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BROUGHT FORWARD

EXECUTIVE

FD3-2/CO55

12/8/75

Previously filed

Date

Name Carl Albert *

Organization For The President
re: Economic and Military

Assistance to Greece
FY 76

EXECUTIVE

FD3-2/CO55

12/12/75

New File Symbol

Date

Final Action Carl Albert *

for Mal Friedersdorf
re: ^{same} correction on str 7/12/8

* Sen. John McClellan
" John Sparkman



BROUGHT FORWARD

EXECUTIVE

F03-2/C055

12/9/75

Previously filed

Date

Name

Carl Albert

Organization

to The President

re: Economic and Military

Assistance to Greece

EXECUTIVE

F03-2/C055

12/12/75

New File Symbol

Date

FY 76

Final Action

Carl Albert *

Am. Maj. Friedersdorf

re: same and correction

on letter of 12/8

* Sen. John McClellan

" John Sparkman

BJ

EXECUTIVE
FO3-2 / CO 55
HE5-1
CO 56
ND18 / CO 40
FG 31
RS
FG 34
FG 6-11-11 Buchen
Philip



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 5, 1975

Dear Mr. Speaker:

Pursuant to Sections 2 (b)(2) and 2 (c)(2) of P. L. 94-104, the President shall on Monday, December 8, 1975, formally transmit reports to you dealing with the following subjects:

- (1) the needs of Greece for economic and military assistance: *filed same 12/8*
- (2) discussions with the Government of Turkey concerning means of preventing the diversion of opium poppy into illicit channels; and *filed EX: HE5-1 12/8*
- (3) progress made during the last sixty days toward the conclusion of a negotiated solution of the Cyprus conflict. *filed EX: ND18 / CO 40 12/8*

Under the terms of the statute, these reports are due today. However given the President's absence from the country, the formal transmittal, a non-delegable function, will be delayed until his return. In the interim, I am providing you with advance copies of these documents which have received his personal approval.

Sincerely,

Philip W. Buchen

Philip W. Buchen
Counsel to the President

The Honorable Carl Albert
The Speaker
U. S. House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515

Enclosures

EXECUTIVE

FO3-2/CO55

CO55

HE5-1

CO156

FG36-3

FG36-10

RS

FG31

FG6-11-1/Buchen

Philip

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 5, 1975



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- (1) the needs of Greece for economic and military assistance; and
- (2) discussions with the Government of Turkey concerning means of preventing the diversion of opium poppy into illicit channels.

filed: EX:
FO3-2/CO55
12/8

filed: EX:
HE5-1
12/8

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Sincerely,

Philip W. Buchen
Counsel to the President

The Honorable John L. McClellan
Chairman
Appropriations Committee
United States Senate
Washington, D. C.

Enclosures

BPH

EXECUTIVE

FD3-2/CO55
FG36-10
FG36-3
FG34

December 12, 1975



Dear Mr. Speaker: *Carl Albert*

In keeping with the provisions of P.L. 94-104, the President wrote you on December 8 concerning assistance for Greece. The figure in line 10, page 2, of that letter regarding FMS credits requested for Greece in FY 1976, \$90 million, is in error and should be changed to \$110 million. The amount of \$110 million is the figure contained in the recommended security assistance program for FY 1976 submitted by the President to the Congress on October 30. The President has asked me respectfully to request that his letter of December 8 to you concerning assistance for Greece be changed accordingly.

Sincerely,

Max L. Friedersdorf
Assistant to the President

*McClellan, John L.
Sparkman, John*

The Honorable
The Speaker
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

bcc: NSC Log #8113 - FYI
bcc: Bob Linder

MLF:NSC:kir

December 12, 1975

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In keeping with the provisions of P.L. 94-104, the President wrote you on December 8 concerning assistance for Greece. The figure in line 10, page 2, of that letter regarding FMS credits requested for Greece in FY 1976, \$90 million, is in error and should be changed to \$110 million. The amount of \$110 million is the figure contained in the recommended security assistance program for FY 1976 submitted by the President to the Congress on October 30. The President has asked me respectfully to request that his letter of December 8 to you concerning assistance for Greece be changed accordingly.

Sincerely,

Max L. Friedersdorf
Assistant to the President



The Honorable John Sparkman
Chairman
Committee of Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

J
cc: NSC Log #8113 - FYI
cc: Bob Linder

MLF:NSC:kir

RECEIVED

DEC 15 1975

CENTRAL FILES

December 12, 1975

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Sincerely,

Max L. Friedersdorf
Assistant to the President



The Honorable John L. McClellan
Chairman
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

✓ bcc: NSC Log #8113 - FYI
✓ bcc: Bob Linder

MLF:NSC:kir

Hand delivered 12/12 p. m.

V. Olson

13 May



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON


8113

December 11, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR MAX FRIEDERSDORF

FROM: Brent Scowcroft *Brent Scowcroft*

SUBJECT: Presidential Report to Congress
on Assistance to Greece



We have discovered an error in the President's December 8 letter report to the Speaker and Chairmen of the Senate Foreign Relations and Appropriations Committees concerning assistance for Greece (copy at Tab B). Specifically, the figure on line 10, page 2, of that letter regarding FMS credits requested for Greece in FY 1976, \$90 million, is incorrect and should be changed to \$110 million. The \$110 million amount is the figure contained in the recommended security assistance program submitted by the President to the Congress on October 30.


At Tab A for your signature to the Speaker and the appropriate committee chairmen is a proposed letter outlining the problem and requesting, in the President's name, that the error be corrected.


Robert Linder concurs.

O.K. - may



1974





Dear Mr. Speaker (of the House):

Dear Mr. Chairman (of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee):

Dear Mr. Chairman (of the Senate Appropriations Committee):



Pursuant to Section 2(b) (2) of P.L. 94-104, I am pleased to submit to the Congress my recommendations for economic and military assistance to Greece for fiscal year 1976.

The bonds between the United States and Greece have historically been close and deep. Both countries were linked together as allies in World War II. They later cooperated in defeating the communist guerrilla movement in Greece in the late 1940's. Subsequently, Greece sent a military force to Korea to assist the United Nations' effort against the communist aggression. In 1952, Greece joined NATO. The bonds between our two nations are not only political, but ethical and cultural as well. The peoples of Greece and the United States cherish a common heritage and a common belief in freedom and human dignity.

My Administration has worked with the new Greek Government in this spirit of friendship and alliance to identify areas in which we might be of assistance and, thereby, advance our common interests. Following consultations with the Greek Government, we began consideration of a program aimed at assisting Greece economically. We supported increased financial assistance for Greece at the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. For fiscal year 1975, we also raised the level of military credit assistance to Greece from \$71 million to \$86 million. In addition, to increase the amount of Export-Import Bank lending to Greece, the Bank Chairman visited Athens last spring to discuss with Greek businessmen and officials ways in which Greece could take better advantage of the Bank's programs. This visit was followed by a further Export-Import Bank mission in November.

The Greek Government itself has moved vigorously to confront its most serious problems. It has dramatically reduced the level of inflation. It has reversed the decline in its Gross National Product. In addition, it has moved to restore public confidence in the military establishment as a non-political force capable of defending Greece's security interests.

At the same time, the government in Athens has made clear to this Administration its need for increased levels of assistance for the current fiscal year. Based on that request and in keeping with the spirit of Congressional debate preceding passage of P.L. 94-104, I

sent an expert team to Athens from the Department of State and the Agency for International Development in October to consult with senior Greek officials on that Nation's most urgent needs for economic and military assistance.

The team of experts concluded that Greece, faced with continued domestic economic difficulties and a need to modernize its military establishment, merited increased U.S. support for fiscal year 1976. Based on Greek requests and the findings of our own experts, I submitted to the Congress on October 30, 1975, a request for fiscal year 1976 for \$50 million in grant military aid, \$90 million in FMS credit and \$65 million as a supporting assistance loan. This latter loan is designed specifically to ease Greece's temporary balance of payment difficulties.

This package of assistance is justified on three grounds. First, it will help strengthen the foundation of representative democracy in Greece. Second, it will demonstrate our interest in modernizing and improving the Greek armed forces, and will be consistent with our stated desire that Greece return at an early date to a full participation within the NATO Alliance. Finally, it will assist the Greek Government and the Greek people in a moment of critical economic need.

Based on my review of Greece's need as well as our overall budgetary situation, I have concluded that my proposals of October 30 are appropriate for this fiscal year. I strongly urge the Congress to give them early and favorable consideration.

Sincerely,



The Honorable
The Speaker
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515

The Honorable John Sparkman
Chairman
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510

The Honorable John L. McClellan
Chairman
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510

PROPOSED LETTER

Dear Mr. Speaker (of the House):

Dear Mr. Chairman (of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee):

Dear Mr. Chairman (of the Senate Appropriations Committee):

In keeping with the provisions of P. L. 94-104, the President wrote you on December 8 concerning assistance for Greece. The figure in line 10, page 2, of that letter regarding FMS credits requested for Greece in FY 1976, \$90 million, is in error and should be changed to \$110 million. The amount of \$110 million is the figure contained in the recommended security assistance program for FY 1976 submitted by the President to the Congress on October 30. The President has asked me respectfully to request that his letter of December 8 to you concerning assistance for Greece be changed accordingly.

Sincerely,

Max L. Friedersdorf



The Honorable
The Speaker
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515

The Honorable John Sparkman
Chairman
Committee of Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510

The Honorable John L. McClellan
Chairman
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510

MLF: NSC:

NSC Log # 8113 FYC
Bob Linder

8113

December 12, 1975

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In keeping with the provisions of P.L. 94-104, the President wrote you on December 8 concerning assistance for Greece. The figure in line 10, page 2, of that letter regarding FMS credits requested for Greece in FY 1976, \$90 million, is in error and should be changed to \$110 million. The amount of \$110 million is the figure contained in the recommended security assistance program for FY 1976 submitted by the President to the Congress on October 30. The President has asked me respectfully to request that his letter of December 8 to you concerning assistance for Greece be changed accordingly.

Sincerely,

Max L. Friedersdorf
Assistant to the President



The Honorable John Sparkman
Chairman
Committee of Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

cc: NSC Log #8113 - FYI
cc: Bob Linder

MLF:NSC:kir

MICROFILM	DATA
DO	DATE
DEC 16 1975	DATE
ORIG) NSC	
TO) PAF	
WEC	X
SUBF	

DEC 17 1975
CENTRAL FILES

MEMORANDUM


NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

8113


URGENT ACTION
December 9, 1975

W/H
F#
4/10/75
OK

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: Mr. Clift  O/K

SUBJECT: Presidential Report to Congress
on Assistance to Greece



We have discovered an error in the President's December 8 letter report to the Speaker and Chairmen of the Senate Foreign Relations and Appropriations Committees concerning assistance to Greece (copy at Tab B). Specifically, the figure on line 10, page 2, of that letter regarding FMS credits requested for Greece in FY 1976, \$90 million, is incorrect and should be changed to \$110 million. The \$110 million amount is the figure contained in the recommended security assistance program submitted by the President to the Congress on October 30. The erroneous \$90 million figure was submitted in the State drafts of the President's report. In our subsequent staffing the error was not detected.

The memorandum for your signature to Max Friedersdorf at Tab I would outline the problem and provide a proposed letter to the Speaker and appropriate committee chairmen correcting the error.

Clint  ranger concurs, as does Les  Janka who has obtained clearances from both Robert Linder and Max Friedersdorf.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum for Max Friedersdorf at Tab I.

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC		RECD		LOG NBR		INITIAL ACTION O	
MO	DA	MO	DA	HR			
12	9	12	9	15	750811	3	

Clift

TO: PRES _____ FROM: KISSINGER, H _____ S/S _____ REFERENCE: _____ CIRCLE AS APPROPRIATE
 KISSINGER _____ COLBY, W _____ OTHER _____ UNCLAS LOG IN/OUT
 SCOWCROFT F _____ SCHLESINGER, J _____ C EYES ONLY EXDIS
 DAVIS _____ ST EX SEC _____ S CODEWORD
 TS SENSITIVE

SUBJECT: *Residential Report to Congress on Assistance to Greece*

SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION			REC CY FOR	ACTION REQUIRED
	ACTION	INFO.		
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT				MEMO FOR HAK ()
STAFF SECRETARY				MEMO FOR PRES ()
FAR EAST				REPLY FOR ()
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA				APPROPRIATE ACTION ()
MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA				MEMO TO ()
EUROPE / CANADA			X	RECOMMENDATIONS ()
LATIN AMERICA				JOINT MEMO ()
UNITED NATIONS				REFER TO FOR: ()
ECONOMIC				ANY ACTION NECESSARY? ()
SCIENTIFIC				CONCURRENCE ()
PROGRAM ANALYSIS				DUE DATE:
NSC PLANNING			X	COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)
CONGRESSIONAL			X	
OCEANS POLICY				
INTELLIGENCE				



SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS

DATE	FROM	TO	S	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	CY TO
12/9		Scowcroft	X	Sp memo to Friedberg (12-16) &	
12/11		USC/C		Scowcroft sp memo to Friedberg	

DJDab 12/11

NSC/S DISP INSTR

DISPATCH _____
 CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS: _____
 NOTIFY _____ & DATE _____ BY _____
 SPECIAL DISPOSITION: _____
 CROSS REF W/ ~~7507944~~ 7507944
 SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: _____ FOLDER: _____

MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS:
 M/F'D _____ BY _____
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 OPEN _____
 CLOSE _____

SA SF
 HP NS
 WH EP
 PA DY

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2/21

The Speaker's Rooms
U. S. House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515
December 9, 1975

MF

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.


Dear Mr. President:

This will acknowledge receipt of your letter of December 8, 1975 transmitting your recommendations for economic and military assistance to Greece for fiscal year 1976.

Sincerely,

Carl Albert
The Speaker

CA/pm



12/11

Mr. J. -

FYI and then on
to Central Files, pls.
Thanks.

KT



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 11, 1975

Bob Linder:

For appropriate handling.

V. Olson



B/S

EXECUTIVE
FO3-2/CO55
CO55
FG34
FG36-3
FG36-10

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
December 8, 1975

McClellan, John L.
Sparkman, John

Dear Mr. Speaker: *Carl Albert*

Pursuant to Section 2(b) (2) of P.L. 94-104, I am pleased to submit to the Congress my recommendations for economic and military assistance to Greece for fiscal year 1976.



The bonds between the United States and Greece have historically been close and deep. Both countries were linked together as allies in World War II. They later cooperated in defeating the communist guerrilla movement in Greece in the late 1940's. Subsequently, Greece sent a military force to Korea to assist the United Nations' effort against the communist aggression. In 1952, Greece joined NATO. The bonds between our two nations are not only political, but ethical and cultural as well. The peoples of Greece and the United States cherish a common heritage and a common belief in freedom and human dignity.

My Administration has worked with the new Greek Government in this spirit of friendship and alliance to identify areas in which we might be of assistance and, thereby, advance our common interests. Following consultations with the Greek Government, we began consideration of a program aimed at assisting Greece economically. We supported increased financial assistance for Greece at the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. For fiscal year 1975, we also raised the level of military credit assistance to Greece from \$71 million to \$86 million. In addition, to increase the amount of Export-Import Bank lending to Greece, the Bank Chairman visited Athens last spring to discuss with Greek businessmen and officials ways in which Greece could take better advantage of the Bank's programs. This visit was followed by a further Export-Import Bank mission in November.

The Greek Government itself has moved vigorously to confront its most serious problems. It has dramatically reduced the level of inflation. It has reversed the decline in its Gross National Product. In addition, it has moved to restore public confidence in the military establishment as a non-political force capable of defending Greece's security interests.

At the same time, the government in Athens has made clear to this Administration its need for increased levels of assistance for the current fiscal year. Based on that request and in keeping with the spirit of Congressional debate preceding passage of P.L. 94-104, I

Background material filed CF: FO3-2, 12/85

Delivered to speaker: 12/8/75 (2:45p)

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
sent an expert team to Athens from the Department of State and the Agency for International Development in October to consult with senior Greek officials on that Nation's most urgent needs for economic and military assistance.

The team of experts concluded that Greece, faced with continued domestic economic difficulties and a need to modernize its military establishment, merited increased U.S. support for fiscal year 1976. Based on Greek requests and the findings of our own experts, I submitted to the Congress on October 30, 1975, a request for fiscal year 1976 for \$50 million in grant military aid, \$90 million in FMS credit and \$65 million as a supporting assistance loan. This latter loan is designed specifically to ease Greece's temporary balance of payment difficulties.

This package of assistance is justified on three grounds. First, it will help strengthen the foundation of representative democracy in Greece. Second, it will demonstrate our interest in modernizing and improving the Greek armed forces, and will be consistent with our stated desire that Greece return at an early date to a full participation within the NATO Alliance. Finally, it will assist the Greek Government and the Greek people in a moment of critical economic need.

Based on my review of Greece's need as well as our overall budgetary situation, I have concluded that my proposals of October 30 are appropriate for this fiscal year. I strongly urge the Congress to give them early and favorable consideration.

Sincerely,



The Honorable
The Speaker
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515

1751



B

1974

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 8, 1975



Dear Mr. Chairman:

John Sparkman

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The bonds between the United States and Greece have historically been close and deep. Both countries were linked together as allies in World War II. They later cooperated in defeating the communist guerrilla movement in Greece in the late 1940's. Subsequently, Greece sent a military force to Korea to assist the United Nations' effort against the communist aggression. In 1952, Greece joined NATO. The bonds between our two nations are not only political, but ethical and cultural as well. The peoples of Greece and the United States cherish a common heritage and a common belief in freedom and human dignity.

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Delivered: 12/8/75 (4:56p)

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DM

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Sincerely,



The Honorable John Sparkman
Chairman
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 8, 1975

Dear Mr. Chairman:

John L. McClellan

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The bonds between the United States and Greece have historically been close and deep. Both countries were linked together as allies in World War II. They later cooperated in defeating the communist guerrilla movement in Greece in the late 1940's. Subsequently, Greece sent a military force to Korea to assist the United Nations' effort against the communist aggression. In 1952, Greece joined NATO. The bonds between our two nations are not only political, but ethical and cultural as well. The peoples of Greece and the United States cherish a common heritage and a common belief in freedom and human dignity.

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Delivered: 12/8/75 (5:00p)

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JDM


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Sincerely,



The Honorable John L. McClellan
Chairman
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510

A.



EXECUTIVE

FO3-2/CO156 DISE

FO3-2/CO55

(2)

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL FO9 5390

INFORMATION

September 27, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM G. HYLAND

FROM:

Mr. Clift



SUBJECT:

Fact Sheet -- US-Turkish and US-Greek
Defense Agreements



As requested, I have put together the brief summary at Tab A covering the US-Turkish and US-Greek DCAs.

RECEIVED

OCT 15 1976

CENTRAL FILES

5/21

February 19, 1976

EXECUTIVE
5P2-3-86
DI2/C058
C058
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TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:

On February 4th a devastating earthquake struck Guatemala. That earthquake, together with its after-shocks, has left over 22,000 dead, more than 75,000 injured, and one million homeless.



The United States has a special responsibility to help meet the urgent needs in Guatemala. Immediate aid has already been extended by U.S. agencies, both public and private, including:

- Emergency shelters, medical supplies and food provided by the Agency for International Development.
- Transportation and medical facilities provided by the Department of Defense.
- Food distribution, medical services, and other disaster relief activities provided by numerous private voluntary agencies.


Last week I dispatched my Special Coordinator for International Disaster Assistance -- AID Administrator Daniel Parker -- to Guatemala for a firsthand review of the situation. He has now reported to me and to Congressional Committees on the extent of damage and need. Both the Senate and the House of Representatives have passed resolutions expressing sympathy for the people of Guatemala in their hour of distress and urging development of a comprehensive U.S. response. The Secretary of State will visit the Republic of Guatemala on February 24 to express further our support for the people of Guatemala.

Delivered to Senate: 2/19/76 (2:30p)
Delivered to House: 2/19/76 (3:30p)

Handwritten scribbles

I am now proposing urgent and specific action to turn these expressions of sympathy into tangible assistance. The proposed \$25 million "Guatemala Disaster Relief Act of 1976" which I am sending herewith represents an immediate humanitarian response of the United States to the victims of this tragedy who have been injured or have lost their relatives, their homes and possessions, and in many cases their very means of existence.

This legislation, and the ensuing appropriation, will enable us to respond to the human tragedy in Guatemala. Our response will reflect America's concern for the people of Guatemala.



Gerald R. Ford

THE WHITE HOUSE,

FEB 19 1976

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

7/14/75

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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE 3522

EXECUTIVE

PAGE 01 STATE 165586

F03-2/C059
C059
F02/C059

70
ORIGIN AF-06

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SS-15 IO-10 AGR-05 AID-05 EB-07 COME-00
TRSE-00 CPR-01 NSC-05 PA-01 USIA-06 PRS-01 1063 R

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DRAFTED BY AF/W:MGWYGANT:MN
APPROVED BY AF/W:JKBISHOP
AF: JJBLAKE
S/S:PSHANKLE
FFP: JDURNAN (INFO)
AFR/CWR: DSHEAR (INFO)

HARROP, William C.

053549

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TO AMEMBASSY CONAKRY PRIORITY
INFO AMEMBASSY DAKAR



LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 165586

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: EAID, GV US

SUBJECT: LETTER FROM PRESIDENT FORD TO PRESIDENT TOURE

1. PLEASE DELIVER FOLLOWING LETTER DATED JULY 10 FROM PRESIDENT FORD TO PRESIDENT SEKOU TOURE. TEXT AS FOLLOWS:

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I HAVE READ WITH INTEREST YOUR LETTERS OF APRIL 21 AND MAY 10 DESCRIBING THE EFFORTS YOU AND YOUR COUNTRY ARE MAKING TO IMPROVE AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION. WE WISH YOU EVERY SUCCESS AS GUINEA STRIVES TO ACHIEVE SELF-SUFFICIENCY IN THE PRODUCTION OF FOOD.

WE ARE MINDFUL OF THE PRESENT FOOD SHORTAGES YOU ARE EXPERIENCING AND ARE PLEASED TO BE ABLE TO ASSIST YOU WHERE WE CAN. WE WILL CAREFULLY EXAMINE YOUR REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE UNDER THE 1976 FOOD FOR PEACE PROGRAM AND WILL

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JUL 22 1975

GENERAL FILES

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

49



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 02 STATE 165586

TRY TO BE AS RESPONSIVE AS POSSIBLE TO YOUR NEEDS.

THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT IS HONORED TO RECEIVE DELEGATIONS FROM GUINEA AS WE SEEK TO IMPROVE FURTHER THE FRIENDLY RELATIONS THAT EXIST BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. WE APPRECIATE THE KIND WORDS WITH WHICH MINISTER DRAME RECENTLY DESCRIBED OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS.

MAY I TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO COMMEND TO YOU OUR NEW AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUINEA, WILLIAM C. HARROP, WHO HAS JUST ARRIVED IN CONAKRY TO ASSUME HIS NEW DUTIES. MR. HARROP IS A DISTINGUISHED CAREER DIPLOMAT IN WHOM I PLACE THE HIGHEST PERSONAL CONFIDENCE. SINCERELY,
GERALD R. FORD.

2. ORIGINAL BEING POUCHED. DECLASSIFY UPON RECEIPT.
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EXECUTIVE

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

Aug. 11, 1976

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PAGE 01 STATE 198667

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ORIGIN AF-08

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CPR-01 NSC-05 PA-02 SS-15 USIA-15
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DRAFTED BY AF/W:DVKILLION:MN
APPROVED BY AF:WESCHAUFELÉ, JR.
AF/W:TWMSMITH
S/S: PSBRIDGES



081885

R 110135Z AUG 76
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY CONAKRY

UNCLAS STATE 198667

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: EAID, PPOR, GV

SUBJECT: PRESIDENT FORD'S LETTER OF AUGUST 6 TO GUINEAN
PRESIDENT SEKOU TOURE

REF: STATE 103437

1. EMBASSY REQUESTED TO DELIVER FOLLOWING LETTER FROM
PRESIDENT FORD TO PRESIDENT SEKOU TOURE AT EARLIEST
OPPORTUNITY. QUOTE. DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

WE VERY MUCH APPRECIATE YOUR LETTER EXTENDING WARM WISHES
FOR THE SUCCESS OF OUR BICENTENNIAL AND EXPRESSING THE
GRATITUDE OF THE PEOPLE OF GUINEA TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE
FOR UNITED STATES FOOD ASSISTANCE, WHICH WAS BROUGHT
TO WASHINGTON BY MINISTER DRAHE.

THE RECENT VISIT OF THE USS CAPODANNO TO CONAKRY AS A
PART OF OUR BICENTENNIAL ACTIVITIES PROVIDED A SPECIAL
OPPORTUNITY TO EMPHASIZE THE U.S. DESIRE TO IMPROVE OUR
MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL RELATIONS. SINCERELY, GERALD R. FORD.

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AUG 26 1976

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Department of State TELEGRAM

9/1/76

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PAGE 01 STATE 216704

41
ORIGIN AF-08

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SS-15 NSC-05 /029 R

DRAFTED BY AF/W:BSKIRKPATRICK:IW (TEXT RECEIVED FROM WH)
APPROVED BY AF:DBBOLEN
S/S: MR. BRIDGES (S/S 7618209)
AF:BTSMITH

EXECUTIVE

No 23-1
CO 59
FO 3-2/CO 59

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R 011558Z SEP 76
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY CONAKRY



LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 216704

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: EAID, PFOR, GV

SUBJECT: PRESIDENT FORD'S LETTER OF AUGUST 6 TO GUINEAN
PRESIDENT SEKOU TOURE.

REF: CONAKRY 1601, STATE 198667

1. DEPARTMENT CONCURS THAT LETTER IN STATE 198667 NOT RPT
NOT BE DELIVERED AS SUGGESTED IN CONAKRY 1601.

5. REQUEST EMBASSY SEND ORIGINAL TO DEPARTMENT AF/W TO
RETURN TO NSC FOR DESTRUCTION. ROBINSON

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Department of State TELEGRAM

9/1/76

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PAGE 01 STATE 216704

41
ORIGIN AF-08

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SS-15 NSC-05 /029 R

DRAFTED BY AF/W:BSKIRKPATRICK:IW (TEXT RECEIVED FROM WH)
APPROVED BY AF:DBBOLEN
S/S: MR. BRIDGES (S/S 7618209)
AF:BTMSMITH

EXECUTIVE

No 23-1
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FOI 2/059

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R 011558Z SEP 76
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY CONAKRY



LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 216704

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: EAID, PFOR, GY

SUBJECT: PRESIDENT FORD'S LETTER OF AUGUST 6 TO GUINEAN
PRESIDENT SEKOU TOURE.

REF: CONAKRY 1601, STATE 198667

1. DEPARTMENT CONCURS THAT LETTER IN STATE 198667 NOT RPT
NOT BE DELIVERED AS SUGGESTED IN CONAKRY 1601.

2. REQUEST EMBASSY SEND ORIGINAL TO DEPARTMENT AF/W TO
RETURN TO NSC FOR DESTRUCTION. ROBINSON

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EXECUTIVE

NSC 4574
DIL/CO62
FG11-4
PR 7-1
CO62
FO3-2/CO62

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Limited Official USE

MEETING WITH HERMAN KLEINE AND RUSSELL MCCLURE
AID DISASTER RELIEF OFFICIALS RETURNING FROM HONDURAS

Monday, October 7, 1974
9:55 A.M. (5 minutes)
The Oval Office

From: Henry A. Kissinger



I. PURPOSE

To receive the report of the AID mission which you sent to Honduras to survey the damage from Hurricane Fifi.

II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS & PRESS ARRANGEMENTS

A. Background: The two AID officials returned Wednesday from Honduras, to which you had sent them to survey the damage caused by Hurricane Fifi. The report which they will present you concludes that the devastation was great and the country's economic capacity severely set back as a result of the storm and subsequent flooding. A substantial portion of the banana trees, on which the country depends for its major export, have been destroyed and will take eighteen months to two years to replace. Damage estimates are \$500 million in a nation with an annual GNP of \$1 billion. U.S. emergency relief efforts were significant but are now phasing out, and AID is planning a \$5 million grant and \$10-15 million concessional loan rehabilitation program.

The meeting will give you an opportunity to receive the report of the AID survey team; demonstrate your personal interest in the humanitarian relief effort being made in Honduras following Hurricane Fifi; and pledge continued U.S. assistance.

B. Participants: Deputy AID Administrator John Murphy (AID Administrator Parker is ill and in Florida); Assistant Administrator Herman Kleine; Foreign Disaster Relief Coordinator Russell McClure; Secretary Kissinger.

C. Press Arrangements: Press photo session. Meeting to be announced.

EXECUTIVE

F03-2/C062
FG150

August 19, 1974

Dear Mr. Oswald:

The President asked me to reply to your letter of July 24, 1974, in which you transmitted a letter from Dr. Stephen Youngberg telling of his voluntary assistance project in Honduras and inquired about possible United States Government assistance to him.

As you are probably aware, the United States and Honduras are jointly involved in extensive development assistance programs through such U.S. agencies as the Peace Corps and the Agency for International Development (A. I. D.) and multilateral organizations such as the World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank. The aim of these programs is to assist Honduras with solutions to the kinds of problems mentioned in Dr. Youngberg's and your letters. You may wish to suggest to Dr. Youngberg that he inquire at the United States Embassy or the A. I. D. Mission in Tegucigalpa to see what possible sources of assistance there might be within Honduras with which he could work.

Sincerely,



Roland L. Elliott
Special Assistant
to the President

The Honorable Robert Oswald
Secretary
Interstate Commerce Commission
Washington, D. C.

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AUG 20 1974

CENTRAL FILES

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

August 16, 1974

TO: Mr. Roland Elliott

FROM: NSC/S

Bjm

The attached revised suggested reply
is sent to you for your appropriate
handling.

P.B.






DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

7414507

3469

August 15, 1974



MEMORANDUM FOR MAJOR GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Malnutrition and Food Assistance
in Honduras

Transmitted herein is a draft reply for signature by Mr. Ronald L. Elliott to Mr. Robert Oswald, Secretary of the Interstate Commerce Commission, concerning Dr. Stephen Youngberg's voluntary assistance project in Honduras. The reply suggests that Mr. Oswald have Dr. Youngberg contact the U.S. Embassy or the A.I.D. Mission in Honduras to explore possible sources of assistance for his project.

Samuel R. Gammon
Acting Executive Secretary

Attachments:

1. Suggested reply
2. Mr. Oswald's letter with enclosure

Yellow

THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

REFERRAL

To: The Secretary of State

Date: August 5, 1974

ACTION REQUESTED

- Draft reply for:
 - President's signature.
 - Undersigned's signature.
- Memorandum for use as enclosure to reply.
- Direct reply.
- Furnish information copy.
- Suitable acknowledgment or other appropriate handling.
- Furnish copy of reply, if any.
- For your information.
- For comment.


NOTE

Prompt action is essential.

If more than 72 hours' delay is encountered, please telephone the undersigned immediately, Code 1450.

Basic correspondence should be returned when draft reply, memorandum, or comment is requested.

REMARKS:



Description:

Letter: Telegram: Other:

To: The President
 From: Robert L. Oswald, Secretary, Interstate Commerce Commission, Wash. D.C.
 Date: July 24, 1974
 Subject: Malnutrition and food assistance in Honduras.

By direction of the President:


Sent out by Pat Byrne

RLE:JHH:pb

Roland L. Elliott
Special Assistant
to the President

(White House File Copy)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON



7.29.74

TO: Roland Elliott

For Your Information: _____

For Appropriate Handling: _____

Jim Holmes

RDL
Robert D. Linder

SUGGESTED REPLY


Dear Mr. Oswald:

The President asked me to reply to your letter of July 24, 1974, in which you transmitted a letter from Dr. Stephen Youngberg telling of his voluntary assistance project in Honduras and inquired about possible United States Government assistance to him.

As you are probably aware, the United States and Honduras are jointly involved in extensive development assistance programs through such U.S. agencies as the Peace Corps and the Agency for International Development (A. I. D.) and multilateral organizations such as the World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank. The aim of these programs is to assist Honduras with solutions to the kinds of problems mentioned in Dr. Youngberg's and your letters. You may wish to suggest to Dr. Youngberg that he inquire at the United States Embassy or the A. I. D. Mission in Tegucigalpa to see what possible sources of assistance there might be within Honduras with which he could work.

Sincerely,

Roland L. Elliott
Special Assistant to the
President



He Hon
Mr. Robert Oswald
Secretary
Interstate Commerce Commission
Washington, D. C.

A large, stylized handwritten signature, possibly "R", written in black ink.

14
Interstate Commerce Commission
Washington, D.C. 20423

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

July 24, 1974



encl
The President
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

RK
Enclosed is a copy of a letter which I have received from my cousin, a physician in Honduras. In that letter he makes mention of his efforts to furnish food to the starving children of that sister country. He states that there are 300,000 malnourished children and that within his 850 acre complex, he is rendering medical care to fifty children and maintaining seventy-five orphans. In addition, he states that fifty die in the third stage of malnutrition daily.

I am at a loss as to where to engender help for his efforts to feed these children.

I am writing to you as a private citizen concerned about such conditions in our neighboring sister countries. My family has been involved in such efforts for three generations and so I have some knowledge of what they face in assisting such people in the under-privileged countries around the world. Any assistance the government can give from a public or private sector will be most appreciated by my relatives and the hungry children of Honduras.

Respectfully,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Robert L. Oswald".

Robert L. Oswald
Secretary

Enclosure

July 14, 1974



Dear Cousin Robert:

Just a note to pass on our bestwishes and to renew old acquaintance.

This war against hunger is getting more serious every day and perhaps you can think up some new doors to knock on or scare up a few new friends for us around Washington.

Bill Paddock of 1323 28th St. N.W. has helped us. He wrote HUNGRY NATIONS and FAMINE 1974 and used to live in Honduras.

We need a packaging machine to package powdered soy beverage and also a machine to make and fill 2 mil poly ethelen bags with liquid milk. The one we need is distributed by Gaulin, in Everet, Mass and is made in France and costs \$15,000.

We also need English and Spanish literature on every phase of food processing and production and gardening etc.

We are developing a 850 acre farm next to the Government Extension service center for the country and desperately need capital for that.

We are a US and Honduras non-profit Corp. listed in the IRS Red Book.

Thanks for anything you might be able to think up to help.

Recently the RYDER WORLD magazine March-April Issue had a cover story about the project. If there is a RYDER TRUCK RENTAL outfit near you you might pick up a copy. This could serve to acquaint any one you might talk to about the project. Also the South Bend Tribune for June 16 had a Sunday Magazine article as well as the Toledo Blade for about a month previous..

We would appreciate having you join our little team and do what you can for my clients---the 300,000 malnourished children in Honduras. We have 50 in the hospital right now and 75 orphans over on the farm. fifty die in the 3rd stage of malnutrition every day down here.

Congressman Purcell (Graham) and Senator McGovern have helped us.

Cordially and hopefully your pariente,

Stephen & Verlene & the children

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ICE
OFFICE OF SECRETARY

YOUR PAN AMERICAN HEALTH SERVICE REPORT from

The Children's Nutrition Hospital and Food Factory, Peña Blanca

The Orphanage & Protein Products Farm at Palo Verde

Box 191, San Pedro Sula, Honduras May 30, 1974

Dear Friend:

"He that goeth forth with weeping, bearing precious seed shall doubtless come again with rejoicing, bringing his sheaves with him."

Spring rains have come at last, moistening the earth parched by 6 months of dry season. While one tractor plants the other is discing or harrowing or picking up rocks. Two crews of children spend several hours a day piling up and hauling rocks from the fields. We were able to buy tropical varieties of Soybeans and Sunflowers in Mexico City and High Lysine Corn and Rice seed here in Honduras this year.

Verlene and the Bramas are in Brownsville getting the trucks ready to cross the border. Arrangements have been made to get the convoy through Mexico without the usual costly Bonding or Guarding procedures. There are six motor vehicles and six trailers--three semi-trailers, two two-wheeled trailers and one implement trailer with a combine.

The 42 passenger school bus donated by Don Hensel's friends in the Butte, N. Dak. Church is pulling the John Deere # 45 combine. The flat bed trailer with its load of pumps, quenset huts, Buttler Bin, etc. from PUC and Rio Lindo Academy and the water well drilling rig trailer are both being pulled by a turbocharged diesel truck from San Bernardino, Calif. The 250 Diesel tractor from Boston is pulling a 40 ft. Van from Strick in Chicago as well as a 2 1/2 ton army trailer from Keene, Texas. Two diesel milk vans are loaded with tents and other equipment and supplies and one is pulling a trailer. Ken Sharman's pick-up is the sixth vehicle.

Ocean freight has nearly tripled in price during the past year. Shipping a 40 ft. 20 ton van now costs \$2,000 instead of \$800. New Orleans to Honduras used to be only 1,000 nautical miles but now it is 2,500 highway miles. We drive via Brownsville and Matamoros. (Get your map out and study this route and then begin to make plans to drive down and see us some time soon.) We reach Tampico by the new Soto La Marina highway. Next are Tuxpan, Posa Rica and Vera Cruz (last few miles via a new toll road). At Alvarado one begins to go inland after following the Gulf beaches all the way from Tampico. At Acayucan we cross the Isthmus of Tehuantepec to Matias Romero and reach Tapachula via Arriaga. Crossing Guatemala we go to Guatemala City via Esquintla and reach the Honduras border via Copapa and Esquipulas. We enter Honduras friendly border at Agua Caliente and Ocotepeque and get to Lake Yojoa via Santa Rosa and San Pedro Sula. There is good pavement all the way except the last 15 miles which are graveled mountain roads.

Thanks to each of you who have helped by giving equipment, supplies or money for the convoy and for the project as a whole. This load includes things for the farm irrigation, the training institute, and the food factory as well as clothes and medicines for the children and the outpatients.

Please pray for each of us down here and for the many little children living on tortillas and salt and very few beans. These children need 1/3 beans and 2/3 tortillas to survive and thrive on these two staples alone. The future is as bright as the promises of God who has told us "Give ye them to eat". However, to the unaided human vision things look dark down here right now. We are calling on God day and night to deliver us and our large family of 150 here on the two campuses. In my Bible I have a prayer list that includes twelve crises facing us right now. One is a large payment due on our diesel tractor and another is the money needed to get more land planted.

We know you will continue to share with hungry children and to help spread the Good News that God loves the poor and the destitute as well as the affluent and the well fed.

Thankfully and Hopefully,

Stephen & Aileen & Al and the rest of Your Crew
in the mountains of Honduras

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

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TO: PRES _____ FROM: KISSINGER, H _____ S/S 7414507 REFERENCE: _____ CIRCLE AS APPROPRIATE

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TS SENSITIVE

SUBJECT: *State program reply to R. Oswald re Malnutrition & food assistance in Honduras*

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION			REC CY FOF	ACTION REQUIRED	
	ACTION	INFO			
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT				MEMO FOR HAK	(_____)
STAFF SECRETARY				MEMO FOR PRES	(_____)
FAR EAST				REPLY FOR _____	(_____)
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA				APPROPRIATE ACTION	(_____)
MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA				MEMO _____ TO _____	(_____)
EUROPE / CANADA				RECOMMENDATIONS	(_____)
LATIN AMERICA	<u>+</u>		<u>+</u>	JOINT MEMO	(_____)
UNITED NATIONS				REFER TO _____ FOR:	(_____)
ECONOMIC				ANY ACTION NECESSARY?	(_____)
SCIENTIFIC				CONCURRENCE. <i>R. Elliott</i>	(<u>+</u>)
PROGRAM ANALYSIS				DUE DATE:	<i>8-23</i>
NSC PLANNING				COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)	
CONGRESSIONAL					
OCEANS POLICY					
INTELLIGENCE					

DATE	FROM	TO	S	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	CY TO
<i>8/16/74</i>	<i>Low</i>	<i>S</i>		<i>Concur as revised</i>	
<i>8/16</i>			<i>C</i>	<i>TO Roland Elliott</i>	



DISPATCH _____

CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS: _____

NOTIFY _____ & DATE _____ BY _____

SPECIAL DISPOSITION: _____

CROSS REF W/ _____

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: + FOLDER: _____

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AUG 20 1974

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MEMORANDUM OF INFORMATION FOR THE FILE

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DATE 8/19/74



EXECUTIVE

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~~LETTER, MEMO, ETC.~~ Agenda

TO: The President
FROM: William Timmons
SUBJECT: Meeting with
Sen. Charles Percy,
8/18/74

F03-2 / C066

ND 10 / FG 15

FG 6-11-1 / Timmons,
Wm.

World Population Conference
Diego Garcia

CORRESPONDENCE FILED CENTRAL FILES - CONFIDENTIAL FILE

SPECIAL FILES

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

INFORMATION

May 4, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: THOMAS J. BARNES
LES JANKA

SUBJECT: Senate Foreign Relations Committee View on Suspending
Military Assistance to Indonesia Because of Its Use of
U.S. Arms in Portuguese Timor

Senators ^{Hubert} Humphrey and ^{Clifford} Case of the Subcommittee on Foreign Relations of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee wrote to Secretary Kissinger (Tab A) on April 28 expressing concern over Indonesia's use of U.S. - supplied arms in Portuguese Timor. The Senators add, that in considering the FY 77 security assistance bill, they will oppose any further commitments of aid to Indonesia until "we are satisfied that we have had an opportunity to consider all facts relevant to Indonesia's use of American-supplied arms and equipment in East Timor. . . ." The letter also indicates that the Committee will invite Philip Habib to meet with its Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance to provide detailed information on the extent of use.

This letter is the latest in a series of exchanges over the past several months. In an April 14 letter to the Secretary (Tab B), the Committee had previously requested the State Department to provide a list of the equipment the Indonesians used in Timor and a chronology of events there including the dates in which the USG first learned of this utilization. Bob McCloskey answered that first request April 26. His reply (Tab C) stated that while we did ensure that the Indonesian Government was aware of the provisions of U.S. law regarding the use of American equipment in Timor, nevertheless, information available indicates that the Indonesian forces in Timor did use some U.S. -supplied equipment anyway. McCloskey added that having considered all factors involved in this case, it was the Administration's judgment that U.S. national interests require our continuing security assistance to Indonesia.

We will advise you of additional developments in this case as they occur.

EXECUTIVE

F03-2/CO 67

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RECEIVED
MAY 21 1976
CENTRAL FILES

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

April 14, 1976

The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of State
Washington, D. C. 20520



Dear Mr. Secretary:

As you know, in response to our letter to you dated March 9, Mr. Carlyle Maw met with members of the staff of the Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance to discuss reports that the Government of Indonesia used American supplied equipment in its invasion and occupation of East Timor. During the meeting, Mr. Maw acknowledged that the Indonesians have, in fact, used U. S. equipment and that they may be in violation of the law and agreements under which the equipment was supplied to them.


We recognize the importance of U. S. relations with Indonesia and are deeply concerned that the violation of the law in this respect could cause serious problems in those relations. We understand from Mr. Maw that the U. S. Government has made representations to the Government of Indonesia in which the U. S. explained the potential consequences of violation of law and agreements. Apparently, these representation have been ignored.

The attitude of the Indonesian Government is of particular concern to us because we fear that the example of Timor may prompt other U. S. aid recipient governments to believe that they, too, may misuse U. S. supplied equipment with impunity.

In order that the Subcommittee may assess Indonesian actions and U. S. Government responses, we would appreciate receiving a chronology governing Indonesia's actions, including an identification of equipment used, and the U. S. Government's responses.


This chronology should specify when the U. S. Government first became aware of the possibility of Indonesian intervention in East Timor. In addition, since our representations apparently had no effect, we would like to know what you plan to do next in order to secure compliance with the law and agreements.

We are aware of the complexities of the situation in East Timor and the inherent difficulties involved in assuring that the use of U. S. supplied equipment complies with our laws and the agreements under which it was furnished. However, as Chairman and Ranking Member of the Subcommittee delegated the responsibility to oversee the implementation of the Foreign Assistance and Foreign Military Sales Acts, we believe strongly that the U. S. Government must adhere to all provisions of the laws governing the transfer of military equipment. Prompt receipt of the information which we have requested will help the Subcommittee to discharge its oversight responsibilities and to cooperate with your efforts to resolve this serious issue.


Hubert H. Humphrey
Chairman

CPC:kc

Sincerely,


Clifford Case
Ranking Member



April 26, 1976



Dear Senator Humphrey:

Thank you for the letter of April 14 from you and Senator Case regarding the possible use of US-supplied equipment by the Indonesians in Timor. (This same letter is being repeated to Senator Case.) As Under Secretary Naw observed in his discussion with staff members of the Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance regarding the recent events in East Timor, the situation is both complex and ambiguous in character. In response to your request for a chronology of Indonesia's actions, the following describes the situation as we understand it and as Under Secretary Naw conveyed it to your staff.

Indonesian actions in East Timor came in the wake of a complex series of events extending back to the change of regimes in Portugal in early 1974. The situation that developed from the initial Portuguese decision to withdraw from its colony in East Timor has been described in detail in the March 12, 1976 report of the United Nations Secretary General to the Security Council, based on the fact-finding mission of his special representative to the area earlier this year. (A copy of the report is enclosed.)

In the spring of 1974 the Government of Portugal determined to initiate a process of decolonization for all its overseas colonies. At Indonesia's initiative, discussions were held between Indonesia and Portugal to ensure that the Portuguese withdrawal would be orderly and that the political views of various Timorese political groups would be considered.

The Honorable
Hubert H. Humphrey, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate.

A plan for phased decolonization of the territory was drawn up as a result of the fighting. This left a political vacuum in East Timor, a situation which Indonesia considered a threat to stability and security in the area.

One of the warring Timorese factions, a party known as Fretilin, gained the support of the Timorese soldiers left behind when the Portuguese garrison was evacuated and obtained possession of the stocks of weapons abandoned by the departing Portuguese. Controlling the only trained and fully armed military force remaining in the colony, Fretilin subsequently occupied much of the territory. To escape the conflict, approximately 40,000 refugees (roughly seven percent of the total population) fled to the Indonesian side of the island. Although the fighting continued, Fretilin in late November 1975 unilaterally declared the territory independent under its rule. Within days the Fretilin regime, which had been designated "the Democratic Republic of East Timor", was recognized by Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Cape Verde and the MPLA faction in Angola. The four main Timorese parties opposed to Fretilin thereupon sought help from Indonesia.

With Indonesia's support, the four anti-Fretilin parties were able to turn the tide and evict the Fretilin forces from Dili, the capital, and most of the other towns and villages in the territory. These parties then joined to form a coalition government which they termed "the Provisional Government of East Timor" and which now appears to be in control of most of the territory. Fighting still continues in some of the remote hill areas, however, and we understand that there have also been incursions by Fretilin forces into Indonesian territory.

From the outbreak of civil war in August to Fretilin's unilateral declaration, the Indonesian Government continued to press Portugal to resume responsibility for restoring order in Timor and to encourage negotiations among all Timorese political factions. The Indonesians and Portuguese foreign ministers met in Rome in October to discuss measures to restore peace to the island, but follow-up action was not forthcoming. During this period the Indonesians also tried unsuccessfully to develop support for the



formation of an international peacekeeping force made up of several Southeast Asian countries plus Portugal.

Throughout this period, U.S. officials in Jakarta were reporting to us the apprehension exhibited by the Indonesian Government as to the potential adverse impact these developments might have on the regime's security. The options being examined by the Indonesians were not completely revealed to us, but the probability of direct military intervention became increasingly clear. Exact plans were closely held by the Indonesians but we did become aware of impending military operations just before the actual landings took place in December 1975.

Prior to Dretelin's action and the subsequent Indonesian reaction, we had taken the position that the Timor problem was one for resolution by those directly concerned. Portugal, Indonesia, such close neighbors as Australia, and the people of East Timor. We did, however, take steps to ensure that the Indonesian Government was aware of the provisions of Section 505 (D) of the Foreign Assistance Act and Section 3 (c) of the Foreign Military Sales Act and of our concern in this regard.

Timor is a remote area and our information on events there is inadequate in many respects. Nevertheless, our information indicates that the Indonesian forces in Timor used some US-supplied equipment in their operations. We do not have a complete list of the equipment used.

We have kept the Timor problem under careful scrutiny while the UN Security Council has been seized with the matter. We have supported that effort, and have not wanted to take any measure which could have been construed as prejudicing UN action and judgments. This would not have been in our interest either with respect to our bilateral relations with Indonesia or with respect to our UN responsibilities.

At the present time we are continuing to support these efforts by the Secretary General and the Security Council to seek a peaceful solution. The Secretary General's report of March 12 points to the need for further consultation among the various parties to resolve the Timor issue and suggests that,



as a first step, the people of East Timor be consulted on the future status of the territory. Various proposals for doing this have been advanced by Indonesia and other parties.

Given the importance of our interests in Indonesia, we have been anxious that the Timor problem not unnecessarily disturb our friendly relations with this key country. In weighing all factors including the legal issues, we have taken into account the complex and ambiguous nature of the problem itself, the views of the Congress as expressed in its debates and its action on relevant legislation, the fact that the fighting in Timor has dwindled, and the continuing role of the United Nations -- including the most recent Security Council resolution of April 22. Under these circumstances, it is the Administration's judgment that it is in the U.S. national interest to continue security assistance to Indonesia.

I hope that the above information may be of help to you, and we would be happy to meet with you informally or in executive session to expand on any aspect of it.

Sincerely,

/S/
Robert J. McCloskey
Assistant Secretary for
Congressional Relations



Enclosure:

UN Secretary General's report.

Drafted by: FA/IMS:ECIngraham:DTKenney:lor
4-23-76 ext 21236 R#7608064

Clearances: FA - Mr. Habib²
PM - Mr. Slott³
I - Mr. Leigh⁴
H - S Goldberg

ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN
CLIFFORD P. CASE, N.J.
JACOB K. JAVTS, N.Y.
IRVING SCOTT, PA.
JAMES B. EASTON, KANS.
CHARLES H. PEPPER, ILL.
ROBERT P. GRIFFIN, MICH.

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

April 28, 1976

7608979

The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of State
Washington, D. C. 20520

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Thank you for your letter of April 26 responding to our inquiries concerning the possibility that Indonesia's use of American-supplied equipment in Timor may be in violation of the law and agreements under which the equipment was provided. We understand and share your concern about the sensitivity and importance of U.S. relations with the Government of Indonesia. However, after careful consideration of your letter we remain concerned about the Department's response to the Indonesians' actions and about the precedent which this response may establish.

At the first opportunity, we will invite Assistant Secretary Philip Habib to meet with the Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance to provide the detailed information which was requested in our letter of April 14, but was not forthcoming in your response. We believe that the Subcommittee must have all the relevant facts about the situation before it takes a position regarding the provision of further assistance to Indonesia. The Subcommittee will pursue this information through private communications with the Executive Branch and possibly through hearings or a staff investigation.


For the moment, the Subcommittee plans to continue with its consideration of assistance for Indonesia in the FY 1977 security assistance bill. Until we are satisfied that we have had an opportunity to consider all facts relevant to Indonesia's use of American-supplied arms and equipment in East Timor, however, it is our view that no further commitments of arms or other items supplied under the authorities of the Foreign Assistance Act or the Foreign Military Sales Act should be made to the Government of Indonesia.




Page Two

We recognize the complexities and difficulties involved in the achievement of a satisfactory resolution of this issue, particularly in a public forum. The Subcommittee has and plans to continue to discharge its responsibilities to ensure full compliance with the applicable laws and agreements in the most effective possible way and stands ready to continue to cooperate with you in this regard.

Sincerely,



Hubert H. Humphrey
Chairman



Clifford Case
Ranking Member



NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DQC		RECD			LOG NUMBER
MO	DA	MO	DA	HR	
5	4	5	4	18	7602588

INITIAL ACTION 0

SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES X FROM: SECSTATE _____ S/S _____ UNCLAS LOG IN/OUT
 SCOWCROFT _____ SECDEF _____ LOU NO FORN MODIS
 HYLAND _____ DCI _____ X REF _____ C EYES ONLY EXDIS
 DAVIS _____ STATE EXSEC _____ S CODEWORD
 OTHER Barnes/Jorka TS SENSITIVE

SUBJECT: Senate form relations (open view on suspension of US military assistance to Indonesia because of their use of US arms in Portuguese Timor

DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION					REC CY FOR	ACTION REQUIRED
ACTION	CONCUR- RENCE	COOR- DINATE	INFO			
ADV CYS S'CROFT/WGH						MEMO FOR SCOWCROFT. ()
STAFF SECRETARY						MEMO FOR PRES ()
CONGRESSIONAL				#		REPLY FOR ()
ECONOMIC						APPROPRIATE ACTION ()
EUR/CANADA/OCEANS						MEMO _____ TO _____ ()
FAR EAST/PRC				#		RECOMMENDATIONS ()
INTELLIGENCE						JOINT MEMO ()
LATIN AMERICA						REFER TO _____ FOR: _____ ()
MID EAST/NO. AFRICA						ANY ACTION NECESSARY? ()
NSC PLANNING						CONCURRENCE ()
PROGRAM ANALYSIS						DUE DATE: ()
SCIENTIFIC						COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)
SUB-SAH/AFRICA/UN						



SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS

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5-17		NSC/C	C	Noted by Scowcroft		

NSC/3 DISP INSTR

DISPATCH _____ NOTIFY _____

SPECIAL DISPOSITION: _____

SPECIAL INDEXING: _____

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED X

MICROFILM & FILE ROOMS

M/F'D _____ BY _____

MAY 19 1976

CRT ID: _____ NS DY

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CLOSE MJT PA

BROUGHT FORWARD

EXECUTIVE
F03-2/C068 1/2/75
Previously filed Date

Name Cong. Clarence D. Long
Organization _____



EXECUTIVE
F03-2/C068 2/27/75
New File Symbol Date

Final Action Memo for Mr. Friederhof
from Mrs. Davis

BROUGHT FORWARD

EXECUTIVE
F03-2/C068 2/27/75
Previously filed Date

Name Cong. Clarence D Long
Organization _____



EXECUTIVE
F03-2/C068 3/7/75
New File Symbol Date

Final Action Further from Mr.
Doen

BROUGHT FORWARD

EXECUTIVE

FO3-2/C068
Previously filed

3/7/75
Date

Name

Cong. Clarence D Long

Organization _____



EXECUTIVE

FO3-2/C068
New File Symbol

3/20/75
Date

Final Action

Memo to Lt. Gen. Scurcraft
from Mr. Lee

BROUGHT FORWARD

EXECUTIVE
FO 3-2/K068 3-20-75
Previously filed Date

Name Leen memo to Seawcraft

Organization M.C. Clarence

Long US Arms Sales Policy
Canada Mass



SAME 6-11-75
New File Symbol Date

Final Action Copy of HSC reply
to Rep Long

BROUGHT FORWARD

EXECUTIVE
FOJ-2/C068 3-25-75
Previously filed Date

Name Letter to Rep. Paul Schroeder
Organization re Military Sales
to Dixon



SAME 6-11-75
New File Symbol Date

Final Action Copy of NSC reply
to Rep. Schroeder

cc/AG

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

EXECUTIVE

F03-2/0068

June 11, 1975



Dear Mr. Long: *Clarence S.*

This is in further response to your concern about US policy on arms sales to Iran, including your letter of December 20, 1974.

We believe that the specific documents which contain the information you are seeking should not be distributed beyond the offices which have responsibility for implementing the terms of the President's directive. We appreciate your needs and those of your colleagues to be aware of factors and conditions underlying US policy in this area, however, and would like to suggest an alternative to distributing the subject documents outside of the Executive Branch.

You will recall that in the March 7 response to your inquiry, Mr. Vernon Loen of the White House Staff indicated that he would be pleased to arrange meetings for you with members of the State Department to discuss the particular concerns you may have about our arms policy decisions. I would now like to add that, if you desire, members of the National Security Council Staff are also prepared to brief you on US arms sales to Iran and specifically discuss with you in detail the contents of the Presidential directive governing policy in this area.


The particular documents you seek deal with only certain aspects of complex matters which are best understood if placed in a broader context which can be provided by an oral briefing. We sincerely believe this suggested alternative will meet your need for full access to information while at the same time protecting the sensitivity of these internal Executive Branch instructions of the President.

I hope that you will find these arrangements suitable and that we can arrange a meeting for you in the near future with the most knowledgeable staff officers in the Executive Branch.

Sincerely,



Jeanne W. Davis
Staff Secretary



Honorable Clarence D. Long
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515

*This version
cleared by Oakley.*

Mr.
Dear Congressman Long:

This is in further response to your message
~~I am writing in further response to your letter of December 20, 1974~~

~~and to the more recent request from Congresswoman Schroeder concerning~~
about
U.S. policy on arms sales to Iran, *including your letter of December 20, 1974,*

We believe that the specific documents which contain the information you are seeking should not be distributed beyond the offices which have responsibility for implementing the terms of the President's directive.

We appreciate your needs and those of your colleagues to be aware of ^{*forces and considerations underlying*} U.S. policy in this area, however, and would like to suggest an alternative to distributing the subject documents outside of the Executive Branch.

You will recall that in the March 7 response to your inquiry, Mr. Vernon Loen of the White House Staff indicated that he would be pleased to arrange meetings for you with members of the State Department to discuss the particular concerns you may have about our arms policy decisions. I would now like to add that, if you desire, members of the National Security Council Staff are also prepared to brief you on U.S. arms sales to Iran and specifically discuss with you ^{*in detail*} the content of the Presidential directive governing policy in this area.



The particular documents you seek deal with only certain aspects of complex matters which are best understood if placed in ^{*a*} the broader context provided by an oral ^{*briefing*} discussion. We sincerely believe this ^{*suggested*} alternative will meet your need for full access to information ^{*while*} ~~and will~~ at the same time protect the sensitivity of ^{*these the internal Executive Branch*} ~~matters detailed in~~ instructions of the President.

9

I hope that you will find these arrangements suitable and that we can arrange a meeting for you in the near future with the most knowledgeable staff officers in the Executive Branch.

Sincerely,



Honorable Clarence D. Long
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515

Dear Congressman Long:

I am writing in further response to your letter of December 20, 1974 and to the more recent request from Congressman Shroeder concerning U. S. policy on arms sales to Iran.

We believe that the
~~The~~ specific documents which you have been seeking contain *the*
~~particular~~ *you are seeking* information which we feel should not be distributed beyond the offices which have responsibility for implementing the terms of the President's directive. We appreciate your needs and those of your colleagues to be aware of U. S. policy in this area, *however, we* and would like to suggest an alternative to distributing the subject ~~reports of~~ *also, does deal with complex* documents outside of the Executive Branch. *matters which are best understood*

You will recall that in ~~my~~ *the above* March 7 response to your inquiry, ~~John~~ *Vern* ~~Tran~~ *Tran* indicated that ~~we~~ *he* would be ~~glad~~ *pleased* to arrange meetings for you with members of the State Department to discuss the particular concerns you may have ~~about~~ *our arms policy decisions. I would now like to add that,* if you desire, members of the National Security Council Staff are also prepared to brief you on U. S. arms sales to Iran and specifically discuss

particular with you the content of the Presidential directive governing policy in ~~this area.~~ *complex matters which are best understood if placed in the broader* We sincerely believe ~~that~~ *suggested* this alternative will meet your need for full access to information and will at the same time protect the sensitivity of matters detailed in the instructions of the President.

I hope that you will find these arrangements suitable and that we can ~~get you together with our~~ *arrange a meeting for you* most knowledgeable staff officers in the near future.
In Executive Branch

Sincerely,

Max Friedersdorf

NO - We showed that give him internal his own way to sensitive



FF

Content provided by our

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 7, 1975

Dear Mr. Long:

This is in further response to your concern about US policy on arms sales to Iran, including your letter of December 20, 1974.

We believe that the specific documents which contain the information you are seeking should not be distributed beyond the offices which have responsibility for implementing the terms of the President's directive. We appreciate your needs and those of your colleagues to be aware of factors and conditions underlying US policy in this area, however, and would like to suggest an alternative to distributing the subject documents outside of the Executive Branch.


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The particular documents you seek deal with only certain aspects of complex matters which are best understood if placed in a broader context which can be provided by an oral briefing. We sincerely believe this suggested alternative will meet your need for full access to information while at the same time protecting the sensitivity of these internal Executive Branch instructions of the President.

I hope that you will find these arrangements suitable and that we can arrange a meeting for you in the near future with the most knowledgeable staff officers in the Executive Branch.

Sincerely,

Jeanne W. Davis
Staff Secretary



Honorable Clarence D. Long
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

June 11, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Mr. George S. Springsteen
Executive Secretary
Department of State



SUBJECT: Congressional Request for Information
on U.S. Arms Sales to Iran

For your information I am enclosing a copy of my letters to Representatives Long and Schroeder in which I offer to arrange a State Department briefing for these two members of Congress.

In addition to the regular internal distribution of these letters we ask that you forward a copy of the correspondence to Monroe Leigh.


Jeanne W. Davis
Staff Secretary

Attachments

June 11, 1975

NSC/S:

Please see that a copy of the signed letters is sent to Janka, Oakley, Buchen and Friedersdorf.

A copy of Schroeders' letter of March 20 should also be sent with the letters to State.

Thanks.

Steve
Steve Skancke



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

June 11, 1975

JWD:

REVIEW AND SIGNATURE

-- Letters to Loig and Schroeder

-- memorandum to Springsteen



Buchen has responded that he concurs in the proposed replies. He asks that we send him a copy of signed letters and that we have one sent to the State Legal Adkviser.

Steve
Steve

*beck's with
copy also to
Loren*

*Sued
~~Frederick~~*

(Over)

Boyer

*Will need
to make up one more
of the patches
for 5/15*

SECRET

Legal Advisor

and that we have one sent to the State
we send him a copy of signed letters
in the proposed replies. He asks that
Bachan has responded that he concurs

-- memorandum to Springsteen

-- Letters to Gorb and Schroeder

REVIEW AND SIGNATURE

LMD:

JUNE 11, 1972



[Handwritten signature]

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

6-10

Buchen's office called (Eva) regarding the attached package says he has nothing more to add to what Casselman said other than info copies should be sent to Monroe Lee--Legal Adviser at State and himself of the signed letters.



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 10, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Jeanne Davis

FROM:

Phil Buchen

P.W.B.

In response to your memorandum of June 9, I see no problem with the attached letters, but suggest you send me an information copy, as well as one to Monroe Leigh at State.

Your letters are returned herewith for your signature.



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

June 9, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: PHILIP W. BUCHEN

FROM: Jeanne W. Davis 

SUBJECT: Response to Congressional Requests for
Information on U.S. Arms Sales to Iran



Last December Congressman Clarence Long wrote to the President seeking information on U.S. arms sales to Iran. We furnished Max Friedersdorf with a draft which we understand was signed by Vern Loen giving a general description of our policy toward Iran and indicating that, because some of the detailed questions Long raised could not be handled adequately in a letter, we would arrange a meeting with State Department officials to discuss his concerns.

Mr. Long found the response unacceptable and has indicated that if he is unable to get answers to his questions, his subcommittee may subpoena the desired information or hold special hearings. (Mr. Long also sits on the Appropriations Subcommittee having jurisdiction over the NSC Staff and raised this question in our budget hearings.) Evidently he is not interested in another letter from the White House Congressional Relations office and Vern Loen has asked that the NSC write directly to Long.

The documents he is seeking are two 1972 memoranda from Mr. Kissinger to the Secretaries of State and Defense regarding "Follow-up on the President's talk with the Shah of Iran." In response to a request last year from Senator Fulbright and two more recent requests from Congressman Long and Senator Sparkman the matter of releasing or showing these documents was raised with Secretary Kissinger. He decided that we should neither give nor allow congressional staff members to read these documents and that instead we should offer an oral briefing to the interested parties, informing them of the content of the documents and placing them in the context of overall US policy. Accordingly, we have prepared a draft response to Congressman Long renewing the offer of the State Department briefing and adding that the NSC Staff is also prepared to discuss the content of the memorandum containing the President's decisions on US policy toward Iran.

In a recent letter Congresswoman Schroeder has joined Mr. Long in his request for information on U.S. - Iran relations and, following consultation with Vernon Loen, we propose to offer her a State briefing as well.

May we please have your clearance and/or comments on the two letters. Because Long was told a further response would be forthcoming very soon, I would appreciate your earliest consideration and if possible an indication of your position by Tuesday, June 10.

Attachments



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

6/6 pri

Jeanne —



Both ~~Bob~~ Oakley
and his Janica have
reviewed and cleared
these letters to Long and
Schroeder. Are we all
set to move them?

Rosamary

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 20, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: LT. GEN. BRENT SCOWCROFT
THROUGH: MAX FRIEDERSDORF *M.C.*
FROM: VERN LOEN *VL*
SUBJECT: M. C. Clarence Long (D-Md)



Mr. Long was dissatisfied with my March 7 response to his letter of December 20, 1974 (see attached).

Mr. Long is a member of the Appropriations Subcommittee having jurisdiction over NSC. He is determined to get answers to the questions raised in his letter concerning U.S. arms sales policy toward Iran. He says that if the answers are not provided, his subcommittee may subpoena the desired information or hold special hearings.

In addition, he indicates that other members of Congress are watching the Administration's response to this request. Presumably, these are members of the liberal Democratic Study Group who have been introducing privileged resolutions of inquiry on a regular basis.

RECEIVED

12

1975 MAR 20

0067

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

4/23/75

NSC/S

Log no 0067 has been incor-
porated in No. 1703.



EXECUTIVE

F03-2/0068

March 7, 1975



cc
Dear Mr. Long:

Clarence D

This is in further reply to your thoughtful letter to the President regarding U.S. arms sales policy to Iran.


It has been and remains our policy to encourage moderate states in the Gulf area to develop the capability to maintain regional stability as well as to meet their legitimate national security needs. Iran, which has pursued a policy of moderation and responsibility in this regard over the years, has a constructive role to play. Our policy toward Iran and the Gulf states was undertaken to further the parallel objectives of regional cooperation and strength in this important area in a time when many of the states in that area are newly independent. We feel that this policy has been constructive in that Iran is working with several of the Gulf states, including in response to the radical-supported insurgency in Oman, in a cooperative way to help achieve regional security, which is also important to peace and stability in the broader Middle East area.

Regarding the question you raise about the secrecy of the U.S. decision-making process, decisions on sales of military equipment to Iran and other countries have been and are taken by authorized officials at times and through established processes appropriate to the issue, with due consideration being given to the ramifications for our foreign policy as a whole and to the U.S. national interest. This is the case with respect to the specific points you raised concerning Iran.

RECEIVED
MAR 10 1975
CENTRAL FILES

Because you have raised a number of issues in some detail, I believe your particular concerns would be best met by arranging for a full discussion with members of the Department of State and I would be prepared to arrange such a meeting at your request.

Sincerely,



Vernon C. Loen
Deputy Assistant
to the President



The Honorable Clarence D. Long
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

bcc: to General Scowcroft - FYI (0067)

VCL:NSC:EF:ki

10

67

March 7, 1975



Dear Mr. Long:

This is in further reply to your thoughtful letter to the President regarding U.S. arms sales policy to Iran.

It has been and remains our policy to encourage moderate states in the Gulf area to develop the capability to maintain regional stability as well as to meet their legitimate national security needs. Iran, which has pursued a policy of moderation and responsibility in this regard over the years, has a constructive role to play. Our policy toward Iran and the Gulf states was undertaken to further the parallel objectives of regional cooperation and strength in this important area in a time when many of the states in that area are newly independent. We feel that this policy has been constructive in that Iran is working with several of the Gulf states, including in response to the radical-supported insurgency in Oman, in a cooperative way to help achieve regional security, which is also important to peace and stability in the broader Middle East area.

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RECEIVED -
MAR 13 1975
CENTRAL FILES

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Because you have raised a number of issues in some detail, I believe your particular concerns would be best met by arranging for a full discussion with members of the Department of State and I would be prepared to arrange such a meeting at your request.

Sincerely,

Vernon C. Loeb
Deputy Assistant
to the President



The Honorable Clarence D. Long
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

bcc: to General Scowcroft - FYI (0067)

VCL:MSC:EF:ki

15

EXECUTIVE

F03-2/0068

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

February 27, 1975



MEMORANDUM FOR

MAX FRIEDERSDORF

FROM:

JEANNE W. DAVIS *JWD*

SUBJECT:

Reply to Congressman Long on U.S. Arms Sales Policy to Iran

The attached correspondence from Congressman Long had been sent to State for consideration. We believe that the best approach for a further reply is a short letter outlining the basic framework of our policy and recommending a full briefing at the State Department. We would coordinate in arranging such a meeting if Mr. Long requests one. He raises a number of issues in detail which would go beyond the space of a letter and could more appropriately be handled in an oral briefing. Attached is a suggested further reply for your signature.

JWD
Les Janga and Col. Granger concur. *dl*

*Max -
pls ok
h*

O.K. - MAY

cc

Dear ^{Mr} Congressman Long:

This is
In further reply to your thoughtful letter to the President, ^{regarding}
~~on U.S. arms sales policy to Iran, I want to say that the oppor-~~
~~tunity to review your thoughts was appreciated.~~

It has been and remains our policy to encourage moderate states in the Gulf area to develop the capability to maintain regional stability as well as to meet their legitimate national security needs. Iran, which has pursued a policy of moderation and responsibility in this regard over the years, has a constructive role to play. Our policy toward Iran and the Gulf states was undertaken to further the parallel objectives of regional cooperation and strength in this important area in a time when many of the states in that area are newly independent. We feel that this policy has been constructive in that Iran is working with several of the Gulf states, including in response to the radical-supported insurgency in Oman, in a cooperative way to help achieve regional security, which is also important to peace and stability in the broader Middle East area.

Regarding the question you raise about the secrecy of the U.S. decision-making process, decisions on sales of military equipment to Iran and other countries have been and are taken by authorized officials at times and through established processes appropriate to the issue,



PAGE 2

with due consideration being given to the ramifications for our foreign policy as a whole and to the U.S. national interest. This is the case with respect to the specific points you raised concerning Iran.

Because you have raised a number of issues in some detail, I believe your particular concerns would be best met by arranging for a full discussion with members of the Department of State and I would be prepared to arrange such a meeting at your request.

Sincerely,

~~Max Friedersdorf~~

Vernon C. Loew
Dep Asst
to the P

cc to General Scowcroft - FYI (0067)

VC L: NSC / of:

NS

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

① Who will sign?

Can't we say that US..

② Combat readiness is not

affected by skilled personnel in
Iran?

③ Has DOD cleared
letter



④ Section 3 ("Secrecy...")

is exceedingly unenlightening

Sales are public. Our policy

is consistent with our interests, as described
(over)

SUGGESTED REPLY

Dear Mr. Long:

I have been asked to reply to your letter of December 20 to President Ford concerning United States arms sales policy toward Iran, which Mr. Vernon Loen acknowledged on January 2.

Since World War II the United States has had an interest in Iran's becoming a strong entity in the Middle East. During the past three decades we have had a steadily evolving relationship with Iran, passing through periods of assistance against Soviet attempts at territorial aggrandizement and of cooperation in developing Iran's economy to a point where Iran no longer needs our assistance through grant aid or concessional loans. Iran has become a noteworthy example of countries that have used an initial input of foreign assistance to help create a self-sustaining level of development. Economic growth in Iran has been accompanied by the development of stable political institutions and conditions.

Honorable Clarence D. Long,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.



Department of State

It is the policy of this Administration, as it was the policy of previous U.S. Administrations, to encourage regional countries to develop the capability to maintain stability in the Persian Gulf region and to assure that the vital oil resources of the region remain in friendly hands and available to the Western world. The importance of these objectives has become ever clearer with the passage of time. Iran's size and geographic position, its determination to modernize, the progress it has achieved, its history of responsible conduct in the region since World War II, and its interest in promoting regional cooperation for stability, all give it a key role in the achievement of our policy toward the Persian Gulf region.

As Iran has developed its economic and security capabilities, it has sought to play an expanded role in the Indian Ocean area and in the world beyond. Its aspirations in this regard appear a natural development that need not conflict with United States interests and should, indeed, complement them.

As for Iran's desire to purchase defense equipment from the United States, the following factors have been included in our consideration: 1) Iran has the funds to



purchase equipment; 2) for most types of equipment, other sources than the United States are available; and 3) our attitudes on sales of equipment are an integral part of our broader relationship, with an effect on Iranian willingness to cooperate with us in other fields including its willingness to continue as a reliable source of oil to us and our allies in the face of an Arab oil embargo. We have seen our overall interests as being well served by a generally positive attitude on Iranian requests, subject to consonance with our broader foreign policy aims and our commitments elsewhere.

Your letter addresses three specific major points:

1. Depletion of U.S. Technical Skills. I am assured that the Department of Defense gives U.S. technical skill shortages careful consideration when evaluating requests to provide these skills to other countries. When skills in the U.S. armed forces cannot be spared, it may be recommended to the purchasing country that it obtain the needed skills commercially.

I fully agree with you, in any event, that the effect on U.S. readiness of exporting military technical skills is important, not only in the case of Iran



but also in the case of sales to other countries. We shall be paying close attention to this problem.

2. Depletion of U.S. Hardware. U.S. Government decisions on timing of deliveries of military equipment to foreign buyers take into consideration the needs of the U.S. services, U.S. production capabilities and procurement levels authorized for the U.S. services by the Congress. Journalistic reporting on foreign procurement usually describes the content but not the time of first delivery to the buyer and the relationship to the purchasing timetable of U.S. services. To cite several examples from your letter: F-14 deliveries to Iran will not start until scheduled production levels for the U.S. Navy provide spare capacity for production for Iran; construction of Spruance-class destroyers for Iran is scheduled after construction of those currently authorized for the U.S. Navy; Huey helicopters for Iran are designed to meet special Iranian needs (high altitude-hot climate) and are not U.S.-forces standard; production of neither Huey nor Cobra aircraft deprives U.S. forces of equipment, since our forces are authorized to procure only limited numbers of helicopters. Iranian orders for these and other systems provide jobs



and profits for U.S. industry and foreign exchange earnings for the United States, while keeping production lines in operation in case of need by the United States or its allies.

3. Secrecy of Decision-making There is no single, fixed procedure for making decisions on security-related issues. Decisions on sales of military equipment to Iran and other countries have been and are taken by authorized officials at times and through processes appropriate to the issue, with due consideration being given to the ramifications for our foreign policy as a whole and to the U.S. national interest. That is the case with respect to the specific points you raised concerning Iran.


Pror In response to your question on how we can be sure that Iran will not use its military might to take over the oil reserves of the other Persian Gulf states, [one must concede that it is impossible to be completely certain of anything in international affairs. But] a look at the record may be instructive: Iran renounced its claim to Bahrain; Iran has tried to get the other Gulf states to join in a cooperative security agreement; Iran is supporting the legitimate government of Oman



against foreign-inspired guerillas; moreover, Iran has for some years been militarily far stronger than any combination of its Gulf neighbors (excluding Iraq), but it has not taken aggressive action against them. This suggests that Iran's desire to develop its economy and society in a secure environment far outweighs any latent imperialistic intent that some foreign observers may claim to detect.

Finally I should note, on one point you mentioned, that the Iranian Government has publicly stated that the Shah was misquoted in the interview with the Lebanese publisher on Iran's intentions in any future Middle East war. As a matter of fact, the Shah has recently made clear that he has no intention to send his military forces to assist the Arab side in a future crisis with Israel. In addition, Iran is continuing to maintain cordial, although informal, relations with Israel, as it has done for many years.

Sincerely,



UNCLASSIFIED
(Classification)
URGENT

JOINT NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL/STATE SECRETARIAT REFERRAL/RESPONSE FORM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

MEMORANDUM FOR: George S. Springsteen
Executive Secretary
Department of State

Date: Jan. 4, 1974

NSC Log No. 67

The attached document(s) are forwarded for staffing as indicated below:

XXX DRAFT REPLY FOR: PRESIDENT'S SIGNATURE TRANSLATION
 WHITE HOUSE STAFF SIGNATURE RECOMMENDATIONS
 OTHER INFO ONLY

 DIRECT REPLY furnish info copy

SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS: _____

URGENT XXXX
PRIORITY _____
ROUTINE _____

DUE DATE: 1/10/75

Alvin D. Crow
for JEANNE W. DAVIS
Staff Secretary

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MEMORANDUM FOR: Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft
National Security Council
The White House.

Date: January 25, 1975

S/S Log No. 7500170

Pursuant to the above referral we are transmitting with this memorandum:

The attached item was received by the Department of State:

 Draft reply for:
 President's signature
 X Other signature

 We believe no response is necessary

 Information copy of direct reply

 X A draft response is attached

 Translation

 A draft response will be forwarded

REMARKS _____



Stephen W. Worrel
GEORGE S. SPRINGSTEEN
Executive Secretary

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION

To: Pres Gerald R. Ford From: Clarence D. Long Date: Dec. 20, 1974

Subject: Rep. Long writes Pres re his request for info re US commitments to Iran & urges review of US arms sales to Iran & other Persian Gulf states.

UNCLASSIFIED
(Classification)

cg
January 2, 1975

Dear Mr. Long:

Thank you for your December 20 letter to the President requesting information regarding United States' commitments to Iran and urging a review of our Nation's arms sales to Iran and other Persian Gulf states.

I have carefully noted your concern about the situation in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East, and will see that the President and his foreign policy advisors receive your letter as soon as possible.

With kind regards,

Sincerely,



Vernon C. Loon
Special Assistant
to the President

The Honorable Clarence M. Long^x
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515

bcc w/lnc to General Scowcroft - for further DRAFT reply, please ✓

VCL:EF:jlc

10

RECEIVED
JAN 31 1975
CENTRAL FILES

14
CLARENCE D. LONG
2D-DISTRICT, MARYLAND

COMMITTEE ON
APPROPRIATIONS

SUBCOMMITTEES:
FOREIGN OPERATIONS
MILITARY CONSTRUCTION
INTERIOR

12-31
2421 RAYBURN BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

DISTRICT OFFICES:
200 POST OFFICE BUILDING
TOWSON, MARYLAND 21204

GOVERNMENT HOUSE
8136 LIBERTY ROAD
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 20217

"OFFICE ON WHEELS"

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

20 December 1974

The Honorable Gerald R. Ford
The White House
Washington, D.C.



BT
Dear Mr. President:

The United States has, for the past four years, been providing stepped-up military assistance to Iran, in the form of sophisticated weapons and military advisors, in amounts so great as to imperil our own defense preparedness; intensify and recharacterize the arms race among oil-rich countries in the Persian Gulf and Middle East; increase greatly the chance of war among Arab and other states; tilt the arms balances so as to increase the peril to the friendly state of Israel; and risk confrontation and possibly nuclear war between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Within recent months, Iran's ruler has publicly avowed his intent to make Iran the world's sixth-strongest military power.¹

Equally disturbing as this stepped-up military buildup of Iran is the fact that it was decided in secrecy, without opportunity for prior debate and discussion. I have twice asked for details on our policy commitments to Iran, and have twice received, from Secretary Kissinger, evasive and incomplete answers.²

I request that Congress be provided with full facts on all U.S. commitments to Iran during the past five years, and especially those made at the May, 1972 Teheran meeting between President Nixon and the Shah. Moreover, I urge an immediate and thorough review of U.S. arms sales to Iran and other Persian Gulf states. I hope that you, Mr. President, will give that review and its results your closest personal attention.

It may be that the sales we have pledged to Iran are indeed in our national interest. It may, on the other hand, be advisable to modify our arms sales policy to avert dangers to U.S. security and to the stability of the Persian Gulf. Whatever our course in this crucial area of the world, that course is so fraught with danger and so important that it should be adopted only after the most careful debate and study.

The Honorable Gerald R. Ford
20 December 1974
Page Two

Three major facts stand out from my investigation into our policies toward Iran.


Depletion of U.S. technical skills: The General Accounting Office noted a Presidential promise in May, 1972 to provide "the number of technical personnel necessary to assist Iranian military advancement."³ Under the terms of that promise, 500-600 U.S. military with scarce skills are at this moment instructing Iranian military personnel in the operation and maintenance of highly advanced U.S. weaponry and in various logistics, communications and electronic projects. How extensive U.S. training in Iran has been, I saw at first hand on my visit to that country for the Appropriations Committee in August, 1973.

The GAO study also cautioned that supplying Iran with advisors on the present scale could "adversely affect the readiness status of U.S. forces."⁴ GAO points out:

An Army document, dated October 2, 1973, listing specialty shortages showed 34 of these (69) skills supplied to Iran were in short supply to worldwide Army requirements. The listing did not specify the degree of shortage. A review of the U.S. Army in Europe manpower requirements, however, showed, as of February 28, 1974, that nine of these were in critical short supply to that command's needs.⁵

Depletion of U.S. hardware: The U.S. is providing critically needed and very sophisticated military hardware to Iran, at the expense of our own military's needs for modernization. Sales to Iran total just in Fiscal 1973-74 between \$5.8 and \$6.8 billion, depending on whose estimates one accepts.⁶ Included are very new weapons--such as the Phoenix, Maverick and TOW Anti-tank Missiles, Spruance-class destroyers, F-14 aircraft and the most advanced Huey and Cobra helicopter models.⁷

Despite these massive supplies, the Shah still asks for other U.S. weapons. I have been advised that the Shah in May, 1972 indicated an interest in laser-guided bombs.⁸ The Shah is now trying to persuade the Defense Department to re-open production of the C-5A. He has accepted an offer from us to sell him 80 F-14s, though U.S. forces still do not have all they require.¹⁰ The Shah has also expressed an interest in acquiring hundreds of the newest generation of U.S. fighters, YF 16s and YF 17s, still under development.¹¹ In 1973, the Shah made overtures to buy about 70 Fairchild A-10A close support fighters.¹² Perhaps most alarming, I have learned from non-official sources that the Shah has asked the U.S. to sell him a missile which is worth having only if armed with a nuclear warhead.



The Honorable Gerald R. Ford
20 December 1974
Page Three

In addition to trying to buy our weapons and weapons systems outright, the Shah has taken steps to become a weapons producer. He has been negotiating with Bell Helicopter to establish a military helicopter plant in Iran, in which Iran would have co-production rights.¹³ Press reports recently have indicated that the Defense Department is prepared to give a green light to the deal.

Secrecy: As I indicated at the beginning of my letter, I am most distressed by the secrecy with which major commitments to Iran have been clothed. There is evidence which entitles us to believe that in May, 1972, President Nixon made a direct promise to the Shah that the U.S. would sell Iran F-14 aircraft, though the actual sale was not made until January, 1974. The specific document central to this issue is a White House Memorandum, dated June 15, 1972.¹⁴ This memorandum, various sources tell me, contains all the pledges made by President Nixon to the Shah at Teheran.

Normally, a decision of this magnitude (to increase substantially U.S. arms sales to a country like Iran) would be made via a National Security Decision Memorandum, based on a National Security Study Memorandum of the pros and cons of the proposed action.¹⁵ No such Decision Memorandum was prepared as a result of the Teheran meeting in May, 1972.¹⁶

The use of a White House Memorandum would strongly indicate that there was, at the time of the Teheran meeting, no current National Security Study Memorandum available on arms sales to Iran. The White House Memorandum, which I have requested, was classified by Dr. Kissinger¹⁷ and contains, I believe, much of the key information regarding our sharply increased arms exports to Iran. Some of the information was most certainly provided to Congress in bits and pieces, but there is no evidence that any Committee of Congress was told that the President had promised to sell Iran F-14s as early as May, 1972. Secretary Kissinger has refused to provide the White House Memorandum which would confirm or deny this premise of an offer. Certainly, there is no evidence that any Committee is aware of study and evaluation current at the May, 1972 time which would have justified our sharply increased commitment to Iran--a commitment involving sales of highly advanced weapons systems.¹⁸

These three concerns--the diminution of U.S. personnel skills, the depletion of U.S. arms supplies, and the covertness of the broadening of U.S. military help to Iran, without study, debate or evaluation--lead to questions vital to our national defense, foreign policy, and world peace.



The Honorable Gerald R. Ford
20 December 1974
Page Four

How can the U.S. justify drawing down its own manpower and materiel in aiding Iran, already widely recognized as the major power in the Persian Gulf, to become an even greater power?


How can the U.S. be sure that Iran's growing military power will not be aimed, by the Shah or his successors, at grabbing the huge oil reserves (2/3 of the world's proved supply) in weaker Persian Gulf states like Kuwait, the Emirates, Iraq and Saudi Arabia?

Prior to now, it has been believed that Iran was friendly to the United States, and understanding of the U.S. policy in the Middle East.

A sudden shift of policy was signaled in the Shah's interview with a Lebanese newspaper publisher on December 5, 1974. The Shah made it plain that Iran's military might will be used on the side of Arab states in any future war, or to force Israel to comply with resolutions voted by the United Nations.¹⁹

I urge you, Mr. President, to re-examine our policies of secretly arming Iran at the expense of our own national defense and at the expense of upsetting the military balance in an area so important as a source of petroleum energy and as a threat to peace.

Sincerely,



Clarence D. Long
CLARENCE D. LONG, M.C.

CDL:jfo

FOOTNOTES

1. Press conference given by the Shah of Iran in Washington, D.C., July, 1973; interview with the Lebanese weekly, "Al-Hawadith," December 5, 1974. Also see New York Times, December 7, 1974, "Shah's Iran: Moving Unevenly Toward a Persian Renaissance."
2. Question for the record to Secretary Kissinger from Congressman Long submitted during June, 1974 hearings before the House Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittee, page 106, Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1975. Letter from Congressman Long to Secretary Kissinger, October 16, 1974; response on November 8, 1974 signed by Assistant Secretary of State Linwood Holton did not mention the document in question.
3. Issues Related to U.S. Military Sales and Assistance To Iran, General Accounting Office, October 21, 1974, page 13. All references to GAO findings are taken from unclassified pages, or parts of pages. The report does contain classified information which this letter has not used.
4. Ibid, page 17.
5. Ibid, page 17. The GAO adds: "According to Air Force projections for March 1974, there will be worldwide U.S. Air Force shortages--15 percent or more short of authorized strength--in 24 of the Specialty Codes associated with the TAFT agreement, 20 of which were identified as mission essential skills." These projections do not include other possible shortages in backup units in the United States who perform much work on Iran-related sales.
6. The official military sales to Iran for fiscal 1973 are listed at \$2.054 billion. The official Defense Department figure on fiscal 1974 sales is \$3.7 billion, although the Congress was told in April, 1974 via the Congressional Presentation document of an estimated \$4.8 billion in military sales to Iran in fiscal 1974. That estimate became unclassified on June 30, 1974, but the fiscal 1975 figure is still classified.
7. All weapons systems mentioned in this letter have been mentioned in the public media. Of note is Arms in the Persian Gulf, Dale R. Tahtinen, with a foreword by Melvin R. Laird, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington, D.C., 1974.



8. Laser-guided bombs are mentioned in "Colossus of the Oil Lanes," Arnaud De Borchgrave, Newsweek, May 21, 1973.
9. The New York Times, "Iran Offers to Fully Back Resumed Output of C-5A's," December 2, 1974, broke the story. See also "Lockheed Moves to Open C-5 Line," Aviation Week, December 9, 1974.
10. Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, Report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, November 29, 1974, page 62:

"The recent sale of 80 F-14 fighter aircraft to Iran could considerably reduce combat capability of the U.S. Armed Forces. These aircraft, the most sophisticated fighter aircraft available, will be delivered to Iran prior to the planned U.S. Navy F-14 Force being fully equipped."

For other examples, see "Iran to Get Better Helicopters Than U.S. Army," Armed Forces Journal, February, 1973.
11. "Iran Reported Leaning Toward Purchase of Northrop YF-17," Aerospace Daily, July 10, 1974.
12. "Iran will buy A-10s---3 squadrons of them, if USAF A-7/A-10 flyoff now underway, vindicates Fairchild Industries new close support plane," Armed Forces Journal, May, 1974. Fairchild sources first reported to Congressman Long's office the Shah was interested in the A-10 in 1973.
13. Telephone conversation between Greg Rushford, of Congressman Long's staff, and Mr. Rockwell, of Bell Helicopter's Washington, D.C. office, November 19, 1974.
14. Letter to Congressman Long from H.M. Fish, Major General, USAF, Defense Security Assistance Agency, 19 August, 1974.
15. The best explanation of how the Administration's national security apparatus is supposed to work is contained in Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT, John Newhouse, Holt, Rinhart And Winston, 1973, pp. 146-148. Mr. Newhouse should know, because his work draws extensively upon NSDMs, NSSMs, and back channel communications. For contrast, see Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1975, House Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittee, page 100. The record reads:

Mr. LONG. Please provide for the record a list of all national security decision memoranda issued by this Administration since its inception in 1969



through the present: (1) the number of each national security decision memorandum, (2) the date issued, (3) the subject, and (4) a brief, but specific description of the policy set forth in that document.

Secretary KISSINGER. National security decision memorandums reflect guidance regarding the entire spectrum of national security issues. These memorandums invariably deal with highly sensitive subjects and by their very nature are not capable of being publicly disclosed without substantial risk to the policy of objectives they are intended to achieve. For these reasons, we have never compiled a list of these memorandums for dissemination outside the executive branch and have engaged in the congressional and public affairs aspects of decisionmaking without specific reference to particular NSDM's. We would, of course, be pleased to discuss fully any aspect of U.S. foreign policy which is of concern to the committee, whether or not the particular also happens to be the subject of a national security decision memorandum.

16. Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations For 1975, House Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittee, page 106.
17. Letter to Congressman Long from H.M. Fish, Major General, USAF, Defense Security Assistance Agency, 19 August, 1974.
18. My conclusion is based on questions by my staff to staff members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and the Senate Armed Services Committee, plus extensive readings from published Congressional hearings and available press reports from 1972-1974. It is possible, of course, that selected Members of Congress were told of some May, 1972 Presidential commitments, but I have found no evidence that Congress has ever been notified on an official basis. Secretary Schlesinger did mention in a press conference of September 25, 1974 that both the F-14 and F-15 aircraft had been offered to Iran during 1972. That is the closest available public source for any 1972 U.S. commitments, whether by the White House or elsewhere in the U.S. government.



NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC		RECD			LOG NBR	INITIAL ACTION O
MO	DA	MO	DA	HR		
12	20	1	04	12	7500067	

SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES XXXX **Long, Clarence D.** REFERENCE: _____ CIRCLE AS APPROPRIATE

FROM: ~~KISSINGER, H~~ S/S _____ **UNCLAS** LOG IN/OUT

KISSINGER _____ COLBY, W _____ LOU NO FORN NODIS

SCOWCROFT _____ SCHLESINGER, J _____ C EYES ONLY EXDIS

DAVIS _____ ST EX SEC _____ S CODEWORD

TS SENSITIVE

SUBJECT: ^{Low} ~~Long~~ fwds ltr to Pres fm Rep. Long re his request for info re US commitments to Iran & urges review of US arms sales to Iran & other Persian Gulf states.

DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION			REC CY FOR	ACTION REQUIRED
	ACTION	INFO		
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT				MEMO FOR HAK (_____)
STAFF SECRETARY				MEMO FOR PRES (_____)
FAR EAST				REPLY FOR (_____)
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA				APPROPRIATE ACTION (_____)
MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA			X	MEMO TO (_____)
EUROPE / CANADA				RECOMMENDATIONS (_____)
LATIN AMERICA				JOINT MEMO (_____)
UNITED NATIONS				REFER TO _____ FOR: (_____)
ECONOMIC				ANY ACTION NECESSARY? (_____)
SCIENTIFIC				CONCURRENCE (_____)
PROGRAM ANALYSIS				DUE DATE: _____
NSC PLANNING			X	COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)
CONGRESSIONAL			X	
OCEANS POLICY				
INTELLIGENCE				

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS

DATE	FROM	TO	S	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	CY TO
1/04/75		State	D	Draft Reply (9/10)	Oakley ✓ Janka ✓
1/27				Key'd state draft 7500170	
1/27				Oakley's memo Davis to Doer (2-2) signed	
1/27				C Davis's memo to Janka	



NSC/S DISP INSTR

DISPATCH B/S/ser

CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS: _____

NOTIFY _____ & DATE _____ BY _____

SPECIAL DISPOSITION: _____

CROSS REF W/ _____

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: X FOLDER: _____

MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS:

M/F MAR 07 1975 BY _____

CRT ID: mw SF

OPEN: GAD HP NS

CLOSE: GAD WH EP

PA DY

DOC # 12 20 1 2 15
MO DA MCTA HR 12 20 1 2 15
RECD 12 20 1 2 15
LOG NR 12 20 1 2 15

TO: PRES
FROM: [unclear]
SUBJECT: [unclear]
DATE: [unclear]
ACTION: [unclear]

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION
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UNITED NATIONS
ECONOMIC
SCIENTIFIC
PROGRAM ANALYSIS
NRC PLANNING
CONGRESSIONAL
OCEANS POLICY
INTELLIGENCE

Name	Date
Charlille Nsc	3/4/55

DATE	FROM	TO	S	DESCRIPTION
1/04/75	State	D	Draft Reply	(9/10)
1/27				
1/27				
1/27				

DISPATCH [unclear]
CY RIGHTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS
NOTIFY: [unclear]
SPECIAL DISPOSITION: [unclear]
CROSS REF W/ [unclear]
SUSPENSE BY ATTACHED: [unclear]

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC		RECD			LOG NBR	INITIAL ACTION O
MO	DA	MO	DA	HR	7500067	
3	20	3	22	11		

TO: PRES _____ FROM: *Loem, ✓* KISSINGER, H. _____ S/S _____ UNCLAS LOG IN/OUT

KISSINGER _____ COLBY, W. _____ OTHER _____ LOU NO FORN NODIS

SCOWCROFT *X* _____ SCHLESINGER, J. _____ C EYES ONLY EXDIS

DAVIS _____ ST EX SEC _____ S CODEWORD

TS SENSITIVE

SUBJECT: *Pop Long request for info on US arms sales policy to Iran*

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION			REC CY FOR	ACTION REQUIRED
	ACTION	INFO		
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT				MEMO FOR HAK
STAFF SECRETARY				MEMO FOR PRES
FAR EAST				REPLY FOR
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA				APPROPRIATE ACTION
MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA				MEMO _____ TO _____
EUROPE / CANADA				RECOMMENDATIONS
LATIN AMERICA				JOINT MEMO
UNITED NATIONS				REFER TO _____ FOR: _____
ECONOMIC				ANY ACTION NECESSARY?
SCIENTIFIC				CONCURRENCE.
PROGRAM ANALYSIS				DUE DATE:
NSC PLANNING				COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS) <i>NOTE = ORIG PROFILE NOT RETURNED</i>
CONGRESSIONAL				
OCEANS POLICY				
INTELLIGENCE				

DATE	FROM	TO	S	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	CY TO
<i>3/22</i>				<i>Reopen / Read Loem memo</i>	
<i>3/22</i>	<i>Dakley</i>	<i>S</i>		<i>Recommendations</i>	
<i>4/23</i>			<i>C</i>	<i>DOB See 7501703 for Action</i>	
<i>WHITE</i>					

DISPATCH _____	MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS: W/FID <i>24</i> 1975 BY _____
CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS: _____	
NOTIFY _____ & DATE _____ BY _____	
SPECIAL DISPOSITION: _____	
CROSS REF W/ _____	CRT ID: _____
SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: _____ FOLDER: _____	OPEN _____
	CLOSE <i>WAS</i>
	SA SF HP NS <i>WH</i> EP PA DY

19
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

EXECUTIVE

FO 3-2/10068

June 11, 1975



Dear Mrs. Schroeder:

I am writing in further response to your March 20 letter to the President in which you ask for an explanation of our policy toward Iran, specifically concerning our military obligations and sales policy in this area.

The United States has for some years followed a policy designed to assist moderate states in the Gulf area to develop the capability to maintain regional stability as well as to meet their own national security needs. Over the years Iran has pursued a policy of moderation and responsibility in the region and has an important role to play in the future. Iran is working with the Gulf states in a cooperative way to achieve the regional security and stability which is also important to peace and stability in the broader Middle East area and to the economic relationships between the Gulf area and the West. We therefore believe that our policy toward Iran and the Gulf states has served US interests well.

Regarding your particular questions on US military commitments and their effect on US capabilities, our policy involves a number of complex issues which are best understood if put in a broader perspective. I believe that these issues could best be dealt with in a briefing by Department of State officials and I would be most pleased to arrange such a session for you.

We are keenly appreciative of your need to be kept informed of our policy in this area and are pleased to provide assistance in these matters. I look forward to hearing from you on the possibility of a briefing.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Jeanne W. Davis".

Jeanne W. Davis
Staff Secretary

Honorable Patricia Schroeder
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515

Dear Mrs. Schroeder:

I am writing in further response to your March 20 letter to the President in which you ask for an explanation of our policy toward Iran, specifically concerning our military obligations and sales policy in this area.

The United States has for some years followed a policy designed to assist moderate states in the Gulf area to develop the capability to maintain regional stability as well as to meet their own national security needs. Over the years Iran has pursued a policy of moderation and responsibility in the region and has an important role to play in the future. Iran is working with the Gulf states in a cooperative way to achieve the regional security and stability which is also important to peace and stability in the broader Middle East area and to the economic relationships between the Gulf area and the West. We therefore believe that our policy toward Iran and the Gulf states has served US interests well.

Regarding your particular questions on US military commitments and their effect on US capabilities, ~~our policy~~ ^{our policy involves a number of complex issues} I believe that these issues could best be dealt with in a ~~briefing~~ ^{briefing} by Department of State officials and I would be most pleased to arrange such a session for you.

We are keenly ~~aware~~ ^{appreciative} of your need to be kept informed of our policy in this area and are pleased to provide assistance in these matters. I look forward to hearing from you on the possibility of a briefing.

Sincerely,

Honorable Paul S
Walters
3/26
20515

This version cleared by Oakley



which are best understood if put in a broader perspective.

June 11, 1975


MEMORANDUM FOR:

Mr. George S. Springsteen
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Congressional Request for Information
on U.S. Arms Sales to Iran

For your information I am enclosing a copy of my letters to Representatives Long and Schroeder in which I offer to arrange a State Department briefing for these two members of Congress.

In addition to the regular internal distribution of these letters we ask that you forward a copy of the correspondence to Monroe Leigh.


Jeanne W. Davis
Staff Secretary



Attachments

RECEIVED
JUL 3 1975
CENTRAL FILES

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

June 11, 1975

JWD:

REVIEW AND SIGNATURE

-- Letters to Long and Schroeder

-- memorandum to Springsteen

Buchen has responded that he concurs in the proposed replies. He asks that we send him a copy of signed letters and that we have one sent to the State Legal Adviser.

Steve
Steve

Steve

*beal's with
copy also to
Lou*

~~*Richard*~~



Over

June 11, 1975

NSC/S:

Please see that a copy of the signed
letters is sent to Janka, Oakley,
Buchen and Friedersdorf.

A copy of Schroeder's letter of March ~~20~~
should also be sent with the letters to
State.

Thanks.

Steve
Steve Skancke



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 10, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Jeanne Davis

FROM: Phil Buchen *P.W.B.*

In response to your memorandum of June 9,
I see no problem with the attached letters, but
suggest you send me an information copy, as
well as one to Monroe Leigh at State.

Your letters are returned herewith for your
signature.



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

6-10

Buchen's office called (Eva) regarding the attached package says he has nothing more to add to what Casselman said other than info copies should be sent to Monroe Lee--Legal Adviser at State and himself of the signed letters.



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

June 9, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: PHILIP W. BUCHEN

FROM: Jeanne W. Davis *JWD*

SUBJECT: Response to Congressional Requests for
Information on U.S. Arms Sales to Iran



Last December Congressman Clarence Long wrote to the President seeking information on U.S. arms sales to Iran. We furnished Max Friedersdorf with a draft which we understand was signed by Vern Loen giving a general description of our policy toward Iran and indicating that, because some of the detailed questions Long raised could not be handled adequately in a letter, we would arrange a meeting with State Department officials to discuss his concerns.


Mr. Long found the response unacceptable and has indicated that if he is unable to get answers to his questions, his subcommittee may subpoena the desired information or hold special hearings. (Mr. Long also sits on the Appropriations Subcommittee having jurisdiction over the NSC Staff and raised this question in our budget hearings.) Evidentially he is not interested in another letter from the White House Congressional Relations office and Vern Loen has asked that the NSC write directly to Long.

The documents he is seeking are two 1972 memoranda from Mr. Kissinger to the Secretaries of State and Defense regarding "Follow-up on the President's talk with the Shah of Iran." In response to a request last year from Senator Fulbright and two more recent requests from Congressman Long and Senator Sparkman the matter of releasing or showing these documents was raised with Secretary Kissinger. He decided that we should neither give nor allow congressional staff members to read these documents and that instead we should offer an oral briefing to the interested parties, informing them of the content of the documents and placing them in the context of overall US policy. Accordingly, we have prepared a draft response to Congressman Long renewing the offer of the State Department briefing and adding that the NSC Staff is also prepared to discuss the content of the memorandum containing the President's decisions on US policy toward Iran.

In a recent letter Congresswoman Schroeder has joined Mr. Long in his request for information on U.S. - Iran relations and, following consultation with Vernon Loen, we propose to offer her a State briefing as well.

May we please have your clearance and/or comments on the two letters. Because Long was told a further response would be forthcoming very soon, I would appreciate your earliest consideration and if possible an indication of your position by Tuesday, June 10.

Attachments



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 7, 1975

Dear Mrs. Schroeder:

I am writing in further response to your March 20 letter to the President in which you ask for an explanation of our policy toward Iran, specifically concerning our military obligations and sales policy in this area.

The United States has for some years followed a policy designed to assist moderate states in the Gulf area to develop the capability to maintain regional stability as well as to meet their own national security needs. Over the years Iran has pursued a policy of moderation and responsibility in the region and has an important role to play in the future. Iran is working with the Gulf states in a cooperative way to achieve the regional security and stability which is also important to peace and stability in the broader Middle East area and to the economic relationships between the Gulf area and the West. We therefore believe that our policy toward Iran and the Gulf states has served US interests well.

Regarding your particular questions on US military commitments and their effect on US capabilities, our policy involves a number of complex issues which are best understood if put in a broader perspective. I believe that these issues could best be dealt with in a briefing by Department of State officials and I would be most pleased to arrange such a session for you.

We are keenly appreciative of your need to be kept informed of our policy in this area and are pleased to provide assistance in these matters. ~~I look forward to~~ hearing from you on the possibility of a briefing.

Sincerely,

Jeanne W. Davis
Staff Secretary

Honorable Patricia Schroeder
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

6/6 pri

Jeanne —



Both ~~Bob~~ Oakley
and his Janica have
reviewed and cleared
these letters to Long and
Schroeder. Are we all
set to move them?

Rosmary

FD 3-2/CO68

CO68

March 25, 1975

Dear Mrs. Schroeder:

Thank you for your March 20 letter to the President requesting background information concerning our commitments with respect to military sales to Iran for a period covering the past five years through the present.

I note that you have joined your request for information with that previously received from Congressman Clarence Long. Since you have expanded the specific information initially requested, we will be pleased to ask that your letter receive prompt consideration. You will hear further as soon as possible.

With kind regards,

Sincerely,

Vern
Vernon C. Loen
Deputy Assistant
to the President



+
The Honorable Patricia Schroeder
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

not attached
bcc: w/incoming to General Scowcroft for DRAFT REPLY.
Please note Mr. Long received substantive reply on March 7
(NSC Log No 0067)

VCL:EF:VO:vo

RECEIVED
MAR 27 1975
GENERAL FILES

*Sent Red Tag
sp/6*

15
PATRICIA SCHROEDER
1ST DISTRICT, DENVER, COLORADO

3-24
ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
POST OFFICE AND CIVIL
SERVICE COMMITTEE

DISTRICT OFFICE:
DENVER FEDERAL BUILDING
1767 HIGH STREET
DENVER, COLORADO 80218
(303) 837-2354

WASHINGTON OFFICE:
1131 LONGWORTH HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515
(202) 225-4431

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

March 20, 1975

MF
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500



Dear Mr. President:

On December 20, 1975, Representative Clarence Long requested full facts on all U.S. commitments to Iran during the last five years plus information regarding the sale of F-14's to Iran in May of 1972. To date, no sufficient reply has been received. However, facts pertaining to U.S. military sales in Iran remain important and I join Representative Long in an inquiry for information in this area.

According to accounts from the Department of Defense, U.S. military sale orders to Iran amounted to \$646,212 between FY1965-69, and during the years FY 1970-74 the total grew to \$6.9 million. In addition to the danger latent in an accelerated supply of arms to the Persian Gulf area, the sales evidently have a detrimental effect upon U.S. capability and resources. In 1974 it was reported before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the sale of eight F-14 fighter aircraft to Iran "prior to the planned U.S. Navy force being equipped" could "considerably reduce combat capacity of the U.S. Armed Forces". Moreover, the allegation by Representative Long and others regarding the absence of a National Security Council study on the advisability of such growth in arms proliferation remains unsolved.

Representative Long has outlined these issues in his letter of December 20, 1974 and my present purpose is to support his request, plus ask for an account of


1. current U.S. policy toward Iran
2. current U.S. commitment and military obligation to Iran
3. the impact of our military personnel and equipment obligation to Iran upon U.S. capability.

March 20, 1975

Without the benefit of crucial information it is impossible for Congress to be effective in performing its duties. The issue of U.S. arms sales to foreign countries is a matter of concern for many and I hope the appropriate information will be forthcoming.


Thank you.

With kind regards,



Patricia Schroeder
Congresswoman

PS/lf/aw



NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC		RECD		LOG NBR		INITIAL ACTION O
MO	DA	MO	DA	HR		
3	25	3	26	13	7501858	Colley

SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES _____ FROM: Loewen, V REFERENCE: _____ CIRCLE AS APPROPRIATE

KISSINGER _____ COLBY, W _____ S/S _____ UNCLAS LOG IN/OUT

SCOWCROFT SCHLESINGER, J _____ OTHER _____ LOU _____ NO FORN NODIS

DAVIS _____ ST EX SEC _____ S _____ EYES ONLY EXDIS

TS _____ SENSITIVE

SUBJECT: Letter to President from Rep. Schroeder re US Military Sales to Iran

DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION	ACTION	INFO	REC CY FOR	ACTION REQUIRED
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT				MEMO FOR HAK (_____)
STAFF SECRETARY				MEMO FOR PRES (_____)
FAR EAST				REPLY FOR _____ (_____)
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA				APPROPRIATE ACTION (_____)
MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA	X		X	MEMO _____ TO _____ (_____)
EUROPE / CANADA				RECOMMENDATIONS (_____)
LATIN AMERICA				JOINT MEMO (_____)
UNITED NATIONS				REFER TO _____ FOR: _____ (_____)
ECONOMIC				ANY ACTION NECESSARY? (_____)
SCIENTIFIC				CONCURRENCE (_____)
PROGRAM ANALYSIS				DUE DATE: _____
NSC PLANNING				COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS) <u>3-27</u> <u>Inter: Clarence Long</u> <u>Backup attached</u>
CONGRESSIONAL				
OCEANS POLICY				
INTELLIGENCE				

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS

DATE	FROM	TO	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	CY TO
6/9			<u>d Davis to Hoen & Buchen (6-10)</u>	
6/10			<u>Recl Buchen Comments</u>	
6/10	<u>K</u>	<u>Loewen</u>	<u>S Further action</u>	
6/11			<u>C Loewen Ad of th to Schroeder</u>	
			<u>Long</u>	
			<u>Sp system (Schroeder with to be included)</u>	

DISPATCH _____

CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS: Go to Loewen + Buchen

NOTIFY _____ & DATE _____ BY _____

SPECIAL DISPOSITION: _____

CROSS REF W/ 7500067

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: yes FOLDER: _____

MICROFILM FILE RQMTS: MAR 02 1975 BY _____

CRT ID: GAB

OPEN GAB

CLOSE _____

SA SF

HP NS

WH EP

PA DY

16

747

~~*****CONFIDENTIAL*****~~ COPY

FLASH
DE RUEHC #0548 2942324
Z 212318Z OCT 75 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY FLASH 3183

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 250548 TOSEC 160173

FOLLOWING REPEAT MADRID 7323 ACTION SECSTATE 21 OCT
QUOTE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MADRID 7323
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINR, SP
SUBJECT: FRANCO
REF: MADRID 7322

1. DESPITE THE UPBEAT GDS ANNOUNCEMENT IN REPTEL, OUR SOURCES, FOR THE MOST PART, CONTINUE TO SAY THAT FRANCO IS GRAVELY ILL. THE [REDACTED] REPORT SUGGESTS HE REMAINS IN GRAVE CONDITION. DAD HAS REPORTS FROM NEW SOURCES THAT FRANCO MAY HAVE DIED.

25X1

2. WE ARE AT A LOSS TO SAY WHAT STATE XFRANCO IS IN AT THE MOMENT. WE SHOULD NOTE THAT IN HIS 1974 BRUSH WITH DEATH, THE GDS SOUGHT TO KEEP SECRET FROM THE PUBLIC THE GRAVITY OF HIS ILLNESS.
STABLER UNQUOTE INGERSOLL
BT

DECLASSIFIED w/ portions exempted

AUTHORITY RAC NLF-TB-HK-16-1-2-6 9/10/04
NSC/State Building
NR NLF DATE 3/5/09



PSN:048310 PAGE 01 OF 01 TOR:294/23:27Z DTG:212318Z OCT 75

Presidential Library Review of NSC and DOS Equities is Required
~~*****CONFIDENTIAL*****~~ COPY

096 *****CONFIDENTIAL***** COPY

OP IMMED
DE RUEHC #0001 2048107
O 212056Z OCT 75 2PF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 3109

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 250001 T0SEC 160162

EXD18
E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)

SUBJECT: MEDICAL CONDITION OF GENERAL FRANCO
FOR THE SECRETARY FROM HYLAND

EMBASSY MADRID HAS SENT FOLLOWING MESSAGE UPDATING EARLIER
[REDACTED] REPORTING DEATH OF FRANCO

25X1
DIA

BEGIN TEXT

SOURCE STATES HIS SPANISH GOVERNMENT SOURCE HAS TOLD HIM
FRANCO HAS RECOVERED CONSCIOUSNESS FROM DEEP COMA, IS NOT
EXPECTED TO LIVE THROUGH NIGHT AND THAT FORMAL CHANGE OF
POWER WILL TAKE PLACE LATER TONIGHT. THIS VERSION ABOUT
SAME AS THAT NOW [REDACTED] STATES
TURNOVER HUNG-UP UPON WHETHER IT WOULD BE TEMPORARY (IN
WHICH CASE PRINCE JUAN CARLOS WOULD REFUSE TO TAKE OVER)
OR PERMANENT.

25X1

DATT COMMENT. THIS STORY MAY BE OFFICIAL LINE TO COVER
PERIOD AFTER FRANCO'S DEATH UNTIL NEW GOVERNMENT READY TO
EXERCISE POWER OR MAY BE TRUE. DO NOT BELIEVE FRANCO WILL
BE RULER OF SPAIN TOMORROW IF HE IS NOW. END TEXT INGERSOLL
BT

DECLASSIFIED w/ portions exempted

AUTHORITY RAC NLF-TB-HK-16-1-1-7 9/8/04
NSC State Guidelines
BY NR NLF DATE 3/5/09



*****WHBR COMMENT*****

ICOWCROFT,LL

SN:048108 PAGE 01 OF 01 TOR:294/21115Z DTG:212056Z OCT 75

*****CONFIDENTIAL***** COPY

Presidential Library Review of NSC and [REDACTED] (SIA Review) completed

EXECUTIVE

TA3/C068

C068.

FO3-2/C068

Chairman of the Board and
Chief Executive Officer

Jones, Thomas V.

4 November 1976

Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, USAF (Ret.)
Assistant to the President
National Security Council
17th & Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, D. C. 20506



Dear Brent:

In reference to our recent discussions on the F-18L for Iran, I would like to review briefly the key elements of the program as of today, placing emphasis on the National Security and other national and international considerations. My concern is that key and significant elements are not being stressed at the expense of some generalizations and past positions that are, at best, incomplete, or at worst, incorrect.

Briefly, let me suggest these points, as follows:

- (1) The policy considerations of this current and latest ^XNorthrop National Security Program (F-18L) are virtually identical with those that were addressed in 1956-1957 that led to initial U. S. Government backing of the N-156 program, the beginning of the F-5 family of aircraft. Interestingly enough, the logic of this initial program so applicable today addressed the very questions that have been raised recently by the Humphrey Committee.
- (2) At no cost to the U. S., the F-18L provides a modern American-made fighter with clear economic and defense advantages, and is the only U. S. aircraft in its class acceptable to those of our allies with an absolute twin engine requirement.
- (3) Failure to permit the offering of this version of the Navy F-18 program would be a denial of competition and the resulting benefits to the defense posture of both the United States and the recipient countries.