR to verify an arms control agreement. This is a valuable precedent for future arms control.

The treaty limits peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs) to yields of 150 kilotons -- the same limit placed on nuclear weapon tests by a companion treaty signed by the United States and Soviet Union in July 1974. These limits were made the same in recognition of the fact that even after some 25 years of design and testing, nuclear explosions for peaceful applications and for weapon applications remain indistinguishable.

The PNE Treaty is also accompanied by an agreement that all testing of nuclear explosives -- even those intended for peaceful application -- will be carried out at weapon test sites, and so will be considered as nuclear weapon tests.

The earlier treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests -- or Threshold Test Ban Treaty -- did not cover underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes; but called for negotiating a separate agreement to cover such explosions. The treaty signed today fulfills the three basic U.S. criteria that were specified:

- Peaceful underground nuclear explosions must not provide weapon-related benefits precluded by the Threshold Test Ban Treaty.
- This must be adequately verifiable.
- The treaty must be consistent with existing obligations, in particular the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963.

Specifically, the latest treaty prohibits any individual nuclear explosion for peaceful purposes of a yield greater than 150 kilotons, any group of individual explosions of a total yield exceeding 1.5 megatons (1500 kilotons), and reaffirms compliance with the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963.

The present PNE Treaty sets out detailed arrangements for verification, and specifies the information to be furnished by the party carrying out the explosion. On-site observation to verify compliance is allowed, for all group explosions having total yields

exceeding 150 kilotons. In addition, observers may be permitted on the basis of consultation between the parties for group explosions having total yields between 100 and 150 kilotons. The observers will be allowed to bring and use their own equipment for verification. The number of observers and their specific rights and functions are linked directly to the total yield and number of individual explosions in a group.

The treaty provides for a Joint Consultative Commission to consider compliance questions that may arise and to develop any further implementation procedures that may be needed.

The Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963 prohibits nuclear weapon testing in the atmosphere, under water, and in outer space. In that same treaty, the parties further agreed not to carry out any nuclear explosion for any purpose in any environment, including underground, that would cause radioactive debris to be present outside the borders of the country in which the explosion takes place. Under the terms of the present PNE Treaty, the parties reaffirm their commitment to conduct peaceful nuclear explosions in compliance with the 1963 treaty.

Both the PNE Treaty and the Threshold Test Ban Treaty will be sent to the Senate for ratification.



STATE AND PARTY REPORT

22 JULY 1976 1 24 PM PA

ROLL NO. 535

H R 12384

2/3 YEA-AND-NAY

CLOSED 22 JULY 1976 1 21

AUTHOR(S):

ON PRESIDENTIAL VETO

MILITARY CONSTRUCTION AUTHORIZATION, 1977

	YEA	NAY	PRES	NV
DEMOCRATIC	228	37		22
REPUBLICAN	42	54		9
OTHER				
TOTAL	270	131		31



ROLL NO. 535

DEMOCRATIC

OTHER

REPUBLICAN

DEMOCRATIC	**OTHER**	REPUBLICAN
ARKANSAS		
BEVILL	NAY	BUCHANAN
FLOWERS	YEA	DICKINSON
JONES (AL)	YEA	EDWARDS (AL)
NICHOLS	YEA	
ARKANSAS		
		YOUNG (AK)
ARIZONA		
UDALL	YEA	CONLAN
		RHODES
		STEIGER (AZ)
KANSAS		
ALEXANDER	YEA	HAMMERSCHMIDT
HILLS	YEA	
THORNTON	YEA	
CALIFORNIA		
ANDERSON (CA)	YEA	BELL
BROWN (CA)	YEA	BURGENER
BURKE (CA)	YEA	CLAUSEN, DON H.
BURTON, JOHN	YEA	CLAWSON, DEL
BURTON, PHILLIP	NAY	GOLDBWATER
CORMAN	YEA	KINSHAW
DANIELSON	YEA	KETCHUM
DELLUMS	NAY	LAGOMARSINO
EDWARDS (CA)	YEA	MC CLOSKEY
HANNAFORD	YEA	MOORHEAD (CA)
HAWKINS	YEA	PETTIS
JOHNSON (CA)	YEA	ROUSSELOT
KREBS	YEA	TALCOTT
LEGGETT	NAY	WIGGINS
LLOYD (CA)	YEA	WILSON, BOB
MC FALL	YEA	
MILLER (CA)	YEA	
MINETA	YEA	
ROSS	YEA	
PATTERSON (CA)	YEA	
REES	YEA	
ROYBAL	YEA	
RYAN	NAY	
SICK	YEA	
STARK	YEA	
VAN BEERLIN	YEA	
WAXMAN	YEA	
WILSON, C. H.	YEA	
MISSOURI		
EVANS (MO)	YEA	ARMSTRONG
SCHROEDER	YEA	



ROLL NO. 535

DEMOCRATIC

OTHER

REPUBLICAN

CONNECTICUT

COTTER YEA
 DODD YEA
 GIARNO YEA
 MOFFETT YEA

CITIZEN

MC KINNEY NAY
 SARASIN NAY

LAWARE

DU PONT YEA

ORIDA

BENNETT YEA
 CHAPPELL YEA
 FASCELL YEA
 FUQUA YEA
 GIBBONS NAY
 HALEY YEA
 LEHMAN YEA
 PEPPER NY
 ROGERS YEA
 SIKES YEA

BAFALIS NAY
 BURKE (FL) NAY
 FREY NAY
 KELLY NAY
 YOUNG (FL) NAY

PCIA

BRINKLEY NY
 FLYNT NY
 GINN YEA
 LANDRUM NAY
 LEVITAS NAY
 MATHIS YEA
 MC DONALD YEA
 STEPHENS NAY
 STUCKEY YEA
 YOUNG (GA) NY

RAII

MATSUNAGA YEA
 HINK YEA

AND

HANSEN NAY
 SYMS NAY



ROLL NO. 535

DEMOCRATIC

OTHER

REPUBLICAN

INDIS

ANNUNZIO YEA
 COLLINS (IL) YEA
 FARY YEA
 HALL (IL) YEA
 METCALFE YEA
 MIKVA YEA
 MURPHY (IL) YEA
 PRICE YEA
 ROSTENKOWSKI YEA
 RUSSO YEA
 SHIPLEY NY
 SIMON NAY
 YATES YEA

ANDERSON (IL) NY
 CRANE YEA
 DERWINSKI NY
 ERLNBORN NAY
 FINDLEY NAY
 HYDE NAY
 MADIGAN NAY
 MC CLORY NAY
 MICHEL NAY
 O'BRIEN NAY
 RAILSBACK YEA

IANA

BRADENAS YEA
 EVANS (IN) YEA
 FITHIAN NAY
 HAMILTON YEA
 HAYES (IN) YEA
 JACOBS YEA
 HADDEN YEA
 ROUSH NAY
 SHARP NAY

HILLIS YEA
 MYERS (IN) NAY

A

BEDELL NAY
 BLOUIN YEA
 HARKIN NY
 HEZVINSKY YEA
 SMITH (IA) NAY

GRASSLEY NAY

SAS

KEYS YEA

SEBELIUS NAY
 SHRIVER NAY
 SKUBITZ NAY
 WINN NAY

TUCKY

BRECKENRIDGE YEA
 HUBBARD YEA
 MANZOLI YEA
 WATSON YEA
 PERKINS YEA

CARTER YEA
 SNYDER YEA

LOUISIANA

BOGGS YEA
 BREWSTER YEA
 HERBERT YEA
 LONG (LA) YEA
 ROSSMAN YEA
 MAGONNER YEA

MOORE YEA
 TREEN NAY



ROLL NO. 535

DEMOCRATIC

OTHER

REPUBLICAN

E

		COHEN	YEA
		EMERY	YEA
LAND			
BYRON	YEA	BAUMAN	YEA
LONG (MD)	YEA	GUDE	NAY
MITCHELL (MD)	YEA	HOLT	YEA
SARBNES	YEA		
SPELLMAN	YEA		
ACHUSETTS			
BOLAND	YEA	CONTE	YEA
BURKE (MA)	YEA	HECKLER (MA)	YEA
BRINAN	YEA		
EARLY	YEA		
HARRINGTON	NV		
HOAKLEY	YEA		
O'NEILL	YEA		
STUBBS	YEA		
TSONGAS	YEA		
IGAN			
BLANCHARD	YEA	BROOKFIELD	NAY
BRODHEAD	YEA	BROWN (MI)	NAY
CARR	NAY	CEBERBERG	NAY
CONYERS	NAY	ESCH	NV
DIGGS	YEA	HUTCHINSON	NAY
DINGELL	YEA	RUPPE	YEA
FORD (MI)	YEA	VANDER JAGT	NAY
HEDZI	YEA		
O'HARA	NV		
RIEGLE	YEA		
TRAXLER	YEA		
VANDER VEEN	YEA		
ESOTA			
BERGLAND	NAY	FRENZEL	NAY
FRASER	NAY	HAGEDORN	NAY
KARTH	NV	QUIE	NAY
NOLAN	NAY		
OBERSTAR	YEA		
MISSISSIPPI			
BOWEN	YEA	COCHRAN	NAY
MONTGOMERY	YEA	LOTT	NAY
WHITTEN	NAY		



ROLL NO. 535

DEMOCRATIC

OTHER

REPUBLICAN

STATE	DEMOCRATIC	**OTHER**	REPUBLICAN
MISSOURI			
BOLLING	YEA		
BURLISON (MO)	YEA		
CLAY	NY		
HUNGATE	YEA		
ICHORD	YEA		
LITTON	NY		
RANDALL	YEA		
SULLIVAN	YEA		
SYMINGTON	YEA		
MISSOURI			TAYLOR (MO) NAY
UTAH			
BAUCUS	YEA		
MELCHER	YEA		
NEBRASKA			
			MC COLLISTER NAY
			SMITH (NB) NAY
			THONE NAY
NEVADA			
SANTINI	YEA		
NEW HAMPSHIRE			
D'AMOURS	YEA		
			CLEVELAND YEA
NEW JERSEY			
DANIELS (NJ)	YEA		
FLORIO	YEA		
HELSTOSKI	YEA		
HOWARD	YEA		
HUGHES	YEA		
MAGUIRE	YEA		
MEYNER	YEA		
MINISH	YEA		
PATTEN (NJ)	YEA		
RODINO	YEA		
RDE	YEA		
THOMPSON	YEA		
			FENWICK NAY
			FORSYTHE NAY
			RINALDO YEA
NEW MEXICO			
PUNNELS	YEA		
			LUJAN NAY



ROLL NO. 535

DEMOCRATIC	**OTHER**	REPUBLICAN
YORK		
AEZUG	NY	CONABLE
ADDABBO	YEA	FISH
AMBRO	YEA	GILMAN
BADILLO	YEA	HORTON
BIAGGI	YEA	KEMP
BINGHAM	YEA	LEHT
CHISHOLM	YEA	MC EWEH
DELAHEY	YEA	HITCHELL (NY)
DOWNNEY (NY)	YEA	PEYSER
HANLEY	YEA	WALSH
HOLTZMAN	YEA	WYDLER
KOCH	YEA	
LAFALCE	YEA	
LUNDINE	YEA	
MC HUGH	YEA	
MURPHY (NY)	NY	
NOVAK	YEA	
OTTINGER	YEA	
PATTISON (NY)	YEA	
PIKE	YEA	
RANGEL	NAY	
RICHMOND	YEA	
ROSENTHAL	YEA	
SCHEUER	YEA	
SOLARZ	YEA	
STRATTON	YEA	
WOLFF	YEA	
ZEFERETTI	YEA	
N CAROLINA		
ANDREWS (NC)	NY	BROYHILL
FOUNTAIN	NAY	MARTIN
HEPNER	YEA	
JENDERSON	YEA	
JONES (NC)	YEA	
KEAL	YEA	
KREYER	YEA	
ROSE	YEA	
TAYLOR (NC)	YEA	
N DAKOTA		
		ANDREWS (ND)



ROLL NO. 535

DEMOCRATIC

OTHER

REPUBLICAN

0
 ASHLEY HAY
 CARNEY HAY
 HAYS (OH) NY
 HOTTI YEA
 SEIBERLING YEA
 STANTON, JAMES V. NY
 STOKES YEA
 YANIK YEA

ASHBROOK HAY
 BROWN (OH) HAY
 CLANCY HAY
 DEVINE HAY
 GRADISON HAY
 GUYER HAY
 HARSHA HAY
 KINDNESS HAY
 LATTA HAY
 MILLER (OH) HAY
 MOSHER HAY
 REGULA HAY
 STANTON, J. WILLIAM HAY
 WHALEN HAY
 WYLIE HAY

ARIZONA
 ALBERT
 ENGLISH YEA
 JONES (OK) HAY
 RISENHOOVER NY
 STEED HAY

JARMAN HAY

CON
 AUGGIN HAY
 DUNCAN (OR) YEA
 ULLMAN YEA
 WEAVER YEA

PENNSYLVANIA
 BENT YEA
 EDGAR YEA
 EILBERG YEA
 FLOOD YEA
 GAYDOS YEA
 GREEN YEA
 HOORHEAD (PA) HAY
 MORGAN YEA
 MURTHA HAY
 NIX YEA
 ROONEY YEA
 VIGORITO YEA
 WATSON YEA

BIESTER YEA
 COUGHLIN HAY
 ESHLEMAN YEA
 GOODLING HAY
 HEINZ YEA
 JOHNSON (PA) HAY
 MC DADE YEA
 MYERS (PA) HAY
 SCHNEEBELI NY
 SCHULZE YEA
 SHUSTER HAY

RHODE ISLAND
 BEARD (RI) YEA
 ST GERMAIN YEA



ROLL NO. 535

DEMOCRATIC

OTHER

REPUBLICAN

SOUTH CAROLINA

DAVIS YEA
 DERRICK YEA
 HOLLAND YEA
 JENNETTE YEA
 NANN NAY

SPEENCE YEA

SOUTH DAKOTA

ABBODD YEA
 PRESSLER NAY

MISSISSIPPI

ALLEN YEA
 EVINS (TH) YEA
 FORD (TH) YEA
 JONES (TH) NY
 LLOYD (TH) YEA

BEARD (TH) YEA
 DUNCAN (TH) NY
 QUILLEN NAY

MISSOURI

BROOKS YEA
 BURLESON (TX) YEA
 DE LA GARZA YEA
 ECKHARDT YEA
 GONZALEZ YEA
 HALL (TX) YEA
 HIGHTOWER YEA
 JORDAN NY
 KAZEN YEA
 KRUEGER NY
 MAHON YEA
 MILFORD NAY
 PICKLE YEA
 POAGE YEA
 ROBERTS YEA
 TEAGUE NY
 WHITE YEA
 WILSON, (TX) YEA
 WRIGHT YEA
 YOUNG (TX) YEA

ARCHER NAY
 COLLINS (TX) NAY
 PAUL NAY
 STEELMAN NY

MICHIGAN

HOWE NY
 MC KAY NAY

MONTANA

JEFFORDS YEA

VIRGINIA

DANIEL, DAN YEA
 DOWNING (VA) YEA
 FISHER YEA
 HARRIS YEA

BUTLER NAY
 DANIEL, R. W. YEA
 ROBINSON NAY
 WAMPLER NAY



ROLL NO. 535

DEMOCRATIC

OTHER

REPUBLICAN

SHINGTON

ADAMS YEA
 BONKER YEA
 FOLEY NAY
 HICKS YEA
 MC CORHACK YEA
 NEEDS YEA

PRITCHARD NAY

ST VIRGINIA

HECHLER (WV) NAY
 MOLLOHAN YEA
 SLACK YEA
 STAGGERS YEA

SCONSIN

ASPIN NAY
 BALDUS YEA
 CORNELL YEA
 KASTENMEIER NAY
 OBEY YEA
 REUSS YEA
 ZABLOCKI YEA

KASTEN NAY
 STEIGER (WI) NAY

ONING

RONCALID YEA

* * * * * END OF REPORT * * * * *

REPUBLICAN CLERK'S
 REFERENCE COPY

JOE BARTLETT
 H-220, U. S. CAPITOL



ROLL NO. 535

DEMOCRATIC

OTHER

REPUBLICAN

SHINGTON				
ADAMS	YEA		PRITCHARD	NAY
BONKER	YEA			
FOLEY	HAY			
HICKS	YEA			
MC CORMACK	YEA			
NEEDS	YEA			
ST VIRGINIA				
HECHLER (WV)	HAY			
MOLLOHAN	YEA			
SLACK	YEA			
STAGGERS	YEA			
SCONSIN				
ASPIN	HAY		KASTEN	HAY
BALDUS	YEA		STEIGER (WI)	HAY
CORNELL	YEA			
KASTENMEIER	HAY			
OBEY	YEA			
REUSS	YEA			
ZABLOCKI	YEA			
OHIO				
RONCALIO	YEA			

* * * * * E N D O F R E P O R T * * * * *

REPUBLICAN CLERK'S
REFERENCE COPY

JOE BARTLETT
H-220, U. S. CAPITOL



THE PRESIDENT AND THE COLLIER TROPHY

Each year since 1911, the Robert J. Collier Trophy has been awarded annually by the National Aeronautic Association "for the greatest achievement in aeronautics or astronautics in America, with respect to improving the performance, efficiency or safety of air or space vehicles, the value of which has been thoroughly demonstrated by actual use during the preceding year."

It was traditional up until the Vietnam War for the President of the United States to either present the trophy to the awardee or to be associated in some way with the ceremony.

This year, the Collier Committee selected David S. Lewis, Chairman of the Board of General Dynamics, and the new U. S. Air Force F-16 Air Combat Fighter to receive this trophy for calendar year 1975.

On May 12, 1976, there will be an awards dinner at the Mayflower Hotel where the aviation community, both Government and civilian, will meet to honor the Collier Trophy recipient. John Connally of Texas will be the principal speaker at the banquet.

To reestablish the tradition of the President's participation in the award of this most coveted trophy, it is suggested that five or ten minutes be set aside sometime at the President's convenience in the White House for his brief appearance with the recipient and the trophy for national and worldwide recognition sometime prior to the dinner on May 12.

Briefly, some reasons in support of President Ford's participation are:

- 1) To reestablish the tradition in this, our Nation's Bicentennial Year.
- 2) To recognize the award to the greatest fighter aircraft since the P-51 that has been accepted by the U. S. Air Force and the NATO countries without a trace of impropriety.
- 3) To acknowledge that low cost, high performance weapons systems can be developed in these days of high cost, over-sophisticated systems.
- 4) To identify with this latest Air Force airplane with its distinctive red, white and blue colors. The F-16 has become symbolic of America through its outstanding flight performance in competition with the French at the Paris Air Show in June 1975 and during its flight demonstrations throughout Europe in the summer of that year.
- 5) To associate with this award in an election year would further promote the President's position on strong defense and would gain enthusiastic support from those thousands of workers in Texas, California, Maryland, Indiana, Ohio, New York and some 12 other participating States who are now involved in building these aircraft for our Armed Forces.



- 6) To alleviate the unwarranted concern on the part of the NATO countries that question whether or not the United States really supports the F-16 Air Combat Fighter. The airplane does have the full support of the Department of Defense, the U. S. Air Force, the Congress, and the Industry.

It appears that the pluses to the President, to national defense, to our foreign allies, and to the airplane that would accrue as a result of this brief audience with the President on May 12 warrant the careful consideration of the White House.





FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

NATIONAL AERONAUTIC ASSOCIATION 806 Fifteenth Street, N. W. • Washington, D. C. • DI 7-2808 • Cable—NATAERO

DAVID S. LEWIS OF GENERAL DYNAMICS CORPORATION
AND THE F-16 AIR FORCE - INDUSTRY TEAM
SELECTED AS 1975 COLLIER TROPHY RECIPIENTS

WASHINGTON, D. C., March 11, 1976 --- David S. Lewis, Chairman of the Board, General Dynamics Corporation, and the USAF-Industry Team that produced the F-16 fighter aircraft have been designated as the recipients of the Robert J. Collier Trophy for 1975.

The Robert J. Collier Selection Committee, appointed by John P. Henebry, President of the National Aeronautic Association, was chaired by James R. Shepley, President, Time, Inc., and consisted of 26 distinguished aerospace leaders and authorities who unanimously selected the F-16 program from a list of outstanding nominees.

The Committee in honoring Mr. Lewis, representing the USAF-Industry F-16 Team, took into consideration the outstanding strides in aviation technology and design innovations incorporated into the F-16 which has set significant new standards in fighter aircraft performance that was amply demonstrated during 1975.

The F-16 prototypes have met or surpassed all design goals set by the USAF to the extent that in 1975 the aircraft was chosen both by the Air Force and a consortium of four NATO nations.

Although lightweight and relatively low cost, the F-16 has 2.3 times the combat radius of previous fighters on an air-superiority mission with each aircraft carrying its design air-to-air armament and flying the same combat maneuvers. Its high thrust-to-weight ratio and low wing loading permit it to out-turn or out-maneuver any threat aircraft in the classic air combat arena.

Before assuming the position of Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of General Dynamics in 1970, Mr. Lewis was associated with the design and development of two other outstanding aircraft -- the McDonnell F-4 and the McDonnell Douglas F-15.

The Collier Trophy will be presented to Mr. Lewis on May 12, 1976 at a banquet hosted jointly by the National Aeronautic Association and the National Aviation Club at the Mayflower Hotel, Washington, D. C.

The Trophy, which is awarded annually by NAA "for the greatest achievement in aeronautics or astronautics in America, with respect to improving the performance, efficiency or safety of air or space vehicles, the value of which has been thoroughly demonstrated by actual use during the preceding year," was established in 1912 by Robert J. Collier, publisher and pioneer aviation enthusiast. NAA is the official U.S. representative of the Federation Aeronautique Internationale, the organization responsible for the authentication of all official aviation and space records on a worldwide basis, and is composed of more than 65 member nations.

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

IMMEDIATE

Honorable Jack Marsh

The White House

RECEIVED

1976 JUL 26 AM 10:52

73 JUN 26 10:16 AM THE WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

TIME SENT: SITUATION ROOM

RECEIVED:

LDX NR: 003

PAGES: 1

CIA	_____	DIA/G	_____
STATE	_____	DIA/H	_____
NMCC	_____	TREAS	_____
ANNCC	_____	NPIC	_____
NSA	_____	ERDA	_____

DESCRIPTION/COMMENT

FROM:

Jack Marsh (White House)

TO:

Asst. Sec. Brehm

Dept of Defense



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 26, 1976


Dear Bill:

Congratulations on the fine job that you and members of your staff did in reference to the recent veto vote on the Military Construction Bill.

This was a fine victory for a number of reasons.

With kindest personal regards, I am

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "John D. Marsh, Jr.", with a large, stylized initial "J" and a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

John D. Marsh, Jr.
Counsellor to the President

The Honorable William K. Brehm
Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Legislative Affairs)
Room 3E882
The Pentagon
Washington, D. C.

JUL 27 1976

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 27, 1976

File

MEMORANDUM FOR:

JACK MARSH
MAX FRIEDERSDORF
BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM:

BOB WOLTHUIS *RKW*

SUBJECT:

B-1 Bomber and Senate Defense Appropriation

This morning Les Janka, Cathy DiSebour and I met with Don Sanders and Air Force Legislative types to discuss the B-1 situation in the Senate. I think the following information will be helpful to you.

1. On a motion to strike the Proxmire Amendment from the Defense Appropriation bill, Air Force figures they have 46 yeas and 50 nays. Four are undecided. This makes a Senate floor vote very risky.
 - a. McGovern may offer an amendment to ~~kill~~ the whole program, but I'm told the liberals are trying to convince him to abstain from doing so.
 - b. Tunney, Cranston and Taft, all States with big pieces of B-1 action may offer striking motions on Proxmire, but Air Force feels they can be turned off if our decision is to fight the issue in conference.
2. The Conferees on the Defense Appropriation bill are expected to be as follows:



<u>Senate</u>	<u>Position on B-1*</u>	<u>House</u>	<u>Position on B-1*</u>
McClellan	ok	Mahon	ok
Stennis	ok	Sikes	ok
Pastore	?	Flood	ok
Magnuson	ok	Addabbo	No
Mansfield	No	McFall	ok
McGee	ok	Flynt	ok
Montoya	ok	Giaimo	ok
Inouye	No	Chappell	ok
Young	ok	Burleson	ok
Hruska	ok	Edwards	ok
Case	No	Robinson	ok
Fong	ok	Kemp	ok
Stevens	ok	Cederberg	ok
Schweiker	?		

* These are Air Force estimates. The Senate estimate stems from the SAC vote on the Proxmire amendment which carried by a 15-14 vote. The House estimate comes from HAC votes and the floor vote on the B-1. Magnuson says he will be okay in Conference but won't embarrass Scoop Jackson on the floor. Pastore and Schweiker are unknown factors as of now.

Recommendations:

1. The Senate supporters of the B-1 should not offer an amendment to strike the Proxmire Amendment.
2. The battle should be waged in the Conference where the figures, if the Air Force is accurate, look like 12-1 in favor of the B-1 among House Conferees and 9-5 among Senate Conferees.

DOD

December 22, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: DICK CHENEY
FROM: JACK MARSH

In reference to the flap that is occurring on the unionization question in the military, this apparently arises out of an ambiguous paragraph in a memo over Don's signature which related to the subject generally.

The paragraph apparently me to be susceptible to two interruptions.

The memo relates generally to the Defense position on unionization. I read the paragraph as an effort to distinguish membership in unions organizations from membership in organizations that promote servicemen's benefits such as AUSA, AFA and similar organizations for both officers and enlisted men. However, apparently some read the paragraph to conclude that it does not prohibit union membership in a union-type organization so long as the organization is forbidden to engage in certain activities.

I spoke to Don on the phone about this. He has strong views that track the Administration's position on this issue but I told him ~~highly controversial~~ the matter arising from the controversial paragraph. He plans to look into that and told me he was calling a meeting of of key people in his building to go over the matter.

JOM/d1

