

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 5, 1975

MEETING WITH BIPARTISAN CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS

Friday, June 6, 1975

8:00-9:00 a.m. (1 hour)

The Cabinet Room

From: Max L. Friedersdorf *mf*

I. PURPOSE

To report on the President's trip to Europe

II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS AND PRESS PLAN

A. Background: The President returned from an important foreign policy trip to Europe late on June 3, 1975. A bipartisan leadership meeting was scheduled for the next evening so the President could brief the leaders on results of his talks. Due to late sessions in both chambers of Congress, this meeting was postponed until Friday, June 6.

B. Participants: See Tab A

C. Press Plan:

Announce to the Press as a Presidential report on the European trip. Press and White House photographers.

III. TALKING POINTS

1. I am sorry we could not meet Wednesday evening as scheduled, but with the extended business in both the House and Senate, we rescheduled the leadership meeting for today.
2. Because of your schedules, we will try to hold our discussion to an hour in order to not detain the leaders longer than necessary.
3. Now, we will give you a report on the trip to Europe. (See Tab B)



PARTICIPANTS

The President  
The Vice President

SENATE

Mike Mansfield  
Hugh Scott  
Bob Byrd  
Bob Griffin  
Frank Moss  
Carl Curtis  
Cliff Case  
John Stennis  
Strom Thurmond

HOUSE

Carl Albert  
"Tip" O'Neill  
John Rhodes  
John McFall  
Bob Michel  
Phil Burton  
"Doc" Morgan  
Bill Broomfield  
Bob Wilson

STAFF

Secretary of State Kissinger  
Secretary of Defense Schlesinger  
Don Rumsfeld  
Bob Hartmann  
Jack Marsh  
Max Friedersdorf  
Phil Buchen  
Bill Seidman  
Alan Greenspan  
Ron Nessen  
Jim Cannon  
Jim Lynn  
Frank Zarb  
Dick Cheney  
Vern Loen  
Bill Kendall  
Brent Scowcroft

REGRETS

Sen. Sparkman  
Rep. Anderson  
Rep. Price



TALKING POINTS

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 11/24/98, State Dept. Guidelines  
By WJM, NARA, Date 11/28/00

A. Introductory

1. The meetings of the past week were important and successful. We clearly demonstrated the capacity of Western democracies to deal with common problems. We reaffirmed our determination to carry on cooperative programs to enhance our own abilities to overcome collectively political, economic and defense challenges.
2. Of foremost importance, I reaffirmed our commitment to an undiminished defense effort. I also had the opportunity in Brussels, to review current issues with 14 Alliance and European colleagues; and in the span of one week, I met with more than 20 foreign leaders.
3. The United States responded to the British initiative for a NATO Summit meeting because of our desire to deal frankly with our current problems and to chart a positive course for the future.
4. We did this against the background of the questions raised by economic recession, the withdrawal from Southeast Asia, the internal strains within the Alliance and the need for a more effective defense effort.

B. NATO Summit

1. In my speech to my NATO colleagues, I underscored our commitment to the Alliance and I put forward six major tasks.
  - maintenance of a strong and credible defense;
  - preservation of the quality and integrity of the Alliance -- and I stressed the perils of partial membership;
  - improvement of the process of political consultation;
  - development of a productive and realistic agenda for detente;
  - reinforcement of democratic institutions within the Alliance and the related issue of associating Spain;
  - rededication of the Alliance to dealing with the challenges of modern industrialized society, so that the skills of our free system can benefit ourselves and others in the world.

2. In the meeting at the Summit, the NATO allies gave increased political impetus to our consultations on Cyprus, Portugal and the Middle East. This meeting provided a necessary prelude to the final stages of the CSCE talks in Geneva.

3. Prime Minister Trudeau proposed -- and I supported him -- regular summits as a political device to maintain a vital Alliance.

#### Brussels Bilateral Talks

##### Greece-Turkey-Cyprus

1. We made a major effort to encourage the parties to move toward a peaceful solution of the Cyprus problem and an improvement in Greek-Turkish relations, stressing the danger that a continuing dispute would pose for broader Western interests.

2. In Brussels I met with Greek Prime Minister Caramanlis and heard first-hand his views on developments in Greece, in Greek-Turkish relations and on Cyprus. I stressed admiration for the progress which Caramanlis has made in restoring democracy to Greece, and I pledged our support to Caramanlis in his efforts.

3. The same morning, I met Turkish Prime Minister Demirel who once again expressed the strong and injured feelings of Turkey against the action of the American Congress in imposing an embargo on Turkey.

4. I was able nevertheless to urge progress in the negotiations on Cyprus and in improving relations with Greece.

5. The Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers met in Brussels the day after we left, and the positive communique issued appears to indicate that progress may be possible. We will continue to work with the parties and with the Cypriot communities who are negotiating in Vienna.

##### Portugal

1. In my discussions with other allied leaders and with Prime Minister Goncalves of Portugal, I expressed my deep concern about developments in Portugal -- and the continuing evidence of Communist control in the decision making process.



2. The Portuguese Prime Minister explained that the armed forces movement was guiding the process in Portugal and that no political party would not be allowed to interfere with Portugal's commitment to NATO.

3. I said that there was an inconsistency in Communist membership in the Government of NATO allies and the purposes for which NATO was formed.

4. I informed the Prime Minister that we would maintain a hopeful and watchful regard on developments there. Frankly, I am not reassured and we continue to have a pessimistic assessment.

#### Other Bilaterals

1. In my meetings with Chancellor Schmidt, Prime Minister Wilson and President Giscard, the recession and related international economic problems were a principle focus of discussion. I expressed my confidence in the ability of the American economy to overcome the current recession, while cautioning against overstimulation and a resulting new round of inflation.


2. In sum, the visit to Brussels enabled me to meet personally with the leaders of our allies, to state our firm resolve, and to impress upon each Prime Minister our determination to work with Europe on common problems.

#### D. Spain

1. At the NATO Summit, I raised the issue of recognizing Spain's role in Western defense through its bilateral defense relationship with the United States.

2. There is considerable opposition to such action while Franco is in power. Frankly, I saw a disappointing double standard among the Allies who are willing to go along with developments in Portugal, but who bury their heads in the sand on Spain.

3. I described our efforts to gain recognition for this effort from other members of the Alliance, and the Spaniards were appreciative.



4. I stressed our interest in maintaining and developing our long-time political, economic and security relations with Spain.

5. We agreed on the importance of a successful conclusion to our current negotiations on U.S. facilities in Spain. Spain is in a period of transition and therefore this is a particularly important time to maintain close relations with the Spanish Government and people. A political process has already started. I had a good talk with Juan Carlos.

E. Meeting with President Sadat

1. The main problem in the Middle East is that if there is no progress toward peace, there will be serious consequences for U.S. interests and for the interests of our friends in the area:

- another Arab-Israeli war is almost certain;
- another war could trigger prolonged cutbacks in oil production which would not only impose a major economic burden on most of the nations of the world but would sharpen tension between us and the Western Europeans and Japan;
- Polarization of the Middle East between the U.S. and the USSR would again be sharpened, with the Soviets regaining much of the influence they have lost since October, 1973;
- there would be a renewed wave of anti-Americanism in the Arab world which would make it almost impossible for the moderate Arabs to go on working with us toward an Arab-Israeli settlement, which is essential both for U.S. strategic and economic interests in the area and for the survival of Israel.

2. For all these reasons, there must be progress toward peace. The strategy of pursuing peace which we followed since October, 1973, permitted us to strengthen our relationships with both the Arabs and Israel while at the same time acting in a way that is consistent with the moderate Arabs' own interest in moving the USSR to the sidelines in the Middle East.



3. As I said before I left on this trip, there are essentially three options for moving toward peace:

- we could try to revive the negotiation of a series of interim agreements. However, for the negotiations that were suspended in March to be resumed, new ideas would have to be introduced;
- it might be possible to develop an interim agreement on the basis of much broader terms of reference than were being discussed in March;
- the third approach would be to shift the focus now to negotiations on an overall settlement, leaving open the opportunity to segment those negotiations and to implement any agreements in stages.

4. My meeting with Sadat was not designed to produce concrete results. As you know, I will be talking with Prime Minister Rabin next week, and there is no way of reaching firm conclusions on a course of action until we have had those talks.

5. The meeting with Sadat provided an opportunity for us to develop a good personal relationship which should be important in the difficult period which lies ahead. It also provided an opportunity for President Sadat to explain the dilemma he faces:

- on the one hand, his main goal is to make peace so that he can tackle Egypt's basic economic problems;
- on the other hand, he does not feel able to make a separate peace with Israel as long as Israel still occupies Syrian and Jordanian territory and nothing has been done to meet the legitimate concerns of the Palestinians;
- he is attempting an historic reorientation of Egyptian policy away from the USSR and toward the U. S. , but to sustain that policy he needs to be able to demonstrate that it produces results for Egypt and the Arab cause



6. Therefore, Sadat has a strong interest in progress in the negotiations. Together we went through the options to see what course he feels is most realistic.

7. Oh an overall settlement, Sadat stated his well-known position:

-- He explained why, in his judgment, such an agreement can only be achieved on the basis of an Israeli agreement to return to the 1967 boundaries, with minor, agreed changes, and to allow for the creation of some sort of a separate Palestinian homeland outside those boundaries.

-- He also confirmed his understanding that the Arabs, on their part, would be expected to agree to recognize Israel's right to exist in peace as an independent, sovereign state. He supported the idea of strong security arrangements and demilitarization as well as external guarantees, if the parties want them, to ensure that a peace agreement will be maintained. He made it clear that he accepts continued strong U.S. support for Israel's survival and well-being within this context.

8. On the question of an interim agreement, Sadat said he would be prepared to review Egypt's position if Israel would do the same. That is where we stand. I will be discussing the situation with Prime Minister Rabin next week.

9. I should also say a word about the economic aspects of our talk. Helping Egypt solve its economic problems is an important part of our political strategy in the Middle East. President Sadat is trying to launch a major attack on Egypt's fundamental human problems, and he has concluded that he must shift away from the Soviet economic model to achieve this. Thus he has turned to us -- as well as to the wealthier Middle Eastern countries and the world Bank -- for advice and assistance. This is a policy reorientation of historic significance.

10. This is why I promised Sadat that we will work with other interested governments and the World Bank to help him meet his most pressing short-term problems as well as to lay the basis for long-term growth. I told him that we would be consulting with the Congress on the U.S.





share of this multi-national effort. We intend to work very closely with Saudi Arabia and Iran as the primary contributors, as well as with Japan and West Germany and the World Bank and IMF. All of them share our interest in seeing Egypt remain a stable, viable force for peace and moderation in the Middle East, not subject to Soviet pressure. All of them are willing to provide economic assistance to this end. We will begin consulting with Congress soon on appropriate aid levels for FY 76.

F. Rome

1. Following on the NATO Summit, my meetings in Rome yesterday with President Leone and Prime Minister Moro permitted me to emphasize the importance we attach to Italy's role in the Alliance, the Mediterranean and the West.
2. While the visit was brief, it had a strong, positive impact. This was evident in the words of the Italian leaders, and it is important at a time when the Italian Communists are challenging the present pro-West government in this month's elections.

G. Conclusion

1. I return from Europe with the Atlantic Alliance as the heart of our foreign policy:
  - rededicated to maintaining our common strength and security;
  - agreed on the value of consultation;
  - basically agreed on the need to address all issues, political, economic and military.
2. Our friends in Europe have a new, clear statement of our will and our determination to succeed together.
3. This provides the United States with an exceptional opportunity to move ahead on those issues requiring joint US-European attention.
4. We should not miss this opportunity. We should dedicate ourselves to working together to achieve our foreign policy goals.



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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 11/24/98, State Dept. Guidelines  
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
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