The original documents are located in Box 8, folder "Coalition for a Democratic Majority - Defense Policy Statement" of the John Marsh Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Jack.

This is Roy Goodson's group.

Col. Hammond sent you a copy.

Wolthuis

For release on Wednesday, April 2, 1975
For more information contact Penn Kemble
785-9001

coalition for a democratic majority

1823 JEFFERSON PLACE, N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036 (202) 785-9001

CDM Calls on Democrats to Support Increased Defense Effort

(A full Task Force Statement will be released at a press conference on Wednesday, April 2, 1975)

A CDM Task Force argues that liberal Democrats must respond to the spreading crisis in many parts of the world, the massive arms build-up by the Soviet Union and its allies, and America's declining military capability by supporting an increase in the U.S. defense effort.

These views are set forth in detail in a new statement by the Task Force on Foreign Policy of the Coalition for a Democratic Majority. The statement will be released in full at a press conference by two of CDM's chief spokesmen Eugene V. Rostow, the former Undersecretary of State, and Ben J. Wattenberg, the author.

Time: Wednesday, April 2, 1975
3:15 P.M.

(a full text of the statement will be available for advance reading at 2:45 P.M.)

Place: Sheraton Carlton Hotel
16th and K Streets, N.W.
Washington, D.C.

The Council Room

Among the members of the CDM Task Force which is releasing the statement are -- in addition to Mr. Rostow, its Chairman -- Henry Fowler, former Secretary of the Treasury, Max M. Kampelman, attorney, Norman Podhoretz, the editor of "Commentary," John P. Roche, the columnist, and Albert Shanker, President of the American Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO.

#

FOR AN ADEQUATE DEFENSE

The second statement by the

Foreign Policy Task Force

of the

Coalition for a Democratic Majority

Coalition for a Democratic Majority
1823 Jefferson Place, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
202/785-9001

COALITION FOR A DEMOCRATIC MAJORITY

Foreign Policy Task Force

EUGENE V. ROSTOW, CHAIRMAN

Professor, Yale Law Shcool
Former Undersecretary of State

Task Force Members

Eugenie Anderson *
former U.S. Ambassador to Denmark

Joseph H. Cople

William A. Douglas
Director of Education, American Institute for Free Labor Development

Henry Fowler *
partner, Goldman, Sachs
former Secretary of the Treasury

David Friedman

Stephen P. Gibert
Consultant, Strategic Studies Center, Stanford Research Institute

Roy Godson *
Director, Georgetown University International Labor Program
Secretary to the CDM Foreign Policy Task Force

Ernest Green *
Director, Recruitment-Training-Placement, Inc.

K. Scott Gudgeon
junior fellow, New York University Center for Strategic Studies

Abraham Halpern

Don Irwin *
Mayor, Norwalk, Connecticut

Fred Isquith
attorney, New York

Jeane J. Kirkpatrick *
Professor, Georgetown University

Robert James Maddox *
Professor, Penn State University

Max M. Kampelman
attorney; former Counsel to Vice-President Hubert H. Humphrey

Norman Podhoretz *
Editor, "Commentary"

Penn Kemble
Executive Director, CDM

Clifford H. Pruefer
Captain, U.S. Navy (Retired)

Lucian W. Pye *
Professor, MIT

John P. Roche *
Professor, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University; former Special Assistant to President Lyndon B. Johnson

Peter J. Rosenblatt
attorney; former special consultant to Senator Edmund S. Muskie

Leonard S. Sandweiss
attorney, New York

Paul Seabury *
Professor, The University of California at Berkeley

Albert Shanker *
President, American Federation of
Teachers, AFL-CIO

D. Bruce Shine
attorney; member, Democratic National
Committee (Tennessee)

Milan Skacel
President, United States-Latin America
Chamber of Commerce

George C. Sponsler *
President, International Planning
Management, Corporation

John Thomas

W. Stull Holt *
Professor (Emeritus), University
of Washington

J.C. Turner *
Secretary-Treasurer, Int'l. Union
of Operating Engineers, AFL-CIO

Robert E. Ward *
Professor, Stanford University

While members of the Task Force share the basic point of view expressed in its statements, not all members necessarily concur with every specific detail or proposal in these statements.

The affiliations of the Task Force members are listed above for purposes of identification only.

* denotes a member of the Policy Drafting Committee

COALITION FOR A DEMOCRATIC MAJORITY
FOREIGN POLICY TASK FORCE

Preface

That party politics should stop at the water's edge is one of the finest principles of American public life. The Coalition for a Democratic Majority will abide by that principle in the statements and studies of its Foreign Policy Task Force, and the statements on foreign policy which its Board of Directors will issue from time to time. The rule does not mean that the policies and actions of the government in the field of foreign affairs should be above criticism. It does require that foreign policy problems be discussed in terms of their wisdom and efficacy in promoting the national interest, not the interests of either political party.

Since the time of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, at least, the foreign policy of the United States has been presented and debated as a national problem, not a party problem. As the shadow of war deepened, President Roosevelt's cabinet included Secretary of War Stimson and Secretary of the Navy Knox. Senator Vandenberg cooperated fully with President Truman, as Senator Johnson did with President Eisenhower. The foreign policy we have pursued for more than thrity years has been developed and supported by a steadfast bipartisan coalition. We approach our problem in the spirit of that experience.

Coalition for a Democratic Majority

Task Force on Foreign Policy

Statement No. 2

For an Adequate Defense

As they did in the Truman years, liberals and Democrats must again take the lead in rallying America to increase our defense capabilities, both nuclear and conventional. The defense budget recently proposed by the Ford Administration would at best keep our defense posture constant. We believe this static policy is not enough, in view of the nature of Soviet policy and the massive regular increases in Soviet military programs, which show no signs of abating. We therefore recommend an increase in our defense capacity, especially for the Navy, for research and development, and for ready conventional forces.

We have reached this disagreeable conclusion reluctantly. We share the general anxiety about the world's mounting stockpile of military weapons. We too would infinitely prefer our tax dollars to be spent for domestic social and economic needs, which must be met in any case if the nation is to remain strong and healthy. We share the mood of the nation in the aftermath of our tragic Vietnam experience, and the nostalgic yearning for the isolation of the nineteenth century which so many Americans feel in their reaction against the turbulent condition of world politics.

These feelings and concerns have tended to obscure the inexorable facts. We are dismayed by the drift toward military vulnerability and political timidity in which the nation seems to be caught up. At one level, every American knows that the nineteenth century is over,

and that isolation is not an available option for American foreign policy today. If there had ever been serious doubt on that score, the oil crisis which began in 1971 or 1972 should put it to rest. Unless we set a new and responsible course, the next two years may see the military balance shift decisively towards the Soviet Union and its allies; an irreversible deterioration of our alliance network; and the conquest or destruction of many small nations whose existence we and others have guaranteed -- among them the embattled state of Israel, which came into existence in reliance on international promises which must be kept.

I

In the first statement of our Task Force, The Quest for Detente, issued on July 31, 1974, we concluded that "our basic security position is strong, if we understand it as it is, and undertake to do what is required to sustain it. Our fundamental national interest in world politics is to achieve and maintain a balance of power which could effectively deter general war. On the foundation of such an equilibrium, we could hope in time to build a system of peace, faithful to the principles of the United Nations Charter.

"The logic of nuclear weapons, and the threat of Soviet power and policy, have forced China, Japan, Western Europe and many other countries to realize that their security interests and those of the United States are indivisible. If the United States consolidates its rapprochement with China; it if achieves once again a relationship of complete and cordial solidarity with our European and our Pacific allies; and if, with our allies, we do what is required to deter Soviet nuclear

and conventional power, we should be able to carry out a foreign policy capable of preventing war, while also pressing forward politically in the endless quest for the vindication of decency.

"If, on the other hand, we allow ourselves to be deceived by the myth of detente, reduce our military strength, and permit our alliances to erode, we may well suffer irreversible defeats, which could imperil the safety of democracy in America."

The course of events since last summer has fully confirmed this judgment. Soviet policy and economic disequilibrium continue to press Western Europe, Japan, China, and the United States together, as they grope for programs that could assure their security and prosperity.

But the foundation of American and allied foreign policy is still weak, because public opinion -- its source -- remains uncertain. In our first statement, we said that President Nixon had abused the standard of ethical responsibility which could govern the discourse between the President and the American people by claiming "too much in explaining the state of Soviet-American relations." President Ford has not yet liberated himself or his administration from the soothing and ambiguous vocabulary President Nixon used in talking about this subject. This is less characteristic of the Administration's statements on our defense posture than is the case in its treatment of other foreign policy problems; it remains true, however, that the full gravity of our defense problems, and the full magnitude of our defense needs, have not been adequately presented to the American people.

The triumph and the agony of Watergate will have been in vain unless the President and his associates trust the people, and explain the situation to them exactly as it is. The Ford Administration has not yet taken this indispensable first step into the post-Nixon era.

II

The nation is in great danger. Our danger is increasing every day. The Soviet Union continues to pursue a policy of expansion that threatens our vital interests in Europe, the Middle East, and other parts of the world. It pursues its goals directly and through proxies, by exploiting and exacerbating local tensions and situations of conflict. This is the essence of the tragic situation in the Middle East, where for twenty years, the Soviet Union has played on Arab hostility to the existence of Israel, and on other conflicts and rivalries in the area, to stir up and to prolong an endless cycle of war and other violence, which can be sustained only by Soviet arms and political influence.

The strategic goal of Soviet policy in the Middle East is to outflank NATO from the South. This perception of the Middle Eastern conflict is not yet fully understood by American public opinion. Our alliance with Western Europe is absolutely essential to the balance of power on which the primordial safety of the United States rests. On this proposition, there is nearly complete unanimity in the United States. But the larger part of public opinion is not yet fully conscious of the fact that Middle Eastern conflicts are not isolated regional problems, but are integral to the defense of NATO. The Middle East is of fundamental geo-political importance to the security of Europe.

For twenty years, the Soviets have pursued a strategy of enveloping NATO. They have exploited Arab hostility to the existence of Israel as an important weapon of that strategy. The Arab-Israeli conflict is not, of course, the only arrow in their quiver. As the Soviets say, they "push at every open door." They have tried to take advantage of every political and military opportunity that served their purposes, if it did not involve excessive risk or cost. Thus they have probed in Iceland and Norway, and participated in many conflicts among Arab states. They are now moving on a large scale in Portugal. They have a naval base in Conakry, and have explored possibilities in many other places on the marches of Europe.

By playing on the Arab-Israeli conflict, and other issues, the Soviets have made considerable progress in the Middle East, from Iraq and Aden to Algeria. And their investment in that effort is by now considerable. They have supplied Arab states with billions of dollars worth of arms and economic aid. And their technical assistance, especially in the military sphere, has often become participatory. If the Soviet Union were to achieve domination of the Mediterranean, North Africa and the Middle East, it would outflank the NATO defenses in Central Europe, and threaten Europe from its soft under-belly, as President Pompidou once remarked. It has been painfully obvious since October, 1973, that hegemonial control of the oil, the space, and the mass of the region by the Soviet Union would carry with it dominion over Western Europe as well. NATO would be dismantled. The United States would have to leave Europe and the Mediterranean. Europe would be reduced to the status of Finland, at best -- a major supplier of technology and consumer goods to the Soviet Union, and a political eunuch.



The Soviets are well advanced in their campaign to control the Middle East and the Mediterranean basin. The achievement of this goal would decisively tip the worldwide military balance in favor of the Soviet Union and its allies, and would leave us isolated in a bitter, hostile, and disillusioned world. In such a world, we, the Europeans, and the Japanese would be "allowed" to supply the Soviet Union -- on favorable credit terms -- with the technology and consumer goods needed to assure her military domination, and to keep her people quiet.

The Soviet Union's expansionist foreign policy is backed by a military building program which has no peacetime parallel in world affairs.

Thus far, however, -- in public, at least -- our government continues to talk about "detente". There have been increases in the Japanese and in some European defense budgets during the last few years. Our own military budget has been swollen by inflation, and by the pay increases needed to produce a volunteer military service. Manpower costs, including those for pay and benefits, have taken an ever-increasing share of available funds, leaving less and less for weapons prodrement and deployment, particularly in the non-strategic sector, i.e., that of general purpose forces. As a result, our defense budget measured in constant dollars has been declining steadily. In terms of real defense capability, the United States is in many respects pursuing a course of unilateral disarmament, especially with regard to the Navy and other conventional forces. We are now spending a smaller fraction of our GNP on defense than has been the case for more than twenty years. Defense spending now takes only 26 cents of every federal tax dollar, compared to 45 cents in 1964 and 57 cents in 1956. In the face of the Soviet military build-up, and Soviet foreign policy, our defense budget is an invitation to disaster.

The best diplomatic signal the United States could give the world now would be a sharp increase in our defense programs, going beyond the programs recommended in Secretary Schlesinger's recent message to the Congress. It is the first responsibility of the Ninety-Fourth Congress, controlled by large Democratic majorities, to provide for the common defense.

The Democratic Party is called by special traditions and responsibilities to take national leadership in meeting these momentous challenges. Democratic leaders -- Truman, Marshall, and Acheson -- established the policy of international alliances and military capability which have prevented a general war for more than two decades. Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson built on that foundation, and sustained the policy on which it rests. More recently, in the aftermath of our painful experience in Vietnam, strong voices, particularly in the Deomocratic Party, have spoken out against this policy, which the state of the world since 1945 has required of us in order to protect our purely national interests in world politics. The current mood, which some have called neo-isolationist, has become so prevalent that a poll of newly-elected Democratic congressmen suggests that some thirty to forty of them may favor further reductions in our military capabilities -- enough to affect the outcome of many important Congressional votes related to defense.

We are confident that these views will fade when our party leaders confront the reality of our international and military situation. We are convinced that when they face the facts, conscious of their responsibility, they will reaffirm our nation's interest in maintaining the balance of world military power as the indispensable predicate of our national safety. If we fail to uphold this balance, we Democrats could not escape

our share of the responsibility for greatly increasing the prospects of political despotism and eventual war.

III

Why have we reached the painful conclusion that the nation's safety requires an increase in our defense capabilities, both nuclear and especially conventional?

The basic reason has already been stated in general terms: Soviet foreign policy is still expansionist. It seeks to take advantage of every opportunity which does not involve unacceptable risks. Moreover, Soviet policy is fuelled by a military build-up which is growing at a rate of over 5% each year, in real terms, while our real expenditure for defense is declining, and has already fallen to the lowest point since the period just before the Korean war.

It follows, we believe, that we should build up our military capabilities in order to deter further aggression and preserve the possibility of peace. We shall now examine this proposition in detail. Our purpose here is to offer a cold look at the relative military capacities of the United States and the Soviet Union, and to suggest some programs and policies which should avert a catastrophic military imbalance. In the nature of Soviet policy, such an imbalance might invite the Soviets to risk disasterous military or quasi-military adventures, like that of the Middle Eastern war of October, 1973, but on an even larger scale.

We should start by making two positions unmistakably clear:

First, we favor continuing the patient quest for conditions of true and reciprocal detente with the Soviet Union -- the quest which has been a central purpose of American foreign policy since the time of President

Franklin Roosevelt. The hope for a true detente with the Soviet Union -- based on an end of the arms race, respect for human rights, and mutual obedience to the rules of the United Nations Charter -- must not be allowed to die.

Secondly, we favor -- and we strongly favor -- any and all kinds of disarmament negotiations with the Soviet Union, and any other negotiations that might lead to the mutual limitation and, more importantly, the eventual reduction of armaments. Our delegates to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and to the negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) should patiently and peristently advance the most sweeping proposals for cuts in military spending, weaponry, and the number of men under arms. But our negotiators should insist on truly balanced and clearly enforceable steps, which would give no advantage to either side. Arms limitation agreements must not involve one-sided concessions on our part, whether made in the sincere but naive hope that the Soviets would follow our example, or to prolong false hopes that we have entered a "new generation of peace."

In thinking about military capacities, we should distinguish the problems of the so-called "strategic forces," a term which is now used to identify our capacity to meet nuclear threats to ourselves or to our allies, from those of "conventional" -- or general purpose -- forces, which include the full range of forces from ground troops to tactical nuclear weapons.

Strategic forces -- an uncertain equation

It has been the goal of our nuclear policy to prevent the use or the threatened use of nuclear weapons in world politics. The first objective of the American strategic forces is to deter a Soviet nuclear attack, either on this country or on its allies. To deter attack, our weapons must be sufficiently strong, numerous, and well-placed to "ride out" any attack by the Soviet Union, and then to retaliate with such force that the Soviets could not hope to gain by initiating a first strike, no matter how great the stakes that might tempt them to consider it. Our "second strike capability" must be clear beyond the faintest shadow of a doubt. The cruel logic of nuclear deterrence requires us to maintain a strategic capability so great that if deterrence should fail, despite all our efforts, we would still have the capacity for an appropriate response.

In a world of changing technology, the tactics and the arithmetic of second strike capability keep changing. But the underlying concept is simple. Second-strike capability is not only a matter of throw-weight and the numbers of ground-based, air-based, and submarine-based launchers on each side. The key issue is and will remain whether the Soviets can have any reasonable expectation of being able to destroy so large a number of our weapons by a first strike as to create doubt about our second strike capacity or our willingness to respond to a nuclear attack as necessary.

The basic flaw of the Ford-Brezhnev "agreement in principle," or "agreement to make an agreement," announced at Vladivostok, is in precisely this area. Quite apart from its other weaknesses, which we discuss in context below, it gives no assurance on the key question: will our second strike capability be maintained? The answer to that question

does not depend on the number of launchers, or on the number of missiles that can be "MIRVed," -- the two issues dealt with at Vladivostok -- but on the number, yield, capacity, accuracy, and range of the warheads themselves, however launched. The Soviet missiles that can be equipped with MIRVs have 3 to 6 times the payload of American missiles that can be so equipped. The result could be an ominous Soviet advantage in strategic warheads, and therefore uncertainty about the American second strike capability.

Soviet strategic forces have been growing dramatically during the past decade, and this growth has continued unabated since the SALT I agreements of May, 1972. The agreements foreseen at Vladivostok show little or no promise of slowing down this cancerous rate of growth.

In the Interim Agreement of Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, the United States accepted numerical inferiority in ICBMs and SLBMs on the basis of two principal arguments:

(1) We then retained technical superiority and a very respectable number of warheads -- many on missiles armed with Multiple Independently Targeted Re-entry Vehicles (MIRVs), which permit one missile to carry multiple payloads. We also had an advantage in bomber payloads not covered by the agreements. These advantages offset the Soviet advantage in missile launchers and "throw-weight."

(2) The Interim SALT Agreement halted the upward momentum of the Soviet programs at a time when we were not expanding our own programs, partly because we would not get the consent of the Congress to do so.

But in the two-and-a-half years since SALT I, the Soviets have surged into the development of four new missile systems and have repeatedly tested new multiple warheads and MIRVs. As a result, they now threaten to overcome the American technological lead and re-entry vehicle (RV) advantage. The new Soviet missiles, described below, have considerably greater pay-

loads than those they appear destined to replace, so that the U.S. superiority in numbers of warheads could become a gross inferiority in a few years. Moreover, the Soviets have started production of a new bomber, the BACKFIRE, with a refueling capability and other characteristics that give it a potential for offsetting our current advantage in strategic bombers. Finally, there are persistent public reports that the Soviets are building new missile silos in excess of the numbers permitted in the Interim SALT Agreement; that they are testing new radar of a kind used in ABM systems (prohibited in the 1972 ABM Treaty); that they are using concealment ("interfering with national means of verification" -- prohibited in the 1972 Agreements); and that they are continuing the development of mobile ICBMs. (The U.S. stated unilaterally in 1972 that deployment of mobile land-based ICBMs would be considered a violation of the spirit of the Interim SALT Agreement).

An early view of the requirements of deterrence held that we must have adequate forces to wreak "Assured Destruction" on the Soviet Union after its worst possible "out-of-the-blue" attack on our strategic forces, i.e., we needed a retaliatory capacity capable of destroying so large a proportion of the population and industrial plants in their cities that no prize could be worth the punishment they would take in return for striking first. If both sides have this capacity, we thought neither would ever dare to attack. The balance of terror would become stable -- the "two scorpions in the bottle" would both live, because neither could survive if it attacked the other.

This doctrine of "Mutual Assured Destruction" has been called by its acronym, MAD, because it leaves no alternative to Armageddon if either side miscalculates and deterrence fails. But recent advances in

the accuracy and numbers of strategic weapons have made it clear that this doctrine, dubious even in its heyday, is now obsolete. The Soviets will soon be able to launch a first strike that spares our cities but destroys a substantial portion of our strategic and conventional military forces. After such an attack, it would be repugnant -- and of doubtful utility -- to respond by wiping out Soviet population centers. Moreover, if the Soviets should use only a portion of their growing strategic forces in such a first strike against military targets, they would retain the capacity to wreak havoc on our people should we respond with a retaliatory attack on their cities. Soviet leaders might be willing in some circumstances to gamble with the lives of their people by launching a first strike against our military, but would we respond to such an attack by massacring the Soviet population -- especially when our own people were in effect hostages to the possibility of a second Soviet nuclear attack? We would surely be reluctant to launch a spasm of nuclear bombs on Soviet cities if the Soviets were to attack our military forces in a selective, probing fashion. And we would be at least as reluctant to respond with an attack on the Soviet population if the Soviets were to launch their first strike against our allies, since to do so would insure the destruction of our own cities without doing anything to rescue those of our allies. Besides, as other nations acquire the bomb, there are not just two scorpions in the proverbial bottle, but several.

In response to this grisly predicament, the Secretary of Defense now proposes to give our forces a greater range of options for meeting the variety of offensive possibilities the Soviets are now developing. We need not only the capability for a massive counterattack on enemy cities,

but also the capability selectively to counterattack enemy military targets. This must include the capacity to destroy "hard" targets, such as hardened missile silos, without expending all our forces. And we must be able to do this with a minimum of damage to nearby civilian populations. These developments are indispensable both to strengthen deterrence, and to provide more rational alternatives if deterrence fails.

The increasingly limited support provided for our strategic forces makes it most difficult for us to mount such a program of flexible deterrence in the face of rapidly improving and expanding Soviet forces. What is needed to restore the balance, and, paradoxically, to reduce the possibility of Mutual Assured Destruction?

Let us start with missiles. As we have already noted, the Soviets have four new ICBM systems in the testing stage, while we have none. They have developed the SS-X-18, which is even bigger than the giant SS-9; the SS-X-17 and SS-X-19, medium sized liquid-fueled missiles, which have three to five times the throw weight of the deployed SS-11s; and the SS-16, which is in the light solid-fueled SS-13 class. If these systems replace the 1610 Soviet ICBMs permitted under the Interim SALT Agreement, they will increase total Soviet throw weight by 67 to 100 percent. All but the SS-X-16 have already been tested with multiple or MIRVed payloads. They could carry an estimated 7,000 one-to-two megaton warheads -- many times the yield of our MIRV warheads.

It would only take 300 of the SS-X-18 missiles, which could legitimately replace SS-9s under the Interim Agreement, to pose a formidable threat to our 1054 ICBM force, even, the Secretary of Defense says, after the projected program for upgrading the hardness of our missile silos is

completed. There would then remain 1,310 Soviet ICBMs with more than 5,000 reentry vehicles to threaten other U.S. targets, including other hard targets. And if the SS-X-16 is deployed in the mobile version believed to be under development, we could not even rely on verification of the permitted numbers.

When we turn to nuclear-missile-launching submarines, we find that the Interim Agreement permits the Soviets up to 62 submarines with 950 launchers, against 44 and 710, respectively, for the United States. The Soviets had argued that because they had shorter-range missiles than the U.S., and lacked the forward submarine bases that we have in Scotland and Spain, they required greater numbers to maintain comparable on-station forces. (We also regarded our multiple-warheaded Polaris and MIRVed Poseidon missiles as an offsetting technological advantage.) But since SALT I the Soviets have tested versions of their SS-N-6 submarine-launched missiles with multiple warheads and have tested also the SS-N-8 at ranges in excess of 4500 miles (considerably more than the Poseidon range and in the class of our future TRIDENT I missile, still far from flight testing). A 4500-mile Soviet missile could reach any U.S. target when launched from a submarine still in or near the ports of Murmansk and Petropavlovsk. Clearly, the imbalance of the Interim Agreement is becoming greater at sea as well as on land. The Soviet submarines provide a force which the Soviets could readily hold in reserve to deter any response we might consider in the event of an attack on our military forces. And our problems of locating and observing submarines will be increasingly complicated by the existence of nuclear submarines in the hands of other nations.

In the air, the Soviets are deploying a supersonic medium bomber, the BACKFIRE, which they could adapt to strategic missions and deploy in much greater numbers. These bombers are not included in the Vladivostok Summit guidelines, and strategic bombers are not yet included in any SALT agreement. Pending such an agreement, and in view of the Soviet superiority in missiles permitted under the present Interim Agreement, we should not permit them to overtake us in bombers.

The B-1 bomber, the projected replacement for the aging B-52, is designed, among other things, to have a greater capacity to survive a Soviet SLBM attack. It would play an important role in diversifying our strategic forces, greatly complicating any Soviet plans for attaining first strike capability, and improving our ability to achieve a resilient and flexible deterrent force. It would force the Soviets to continue to maintain their expensive air defenses. Pending an agreement that equitably and verifiably limits bombers, the B-1 is indispensible to help maintain the balance of strategic forces through the eighties. Research and development for the B-1 should not be further delayed.

While the Soviets build toward superiority in strategic forces, spending annually about twice as much on them as we do, we have unilaterally frozen the level of our strategic forces. Moreover, we have denied ourselves qualitative improvements that are within reach and are needed to implement our developing strategic doctrine. Our strategic budget has been declining, both in constant dollars and as a percent of the total defense budget. We must be willing to spend enough to keep up the momentum of the B-1 and TRIDENT programs until equitable and verifiable SALT agreements are reached. We need to accelerate research and development for



increased missile accuracy, so that our missiles -- small targets -- can acquire the capability of destroying hard targets. This is essential if we are to continue to be able to counterattack selected military targets -- a necessity under the new strategic doctrine. We should also step up research and development on larger and more versatile missiles, as permitted under the Interim Agreement. These are needed to match the strong Soviet missile development program. Research and development must go forward on both ABM and ways of penetrating ABM, and must be stepped up to find ways of protecting our vulnerable satellites. We should devote much more effort to development of the NARWAHL, a new strategic submarine that is potentially much cheaper, albeit smaller and of lower performance, than the TRIDENT. (The NARWAHL currently receives only $16 million for design studies.) We urge as well the careful study of more radical solutions, such as the important proposal that we place more emphasis on ballistic missile submarines as our principal deterrent. Obviously, we cannot and should not stop doing research on successor systems. If the SALT talks fail to produce fair agreements, we shall need them.

All of these steps, and probably others, will be needed if, in the face of the Soviet capabilities, we are to insure, as we say we will, that no American President should ever have to choose between capitulating to threats to vital American interests or destroying the Soviet -- and American -- people. The steps proposed above are modest by comparison to the massive Soviet effort to win strategic superiority. They go substantially beyond the proposals of President Ford and Secretary Schlesinger which, in our judgment, are insufficient for dealing with the threats posed by Soviet advances in strategic weaponry.



Unfortunately, the Vladivostok understanding reached last year between President Ford and Secretary Brezhnev offers no promise of lessening the burden of strategic defense. On the contrary, it could well accelerate the arms race and further complicate the negotiating problem of maintaining second strike capability. It provides a poor and unproductive basis for further negotiations, precisely because it represents a wrong and unnecessary concession to Soviet demands for higher levels of strategic arms, rather than requiring much needed arms cut-backs on both sides.

By allowing each side 2400 strategic vehicles, regardless of size, the Vladivostok Agreement freezes the great missile throw-weight advantage of the Soviets. Thus it gives the illusion but not the substance of equality. If the final agreement attempts to ameliorate this by permitting the replacement of missiles and silos with larger ones, it will invite an arms race of unprecedented, and world-threatening proportions. Moreover, the limit of 1320 for the number of missiles that may be "MIRVed" will further spur an arms race, given the Soviet throw-weight advantage and their catch-up in MIRV technology.

These high numbers of MIRVed missiles will also present especially difficult verification problems. It is particularly unsettling that they carry a real threat of a first-strike capability against fixed ICBMs -- a capability that would not necessarily be reached at the same time by each country. The Soviet advantage in throw-weights and yields might well offset the eroding U.S. lead in MIRV and accuracy technology, so that the Soviets might reach a high fixed-ICBM kill capability first.

In short, the Vladivostok formula could well spur, not cap, the arms race, and its codification in a treaty or ten-year interim agreement would make subsequent arms reduction agreements less, not more, likely.

While SALT and the MBFR negotiations continue, and Congress reviews the Ford-Brezhnev guidelines, we must take the hard and costly measures to insure that, should they fail, we will be adequately prepared to meet the mounting military threats to ourselves and our allies. Action of this kind can only encourage the success of these negotiations.

The Secretary of State has asked rhetorically, "What in the name of God is superiority? What do you do with it? How do you use it?" The Soviets can answer this question. They are squeezing their economy and their people for the sake of military superiority because they are convinced that it has meaning today. It offers them the credible possibility of being able to make or to threaten selected strategic attacks against our military and our allies. Even more important in their eyes, it provides them with a great psychological and political advantage in the coercive diplomacy of blackmail they have practiced for more than thirty years, and continue to practice unabated, despite their indulgence in the political rhetoric of "detente". We should not rest peace and liberty on the possibility that Mr. Kissinger -- talented as he is -- can talk the Soviet leaders out of their convictions, or out of acting on them in a disastrous experiment to discover whether or not they are valid.

IV

Conventional Forces

While the problems of nuclear balance are difficult, maintaining an adequate U.S. military potential in the non-nuclear field is our greatest immediate challange. Thus far, nuclear stalemate has given the Soviets the opportunity to inspire conventional wars and proxy wars -- an opportunity which has become nearly a license with the decline since Korea of the will of the Western allies to insist on the enforcement of the United Nations Charter. The policy of deterrence must apply at the conventional as well as the nuclear level. The experiences of the Arab-Israeli war of October, 1973, and subsequent hostilities, and the prospects that conventional war may again break out in the Middle East, in Europe, or in Asia -- all should cause us grave concern about the adequacy and morale of our general purpose forces.

The Soviets provided their Arab allies with vast quantities of highly sophisticated conventional equipment before the Yom Kippur war. These included effective anti-tank and SAM anti-aircraft missiles, new model tanks and other armored vehicles, and SCUD ground-to-ground missiles. Much of this equipment remains in Arab hands, and the Soviets have massively re-armed the Syrians during the past year -- bringing the quantity and quality of Syrian arms well above the levels of 1973. It is widely predicted that Soviet-Egyptian rapport -- if it was ever really frayed -- will soon revive, and that the vast Soviet arsenal will again pour out conventional weapons, parts and ammunition for the Egyptian armies, which have in any event received some Soviet supplies throughout the period since October, 1973.

We cannot provide our Israeli allies with the arms to counteract this Soviet supply without either denuding our forces in Europe and at home or substantially increasing our manufacture of conventional arms. Our predicament is not caused only by the Middle East conflict. Both military and political trends are undercutting our capacity to defend Europe. Without new efforts by the U.S. and its NATO allies, NATO forces may deteriorate before long into a mere skirmish line -- a "military museum," as General Steinhoff remarked -- in comparison with the Warsaw pact armies, which are mounting an ominous potential for a blitzkrieg attack across Germany to the English Channel.

Security plans in relation to the Soviet Union necessarily depend on capabilities, not on misty and uncertain estimates of intention. Whether such an attack ever occurs will depend in large part not only on political and strategic developments throughout the world, but on NATO's steady capacity to resist. What can be said now, with certainty, is that the Soviet posture with respect to Europe goes far beyond the conceivable limits of "defense".

A comparison of American and Soviet conventional military potential is a somber exercise. The Soviet Union has half-again as many men under arms as the United States: 3.4 million to 2.2 million. Some military analysts believe the ratio is more like two-to-one, if one allows for the large numbers of paramilitary personnel in border guard, internal security and other units not officially included in the Soviet armed forces, and the high ratio of support to combat troops in all American formations. Direct comparisons are here even more difficult than in the strategic case, and there are great uncertainties about equipment, logistics,

training, and readiness. But we know that the Soviet and Warsaw pact armies are heavily equipped with tanks and artillery. The Soviet Union alone is estimated to have four times as many tanks as the United States (and five times the annual production rate, even after the projected U.S. step-up in 1975), three times as many artillery tubes and twice as many heavy mortars. While total numbers of Soviet tactical aircraft exceed those of the U.S. by about 40 percent, they are believed to be producing such aircraft at double the U.S. rate. And their air defenses are not only far greater in their home (strategic) deployment but also in mobile or transportable systems (both missiles and artillery).

At sea, the Soviets have moved rapidly from a coastal defense to a "blue water" navy, with almost as many surface combat ships as the United States, and over three times as many submarines (other than ballistic missile submarines). Here again, their building programs are far, far greater than our own. Their surface ships tend to be smaller, but emphasize speed and intense firepower, and they have been dramatically increasing their at-sea activity rates. They are ahead of the U.S. in surface-to-surface antiship missiles, and have nuclear antiship missiles, which we do not. In a direct conflict, these weapons could take a heavy toll of our fleet at the outset. The Soviets are behind us in endurance and in their ability to resupply their navy while it is under way. In aircraft carriers, with fifteen in service, the U.S. still enjoys a virtual monopoly, but the Soviets now have a program under way which has already produced one carrier and soon will produce another. They possess a formidable attack submarine fleet, although the U.S. currently has far greater antisubmarine resources and capabilities.



Clearly, our conventional military resources are in many important respects inferior to those of our principal potential adversary. And our programs for revitalizing and restoring these resources are so modest that we are falling further and further behind, rather than catching up. Are we, then, maintaining a prudent deterrent against aggression? Are we taking undue risks? Can we handle likely contingencies?

Let us ask these questions first about the defense of Western Europe itself. Obviously, the strategic position of the United States would change profoundly -- and nearly fatally -- if Western Europe should come under Soviet control. The Warsaw Pact and NATO have substantially equal manpower -- roughly 900,000 troops -- in central Europe, a front of primary concern. But the Pact has almost twice as many divisions and a much higher "teeth-to-tail" ratio -- more tanks and firepower, less logistical support. The Soviet forces and doctrine appear to be designed for massed attack on a narrow front -- blitzkrieg "shock" tactics against a sector of the NATO defenses, which are thinly spread over the whole front. They aim at quick breakthrough and a short war. The NATO forces are geared to a long-sustained defensive effort, with some quick reinforcements airlifted from the U.S., but the bulk coming by sealift. (This would require first the winning of a protracted battle for the Atlantic sealanes, against the growing Soviet submarine and surface fleet.) Political and moral strictures preclude an offensive military strategy on our part, a limitation that offers the Soviets some important advantages. The air forces at the front are roughly equal, but if the Soviets achieve surprise and knock out many airfields at the outset, NATO might have great difficulty in providing an adequate air defense. We have one program underway to redress

this risk: building concrete aircraft shelters, which the Soviets did in response to lessons of the Six-Day War in 1967, and which NATO should have done much more quickly.

There are, of course, claims that NATO could mount an impressive defense. To us, such claims appear dubious. Prudence dictates much more vigorous action to correct the deficiences both of hardware and of strategic doctrine. There is considerable feeling, particularly in Europe, that the risks are not great: that the Soviets are inhibited by fear of a second front in the East; by the "nuclear umbrella"; by their interest in winning control of an intact European industrial base by political means; by the unreliability of their satellites in Eastern Europe; and so on. But the Soviets are steadily building up their forces facing Europe. They have shown no real interest in negotiating MBFR -- Mutual Balanced Force Reductions -- and they keep up the pressures on Europe in many ways. They have suppressed dissension within the Warsaw Pact. And they continue to pursue their Middle Eastern policy, which, as we have remarked, has always been directed not against Israel alone, but first and primarily against Europe and NATO. Indeed, the Chinese now say that the United States has successfully deterred a Soviet attack on China, and that the threat of a Soviet attack in Western Europe is great, and is growing.

Today, the Europeans must look to American tactical nuclear weapons to deter a conventional Soviet attack. We currently have seven thousand tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, but we must remember that the Soviets have 3500 nuclear weapons of their own. Theirs are believed to be larger than ours, on the average. If NATO's conventional defenses



did not contain a Soviet attack, the Soviets would be able to overrun at least a portion of the American weapons. NATO field commanders might not get the Presidential release to use them in time. The Soviets would have the initiative, which could well prove decisive: they might, for example, start with a nuclear attack on our nuclear weapons, airfields, and other military installations. American "victory" then, if achievable at all, would at best save a devastated Europe.

Yet we cannot unilaterally withdraw the tactical nuclear weapons from Europe, and leave the Europeans feeling completely vulnerable to the Soviets, lacking the assurance these weapons provide of our seriousness about European defense. Nor is there any present prospect for a verifiable bilateral withdrawal of Soviet and U.S. tactical nuclear arms from Europe. The only realistic option is to redress and maintain a genuine balance of conventional forces in the European theatre. Nor can we look at Europe in isolation. The great risk is not of an "out-of-the-blue" Soviet attack on Europe, but rather that the Soviets might attack Europe during a deep crisis involving conflict in the Mideast or elsewhere. When there is no deep crisis, there are always less risky ways for the Soviets to attempt to obtain their objectives; it is when we are engaged elsewhere, or when they are frustrated and under pressure, perhaps both internally and abroad, that attack may appear to be the only way to secure their interests, and the risks may look acceptable, or at least unavoidable.

This brings up the question of what depth of conventional force levels we should seek to maintain. During most of the sixties, it was assumed by policymakers that major wars were conceivable, and not wholly improbable, in both Europe and the Far East, and lesser contingencies were possible virtually everywhere else. In planning jargon, the General Purpose

Forces were to be adequate for "two and one-half wars." Since China's rapprochement with us, our planners have shifted from a "two and one-half war" strategy to a "one and one-half war" strategy. While there is some justification for this shift -- the Soviets may well fear a two-front war involving both NATO and the Chinese -- we should guard against the facile assumption that China has become a reliable ally. She is still a potentially dangerous totalitarian state, subject to the drastic shifts in policy which characterize the goverments of narrow elites. The Soviets are surely making great efforts to reverse the American orientation of Mao's policy, and will intensify these efforts when he dies. Therefore we must carefully scrutinize the adequacy of our deterrent (and readiness) for the "one and one-half war" contingency, and the adequacy of the concept itself.

But one need not make a final judgment on such complex problems of strategy to realize that our conventional forces are at present spread very thin. The Secretary of Defense has said that we faced an empirical test of our conventional preparedness in the Middle East conflict of October, 1973, and that we met the test "smartly and efficiently." Our impressions are less sanguine. We seriously depleted our stocks of modern weapons in Germany to supply the Israelis; our airlift depended on a single staging base in the Azores, which Portugal may now deny us; and the only credible deterrent we could pose to the prospect that Soviet troops would intervene on behalf of the Arabs was our worldwide nuclear alert. This, remember, was only "one-half" of a war, not "one-and-a half" wars. To say that our performance does not inspire confidence is to be generous indeed.

It is apparent that we and our allies must increase our conventional defense capabilities in order to counter the rising pressure of Soviet policy, felt in many areas of the world vital to our security. Soviet general purposes forces are increasing steadily in strength and mobility, backed by formidable sea power and air-lift capacity. The Soviets continue to arm and supply client states, and to foment proxy wars which have proved extremely difficult to contain. We need to increase our research and development on antitank, antiaircraft, and antiship weapons; on battlefield surveillance and targetting capabilities, especially for night and bad weather conditions; and on more flexible and rapid command control capabilities. We need to build up our stocks of vehicles, weapons, and ammunition, both for deterrence, and to make certain that our War Material Reserve will not be dangerously depleted by crisis requirements like the October, 1973, airlift and sealift which helped save Israel. We need to build and arm ships to revitalize our dwindling Navy before it can be successfully challenged by the growing power of the Soviet fleet. We need to increase our capabilities for both tactical and strategic mobility and air resupply. Above all, we need larger well-trained mobile ready forces.

None of these needs is met by the programs recently proposed by the Ford Administration.

These conventional requirements, plus the strategic needs we have already noted, could cost eight to ten billion dollars in the Fiscal Year 1976, at present prices, beyond the amounts requested by the Ford Administration. Exactly how much more these additional capabilities would cost will depend not only on the calculations of experts, but on how much could be saved by potential economies in other parts of the budget. The

struggle to eliminate waste in the defense budget is and should always be a prime concern of good management. Of course we favor such efforts. Our thesis here simply is that the needs must be met, at the lowest possible overall cost.

The Ford Administration has proposed an $8 billion increase in defense spending for the Fiscal Year 1976: -- less than a 10% increase in a year in which it forecasts a 10% increase in the price of defense goods and services. In short, the Administration proposes what could be a static or constant level of defense effort on the most optimistic possible assumptions -- if everything proceeds according to plan, and prices do not rise more than 10%.

This is simply not good enough as the framework for an adequate defense program. We cannot afford to fall behind in efforts essential to the stability of the balance of power, and therefore to the safety of the nation.

Current defense spending takes the lowest proportion of our current output, the lowest percentage of our GNP, since the days before Korea. Even more significant, we have over eight percent unemployment, and vast unused plant capacity. If we should spend an additional $10 billion for defense -- two-thirds of one percent of our current GNP -- we would still have ample unused resources which could be devoted to producing additional output for new social programs, and to stimulate private capital formation and consumption through tax cuts. In the present state of the economy we do not face a "guns or butter" choice. If it is well-managed, the American economy can provide the defense we need and much more "butter" as well -- more education, medical research, pollution control, new energy capacities, and more of the other things we urgently need.

Of course, as a matter of principle, defense efforts should never be based on what we can "afford." They are not luxuries, optional programs to be dropped in times of difficulty. We can never afford not to do what has to be done to assure the safety of our people, our national interests, and our democratic institutions.

Conclusion

In our Statement last July on "The Quest for Detente," we commented that "the Soviet Union does not even pretend that it is carrying out its obligations under the Indochina accords of 1973." The significance of that judgment, which the Administration did not challence in its response to our statement, is now more obvious than it was eight months ago, with the bleak news of intense combat in South Vietnam and Cambodia.

The news is bleak also in the other main theatre of active conflict, the Middle East. The Soviets continue to arm the Arab states for offensive war, and to support the Palestinian terrorist and political groups which are desperately seeking to prevent a political settlement between Israel and her neighbors.

When John F. Kennedy was a student in London, during the middle 'thirties, he wrote a book, "While England Slept." We and our allies are in a mood of somnabulism similar to that which paralyzed France, Britain, and the United States during that strange period. If we and our allies had been able to wake up then, World War II, and all that flowed from it, could easily have been prevented. We and our allies have the capacity to prevent an even more terrible war today. To do so requires us to face the world as it is, and to act calmly, responsibly, and effectively in order to protect our interests in its evolution.

Some contend that we cannot afford a larger defense budget, and that the present budget is full of fat, luxury, and expenditure for obsolete weapons. We have been careful here not to propose specific figures for the cost of the programs recommended in this statement, beyond indicating the order of magnitude they imply. Perhaps all that the Secretary of Defense wishes to do, and all that we propose to add to his program, can be obtained for less than the budget he has proposed. We are sure that there are economies that can be discoverd. And we support research and modernization that might reduce the vast cost of the defense establishment.

But long experience has made us skeptical of easy promises to eliminate spending "fat", worthy as that goal is. The effort should continue to be made, of course. Our thesis is simply that our strength should be enhanced, through the programs suggested here, at the lowest possible cost.

We are also convinced that we can afford both the programs essential to our defense, and those essential to our domestic well-being, if we adopt sound policies for ending the recession and reviving economic growth, and if scarce resources, such as energy, are widely used. A progressive economic policy should make it possible for us to do whatever the national defense requires, in an economic environment which restores both full employment and price stability.

We shall not pursue these issues in this paper. (They are thoroughly discussed in the Statement of the Economic Policy Task Force of CDM which was recently issued.) We have prepared this document on the assumption, which we believe to be absolutely sound, that Americans will

spend, and do, whatever is needed to assure the safety and prosperity of the nation. The problems we have sought to address are the kind of international challenges the nation faces, and the kind of defense program the national safety requires to deal with them.

Our answer is sober, but not pessimistic. We believe that we must stop drifting, and stop distracting ourselves with sentimental, guilty, or foolhardy excuses for neglecting our responsibility to provide for the common defense. That responsibility is shared by every official of the Executive branch, every member of Congress, and every citizen. We appeal to them all, from the President and the Secretary of State to the proverbial man and woman on the street, to look at the evidence directly and soberly. We face choices like those the nation faced in the heroic administration of Harry Truman, whose achievements are generally applauded today.

The nation -- and the world -- owe an immense debt of gratitude to the two generations of leaders of both parties who confronted, and met, the troubles of their times. The nation must come together once again, to deal with the challenges now before us.

The will of the people cannot be mobilized unless the President and the Secretary of State address these issues with words and deeds adequate to their gravity. Nor can a broad and bipartican concensus emerge unless the Democratic Party faces the facts with equal discipline and equal responsibility.

The United States should be the master, not the victim, of its fate. The dangers before us demand a great and concerted national effort --

a sharp and dramatic turn in the direction of policy. That turn will require earnest political debate. But it will require something more -- a resolve to undertake that discussion and debate.

Thus far, that resolve has been the missing factor in the politics of national defense. It is the key factor. We appeal for its revival -- a revival of will and of responsibility.

The nation can no longer afford the luxury of political evasion and party politics on the life-and-death issues of foreign policy and national defense.

# # #

FOR AN ADEQUATE DEFENSE

The second statement by the

Foreign Policy Task Force

of the

Coalition for a Democratic Majority

Coalition for a Democratic Majority
1823 Jefferson Place, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
202/785-9001

COALITION FOR A DEMOCRATIC MAJORITY

Foreign Policy Task Force

EUGENE V. ROSTOW, CHAIRMAN

Professor, Yale Law Shcool
Former Undersecretary of State

Task Force Members

Eugenie Anderson *
former U.S. Ambassador to Denmark

Joseph H. Cople

William A. Douglas
Director of Education, American Institute for Free Labor Development

Henry Fowler *
partner, Goldman, Sachs
former Secretary of the Treasury

David Friedman

Stephen P. Gibert
Consultant, Strategic Studies Center, Stanford Research Institute

Roy Godson *
Director, Georgetown University International Labor Program
Secretary to the CDM Foreign Policy Task Force

Ernest Green *
Director, Recruitment-Training-Placement, Inc.

K. Scott Gudgeon
junior fellow, New York University Center for Strategic Studies

Abraham Halpern

Don Irwin *
Mayor, Norwalk, Connecticut

Fred Isquith
attorney, New York

Jeane J. Kirkpatrick *
Professor, Georgetown University

Robert James Maddox *
Professor, Penn State University

Max M. Kampelman
attorney; former Counsel to Vice-President Hubert H. Humphrey

Norman Podhoretz *
Editor, "Commentary"

Penn Kemble
Executive Director, CDM

Clifford H. Pruefer
Captain, U.S. Navy (Retired)

Lucian W. Pye *
Professor, MIT

John P. Roche *
Professor, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University; former Special Assistant to President Lyndon B. Johnson

Peter J. Rosenblatt
attorney; former special consultant to Senator Edmund S. Muskie

Leonard S. Sandweiss
attorney, New York

Paul Seabury *
Professor, The University of California at Berkeley.

he's working w/ NSIC / NYU on New York City Secondary School curriculum on defense education.

Albert Shanker *
President, American Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO

D. Bruce Shine
attorney; member, Democratic National Committee (Tennessee)

Milan Skacel
President, United States-Latin America Chamber of Commerce

George C. Sponsler *
President, International Planning Management, Corporation

John Thomas

W. Stull Holt *
Professor (Emeritus), University of Washington

J.C. Turner *
Secretary-Treasurer, Int'l. Union of Operating Engineers, AFL-CIO

Robert E. Ward *
Professor, Stanford University

While members of the Task Force share the basic point of view expressed in its statements, not all members necessarily concur with every specific detail or proposal in these statements.

The affiliations of the Task Force members are listed above for purposes of identification only.

* denotes a member of the Policy Drafting Committee

COALITION FOR A DEMOCRATIC MAJORITY
FOREIGN POLICY TASK FORCE

Preface

That party politics should stop at the water's edge is one of the finest principles of American public life. The Coalition for a Democratic Majority will abide by that principle in the statements and studies of its Foreign Policy Task Force, and the statements on foreign policy which its Board of Directors will issue from time to time. The rule does not mean that the policies and actions of the government in the field of foreign affairs should be above criticism. It does require that foreign policy problems be discussed in terms of their wisdom and efficacy in promoting the national interest, not the interests of either political party.

Since the time of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, at least, the foreign policy of the United States has been presented and debated as a national problem, not a party problem. As the shadow of war deepened, President Roosevelt's cabinet included Secretary of War Stimson and Secretary of the Navy Knox. Senator Vandenberg cooperated fully with President Truman, as Senator Johnson did with President Eisenhower. The foreign policy we have pursued for more than thrity years has been developed and supported by a steadfast bipartisan coalition. We approach our problem in the spirit of that experience.

Coalition for a Democratic Majority

Task Force on Foreign Policy

Statement No. 2

For an Adequate Defense

As they did in the Truman years, liberals and Democrats must again take the lead in rallying America to increase our defense capabilities, both nuclear and conventional. The defense budget recently proposed by the Ford Administration would at best keep our defense posture constant. We believe this static policy is not enough, in view of the nature of Soviet policy and the massive regular increases in Soviet military programs, which show no signs of abating. We therefore recommend an increase in our defense capacity, especially for the Navy, for research and development, and for ready conventional forces.

We have reached this disagreeable conclusion reluctantly. We share the general anxiety about the world's mounting stockpile of military weapons. We too would infinitely prefer our tax dollars to be spent for domestic social and economic needs, which must be met in any case if the nation is to remain strong and healthy. We share the mood of the nation in the aftermath of our tragic Vietnam experience, and the nostalgic yearning for the isolation of the nineteenth century which so many Americans feel in their reaction against the turbulent condition of world politics.

These feelings and concerns have tended to obscure the inexorable facts. We are dismayed by the drift toward military vulnerability and political timidity in which the nation seems to be caught up. At one level, every American knows that the nineteenth century is over,

and that isolation is not an available option for American foreign policy today. If there had ever been serious doubt on that score, the oil crisis which began in 1971 or 1972 should put it to rest. Unless we set a new and responsible course, the next two years may see the military balance shift decisively towards the Soviet Union and its allies; an irreversible deterioration of our alliance network; and the conquest or destruction of many small nations whose existence we and others have guaranteed -- among them the embattled state of Israel, which came into existence in reliance on international promises which must be kept.

I

In the first statement of our Task Force, The Quest for Detente, issued on July 31, 1974, we concluded that "our basic security position is strong, if we understand it as it is, and undertake to do what is required to sustain it. Our fundamental national interest in world politics is to achieve and maintain a balance of power which could effectively deter general war. On the foundation of such an equilibrium, we could hope in time to build a system of peace, faithful to the principles of the United Nations Charter.

"The logic of nuclear weapons, and the threat of Soviet power and policy, have forced China, Japan, Western Europe and many other countries to realize that their security interests and those of the United States are indivisible. If the United States consolidates its rapprochement with China; it if achieves once again a relationship of complete and cordial solidarity with our European and our Pacific allies; and if, with our allies, we do what is required to deter Soviet nuclear

and conventional power, we should be able to carry out a foreign policy capable of preventing war, while also pressing forward politically in the endless quest for the vindication of decency.

"If, on the other hand, we allow ourselves to be deceived by the myth of detente, reduce our military strength, and permit our alliances to erode, we may well suffer irreversible defeats, which could imperil the safety of democracy in America."

The course of events since last summer has fully confirmed this judgment. Soviet policy and economic disequilibrium continue to press Western Europe, Japan, China, and the United States together, as they grope for programs that could assure their security and prosperity.

But the foundation of American and allied foreign policy is still weak, because public opinion -- its source -- remains uncertain. In our first statement, we said that President Nixon had abused the standard of ethical responsibility which could govern the discourse between the President and the American people by claiming "too much in explaining the state of Soviet-American relations." President Ford has not yet liberated himself or his administration from the soothing and ambiguous vocabulary President Nixon used in talking about this subject. This is less characteristic of the Administration's statements on our defense posture than is the case in its treatment of other foreign policy problems; it remains true, however, that the full gravity of our defense problems, and the full magnitude of our defense needs, have not been adequately presented to the American people.

The triumph and the agony of Watergate will have been in vain unless the President and his associates trust the people, and explain the situation to them exactly as it is. The Ford Administration has not yet taken this indispensable first step into the post-Nixon era.

II

The nation is in great danger. Our danger is increasing every day. The Soviet Union continues to pursue a policy of expansion that threatens our vital interests in Europe, the Middle East, and other parts of the world. It pursues its goals directly and through proxies, by exploiting and exacerbating local tensions and situations of conflict. This is the essence of the tragic situation in the Middle East, where for twenty years, the Soviet Union has played on Arab hostility to the existence of Israel, and on other conflicts and rivalries in the area, to stir up and to prolong an endless cycle of war and other violence, which can be sustained only by Soviet arms and political influence.

The strategic goal of Soviet policy in the Middle East is to outflank NATO from the South. This perception of the Middle Eastern conflict is not yet fully understood by American public opinion. Our alliance with Western Europe is absolutely essential to the balance of power on which the primordial safety of the United States rests. On this proposition, there is nearly complete unanimity in the United States. But the larger part of public opinion is not yet fully conscious of the fact that Middle Eastern conflicts are not isolated regional problems, but are integral to the defense of NATO. The Middle East is of fundamental geo-political importance to the security of Europe.

For twenty years, the Soviets have pursued a strategy of enveloping NATO. They have exploited Arab hostility to the existence of Israel as an important weapon of that strategy. The Arab-Israeli conflict is not, of course, the only arrow in their quiver. As the Soviets say, they "push at every open door." They have tried to take advantage of every political and military opportunity that served their purposes, if it did not involve excessive risk or cost. Thus they have probed in Iceland and Norway, and participated in many conflicts among Arab states. They are now moving on a large scale in Portugal. They have a naval base in Conakry, and have explored possibilities in many other places on the marches of Europe.

By playing on the Arab-Israeli conflict, and other issues, the Soviets have made considerable progress in the Middle East, from Iraq and Aden to Algeria. And their investment in that effort is by now considerable. They have supplied Arab states with billions of dollars worth of arms and economic aid. And their technical assistance, especially in the military sphere, has often become participatory. If the Soviet Union were to achieve domination of the Mediterranean, North Africa and the Middle East, it would outflank the NATO defenses in Central Europe, and threaten Europe from its soft under-belly, as President Pompidou once remarked. It has been painfully obvious since October, 1973, that hegemonial control of the oil, the space, and the mass of the region by the Soviet Union would carry with it dominion over Western Europe as well. NATO would be dismantled. The United States would have to leave Europe and the Mediterranean. Europe would be reduced to the status of Finland, at best -- a major supplier of technology and consumer goods to the Soviet Union, and a political eunuch.

The Soviets are well advanced in their campaign to control the Middle East and the Mediterranean basin. The achievement of this goal would decisively tip the worldwide military balance in favor of the Soviet Union and its allies, and would leave us isolated in a bitter, hostile, and disillusioned world. In such a world, we, the Europeans, and the Japanese would be "allowed" to supply the Soviet Union -- on favorable credit terms -- with the technology and consumer goods needed to assure her military domination, and to keep her people quiet.

The Soviet Union's expansionist foreign policy is backed by a military building program which has no peacetime parallel in world affairs.

Thus far, however, -- in public, at least -- our government continues to talk about "detente". There have been increases in the Japanese and in some European defense budgets during the last few years. Our own military budget has been swollen by inflation, and by the pay increases needed to produce a volunteer military service. Manpower costs, including those for pay and benefits, have taken an ever-increasing share of available funds, leaving less and less for weapons prodrurement and deployment, particularly in the non-strategic sector, i.e., that of general purpose forces. As a result, our defense budget measured in constant dollars has been declining steadily. In terms of real defense capability, the United States is in many respects pursuing a course of unilateral disarmament, especially with regard to the Navy and other conventional forces. We are now spending a smaller fraction of our GNP on defense than has been the case for more than twenty years. Defense spending now takes only 26 cents of every federal tax dollar, compared to 45 cents in 1964 and 57 cents in 1956. In the face of the Soviet military build-up, and Soviet foreign policy, our defense budget is an invitation to disaster.

The best diplomatic signal the United States could give the world now would be a sharp increase in our defense programs, going beyond the programs recommended in Secretary Schlesinger's recent message to the Congress. It is the first responsibility of the Ninety-Fourth Congress, controlled by large Democratic majorities, to provide for the common defense.

The Democratic Party is called by special traditions and responsibilities to take national leadership in meeting these momentous challenges. Democratic leaders -- Truman, Marshall, and Acheson -- established the policy of international alliances and military capability which have prevented a general war for more than two decades. Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson built on that foundation, and sustained the policy on which it rests. More recently, in the aftermath of our painful experience in Vietnam, strong voices, particularly in the Deomocratic Party, have spoken out against this policy, which the state of the world since 1945 has required of us in order to protect our purely national interests in world politics. The current mood, which some have called neo-isolationist, has become so prevalent that a poll of newly-elected Democratic congressmen suggests that some thirty to forty of them may favor further reductions in our military capabilities -- enough to affect the outcome of many important Congressional votes related to defense.

We are confident that these views will fade when our party leaders confront the reality of our international and military situation. We are convinced that when they face the facts, conscious of their responsibility, they will reaffirm our nation's interest in maintaining the balance of world military power as the indispensable predicate of our national safety. If we fail to uphold this balance, we Democrats could not escape

our share of the responsibility for greatly increasing the prospects of political despotism and eventual war.

III

Why have we reached the painful conclusion that the nation's safety requires an increase in our defense capabilities, both nuclear and especially conventional?

The basic reason has already been stated in general terms: Soviet foreign policy is still expansionist. It seeks to take advantage of every opportunity which does not involve unacceptable risks. Moreover, Soviet policy is fuelled by a military build-up which is growing at a rate of over 5% each year, in real terms, while our real expenditure for defense is declining, and has already fallen to the lowest point since the period just before the Korean war.

It follows, we believe, that we should build up our military capabilities in order to deter further aggression and preserve the possibility of peace. We shall now examine this proposition in detail. Our purpose here is to offer a cold look at the relative military capacities of the United States and the Soviet Union, and to suggest some programs and policies which should avert a catastrophic military imbalance. In the nature of Soviet policy, such an imbalance might invite the Soviets to risk disasterous military or quasi-military adventures, like that of the Middle Eastern war of October, 1973, but on an even larger scale.

We should start by making two positions unmistakably clear:

First, we favor continuing the patient quest for conditions of true and reciprocal detente with the Soviet Union -- the quest which has been a central purpose of American foreign policy since the time of President

Franklin Roosevelt. The hope for a true detente with the Soviet Union -- based on an end of the arms race, respect for human rights, and mutual obedience to the rules of the United Nations Charter -- must not be allowed to die.

Secondly, we favor -- and we strongly favor -- any and all kinds of disarmament negotiations with the Soviet Union, and any other negotiations that might lead to the mutual limitation and, more importantly, the eventual reduction of armaments. Our delegates to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and to the negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) should patiently and peristently advance the most sweeping proposals for cuts in military spending, weaponry, and the number of men under arms. But our negotiators should insist on truly balanced and clearly enforceable steps, which would give no advantage to either side. Arms limitation agreements must not involve one-sided concessions on our part, whether made in the sincere but naive hope that the Soviets would follow our example, or to prolong false hopes that we have entered a "new generation of peace."

In thinking about military capacities, we should distinguish the problems of the so-called "strategic forces," a term which is now used to identify our capacity to meet nuclear threats to ourselves or to our allies, from those of "conventional" -- or general purpose -- forces, which include the full range of forces from ground troops to tactical nuclear weapons.

Strategic forces -- an uncertain equation

It has been the goal of our nuclear policy to prevent the use or the threatened use of nuclear weapons in world politics. The first objective of the American strategic forces is to deter a Soviet nuclear attack, either on this country or on its allies. To deter attack, our weapons must be sufficiently strong, numerous, and well-placed to "ride out" any attack by the Soviet Union, and then to retaliate with such force that the Soviets could not hope to gain by initiating a first strike, no matter how great the stakes that might tempt them to consider it. Our "second strike capability" must be clear beyond the faintest shadow of a doubt. The cruel logic of nuclear deterrence requires us to maintain a strategic capability so great that if deterrence should fail, despite all our efforts, we would still have the capacity for an appropriate response.

In a world of changing technology, the tactics and the arithmetic of second strike capability keep changing. But the underlying concept is simple. Second-strike capability is not only a matter of throw-weight and the numbers of ground-based, air-based, and submarine-based launchers on each side. The key issue is and will remain whether the Soviets can have any reasonable expectation of being able to destroy so large a number of our weapons by a first strike as to create doubt about our second strike capacity or our willingness to respond to a nuclear attack as necessary.

The basic flaw of the Ford-Brezhnev "agreement in principle," or "agreement to make an agreement," announced at Vladivostok, is in precisely this area. Quite apart from its other weaknesses, which we discuss in context below, it gives no assurance on the key question: will our second strike capability be maintained? The answer to that question

does not depend on the number of launchers, or on the number of missiles that can be "MIRVed," -- the two issues dealt with at Vladivostok -- but on the number, yield, capacity, accuracy, and range of the warheads themselves, however launched. The Soviet missiles that can be equipped with MIRVs have 3 to 6 times the payload of American missiles that can be so equipped. The result could be an ominous Soviet advantage in strategic warheads, and therefore uncertainty about the American second strike capability.

Soviet strategic forces have been growing dramatically during the past decade, and this growth has continued unabated since the SALT I agreements of May, 1972. The agreements foreseen at Vladivostok show little or no promise of slowing down this cancerous rate of growth.

In the Interim Agreement of Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, the United States accepted numerical inferiority in ICBMs and SLBMs on the basis of two principal arguments:

(1) We then retained technical superiority and a very respectable number of warheads -- many on missiles armed with Multiple Independently Targeted Re-entry Vehicles (MIRVs), which permit one missile to carry multiple payloads. We also had an advantage in bomber payloads not covered by the agreements. These advantages offset the Soviet advantage in missile launchers and "throw-weight."

(2) The Interim SALT Agreement halted the upward momentum of the Soviet programs at a time when we were not expanding our own programs, partly because we would not get the consent of the Congress to do so.

But in the two-and-a-half years since SALT I, the Soviets have surged into the development of four new missile systems and have repeatedly tested new multiple warheads and MIRVs. As a result, they now threaten to overcome the American technological lead and re-entry vehicle (RV) advantage. The new Soviet missiles, described below, have considerably greater pay-

loads than those they appear destined to replace, so that the U.S. superiority in numbers of warheads could become a gross inferiority in a few years. Moreover, the Soviets have started production of a new bomber, the BACKFIRE, with a refueling capability and other characteristics that give it a potential for offsetting our current advantage in strategic bombers. Finally, there are persistent public reports that the Soviets are building new missile silos in excess of the numbers permitted in the Interim SALT Agreement; that they are testing new radar of a kind used in ABM systems (prohibited in the 1972 ABM Treaty); that they are using concealment ("interfering with national means of verification" -- prohibited in the 1972 Agreements); and that they are continuing the development of mobile ICBMs. (The U.S. stated unilaterally in 1972 that deployment of mobile land-based ICBMs would be considered a violation of the spirit of the Interim SALT Agreement).

An early view of the requirements of deterrence held that we must have adequate forces to wreak "Assured Destruction" on the Soviet Union after its worst possible "out-of-the-blue" attack on our strategic forces, i.e., we needed a retaliatory capacity capable of destroying so large a proportion of the population and industrial plants in their cities that no prize could be worth the punishment they would take in return for striking first. If both sides have this capacity, we thought neither would ever dare to attack. The balance of terror would become stable -- the "two scorpions in the bottle" would both live, because neither could survive if it attacked the other.

This doctrine of "Mutual Assured Destruction" has been called by its acronym, MAD, because it leaves no alternative to Armageddon if either side miscalculates and deterrence fails. But recent advances in

the accuracy and numbers of strategic weapons have made it clear that this doctrine, dubious even in its heyday, is now obsolete. The Soviets will soon be able to launch a first strike that spares our cities but destroys a substantial portion of our strategic and conventional military forces. After such an attack, it would be repugnant -- and of doubtful utility -- to respond by wiping out Soviet population centers. Moreover, if the Soviets should use only a portion of their growing strategic forces in such a first strike against military targets, they would retain the capacity to wreak havoc on our people should we respond with a retaliatory attack on their cities. Soviet leaders might be willing in some circumstances to gamble with the lives of their people by launching a first strike against our military, but would we respond to such an attack by massacring the Soviet population -- especially when our own people were in effect hostages to the possibility of a second Soviet nuclear attack? We would surely be reluctant to launch a spasm of nuclear bombs on Soviet cities if the Soviets were to attack our military forces in a selective, probing fashion. And we would be at least as reluctant to respond with an attack on the Soviet population if the Soviets were to launch their first strike against our allies, since to do so would insure the destruction of our own cities without doing anything to rescue those of our allies. Besides, as other nations acquire the bomb, there are not just two scorpions in the proverbial bottle, but several.

In response to this grisly predicament, the Secretary of Defense now proposes to give our forces a greater range of options for meeting the variety of offensive possibilities the Soviets are now developing. We need not only the capability for a massive counterattack on enemy cities,

but also the capability selectively to counterattack enemy military targets. This must include the capacity to destroy "hard" targets, such as hardened missile silos, without expending all our forces. And we must be able to do this with a minimum of damage to nearby civilian populations. These developments are indispensable both to strengthen deterrence, and to provide more rational alternatives if deterrence fails.

The increasingly limited support provided for our strategic forces makes it most difficult for us to mount such a program of flexible deterrence in the face of rapidly improving and expanding Soviet forces. What is needed to restore the balance, and, paradoxically, to reduce the possibility of Mutual Assured Destruction?

Let us start with missiles. As we have already noted, the Soviets have four new ICBM systems in the testing stage, while we have none. They have developed the SS-X-18, which is even bigger than the giant SS-9; the SS-X-17 and SS-X-19, medium sized liquid-fueled missiles, which have three to five times the throw weight of the deployed SS-11s; and the SS-16, which is in the light solid-fueled SS-13 class. If these systems replace the 1610 Soviet ICBMs permitted under the Interim SALT Agreement, they will increase total Soviet throw weight by 67 to 100 percent. All but the SS-X-16 have already been tested with multiple or MIRVed payloads. They could carry an estimated 7,000 one-to-two megaton warheads -- many times the yield of our MIRV warheads.

It would only take 300 of the SS-X-18 missiles, which could legitimately replace SS-9s under the Interim Agreement, to pose a formidable threat to our 1054 ICBM force, even, the Secretary of Defense says, after the projected program for upgrading the hardness of our missile silos is

completed. There would then remain 1,310 Soviet ICBMs with more than 5,000 reentry vehicles to threaten other U.S. targets, including other hard targets. And if the SS-X-16 is deployed in the mobile version believed to be under development, we could not even rely on verification of the permitted numbers.

When we turn to nuclear-missile-launching submarines, we find that the Interim Agreement permits the Soviets up to 62 submarines with 950 launchers, against 44 and 710, respectively, for the United States. The Soviets had argued that because they had shorter-range missiles than the U.S., and lacked the forward submarine bases that we have in Scotland and Spain, they required greater numbers to maintain comparable on-station forces. (We also regarded our multiple-warheaded Polaris and MIRVed Poseidon missiles as an offsetting technological advantage.) But since SALT I the Soviets have tested versions of their SS-N-6 submarine-launched missiles with multiple warheads and have tested also the SS-N-8 at ranges in excess of 4500 miles (considerably more than the Poseidon range and in the class of our future TRIDENT I missile, still far from flight testing). A 4500-mile Soviet missile could reach any U.S. target when launched from a submarine still in or near the ports of Murmansk and Petropavlovsk. Clearly, the imbalance of the Interim Agreement is becoming greater at sea as well as on land. The Soviet submarines provide a force which the Soviets could readily hold in reserve to deter any response we might consider in the event of an attack on our military forces. And our problems of locating and observing submarines will be increasingly complicated by the existence of nuclear submarines in the hands of other nations.

In the air, the Soviets are deploying a supersonic medium bomber, the BACKFIRE, which they could adapt to strategic missions and deploy in much greater numbers. These bombers are not included in the Vladivostok Summit guidelines, and strategic bombers are not yet included in any SALT agreement. Pending such an agreement, and in view of the Soviet superiority in missiles permitted under the present Interim Agreement, we should not permit them to overtake us in bombers.

The B-1 bomber, the projected replacement for the aging B-52, is designed, among other things, to have a greater capacity to survive a Soviet SLBM attack. It would play an important role in diversifying our strategic forces, greatly complicating any Soviet plans for attaining first strike capability, and improving our ability to achieve a resilient and flexible deterrent force. It would force the Soviets to continue to maintain their expensive air defenses. Pending an agreement that equitably and verifiably limits bombers, the B-1 is indispensible to help maintain the balance of strategic forces through the eighties. Research and development for the B-1 should not be further delayed.

While the Soviets build toward superiority in strategic forces, spending annually about twice as much on them as we do, we have unilaterally frozen the level of our strategic forces. Moreover, we have denied ourselves qualitative improvements that are within reach and are needed to implement our developing strategic doctrine. Our strategic budget has been declining, both in constant dollars and as a percent of the total defense budget. We must be willing to spend enough to keep up the momentum of the B-1 and TRIDENT programs until equitable and verifiable SALT agreements are reached. We need to accelerate research and development for

increased missile accuracy, so that our missiles -- small targets -- can acquire the capability of destroying hard targets. This is essential if we are to continue to be able to counterattack selected military targets -- a necessity under the new strategic doctrine. We should also step up research and development on larger and more versatile missiles, as permitted under the Interim Agreement. These are needed to match the strong Soviet missile development program. Research and development must go forward on both ABM and ways of penetrating ABM, and must be stepped up to find ways of protecting our vulnerable satellites. We should devote much more effort to development of the NARWAHL, a new strategic submarine that is potentially much cheaper, albeit smaller and of lower performance, than the TRIDENT. (The NARWAHL currently receives only $16 million for design studies.) We urge as well the careful study of more radical solutions, such as the important proposal that we place more emphasis on ballistic missile submarines as our principal deterrent. Obviously, we cannot and should not stop doing research on successor systems. If the SALT talks fail to produce fair agreements, we shall need them.

All of these steps, and probably others, will be needed if, in the face of the Soviet capabilities, we are to insure, as we say we will, that no American President should ever have to choose between capitulating to threats to vital American interests or destroying the Soviet -- and American -- people. The steps proposed above are modest by comparison to the massive Soviet effort to win strategic superiority. They go substantially beyond the proposals of President Ford and Secretary Schlesinger which, in our judgment, are insufficient for dealing with the threats posed by Soviet advances in strategic weaponry.

Unfortunately, the Vladivostok understanding reached last year between President Ford and Secretary Brezhnev offers no promise of lessening the burden of strategic defense. On the contrary, it could well accelerate the arms race and further complicate the negotiating problem of maintaining second strike capability. It provides a poor and unproductive basis for further negotiations, precisely because it represents a wrong and unnecessary concession to Soviet demands for higher levels of strategic arms, rather than requiring much needed arms cut-backs on both sides.

By allowing each side 2400 strategic vehicles, regardless of size, the Vladivostok Agreement freezes the great missile throw-weight advantage of the Soviets. Thus it gives the illusion but not the substance of equality. If the final agreement attempts to ameliorate this by permitting the replacement of missiles and silos with larger ones, it will invite an arms race of unprecedented, and world-threatening proportions. Moreover, the limit of 1320 for the number of missiles that may be "MIRVed" will further spur an arms race, given the Soviet throw-weight advantage and their catch-up in MIRV technology.

These high numbers of MIRVed missiles will also present especially difficult verification problems. It is particularly unsettling that they carry a real threat of a first-strike capability against fixed ICBMs -- a capability that would not necessarily be reached at the same time by each country. The Soviet advantage in throw-weights and yields might well offset the eroding U.S. lead in MIRV and accuracy technology, so that the Soviets might reach a high fixed-ICBM kill capability first.

In short, the Vladivostok formula could well spur, not cap, the arms race, and its codification in a treaty or ten-year interim agreement would make subsequent arms reduction agreements less, not more, likely.

While SALT and the MBFR negotiations continue, and Congress reviews the Ford-Brezhnev guidelines, we must take the hard and costly measures to insure that, should they fail, we will be adequately prepared to meet the mounting military threats to ourselves and our allies. Action of this kind can only encourage the success of these negotiations.

The Secretary of State has asked rhetorically, "What in the name of God is superiority? What do you do with it? How do you use it?" The Soviets can answer this question. They are squeezing their economy and their people for the sake of military superiority because they are convinced that it has meaning today. It offers them the credible possibility of being able to make or to threaten selected strategic attacks against our military and our allies. Even more important in their eyes, it provides them with a great psychological and political advantage in the coercive diplomacy of blackmail they have practiced for more than thirty years, and continue to practice unabated, despite their indulgence in the political rhetoric of "detente". We should not rest peace and liberty on the possibility that Mr. Kissinger -- talented as he is -- can talk the Soviet leaders out of their convictions, or out of acting on them in a disastrous experiment to discover whether or not they are valid.

IV

Conventional Forces

While the problems of nuclear balance are difficult, maintaining an adequate U.S. military potential in the non-nuclear field is our greatest immediate challange. Thus far, nuclear stalemate has given the Soviets the opportunity to inspire conventional wars and proxy wars -- an opportunity which has become nearly a license with the decline since Korea of the will of the Western allies to insist on the enforcement of the United Nations Charter. The policy of deterrence must apply at the conventional as well as the nuclear level. The experiences of the Arab-Israeli war of October, 1973, and subsequent hostilities, and the prospects that conventional war may again break out in the Middle East, in Europe, or in Asia -- all should cause us grave concern about the adequacy and morale of our general purpose forces.

The Soviets provided their Arab allies with vast quantities of highly sophisticated conventional equipment before the Yom Kippur war. These included effective anti-tank and SAM anti-aircraft missiles, new model tanks and other armored vehicles, and SCUD ground-to-ground missiles. Much of this equipment remains in Arab hands, and the Soviets have massively re-armed the Syrians during the past year -- bringing the quantity and quality of Syrian arms well above the levels of 1973. It is widely predicted that Soviet-Egyptian rapport -- if it was ever really frayed -- will soon revive, and that the vast Soviet arsenal will again pour out conventional weapons, parts and ammunition for the Egyptian armies, which have in any event received some Soviet supplies throughout the period since October, 1973.

We cannot provide our Israeli allies with the arms to counteract this Soviet supply without either denuding our forces in Europe and at home or substantially increasing our manufacture of conventional arms. Our predicament is not caused only by the Middle East conflict. Both military and political trends are undercutting our capacity to defend Europe. Without new efforts by the U.S. and its NATO allies, NATO forces may deteriorate before long into a mere skirmish line -- a "military museum," as General Steinhoff remarked -- in comparison with the Warsaw pact armies, which are mounting an ominous potential for a blitzkrieg attack across Germany to the English Channel.

Security plans in relation to the Soviet Union necessarily depend on capabilities, not on misty and uncertain estimates of intention. Whether such an attack ever occurs will depend in large part not only on political and strategic developments throughout the world, but on NATO's steady capacity to resist. What can be said now, with certainty, is that the Soviet posture with respect to Europe goes far beyond the conceivable limits of "defense".

A comparison of American and Soviet conventional military potential is a somber exercise. The Soviet Union has half-again as many men under arms as the United States: 3.4 million to 2.2 million. Some military analysts believe the ratio is more like two-to-one, if one allows for the large numbers of paramilitary personnel in border guard, internal security and other units not officially included in the Soviet armed forces, and the high ratio of support to combat troops in all American formations. Direct comparisons are here even more difficult than in the strategic case, and there are great uncertainties about equipment, logistics,

training, and readiness. But we know that the Soviet and Warsaw pact armies are heavily equipped with tanks and artillery. The Soviet Union alone is estimated to have four times as many tanks as the United States (and five times the annual production rate, even after the projected U.S. step-up in 1975), three times as many artillery tubes and twice as many heavy mortars. While total numbers of Soviet tactical aircraft exceed those of the U.S. by about 40 percent, they are believed to be producing such aircraft at double the U.S. rate. And their air defenses are not only far greater in their home (strategic) deployment but also in mobile or transportable systems (both missiles and artillery).

At sea, the Soviets have moved rapidly from a coastal defense to a "blue water" navy, with almost as many surface combat ships as the United States, and over three times as many submarines (other than ballistic missile submarines). Here again, their building programs are far, far greater than our own. Their surface ships tend to be smaller, but emphasize speed and intense firepower, and they have been dramatically increasing their at-sea activity rates. They are ahead of the U.S. in surface-to-surface antiship missiles, and have nuclear antiship missiles, which we do not. In a direct conflict, these weapons could take a heavy toll of our fleet at the outset. The Soviets are behind us in endurance and in their ability to resupply their navy while it is under way. In aircraft carriers, with fifteen in service, the U.S. still enjoys a virtual monopoly, but the Soviets now have a program under way which has already produced one carrier and soon will produce another. They possess a formidable attack submarine fleet, although the U.S. currently has far greater antisubmarine resources and capabilities.

Clearly, our conventional military resources are in many important respects inferior to those of our principal potential adversary. And our programs for revitalizing and restoring these resources are so modest that we are falling further and further behind, rather than catching up. Are we, then, maintaining a prudent deterrent against aggression? Are we taking undue risks? Can we handle likely contingencies?

Let us ask these questions first about the defense of Western Europe itself. Obviously, the strategic position of the United States would change profoundly -- and nearly fatally -- if Western Europe should come under Soviet control. The Warsaw Pact and NATO have substantially equal manpower -- roughly 900,000 troops -- in central Europe, a front of primary concern. But the Pact has almost twice as many divisions and a much higher "teeth-to-tail" ratio -- more tanks and firepower, less logistical support. The Soviet forces and doctrine appear to be designed for massed attack on a narrow front -- blitzkrieg "shock" tactics against a sector of the NATO defenses, which are thinly spread over the whole front. They aim at quick breakthrough and a short war. The NATO forces are geared to a long-sustained defensive effort, with some quick reinforcements airlifted from the U.S., but the bulk coming by sealift. (This would require first the winning of a protracted battle for the Atlantic sealanes, against the growing Soviet submarine and surface fleet.) Political and moral strictures preclude an offensive military strategy on our part, a limitation that offers the Soviets some important advantages. The air forces at the front are roughly equal, but if the Soviets achieve surprise and knock out many airfields at the outset, NATO might have great difficulty in providing an adequate air defense. We have one program underway to redress

this risk: building concrete aircraft shelters, which the Soviets did in response to lessons of the Six-Day War in 1967, and which NATO should have done much more quickly.

There are, of course, claims that NATO could mount an impressive defense. To us, such claims appear dubious. Prudence dictates much more vigorous action to correct the deficiences both of hardware and of strategic doctrine. There is considerable feeling, particularly in Europe, that the risks are not great: that the Soviets are inhibited by fear of a second front in the East; by the "nuclear umbrella"; by their interest in winning control of an intact European industrial base by political means; by the unreliability of their satellites in Eastern Europe; and so on. But the Soviets are steadily building up their forces facing Europe. They have shown no real interest in negotiating MBFR -- Mutual Balanced Force Reductions -- and they keep up the pressures on Europe in many ways. They have suppressed dissension within the Warsaw Pact. And they continue to pursue their Middle Eastern policy, which, as we have remarked, has always been directed not against Israel alone, but first and primarily against Europe and NATO. Indeed, the Chinese now say that the United States has successfully deterred a Soviet attack on China, and that the threat of a Soviet attack in Western Europe is great, and is growing.

Today, the Europeans must look to American tactical nuclear weapons to deter a conventional Soviet attack. We currently have seven thousand tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, but we must remember that the Soviets have 3500 nuclear weapons of their own. Theirs are believed to be larger than ours, on the average. If NATO's conventional defenses

did not contain a Soviet attack, the Soviets would be able to overrun at least a portion of the American weapons. NATO field commanders might not get the Presidential release to use them in time. The Soviets would have the initiative, which could well prove decisive: they might, for example, start with a nuclear attack on our nuclear weapons, airfields, and other military installations. American "victory" then, if achievable at all, would at best save a devastated Europe.

Yet we cannot unilaterally withdraw the tactical nuclear weapons from Europe, and leave the Europeans feeling completely vulnerable to the Soviets, lacking the assurance these weapons provide of our seriousness about European defense. Nor is there any present prospect for a verifiable bilateral withdrawal of Soviet and U.S. tactical nuclear arms from Europe. The only realistic option is to redress and maintain a genuine balance of conventional forces in the European theatre. Nor can we look at Europe in isolation. The great risk is not of an "out-of-the-blue" Soviet attack on Europe, but rather that the Soviets might attack Europe during a deep crisis involving conflict in the Mideast or elsewhere. When there is no deep crisis, there are always less risky ways for the Soviets to attempt to obtain their objectives; it is when we are engaged elsewhere, or when they are frustrated and under pressure, perhaps both internally and abroad, that attack may appear to be the only way to secure their interests, and the risks may look acceptable, or at least unavoidable.

This brings up the question of what depth of conventional force levels we should seek to maintain. During most of the sixties, it was assumed by policymakers that major wars were conceivable, and not wholly improbable, in both Europe and the Far East, and lesser contingencies were possible virtually everywhere else. In planning jargon, the General Purpose

Forces were to be adequate for "two and one-half wars." Since China's rapprochement with us, our planners have shifted from a "two and one-half war" strategy to a "one and one-half war" strategy. While there is some justification for this shift -- the Soviets may well fear a two-front war involving both NATO and the Chinese -- we should guard against the facile assumption that China has become a reliable ally. She is still a potentially dangerous totalitarian state, subject to the drastic shifts in policy which characterize the goverments of narrow elites. The Soviets are surely making great efforts to reverse the American orientation of Mao's policy, and will intensify these efforts when he dies. Therefore we must carefully scrutinize the adequacy of our deterrent (and readiness) for the "one and one-half war" contingency, and the adequacy of the concept itself.

But one need not make a final judgment on such complex problems of strategy to realize that our conventional forces are at present spread very thin. The Secretary of Defense has said that we faced an empirical test of our conventional preparedness in the Middle East conflict of October, 1973, and that we met the test "smartly and efficiently." Our impressions are less sanguine. We seriously depleted our stocks of modern weapons in Germany to supply the Israelis; our airlift depended on a single staging base in the Azores, which Portugal may now deny us; and the only credible deterrent we could pose to the prospect that Soviet troops would intervene on behalf of the Arabs was our worldwide nuclear alert. This, remember, was only "one-half" of a war, not "one-and-a half" wars. To say that our performance does not inspire confidence is to be generous indeed.

It is apparent that we and our allies must increase our conventional defense capabilities in order to counter the rising pressure of Soviet policy, felt in many areas of the world vital to our security. Soviet general purposes forces are increasing steadily in strength and mobility, backed by formidable sea power and air-lift capacity. The Soviets continue to arm and supply client states, and to foment proxy wars which have proved extremely difficult to contain. We need to increase our research and development on antitank, antiaircraft, and antiship weapons; on battlefield surveillance and targetting capabilities, especially for night and bad weather conditions; and on more flexible and rapid command control capabilities. We need to build up our stocks of vehicles, weapons, and ammunition, both for deterrence, and to make certain that our War Material Reserve will not be dangerously depleted by crisis requirements like the October, 1973, airlift and sealift which helped save Israel. We need to build and arm ships to revitalize our dwindling Navy before it can be successfully challenged by the growing power of the Soviet fleet. We need to increase our capabilities for both tactical and strategic mobility and air resupply. Above all, we need larger well-trained mobile ready forces.

None of these needs is met by the programs recently proposed by the Ford Administration.

These conventional requirements, plus the strategic needs we have already noted, could cost eight to ten billion dollars in the Fiscal Year 1976, at present prices, beyond the amounts requested by the Ford Administration. Exactly how much more these additional capabilities would cost will depend not only on the calculations of experts, but on how much could be saved by potential economies in other parts of the budget. The

struggle to eliminate waste in the defense budget is and should always be a prime concern of good management. Of course we favor such efforts. Our thesis here simply is that the needs must be met, at the lowest possible overall cost.

The Ford Administration has proposed an $8 billion increase in defense spending for the Fiscal Year 1976: -- less than a 10% increase in a year in which it forecasts a 10% increase in the price of defense goods and services. In short, the Administration proposes what could be a static or constant level of defense effort on the most optimistic possible assumptions -- if everything proceeds according to plan, and prices do not rise more than 10%.

This is simply not good enough as the framework for an adequate defense program. We cannot afford to fall behind in efforts essential to the stability of the balance of power, and therefore to the safety of the nation.

Current defense spending takes the lowest proportion of our current output, the lowest percentage of our GNP, since the days before Korea. Even more significant, we have over eight percent unemployment, and vast unused plant capacity. If we should spend an additional $10 billion for defense -- two-thirds of one percent of our current GNP -- we would still have ample unused resources which could be devoted to producing additional output for new social programs, and to stimulate private capital formation and consumption through tax cuts. In the present state of the economy we do not face a "guns or butter" choice. If it is well-managed, the American economy can provide the defense we need and much more "butter" as well -- more education, medical research, pollution control, new energy capacities, and more of the other things we urgently need.

Of course, as a matter of principle, defense efforts should never be based on what we can "afford." They are not luxuries, optional programs to be dropped in times of difficulty. We can never afford not to do what has to be done to assure the safety of our people, our national interests, and our democratic institutions.

Conclusion

In our Statement last July on "The Quest for Detente," we commented that "the Soviet Union does not even pretend that it is carrying out its obligations under the Indochina accords of 1973." The significance of that judgment, which the Administration did not challence in its response to our statement, is now more obvious than it was eight months ago, with the bleak news of intense combat in South Vietnam and Cambodia.

The news is bleak also in the other main theatre of active conflict, the Middle East. The Soviets continue to arm the Arab states for offensive war, and to support the Palestinian terrorist and political groups which are desperately seeking to prevent a political settlement between Israel and her neighbors.

When John F. Kennedy was a student in London, during the middle 'thirties, he wrote a book, "While England Slept." We and our allies are in a mood of somnabulism similar to that which paralyzed France, Britain, and the United States during that strange period. If we and our allies had been able to wake up then, World War II, and all that flowed from it, could easily have been prevented. We and our allies have the capacity to prevent an even more terrible war today. To do so requires us to face the world as it is, and to act calmly, responsibly, and effectively in order to protect our interests in its evolution.

Some contend that we cannot afford a larger defense budget, and that the present budget is full of fat, luxury, and expenditure for obsolete weapons. We have been careful here not to propose specific figures for the cost of the programs recommended in this statement, beyond indicating the order of magnitude they imply. Perhaps all that the Secretary of Defense wishes to do, and all that we propose to add to his program, can be obtained for less than the budget he has proposed. We are sure that there are economies that can be discoverd. And we support research and modernization that might reduce the vast cost of the defense establishment.

But long experience has made us skeptical of easy promises to eliminate spending "fat", worthy as that goal is. The effort should continue to be made, of course. Our thesis is simply that our strength should be enhanced, through the programs suggested here, at the lowest possible cost.

We are also convinced that we can afford both the programs essential to our defense, and those essential to our domestic well-being, if we adopt sound policies for ending the recession and reviving economic growth, and if scarce resources, such as energy, are widely used. A progressive economic policy should make it possible for us to do whatever the national defense requires, in an economic environment which restores both full employment and price stability.

We shall not pursue these issues in this paper. (They are thoroughly discussed in the Statement of the Economic Policy Task Force of CDM which was recently issued.) We have prepared this document on the assumption, which we believe to be absolutely sound, that Americans will

spend, and do, whatever is needed to assure the safety and prosperity of the nation. The problems we have sought to address are the kind of international challenges the nation faces, and the kind of defense program the national safety requires to deal with them.

Our answer is sober, but not pessimistic. We believe that we must stop drifting, and stop distracting ourselves with sentimental, guilty, or foolhardy excuses for neglecting our responsibility to provide for the common defense. That responsibility is shared by every official of the Executive branch, every member of Congress, and every citizen. We appeal to them all, from the President and the Secretary of State to the proverbial man and woman on the street, to look at the evidence directly and soberly. We face choices like those the nation faced in the heroic administration of Harry Truman, whose achievements are generally applauded today.

The nation -- and the world -- owe an immense debt of gratitude to the two generations of leaders of both parties who confronted, and met, the troubles of their times. The nation must come together once again, to deal with the challenges now before us.

The will of the people cannot be mobilized unless the President and the Secretary of State address these issues with words and deeds adequate to their gravity. Nor can a broad and bipartican concensus emerge unless the Democratic Party faces the facts with equal discipline and equal responsibility.

The United States should be the master, not the victim, of its fate. The dangers before us demand a great and concerted national effort --

a sharp and dramatic turn in the direction of policy. That turn will require earnest political debate. But it will require something more -- a resolve to undertake that discussion and debate.

Thus far, that resolve has been the missing factor in the politics of national defense. It is the key factor. We appeal for its revival -- a revival of will and of responsibility.

The nation can no longer afford the luxury of political evasion and party politics on the life-and-death issues of foreign policy and national defense.

# # #