

**The original documents are located in Box 30, folder “10/6/75 S2230 Board for International Broadcasting Appropriation Authorization FY1976 and Military Assistance for Turkey” of the White House Records Office: Legislation Case Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.**

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**APPROVED**

**OCT 6 - 1975**

*Statement on bill passage issued 10/3/75*

*Signed 10/6/75*

ACTION

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

October 3, 1975

*Posted 10/7/75  
To the President 10/8/75*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: JIM CANNON  
SUBJECT: Enrolled Bill S. 2230 - Board for International Broadcasting Appropriation Authorization, FY 1976 and Military Assistance for Turkey

Attached for your consideration is S. 2230, which authorizes appropriations of \$65,640,000 for FY 76 for the Board for International Broadcasting and removes certain statutory restrictions on military assistance to Turkey.

A detailed analysis of the enrolled bill is provided in OMB's enrolled bill report at Tab A.

OMB, Max Friedersdorf, Counsel's Office (Lazarus), NSC and I recommend approval of the enrolled bill.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign S. 2230 at Tab B.



*Recd in Records Office 10/7/75 (1:10 pm)  
Jack Heubner, Press Officer, advised 10/7/75 (1:15 pm)*

COMMENTS  
WHITE HOUSE COUNSEL'S OFFICE

"The concurrent resolution feature noted in OMB's memorandum is the least offensive form of legislative encroachment; committee vetoes and one-house veto provisions which are accepted on occasion are much more objectionable. Moreover, the concurrent resolution veto is better described as "arguably" unconstitutional.

The requirement in the bill that the President report to the Congress on any negotiations with Greece or Turkey is unseemly in view of the exclusivity of Executive control over the conduct of foreign affairs. However, due to the fact that the language will not require detailed reports on the progress of any negotiations, it would not appear to merit Presidential notice in this context."

A



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

OCT 3 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Enrolled Bill S. 2230 - Board for International  
Broadcasting appropriation authorization,  
fiscal 1976, and military assistance for Turkey  
Sponsors - Sen. Sparkman (D) Alabama and Sen. Case  
(R) New Jersey

Last Day for Action



Purpose

Authorizes appropriations of \$65,640,000 for fiscal year 1976 for the Board for International Broadcasting; removes certain statutory restrictions on military assistance to Turkey.

Agency Recommendations

Office of Management and Budget

Approval

Department of State

Approval (Informally)

National Security Council

Approval (Informally)

Department of Defense

Approval (Informally)

Board for International Broadcasting

Approval (Informally)

Discussion

The enrolled bill authorizes fiscal year 1976 appropriations of \$65,640,000 for the Board for International Broadcasting, as requested. It also authorizes appropriations of "such sums as may be necessary" for salary increases and other nondiscretionary costs which may arise in fiscal year 1976, which the Administration also requested.

The more significant part of the enrolled bill, however, is section 2 which partially removes the total arms embargo imposed on Turkey by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974. S. 2230 eases the current statutory restrictions by permitting delivery of defense articles and services for which contracts of sale were signed prior to February 5, 1975, the effective date of the embargo, and permits renewed commercial arms sales to Turkey. In order for these provisions to become effective, the President must determine and certify to Congress that the assistance authorized is important to the national security interests of the United States. These provisions would be effective only while Turkey observes the cease-fire on Cyprus and provided Turkey does not increase its forces on Cyprus or transfer any U.S. supplied implements of war to Cyprus.


The enrolled bill also provides that, after enactment of legislation authorizing fiscal 1976 sales, credits and guaranties under the Foreign Military Sales Act, and subject to certain other conditions, the President would be authorized to approve additional sales to Turkey under the Foreign Military Sales Act if he determines and certifies to Congress that such sales are necessary in order for Turkey to fulfill its NATO responsibilities.

With regard to this latter authority, we note that it contains one constitutionally objectionable provision. Under the bill, the President would be required to report to Congress in advance of any letter of offer to sell Defense articles or services to Turkey exceeding \$25 million in value. The letter of offer could not be issued if Congress adopted a concurrent resolution within 20 calendar days objecting to the proposed sale. Justice has frequently opposed inclusion of such concurrent resolution override provisions in law on the grounds that they conflict with Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution which requires the President's approval of all legislative resolutions which are to have the force of law. We would point out, however, that the current provision parallels existing section 36(b) of the Foreign Military Sales Act which applies generally to proposed sales in excess of \$25 million.

The bill also requests the President to initiate discussions with Greece to determine that country's most urgent economic and military assistance needs and to initiate discussions with Turkey concerning effective means of preventing the diversion of opium poppy into illicit channels. The President is required to submit a report to Congress on these discussions within 60 days of enactment of S. 2230 together with his recommendations for economic and military assistance to Greece for fiscal 1976. Finally, the bill also requires the President to submit reports to the Congress at 60 day intervals on progress toward a negotiated solution of the Cyprus conflict.

We believe Congressional action on S. 2230 accomplishes the purpose of your September 16, 1975, letter to Chairman Morgan of the House International Relations Committee in which you said:

"While I believe the arms ban should be removed in its entirety at the earliest possible date, I think that S. 2230 would, if adopted this month by the Congress, permit us to begin the essential task of rebuilding our bilateral relationship with Turkey and would greatly enhance the possibilities for progress on Cyprus. I emphasize again that timely action is important. I urge in the strongest terms early and favorable consideration of this legislation."

  
Assistant Director for  
Legislative Reference

Enclosures

B



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET

DATE: 10-6-75

TO: Bob Linder  
FROM: Jim Frey

Attached are agency views  
letters as follow:

HJR 672 - GSA and Nat'l Comm.  
on Productivity and Work  
Quality

S 2230 - Dept. of Defense

Please have included in the  
enrolled bill files. Thanks.

OMB FORM 38  
REV AUG 73

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

10.7.75

TO: Tom Jones

For Your Information: \_\_\_\_\_

For Appropriate Handling:  \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

  
Robert D. Linder

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

OCT 3 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Enrolled Bill S. 2230 - Board for International Broadcasting appropriation authorization, fiscal 1976, and military assistance for Turkey Sponsors - Sen. Sparkman (D) Alabama and Sen. Case (R) New Jersey

Last Day for Action

*October 15, 1975*

Purpose

Authorizes appropriations of \$65,640,000 for fiscal year 1976 for the Board for International Broadcasting; removes certain statutory restrictions on military assistance to Turkey.

Agency Recommendations

Office of Management and Budget

Approval

Department of State

Approval (Informally)

National Security Council

Approval (Informally)

Department of Defense

Approval (Informally)

Board for International Broadcasting

Approval (Informally)

Discussion

The enrolled bill authorizes fiscal year 1976 appropriations of \$65,640,000 for the Board for International Broadcasting, as requested. It also authorizes appropriations of "such sums as may be necessary" for salary increases and other nondiscretionary costs which may arise in fiscal year 1976, which the Administration also requested.

The more significant part of the enrolled bill, however, is section 2 which partially removes the total arms embargo imposed on Turkey by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974. S. 2230 eases the current statutory restrictions by permitting delivery of defense articles and services for which contracts of sale were signed prior to February 5, 1975, the effective date of the embargo, and permits renewed commercial arms sales to Turkey. In order for these provisions to become effective, the President must determine and certify to Congress that the assistance authorized is important to the national security interests of the United States. These provisions would be effective only while Turkey observes the cease-fire on Cyprus and provided Turkey does not increase its forces on Cyprus or transfer any U.S. supplied implements of war to Cyprus.

The enrolled bill also provides that, after enactment of legislation authorizing fiscal 1976 sales, credits and guaranties under the Foreign Military Sales Act, and subject to certain other conditions, the President would be authorized to approve additional sales to Turkey under the Foreign Military Sales Act if he determines and certifies to Congress that such sales are necessary in order for Turkey to fulfill its NATO responsibilities.

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We believe Congressional action on S. 2230 accomplishes the purpose of your September 16, 1975, letter to Chairman Morgan of the House International Relations Committee in which you said:

"While I believe the arms ban should be removed in its entirety at the earliest possible date, I think that S. 2230 would, if adopted this month by the Congress, permit us to begin the essential task of rebuilding our bilateral relationship with Turkey and would greatly enhance the possibilities for progress on Cyprus. I emphasize again that timely action is important. I urge in the strongest terms early and favorable consideration of this legislation."

((Signed)) James M. Frey

Assistant Director for  
Legislative Reference

Enclosures

# Ninety-fourth Congress of the United States of Ame

AT THE FIRST SESSION

*Begun and held at the City of Washington on Tuesday, the fourteenth day of January,  
one thousand nine hundred and seventy-five*

## An Act

To authorize appropriations for the Board for International Broadcasting for fiscal year 1976; and to promote improved relations between the United States, Greece, and Turkey, to assist in the solution of the refugee problem on Cyprus, and to otherwise strengthen the North Atlantic Alliance.

*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That section 8(a) of the Board for International Broadcasting Act of 1973 (22 U.S.C. 2877 (a)) is amended—*

(1) by striking out “\$49,990,000 for fiscal year 1975, of which not less than \$75,000 shall be available solely to initiate broadcasts in the Estonian language and not less than \$75,000 shall be available solely to initiate broadcasts in the Latvian language” in the first sentence and inserting in lieu thereof “\$65,640,000 for fiscal year 1976”; and


(2) by striking out “fiscal year 1975” in the second sentence and inserting in lieu thereof “fiscal year 1976”.

Sec. 2. (a) (1) The Congress reaffirms the policy of the United States to seek to improve and harmonize relations among the allies of the United States and between the United States and its allies, in the interest of mutual defense and national security. In particular, the Congress recognizes the special contribution to the North Atlantic Alliance of Greece and Turkey by virtue of their geographic position on the southeastern flank of Europe and is prepared to assist in the modernization and strengthening of their respective armed forces.

(2) The Congress further reaffirms the policy of the United States to alleviate the suffering of refugees and other victims of armed conflict and to foster and promote international efforts to ameliorate the conditions which prevent such persons from resuming normal and productive lives. The Congress, therefore, calls upon the President to encourage and to cooperate in the implementation of multilateral programs, under the auspices of the Secretary General of the United Nations, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, or other appropriate international agencies, for the relief of and assistance to refugees and other persons disadvantaged by the hostilities on Cyprus pending a final settlement of the Cyprus refugee situation in the spirit of Security Council Resolution 361.

(b) (1) In order that the purposes of this Act may be carried out without awaiting the enactment of foreign assistance legislation for fiscal year 1976 programs—

(A) the President is authorized, notwithstanding section 620 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, to furnish to the Government of Turkey those defense articles and defense services with respect to which contracts of sale were signed under section 21 or section 22 of the Foreign Military Sales Act on or before February 5, 1975, and to issue licenses for the transportation to the Government of Turkey of arms, ammunition, and implements of war (including technical data relating thereto): *Provided, That* such authorization shall be effective only while Turkey shall observe the cease-fire and shall neither increase its forces on



Cyprus nor transfer to Cyprus any United States supplied implements of war: *Provided further*, That the authorities contained in this section shall not become effective unless and until the President determines and certifies to the Congress that the furnishing of defense articles and defense services, and the issuance of licenses for the transportation of implements of war, arms and ammunition under this section are important to the national security interests of the United States; and

(B) the President is requested to initiate discussions with the Government of Greece to determine the most urgent needs of Greece for economic and military assistance.

(C) the President is requested to initiate discussions with the Government of Turkey concerning effective means of preventing the diversion of opium poppy into illicit channels.

(2) The President is directed to submit to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the Foreign Relations and Appropriations Committees of the Senate within sixty days after the enactment of this Act a report on discussions conducted under subsections (b) (1) (B) and (C), together with his recommendations for economic and military assistance to Greece for the fiscal year 1976.

(c) (1) Section 620(x) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is amended by striking out all after the word "*Provided*," and inserting in lieu thereof the following: "That the President is authorized to suspend the provisions of this section and of section 3(c) of the Foreign Military Sales Act only with respect to sales, credits, and guaranties under the Foreign Military Sales Act, as amended, for the procurement of such defense articles and defense services as the President determines and certifies to the Congress are necessary in order to enable Turkey to fulfill her defense responsibilities as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Any such suspension shall be effective only while Turkey shall observe the cease-fire and shall neither increase its forces on Cyprus nor transfer to Cyprus any United States supplied arms, ammunition, and implements of war."

(2) Section 620(x) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is further amended by designating the present subsection as paragraph (1) and by adding at the end thereof the following new paragraph:

"(2) The President shall submit to the Congress within sixty days after the enactment of this paragraph, and at the end of each succeeding sixty-day period, a report on progress made during such period toward the conclusion of a negotiated solution of the Cyprus conflict."


(3) Nothing in this section shall be construed as authorizing (A) military assistance to Turkey under chapter 2 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, or (B) sales, credits, or guaranties to or on behalf of Turkey under the Foreign Military Sales Act for the procurement of defense articles or defense services not determined by the President to be needed for the fulfillment of Turkey's North Atlantic Treaty Organization responsibilities.

(4) Pursuant to the provisions of this section, in the case of any letter of offer to sell any defense article or defense service pursuant to the Foreign Military Sales Act for \$25,000,000 or more, the President shall submit to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a statement containing (A) a brief description of the defense article or defense service to be offered, (B) the dollar amount of the proposed sale, (C) the United States Armed Force which is making the sale, and (D) the date on which any letter of offer to sell is to be issued. The letter of offer shall not be issued if the Congress, within twenty

calendar days after receiving any such statement, adopts a concurrent resolution stating in effect that it objects to such proposed sale.

(5) This subsection shall become effective only upon enactment of foreign assistance legislation authorizing sales, credits, and guaranties under the Foreign Military Sales Act for fiscal year 1976.

  
*Carl Albert*  
Speaker of the House of Representatives.

  
Via President of the United States and  
Acting President of the Senate, for Tom

Office of the White House Press Secretary

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THE WHITE HOUSE

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

I welcome the passage by the Congress of S. 2230, which provides for a partial lifting of the embargo on U.S. arms for Turkey. This action is an essential first step in the process of rebuilding a relationship of trust and friendship with valued friends and allies in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The Congressional vote reflects a cooperative effort with the Senate and House of Representatives on the difficult question of Cyprus and the vital task of restoring stability and security along NATO's strategically important southern flank.

With the partial lifting of the embargo, I intend to take action in four broad areas in the weeks ahead.

First, we will seek to rebuild our security relationship with Turkey to underscore that Turkey's membership in the Western alliance and partnership with the United States serve the very important interest of both nations.

Second, we will make a major effort to encourage resumption of the Cyprus negotiations and to facilitate progress by the parties involved -- Greece, Turkey and Cyprus -- toward a peaceful and equitable settlement of this dispute. In this connection, we will fulfill whatever role the parties themselves want us to play in achieving a settlement acceptable to all. In accordance with S. 2230, I will submit to the Congress within 60 days of enactment a report on progress made in reaching a solution to the Cyprus problem.

Third, the Administration will intensify cooperation with appropriate international humanitarian agencies to find ways to alleviate the suffering of the many people displaced as a result of the 1974 hostilities. The plight of these unfortunate people makes progress towards solution of the Cyprus problem all the more important.

Finally, the Administration intends to provide support to the democratic government of Greece. In that regard, we will pursue efforts to help that country overcome its current economic and security problems. Also, in compliance with S. 2230, I will submit within 60 days my recommendations for assistance to Greece for fiscal year 1976.

(MORE)

Our goals in the Eastern Mediterranean in the months ahead -- to help the parties involved achieve a Cyprus settlement, to rebuild a relationship of trust and friendship with both Greece and Turkey, to alleviate the suffering on Cyprus and to meet Greece's needs for assistance -- are objectives on which we all can agree. Let us now join in working together to achieve them.

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GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

3 October 1975

Honorable James T. Lynn  
Director, Office of Management  
and Budget  
Washington, D. C. 20503

Dear Mr. Lynn:


Reference is made to your request for the views of the Department of Defense on the Enrolled Enactment of S. 2230, 94th Congress, "To authorize appropriations for the Board for International Broadcasting for fiscal year 1976; and to promote improved relations between the United States, Greece, and Turkey, to assist in the solution of the refugee problem on Cyprus, and to otherwise strengthen the North Atlantic Alliance."

Section 1 of S. 2230, as passed by the Congress, authorizes the appropriation of \$65.64 million for FY 1976 to support the operations of Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, and the Board for International Broadcasting. The Department of Defense defers to the views of the Board in this regard.


The balance of S. 2230 relates to the partial relaxation of the embargo on arms shipments to the Turkish Government which has been imposed pursuant to section 620(x) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. S. 2230 also requests the President to initiate discussions (a) with the Greek Government to determine the most urgent needs of Greece for economic and military assistance and (b) with the Turkish Government concerning effective means of preventing the diversion of opium poppy into illicit channels, and directs the President to submit a report to the Congress within 60 days on these discussions, together with his recommendations for economic and military assistance to Greece for the current fiscal year. Finally, S. 2230 requires the President to submit to the Congress at 60-day intervals reports on progress made toward the conclusion of a negotiated solution of the Cyprus conflict.

On September 16, 1975, the President wrote a letter to the Chairman of the House Committee on International Relations in which he urged "in the strongest terms early and favorable consideration of this legislation" and stated his conviction that "immediate Congressional action is needed to relax the embargo on arms shipments to Turkey if U.S. security interests in the eastern Mediterranean are not to be jeopardized beyond repair." Accordingly, the Department of Defense recommends that the President approve S. 2230, 94th Congress.

Sincerely yours,



Benjamin Forman  
Acting General Counsel



MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

6630

October 3, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: JIM CAVANAUGH

FROM: Jeanne W. Davis 

SUBJECT: S 2230: Appropriations for Board of  
International Broadcasting; to promote  
improved relations between the U. S. ,  
Greece and Turkey

The NSC Staff concurs in S 2230. For maximum effect the  
bill should be signed today, if possible.

THE WHITE HOUSE

ACTION MEMORANDUM

WASHINGTON

LOG NO.:

Date: October 3

Time: 300pm

FOR ACTION: NSC/S  
Max Friedersdorf  
Ken Lazarus

cc (for information):

FROM THE STAFF SECRETARY

DUE: Date: October 3

Time: 510pm

SUBJECT:

SS. 2230- Appropriations for International Broadcasting;  
to promote improved relations between the U.S.  
Greece and Turkey



ACTION REQUESTED:

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> For Necessary Action     | <input type="checkbox"/> For Your Recommendations |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Agenda and Brief | <input type="checkbox"/> Draft Reply              |
| <input type="checkbox"/> For Your Comments        | <input type="checkbox"/> Draft Remarks            |

REMARKS:

Please return to Judy Johnston, Ground Floor West Wing

PLEASE ATTACH THIS COPY TO MATERIAL SUBMITTED.

If you have any questions or if you anticipate a delay in submitting the required material, please telephone the Staff Secretary immediately.

\_\_\_\_\_  
K. R. COLE, JR.  
For the President

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

October 3, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: JIM CAVANAUGH  
FROM: MAX L. FRIEDERSDORF *M. G.*  
SUBJECT: SS. 2230 - Appropriations for International  
Broadcasting; to promote improved relations between  
the U.S. Greece and Turkey

The Office of Legislative Affairs concurs with the agencies  
that the subject bill be signed.

Attachments

Date: October 3

Time: 300pm

received 10/4/75

8:55 AM

FOR ACTION: NSC/S  
 Max Friedersdorf  
 Ken Lazarus

cc (for information): Robert Hartmann  
 Jack Marsh

FROM THE STAFF SECRETARY

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DUE: Date: October 3

Time: 530pm

SUBJECT:

SS. 2230- Appropriations for International Broadcasting;  
 to promote improved relations between the U.S.  
 Greece and Turkey

## ACTION REQUESTED:

 For Necessary Action For Your Recommendations Prepare Agenda and Brief Draft Reply For Your Comments Draft Remarks

## REMARKS:

Please return to Judy Johnston, Ground Floor West Wing

Note: The bill just arrived at the White House, OMB has not had time to do an enrolled bill report, and the President has indicated that he would like the bill this evening, so the copy of the bill itself is being staffed for clearance.

*Approved*  
*RTA*

PLEASE ATTACH THIS COPY TO MATERIAL SUBMITTED.

If you have any questions or if you anticipate a delay in submitting the required material, please telephone the Staff Secretary immediately.

— Jim Cavanaugh  
 For the President

# Calendar No. 69

94TH CONGRESS }  
1st Session }

SENATE }

REPORT  
No. 94-74

## MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO TURKEY

APRIL 10, 1975.—Ordered to be printed

Mr. SPARKMAN, from the Committee on Foreign Relations,  
submitted the following

### REPORT

[To accompany S. 846]

The Committee on Foreign Relations, to which was referred the bill (S. 846) to authorize the further suspension of prohibitions against military assistance to Turkey, and for other purposes, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon without amendment and recommends that the bill do pass.

#### PURPOSES OF THE BILL

The main purposes of the bill are to amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961—and related continuing resolutions (the terms of which now have expired)—to make possible on a contingent basis the resumption of United States military assistance to Turkey, and to provide that the President shall make monthly reports to the Congress on progress “. . . toward the conclusion of a negotiated solution of the Cyprus conflict.”

#### BACKGROUND

The first landing of Turkish armed forces on the independent island Republic of Cyprus took place on July 20, 1974, in response to a coup, obviously inspired by the Greek military regime then in power in Athens, which resulted in the overthrow of the Makarios government. At the same time the United Nations Security Council adopted a resolution calling for a ceasefire, withdrawal of all foreign troops and negotiations between Greece, Turkey and Great Britain. The United States unsuccessfully attempted to mediate between Greece and Turkey on this issue. More significantly, the Geneva talks on the Cyprus situation by the so-called guarantor powers (Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom) broke down by mid-August and Turkey immedi-

ately thereafter reinforced its troops and expanded their sphere of control on the island.

As a consequence of the second round of Turkish armed intervention, many members of the U.S. Congress stated their conviction that Turkey had violated the terms of law set forth in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 relating to the provision of military assistance to friendly countries. Section 502 of that Act in part reads as follows:

Defense articles and defense services to any country shall be furnished solely for internal security, for legitimate self-defense, to permit the recipient country to participate in regional or collective arrangements or measures consistent with the Charter of the United Nations, or otherwise to permit the recipient country to participate in collective training or restoring international peace and security . . .

In October of 1974 the Congress, through a provision of the continuing resolution for foreign aid appropriations, acted explicitly to cut off military aid to Turkey, including defense cash sales and the licensing of commercial transactions. Nevertheless, a six-week grace period was permitted to encourage further negotiations. On December 10, the cut-off took effect and lasted until December 31. By that latter date the amended terms of the Foreign Assistance Act re-enacted the cut-off but suspended its effect until February 5, 1975, when it was reimposed. Under the current cut-off provision, no military assistance (including sales) may be provided to Turkey unless the President first certifies that two conditions obtain: (1) Turkey must be in compliance with all agreements entered into under requirements of U.S. military aid legislation, and (2) substantial progress must have been made toward an agreement regarding military forces in Cyprus. No military deliveries have been made to Turkey since February 5.

#### COMMITTEE ACTION

On February 26, 1975, Senator Scott (for himself and Senators Case, Griffin, Mansfield, Sparkman, Stennis and Tower) introduced S. 846, to authorize a further suspension of the military assistance cut-off. The Committee on Foreign Relations, in executive session, on March 5 met with Ambassador to Turkey William B. Macomber, and on March 17 received testimony from Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, presenting strong Administration support for the bill. The opposing views of Congressmen Paul S. Sarbanes and Benjamin S. Rosenthal were also heard at that time.

The Committee considered S. 846 in executive session on March 26 and ordered the bill reported favorably by a vote of 9 to 7. Voting for the bill were Senators Sparkman, Mansfield, McGee, Case, Scott, Pearson, Percy, Griffin and Baker; those opposed were Senators Church, Pell, McGovern, Humphrey, Clark, Biden and Javits. Senator Percy made it clear that he reserved the right to vote against the bill on the Senate floor, and was voting favorably only in order to permit S. 846 to go to the Senate. There was considerable discussion of, and support for, a possible compromise whereby the President might

be encouraged, through a Senate resolution, to exercise his waiver authority (under Sec. 614(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act) to make available to Turkey up to \$50 million in grant military aid notwithstanding other provisions of law, if he determined such a course "important to the security of the United States." However, the Administration strongly pressed for a clear-cut vote on S. 846 and the Committee acted in accordance with that wish in ordering the bill reported.

#### CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW

In compliance with paragraph 4 of rule XXIX of the Standing Rules of the Senate, changes in existing law made by the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new matter is printed in italic, existing law in which no change is proposed is shown in roman):

#### THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961, AS AMENDED

\* \* \* \* \*  
 SEC. 620(x)(1). All military assistance, all sales of defense articles and services (whether for cash or by credit, guaranty, or any other means), and all licenses with respect to the transportation of arms, ammunitions, and implements of war (including technical data relating thereto) to the Government of Turkey, shall be suspended on the date of enactment of this subsection unless and until the President determines and certifies to the Congress that the Government of Turkey is in compliance with the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the Foreign Military Sales Act, and any agreement entered into under such Acts, and that substantial progress toward agreement has been made regarding military forces in Cyprus: *Provided*, That the President is authorized to suspend the provisions of this section and such Acts if he determines that such suspension will further negotiations for a peaceful solution of the Cyprus conflict. Any such suspension shall be effective only [until February 5, 1975, and only if, during that time] *if during such suspension* Turkey shall observe the cease-fire and shall neither increase its forces on Cyprus nor transfer to Cyprus any United States supplied implements of war.

(2) *The President shall submit to the Congress within thirty days after the enactment of this paragraph, and at the end of each succeeding thirty-day period, a report on progress made during such period toward the conclusion of a negotiated solution of the Cyprus conflict.*

#### CONTINUING APPROPRIATIONS, 1975 (PUBLIC LAW 93-570)

\* \* \* \* \*  
 SEC. 6. None of the funds herein made available shall be obligated or expended for any military assistance, or for any sales of defense articles and services (whether for cash or by credit, guaranty, or any other means), or for any licenses with respect to the transportation of arms, ammunitions, and implements of war (including technical data related thereto) to the Government of Turkey unless and until the

President determines and certifies to the Congress that the Government of Turkey is in compliance with the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the Foreign Military Sales Act, and any agreement entered into under such Acts, and that substantial progress toward agreement has been made regarding military forces in Cyprus: *Provided*, That the President is authorized to suspend the provisions of this section and said Acts if he determines that such suspension will further negotiations for a peaceful solution of the Cyprus conflict. Any such suspension shall be effective only [until February 5, 1975, and only if, during that time] *if during such suspension*, Turkey shall observe the cease-fire and shall neither increase its forces on Cyprus nor transfer to Cyprus any United States supplied implements of war.

○

# Union Calendar No. 187

94th Congress }  
1st Session }

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

{ REPORT  
{ No. 94-365

TO PROMOTE IMPROVED RELATIONS BETWEEN  
THE UNITED STATES, GREECE, AND TURKEY,  
TO ASSIST IN THE SOLUTION OF THE REFUGEE  
PROBLEM ON CYPRUS, AND TO OTHERWISE  
STRENGTHEN THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

REPORT

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

TOGETHER WITH

OPPOSING, SUPPLEMENTAL, DISSENTING, ADDI-  
TIONAL AND SEPARATE VIEWS

ON

S. 846

TO AUTHORIZE THE FURTHER SUSPENSION OF PROHIBI-  
TIONS AGAINST MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO TURKEY, AND  
FOR OTHER PURPOSES



JULY 16, 1975

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

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FURTHER SUSPENSION OF PROHIBITIONS AGAINST  
MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO TURKEY, AND FOR  
OTHER PURPOSES

JULY 16, 1975.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the state of  
Union and ordered to be printed

Mr. MORGAN, from the Committee on International Relations,  
submitted the following

REPORT

together with

DISSENTING, OPPOSING, SUPPLEMENTAL ADDITIONAL  
AND SEPARATE VIEWS

[To accompany S. 846]

The Committee on International Relations, to whom was referred the bill (S. 846) to authorize the further suspension of prohibitions against military assistance to Turkey, and for other purposes, having considered the same, report favorably thereon with amendments and recommend that the bill as amended do pass.

The amendment to the text of the bill strikes out all after the enacting clause and inserts in lieu thereof a substitute text which appears in italic type in the reported bill.

The title of the bill is amended to reflect the amendment to the text of the bill.

BACKGROUND: JULY 1974 TO JULY 1975

In order to frame a context for the Committee's action on S. 846 a review of the events leading to its consideration of this legislation is essential.

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

*July 15*—The National Guard of Cyprus, which was commanded by mainland Greek officers together with pro-*enosis* Greek Cypriot factions overthrew the legitimate Government of Cyprus in a coup d'etat. Nikos Sampson took over the reigns of the Government of Cyprus. The Turkish Prime Minister responded to this

- development by declaring that Turkey would defend the security of Turkish Cypriots on the island.
- July 18*—U.S. Under Secretary of State Joseph Sisco began a series of talks with British, Greek and Turkish leaders in an effort to bring about a peaceful solution of the crisis.
- July 20*—The Armed Forces of Turkey invaded Cyprus. This action was justified by Turkey on the basis that it had been undertaken to uphold the independent status of Cyprus pursuant to the 1960 accords regarding the future of Cyprus.
- July 23*—Glafkos Clerides, Speaker of the Cyprus House of Representatives, replaced Nikos Sampson as President.
- July 26*—The first phase of the Geneva peace talks began.
- July 27*—Turkish forces halted their drive against Greek Cypriot towns, 1 day after cease-fire talks had begun in Geneva, and 4 days after the United Nations Security Council had adopted a resolution calling for a cease-fire on Cyprus.
- August 14*—Geneva peace talks collapsed after Turkey refused to consider a 36-hour "cooling off period." Turkey renewed its military offensive on Cyprus and Greece announced that it was withdrawing from the military arrangements of NATO but declared that it would remain in the Alliance's political body.
- August 16*—The Turkish Government announced a cease-fire after the Security Council issued a fourth resolution calling for a cease-fire.
- August 18*—Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger said that continued military assistance to Turkey was under review by the U.S. Government in view of Turkish military moves on Cyprus.
- August 19*—U.S. Ambassador to Cyprus, Rodger P. Davies, was shot and killed by Greek Cypriot gunmen at the U.S. Embassy in Nicosia.
- August 21*—The United Kingdom, supported by the United States, launched a new diplomatic initiative to seek eventual accommodation between Greece, Turkey and the island's two communities.
- August 23*—U.S. Secretary of State Kissinger stated that the United States favored "a single, sovereign, autonomous state in Cyprus."
- August 31*—William R. Crawford, replacing Rodger P. Davies as U.S. Ambassador to Cyprus, presented his credentials to President Clerides.
- September 9*—Turkish Prime Minister Fcavit announced his resignation. This precipitated a government crisis which lasted until March 31, 1975, when a coalition government was formed in Turkey.
- September 24*—The House of Representatives by a vote of 307 to 90 attached to a resolution on continuing appropriations a provision suspending military assistance and sales to Turkey until substantial progress had been made toward a settlement of the Cyprus issue.
- September 30*—The Senate adopted by a vote of 57 to 20 an amendment suspending military assistance and sales to Turkey.
- October 1*—The President announced that he would veto the bill on continuing appropriations if it contained language halting military assistance and sales to any country. In New York, the Greek

- Foreign Minister said that no progress had been made in talks with Secretary of State Kissinger on resolving the deadlock over Cyprus.
- October 3*—House-Senate conferees recommended the termination of further assistance to Turkey until it showed "good faith efforts" to reach a negotiated settlement of the Cyprus crisis.
- October 7*—The House by a vote of 291 to 69 rejected the language recommended by the House-Senate conferees that further military assistance to Turkey be terminated until Turkey demonstrated "good faith efforts" to reach a negotiated settlement, and agreed to an amendment by Congressman Benjamin Rosenthal halting aid to Turkey until that country was in compliance with U.S. laws and until "substantial progress had been made toward a settlement of the Cyprus question."
- October 14*—President Ford vetoed the Continuing Resolution (H.J. Res. 1131).
- October 15*—The House by a vote of 223 to 135 (76 not voting) sustained President Ford's veto.
- October 16*—A new continuing resolution House Joint Resolution 1163 was passed by the House by a vote of 287 to 30 (177 not voting) and the Senate by a vote of 45 to 23 (32 not voting).
- October 17*—The President vetoed the Continuing Resolution (H.J. Res. 1163) for the second time because it required the suspension of military assistance to Turkey. The House sustained the veto by a vote of 161 to 83 (190 not voting). A new resolution House Joint Resolution 1167, which contained a compromise that postponed the effective date of the cutoff of military assistance to Turkey until December 10, 1974, was introduced and passed by the House. The Senate subsequently passed the resolution and Congress adjourned until November 18, 1974.
- November 5*—Secretary of State Kissinger continued his efforts to effect a solution to the Cyprus issue and held talks with Greek Foreign Minister Bitsios in Rome to discuss a possible compromise on the Cyprus question.
- November 5*—Secretary of State Kissinger announced that he had been required to postpone his intended visit to Turkey because of that country's governmental crisis.
- November 12*—It was disclosed that Turkey had withdrawn more than 5,000 troops from Cyprus since October 29, 1974.
- November 13*—Archbishop Makarios met with Secretary Kissinger in Washington and announced he intended to return to Cyprus resume his role as President.
- December 1*—The Department of State declined to rule on whether Turkey had violated U.S. foreign assistance and foreign military sales legislation with respect to the use of U.S. furnished defense articles during the Cyprus conflict. The Department contended that such a determination in public would prejudice Cyprus peace efforts.
- December 8*—President Makarios returned to Cyprus.
- December 11-13*—Secretary of State Kissinger met separately with Greek and Turkish foreign ministers in Brussels to urge a resumption of inter-communal talks.

*December 18*—The Congress passed the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 with a provision requiring the President to suspend all military assistance, sales of defense articles and the issuance of licenses for the transportation of arms, ammunition, and implements of war to the Government of Turkey, effective upon the date of enactment. This amendment authorized the President to resume assistance if he determined that the Government of Turkey is in compliance with the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the Foreign Military Sales Act, and any agreement entered into under such acts, and that substantial progress toward agreement has been made regarding military forces in Cyprus. The Congress authorized the President to suspend the effective date of the suspension until February 5, 1975, if he determined that such a suspension would further negotiations for a peaceful solution of the Cyprus conflict. The President made such a determination on December 31, 1975. In the absence of any Turkish action which would have enabled the President to make a determination that Turkey was in compliance with the laws and agreements relating to the use of defense articles furnished by the United States, and that substantial progress had been made towards a Cyprus agreement, the embargo became effective on February 5, 1975.

*January 2*—The U.S. Ambassadors to Greece and Turkey were summoned to Washington to discuss the Cyprus situation with Secretary Kissinger.

*February 5*—President Ford urged Congress to authorize the resumption of military assistance to Turkey, stating that the suspension of such assistance "could have far reaching and damaging effects on the security and hence the political stability of all countries in the region." The President further said that the suspension of assistance was "an action which is clearly incompatible with U.S. interests" and was "likely to impede the negotiations of a just Cyprus settlement."

*February 13*—Turkish Cypriots declared a separate Turkish administration on Cyprus. The Department of State reiterated U.S. support for the territorial integrity and independence of Cyprus. Greek Cypriots off inter-communal talks.

*February 16*—Turkish Defense Minister Sancar said that his country was negotiating arms deals with five Western European countries.

*February 17*—Turkish Foreign Minister Esenbel stated that his government was drafting plans to close down some U.S. military and other installations in retaliation for the suspension of U.S. assistance.

*February 18*—Turkish liaison officers were withdrawn from the joint United States-Turkish military mission in Ankara.

*February 24*—Turkey informed NATO that it would not participate in the Alliance's forthcoming winter maneuvers, stating its decision resulted from Greek refusal to permit flights over the Aegean Sea.

*March 26*—The Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved a bill that would permit the President to resume military assistance and sales to Turkey.

*March 31*—Turkish Prime Minister Demirel announced the formation of 30-member cabinet based on a coalition of four political parties after a 7-month government crisis.

*April 14*—Representatives Hamilton and Buchanan introduced H.R. 5918, a bill to authorize the further suspension of the prohibitions against military assistance to Turkey, which was referred to the Committee on International Relations.

*April 21*—U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Arthur Hartmann met with Turkish leaders urging them to negotiate with Greek officials in an effort to defuse tensions on NATO's southern flank.

*April 29*—In a joint statement, Greece and the United States announced the termination of Greek home port facilities for U.S. warships, the closing of the U.S. military air base near Athens, and the placement of all remaining U.S. military facilities under Greek commanders.

*May 20*—The Senate passed S. 846, a bill to authorize the further suspension of military assistance and sales to Turkey, which was referred to the Committee on International Relations.

*May 28*—President Ford met separately with Karamanlis and Demirel at the NATO summit meeting in Brussels.

*June 18*—Representative Russo introduced House Resolution 553 expressing the sense of the House that the ban on military assistance to Turkey should not be lifted until such time as Turkish forces are withdrawn from Cyprus and there is a negotiated settlement in Cyprus. House Resolution 553 was referred to the Committee on International Relations.

*July 8*—Representative Whalen introduced H.R. 8412, a bill to authorize the shipment of defense articles which were awaiting shipment to such country on February 5, 1975. H.R. 8412 was referred to the Committee on International Relations.

*July 9*—Representatives Morgan, Broomfield, Zablocki, Hamilton, Findley, Buchanan, and Whalen introduced H.R. 8454 a bill to promote improved relations between the United States, Greece, and Turkey, to assist in the solution of the refugee problem on Cyprus, and to otherwise strengthen the North Atlantic Treaty. H.R. 8454 was referred to the Committee on International Relations.

#### COMMITTEE ACTION

On July 10, 1975, responding to President Ford's urgent request, the committee met for more than 10 hours to consider the several bills and resolutions that had been referred to it dealing with the question of military assistance and sales to Turkey. The leadoff witnesses were Hon. Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary of State; Hon. William B. Macomber, U.S. Ambassador to Turkey; and Hon. Arthur Hartmann, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs. Testimony was also heard from the following executive branch witnesses, Members of Congress, and private citizens:

Hon. William Colby, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency; Hon. Robert Ellsworth, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; Hon. George Ball, former Under Secretary of

State; Hon. Cyrus A. Vance, former Deputy Secretary of Defense and Special Representative of the President, Cyprus, 1967; Hon. John Brademas; Hon. Charles B. Rangel; Hon. Paul S. Sarbanes; Hon. Edward R. Beard; Hon. Eugene T. Rossides, formerly Assistant Secretary of Treasury for Enforcement, Tariff and Trade Affairs, and Operations, and currently counsel to the American Hellenic Educational and Progressive Association (AHEPA); Mr. Peter Derzis, vice president, AHEPA; and Dr. Andrew S. Tegeris, acting national chairman, United Hellenic American Congress. In addition, the committee received several statements from Members of Congress and private citizens which have been made part of the record.

On July 11, in open session, the committee by voice vote agreed to a motion to take up H.R. 8454 as the pending business and proceeded to mark up that bill. During the markup, the committee considered nine amendments which dealt with various prohibitions and restrictions on U.S. military sales programs for Turkey. Of these, four were adopted.

The committee then agreed to adopt H.R. 8454, as amended, by a vote of 16 ayes and 11 nays. Subsequently, the committee agreed by a vote of 19 ayes and 4 nays, with 1 voting present, to take up S. 846, strike everything after the enacting clause and the title, and to insert in lieu thereof the text and title of H.R. 8454. The committee then ordered favorably reported S. 846, as amended, by voice vote.

#### PRINCIPAL PURPOSES OF THE BILL

The principal purposes of the bill are:

1. To promote the national security of the United States by insuring a continuation of our mutual defense relationship with Turkey, within the framework of NATO, including continued access by U.S. military forces to critical military bases in Turkey;
2. To increase the ability of the United States to move the negotiations among the Governments of Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus toward a peaceful solution which is acceptable to all parties to the conflict;
3. To ease the embargo on the shipment of arms to Turkey by permitting delivery of defense articles and services with respect to which contracts of sale were signed under the Foreign Military Sales Act on or before February 5, 1975, and by authorizing the issuance of licenses for the transportation of arms, ammunition, and implements of war to Turkey;
4. To authorize the President to suspend the provisions of section 620(x) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, only with respect to such sales, credits, and guaranties under the Foreign Military Sales Act as he determines and certifies to the Congress are necessary to enable Turkey to fulfill her defense responsibilities as a member of NATO. This provision, however, would not become effective until the Congress enacts foreign assistance legislation authorizing sales, credits, and guaranties under the Foreign Military Sales Act for fiscal year 1976;
5. To request the President to initiate discussions with the Government of Greece to determine the most urgent needs of that

country for economic and military assistance, and to direct the President to report on these discussions, together with his recommendations for economic and military assistance to Greece for fiscal year 1976, within 60 days after enactment of this bill; and

6. To alleviate the suffering of refugees and other victims of conflict on Cyprus and to foster and promote international efforts to ameliorate the conditions which prevent such persons from resuming normal and productive lives.

#### EFFECTS OF THE BILL ON THE DELIVERY OF DEFENSE ARTICLES TO TURKEY

This bill authorizes the delivery of defense articles and defense services to Turkey with respect to which contracts of sale were signed under sections 21 and 22 of the Foreign Military Sales Act prior to February 5, 1975. It further authorizes the President to issue licenses for the transportation to that country, of commercially purchased arms, ammunition, and implements of war.

As of February 5, 1975, Turkey had purchased \$184.9 million in defense articles and services from the United States. These have not been delivered and include the following:

#### Undelivered foreign military sales purchases

Categories/Descriptions	(In thousands)
Aircraft (24 F-4E, Spares and auxiliary ground equipment)	\$104,557
Ships (miscellaneous boats and craft with spares)	15,220
Vehicles and weapons (55 trucks and 36 machine guns)	1,990
Other ammunition and components	19,649
Missiles and support equipment	18,250
Communications equipment	3,718
Miscellaneous repair and support equipment	8,911
Supply operations	5,982
Training	411
Technical assistance	6,246
<b>Total</b>	<b>184,934</b>


Included in the above figures are \$52.8 million in defense articles which were available but undelivered on July 1, 1975.

#### Defense articles available but undelivered

Category/Description	(In thousands)
12 F-4E aircraft	\$44,000
Spares, radio equipment	1,300
Miscellaneous items held by freight forwarder	500
F-4E Mods, ground equipment and spare parts	7,000
<b>Total</b>	<b>52,800</b>

The above figures do not include \$86.9 million in grant military assistance items programed for Turkey prior to the imposition of the arms embargo. None of that military assistance may be delivered to Turkey under this bill. Neither does the bill authorize any future military assistance to Turkey.

As indicated above, the bill would make it possible for Turkey to purchase arms in the United States through private commercial channels. U.S. Government military sales, credits, and guaranties to Tur-



key would continue to be prohibited until the Congress enacts foreign assistance legislation authorizing sales, credits, and guaranties under the Foreign Military Sales Act for fiscal year 1976. After the enactment of such legislation—and barring any new congressional restrictions on military sales to Turkey—the President would be authorized to approve those FMS sales of defense articles and services which he determines—and certifies to the Congress—are necessary for the fulfillment by Turkey of her responsibilities to NATO. The suspension of the ban on those sales would be effective only so long as Turkey observes the cease-fire, does not increase its forces on Cyprus, and does not transfer to Cyprus any U.S.-supplied arms, ammunition, or implements of war.

#### U.S. INTERESTS IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN

The political, economic, and military well-being of the member states of the North Atlantic area has been a focal point of U.S. foreign policy for almost three decades.

Greece and Turkey, with the support of the United States, play a key role in the defense of the southeastern flank of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Both permit U.S. forces access to military bases and installations in their respective countries.

Those bases have served the defense interests of the United States and NATO and they continue to be of great importance to the security of all the members of the Alliance.

Furthermore, access to ports and air bases in both countries has enabled the United States to maintain a credible military presence in the Mediterranean during times of crisis and to support U.S. foreign policy objectives in the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, and in the Indian Ocean.

Greece and Turkey's geographic positions on the southeastern flank of the Alliance and in the case of Turkey along the border of the Soviet Union makes them particularly valuable to the common defense.

U.S. security relations in the eastern Mediterranean grew, in part, out of Soviet threats to the integrity and independence of Greece and Turkey and later to the southern flank of NATO.

The continuing involvement of the Soviet Union in the Mediterranean, in the Middle East, and in the Indian Ocean increases the strategic importance of both Greece and Turkey to the foreign policy and global defense strategy of the United States.

To insure that both countries are able to carry out their assigned NATO responsibilities, the United States has provided them with defense articles and defense services over the years. The United States is continuing to provide Greece with some implements of war required by that country to maintain an effective military capability. Cash and credit sales are being made in response to specific requests by the Government of Greece and requests for additional military assistance are being considered by the U.S. Government. No defense articles or defense services can be provided to Turkey, however, because of the provisions of section 620(x) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended.


#### MILITARY BASES IN TURKEY

The United States has access to several military bases and other installations in Turkey. The rights to these bases are governed by the Defense Cooperation Agreement of July 3, 1969, which replaced an earlier Military Facilities Agreement of 1954.

Immediately after the 1969 agreement was reached, negotiations were begun with the Government of Turkey on implementing the agreement with respect to conditions and circumstances surrounding the use of the bases by the United States. Those negotiations were suspended by the Government of Turkey in February 1975, in reaction to the suspension of military assistance and sales by the United States to the Government of Turkey. Then, in mid-June, the Turkish Government notified the United States that in view of the continued arms embargo, Turkey felt compelled to renegotiate the status of U.S. installations in that country.

There are two categories of military bases and installations in Turkey which are of particular interest to the United States. In the first category are those bases which are oriented toward the common defense of NATO. The second involves those which are of primary importance to U.S. defense needs, including the intelligence installations at Sinop, Diyarbakir, Karamursel, and Belbasi.

The major bases and installations used by the United States are shown in the following map.



Major Military Bases and Installations in Turkey

Loss of these bases would impair U.S. ability to carry out its NATO responsibilities and would deny the United States use of valuable, if

not irreplaceable, intelligence installations which serve U.S. strategic defense needs, separate and distinct from those of NATO. Furthermore, it would inhibit or preclude the use of Turkey to support potential contingency operations elsewhere in the region, including the Middle East, and would restrict overflight of Turkish air space by U.S. military aircraft.

It is estimated that some U.S. facilities could be relocated outside Turkey. Some U.S. Government officials believe, however, that such relocation would greatly diminish current U.S. capabilities.

#### RESULTS OF THE EMBARGO

The intent of the Congress in imposing the embargo on military assistance and sales to Turkey was to influence Turkey in the Cyprus negotiations and to encourage the Government of Turkey to withdraw troops and U.S. furnished defense articles from the island.

The embargo on the delivery of defense articles and defense services has been in effect for over 5 months. Unfortunately, the cutoff has not had the desired effect.

During this time progress toward reconciliation of the Cyprus problem has been blocked, suffering of the people on Cyprus has been prolonged, Turkish attitude toward negotiations has hardened, tensions have increased between Greece and Turkey in the Aegean, and the Government of Turkey has indicated that it may be prepared to force the United States to withdraw from certain military bases and installations in Turkey. The latter move would exacerbate relations between the United States and Turkey and further restrict the ability of the United States to encourage successful negotiations over Cyprus.

The President of the United States has expressed his concern over the deteriorating situation in the eastern Mediterranean and has asked the Congress to "join in legislative action which will remedy the present situation."

Specifically, the President said in a letter to the Congress dated July 9, 1975, that the existing legislation has:

1. Called into question the ability of an ally to continue to fulfill its essential NATO responsibilities thus undermining NATO's strength in the eastern Mediterranean;
2. Jeopardized vital common defense installations which Turkey and the U.S. jointly maintain;
3. Contributed to tensions which are not helpful to Greece; and
4. Reduced American influence to move the Cyprus negotiations toward a peaceful conclusion acceptable to all parties.

The President's letter went on to say that—

The legislation voted against Turkey last December is sweeping in its effect. It is more extensive than similar legislation enacted in October 1974, with which the administration was in full compliance. The December legislation provides for not only a total embargo on grant military assistance, and cash and credit sales of defense items by the U.S. Government, but prohibits as well the issuance of licenses

to permit the export of military equipment purchased from American firms. Practically all nations of the world can purchase in this country at least some items that are forbidden to Turkey. It is now impossible for Turkey to procure most items produced in third countries under U.S. license; nor can Turkey even take possession of merchandise in the United States which it paid for prior to February 5 and which is now ready for shipment. The result is that a relationship of trust and confidence with this important NATO ally, built up over many years, has been seriously eroded. Continuation of the embargo risks further deterioration, jeopardizing our security interests throughout the eastern Mediterranean area.

In dealing with this issue, the committee has borne in mind that, since 1947, Turkey has relied almost exclusively upon the United States as its source of military materiel. The Turkish Armed Forces—including one of the largest standing armies committed to NATO—will be severely hampered in their effort to continue to meet their defense responsibilities if their access to U.S. sources of military hardware continues to be prohibited.

#### TURKEY'S USE OF U.S. DEFENSE ARTICLES ON CYPRUS: THE ISSUE OF PRINCIPLE

At the heart of the congressionally imposed embargo on all forms of military assistance and sales to Turkey is the assertion that Turkey, during the Cyprus crisis in July and August 1974, and especially in mid-August when its Armed Forces occupied 40 percent of the island, violated an agreement required under our laws by using U.S.-supplied military materiel for purposes not envisaged in the Foreign Assistance Act and the Foreign Military Sales Act.

In 1947, Turkey agreed not to use U.S.-furnished defense articles except for authorized purposes which include self-defense, internal security, and participation in collective arrangements or measures consistent with the U.N. Charter.

In the view of the majority of the Members of the House of Representatives, as expressed in a series of votes on the House floor late in 1974, Turkey had violated that agreement by invading Cyprus. Congress went on record against this violation and in affirmation of the fundamental principle that American-supplied military equipment must not be used for purposes other than those for which it is furnished.

The clear and unequivocal expression by Congress of this principle is an important matter of record. The legislation recommended by the committee in no way reflects approval of the Turkish intervention on Cyprus or suggests that aggression by states using U.S.-furnished weapons will be condoned. The reason for the committee's recommendation is that after a more than 5 months' suspension of arms shipments to Turkey, it has become clear that in the complex circumstances of this particular case, our national interests and the cause of a peaceful resolution of the Cyprus tragedy are not being served by continuation of the total embargo.

No one can be sure that the passage of the legislation recommended by the committee will cause the Government of Turkey to enter into

meaningful negotiations with respect to Cyprus. The political situation in Turkey remains fragile and the emotionally charged issue of Cyprus will continue to present domestic political difficulties to the Turkish Government. Moreover, any progress in resolving this issue will depend in large part on the good will of the other parties to the negotiations—Greece and Cyprus. The committee feels strongly, however, that the passage of this legislation will help to foster the climate for constructive negotiations. At the same time, the committee feels that failure on the part of Turkey to adopt a positive approach following enactment of this legislation would not only preclude full restoration of our military assistance and sales but could prejudice the full range of United States-Turkish relations.

#### LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS UNIQUE TO TURKEY

In arriving at its recommendations, the committee took into account the Turkish perception of the legal issues relating to its intervention on Cyprus. On the one hand, there was the 1947 agreement with the United States which limited the use of American-supplied equipment to the authorized purposes set out in U.S. legislation. On the other hand, Turkey had a responsibility under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee to maintain the independence, territorial integrity, and security of Cyprus. That treaty reserves to Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom the right to take action to maintain the arrangements that had been established for an independent Cyprus.

Also from the Turkish point of view, it seems unjust that Turkey was singled out for having reacted to an unlawful overthrow of a legitimate government on Cyprus apparently instigated by the then-government of Greece and supported by Greek military personnel on Cyprus and to subsequent events which suggested a strong likelihood of *enosis*, or union with Greece, which constituted an unacceptable threat to the security of the Turkish Cypriot community.

Moreover, there are reports that some American-furnished arms had been used in the overthrow of Archbishop Makarios.

These considerations do not condone the violation by Turkey of its agreement with the United States. They do help to explain, however, why a modification of the existing legislation is required if the United States is to play an effective role in encouraging Turkish cooperation in arriving at a just settlement of the Cyprus issue. In addition, they demonstrate the unique historical and legal background of the Cyprus issue, which precludes generalizations or predictions as to the possible implications of this legislation in other and different situations.

#### ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO GREECE

The committee is aware of the fact that no progress can be made to solve the Cyprus issue without the full cooperation of the Government of Greece. The committee is also sensitive to the possibility that the proposal for the easing of the arms embargo on Turkey may produce some political reactions in Greece. The committee hopes that any such reactions will be conditioned both by the longstanding friendship between the United States and Greece and by the realization among our Greek friends that continuation of the stalemate can only work to the

detriment of all concerned—Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, the United States—and our mutual defense and security arrangements.

Since the crisis-ridden post-World War II period, when a Communist takeover of Greece appeared imminent, the United States has provided Greece with more than \$4 billion in military and economic assistance. The U.S. military advisory mission, headed by Gen. James Van Fleet, played a key role in helping the Greek people preserve freedom and democracy on their soil. The friendship of the American people for the people of Greece has withstood many crises. It is that friendship that, today, must provide a basis for understanding and actions which will serve our mutual interests.

During the past fiscal year, fiscal year 1975, Greece had access to \$169 million's worth of U.S. defense articles and services—a large part of it on government credit terms. These defense articles included F-4 aircraft, missiles, ships, and other important equipment. The pipeline of military hardware sold to Greece under the Foreign Military Sales Act currently exceeds \$619 million.

Section 2 of S. 846, as amended, contains a provision which calls on the President to initiate discussions with Greece to determine that country's most urgent needs for economic and military assistance and to submit to the Congress within 60 days after the enactment of this bill a report on such discussions together with his recommendations for economic and military assistance to Greece for fiscal year 1976.

The committee views this provision as an indispensable part of the legislation in that it demonstrates an evenhanded U.S. policy in the eastern Mediterranean region and recognizes that the United States has important national security interests in Greece as well as in Turkey.

The committee is gratified to learn that the executive branch has already engaged in some preliminary discussions with Greece with respect to economic and military assistance programs. It is the committee's intent that the President should continue such discussions with Greece and submit his recommendations promptly to the Congress so that the committee may consider them in conjunction with its consideration of fiscal year 1976 foreign economic and military assistance authorization legislation.

#### THE REFUGEE SITUATION IN CYPRUS

One of the key considerations in the committee's action on this legislation is the continuing tragic plight of some 180,000 refugees displaced by the conflict on Cyprus. For nearly a year, this large segment of the population of the island—nearly 30 percent—has been subjected to extreme hardship and privation. The rights of these people to pursue secure and dignified lives have been cruelly suspended by the continuing deadlock in the negotiations. Unless a new start is made to bring the parties together, the misery of these unfortunate people will be further prolonged.

Section 1 reaffirms the policy of the United States to alleviate the suffering of these refugees and to support international efforts to assist them to resume normal and productive lives. Specifically, section 1 calls on the President to encourage and cooperate in the implementation of multilateral programs, under the auspices of appropriate inter-

national agencies, for the relief of and assistance to refugees and other victims of the hostilities on Cyprus.

The Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 earmarked \$25 million for famine and disaster relief assistance in Cyprus for fiscal year 1975. An identical sum has been proposed for fiscal year 1976. The entire amount for fiscal year 1975 has been donated to two international agencies; \$20.8 million to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); and \$4.2 million to the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC). To date, the UNHCR and the ICRC in cooperation with the Government of Cyprus have obligated most of these funds for emergency shelter, food, clothing, and medical needs of the refugees.

According to the Department of State, the Government of Cyprus has identified two major needs of the refugees and other war victims who remain dependent on relief programs: housing for those who are currently inadequately sheltered; and employment opportunities. With respect to housing, the Government of Cyprus is considering a program for the construction of low cost housing units for those refugees now living in shacks and tents. The units would be located in various areas in the southern portion of the island in order to integrate the refugees into the Cyprus economy more effectively and equitably. Such an effort will require external assistance. Therefore, the committee urges the President to promote such refugee programs through the auspices of the UNHCR and other appropriate international agencies.

In addition to the Cypriot refugees, the committee is also deeply concerned about the welfare of those American citizens who were in Cyprus during the hostilities and who are still missing. According to the Department of State, 16 of the 25 American citizens originally reported missing have been accounted for. The committee urges the President to make every appropriate effort to establish the whereabouts of those nine Americans still missing and to secure their safe return.

#### STATEMENT REQUIRED BY RULE XI(1)(3) OF THE HOUSE RULES

Pursuant to the requirements of Rule XI(1)(3) of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the following statements are made:

(A) *Oversight findings and recommendations.*—Section 620(x) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, required the President to suspend military assistance and sales to the Government of Turkey because that country had used U.S. furnished defense articles in violation of certain agreements between the two Governments made pursuant to the requirements of the Foreign Assistance Act and the Foreign Military Sales Act. In exercising its oversight responsibility for the application of the Foreign Assistance Act, the committee determined that the embargo on the furnishing of defense articles to Turkey, which had been in effect for over 5 months, has not accomplished its intended purpose; i.e., a peaceful solution to the crisis in Cyprus. The committee, therefore, took steps to determine why the embargo had failed to achieve the desired result and concluded that it was in the interest of United States and NATO security to permit the President to furnish to the Government of Turkey those defense articles for

which contracts of sale had been signed on or prior to February 5, 1975. The committee recommends that the President use the authorities contained in this bill to persuade the Turkish Government that it is in its interest to observe fully agreements made with the United States with respect to the use of U.S.-furnished defense articles and that a peaceful solution of the Cyprus question is essential.

(B) *Congressional Budget Act section 308(a) requirement.*—This measure does not provide for additional budget authority.

(C) *Congressional Budget Office estimate and comparison.*—No estimate and comparison prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office under section 408 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 has been received by the committee.

(D) *Committee on Government Operations summary.*—No oversight findings and recommendations have been received which relate to this measure from the Committee on Government Operations under clause 2(b)(2) of Rule X.

#### INFLATIONARY IMPACT STATEMENT

There are no funds authorized by this bill.

This legislation removes a restriction on the shipment of defense articles purchased by the Government of Turkey. It has no identifiable inflationary impact.

#### COST ESTIMATE REQUIRED BY CLAUSE 7, RULE XIII

This bill removes a restriction on the transportation of defense articles purchased by the Government of Turkey prior to February 5, 1975, and does not authorize the appropriation of any funds.

It is possible that there will be future legislation authorizing military assistance for Turkey but the committee is not able to estimate the cost, if any, of such programs at this time.

#### SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS

##### Section 1

Section 1 reaffirms that in the interest of mutual defense and national security, it is the policy of the United States to seek to improve relations among the U.S. allies and between the United States and its allies. In particular, Congress recognizes that, due to their geographic positions on the southeastern flank of Europe, both Greece and Turkey play equally important roles in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and are, therefore, indispensable to the alliance. In light of the importance of both countries to NATO and to the U.S. national security, the Congress is prepared to assist in the modernization and strengthening of their respective armed forces.

Section 1 also reaffirms U.S. policy to assist refugees and other victims of armed conflict and to foster and promote international efforts to assist such persons in resuming normal and productive lives.

Section 1 particularly calls on the President to encourage and to cooperate in the implementation of multilateral programs under the auspices of appropriate international agencies for the relief of and assistance to refugees and other persons disadvantaged by the hostilities on Cyprus. Specifically, the committee recognizes the current

needs of the refugees for housing and employment and urges the President to seek the formulation of such assistance through the appropriate multilateral channels.

*Section 2*

Subsection (a) (1) of section 2 states that, in order for the purpose of the bill to be carried out without awaiting the enactment of fiscal year 1976 foreign assistance legislation, the President is authorized to furnish to the Government of Turkey those defense articles and services for which contracts of sale were signed under sections 21 and 22 of the Foreign Military Sales Act on or before February 5, 1975, and to issue licenses for the transportation of arms, ammunition, and implements of war and related technical data to the Government of Turkey. In authorizing the delivery "notwithstanding any other provision of law" of articles contracted for prior to the effective date of the current statutory embargo, the committee has used standard superseding language also contained in various other provisions of foreign assistance legislation. This permits deliveries to be made without regard to section 620(x) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. It should be emphasized, however, that the items to be delivered were purchased under contracts containing all of the assurances and undertakings required by applicable legislation. It is the committee's intention that these assurances and undertakings shall remain fully applicable. Further, the authorization made by this subsection is expressly effective only for so long as Turkey observes the cease-fire and neither increases its forces on Cyprus nor transfers to Cyprus any U.S.-supplied implements of war.

Subsection (a) (2) calls on the President to initiate discussions with the Government of Greece to determine Greece's most urgent economic and military assistance requirements.

Subsection (b) directs the President to submit to the Congress within 60 days after the enactment of this bill a report on such discussions, together with his recommendations for economic and military assistance to Greece for fiscal year 1976.

The committee finds subsections (a) (2) and (b) to be indispensable to this bill in that the provisions therein recognize a need for an even-handed U.S. policy in the eastern Mediterranean and that the United States has significant national security interests in Greece as well as in Turkey.

*Section 3*

Subsection (a) of section 3 authorizes the President to suspend the arms embargo on Turkey with respect to sales, credits and guaranties under the FMS Act for procurement of defense articles and services which the President determines—and certifies to Congress—are necessary to enable Turkey to fulfill her NATO responsibilities. This suspension is to be only for so long as Turkey observes the cease-fire, does not increase its forces on Cyprus, and does not transfer to Cyprus any U.S.-supplied arms, ammunition, or implements of war. This last condition prohibits Turkish transfers to Cyprus of any U.S. defense articles as defined in section 644(d) (1) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

Subsection (b) directs the President to report to Congress every 60 days on progress made toward peaceful solution of the Cyprus conflict.

Subsection (c) provides that nothing in this section shall be construed as authorizing military assistance to Turkey—by grant or loan—under chapter 2 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act or for transactions of Foreign Military Sales Act sales, credits, or guaranties under the bill for procurement of defense articles and services not determined by the President as needed for the fulfillment by Turkey of her responsibilities to NATO.

Subsection (d) stipulates that the authorities contained in section 3 shall become effective only upon enactment of foreign assistance legislation authorizing sales, credits and guaranties under the Foreign Military Sales Act for fiscal year 1976.

The committee added subsection 3(d) to permit the Congress sufficient time to determine what progress, if any, is made with respect to movement toward a solution of the Cyprus problem and to preclude the use of any funds made available for fiscal year 1976 pursuant to continuing resolution authority for the sale of defense articles or defense services to Turkey.

CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW MADE BY THE BILL, AS REPORTED

In compliance with clause 3 of Rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new matter is printed in italic, existing law in which no change is proposed is shown in roman) :

SECTION 620 OF THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961

SEC. 620. PROHIBITIONS AGAINST FURNISHING ASSISTANCE.—  
(a) (1) \* \* \*

\* \* \* \* \*  
(x) (1) All military assistance, all sales of defense articles and services (whether for cash or by credit, guaranty, or any other means), and all licenses with respect to the transportation of arms, ammunitions, and implements of war (including technical data relating thereto) to the Government of Turkey, shall be suspended on the date of enactment of this subsection unless and until the President determines and certifies to the Congress that the Government of Turkey is in compliance with the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the Foreign Military Sales Act, and any agreement entered into under such Acts, and that substantial progress toward agreement has been made regarding military forces in Cyprus: *Provided*, That the President is authorized to suspend the provisions of this section and [such acts if he determines that such suspension will further negotiations for a peaceful solution of the Cyprus conflict. Any such suspension shall be effective only until February 5, 1975, and only if, during that time, Turkey shall observe the ceasefire and shall neither increase its forces on Cyprus nor transfer to Cyprus any U.S. supplied implements of war].

of section 3 (c) of the Foreign Military Sales Act only with respect to sales, credits, and guarantees under the Foreign Military Sales Act, as amended, for the procurement of such defense articles and defense services as the President determines and certifies to the Congress are necessary in order to enable Turkey to fulfill her defense responsibilities as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Any such suspension shall be effective only while Turkey shall observe the ceasefire and shall neither increase its forces on Cyprus nor transfer to Cyprus any United States supplied arms, ammunition and implements of war.

(2) The President shall submit to the Congress within sixty days after the enactment of this paragraph, and at the end of each succeeding sixty-day period, a report on progress made during such period toward the conclusion of a negotiated solution of the Cyprus conflict.

OPPOSING VIEWS OF HON. DANTE B. FASCELL, HON. CHARLES C. DIGGS, JR., HON. ROBERT N. C. NIX, HON. BENJAMIN S. ROSENTHAL, HON. GUS YATRON, HON. MICHAEL HARRINGTON, HON. DONALD W. RIEGLE, JR., HON. CARLISS COLLINS AND HON. DON BONKER

This bill represents bad legislation, bad policy and bad precedent. Here are the bill's major deficiencies:

- (1) *The so-called compromise is no compromise.* In exchange for a resumption of arms sales, Turkey is required to do nothing to correct actions it took on Cyprus. These aggressive actions, made possible by American weapons, caused the arms cutoff.
- (2) *A major principle of American foreign policy is abandoned.* Reviving arms to Turkey without any action by Turkey to remedy the consequences of its aggression abandons a fundamental principle of American foreign policy—that weapons are supplied by the United States to other countries for defensive and not for aggressive purposes.
- (3) *Restoring arms sales to Turkey condones the continuing violations of law and bilateral agreements.* Over 30,000 Turkish troops, equipped with American arms, still occupy 40% of Cyprus, an independent country. 180,000 Greek Cypriot refugees remain homeless. Turkey refuses to deal with these conditions.
- (4) *This bill encourages further Turkish aggression.* Arms ordered by Turkey before the embargo would be released "notwithstanding any other provision of law" including prohibitions against offensive use of American supplied arms. Turkey could use these arms, and all commercial arms which it is also allowed to buy under this bill, in aggression against Greece.
- (5) *Resuming arms sales would be yielding to Turkish extortion.* This bill is a surrender to the Turkish threat to close U.S. bases. Yielding to such a threat invites other countries to hold hostage 300 major U.S. overseas bases.
- (6) *Passage of S. 846 would encourage other countries to misuse U.S. arms.* Over \$8 billion in U.S. arms were sold abroad last year. The legal restraints prohibiting the transfer of these arms and limiting their use to self-defense will be severely eroded elsewhere if Turkey can resume buying U.S. arms under present circumstances.
- (7) *The arms embargo has not produced progress on Cyprus because it has been undermined publicly and privately by the Department of State.* On February 16, 1973, 11 days after the arms ban went into effect, an Administration proposal was introduced in the Senate to repeal the arms ban. Administration spokesmen have consistently and repeatedly blamed Congress, which is enforcing the law, instead of Turkey, which is violating it, as the obstacle to peace. This has encouraged Turkey to remain intransigent with the expectation that the Administration would soon cause the ban to be lifted.

(8) *Resumption of arms sales to Turkey could severely damage Greece.* Rearming Turkey could have a "catastrophic" effect on the new democracy in Greece according to former Under Secretary of State George Ball when he testified in opposition to this bill. To rearm Turkey without the fundamental restraints of our laws, as this bill proposes, could also endanger U.S. bases in Greece and a revived Greek role in NATO.

(9) *Opponents of this bill support NATO and want both Greece and Turkey to resume their full participation in the alliance.* American policy must move toward rebuilding the southeastern flank of NATO by supporting a prompt and fair settlement on Cyprus. As long as U.S. policy tilts toward Turkey, this rebuilding of NATO is impossible.

#### THE PERTINENT PROVISIONS OF AMERICAN LAW

Following are the relevant provisions of law associated with the Turkish aid ban:

Section 505(b) of the *Foreign Assistance Act of 1961*, as amended, states that—

No Defense articles shall be furnished . . . to any country . . . unless the President determines . . . that such defense articles will be utilized by such country for the maintenance of its own defensive strength, or the defensive strength of the free world;

Section 505(d) of the same Act states that—

Any country which hereafter uses defense articles or defense services furnished such country . . . in substantial violation of the provisions of this chapter shall be immediately ineligible for further assistance.

Section 4. of the *Foreign Military Sales Act* states that—

Defense articles and defense services shall be sold . . . solely for internal security, for legitimate self-defense, to permit the recipient country to participate in regional or collective arrangements or measures consistent with the Charter of the United Nations. . . .

Section 3(c) of the same Act states that—

any foreign country which hereafter uses defense articles or defense services furnished under this Act, in substantial violation or any provision of this Act . . . shall be immediately ineligible for further cash sales, credits, or guarantees.

#### EVENTS ON CYPRUS

In 1960, Cyprus became independent. The London-Zurich Agreement established Great Britain, Turkey and Greece as guarantors of this independence.

This small Mediterranean island, with a long history of strife among its inhabitants is peopled by approximately 80% Greek, 18% Turkish and 2% Armenian descendents.

On July 15, 1975, the military junta that ruled Greece instigated a violent overthrow of the legitimate Cypriot government. Fearing a physical threat to the Turkish minority on the island, the Turkish government, on July 20, landed troops on the island and occupied about 15% of the island's territory.

On August 14-17, Turkey broke off peace talks underway at Geneva and launched a major military assault on Cyprus. This aggressive military operation resulted in Turkey's occupying 40% of the island's area, representing 70% of the island's economic wealth.

As a result of this military action about 5,000 Cypriots were killed, the island's economy was immobilized and about 200,000 Greek Cypriots were expelled from the Turkish military-dominated area. A massive international refugee relief effort has been required to prevent starvation and disease.

The Turkish military forces that invaded and continue to occupy Cyprus used American military equipment including tanks, planes, guns, personnel carriers and landing craft. All of this equipment was delivered to Turkey for NATO purposes. It is irrefutable that these Turkish actions were a clear and explicit violation of U.S. laws prohibiting aggressive use of American weapons, and in direct contravention of Turkish-American bilateral agreements that prohibit this same conduct.

#### CONGRESSIONAL ACTIONS ON CYPRUS

The Turkish occupation of Cyprus triggered the prohibitions contained in Section 505 of the *Foreign Assistance Act* and Sections 3-4 of the *Foreign Military Sales Act*. As a result of this occupation and because of the Administration's failure to itself comply with the aforementioned provisions, Congress took the following actions:

*September 24, 1974:* House, by vote of 307 to 90, passes an amendment to Continuing Resolution banning military aid to Turkey until President certifies that "substantial progress toward agreement has been made regarding military forces in Cyprus."

*October 7, 1974:* House, by vote of 291-69, rejects an Administration backed proposal to soften the Turkish aid cutoff by allowing the President to certify that Turkey is making "good faith efforts" to negotiate on Cyprus.

*October 14, 1974:* President Ford vetoes Continuing Resolution on foreign aid funds because of provision ending aid to Turkey until that country is in compliance with FAA and FMSA and until substantial progress is made on a military forces agreement concerning Cyprus.

*October 15, 1974:* House fails, in 223-135 vote, to override presidential veto on bill containing Turkish aid cutoff.

*October 17, 1974:* President Ford vetoes second bill containing Turkish aid cutoff. This version would have delayed the cutoff until December 15 on the condition that Turkey did not transship any U.S.-supplied materials to Cyprus during that period. House vote to override the veto fails by two votes (161-83). Later in the day, House and Senate pass a compromise bill which delays cutoff in

aid until December 10 on three conditions: that Turkey transship no U.S. "implements of war" to Cyprus, that it observe the cease-fire and that it not increase its forces on the island.

*December 18, 1974:* House passes foreign aid authorization bill which suspends all military aid to Turkey effective February 5, 1975 until Turkey complies with U.S. law and until "substantial progress toward agreement has been made regarding military forces on Cyprus." President signs legislation on December 30, 1974.

*May 19, 1975:* Senate approves (41-40) repeal of Turkish aid ban amendment in S. 846.

#### S. 846, AS AMENDED—THE INSTRUMENT OF LEGISLATIVE VIOLENCE

The provisions of this bill are so broad and its consequences so great, that House Members should understand them clearly. The bill:

(a) Releases immediately all goods we contracted to sell to Turkey up to the February 5, 1975 aid ban. These items, which total \$185 million, include 24 F-4-E aircraft.

(b) Allows immediately all commercial military sales by U.S. arms manufacturers to Turkey.

(c) Allows resumption later this year of all sales by our government of military goods to Turkey with subsidies paid by U.S. taxpayers to provide Turkey with reduced interest rates so they can buy on credit.

#### Implications of the bill:

(a) All of the goods ordered by Turkey before February 5 (a, above) and all commercially obtained military supplies (c, above) can be used without the fundamental restraints of the Foreign Assistance Act and the Foreign Military Sales Act. These restraints, which limit the use of our arms to defensive purposes, have been in law since the beginning of the foreign military aid program.

(b) The only part of the cutoff amendment not repealed is the ban on grant military assistance to Turkey. But the President already has general authority to waive that ban (under Sec. 614, Foreign Assistance Act) for up to \$50 million for Turkey. This is more grant aid than Turkey received from us in the last normal fiscal year (FY 1974) when it received \$48.7 million.

(c) In summary, this bill opens an enormous loophole in existing laws, as well as repealing the cutoff amendment (except for grant aid) which went into effect in February.

#### THE REAFFIRMATION OF THE RULE OF LAW

The principal concern of Congress from the start of the Cyprus occupation has been the violation of American law and of Turkish bilateral agreements prohibiting the aggressive use of our military aid.

We believe the provisions of law prohibiting the use of U.S. aid for aggressive purposes represent an important principle, not a technical

or an insignificant requirement of U.S. military aid. Those provisions, and the underlying principle, are as valid today as when Congress, by majority votes, upheld them seven times.

These provisions of law state a fundamental principle of American foreign policy which must now be reaffirmed by a vote against S. 846, as amended.

DANTE B. FASCELL.  
CHARLES C. DIGGS.  
ROBERT N. C. NIX.  
BENJAMIN S. ROSENTHAL.  
GUS YATRON.  
MICHAEL HARRINGTON.  
DONALD W. RIEGLE, JR.  
CARDISS COLLINS.  
DON BONKER.

## SUPPLEMENTAL VIEWS OF HON. LEE H. HAMILTON

The vote of the House of Representatives on S. 846 may be the most important single vote for Congress on a foreign policy issue this year, and I hope Members will support this bill.

The vote is important because it touches on several key foreign policy interests, including:

- the future of the southern flank of NATO,
- U.S. bilateral relations with Greece, Turkey and Cyprus,
- the ability of the United States to deal effectively with future mediterranean and Middle East crises,
- the ability of the United States to promote successful negotiations for a just and lasting resolution of the Cyprus problem and an end to the suffering of the Cypriot people, and
- the ability of the United States to continue to gather information vital to our national security.

The crucial question here concerns the means that the United States Government has to influence the Governments of Turkey, Greece and Cyprus to deal with an unacceptable and deteriorating situation in the Eastern Mediterranean. More precisely, the question is whether the several U.S. foreign policy interests in the area will be better served by continuation or modification of the arms embargo against Turkey.

In my view the arms embargo has been detrimental to the maintenance of a strong southern flank of NATO, to United States efforts to play a constructive role in the region, and to the preservation of important, if not irreplaceable, U.S. intelligence gathering facilities.

In short, the nearly six month ban has simply not worked and it is time to take a new approach. If the ban is removed, the United States will be in a better position to promote favorably its several interests in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Several arguments are being used against S. 846 and in support of the arms embargo, and I would like to comment on them:

*Argument:* Turkey violated provisions of American law when it used U.S. equipment in invading Cyprus.

*Counter:*

Unfortunately, the issue is not so simple. As a guarantor of the independence of Cyprus under the 1960 accords, Turkey felt its duty was to protect the independence of Cyprus when the Greek Government helped engineer the overthrow of Archbishop Makarios in July 1974.

Turkey was, then, caught between conflicting legal responsibilities. If Turkey did not act to protect Cypriot independence and the Turkish-Cypriot minority, which it felt were threatened by the July 1974 coup, Turkey would be ignoring its international legal obligations under the 1960 agreements on Cyprus; on the other hand, if Turkey did act, its actions could be construed to be in violation of American law.

Whatever its position with respect to American law, Turkey felt it was acting according to international law and the 1960 accords to which Turkey was a party.

Moreover, Turkey has been punished for nearly a half year for its invasion of Cyprus. The effect of the law has been felt and the principle honored. The law was not intended to punish Turkey, or anyone else, indefinitely, especially when the cause of peace and promotion of the national interest argue strongly for a modification of the embargo.

In addition, the United States law should not be selectively enforced. Several other similar military agreements that have been violated by friendly states around the world have not led to denials of aid and the United States has furnished arms to countries which were in possession of territory of other states.

There is, for example, uncontradicted evidence that Greece has transferred U.S. military equipment to Cyprus since the mid-1960s in violation of law.

*Argument:* If the United States resumes aid, we will set a precedent encouraging other states to use U.S.-supplied arms as they please.

*Counter:*

The law has been punitive to Turkey. Nations are on notice that if they misuse American arms, they risk losing access to those arms. The only reason for suspending the provisions of the law with respect to Turkey is because of a new situation.

This action will have no impact on Persian Gulf states or other states in the Middle East—the only way we can persuade other states not to use arms for purposes other than those prescribed in the law is through bilateral presentations and we do that. The particular facts of each situation will determine the use of American arms, not this or any other precedent.

We have upheld the principle that violators of U.S. laws and regulations relating to military equipment provided to foreign nations will be penalized.

*Argument:* The Turkish military is hurting now and Turkey will eventually make concessions.

*Counter:*

Turkey can buy arms elsewhere. The British are willing to sell them equipment. Others in Europe, including the Soviet Union, could supply arms.

Pressure on Turkey in the last several months has only hardened its position. Given the Turkish national character and their unanimity of view in opposition to the embargo, Turkey is not likely to make concessions under duress and this means that suffering on Cyprus only continues.

The Turkish military may be hurting, but not that much. Over the years it has been able to cannibalize equipment and it can do so now. The ban is simply forcing the Turks to turn for help to other nations whose interests may not be harmonious with ours.

*Argument:* The embargo did not work because the President and the Secretary of State did not want it to work. Rather than pressing for Turkish concessions, the U.S. told Turkey "wait, we will bring Congress around on the aid issue."

*Counter:*

Under Secretary of State Sisco denied this charge. He said that we have made vigorous efforts to try to obtain concessions and meaningful

negotiations. I would not try to defend every move of the Administration in dealing with Cyprus. The fact is, however, that with the embargo, our ability to work with, and to influence Turkey has diminished, and Turkish cooperation is essential if progress is to be made on Cyprus, as well as on other crises in the area.

*Argument:* We are only acting now because Turkey gave the U.S. an ultimatum that bases may be closed after July 17. If we give in to extortion, now we will only up the ante and face future Turkish demands.

*Counter:*

We are acting now, not because of any ultimatum, but because it is in our national interest to act.

Most Turkish political parties have been calling for a review of base and facility arrangements for some time. This is not a new issue.

There is neither extortion nor ultimatum here. Our security arrangement with Turkey is for the mutual benefit of Turkey and the United States. Because of the embargo, it is only natural that Turkey is reviewing its security ties.

We are not upping the ante: our security relationship with Turkey has always been at the core of our ties.

*Argument:* Turkey will not make concessions and compromise on this issue or other issues like the opium poppy growing issue.

*Counter:*

While Turkey has resumed production of opium poppies, the harvest is only now beginning and we do not know whether its substantial efforts to keep opium out of illicit markets will work. We will have to judge these efforts later.

We have had a 30-year relationship with Turkey and our mutual interests in preserving that relationship are great. In the past, they have shown a willingness to cooperate and to compromise, and there is no reason to think they will not in the future, provided that we treat them as a partner in a mature relationship.

We need good relations with the Turks if we are to be able to work with them on some issues that matter to us, like the opium issue and the Cyprus problem.

The embargo only reduces our ability to work with and influence Turkey on these and other issues.

*Argument:* Resuming aid will seriously jeopardize United States-Greek relations.

*Counter:*

The basis of our dealings with one ally—Greece—should not hinge on what we do with another ally—Turkey. Greece cannot complain if she and Turkey are treated equally, which would be the effect of a lifting of the ban.

The best judgment of our diplomats is that a modification of the ban will not produce a major reaction in Greece. Many Greeks recognize that the ban has introduced a complexity into the negotiations which is, at least, delaying a solution.

There is only one way to improve and preserve the close relations we want with Greece and that is directly with Greece in our bilateral ties. These bilateral dealings continue to need urgent, direct attention.

We are working with Greece now on further military assistance and there is a likelihood of economic help in the future. The bill before the

House encourages assistance to Greece. Greece intends to buy considerable military equipment from the United States, and Greece's relationship with the United States is more important to Greece than what we sell to Turkey.

*Argument:* S. 846 is no compromise. It gives Turkey everything it wants.

*Counter:*

This bill continues to put restrictions on what we give Turkey. Upon enactment of this bill, Turkey will not have everything it wants. This bill releases to Turkey equipment it has already purchased. Only when the Foreign Assistance Act of 1975 is enacted will Turkey be able to buy equipment directly or on credit. The denial of grant aid to Turkey continues.

This bill, with a partial lifting of the arms embargo, is a compromise between the President and Secretary of State who wanted a total and immediate removal of the arms embargo, and the proponents of the arms embargo in Congress who wanted no removal without prior Turkish concessions or assurances of them.

If Turkey fails to respond to this effort and if no meaningful negotiations result, the partial lifting of the ban can be removed and the full ban reimposed.

LEE H. HAMILTON.

#### OPPOSING VIEWS OF MICHAEL HARRINGTON

Lifting the ban on military aid to Turkey will rearm a nation in blatant violation of two provisions of U.S. law. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Foreign Military Sales Act both require the immediate suspension of aid to any nation that uses American-supplied arms for aggressive purposes. Last year, Turkey ignored its agreement to abide by the provisions of this agreement. Equipped with American-supplied bombs, bullets, guns, tanks, ships, and aircraft, Turkey invaded and occupied the island of Cyprus. An immediate suspension of military aid was required by law, yet the Executive Branch consistently failed to act. Thus, Congress finally took the lead and enacted the necessary legislation suspending further military aid to Turkey. And until recently, the Congress has properly resisted Executive Branch requests to rescind these measures.

From a broad perspective, this vote reflects congressional acceptance of the administration's view that higher levels of military aid in general will bring peace to nations confronted with internal security problems or external threats. More specifically, the committee action advances the notion that the resumption of military assistance to Turkey, in the absence of any concessions on its part, will provide that nation with the necessary incentives to negotiate issues that last year it sought to settle solely by the use of force. Nothing could be further from the truth.

Despite current Turkish threats to close U.S. military bases in Turkey, we are asked to believe that resumption of U.S. aid will serve the higher national security interests of the United States. Appeasing a nation engaging in such threats clearly will never serve our long-term national interest.

Due to Turkish stockpiling of U.S. military aid prior to the cutoff of February 5, 1975, the effect of the arms ban is only now beginning to have a serious impact. I am, therefore, wholeheartedly opposed to any action that renews military aid to Turkey prior to a serious effort to achieve a negotiated settlement. In fact, a diminished capacity to rely on the use of force may provide the incentives needed for the stalemated negotiations.

We are being asked once again to believe that the influx of arms will bring peace to a highly volatile situation. Such contorted logic deserves rejection, and I trust my colleagues will join me in seeing this measure defeated on the House floor.

MICHAEL HARRINGTON.

#### DISSENTING VIEWS OF HON. DONALD W. RIEGLE, JR.

I am strongly opposed to the resumption of military assistance to Turkey at this time. To resume aid directly violates existing provisions of American law which require that countries receiving American arms not use those arms against other American allies.

In recent days I have met and talked with the Ambassadors of Turkey, Greece and Cyprus. I strongly believe the US should and can maintain cordial relationships with Turkey, Greece and Cyprus—but it must not be at the cost of breaking our own laws or standing by silently while one US ally bullies another and terrorizes a civilian population with the very American arms shipments this bill addresses.

With its capture and occupation of 40 percent of the island of Cyprus—and creation of some 200,000 Cypriot refugees—Turkey has directly violated its legal obligations and commitments with the US concerning the use of American supplied arms.

Over 90 percent of the military equipment used by Turkey to invade Cyprus was supplied by the US, and thus far the US Government has not even been able to establish the whereabouts of some 25 Americans who were visiting Cyprus when the invasion occurred and who are lost behind the Turkish lines.

Thus far there has been no substantial progress in settling the Cyprus issue, and the human misery there mounts daily. This is a burning human rights issue, and there is an urgent need for a negotiated settlement of the Cyprus problem.

There is no justification for Turkish intransigence concerning Cyprus and the Cyprus issue lies at the very heart of the question of resuming arms shipments to Turkey.

The end of the Turkish arms embargo must go hand in hand with concrete progress on the Cyprus issue—the two are inseparable—and the resolution of one cannot proceed without the other.

Insofar as the issue of American strategic bases in Turkey and Greece, I listened carefully to CIA Director Colby's classified briefing on the matter. It is my own judgment that strategic base rights in both Greece and Turkey are important to US security interests at this time. Bases in one country ought not to be jeopardized for bases in the other country. We need both and should endeavor to keep both. But if we are intimidated into breaking our own laws as a ransom for US base rights abroad, then we set a precedent that will invite other nations to blackmail the US over base rights in their countries. I see great danger in that course.

We must persuade Turkey that her long-run security interests lie with the West, and that an equitable solution to the Cyprus issue, now, will serve the strategic interests of Turkey and her allies.

If the Congress were to remove the Turkish arms embargo at this time, we would cause two deadly serious consequences that would badly damage US foreign policy interests.

First, we would send a message to all other recipients of American arms shipments that they could if they followed Turkey's example, violate their agreements with the US, use US supplied arms against other US allies and get away with it. With the mounting world-wide arms race and growing pressures between nations, any backtracking by the US concerning the use of its arms abroad can only result in a less stable world and mounting threats to the peace and security of the Western world.

Second, we would walk away from the Cyprus tragedy, the 200,000 misplaced refugees, and the stalemate that now blocks progress toward a permanent settlement. US arms shipments are perhaps the only significant lever, both moral and practical, we have in persuading the Turks to move now to settle the Cyprus issue.

These dissenting views in no way are attempting to prejudge the resolution of the Cyprus issue and the long-standing claims and problems associated with both Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Those issues must be worked out directly between Turkey and Greece, but there is no excuse for even another day's delay in resolving these questions. When such movement begins in earnest, the US can again take up the question of resuming arms shipments to Turkey.

Thank you for considering these dissenting views.

DONALD W. RIEGLE, JR.

## ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF HON. WILLIAM S. BROOMFIELD

### POPPY CULTIVATION IN TURKEY

In considering legislation to ease the arms embargo to Turkey, the Committee on International Relations addressed, on several occasions, the matter of Turkish control over opium poppies grown in that country. The Committee was fortunate in having our Ambassador to Turkey, the Honorable William B. Macomber, Jr., present at the morning sessions of the hearings to respond to questions about the Turkish opium crop. We also had an opportunity to hear an eloquent statement from the gentleman from New York, Mr. Rangel, in which he expressed his sincere concern over the possibility of the illegal export of Turkish opium, regardless of controls which may be in force.

I believe the record of the Committee deliberations should clearly show that Congress is deeply and legitimately concerned with the possible export of Turkish opium to this country. We have heard testimony from Ambassador Macomber regarding Turkish control over the opium crop and his assurances that the Government of Turkey is working in good faith to direct opium production solely to legitimate purposes. As Ambassador Macomber stated in his testimony, it is still too early to tell whether the United Nations sponsored system of controls now implemented in Turkey will prove effective. Given these circumstances, I submit that Congress has no alternative but to accept for the time being the *bona fides* of the Turkish Government and to monitor the situation closely.

Despite the importance of the opium issue to this and other nations and the obvious requirement for strict, effective control of the poppy crop, the Committee on International Relations has chosen, correctly in my opinion, not to link the issues of arms and opium. The Committee assessed the question of the arms embargo in terms of its impact on the prospects for a Cyprus settlement, on the status of our bilateral relations with Turkey and our important bases in that country, on the potential damage to the NATO alliance, and on the importance of maintaining good relations with both Greece and Turkey.

It is my judgment, and one I believe to be shared by the majority of the Committee members, that the Government of Turkey should be permitted an opportunity to demonstrate its good faith on the opium question, an issue essentially unrelated to either the imposition or the relaxation of the arms embargo. I have every confidence that, with Ambassador Macomber, one of our most outstanding diplomats, serving in Ankara, Congress and the American people will be kept fully and currently informed of any illegal diversion of Turkish opium production.

WILLIAM S. BROOMFIELD.

## SEPARATE VIEWS OF HON. J. HERBERT BURKE

This bill represents bad legislation, bad policy and bad precedent. Here are the bill's major deficiencies:

(1) *The so-called compromise is no compromise.* In exchange for a resumption of arms sales, Turkey is required to do nothing to correct actions it took on Cyprus. These aggressive actions, made possible by American weapons, caused the arms cutoff.

(2) *A major principle of American foreign policy is abandoned.* Reviving arms to Turkey without any action by Turkey to remedy the consequences of its aggression abandons a fundamental principle of American foreign policy—that weapons are supplied by the United States to other countries for defensive and not for aggressive purposes.

(3) *Restoring arms sales to Turkey condones the continuing violations of law and bilateral agreements.* Over 30,000 Turkish troops, equipped with American arms, still occupy 40% of Cyprus, an independent country. 180,000 Greek Cypriot refugees remain homeless. Turkey refuses to deal with these conditions.

(4) *This bill encourages further Turkish aggression.* Arms ordered by Turkey before the embargo would be released "notwithstanding any other provision of law" including prohibitions against offensive use of American supplied arms. Turkey could use these arms, and all commercial arms which it is also allowed to buy under this bill, in aggression against Greece.

(5) *Resuming arms sales would be yielding to Turkish extortion.* This bill is a surrender to the Turkish threat to close U.S. bases. Yielding to such a threat invites other countries to hold hostage 300 major U.S. overseas bases.

(6) *Passage of S. 846 would encourage other countries to misuse U.S. arms.* Over \$8 billion in U.S. arms were sold abroad last year. The legal restraints prohibiting the transfer of these arms and limiting their use to self-defense will be severely eroded elsewhere if Turkey can resume buying U.S. arms under present circumstances.

\* \* \* \* \*

(8) *Resumption of arms sales to Turkey could severely damage Greece.* Rearming Turkey could have a "catastrophic" effect on the new democracy in Greece according to former Under Secretary of State George Ball when he testified in opposition to this bill. To rearm Turkey without the fundamental restraints of our laws, as this bill proposes, could also endanger U.S. bases in Greece and a revived Greek role in NATO.

(9) *Opponents of this bill support NATO and want both Greece and Turkey to resume their full participation in the alliance.* American policy must move toward rebuilding the southeastern flank of NATO by supporting a prompt and fair settlement on Cyprus. As long as U.S. policy tilts toward Turkey, this rebuilding of NATO is impossible.

## THE PERTINENT PROVISIONS OF AMERICAN LAW

Following are the relevant provisions of law associated with the Turkish aid ban:

Section 505(b) of the *Foreign Assistance Act of 1961*, as amended, states that—

No Defense articles shall be furnished . . . to any country . . . unless the President determines . . . that such defense articles will be utilized by such country for the maintenance of its own defensive strength, or the defensive strength of the free world;

Section 505(d) of the same Act states that—

Any country which hereafter uses defense articles or defense services furnished such country . . . in substantial violation of the provisions of this chapter shall be immediately ineligible for further assistance.

Section 4. of the *Foreign Military Sales Act* states that—

Defense articles and defense services shall be sold . . . solely for internal security, for legitimate self-defense, to permit the recipient country to participate in regional or collective arrangements or measures consistent with the Charter of the United Nations. . . .

Section 3(c) of the same Act states that—

any foreign country which hereafter uses defense articles or defense services furnished under this Act, in substantial violation or any provision of this Act . . . shall be immediately ineligible for further cash sales, credits, or guarantees.

J. HERBERT BURKE.

## ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF HON. ROBERT J. LAGOMARSINO

Although I originally voted to impose the arms embargo on Turkey, recent developments have led me to support S-846, as amended, by the Committee on International Relations as an acceptable compromise solution to a very difficult and complex situation. The fact is that the present embargo has not worked in its attempt to defuse the tension on Cyprus, and its only effect has been to weaken America's national interest.

S-846 contains adequate safeguards to prevent the arms from being misused by Turkey. The only arms that can be sold by the United States are those needed by Turkey to fulfill its NATO commitments, and then only after the enactment of legislation authorizing military sales for fiscal year 1976. Arms sales will be halted immediately if Turkey does not observe the Cyprus cease-fire, if it increases the number of troops on Cyprus, or if it transfers any American weapons to Cyprus. Also, the President is requested to initiate discussion with Greece to determine Greek military and economic needs. The President is further directed to cooperate in various multinational programs for the relief of refugees and other dislocated persons on Cyprus. I am convinced that this compromise is a workable solution to a very serious problem.

The United States has much to gain from lifting the arms embargo to Turkey under these protective provisions. Turkey will be able to fulfill its NATO commitments, and the United States will be able to keep its bases in Turkey which are vital to American and NATO security. Events in Portugal have already weakened NATO's southern flank enough. Both Turkey and NATO will view the easing of the embargo as a re-affirmation of the American commitment to Europe.

The most important aspect of this partial lifting of the embargo, however, is that it will break the stalemate in the Cyprus negotiations. Because of the delicate domestic political balance in Turkey, the Turkish government, for its own survival, cannot be perceived by the Turkish people to be yielding to external pressure; thus, easing the embargo is necessary for serious negotiations. The diplomatic hand of the United States will be strengthened in dealing with Turkey. The current embargo has made the Turks more resistant to making changes in Cyprus than they were before we imposed it.

I am very concerned about the right of self-determination of the Cypriot people. I am also concerned about America's vital interests in this part of the world. S-846, as amended, is a workable compromise that will promote both of these important goals.

AMENDING THE BOARD FOR INTERNATIONAL  
BROADCASTING ACT OF 1973

JUNE 26, 1975.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of  
the Union and ordered to be printed

Mr. MORGAN, from the Committee on International Relations,  
submitted the following

REPORT

together with

ADDITIONAL VIEWS

[To accompany H.R. 4699]



The Committee on International Relations, to whom was referred the bill (H.R. 4699) to authorize appropriations for fiscal years 1976 and 1977 for carrying out the Board for International Broadcasting Act of 1973, having considered the same, report favorably thereon with amendments and recommend that the bill as amended do pass.

The amendments are as follows:

Page 1, beginning on line 10, strike out "\$65,640,000 for fiscal year 1976" and insert in lieu thereof the following: "\$70,640,000 for fiscal year 1976, of which \$5,000,000 shall be available only to the extent that the Director of the Office of Management and Budget determines (and so certifies to the Congress) is necessary, because of fluctuations in foreign currency exchange rates, in order to maintain the budgeted level of operation for Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty".

Page 2, lines 1 and 2, strike out "and such sums as may be necessary for fiscal year 1977".

Amend the title so as to read:

A bill to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1976 for carrying out the Board for International Broadcasting Act of 1973.

PURPOSE OF THE BILL

The purpose of H.R. 4699, as reported, is to authorize an appropriation of \$70,640,000 for fiscal year 1976 to support the operations of Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, and the Board for International Broadcasting.

## COMMITTEE ACTION

On February 5, 1975, the Executive forwarded to the Speaker of the House Executive Communication 257, together with a draft bill "to authorize appropriations for fiscal years 1976 and 1977 for carrying out the Board for International Broadcasting Act of 1973", which was referred to the Committee on International Relations. The Honorable Thomas F. Morgan, Chairman of the Committee on International Relations, introduced the draft bill as H. R. 4699, on March 12, 1975.

The committee held a public hearing on this bill on May 12, 1975. It received testimony from Dr. David M. Abshire, Chairman, and other members of the Board for International Broadcasting. Other Board members are: Hon. Foy D. Kohler, professor, Center for Advanced International Studies, the University of Miami, Coral Gables Fla.; Mr. Thomas Henry Quinn, general partner, law firm of O'Connor & Hannan, Washington, D.C.; and ex officio (nonvoting) Board members, representing the two stations—Hon. William P. Durkee, president, Free Europe, Inc., and Hon. Howland Sargeant, president, Radio Liberty Committee; Hon. John P. Roche, Henry R. Luce Professor of Civilization and Foreign Affairs, the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, Medford, Mass., was unable to attend the hearing. The fifth voting member of the Board, Mr. John T. Murphy, president, AVCO Broadcasting Corp., Cincinnati, Ohio, had not been sworn in at the time of the hearing and, consequently, did not testify.

On June 17, 1975, the committee held an open markup session and ordered favorably reported the bill H. R. 4699 with amendments by unanimous voice vote.

## COMMITTEE AMENDMENTS

The first amendment authorizes an additional appropriation of \$5 million to be available until expended. These funds, or any portion thereof, may be made available to the radios *only to the extent* that the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) determines (and so certifies to the Congress) they are necessary to compensate for foreign currency exchange losses in order to maintain the budgeted level of operation for Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. (For a full explanation of this amendment see sections on "Devaluation Problem" and "Committee Amendment on Exchange Loss Contingency Fund.")

The second amendment deletes all references to fiscal year 1977—thus limiting the authorization to fiscal year 1976 only.

The third amendment amends the title of the bill to reflect the above change.

## BACKGROUND

Radio Free Europe (RFE) and Radio Liberty (RL) had their origin in the years immediately following World War II, when the Soviets gave every indication of establishing hegemony over Eastern Europe and threatening Western interests. RFE was incorporated in New York in 1950 and RL in Delaware in 1951. Operational headquarters for both stations are located in Munich, Germany.

Until June 30, 1974, both radios were supported by funds provided by the Central Intelligence Agency. In the case of RFE, some funds

were raised from private sources totalling \$50,050,000 from 1951 through April 1975. After CIA funding of the two radios was terminated by Congress, they were funded on a temporary basis under section 703 of the U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948, as amended. This funding procedure was adopted as a transitional mechanism—pending the completion of studies on RFE and RL by the Library of Congress, the General Accounting Office and, subsequently, the Presidential Study Commission on International Radio Broadcasting, headed by Dr. Milton Eisenhower.

In October 1973, Congress passed and the President signed the Board for International Broadcasting Act of 1973. This act, based on the Eisenhower Commission's recommendations, created a five-member Board for International Broadcasting which was authorized to receive congressionally appropriated funds and to allocate them to the two radios. The Board was also charged with certain specific review and oversight responsibilities.

## THE BOARD FOR INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING

The Board consists of five voting members appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and two ex officio (nonvoting) members representing the two stations. Voting members are to be selected from "among Americans distinguished in the fields of foreign policy or mass communications" who are not regular full-time employees of the U.S. Government. Not more than three such members may be of the same political party. Board members serve without annual salary, although they may be compensated on a daily basis at level V of the executive schedule while attending Board meetings or engaged in official Board business, and receive travel expenses and per diem.

## STAFF

The Board is currently serviced by a small staff, consisting of four members and three secretaries. Staff headquarters are located in Washington, D.C.

## FUNCTIONS

The Board is authorized to receive congressionally authorized and appropriated funds for allocation to the two radios. In addition, it is charged with the responsibility of reviewing and evaluating the mission and operation of the two radios and assessing the "quality, effectiveness, and professional integrity" of their broadcasting within the context of broad U.S. foreign policy objectives. The 1973 act also requires the Board to "encourage the most effective utilization of available resources and undertake such studies as may be necessary to insure economic and efficient operations"; to develop financial and auditing procedures to insure that grants are being made for the purposes Congress intended; and to report annually to the President and Congress on the activities of the Board and the operations of RFE and RL.

## BOARD'S OVERSIGHT PROGRESS DURING FISCAL YEAR 1975

The Board for International Broadcasting has been in operation for approximately 1 year—beginning in May 1974. Predictably, the first several months were taken up largely with organizational activities,

During fiscal year 1975, the Board utilized the assistance of experts and consultants in both the telecommunications and management areas. The consultants traveled to Munich and worked with Board staff on fiscal, management, and general operations relating to the two radios.

During fiscal year 1975, the New York headquarters of the two radios were brought together in one building—in preparation for the move to Washington. Early in fiscal year 1976, a single headquarters will be established there under one President, Mr. Sig Mickelson. A former president of CBS news, vice president of Time-Life, Inc., and chairman of the Department of Editorial Journalism of the Medill School, Northwestern University, Mr. Mickelson possesses outstanding qualifications for his new assignment. He is scheduled to take over as president of both Radio Liberty Committee, Inc. and Free Europe, Inc., on July 1, 1975.

Construction of added space at RFE's programming center in Munich will enable Radio Liberty programming to be accommodated there in the fall of 1975—with the reduction of 90 supporting service employees. Henceforth, RFE/RL programming will be carried out under a single program director stationed in Munich.

Despite these indications of initial progress, the committee is of the opinion that the Board has a long way to go in fulfilling its oversight responsibilities. During the hearings, evidence was presented which confirms that BIB consultants and staff have not had full and unimpeded access to information on the Radios. On the contrary, directives have been issued by the Radios' executives specifically limiting such access and circumscribing the Board's activities. Such actions, the committee wishes to state categorically, run counter to the legislative mandate assigned to the Board under the Board for International Broadcasting Act of 1973 and should be halted forthwith.

The committee supports the authorization contained in this bill because of its belief that during this past fiscal year, the U.S. Board for International Broadcasting has begun to carry out the mandate of the Congress to foster the consolidation of the two Radios, to reduce the personnel base to a stable and fundable level which will avoid future financial crises, and to accomplish these objectives with reference to other relevant U.S. international broadcasting activities. Any assertions (such as have appeared in the foreign press) that reductions in the personnel of the two Radios have been diplomatically or politically motivated as a part of "détente" are oblivious to: (a) the congressional demands for economies during a domestic recession; (b) the financial predicament of the Radios; (c) the need for a stable base and more interagency coordination prior to requesting greater Government resources for modernization; and (d) the fact that BIB has been persuasively testifying before Congress that the radio broadcasting mission is more important than ever.

The basis for the authorization has been the committee's belief that BIB is in the process of becoming an active oversight board. In this regard, it is important that the corporate management communicate to the rank and file of the Radios the need for the acceptance, in practice and in spirit, of the present process of authorization, appropriation and oversight, which is quite different from the earlier years of the Radios. Furthermore, the new Chief Executive Officer of the two corporations; Mr. Sig Mickelson, must have full corporate authority in his role; the mission of the Radios is too important to be

hindered by past bureaucratic interests. The effectiveness and quality of the broadcasts will be maximized if improved efficiencies are sought and instituted. Congressional support will be influenced by developments in those areas.

The committee intends to monitor the relationship between BIB and RFE/RL during the coming fiscal year to insure that the legislative intent set forth above is strictly adhered to. If necessary, the Board's authority to investigate, advise, and implement its recommendations will be strengthened by legislation.

The committee also hopes that before proceeding with the modernization of transmitters, the Board will carefully assess the possibility of sharing equipment which may be in the possession of—but not fully utilized by—other U.S. agencies, as well as other options (including rental or exchange of transmitter time with private or foreign entities) suggested in the course of the committee's hearings.

#### FISCAL YEAR 1976 BUDGET REQUEST

As noted above, the administration's request for a 2-year authorization was disapproved. As reported by the committee, H.R. 4699 authorizes appropriations only for fiscal year 1976.

The fiscal year 1976 request includes \$65,240,000 in grants to Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty—and \$400,000 to finance the operations of the Board for International Broadcasting. This compares with a total fiscal year 1975 authorization of \$49,990,000 and an appropriation of \$49,800,000. Thus the fiscal year 1976 authorization request represents an increase over the fiscal year 1975 authorization level of \$15,650,000 or approximately 30 percent.

This proposed grant increase to the two Radios is based on: (1) Exchange loss since last September resulting from the devaluation of the dollar vis-à-vis European currencies, especially the deutsche mark (see section entitled "Devaluation Problem"); (2) increased pension payments imposed by the Employment Income Security Act and similar legislation enacted by the West German parliament; (3) severance pay and benefits for the termination of approximately 245 employees; (4) Baltic language programming (initiation of Latvian and Estonian service in addition to Lithuanian programming begun in January 1975); and (5) net operating cost increases due to inflation.

#### ONE-TIME COSTS

The fiscal year 1976 budget includes an estimated \$11.1 million in so-called "one-time costs." These are nonrecurring expenditures for such purposes as:

- (1) Cost of headquarters consolidation in the United States and proposed move to Washington, D.C.
- (2) Cost of operational consolidation in Munich.
- (3) Replacement of transmitters.
- (4) Severance pay and benefits for terminated employees; required by law.
- (5) Pension "make-up" (i.e., pension payments for past years in which payments were not made owing to budgetary limitations); A detailed breakdown of the BIB request follows:

## RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY DISTRIBUTION OF COSTS BY TYPE OF EXPENSE

[In thousands of dollars]

	Fiscal year 1974 actual		Fiscal year 1975 estimate		Fiscal year 1976 estimate	
	Number	Amount	Number	Amount	Number	Amount
<b>Regular operating expenses:</b>						
Personnel compensation:						
Annual salaries:						
Permanent employees	2,025	25,547	2,011	27,457	1,789/1,739	25,242
Temporary and part-time employees	48	306	31	348	26	258
Total annual salaries	2,073	25,853	2,042	27,805	1,815/1,765	25,500
Employee benefits:						
Taxes		2,673		2,883		3,147
Pension program		605		1,170		1,385
Fringe benefits		6,570		6,544		7,139
Total employee benefits		9,848		10,597		15,671
Miscellaneous fees and professional services						
		1,749		2,001		2,309
Total personnel compensation and benefits		37,450		40,403		43,480
Administrative costs:						
Travel		217		265		292
Rent and utilities		1,319		1,233		965
Licenses, royalties, copyrights		576		619		630
Technical		2,111		2,378		2,856
News and information		424		456		566
Conferences		1		5		5
Representation		36		49		53
General and administrative		2,006		2,040		2,416
Total administrative costs		6,600		7,045		7,783
Total regular operating expenses		44,140		47,448		51,263
Consolidation expenses:						
Operating and termination costs						
Capital		5,518		375	(240/290)	5,622
				275		470
Total consolidation expenses		5,518		1,150		6,092
Capital expenses:						
Regular		68		292		425
Modernization				370		2,710
Total capital		68		662		3,135
<b>Summary:</b>						
Regular operating expenses		44,140		47,448		51,263
Consolidation expenses		5,518		1,150		6,092
Capital expenses		68		662		3,135
Subtotal, expenses at \$1 = Deutsche marks as indicated		49,726		49,260		60,490
Exchange loss as indicated				2,276		1,300
Exchange loss as indicated						3,450
Grand total expenses		49,726		51,536		65,240
Financing:						
U.S. Government grant		49,500		49,510		65,240
Application of working capital		226		2,026		0
Total		49,726		51,536		65,240

<sup>1</sup>The Radios' pension plans are of the type normal to the private sector requiring premium payments that include amortization of past service costs and funding for future benefits in accordance with generally accepted actuarial principles. In addition, they are now governed by the provisions of new pension legislation, both in the United States (ERISA) and in Germany.

<sup>2</sup>This line includes the cost of 90 reductions from consolidating the management and supporting services of the Radios and from 150-200 additional terminations not related to consolidation.

<sup>3</sup>Congressional authorization for broadcasting in the Baltic languages at the earliest possible date required that a portion of the technical modernization program scheduled for fiscal year 1976 be completed earlier.

<sup>4</sup>Deutsche marks 2.54.

<sup>5</sup>Deutsche marks 2.60.

<sup>6</sup>Represents 7 months actual loss; 5 months projected loss at \$1 = Deutsche marks 2.35.

<sup>7</sup>Deutsche marks 2.53.

<sup>8</sup>Deutsche marks 2.35.

## Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Justification

Regular operating expenses:

Annual salaries—Permanent employees

(In thousands)

- \$2,215

Savings from fiscal year 1975 and fiscal year 1976 consolidation actions: Fiscal year 1975 nonrecurring cost of salaries prior to terminations; fiscal year 1976 salary savings after terminations

- 849

Other termination actions in fiscal years 1976. In order to achieve a lower fiscal year 1977 budget level, the Radios will reduce staff during fiscal year 1976 by about 10 percent (150-200 employees) beyond the 90 staff reductions due to consolidation efforts. This will result in savings of approximately \$4.1 million (at \$1/DM 2.35) in fiscal year 1977. The fiscal year 1976 salaries for the personnel affected will be reprogrammed to pay their termination costs

- 3,705

General salary increase of 5 percent for all employees in line with expected cost of living and wage scale level increases. In-grade increases in accordance with union contracts and company policy for employees below the tops of their grades. Annualization of fiscal year 1975 personnel actions (in-grades, hires, promotions, etc.)

+ 2,019

Salaries for 15 new employees to initiate broadcasting in Latvian and Estonian as authorized by Congress

+ 320

Annual salaries—temporary and part-time employees

- 90

Savings from fiscal year 1975 and fiscal year 1976 consolidation actions

- 55

Savings from reduced usage of temporary personnel

- 47

General salary increase of 5 percent for all personnel in line with expected cost of living increase

+ 12

Employee benefits: Taxes

+ 264

Savings from fiscal year 1975 and fiscal year 1976 consolidation actions

- 47

Increase in taxes due to fiscal year 1976 general increase, fiscal year 1976 in-grade increases and annualization of fiscal year 1975 personnel actions

+ 235

Effects of known or expected increases in tax rates in the United States, Germany, Iberia, and other countries in which the Radios operate

+ 76

Employee benefits: Pension program

+ 4,215

Increase in current year's pension premiums caused by salary increases offset by savings from fiscal year 1975 consolidation actions

+ 89

Increase in or reinstatement of current pension premium funding to four plans: RL: German plan \$225; HQ plan \$70; RFE: DM plan \$913; Dollar plan \$1,200

+ 2,408

Budgetary problems in prior years had required some deferral of pension premiums. Partial makeup payments are planned this year in accordance with new United States and German pension legislation and with actuarial recommendations: RL-HQ plan \$395; RFE-DM plan \$895

+ 1,290

Improvements in pension plans in order (a) to bring them into line with new pension legislation and (b) to make RFE and RL plans more comparable

+ 428

Employee benefits: Fringe benefits

+ 595

Nonrecurring fiscal year 1975 costs and savings from consolidation

- 77

Improvements in insurance provisions to make RFE and RL plans more comparable

+ 57

## Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Justification—Continued

Regular operating expenses—Continued	
Employee benefits: Fringe benefits—Continued (In thousands)	
Annualization of effects of salary and price increases on fiscal year 1975 costs	+60
Increase due to salary increases (e.g. life insurance, some allowances for overseas service) and price increases (e.g. insurance, home leave travel, housing and utility costs)	+501
Insurance costs for new retirees and increased number of home leave travelers	+54
Miscellaneous fees and professional services	+308
Nonrecurring fiscal year 1975 costs due to consolidation	-2
New freelance requirements due to implementation of Baltic programming	+130
Reinstatement of freelance usage deferred in fiscal year 1975 due to financial situation and increased requirements in fiscal year 1976 due to major staff reductions	+139
Price increases in outside professional services (e.g. legal, auditing, engineering consultants)	+41
Travel: Cost of price increases	+27
Rent and utilities	-268
Saving on Radio Liberty's Munich rental costs due to consolidation in RFE's building	-292
Increased cost of utilities	+24
Licenses, royalties and copyrights: Annualization of fiscal year 1975 price increase in royalty payment	+11
Technical	+478
Annualization of fiscal year 1975 and new fiscal year 1976 increases in power costs, and other price increases	+228
Increased technical requirements due to modernization of equipment	+250
News and information	+110
Reductions in personnel will require an increase in the purchase of news and information services	+37
Increase due to initiation of Latvian and Estonian broadcasting	+20
Annualization of fiscal year 1975 and cost of new fiscal year 1976 increases	+53
Representation: Cost of price increases	+4
General and administrative: Cost of annualization of fiscal year 1975 and new fiscal year 1976 price increases (e.g. postage, stationery, copy machines, telephones, general repairs, general insurance, building maintenance) offset by savings from reduction in personnel and economy measures	+376
Consolidation expenses	+4,942
Cost for severance payments and related costs to terminate 90 Munich employees on Dec. 31, 1975. Cost to restore RL's Munich office to proper condition prior to return to landlord, and moving costs for relocation of RL equipment to FRE building	+1,542
Cost for severance payments and related costs to terminate an additional 150-200 employees during fiscal year 1976	+3,705
Decreased requirement for remaining cost to complete construction on RFE's Munich office prior to consolidation	-305

## Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Justification—Continued

(In thousands)	
Capital expenses	+2,473
Regular costs: Continues program to replace worn and obsolete equipment and to install new equipment for more efficient operations	+133
Modernization costs: Required funds to continue the modernization program of the technical facilities of the Radios (\$370 was expended in fiscal year 1975 for this purpose)	+2,340
Foreign exchange loss	+2,474
Continued deterioration of the U.S. dollar in relation to the foreign currencies in which the Radios are required to expend most of their funds (primarily the deutsche mark, peseta and escudo) has substantially increased their operation costs. This loss amounted to \$2.276 million in fiscal year 1975 and represented the difference between the buying power of the dollar at the original budgeted rate of DM 2.60/\$1 and the actual average cost of foreign currencies for 7 months plus the remaining 5 months loss projected at DM 2.35/\$1. The loss for fiscal year 1976 is estimated at \$4.750 million (an increase over fiscal year 1975 of \$2.474 million) and is composed of \$1.3 million representing the difference between \$1/DM 2.60 and the fiscal year 1976 budgeted rate of \$1/DM 2.53, and \$3.450 million reflecting the additional cost arising out of the dollar's further deterioration to around \$1/DM 2.35	+2,474
Board for International Broadcasting, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty—Distribution of costs by type of expense for the transition period (July 1, 1976, to Sept. 30, 1976) (In thousands of dollars)	
	Estimate for transition period—amount
Personnel compensation:	
Annual salaries—all employees (estimate 1,804)	\$6,975
Employee benefits:	
Taxes	800
Pension:	
Normal payment	1,250
Deferred fiscal year 1976 payment plus interest and penalty*	2,100
Minor cost-of-living adjustment past pensioners (3 percent per year from 1968)*	825
Fringe benefits	1,400
Miscellaneous fees and professional services	550
Total personnel compensation and benefits	13,900
Administrative costs:	
Licenses, royalties, copyrights (increase by Spanish and Portuguese Governments in fees)*	850
Remainder of administrative costs	1,800
Total administrative costs	2,650
Total regular operating expenses	16,550
Consolidation expense—Senior staff termination costs and December cuts*	250
Capital maintenance at normal level	200
Devaluation—covers \$1/2.60 DM down to \$1/2.35 DM	1,100
Total other costs	1,550
Total grant to radios	18,100
Board for International Broadcasting	100
Total estimated transition period costs	18,200

\* NOTE.—All categories unless marked \* are ¼ of full year costs. Those marked \* are payable in this period.

## DEVALUATION PROBLEM

Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty are especially vulnerable to the effects of dollar devaluation because 80 percent of their expenditures are made in foreign currencies, especially the deutsche mark (DM).

In this connection, the Comptroller General of the United States observed:

We think this situation is rather unique in the case of the Radios from the standpoint of the large percent of their funds being spent in foreign currencies. Offhand, I cannot think of a single U.S. Government Department or Agency that spends near that percent of funds in foreign currencies \* \* \* (Letter, dated April 11, 1975, from Comptroller General Elmer B. Staats to Hon. John M. Slack, chairman, Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Justice, Commerce and Judiciary.)

The Board for International Broadcasting budget request for fiscal year 1976 was submitted to the Office of Management and Budget in September 1974. At that time the value of the U.S. dollar to the German deutsche mark was \$1=2.60 DM. By November 1974, the exchange rate had slipped to \$1=2.53 DM. This change was provided for in the budget transmitted to Congress by the President. But even before the President's budget was printed in final form, the dollar had slipped to \$1=2.25 DM. Although the exchange rate has since leveled off at \$1=2.35 DM, the total loss resulting from the devaluation of the dollar since last September already amounts to \$4.750 million. An authorization sufficient to cover this exchange loss is included in the bill.

It is impossible to predict at this point what will happen to the U.S. dollar-deutsche mark exchange rate during the next 12 months. If the value of the dollar should drop further, the Radios will be faced with a second consecutive annual deficit. In fiscal year 1975, that deficit was covered by personnel reductions, reprogramming, and depletion of the working fund. Continued reliance on such administrative remedies can only aggravate the already difficult personnel and operational situation faced by the Radios.

COMMITTEE AMENDMENT ON EXCHANGE LOSS  
CONTINGENCY FUND

During the hearings on H.R. 4699, attention was called to one possible long-range solution to this problem, suggested by the General Accounting Office. In his communication to the Appropriations Subcommittee (referred to above), Comptroller General Staats suggested the establishment of a \$5 million "reserve fund" to be used *exclusively* for the purpose of compensating the Radios for currency exchange losses. Under this concept, funds would be made available to the Radios to maintain programmed levels of operations and placed *back* into reserve when and if the dollar is revalued upward.

## EFFECT OF COMMITTEE AMENDMENT

With the general outlines of the GAO proposal in mind, the committee adopted, by unanimous voice vote, an amendment which includes the following provisions:

1. It authorizes an additional appropriation of \$5 million which is authorized to remain available until expended.
2. It stipulates that this additional funding, or any portion of it, "shall be available only to the extent that the Director of the Office of Management and Budget determines (and so certifies to the Congress) is necessary because of fluctuations in foreign currency exchange rates in order to maintain the budgeted level of operation for Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty."

Because the budgeted level of operation for the radios for fiscal year 1976 takes into account an anticipated \$4,750 million devaluation loss, funds made available under the committee amendment could not be used to offset devaluation during fiscal year 1976 except to the extent that the resulting loss may exceed \$4.750 million. For any subsequent fiscal year, funds in the devaluation reserve will be available to maintain the budgeted level of operations if the rate of exchange falls below that which was used in preparing the budget for such fiscal year.

It is understood by the committee that, in the event of an upward revision in the value of the dollar, the Board for International Broadcasting would make its grants in such a way that the amounts furnished to the Radios would not exceed those required by them to maintain their budgeted levels of operation.

The legislative intent of the committee's amendment is identical with the following declaration of purpose set forth by the Comptroller General in his letter to Chairman Slack:

The whole idea of our proposal is that Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty could be assured that they may proceed to operate at an approved program level without being penalized if the dollar depreciates against the German mark and other foreign currencies and without gaining any advantage from the upward revision of the dollar.

## THE RADIOS AND "DÉTENTE"

In the past, critics of the Radios have charged that the operations of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty are inconsistent with the official U.S. policy of seeking "détente" with the Soviet Union. The committee has reviewed this issue over a period of years and finds the argument unpersuasive.

The continuation of RFE/RL broadcasting has been advocated by an impressive cross-section of academic specialists in Soviet and Eastern European affairs, as well as by journalists with experience in the U.S.S.R. The Radios also enjoy strong editorial support within the United States and Western Europe. It is the overwhelming consensus of those knowledgeable in the field that these Radios continue to perform a useful function and, in long-range terms, contribute toward, rather than inhibit, a lessening of tension between the United States and the countries of Eastern Europe.

If a meaningful détente is to develop—one that is based on substance rather than rhetoric—it must include a freer flow of people, ideas and information between East and West. That has been the position of the United States at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Geneva which is moving toward conclusion of a crucial stage in the negotiations. International broadcasting has become an important aspect of those negotiations. Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights—to which both the United States and the Soviet Union are signatories—states that “everyone has the right of freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference, to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through media, regardless of frontiers.” This right to impart ideas through any media, regardless of frontiers, is also spelled out in the Board for International Broadcasting Act of 1973, enacted by the Congress. Any unilateral action to terminate the Radios’ operations would, in fact, serve to undermine U.S. adherence to this position at a crucial juncture in the Geneva negotiations.

Moreover, the Radios permit the voices of moderation within Soviet and Eastern European societies to be heard—an essential ingredient of détente. Recent audience research studies, conducted by reputable, independent polling organizations in the West, indicate that the Radios are listened to not only by so-called “dissidents” within the target areas but also by a substantial number of middle- to senior-level Communist party officials. These individuals have come to rely on the Radios for news and information about what is actually taking place within their own societies—information which is denied to them by their own strictly controlled media. Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty are, in fact, the *only* source of this type of information. It is not provided by any other broadcast facility. It is for this reason, in particular, that the committee feels their operations should be continued.

#### THE IMPORTANCE OF DEVELOPING A COMPREHENSIVE U.S. INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING POLICY

Although the proposed legislation (H.R. 4699) is concerned exclusively with the support of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, the mandate given the Board for International Broadcasting by the Congress—to eliminate costly duplication, to promote consolidation of facilities and broadcasting hardware, and to achieve greater economy in operations—cannot be carried out without reference to other U.S. broadcasting activities in Europe. Moreover, there is an evident need for the United States to develop a broader, more comprehensive policy on *all* U.S. international broadcasting operations.

To date, there has been a notable lack of cooperation and coordination among U.S. overseas broadcasters, which include—in addition to RFE and RL—the Voice of America (VOA), the Armed Forces Network (AFN), and Radio in the American Sector of Berlin (RIAS). The history of these various operations, which have developed since World War II, indicates that each has operated independently of the others, leading to duplication of facilities and efforts and, in some cases, bureaucratic conflicts.

Apart from the urgent need to rectify this situation for budgetary reasons, the U.S. Government should be concerned about the lack of interagency cooperation because of recent developments relating to pending reallocation of international broadcasting frequencies.

Last October, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) sponsored a Regional Administrative Conference for Low and Medium Frequency Broadcasting. The first session of that Conference, held in Geneva, produced general agreement on criteria for assigning or reassigning radio frequencies to various government and commercial interests throughout Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. The crunch will come at the Conference’s second session, scheduled for next October, when specific proposals for reassigning frequencies will be considered.

In the competition for available wave bands, pressures have been building up among European commercial broadcasters to have U.S. broadcasters move from LF/MF bands to shortwave. The United States is not a participant in the ITU Conference and much will depend upon the outcome of forthcoming bilateral talks with the FRG authorities who will represent U.S. interests at the Conference. If some sacrifice is called for in this regard, there is an evident need to develop a set of priorities which represent the overall U.S. interest as opposed to the parochial interests of the individual U.S. Government broadcasters.

#### POSSIBLE EXPANSION OF U.S. BROADCASTING TO OTHER REGIONS

During the hearings on H.R. 4699, questions were raised by committee members as to the possible expansion of U.S. broadcast operations to include other parts of the world—particularly in Asia. It was suggested, in fact, that BIB be authorized to conduct a feasibility study along this line.

After considerable discussion, a consensus was reached that such a move would be premature at this time. It was felt, in particular, that certain basic policy decisions would have to be made in order to establish the parameters or terms of reference within which such a study of technical possibilities would be carried out. There was general agreement among the committee’s membership, however, that this is a desirable area for future investigation, leading to development of policy recommendations which could provide the framework for subsequent action.

#### BALTIC LANGUAGE PROGRAMING

In accordance with last year’s congressional mandate, broadcasting in Lithuanian began in January 1975. Radio Liberty now broadcasts up to 9 hours a day in Lithuanian and will begin weekly programing in Latvian and Estonian in July 1975. Daily broadcasting in the latter two languages is scheduled to commence in September 1975.

Financing of these Baltic language broadcasts is included in the fiscal year 1976 authorization request.

## COST ESTIMATE

Pursuant to clause 7 of rule XIII of the House Rules, the committee has examined the request submitted by the Executive and has determined that an authorization of \$70,640,000—including a \$5 million contingency for unforeseen exchange losses—is sufficient to support the operations of Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, and the Board for International Broadcasting for fiscal year 1976. As noted elsewhere in this report, the fiscal year 1976 request includes an estimated \$11.1 million in nonrecurring expenditures for such special requirements as replacement of transmitters, consolidation of facilities, and severance pay and benefits for terminated employees. The Board for International Broadcasting has assured the committee that if the fiscal year 1976 request is approved and the necessary funds appropriated, the fiscal year 1977 authorization request should not exceed \$57 million.

The projected cost of this program over the next 5 years cannot be estimated at this time. The level of future funding will depend in part on progress achieved in consolidating broadcasting facilities available to the U.S. Government and in implementing a coherent interagency policy on international broadcasting.

## STATEMENT REQUIRED BY RULE XI(1)(3) OF HOUSE RULES

Pursuant to the requirements of rule XI(1)(3) of the Rules of the House of Representatives the following statements are made:

(A) *Oversight findings and recommendations.*—Under applicable provisions of the Board for International Broadcasting Act of 1973, the Board is assigned direct oversight responsibility over two distinct aspects of the Radios' operations: (1) Broadcast policy and effectiveness, including the responsibility to insure that broadcasts of RFE and RL are carried out within the context of broad U.S. foreign policy objectives, and (2) administration, to insure the most effective utilization of available resources. The Board is also required to report annually to Congress on the operations of the Board and the two Radios.

Since the Board has only been in existence for approximately 1 year, several months of which were devoted primarily to organizational requirements, a definitive assessment of its effectiveness is not yet possible. The committee has included in this report a summary of its preliminary findings in this regard, including certain initial accomplishments, apparent deficiencies and recommendations for future action.

The committee also reached a consensus in favor of pursuing an investigation during the coming fiscal year into developing a comprehensive international broadcasting policy, which would include not only the two Radios covered under this authorization bill, but also other publicly funded U.S. international broadcasting operations. Such a policy is necessary to increase U.S. broadcasting effectiveness, avoid duplication, and cut operating costs.

(B) *Congressional Budget Act section 308(a) requirement.*—This measure provides no budget authority or increased tax expenditures outside of the regular authorization and appropriation process.

(C) *Congressional Budget Office estimate and comparisons.*—No estimate and comparison prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office under section 403 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 has been received by the committee.

(D) *Committee on Government Operations summary.*—No oversight findings and recommendations have been received which relate to this measure from the Committee on Government Operations under clause 2(b)(2) of rule X.

## INFLATIONARY IMPACT STATEMENT

The measure would not have any identifiable inflationary impact. Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty have undergone significant staff reductions in recent years: Net reductions in personnel amounted to 295 in fiscal year 1974, 31 in fiscal year 1975, and will reach 227–277 in fiscal year 1976. Total staff reductions since 1968 (not including the fiscal year 1976 projections) amount to about 30 percent. Moreover, consolidation of headquarters in the United States and operating facilities in Munich is expected to be completed in the fall of 1975. As a consequence of this retrenchment program, long-range economies are anticipated. The fiscal year 1977 authorization request, for instance, will be at a level of about \$57 million or \$13,640,000 less than that provided for in this bill.

Given the phase down of the program as a whole and the fact that 80 percent of the proposed authorization will be spent abroad on international operations, this authorization is not likely to have any measurable inflationary impact.

## CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW MADE BY THE BILL, AS REPORTED

■ In compliance with clause 3 of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new matter is printed in italic, existing law in which no change is proposed is shown in roman):

## BOARD FOR INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING ACT OF 1973

\* \* \* \* \*

## FINANCING AND IMPLEMENTATION

SEC. 8. (a) There are authorized to be appropriated, to remain available until expended, [ \$49,990,000 for fiscal year 1975, of which not less than \$75,000 shall be available solely to initiate broadcasts in the Estonian language and not less than \$75,000 shall be available solely to initiate broadcasts in the Latvian language ] \$70,640,000 for fiscal year 1976, of which \$5,000,000 shall be available only to the extent that the Director of the Office of Management and Budget determines (and so certifies to the Congress) is necessary, because of fluctuations in foreign currency exchange rates, in order to maintain the budgeted level of operation for Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. There are authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year [1975] 1976 such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in salary, pay, retirement, or other employee benefits authorized by law and for other nondiscretionary costs.

(b) To allow for the orderly implementation of this Act, the Secretary of State is authorized to make grants to Radio Free Europe and to Radio Liberty under such terms and conditions as he deems appropriate for their continued operation until a majority of the voting members of the Board have been appointed and qualified, and until funds authorized to be appropriated under this Act are available to the Board.

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF HON. STEPHEN J. SOLARZ

Although efforts must be made to continue and strengthen the important broadcasts produced by Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe and beamed to the captive nations of Eastern Europe, we must also take affirmative steps to direct our attention to those nations in other parts of the world which are governed by totalitarian regimes and in which there is neither freedom of expression nor any sort of opposition media as well.

There are several nations in the Western Hemisphere, in the Far East and in Africa in which the written and electronic media are strictly controlled and where the general populace is not permitted to know of significant developments in either the outside world or at home. Artists, intellectuals, journalists, political leaders and others who fail to parrot the government dogma or who partake in responsible opposition to the regimes in power are silenced. In some instances the suppression is ruthless and many have been arrested and imprisoned. Other nations strictly censor and control all media and forms of public information and the people are unaware of any developments—internally or externally—even of those events which directly affect their daily lives and destiny.

If the justification for RFE and RL rests ultimately on the fact that both of these stations beam their messages into those closed societies in order to provide the peoples of those countries with precise and accurate information and news, then presumably the same rationale would apply elsewhere in the world. During the course of the hearings on H.R. 4699 there was general agreement that the committee would carefully consider the lack of a free press, of free speech or of unfettered expression in other closed societies throughout the world with a view toward recommending legislation to authorize broadcasts similar to those now conducted by RL in the Soviet Union and RFE in Eastern Europe. To the extent that closed societies exist in other parts of the world, meaningful steps must be taken to insure that the people of these lands know of important developments in their own countries as well as in the outside world. I am hopeful that the committee will closely examine this issue and that it will focus its attention on those countries in which responsible dissent and a free press are stifled. Should it be determined that there are nations in which there is little or no open communication, then we must act decisively to insure that uncensored and unabridged news reaches as many people as possible.

STEPHEN J. SOLARZ.

to impose Russian over their own languages. In the face of the Soviet Union's policy of genocide in the Baltic nations, the Board for International Broadcasting and Radio Liberty are serving a tremendous humanitarian interest in beaming these broadcasts to the Baltic lands in their native languages.

**ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF HON. EDWARD J. DERWINSKI**

I want to commend the Board for International Broadcasting and Radio Liberty for including in this bill a request for funds for language broadcasts to the Baltic nations—Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

For long years the Baltic nations, under the domination of the U.S.S.R., were without the "home service" broadcasts which Radio Liberty beams in more than a dozen other languages spoken in the Soviet Union and which Radio Free Europe transmits to five East European countries.

Radio Liberty with the help of this committee first received funding and authorization for broadcasts in Lithuanian in its fiscal year 1975 budget. Radio Liberty was also authorized last year to initiate broadcasts in Estonian and Latvian, but no appropriation was made for this purpose. I want to commend Radio Liberty for its initiation of Lithuanian broadcasts on a weekly basis on January 4, 1975, and for beginning a full schedule of daily programing on March 2, 1975. Also, the Baltic-American community deserves our praise for emphasizing to the Congress and the executive branch the importance of broadcasts to the Baltic nations.

Even though the Congress has not yet acted on the fiscal year 1976 authorization and appropriation, the Board for International Broadcasting and Radio Liberty—reflecting congressional interest—have taken preliminary steps to put Estonian and Latvian broadcasts on the air on a weekly basis in July with daily broadcasts scheduled for September. To provide a full schedule of daily programing in all three Baltic languages in fiscal year 1976, the Congress is being asked to appropriate \$400,000. In addition, it is essential that Radio Liberty receive funds (\$1.7 million) for the purchase of new transmitter equipment to permit the station to beam a strong signal to the Baltic audiences without reducing transmitting power in Russian and other languages. In the absence of a regular broadcast schedule, due to lack of funds, Radio Liberty broadcast special programs in Latvian and Estonian on June 17-18 and June 20-21 in observation of the occupation of the Baltic states by the Soviet Army in 1940.

Since Lithuanian broadcasts were begun, Radio Liberty has carried out a high-quality service including: Two *samizdat* shows a week in which self-published materials such as the 3-year-old serial Chronicle of the Lithuanian Catholic Church, which details repression of believers in Lithuania, are read verbatim; also a program, "This Is the Way It Was," marking anniversaries important in Lithuanian national history, but officially ignored in Soviet Lithuania; reviews of the Lithuanian press abroad; nationality problems in the U.S.S.R.; legal affairs and human rights issues of special concern to Lithuanians.

The broadcasts to the Baltic people take on a particular urgency when we recognize that they are the victims of a diabolical attack by the Soviet Union on their human rights. The Soviets are deliberately trying to destroy the identity of the Baltic lands. Large numbers have been deported to the Soviet interior, and efforts are being made

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF HON. STEPHEN J. SOLAR

Although efforts must be made to continue and strengthen the important broadcasts produced by Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe and beamed to the captive nations of Eastern Europe, we must also take affirmative steps to direct our attention to those nations in other parts of the world which are governed by totalitarian regimes and in which there is neither freedom of expression nor any sort of opposition media as well.

There are several nations in the Western Hemisphere, in the Far East and in Africa in which the written and electronic media are strictly controlled and where the general populace is not permitted to know of significant developments in either the outside world or at home. Artists, intellectuals, journalists, political leaders and others who fail to parrot the government dogma or who partake in responsible opposition to the regimes in power are silenced. In some instances the opposition is ruthless and many have been arrested and imprisoned. Other nations strictly censor and control all media and forms of public information and the people are unaware of any developments—internally or externally—even of those events which directly affect their daily lives and destiny.

If the justification for RFE and RL rests ultimately on the fact that both of these stations beam their messages into those closed societies in order to provide the peoples of those countries with precise and accurate information and news, then presumably the same rationale would apply elsewhere in the world. During the course of the hearings on H.R. 14890 there was general agreement that the committee would carefully consider the lack of a free press of free speech or of unfiltered expression in other closed societies throughout the world with a view toward recommending legislation to authorize broadcasts similar to those now conducted by RL in the Soviet Union and RFE in Eastern Europe. To the extent that closed societies exist in other parts of the world, meaningful steps must be taken to insure that the people of these lands know of important developments in their own countries as well as in the outside world. I am hopeful that the committee will closely examine this issue and that it will focus its attention on those countries in which responsible dissent and a free press are stifled. Should it be determined that there are nations in which there is little or no open communication, then we must act decisively to insure that uncensored and unimpeded news reaches as many people as possible.

STEPHEN J. SOLAR

to impose Russian over their own languages. In the face of the Soviet Union's policy of genocide in the Baltic nations, the Board for International Broadcasting and Radio Liberty are serving a tremendous humanitarian interest in beaming these broadcasts to the Baltic lands in their native languages.

I urge my colleagues to join me in voting approval of this authorization request.

EDWARD J. DERWINSKI.



TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE  
BOARD FOR INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING  
FOR FISCAL YEAR 1976; AND TO PROMOTE IM-  
PROVED RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED  
STATES, GREECE, AND TURKEY, TO ASSIST IN  
THE SOLUTION OF THE REFUGEE PROBLEM ON  
CYPRUS, AND TO OTHERWISE STRENGTHEN  
THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

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REPORT  
OF THE  
COMMITTEE ON  
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS  
TOGETHER WITH  
OPPOSING, SEPARATE, SUPPLEMENTAL,  
AND ADDITIONAL VIEWS  
ON  
S. 2230



SEPTEMBER 22, 1975.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House  
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(III)

TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE BOARD FOR INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING FOR FISCAL YEAR 1976; AND TO PROMOTE IMPROVED RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES, GREECE, AND TURKEY, TO ASSIST IN THE SOLUTION OF THE REFUGEE PROBLEM ON CYPRUS, AND TO OTHERWISE STRENGTHEN THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

SEPTEMBER 22, 1975.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed.

Mr. MORGAN, from the Committee on International Relations, submitted the following

## REPORT

Together With

Opposing, Separate, Supplemental, and Additional Views

[To accompany S. 2230]

The Committee on International Relations, to whom was referred the bill (S. 2230) to authorize appropriations for the Board for International Broadcasting for fiscal year 1976; and to promote improved relations between the United States, Greece, and Turkey, to assist in the solution of the refugee problem on Cyprus, and to otherwise strengthen the North Atlantic Alliance, having considered the same, report favorably thereon without amendment and recommend that the bill do pass.

### BACKGROUND

On July 24, 1975, the House of Representatives rejected S. 846, a bill that would have permitted the President to authorize the shipment to Turkey of those defense articles with respect to which contracts of sale were signed under sections 21 and 22 of the Foreign Military Sales Act on or before February 5, 1975; to issue licenses for the transportation to the Government of Turkey of certain arms, ammunition, and implements of war; to provide for a discussion of Greece's needs of external economic and military assistance; to urge more effective assistance to the refugees on Cyprus; and for other purposes. (See House Report No. 94-365 dated July 16, 1975.)

On July 31, 1975, the Senate passed S. 2230, a bill which includes the language of S. 846, as amended on the floor of the House, and authorizes an appropriation of \$65,640,000 for the Board for Inter-

national Broadcasting for fiscal year 1976. This latter provision is comparable to H.R. 4699, which was reported by the Committee on International Relations on June 17, 1975, and for which a rule had been granted on July 22, 1975. (See House Report No. 94-329 dated June 26, 1975.)

In the House, S. 2230 was referred to the Committee on International Relations on September 15, 1975.

#### CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

In order to frame a context for the reconsideration of legislation to partially lift the ban on arms shipments to Turkey, it is essential to review developments which have transpired since July 24, 1975 with respect to the Cyprus issue in general, and to United States relations with Turkey in particular.

*July 24*—By a vote of 223 to 206, the House rejected S. 846 which provided for a partial lifting of the embargo on arms shipments to Turkey.

*July 25*—The Turkish Government announced that there was "no legal basis left for the continuation of the bilateral defense agreements between Turkey and the United States," and that joint defense installations would cease all activities as of July 26.

*July 28*—State Department spokesman Robert Anderson said that American military personnel had suspended all activities on 27 bases in Turkey at the request of that government, but that the United States had informed Turkey that, in its view, the 1969 security agreement between the two countries would remain in effect until it was renegotiated.

*July 29*—In Nicosia, the Turkish Cypriot administration announced it had ordered the cessation of operations at three U.S. telecommunications installations in northern Cyprus.

*July 30*—Secretary Schlesinger, following an appearance before the Senate Armed Services Committee, said that several of the U.S. installations taken over by Turkey "cannot be duplicated" and that "others can be duplicated at considerable expense."

*July 31*—By a vote of 47 to 46, the Senate passed and sent to the House S. 2230, to authorize appropriations for the Board for International Broadcasting for fiscal year 1976; and to promote improved relations between the United States, Greece, and Turkey, to assist in the solution of the refugee problem on Cyprus, and to otherwise strengthen the North Atlantic Alliance.

*July 31*—The House turned down unanimous consent requests to suspend the rules and take up S. 2230 for immediate consideration.

*August 2*—In Vienna, Greek Cypriot leader Clerides and his Turkish Cypriot counterpart, Denktash, announced agreement whereby more than 9,000 Turkish Cypriots in the southern sector of the island would be permitted to move to the north, and a similar number of Greek Cypriots would be free to remain in the Turkish-controlled sector.

*August 3*—In Athens, Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis and Archbishop Makarios expressed hope for a Cyprus settlement as a result of active interest by members of the EEC and the progress achieved at the Vienna talks.

*August 3*—U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director, Fred Ikle, said the closure of U.S. bases in Turkey could affect future strategic arms limitation talks with the Soviet Union and U.S. ability to monitor Soviet compliance with past agreements.

*August 7*—President Ford said that the refusal by the Congress to permit arms sales to Turkey was "the most serious wrong decision since I have been in Washington, which is 27 years."

*August 8*—Turkish Foreign Minister Chaylayangil said that if the embargo is to continue, the Turkish Government has "no other path but to tackle liquidation of the installations."

*August 14*—A convoy of Turkish Cypriots left Pafos for the north, and a group of Greek Cypriots moved into the Karpas area and Bellapais.

*August 16*—The Turkish Government closed down post exchanges on U.S. military installations, with the exception of the NATO Incirlik Airbase, and announced that U.S. Army Post Office (APO) package mail would not be allowed to enter Turkey after September 15.

*August 17*—In an official statement, the Turkish Defense Ministry announced it had drawn up guidelines to establish an arms industry capable of producing hardware ranging from ammunition to aircraft.

*August 21*—The Greek Government acknowledged that bombs and ammunition had been seized by Greek forces from a U.S. ammunition depot at Suida Bay, in Crete, during the last week of July 1974, when the Cyprus crisis had posed the threat of war between Greece and Turkey.

*August 21*—The National Convention of the American Legion adopted a resolution citing the strategic importance of Turkey to the United States and calling on Congress to lift the ban on military sales and assistance to Turkey. The National Convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars adopted a similar resolution on August 22. (See appendix p. 19.)

*September 12*—U.N. Secretary General Waldheim abandoned his latest effort to settle the Cyprus conflict due to an impasse in the intercommunal talks between Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders.

*September 13*—Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash said he would declare the Turkish-held northern part of the island independent unless negotiations on the settlement were resumed and unless he were permitted to address the United Nations on an equal status with Archbishop Makarios.

*September 14*—About 35,000 troops from 6 NATO countries, including the United States, joined in military maneuvers in Turkey.

## COMMITTEE ACTION

On September 17, 1975, responding to President Ford's urgent request, the committee met to consider S. 2230.

The text of a letter from the President to Chairman Morgan appears below:

THE WHITE HOUSE,  
Washington, D.C., September 16, 1975.

HON. THOMAS E. MORGAN,  
Chairman, International Relations Committee, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.

DEAR DOC: I am convinced that immediate Congressional action is needed to relax the embargo on arms shipments to Turkey if U.S. security interests in the eastern Mediterranean are not to be jeopardized beyond repair.

U.S.-Turkish ties have been subjected to intense strains since the arms embargo went into effect on February 5. Following the failure of the House to lift the embargo in late July, the Turkish Government suspended operations at major U.S. military facilities which provided intelligence collection capability and support to U.S. and NATO forces in the eastern Mediterranean. The affected facilities are vital to U.S. and Western security. I firmly believe failure to lift the embargo soon will lead to complete closure of a majority of U.S. installations in Turkey. Some of these installations are unique and irreplaceable.

Not only does the embargo harm U.S. and NATO security interests, it is a major impediment to negotiations toward a constructive settlement of the tragic Cyprus problem. It also serves generally to prevent improvement of Greek-Turkish bilateral relations, without which a Cyprus settlement is unlikely.

I intend to continue my efforts to help achieve a Cyprus solution, to improve further U.S.-Greek and Greek-NATO relations, and to contribute to a broad relaxation of tensions between Greece and Turkey. I also will do everything possible to ensure that overall relationships in NATO are strengthened and that essential U.S. security interests are safeguarded. In that regard, it cannot be in our interest to risk further weakening Turkey's ties with the Western alliance system.

On July 31 the Senate passed and sent to the House S. 2230 which, if adopted, would permit the U.S. to ship to Turkey those military items which Turkey purchased prior to the embargo's effective date, and to renew access to commercial sales. While I believe the arms ban should be removed in its entirety at the earliest possible date, I think that S. 2230 would, if adopted this month by the Congress, permit us to begin the essential task of rebuilding our bilateral relationship with Turkey and would greatly enhance the possibilities for progress on Cyprus. I emphasize again that timely action is important. I urge in the strongest terms early and favorable consideration of this legislation.

I have sent an identical letter on this matter to Bill Broomfield.  
Sincerely,

GERALD R. FORD.

The committee also received testimony from Hon. Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs.

Thereafter, in an open markup session, the committee ordered favorably reported, without amendment, the bill S. 2230 by a vote of 20 ayes to 9 nays.

## PRINCIPAL PURPOSES OF THE BILL

The principal purposes of the bill are:

1. To promote the national security of the United States by insuring a continuation of our mutual defense relationship with Turkey, within the framework of NATO, including continued access by U.S. military forces to critical military bases in Turkey;
2. To increase the ability of the United States to move the negotiations among the Governments of Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus toward a peaceful solution which is acceptable to all parties to the conflict;
3. To ease the embargo on the shipment of arms to Turkey by permitting delivery of defense articles and services with respect to which contracts of sale were signed under the Foreign Military Sales Act on or before February 5, 1975, and by authorizing the issuance of licenses for the transportation of arms, ammunition, and implements of war to Turkey;
4. To authorize the President to suspend the provisions of section 620(x) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, only with respect to such sales, credits, and guaranties under the Foreign Military Sales Act as he determines and certifies to the Congress are necessary to enable Turkey to fulfill her defense responsibilities as a member of NATO. This provision, however, would not become effective until the Congress enacts foreign assistance legislation authorizing sales, credits, and guaranties under the Foreign Military Sales Act for fiscal year 1976;
5. To request the President to initiate discussions with the Government of Greece to determine the most urgent needs of that country for economic and military assistance, and to direct the President to report on these discussions, together with his recommendations for economic and military assistance to Greece for fiscal year 1976, within 60 days after enactment of this bill;
6. To alleviate the suffering of refugees and other victims of conflict on Cyprus and to foster and promote international efforts to ameliorate the conditions which prevent such persons from resuming normal and productive lives; and
7. To authorize an appropriation of \$65,640,000 to support the operations of Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, and the Board for International Broadcasting in fiscal year 1976.

## EFFECTS OF THE BILL ON THE DELIVERY OF DEFENSE ARTICLES TO TURKEY

This bill authorizes the delivery of defense articles and defense services to Turkey with respect to which contracts of sale were signed under sections 21 and 22 of the Foreign Military Sales Act prior to February 5, 1975. It further authorizes the President to issue licenses for the transportation to that country of commercially purchased arms, ammunition, and implements of war. This authority would not

become effective unless and until the President determines and certifies to the Congress that the furnishing of such defense articles and the issuance of such licenses is important to the national security interests of the United States.

As of February 5, 1975, Turkey had purchased \$184.9 million in defense articles and services from the United States which have not been delivered and include the following:

*Undelivered foreign military sales purchases*

<i>Category/description</i>	<i>(In thousands)</i>
Aircraft (24 F-4E, Spares and auxiliary ground equipment)-----	\$104, 557
Ships (miscellaneous boats and craft with spares)-----	15, 220
Vehicles and weapons (55 trucks and 36 machineguns)-----	1, 990
Other ammunition and components-----	19, 649
Missiles and support equipment-----	18, 250
Communications equipment-----	3, 718
Miscellaneous repair and support equipment-----	8, 911
Supply operations-----	5, 982
Training-----	411
Technical assistance-----	6, 246
<b>Total</b> -----	<b>184, 934</b>

Included in the above figures are \$67.8 million in defense articles which were available but undelivered on September 1, 1975.

*Defense articles available but undelivered*

<i>Category/description</i>	<i>(In thousands)</i>
16 F-4E aircraft-----	\$59, 000
Spares, radio equipment-----	1, 300
Miscellaneous items held by freight forwarder-----	500
F-4E Mods, ground equipment and other spare parts-----	7, 000
<b>Total</b> -----	<b>67, 800</b>

The above figures do not include \$86.9 million in grant military assistance items programed for Turkey prior to the imposition of the arms embargo. None of that military assistance may be delivered to Turkey under this bill. Neither does the bill authorize any future military assistance to Turkey.

As indicated above, the bill would make it possible for Turkey to purchase arms in the United States through private commercial channels. U.S. Government military sales, credits, and guaranties to Turkey would continue to be prohibited until the Congress enacts foreign assistance legislation authorizing sales, credits, and guaranties under the Foreign Military Sales Act for fiscal year 1976. After the enactment of such legislation—and barring any new congressional restrictions on military sales to Turkey—the President would be authorized to approve those FMS sales of defense articles and services which he determines—and certifies to the Congress—are necessary for the fulfillment by Turkey of her responsibilities to NATO. The suspension of the ban on those sales would be effective only so long as Turkey observes the cease-fire, does not increase its forces on Cyprus, and does not transfer to Cyprus any U.S.-supplied arms, ammunition, or implements of war.

In dealing with this issue, the committee has borne in mind that, since 1947, Turkey has relied almost exclusively upon the United

States as its source of military materiel. The Turkish Armed Forces—including one of the largest standing armies committed to NATO—will be severely hampered in their effort to continue to meet their defense responsibilities if their access to U.S. sources of military hardware continues to be prohibited.

**U.S. INTERESTS IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN**

The political, economic, and military well-being of the member states of the North Atlantic area has been a focal point of U.S. foreign policy for almost three decades.

Greece and Turkey, with the support of the United States, play a key role in the defense of the southeastern flank of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Both permit U.S. forces access to military bases and installations in their respective countries.

Those bases have served the defense interests of the United States and NATO and they continue to be of great importance to the security of all the members of the alliance.

Furthermore, access to ports and air bases in both countries has enabled the United States to maintain a credible military presence in the Mediterranean during times of crisis and to support U.S. foreign policy objectives in the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, and in the Indian Ocean.

Greece and Turkey's geographic position on the southeastern flank of the alliance and, in the case of Turkey, along the border of the Soviet Union, makes them particularly valuable to the common defense.

U.S. security relations in the eastern Mediterranean grew, in part, out of Soviet threats to the integrity and independence of Greece and Turkey and later to the southern flank of NATO.

The continuing involvement of the Soviet Union in the Mediterranean, in the Middle East, and in the Indian Ocean increases the strategic importance of both Greece and Turkey to the foreign policy and global defense strategy of the United States.

To insure that both countries are able to carry out their assigned NATO responsibilities, the United States has provided them with defense articles and defense services over the years. The United States is continuing to provide Greece with some implements of war required by that country to maintain an effective military capability. The pipeline of military articles sold to Greece is in excess of \$600 million. Requests for additional military assistance are being considered by the U.S. Government. No defense articles or defense services can be provided to Turkey, however, because of the provisions of section 620(x) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended.

**U.S. MILITARY BASES IN TURKEY**

There are two categories of military bases and installations in Turkey which are of particular interest to the United States. In the first category are those bases which are oriented toward the common defense of NATO. The second category involves those which are of primary importance to U.S. defense needs, including the intelligence installations at Sinop, Diyarbakir, Karamursel, and Belbasi.

The major bases and installations are shown in the following map.



MAJOR MILITARY BASES AND INSTALLATIONS IN TURKEY

Within 24 hours after the House of Representatives rejected S. 846, the Government of Turkey announced that it would suspend all United States military activities in Turkey.

The results of that action, and the subsequent takeover of 27 military bases, including critical intelligence collection installations, by Turkey has severely limited the ability of the United States to monitor Soviet military activities—especially with regard to missile development and testing, troop movements, and atomic energy matters.

The inability to collect this kind of intelligence has harmed United States and NATO security.

The committee is concerned that if legislative action is not taken to lift the embargo, the Turkish Government may deny the United States any access to the bases entirely and request all American military personnel to leave Turkey. In that case, the damage to U.S. security interests could become permanent.

This would also have an adverse effect on the security of NATO.

The President of the United States has expressed the same concerns.

A number of prominent American newspapers and organizations, including the Christian Science Monitor, the Washington Star, the American Legion, and the Veterans of Foreign Wars, have called for the lifting of the arms ban on Turkey. So have a number of distinguished Americans with extensive experience in national security affairs, including Gen. Lyman Lemnitzer, and Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, both former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Gen. Andrew Goodpaster and Gen. Lauris Norstad, both former Commanders, Supreme Allied Command, Europe; Hon. W. Randolph Burgess, for-

mer U.S. Ambassador to NATO; and Hon. Parker Hart, former U.S. Ambassador to Turkey. Their statements, and other pronouncements referred to above, appear in the appendix, p. 20.

#### TURKEY'S USE OF U.S. DEFENSE ARTICLES ON CYPRUS: THE ISSUE OF PRINCIPLE

At the heart of the congressionally imposed embargo on all forms of military assistance and sales to Turkey is the question whether Turkey, during the Cyprus crisis in July and August 1974, and especially in mid-August when its Armed Forces occupied 40 percent of the island, violated an agreement required under our laws by using U.S.-supplied military materiel for purposes not envisaged in the Foreign Assistance Act and the Foreign Military Sales Act.

In 1947, Turkey agreed not to use U.S.-furnished defense articles except for authorized purposes which include self-defense, internal security, and participation in collective arrangements or measures consistent with the U.N. Charter.

In the view of the majority of the Members of the House of Representatives, as expressed in a series of votes on the House floor, Turkey had violated that agreement by invading Cyprus. Congress went on record against this violation and in affirmation of the fundamental principle that American-supplied military equipment must not be used for purposes other than those for which it is furnished.

The clear and unequivocal expression by Congress of this principle is an important matter of record. The legislation recommended by the committee in no way reflects approval of the Turkish intervention on Cyprus or suggests that misuse of U.S.-furnished weapons will be condoned. The reason for the committee's recommendation is that after a more than 7 months' suspension of arms shipments to Turkey, it has become clear that in the complex circumstances of this particular case, our national interests and the cause of a peaceful resolution of the Cyprus tragedy are not being served by continuation of the total embargo.

No one can be sure that the passage of the legislation recommended by the committee will cause the Government of Turkey to enter into meaningful negotiations with respect to Cyprus. The political situation in Turkey remains fragile and the emotionally charged issue of Cyprus will continue to present domestic political difficulties to the Turkish Government. Moreover, any progress in resolving this issue will depend in large part on the good will of the other parties to the negotiations—Greece and Cyprus. The committee feels strongly, however, that the passage of this legislation will help to foster the climate for constructive negotiations. At the same time, the committee feels that failure on the part of Turkey to adopt a positive approach following enactment of this legislation would not only preclude full restoration of our military assistance and sales but could prejudice the full range of United States-Turkish relations.

#### LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS UNIQUE TO TURKEY

In arriving at its recommendations, the committee took into account the Turkish perception of the legal issues relating to its intervention on Cyprus. On the one hand, there was the 1947 agreement with the

United States which limited the use of American-supplied equipment to the authorized purposes set out in U.S. legislation. On the other hand, Turkey had a responsibility under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee to maintain the independence, territorial integrity, and security of Cyprus. That treaty reserves to Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom the right to take action to maintain the arrangements that had been established for an independent Cyprus.

Turkey claims that it had acted to fulfill its responsibilities under the 1960 Treaty when the legitimate government on Cyprus was overthrown unlawfully with the help of the then-government of Greece and Greek military personnel on Cyprus—and when subsequent events suggested a strong likelihood of *enosis*, or union with Greece, which constituted an unacceptable threat to the security of the Turkish Cypriot community.

From the Turkish point of view, Turkey should not have been singled out for sanctions when other parties were responsible for the crisis and her reaction was required under the treaty.

Moreover, there are confirmed reports that some American-furnished arms had been used in the overthrow of Archbishop Makarios.

These considerations do not condone the violation by Turkey of its agreement with the United States. They do help to explain, however, why a modification of the existing legislation is required if the United States is to play an effective role in encouraging Turkish cooperation in arriving at a just settlement of the Cyprus issue. In addition, they demonstrate the unique historical and legal background of the Cyprus issue, which precludes generalizations or predictions as to the possible implications of this legislation in other and different situations.

#### ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO GREECE

The committee is aware of the fact that no progress can be made to solve the Cyprus issue without the full cooperation of the Government of Greece. The committee is also sensitive to the possibility that the proposal for the easing of the arms embargo on Turkey may produce some political reactions in Greece. The committee hopes that any such reactions will be conditioned both by the longstanding friendship between the United States and Greece and by the realization among our Greek friends that continuation of the stalemate can only work to the detriment of all concerned—Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, the United States—and our mutual defense and security arrangements.

Since the crisis-ridden post-World War II period, when a Communist takeover of Greece appeared imminent, the United States has provided Greece with more than \$4 billion in military and economic assistance. The U.S. military advisory mission, headed by Gen. James Van Fleet, played a key role in helping the Greek people preserve freedom and democracy on their soil. The friendship of the American people for the people of Greece has withstood many crises. It is that friendship that, today, must provide a basis for understanding and actions which will serve our mutual interests.

During the past fiscal year, fiscal year 1975, Greece had access to \$169 million worth of U.S. defense articles and services—a large part of it on government credit terms. These defense articles included F-4 aircraft, missiles, ships, and other important equipment. The pipeline of military hardware sold to Greece under the Foreign Military Sales Act currently exceeds \$619 million.

Section 2 of S. 2230 also contains a provision which calls on the President to initiate discussions with Greece to determine that country's most urgent needs for economic and military assistance and to submit to the Congress within 60 days after the enactment of this bill a report on such discussions together with his recommendations for economic and military assistance to Greece for fiscal year 1976.

The committee views this provision as an indispensable part of the legislation in that it demonstrates an evenhanded U.S. policy in the eastern Mediterranean region and recognizes that the United States has important national security interests in Greece as well as in Turkey.

The committee is gratified to learn that the executive branch has already engaged in some preliminary discussions with Greece with respect to economic and military assistance programs. It is the committee's intent that the President should continue such discussions with Greece and submit his recommendations promptly to the Congress so that the committee may consider them in conjunction with its consideration of fiscal year 1976 foreign economic and military assistance authorization legislation.

#### THE REFUGEE SITUATION IN CYPRUS

One of the key considerations in the committee's action on this legislation is the continuing tragic plight of some 180,000 refugees displaced by the conflict on Cyprus. For nearly a year, this large segment of the population of the island—nearly 30 percent—has been subjected to extreme hardship and privation. The rights of these people to pursue secure and dignified lives have been cruelly suspended by the continuing deadlock in the negotiations. Unless a new start is made to bring the parties together, the misery of these unfortunate people will be further prolonged.

Section 2(a)(2) reaffirms the policy of the United States to alleviate the suffering of these refugees and to support international efforts to assist them to resume normal and productive lives. Specifically, subsection (a)(2) calls on the President to encourage and cooperate in the implementation of multilateral programs, under the auspices of appropriate international agencies, for the relief of and assistance to refugees and other victims of the hostilities on Cyprus.

The Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 earmarked \$25 million for famine and disaster relief assistance in Cyprus for fiscal year 1975. The entire amount for fiscal year 1975 has been donated to two international agencies; \$20.8 million to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); and \$4.2 million to the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC). To date, the UNHCR and the ICRC in cooperation with the Government of Cyprus have obligated most of these funds for emergency shelter, food, clothing, and medical needs of the refugees.

According to the Department of State, the Government of Cyprus has identified two major needs of the refugees and other war victims who remain dependent on relief programs: housing for those who are currently inadequately sheltered; and employment opportunities. With respect to housing, the Government of Cyprus is considering a program for the construction of low cost housing units for those

refugees now living in shacks and tents. The units would be located in various areas in the southern portion of the island in order to integrate the refugees into the Cyprus economy more effectively and equitably. Such an effort will require external assistance. Therefore, the committee urges the President to promote such refugee programs through the auspices of the UNHCR and other appropriate international agencies.

In addition to the Cypriot refugees, the committee is also deeply concerned about the welfare of those American citizens who were in Cyprus during the hostilities and who are still missing. According to the Department of State, 16 of the 25 American citizens originally reported missing have been accounted for. The committee urges the President to make every appropriate effort to establish the whereabouts of those nine Americans still missing and to secure their safe return.

#### STATEMENTS REQUIRED BY RULE XI(1)(3) OF THE HOUSE RULES

Pursuant to the requirements of rule XI(1)(3) of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the following statements are made:

##### (A) OVERSIGHT FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### 1. *Board for International Broadcasting (Section 1)*

Under applicable provisions of the Board for International Broadcasting Act of 1973, the Board is assigned direct oversight responsibility over two distinct aspects of the Radios' operations: (1) Broadcast policy and effectiveness, including the responsibility to insure that broadcasts of Radio Free Europe (RFE) and Radio Liberty (RL), are carried out within the context of broad U.S. foreign policy objectives; and (2) administration to insure the most effective utilization of available resources. The Board is also required to report annually to Congress on the operations of the Board and the two Radios.

Since the Board has only been in existence for approximately 1 year, several months of which were devoted primarily to organizational requirements, a definitive assessment of its effectiveness is not yet possible.

The committee also reached a consensus in favor of pursuing an investigation during the coming fiscal year into developing a comprehensive international broadcasting policy, which would include not only the two Radios covered under this authorization bill, but also other publicly funded U.S. international broadcasting operations. Such a policy is necessary to increase U.S. broadcasting effectiveness, avoid duplication, and cut operating costs.

#### 2. *Turkey (Section 2)*

Section 620(x) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, required the President to suspend military assistance and sales to the Government of Turkey because that country had used U.S.-furnished defense articles in violation of certain agreements between the two Governments made pursuant to the requirements of the Foreign Assistance Act and the Foreign Military Sales Act. In exercising its oversight responsibility for the application of the Foreign Assistance

Act, the committee determined that the embargo on the furnishing of defense articles to Turkey, which had been in effect for over 7 months, has not accomplished its intended purpose; i.e., a peaceful solution to the crisis in Cyprus. The committee, therefore, took steps to determine why the embargo had failed to achieve the desired result and concluded that it was in the interest of United States and NATO security to permit the President to furnish to the Government of Turkey those defense articles for which contracts of sale had been signed on or prior to February 5, 1975. The committee recommends that the President use the authorities contained in this bill to persuade the Turkish Government that it is in its interest to observe fully agreements made with the United States with respect to the use of U.S.-furnished defense articles and that a peaceful solution of the Cyprus question is essential.

##### (B) CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET ACT SECTION 308(A) REQUIREMENT

#### 1. *Board for International Broadcasting (Section 1)*

This measure does not provide for additional budget authority.

#### 2. *Turkey (Section 2)*

This measure provides no budget authority or increased tax expenditures outside of the regular authorization and appropriation process.

##### (C) CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE ESTIMATE AND COMPARISON

No estimate and comparison prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office under section 403 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 has been received by the committee.

##### (D) COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS SUMMARY

No oversight findings and recommendations have been received which relate to this measure from the Committee on Government Operations under clause 2(b)(2) of rule X.

#### INFLATIONARY IMPACT STATEMENT

#### 1. *Board for International Broadcasting (Section 1)*

The measure would not have any identifiable inflationary impact. Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty have undergone significant staff reductions in recent years: Net reductions in personnel amounted to 295 in fiscal year 1974, 31 in fiscal year 1975, and will reach 227-277 in fiscal year 1976. Total staff reductions since 1968 (not including the fiscal year 1976 projections) amount to about 30 percent. Moreover, consolidation of headquarters in the United States and operating facilities in Munich is expected to be completed in the fall of 1975. As a consequence of this retrenchment program, long-range economies are anticipated. The fiscal year 1977 authorization request, for instance, will be at a level of about \$57 million or \$13,640,000 less than that provided for in this bill.

Given the phasedown of the program as a whole and the fact that 80 percent of the proposed authorization will be spent abroad on

international operations, this authorization is not likely to have any measurable inflationary impact.

## 2. *Turkey (Section 2)*

There are no funds authorized by this bill.

This legislation removes a restriction on the shipment of defense articles purchased by the Government of Turkey. It has no identifiable inflationary impact.

### COST ESTIMATE REQUIRED BY CLAUSE 7, RULE XIII

#### 1. *Board for International Broadcasting (Section 1)*

Pursuant to clause 7 of rule XIII of the House Rules, the committee has examined the request submitted by the Executive and has determined that an authorization of \$65,640,000 is sufficient to support the operations of Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, and the Board for International Broadcasting for fiscal year 1976. The fiscal year 1976 request includes an estimated \$11.1 million in nonrecurring expenditures for such special requirements as replacement of transmitters, consolidation of facilities, and severance pay and benefits for terminated employees. The Board for International Broadcasting has assured the committee that if the fiscal year 1976 request is approved and the necessary funds appropriated, the fiscal year 1977 authorization request should not exceed \$57 million.

The projected cost of this program over the next 5 years cannot be estimated at this time. The level of future funding will depend in part on progress achieved in consolidating broadcasting facilities available to the U.S. Government and in implementing a coherent interagency policy on international broadcasting.

#### 2. *Turkey (Section 2)*

This bill removes a restriction on the transportation of defense articles purchased by the Government of Turkey prior to February 5, 1975, and does not authorize the appropriation of any funds.

It is possible that there will be future legislation authorizing military assistance for Turkey but the committee is not able to estimate the cost, if any, of such programs at this time.

### SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS

#### *Section 1*

Section 1 authorizes an appropriation of \$65,640,000 for fiscal year 1976 to support the operations of Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, and the Board for International Broadcasting. This figure represents the full amount requested by the Executive and already approved by the Senate.

#### *Section 2*

Subsection (a) (1) reaffirms that in the interest of mutual defense and national security, it is the policy of the United States to seek to improve relations among the U.S. allies and between the United States and its allies. In particular, Congress recognizes that, due to their geographic positions on the southeastern flank of Europe, both Greece and Turkey play equally important roles in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and are, therefore, indispensable to the alliance. In light of the importance of both countries to NATO and to

U.S. national security, the Congress is prepared to assist in the modernization and strengthening of their respective armed forces.

Subsection (a) (2) reaffirms U.S. policy to assist refugees and other victims of armed conflict and to foster and promote international efforts to assist such persons in resuming normal and productive lives.

This subsection particularly calls on the President to encourage and to cooperate in the implementation of multilateral programs under the auspices of appropriate international agencies for the relief of and assistance to refugees and other persons disadvantaged by the hostilities on Cyprus. Specifically, the committee recognizes the current needs of the refugees for housing and employment and urges the President to seek the formulation of such assistance through the appropriate multilateral channels.

Subsection (b) (1) (A) of section 2 states that, in order for the purposes of the bill to be carried out without awaiting the enactment of fiscal year 1976 foreign assistance legislation, the President is authorized to furnish to the Government of Turkey those defense articles and services for which contracts of sale were signed under sections 21 and 22 of the Foreign Military Sales Act on or before February 5, 1975, and to issue licenses for the transportation of arms, ammunition, and implements of war and related technical data to the Government of Turkey. In authorizing the delivery "*notwithstanding section 620 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961*" of articles contracted for prior to the effective date of the current statutory embargo, deliveries are permitted to be made without regard to section 620 (x) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. It should be emphasized, however, that the items to be delivered were purchased under contracts containing all of the assurances and undertakings required by applicable legislation. It is the committee's intention that these assurances and undertakings shall remain fully applicable. Further, the authorization made by this subsection is expressly effective only for so long as Turkey observes the cease-fire and neither increases its forces on Cyprus nor transfers to Cyprus any U.S.-supplied implements of war. Also, the authorities in section 2 shall not become effective unless and until the President determines and certifies to Congress that they are important to the national security interests of the United States.

Subsection (b) (1) (B) calls on the President to initiate discussions with the Government of Greece to determine Greece's most urgent economic and military assistance requirements.

Subsection (b) (2) directs the President to submit to the Congress within 60 days after the enactment of this bill a report on such discussions, together with his recommendations for economic and military assistance to Greece for fiscal year 1976.

The committee finds subsections (b) (1) (B) and (b) (2) to be indispensable to this bill in that the provisions therein recognize a need for an evenhanded U.S. policy in the eastern Mediterranean and that the United States has significant national security interests in Greece as well as in Turkey.

Subsection (c) (1) amends section 620 (x) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to authorize the President to suspend the embargo of arms shipments to Turkey with respect to sales, credits, and guaranties under the Foreign Military Sales Act for procurement of defense

articles and services which the President determines—and certifies to Congress—are necessary to enable Turkey to fulfill her NATO responsibilities. This suspension is to be only for so long as Turkey observes the cease-fire, does not increase its forces on Cyprus, and does not transfer to Cyprus any U.S.-supplied arms, ammunition, or implements of war. This last condition prohibits Turkish transfers to Cyprus of any U.S. defense articles as defined in section 644(d)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

The authorities contained in this subsection shall become effective only upon enactment of authorizing legislation.

Subsection (c)(2) directs the President to report to Congress every 60 days on progress made toward a peaceful solution of the Cyprus conflict.

Subsection (c)(3) provides that nothing in this section shall be construed as authorizing military assistance to Turkey—by grant or loan—under chapter 2 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act. The bill also precludes transactions of Foreign Military Sales Act sales, credits, or guaranties under the bill for procurement of defense articles and services not determined by the President as needed for the fulfillment by Turkey of her responsibilities to NATO.

Subsection (c)(4) restates the provisions of section 36(b) of the Foreign Military Sales Act (FMS) which require the President to report to Congress certain information concerning any letter of offer to sell any defense article or defense service for \$25 million or more under the Foreign Military Sales Act. If the Congress adopts a concurrent resolution objecting to the sale within 20 calendar days, the letter of offer shall not be issued.

Subsection (c)(5) stipulates that the authorities contained in the amendment made by subsection (c) shall become effective only upon enactment of foreign assistance legislation authorizing sales, credits, and guaranties under the Foreign Military Sales Act for fiscal year 1976.

This subsection is included to permit the Congress sufficient time to determine what progress, if any, is made with respect to movement toward a solution of the Cyprus problem and to preclude the use of any funds made available for fiscal year 1976 pursuant to continuing resolution authority for the sale of defense articles or defense services to Turkey.

#### CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW MADE BY THE BILL, AS REPORTED

In compliance with clause 3 of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new matter is printed in italic, existing law in which no change is proposed is shown in roman):

#### BOARD FOR INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING ACT OF 1973

\* \* \* \* \*

#### FINANCING AND IMPLEMENTATION

Sec. 8. (a) There are authorized to be appropriated, to remain available until expended, [\$49,990,000 for fiscal year 1975, of which not less than \$75,000 shall be available solely to initiate broadcasts

in the Estonian language and not less than \$75,000 shall be available solely to initiate broadcasts in the Latvian language] \$65,640,000 for fiscal year 1976. There are authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year [1975] 1976 such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in salary, pay, retirement, or other employee benefits authorized by law and for other nondiscretionary costs.

(b) To allow for the orderly implementation of this Act, the Secretary of State is authorized to make grants to Radio Free Europe and to Radio Liberty under such terms and conditions as he deems appropriate for their continued operation until a majority of the voting members of the Board have been appointed and qualified, and until funds authorized to be appropriated under this Act are available to the Board.

#### SECTION 620 OF THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961

SEC. 620. PROHIBITIONS AGAINST FURNISHING ASSISTANCE.—  
(a) (1) \* \* \*

\* \* \* \* \*  
(x) (1) All military assistance, all sales of defense articles and services (whether for cash or by credit, guaranty, or any other means), and all licenses with respect to the transportation of arms, ammunition, and implements of war (including technical data relating thereto) to the Government of Turkey, shall be suspended on the date of enactment of this subsection unless and until the President determines and certifies to the Congress that the Government of Turkey is in compliance with the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the Foreign Military Sales Act, and any agreement entered into under such Acts, and that substantial progress toward agreement has been made regarding military forces in Cyprus: *Provided*, That the President is authorized to suspend the provisions of this section and [such acts if he determines that such suspension will further negotiations for a peaceful solution of the Cyprus conflict. Any such suspension shall be effective only until February 5, 1975, and only if, during that time, Turkey shall observe the ceasefire and shall neither increase its forces on Cyprus nor transfer to Cyprus any U.S. supplied implements of war], of section 3(c) of the Foreign Military Sales Act only with respect to sales, credits, and guaranties under the Foreign Military Sales Act, as amended, for the procurement of such defense articles and defense services as the President determines and certifies to the Congress are necessary in order to enable Turkey to fulfill her defense responsibilities as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Any such suspension shall be effective only while Turkey shall observe the ceasefire and shall neither increase its forces on Cyprus nor transfer to Cyprus any United States supplied arms, ammunition, and implements of war.

(2) The President shall submit to the Congress within sixty days after the enactment of this paragraph, and at the end of each succeeding sixty-day period, a report on progress made during such period toward the conclusion of a negotiated solution of the Cyprus conflict.

## APPENDIX

### RESOLUTION No. 336, ADOPTED AUGUST 21, 1975, BY THE 57TH NATIONAL CONVENTION OF THE AMERICAN LEGION

Whereas, Greece and Turkey are allied with the United States in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; and

Whereas, Current diplomatic differences between Greece and Turkey and the United States are gravely weakening the NATO alliance; and

Whereas, Both nations are essential to the security of the United States and the Free World in the Mediterranean area, providing military bases for NATO as well as furnishing troops and material; and

Whereas, The strategic locations of Greece and Turkey which, together, anchor the southeastern extremity of the NATO defense against possible Soviet expansion into the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean; and

Whereas, The American use of military bases in Greece and Turkey under NATO authority has been suspended; and

Whereas, The United States has long-standing friendships with both Greece and Turkey and is vitally interested in seeing these two allies compose their mutual differences: Now, therefore, be it

*Resolved*, By The American Legion in National Convention assembled in Minneapolis, Minnesota, August 19, 20, 21, 1975 that we express our appreciation for the contributions made by the Greek and Turkish peoples to the cause of the Free World and support mediation or other peaceful efforts to assist them in resolving their differences; and be it further

*Resolved*, That we strongly urge the United States to take every possible measure to insure the present U.S. and NATO bases in Greece and Turkey operate without restrictions, and we urge the Congress immediately to lift the embargo on military aid to Turkey.

### RESOLUTION No. 472, ADOPTED AUGUST 22, 1975, BY THE VETERANS OF FOREIGN WARS

#### THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF TURKEY

Whereas, ever since Turkey acceded to NATO in 1951 and CENTO in 1954, Turkey has been a loyal and effective ally of the United States having earlier fought at our side in Korea; and

Whereas, Turkey, with a long tradition of hostility to both Czarist and Communist Russia, commands the air, sea, and land approaches to the oil-rich Middle East; and

Whereas, the U.S., with Turkish cooperation, has created an *indispensable* network of bases on Turkish soil which can monitor Soviet

missile flights, nuclear weapons tests, and aerial overflights capabilities which *cannot* be matched elsewhere in the region and which bear importantly on the United States ability to verify Soviet compliance with the SALT agreements; and

Whereas, in a blind surrender to domestic political considerations, the 94th Congress has voted to deny Turkish military aid to include arms and spare parts Turkey has paid for; and

Whereas, the proud Turks, stung by this insensitive Congressional rebuff, have moved to close down U.S. bases, deny PX and mailing privileges and, in other ways, have moved to terminate their close association with the U.S.: Now, therefore, be it

*Resolved*, By the 76th National Convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States, that the Commander-in-Chief of the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States clearly and unequivocally seek to reverse this Congressional blunder and impress upon Congressional leadership the overriding strategic importance of Turkey, and the U.S. bases therein, to the United States of America.

STATEMENT ON TURKISH MILITARY ASSISTANCE, SUBMITTED BY ADM.  
THOMAS H. MOORER, U.S. NAVY (RET.), FOR HIMSELF AND OTHERS

SEPTEMBER 15, 1975.

HON. THOMAS E. MORGAN,  
*Chairman, House International Relations Committee,  
Washington, D.C.*

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I am forwarding herewith a statement on Turkish military assistance which is fully subscribed by me as well as the individuals whose names are listed on the enclosed statement.

We are presenting our views to you in our capacity as private citizens and sincerely hope that the wisdom of the Congress will be manifested in acting promptly in the restoration of military assistance to Turkey.

Sincerely,

THOMAS H. MOORER,  
*Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.).*

Enclosure.

STATEMENT ON TURKISH MILITARY ASSISTANCE

The following statement expresses the views of the undersigned individuals on the matter of military assistance to Turkey:

Recent developments in the eastern Mediterranean are of serious concern. As Americans whose experience has made us keenly aware of the vital U.S. security interests at stake in the area, we view with alarm any weakening in Turkey's ability to meet its NATO military commitments. Turkey's role in protecting Western security in the region is an essential one.

We are deeply concerned also about the situation on Cyprus and the plight of its refugees. However, we believe both a settlement of the Cyprus problem and the vital task of maintaining the military situation in NATO's southern flank can be most effectively accomplished

by the speedy resumption of military aid to Turkey. The situation is an extremely urgent and dangerous one. We urge the Congress to act promptly on legislation restoring military assistance to Turkey.

We urge both Greece and Turkey, and the parties in Cyprus, to take full and prompt advantage of the present favorable opportunity for negotiating a new and just constitutional basis for Cyprus.

HON. THEODORE C. ACHILLES,  
Former Counselor of the Department of State;  
Former U.S. Ambassador to Peru.

HON. W. RANDOLPH BURGESS,  
Former U.S. Ambassador to NATO.

Gen. ANDREW J. GOODPASTER,  
Former Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.

HON. PARKER HART,  
Former U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia,  
Kuwait and Turkey.

Gen. LYMAN L. LEMNITZER,  
Former Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.

Adm. THOMAS H. MOORER,  
Former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Gen. LAURIS NORSTAD,  
Former Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.

Adm. HORACIO RIVERO,  
Former U.S. Ambassador to Spain;  
Former Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces,  
Southern Europe.

HON. EUGENE V. ROSTOW,  
Former Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs.

EDITORIALS SUPPORTING LIFTING OF THE ARMS EMBARGO AGAINST  
TURKEY

[From The Pittsburgh Press, Sept. 20, 1975]

Lift Embargo Now

It is good news that the House International Relations Committee has given its approval, by a thumping 20-9 vote, to lifting partially the U.S. arms embargo against Turkey by releasing weapons which this NATO ally paid for before the ban went into effect Feb. 5.

But it's too early to say that the measure will win swift passage in the House. It still must be approved by the Rules Committee, where, in spite of urgent administration pressure, it was bogged down before Congress recessed in August.

However, it's a step in the right direction. The Senate passed an identical measure weeks ago.

And it's a step toward refurbishing our sadly eroded friendship with Turkey—as well as toward an eventual settlement between Turkey and Greece on the explosive issue of Cyprus.

The recent round of talks at the United Nations on Cyprus was fated to be stillborn, as indeed it was.

The government of Turkey's moderate, pro-American Premier Suleiman Demirel is on shaky ground. The next parliamentary election is scheduled for Oct. 12. If, before then, Demirel were to appear to submit to U.S. strongarming through the continued arms embargo, and to give away to the Greek Cypriots, his government would be in grave danger of defeat by Turkish hard-liners.

Consequently, the Turkish Cypriot representative at the U.N. talks must necessarily continue his diplomatic shadowboxing at least until after the election.

Now, the House has the opportunity of strengthening Demirel's hand at home by lifting the embargo, which should be a big help toward reaching a fair settlement of the Cyprus question.

And it can go a long way toward altering the tide of anti-American public opinion in Turkey. The ultimate effect would be to maintain the security of NATO's southeastern anchor.

But the House must approve the first step toward a complete lifting of the embargo by allowing Turkey to take delivery of the \$185 million worth of arms it has already paid for. And it should do so as quickly as possible.

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[From the New York Times, July 23, 1975]

### Turkish Embargo

The House is expected to vote today or tomorrow on a compromise proposal for a partial lifting of the Congressional embargo on arms shipments to Turkey. The embargo, in effect since February, had previously been twice suspended by Congress for several months to advance a settlement of the dangerous quarrel between Greece and Turkey—but without success.

Furthermore, American pressure led to counter-pressure. Turkey has called for discussions on the future of about 20 American bases, of importance to NATO and to the monitoring of Soviet missile shots and verification of the strategic arms limitation treaty (SALT) with Moscow.

The Senate has voted by a narrow margin to lift the Turkish arms embargo completely. But a House majority and many others who are concerned about the present impasse are rightly unwilling to go that far, remembering Turkey's illegal use of American-made arms in her invasion of Cyprus last year and reluctance to withdraw substantially from occupied areas of Cyprus.

Two former American mediators in the Cyprus dispute—George Ball and Cyrus Vance—have suggested ways to resume arms shipments now while linking their continuation later to progress in the Cyprus negotiations. Without such a link, they fear an unfavorable impact on the democratic Greek government and an open door for misuse of American arms by other nations, besides Turkey, committed to employ American-supplied arms only for defensive purposes. It is vital that this latter principle not be further undermined by whatever new arrangement is reached on the Turkish embargo.

The compromise proposal now pending before the House is much more restrictive than that originally agreed on by President Ford and

the House leadership, but its link to resumption of the Cyprus negotiations is less direct than that in the Ball-Vance proposals. The House bill would continue to bar further grant aid to Turkey as well as delivery of grant aid already authorized. The embargo would be lifted primarily to permit delivery of cash and credit arms "in the pipeline," arms for which Turkey already has contracted, more than three-fifths of which has been paid for.

But Turkey would be denied further cash or credit purchases through the Pentagon's arms sales program. Unless such sales were to be specifically authorized by Congress in the next foreign assistance act, Turkey would only be able to make direct commercial purchases on its own, a difficult and little-tried procedure. The President would be required to report to Congress every 60 days on the progress of the Cyprus negotiations.

Turkey has been put on notice publicly by the Administration that if Congress relaxes the embargo and Turkey "adopts an unconstructive or inflexible attitude" in the Cyprus talks, the Administration then could not save Turkey from re-enactment of the Congressional embargo.

Inasmuch as the present total embargo has failed to advance a Cyprus settlement, we are driven to the conclusion that a more flexible approach should be tried again. The Senate bill clearly goes too far in totally wiping out the sanctions properly imposed against Turkey for last year's gross misuse of American arms. The House bill, while hardly a perfect instrument, is at least close to what is needed.

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[From The Washington Star, July 22, 1975]

### An Unproductive Embargo

In the hectic jockeying over the House vote scheduled for this week on the lifting of the Turkish arms embargo, the homelier objectives of American policy in the Eastern Mediterranean ought to be kept in view.

The friends of the embargo, digging in to defend it, have taken a highly principled position. American arms sent to a NATO ally, they say, should not be used—indeed are prohibited by congressional act from being used—for "aggressive" purposes. They declare they won't relent until Turkey pledges a conciliatory policy on the Cyprus issue. "Without such a principled content," Rep. Paul Sarbanes told the House Committee on International Relations a week ago, "I do not believe the U.S. will hold a position of leadership in the world premised on anything else but its power."

The administration, which is seeking to end the embargo, believes that there is a principle of parallel importance on the other side. It is the structural principle, if you will, that the President and his agents, not House members, conduct this country's foreign policy.

Both principles are fairly high flown. An administration, to take its principle first, is entitled to negotiate the agreements it wishes; but when it calls upon Congress to supply the bait, Congress can impose any conditions it wishes. The question is whether they're practical.

In this instance, the conditions seem impractical. The Greeks and Turks have been struggling over Cyprus for a long time, and coercive measures like the arms embargo are not likely to resolve the struggle. In fact, all the arms embargo has achieved is a counter-threat from the Turks that they may close American bases, some of which, it is claimed, are key monitors of Soviet military maneuvers.

This looks suspiciously like another of those instances in which high principles, too stiffly applied, have got the U.S. more deeply involved than it needs to be in the affairs that trouble its allies.

Moreover, both the administration and Congress make a delicately selective application of most such principles. Would the House, for instance, insist that when Israel uses American arms to raid Lebanon a similar embargo should be visited upon Israel? If not, what is the distinction—that Turkish exertions on Cyprus are “aggressive” whereas Israel’s raids in Lebanon are “defensive”? How aggressive is aggressive?

There is, in fact, no way to make sense of American foreign policy as a whole in terms of any single principle or set of principles. One can say that there is surely an underlying bias in favor of political freedom. Yet we do—and long have done—quite a lot of arms business with regimes whose devotion to the principles of the Declaration of Independence is less than flawless.

Why, then, the great outpouring of rhetoric about basic principle in the Greek-Turkish impasse? It is quite beyond American wisdom or capacity to push, and perhaps even to guide, this ancient quarrel to a settlement in the face of internal political pressures in both countries.

Instead, the arms embargo after eight months has produced nothing—or nothing but counter-threats. It is time to try another, more modest approach. That is President Ford’s trump card this week.

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[From the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette]

### Don't Underestimate the Turks

Like the late and unlamented military junta that ruled Greece until July of last year, the U.S. House of Representatives has made the mistake of underestimating the Turks. Consequently the U.S. is embroiled in a controversy with Turkey that should never have occurred.

When the Greek colonels conspired against the president of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, thinking they could unseat him and impose “enosis,” or union with Greece, on Cyprus, they had the fool notion that the Turks would hold still while that went on.

Of course, the Turks didn't. They invaded Cyprus and took possession of some 40 per cent of that hapless island, using American arms in the process.

Because that use violated an agreement with the U.S., Congress voted to discontinue arms aid to Turkey; and Turks, in turn, let it be known that if the aid were discontinued they would take control of more than 20 American military installations on Turkish soil.

The Senate, at the Ford Administration's urging, accepted a compromise under which arms aid to Turkey would have continued. The

House, however, has refused to follow suit, still insisting that Turkey must make concessions to the Greeks on Cyprus before arms aid can be resumed.

True to form, the Turks have matched threat with action. They have assumed control of the American bases except for one joint defense installation reserved for NATO tasks alone. Meanwhile charges of “blackmail” are heard on both sides, the Turks arguing that we have tried to blackmail them into concession on Cyprus and the House majority contending that Turks are using our bases to blackmail us into more military aid.

This dispute isn't getting anybody anywhere. If we read the Turks correctly, our discontinuance of aid will simply harden their attitude on Cyprus. Meanwhile, the military security of both the U.S. and Turkey is damaged, to say nothing of the NATO alliance and the general security of the Middle East.

This is the sort of thing that happens when Congress abrogates foreign policy unto itself and acts not on the basis of our national self-interest but at the importunities of whatever domestic groups can muster the strongest lobby.

The best way out of this mess would be for the House to reconsider and follow the Senate's example in accepting President Ford's compromise proposal for continued aid to Turkey.

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[From the Christian Science Monitor, July 28, 1975]

### Lift the Turkish Arms Embargo

The restoration of stability in the eastern Mediterranean has been seriously threatened by the U.S. House of Representatives refusal to pass even a temporary easing of the arms embargo against Turkey. The House ought to provide the “prompt, affirmative action” requested by President Ford and reverse its decision of last week.

To restore arms shipments would not be a signal that the U.S. would tolerate the offensive use of American arms aid by other recipients of it in violation of the laws under which it is supplied. Congress has rightly shown its concern about Turkey's use of American arms in invading Cyprus. Other recipients, take notice.

But the legal question is a tangled one. No arms embargo was applied to Greece after the coup on Cyprus which precipitated the Turkish invasion. It is thought within the administration that American arms were probably used in that coup, though on a smaller scale. Then, too, Turkey makes the argument that its military action in Cyprus was taken as one of the “guarantor nations” protecting Cyprus independence under the 1960 agreement. By this reasoning, its action would not have been necessary if the other two guarantors, Britain and Greece, were upholding their end of the job. The U.S., for its part, showed little of the vigorous diplomatic response to the coup that might have made Turkey feel reassured about the interests of the long-discriminated-against Turkish Cypriot minority on the island.

But, if the legalities are not clear-cut, the potentialities for trouble are all too evident the longer the embargo is kept. An administration

source laments that every compromise offered was resisted by those congressmen influenced by an effective Greek ethnic lobby.

The issues are too grave to become the plaything of domestic politics. It is to Mr. Ford's credit that he defies them and sticks to his campaign against the embargo. He and his advisers know that Greece too would benefit from the stability more likely to be restored if the embargo is lifted and the Turkish Government can enter more wholeheartedly into Cyprus negotiations.

At the moment, the Turkish Government is sympathetic to the West but cannot appear soft in the eyes of its opponents and its people. It said that U.S. bases would be affected if the ban were not lifted. It postponed its decision. With the House vote last week, it went through with the retaliatory gesture of announcing a suspension of operations on U.S. bases in Turkey. At this writing, the State Department did not know exactly what the terms would be or how seriously these operations would be altered.

But the potential impact on bases is only part of the picture. A continued embargo would hamper Turkish flexibility on Cyprus, and this in turn could harden the attitudes of Greece. It would not satisfy the Turks for Mr. Ford to accept the suggestion of supplying the small amount of aid possible under executive authority—nor would this look right just after the embargo was congressionally upheld.

The ramifications for NATO—not to mention the tragically situated people of Cyprus—add to the urgency of a quick vote by the House to reverse its stand.

[From the Chicago Tribune, July 16, 1975]

### Congress and Turkey

Tomorrow is the deadline by which Congress must lift its embargo on arms shipments to Turkey—or else Turkey says it will review the status of the 24 American bases on its territory.

Given this ultimatum by a foreign power, Congress has reacted as almost anybody probably would under the circumstances—by pointedly ignoring it. Even the most congressmen must recognize by now that Congress' venture into foreign policy was a disaster, the House has put off until next week its vote on an administration measure to repeal the embargo. Many members of the House don't want to look as if they were knuckling under to an ultimatum from Ankara.

This attitude is thoroughly understandable, and we trust that the Turkish government is tolerant enough of the vagaries of human nature not to take any hasty action that may further antagonize Congress or that it may regret later. There is enough contrition in Congress to make it likely that the repealer will pass, especially since it contains a White House promise to report to Congress every two months on the extent to which Turkey does in fact resume negotiations over Cyprus. It is in Turkey's interest, as well as Greece's, NATO's, and ours, to get these negotiations back on the track.

If Turkey reacts with patience and reason, it will be displaying a better understanding of human nature than Congress did last fall when it yielded to the impetuous demands of vindictive foreign policy

“experts” in its midst [some of whom are quoted herewith] and slapped on the embargo by overwhelming majorities.

Instead of bringing Turkey to heel, as advocates of the embargo said it would, the embargo caused Turkey to break off all negotiations over Cyprus, to seize more land on Cyprus and set up a Turkish “autonomous republic,” and to threaten other retaliatory measures which would have left peace less secure and NATO weaker than ever. In short, Turkey reacted to the embargo just as Congress has reacted to the Turkish deadline: with stubborn resentment.

What all of this demonstrates is that there are nuances in diplomacy that simply can't be understood or voiced in the politically charged atmosphere of a legislative hall. There are times when patience and restraint are called for; there are other times when toughness is called for. And whatever its inadequacies, the State Department is better able to judge these things than Congress.

[From the Christian Science Monitor, July 16, 1975]

### Vital Dates for Cyprus

Two dates are coming up that could mark new hope or new doubts about establishing stability in torn and troubled Cyprus—and thus enhancing stability on the uneasy southern flank of NATO.

July 17 is Turkey's deadline for the United States to lift the arms embargo prompted by the Turkish invasion of Cyprus—or to face the possibility of restrictions on U.S. military bases in Turkey. Here the more hopeful alternative would be for the House of Representatives to follow the Senate and at least ease the embargo. Further progress in this direction would depend on evidence of Turkish diplomatic effort toward resolving the Cyprus situation, which Turkey well understands.

Congress understandably does not want to appear to knuckle under to a Turkish ultimatum over an embargo imposed on the grounds that Turkey violated the terms of nonaggressive use under which American arms were supplied. But it can be argued that the embargo has now made its point, and that there would be net progress toward maintaining the peace if Turkey were encouraged toward accommodation on Cyprus through U.S. steps toward accommodating its old ally.

The present Turkish Government wants to remain aligned with the West. A prolonged failure by it to bring about a lifting of the embargo would open the way for anti-West extremists to gather power—with threatening prospects for Cyprus and democracy in Turkey as well as for the Western alliance.

Greece, of course, is also part of this alliance. And the legislation before the House carefully includes assurances of help for Greece as well as Turkey, seeking to make clear that restored U.S. relations with the Turkish ally means no lessening of relations with the Greek ally. The vote will probably not come until next week, and of course it would be folly for Turkey to enforce its July 17 deadline in view of the efforts in its behalf.

July 25 is the date for the beginning of a new round of Vienna talks between Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders, with United Nations

Secretary-General Waldheim in attendance. Though Greece and Turkey loom large behind the Cypriot participants, it is only through Cypriot effort that ultimate compromise can be ensured, as free as possible from undue influence by the patron states.

Here the setback to Greek Cypriots through the use of Turkish troops has to be considered along with the Greek coup that set off the year-long crisis. Turkish Cypriot Raouf Denktash can go into the Vienna talks with a more conciliatory attitude if Turkey feels renewed security in its U.S. relations. Greek Cypriot Glavkos Clerides can follow suit if Turkey then is prepared to proceed toward reducing its military presence on Cyprus as the Cypriots move toward agreement on the form of the new federal government for which they have both expressed support at least in principle.

It would be most unfortunate if the years-long Cyprus "dialogue" should not resume on time in Vienna, either because of ruffled U.S.-Turkish relations or because the Turkish side as it has hinted, stays away in protest against "Greek Cypriot propaganda."

Which again brings the focus back to the first date, July 17. If the Turkish Government can tamp down opposition against it by obtaining what it can call a success in its U.S. negotiations, it will be in a better position to back its Turkish Cypriot dependents in the kind of flexibility that will be necessary on all sides to break the current impasse, with all the human suffering it involves.

[From Newsday, July 11, 1975]

### Getting the Turks to Move on Cyprus

Since the U.S. ban on arms shipments to Turkey took effect five months ago, the Turks haven't moved an inch closer to the Greeks in resolving their quarrel over Cyprus. Last month they gave Washington 30 days to lift the ban or get ready to pull American bases out of Turkey. The Senate has already voted to end the arms embargo. This week a compromise was worked out in the House International Affairs Committee that offers some hope of getting the Turks to negotiate without caving in on principle.

The principle was laid down by Congress back in 1961: U.S. military aid shouldn't go to nations that use it for aggressive purposes—as Turkey did by invading Cyprus last summer after a Greek inspired coup against President Makarios. The House compromise would still deny Turkey military aid. But it would permit the Turks to receive \$78-million worth of military equipment they've already paid for, including Phantom jets. And it would allow them to buy additional weapons on a cash basis.

Admittedly there's no guarantee that this plan will produce any Turkish concessions when negotiations with Greece on the Cyprus question resume in Vienna July 24—or even that it will ensure the continuing presence of U.S. bases on Turkish soil. Nor is the plan likely to be popular with the Greeks, who understandably feel that the weapons are more likely to be used on Cyprus than against the Soviet Union.

But Turkey is, after all, a NATO ally—the only one, in fact, that actually borders on the Soviet Union. And right now it looks as though Turkey's quarrel with the United States is standing in the way of settling Turkey's quarrel with Greece, another NATO ally. We see no reason why the United States shouldn't be willing to take a step toward ending both quarrels. If the Turks aren't willing to take the next step, Washington had better start wondering whether they don't need us as allies more than we need them.

[From the Indianapolis Star, July 19, 1975]

### The Turkey Aid Knot

The Ford administration is seeking some negotiating room in which to try to untangle some of the diplomatic and military problems revolving around Turkey, Greece, Cyprus and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Certainly the situation needs some untangling.

To recapitulate briefly, the problems began a year ago when some Greek army officers were involved in a takeover of the elected government of Cyprus by the Cypriot National Guard, which installed a president who favored union with Greece. Turkey invaded Cyprus, saying the action was to protect Turkish Cypriots, and seized a third of the island, which it still holds. The Cypriot military meanwhile returned control of the government to civilian hands.

Responding to a charge that in the invasion of Cyprus Turkey illegally used United States aid weapons, Congress in February cut off all military aid and arms sales to Turkey. Thereupon Turkey threatened to withdraw from NATO, of which Greece also is a member.

It's a very involved situation, but one thing clear is that unless it can be ironed out the southern flank of NATO will be badly weakened, to say the least. There is the further point that on July 17 the U.S. opens talks with Turkey about renewal of agreements for U.S. bases in that country.

Ever since the congressional cutoff of aid and arms sales to Turkey, President Ford has been trying to get the action rescinded, arguing that it ties American hands in dealing with Turkey. A few days ago he finally reached a compromise with a group of congressional leaders.

Under the compromise, now about to go before the House, the ban against loan or grant aid would continue but cash arms sales would be permitted, including delivery of a \$184 million order that had been negotiated before the cutoff.

This seems reasonable. While we sympathize with the congressional purpose of forcing Turkey to withdraw from Cyprus, it would be very bad if Turkey instead remained adamant and carried out the threat to forsake NATO. The Turks know very well that Turkey is important to NATO and that U.S. foreign policy for Europe rests on NATO.

It makes sense to give the administration authority to make some material overture in an effort to rebuild a working co-operative arrangement with Turkey. Resolution of the Cyprus situation certainly

should be part of a final arrangement. There is need for a step to get productive talks underway.

[From the Washington Star, May 2, 1975]

### Easing Up on Turkey

Monday's 41-to-40 Senate vote to lift the ill-advised embargo on military aid to Turkey is legislatively insignificant without House concurrence, which is ruled out in present circumstances. But half a congressional loaf is better than none as Turkey teeters between short-sightedness and wisdom in its policies toward the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and toward a settlement with Greece and the Greek Cypriots on Cyprus.

The Senate action at least creates a somewhat more pleasant climate for Secretary of State Kissinger's visit to Ankara tomorrow, for a foreign ministers' review of the Central Treaty Organization. Ideally, the congressional gesture toward ending the three-and-a-half-month-old arms-aid ban could be followed by some Turkish movement toward a Cyprus agreement, justifying a House reversal on Turkish aid and greatly increasing this country's leverage for encouraging Cyprus concessions by the Turks.

This sounds too pat, and it is, especially since Prime Minister Demirel and his associates hold power by the slimmest of margins in Parliament and are in no position to take initiatives that might tread on the nationalistic, anti-Greek feelings of their constituents. But it should be evident, as Kissinger hears out the once staunchly allied Turks, that the playing of Greek ethnic politics by some congressmen not only hurts this country's effort to play a helpful role in Cyprus negotiations, but places the eastern Mediterranean flank of NATO in additional jeopardy.

The arms ban, besides, represents a disturbing commentary on the stability of the United States' relations with its allies in general. This is the worst possible time for the reinforcement of such doubts, following the debacle in Southeast Asia and the widespread questioning of the reliability of American commitments. It is too bad that Kissinger, on his current trip, is not rid completely of the handicap that Congress unnecessarily placed the nation's policy under last February.

### OPPOSING VIEWS OF HON. DANTE B. FASCELL, HON. BENJAMIN S. ROSENTHAL, HON. GUS YATRON, HON. MICHAEL HARRINGTON, HON. CARDISS COLLINS, AND HON. DON BONKER ON S. 2230—MILITARY AID TO TURKEY

We believe it inappropriate for the committee and the House to reconsider this legislation less than 2 months after an identical bill was defeated on the House floor.

The House has voted nine previous times on this same issue in the past 12 months. In every case a majority of the House voted to suspend arms deliveries to the Turkish Government until the President could certify that Turkey is in compliance with our laws. Why should the refusal of Turkey to comply with these laws, and the support of the administration for Turkey's intransigence, force the House to vote again and again on the same issue?

The President today cannot make such a certification because Turkey continues to use American-supplied weapons to occupy 40 percent of Cyprus, an independent country.

Since the House considered this issue on July 24, only two changes have occurred:

(1) Turkey has suspended activities at several American intelligence bases there and threatens further retaliation unless the Congress ends the arms suspension;

(2) Turkey agreed, in late July at Vienna, to propose a comprehensive settlement on Cyprus at the U.N.-sponsored negotiations. But in early September, at U.N. Headquarters in New York, Turkey reneged on this commitment, refusing to make any proposals, thereby causing an indefinite suspension of negotiations.

The supporters of this bill must explain how these Turkish actions—of threat and obstruction—justify a 10th consideration of such legislation in less than a year.

With those who say something must be tried, we wholeheartedly agree. Let the Turkish Government, for the first time since its occupation of Cyprus a year ago last August, try another approach.

Let Turkey make a significant effort to solve the problem of 180,000 refugees who face a second winter in tents.

Let Turkey show, by any sign, public or private, major or minor, to any disinterested observer that it wants a fair and prompt settlement on Cyprus.

When such evidence is presented, we are confident that Congress will rapidly end its arms suspension. But to do so without such evidence would risk an evil far greater than the closing of several military bases. For to pass this bill would give a sign to the world that a principle in our aid legislation for over a quarter-century is without significance. Passing this bill will show the countries which last year bought \$10

billion in U.S. arms that realistically no legal restrictions apply to their use.

In a year where even more U.S. arms will be sold to Turkey's neighbors than were purchased worldwide last year, this abandonment of restrictions on the use of American arms could have catastrophic effects.

If the administration, which pursues this legislation so doggedly, wants to release arms customers from all conditions on their use, a repeal of the fundamental provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act and the Foreign Military Sales Act should be proposed and debated in the Congress. But to attempt to carve an exemption in these laws for Turkey, as this bill proposes, does a gross injustice to the people of Cyprus and a major disservice to the rule of law.

If the administration does not recognize the importance of the law-making and law-observing processes in the world community, the Congress must remind it once again by soundly defeating this legislation.

DANTE B. FASCELL.  
 BENJAMIN S. ROSENTHAL.  
 GUS YATRON.  
 MICHAEL HARRINGTON.  
 CARLISS COLLINS.  
 DON BONKER.

#### SEPARATE VIEWS OF HON. LESTER L. WOLFF ON RENEWING ARMS SHIPMENTS TO TURKEY

The primary reason that I do not support this legislation concerns the Turkish Government's failure to cooperate with the United Nations, the United States, and other members of the international community in preventing the smuggling of opium which ends up in the veins of American youths in the form of heroin.

It is well known that the Turkish Government unilaterally broke the agreement which they had made whereby they banned the planting of poppies in return for economic assistance from the United States. It is also well known that the Turkish ban was an integral part of our narcotics control program which was able to reduce the number of addicts by roughly 50 percent while the ban was in effect. Since the lifting of the ban, and in fairness to the Turkish Government not entirely as a result of the lifting of the ban, the number of addicts has increased to approximately 750,000 in the United States. I cite these statistics because I think that when one considers the impact which an addict community of this magnitude has on this country in terms of property crime, treatment costs, and general disintegration of community stability because individuals are afraid to walk the streets of their communities for fear of being robbed or mugged, one realized that heroin addiction is probably the single most destructive force tearing at the quality of life in the United States.

It is for this reason, the tremendous impact on our way of life and the influence which heroin has on the youth of this country that I cannot allow narcotics control decisions to take a back seat to other foreign policy considerations. As I have stated before, it is time that we placed our domestic relations, our relations with our own children, on a par with our relations with our so-called allies. We have a tremendous domestic problem which is fed by the planting of poppies around the world. I feel that it is time that Turkey came to the support of the United States and demonstrate that they are really allies, interested in our mutual security as the pact which we share with Turkey states. I have to this point seen no indication that the Turks are serious or sincere in their effort to cooperate with us on this problem. The Turks insist that they are controlling the crop and should be trusted one more time, even though they have never been successful in controlling the diversion of licit opium in the past. If the Turks are sincere, I can only say their actions seem to contradict their statements. First of all, one should realize that the Turks voluntarily reduced the number of provinces where opium could be planted before the ban from 21 down ultimately to 4 because they admitted they were unable to control the diversion. Now when they unilaterally lifted the ban, the first thing that was made clear was that seven and then eight provinces would be selected for the cultivation of opium and 100,000 farms would be licensed. To supervise this massive agricultural operation 75 teams

were created to monitor the fields. To further complicate the control picture, a general amnesty in 1974 freed many of the major traffickers the enforcement community had worked so hard to apprehend and convict. That is not what I call a sincere effort. Furthermore, the Turks have invited teams from the U.N. to help in the monitoring of the fields but have not allowed for Americans to survey all of the fields or do investigating on their own. The Turks stated that they did not want the Americans looking over their shoulders and the administration has gone along with their lifting of the ban because they feel the Turks are proud and sensitive people. Well I feel that the youths of this country and their families and the innocent victims of drug-related crime are also sensitive people and in this instance at least as important to our national interest.

At the present time, major precautions are being taken to prevent the new Turkish crop from reaching our soldiers in Europe. If our enforcement people were convinced that the Turks were able to control the new crop even with the institution of the poppy straw method, they would not be panic stricken over the possibilities that a new opium pipeline will be established which will feed our troops in Europe and further reduce our military capability.

On the other hand there are some heartening signs that the United States will not be subjected to an epidemic sized invasion from the poppy fields from Turkey as I fear. First of all, President Ford has recently written in a letter to my colleague Mr. Rangel:

I also want you to know that my concern in Turkey is the same as my concern in every nation in which opium poppies are grown. All nations of the world—friend and foe alike—must understand that America considers the illicit export of opium to this country a threat to our national security. Secretary Kissinger and I intend to make sure that they do.

When the Turks were in the process of determining that they would lift the ban and began to consider certain control precautions, Secretary Kissinger did not once feel that it was worthwhile to stop in Turkey and discuss the matter with the President or Prime Minister and express the seriousness of our concern. I am afraid that once again the administration is making admirable speeches proclaiming the seriousness of our concern over the problem of narcotics, and yet whenever it comes down to the question of choosing between effective narcotics control which means possibly upsetting our relations with an ally and other foreign policy considerations, the administration always chooses to emphasize the necessity of protecting our alliances. In short, the rhetoric is not translated into constructive policy. I must dissent from the administration's decision as I feel that our national interest in this case is preventing the narcotics from reaching our shores at any cost and if this means maintaining the ban on arms shipments to Turkey to impress them with our degree of seriousness then that is the course I support.

As a member of this committee, I have advocated for many years that narcotics control should be a priority issue in our foreign policy. I have recently convened 2 days of hearings on the effectiveness of the controls which Turkey has imposed on poppy straw cultivation before

the subcommittee I chair on Future Foreign Policy Research and Development, and the testimony does not allow me to be optimistic about the coming months. I can report that the representatives from the Department of State and the Drug Enforcement Administration have each testified that although they did not support the lifting of the ban that they had no reason to believe that the Turks would be unable to control the production and collection of the poppy straw. I am happy to say that they also testified to an elaborate set of contingency plans which are being set up in case diversion does take place. However, I am unable to be swayed by their optimistic predictions because first of all they have not been provided with access to all of the growing areas and also because of their desire not to testify to anything which might conflict with administration views—namely that narcotics control is more important to the people of this Nation than maintaining our relations with Turkey. I do not want to belabor the point but they were clearly not in a position to speak of their personal feelings about the sincerity of the Turkish effort or the effectiveness of the control system.

However, during the second day of my subcommittee's hearings I was fortunate to hear from a prosecutor from the city of New York and also from the former Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration. Each of these individuals had totally different views on the Turkish situation from their administration counterparts. Sterling Johnson who deals with the narcotics situation on the streets of New York stated that:

It is my opinion that huge quantities of Turkish opium will be translated into heroin and will be available on the streets of New York this fall.

Mr. Johnson went on to discuss the impact of the lifting of the poppy ban and he concluded:

All agree, we have at the present time all the ingredients for a disaster in New York City. If our efforts in New York City fail, other cities and suburban communities will soon be infected by the disease of addiction. For, when the new influx of heroin hits New York, it will not be confined to the ghetto communities. Addiction will spread to our more affluent areas and bring with it a continued rise in crime.

We had the opportunity to ask Mr. Johnson what we in the Federal Government could do to halt the flow of drugs to this country and particularly how we could keep the new invasion of Turkish drugs from reaching the streets. He responded, "you must have a well orchestrated effort from several particular areas—enforcement rehabilitation, training and most importantly you have to have national leadership and a national commitment that this is what we are going to do." I think this gets to the heart of the issue. We must make narcotics control a top priority issue in our foreign policy and I do not feel succumbing to pressures and granting Turkey the right to purchase arms regardless of their lack of cooperation with us on narcotics control is a very damaging precedent.

Another expert witness whom we had the opportunity to hear from was the former Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administra-

tion who's testimony did not give the committee any reason to feel optimistic about the ability of Turkey to control the opium poppies this year. Mr. Bartels began by quoting from a letter from the director of the French Central Police who observed that, "... we must fear that, despite the claims of the Government of Turkey, there is justification for scepticism over their claim that more than 100,000 growers can today be effectively controlled." This is an individual who has great experience in dealing with the famed French connection. Possibly the most damaging estimate came from Mr. Bartels who stated simply, "I am very fearful of it. I think we are going to see an influx of Turkish heroin into this country this spring, and I think much could have been done to prevent it and still can be done." This is where the committee is in a position to influence the narcotics situation outcome on our streets this fall. We still have options before us but the resumption of aid to Turkey does not complement the activity which I support. That course as described by Mr. Bartels is, "First, we have to make up our mind whether we are really serious, whether or not narcotics control is ever going to rise to the issue of being worthy of diplomatic attention."

The problem of treating narcotics as a second-rate domestic issue has gone on for too long in my opinion and has been expertly documented in several reports which have been issued this year. I think it is useful to cite some of the observations and conclusions from these reports.

The first report which I feel is relevant is by a reporter for the New York Times who authored a series of articles dealing with international narcotics control in April of this year. Mr. Gage, the author, observes, "But officials from several participating agencies believe that Secretary of State Kissinger has little interest in the narcotics effort and that as a result many American diplomats in Latin America haven't devoted themselves wholeheartedly to it either." The State Department spokesman defends the Secretary by pointing out that if he was not interested he would not remain as Chairman of the Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control. I find this to be less than convincing, as this high-level committee has met only once in the last 3 years and that was for a pro forma meeting in November of 1973.

Mr. Gage goes on to the quotation of one Ambassador who states, "We could jeopardize our relations by pushing too hard on narcotics. These countries don't have a drug problem themselves. There's no mutual interest to work with." Well it is time that our problem took a priority place, and this does not only involve Turkey or Latin America but in all countries.

I must admit, the picture which Mr. Gage paints is not nearly as critical or damaging as the statements which are made in a draft appendix to the Murphy Commission which was written by Mr. Tom Peters, a former official in the narcotics bureaucracy in OMB. Mr. Peters' report of March 25, 1975, "State Department Response to a New Policy Issue: Narcotics Control" concludes that, "The State Department did not respond creatively or rapidly to the narcotics issue." Furthermore, "Most new issues confronting the U.S. foreign policy machinery in the 1970's and 1980's will be like drugs in that they will deal with issues related to domestic problems. Implementation of U.S.

foreign policy will increasingly require an understanding of the levers necessary to predict and potentially influence internal economic and social behavior of important allies and adversaries. Socioeconomic interdependence will continue to increase rapidly. The State Department should take the lead in suggesting creative answers to issues in areas which have traditionally been peripheral to national security analysis. Response to the drug case gives us no reason to view the future with optimism."

One would think that the State Department would take some note of a report which contains such strong observations and yet the chief of the State Department narcotics panel, Ambassador Sheldon Vance testified that he had only read that part of the report through which he could stay awake. I honestly do not know what must be done to impress upon the State Department and then upon other countries that the United States is sincere in its desire to control international narcotics trafficking and cut off the supply of heroin which comes from poppies grown in foreign lands.

Unfortunately, the only response which the executive seems to be able to provide is further investigations of the narcotics bureaucracy which results in constructive suggestions which are not implemented. I need only cite the recent GAO report to the Congress. "If the United States is to develop an effective International Narcotics Control Program Much More Must Be Done." That is only the title of the report but the conclusions are even more to the point. "U.S. policy on eliminating opium production and illicit narcotics trafficking is not always clear to those who must follow it in attempting to carry out international narcotics control programs." Additionally, although the United States continues to give top priority to international narcotics control, (1) it was not included among U.S. objectives in some narcotics-problem countries and (2) some U.S. embassies' officials were uncertain as to whether it was an objective in their countries."

The message seems clear, the State Department does not consider narcotics control to be a foreign policy priority worthy of much stature and will always defer to other foreign policy concerns when there is a conflict. Furthermore, no amount of reports which contain lofty rhetoric or Presidential statements about our concern will have any influence if they are not backed up with policies and directives which clearly state that narcotics control is a priority issue and is followed up on by members of the bureaucracy who have enough clout to accomplish their goals. In short, the decision to resume arms shipments to Turkey is just another example of narcotics being considered a second-rate foreign policy priority. In my mind, narcotics control is a matter of national security of the highest priority and a resumption of the invasion of Turkish heroin onto the streets of this country is a more dangerous threat to our national security and does more damage to our national interest than damage to our relations with the Government of Turkey brought about by an arms embargo.

LESTER L. WOLFF.

OPPOSING VIEWS OF HON. MICHAEL HARRINGTON  
ON S. 2230 (MILITARY AID TO TURKEY)

In the wake of the second Turkish invasion of Cyprus, the U.S. Congress imposed an embargo on Turkish arms shipments as required by two provisions of U.S. law. Both the Foreign Assistance Act and the Foreign Military Sales Act set forth specific prohibitions on the use of American-supplied weapons for offensive purposes and mandate an embargo on further arms shipments should the conditions under which the weapons are supplied be violated.

With the imposition of the embargo on February 5, 1975, the United States gave notice of its willingness to resume arms shipments only subsequent to serious steps taken by Turkey to remedy the effects of its hostile actions on the island. Yet given the lack of progress in the ensuing months toward a Cyprus settlement, the House, on July 24, voted down a partial lifting of the ban and now, despite the continued stalemate, the House is being asked to reverse its earlier judgment.

In six months' time, there has been a substantial absence of movement toward a solution of the Cyprus issue. Clearly, there is little question that the Turkish position on Cyprus is characterized more by inflexibility than by a willingness to compromise. Given the impasse, what is needed now is a serious conciliatory gesture by Turkey: Partial removal of the 30,000 to 40,000 troops stationed in Cyprus or concrete efforts to remedy the plight of the 200,000 refugees currently detained on Turkish-occupied territory, for instance, might be perceived as evidence of good faith on the part of the Turkish Government.

Recent administration efforts to facilitate a resumption of arms shipments have been accompanied not by Turkish efforts at reconciliation but rather by continued intransigence and threats of reprisals. Compounding the difficulties produced by the closure of all but one of the American bases on Turkey, has been the total breakdown in the fourth round of negotiating sessions and the rumor that Turkish Cypriots who comprise 18 percent of the population and control 40 percent of the island may soon declare the occupied territory an independent state. Such actions clearly indicate that Turkey would rather consolidate recent gains than seriously search for a compromise.

In view of Turkey's apparent unwillingness to remedy the consequences of its hostile actions on Cyprus, there is no acceptable justification at this time for the resumption of arms shipments. By violating the conditions under which arms are granted, the Turkish Government brought this undesirable situation upon itself and now the Turkish Government, not the U.S. Congress, must alter it.

A negative vote on this issue should not be equated with an attempt to extract humiliating concessions from Turkey. It acknowledges simply that the conduct of American foreign policy should be governed by laws and principles rather than by expedient considerations of the moment. Those who agree with this proposition will join with me in seeing this bill defeated again on the House floor.

MICHAEL HARRINGTON.

OPPOSING VIEWS OF DONALD W. RIEGLE, JR., ON  
S. 2230 (MILITARY AID TO TURKEY)

Since the beginning of the Cyprus problem, we have heard administration spokesmen say that what really triggered the crisis was the initial move by the Greek dictatorship, since deposed, to topple the government on Cyprus. I recall painfully that for months and years our Government, the Nixon administration, but still essentially the same personnel today, bent over backward to accommodate the dictatorship of Greece. It was as clear then as it is today that such a policy was unwise, and necessarily brought about the kind of feeling that encouraged the junta to make exactly the kind of move they did that started this slide of events that brings us to the sad moment where we now find ourselves.

Our Government should not behave in a similar way in a different situation which is today's situation. We must not adopt policies today which encourage the Turkish Government to commit aggression—or take unfair advantage of the Cyprus situation. I think there is a responsibility on the part of the Turkish Government to now do something positive and affirmative with respect to the situation on Cyprus, and not attempt to blackmail the United States regarding U.S. bases which are essential to the security of the United States and Western Europe, including Turkey.

At this point in time, the Turkish Government occupies approximately 40 percent of the land area of Cyprus. There are something over 200,000 refugees that have been displaced. The situation there as I understand it is miserable in human terms.

It is not right for the clock to keep ticking week in and week out, month in and month out with the Turkish Government saying that nothing can be done, or that that can be taken care of later, or that this is a longstanding dispute and it can be worked out at some future date. That is not satisfactory.

There are essentially two aspects to the problem before us: U.S. law and Cyprus. The Turkish invasion took place principally with the help of American arms—approximately 90 percent of the equipment that the Turks used in this move came from the United States. That was an outright violation of our laws that govern the sale and grant of military assistance to allies. Regarding the issue between Greece and Turkey, it is not necessary to get into the issue of the longstanding disputes between these two countries over Cyprus or other matters. At the same time we must not ignore the question of what is actually happening on Cyprus at this moment and the fact that these questions must not be put on the back burner to wait.

The two issues here—military assistance to Turkey from the United States and a resolution of the Cyprus issue—are interrelated. They cannot be separated. They have to be dealt with at the same time, and that should be done equitably and fairly. This is not to suggest that we should seek to resolve those difficulties only as they relate to Cyprus. It is to say that it would be wrong if Cyprus were detached as an issue,

put off to the side, with the United States resuming arms shipments to Turkey.

The political situation within Turkey is admittedly sensitive. Turkish national elections will be held on October 10, 1975. I respect the democracy that exists in Turkey. But I think at the same time this Government of ours is going to have to do more to encourage change in Turkish policy than has thus far been apparent.

The administration bill asks us to circumvent, or ignore, or set aside a particular part of our own law. This is something we should not do regardless of which side happens to be in the dominant military position today in Cyprus. This is a basic principle, and the issue of shaping U.S. policy ought to be looked at on that basis without regard to whether it is Greece or Turkey. In terms of the present choices, the Congress should not be asked to approve a violation of U.S. law, at least until some real and good faith negotiation on the Cyprus question should be apparent. This progress need not come first, it can parallel changes in U.S. policy; but it must be clear.

There has been much talk about the question of why the embargo up to this point has not produced more results. It is obvious why it has not. The administration from the day this limitation was passed objected to the embargo, sought to have it lifted, made it clear in every way it could, verbally and otherwise, to the Turkish Government that they were going to do what they could to have the embargo suspended. Understandably, with the President of the United States and the Secretary of State arguing against the embargo and the Congress arguing for it, the best position for you to take is to wait and do nothing. That is exactly what the Turks have done with respect to Cyprus. It is for this reason that the intercommunal talks, involving the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities have broken down. Most recently the Turkish side again showed its arrogance when it failed to fulfill its promise to provide specific alternatives.

If, however, the United States takes a firm position, and if the Congress and the President can stand together on this particular issue to insist that our laws, which the Turks agreed to when they accepted the U.S. arms, be adhered to, then both the incumbent government in Turkey and any prospective government there would find themselves having to deal with exactly the same conditions.

There are still 200,000 refugees on Cyprus—nothing is being done about it. That is a burning human rights issue right now. It directly relates to why this arms embargo was imposed. I think as a bare minimum we ought to ask for some specific and definite progress on that problem as part of an exchange process where a policy change is to be made with respect to the arms embargo that we have imposed. But that issue has been pushed to the side.

The fact that there might be progress months from now, years from now when there may be a new government in Turkey, that is not sufficient. Past Turkish policy provides no reason to believe that unilateral U.S. concession will produce a new attitude on the part of Turkish leaders. No more arms should leave this country until we have some specific indication that either progress has been made or will be made. We ought to insist on specific quid pro quos; I do not think that is asking too much.

DONALD W. RIEGLE, JR.

#### SUPPLEMENTAL VIEWS OF HON. WILLIAM S. BROOMFIELD ON TURKISH ARMS EMBARGO

In urging favorable consideration of S. 2230, I hope Congress will carefully consider the consequences of our last vote on this issue and weigh the potential damage to our national interests implicit in a continuation of the embargo on arms to Turkey.

I believe there is fundamental agreement, even on this emotional issue, that the recent decision of the Turkish Government to suspend important United States intelligence-gathering activities was linked directly to congressional refusal in July to ease the embargo. There are those who suggest that the installations lost to us were not all that important; that there are alternative sources and methods of collection.

In rebutting this contention, I would like to quote from portions of an unclassified Department of Defense document stating, *inter alia* :

As a result of the suspension of operations at U.S. intelligence collection facilities in Turkey, the United States suffered a significant loss of electronic intelligence on Soviet activities \* \* \* our actual loss has been greater than we had anticipated.

The document goes on to state that in the category of Soviet weapons systems development there has been a net loss of about 15 percent, "including a total loss of information on some critically important weapons systems which is uniquely available from Turkey." We have lost more than half our surveillance capability in regard to Soviet military forces in the southwest U.S.S.R., a development with obvious implications for our security.

The DOD document further suggests that it will cost some \$75 to \$100 million in capital investment and a minimum of 2 years to recoup the intelligence losses we will suffer if our Turkish bases are permanently closed. The report characterizes our electronic intelligence activities in Turkey as "extensive, important, and often unique" and recommends, if it proves impossible to resume activities in Turkey, that we move promptly to restore as much of our capability as possible.

The Turkish people will hold parliamentary elections in mid-October. In the absence of congressional action to ease the embargo, it is safe to assume that our bases in Turkey will become an important political issue and may be irrevocably lost to us. The vote on S. 2230 may well be our last opportunity to save installations of indisputable importance to our national security. The President, in a September 16 letter to the chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on International Relations, stated the issue clearly when he wrote, "I firmly believe failure to lift the embargo soon will lead to complete closure of a majority of U.S. installations in Turkey."

The jeopardy to our installations in Turkey is important, but it is by no means the only consequence of our action in July. Turkish-

American relations are at their lowest ebb in a generation and the southern flank of NATO is in disarray. The question of the arms embargo transcends the issue of punishing Turkey for its invasion of Cyprus. It has come to bear directly on our own national interests and the continued vitality of our keystone alliance with Western Europe.

Finally, the breakdown of the talks between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders recently conducted in New York is additional evidence, if any is required, that the Government of Turkey, like most governments in the world, is absolutely unprepared to negotiate an issue it views as vital to its national interests while under the pressure of an arms embargo. No one can guarantee that favorable House action on S. 2230 will lead directly to accommodation on Cyprus, but the experience of the past 8 months has demonstrated beyond any doubt that the arms embargo is totally ineffective as a spur to negotiating the complex and emotional issue of Cyprus. Congressional refusal to relax the embargo can only result in a diminished American influence with the Government of Turkey and a waning ability to play a helpful role in resolving the Cyprus tragedy.

The situation in the eastern Mediterranean—the damage to our bilateral relations with Turkey, the obvious strains in the NATO alliance, the status of our installations in Turkey, and the lack of progress toward peace on Cyprus—is disquieting, but it is not hopeless. Favorable consideration of S. 2230, which permits a partial lifting of the arms embargo, will remove one of the impediments to serious negotiations on Cyprus while still permitting Congress an opportunity to assess the Turkish reaction before we authorize any new credit or government-to-government sales of military equipment. A relaxation of the arms embargo will diminish the possibility that our installations in Turkey will be closed permanently. It should close some of the fissures in NATO and improve the general environment of Turkish-American relations. It will also give us the chance, without foreclosing future options, to judge whether or not the Government of Turkey is prepared to negotiate in good faith on the Cyprus issue.

The President, in his September 16 letter to me urging approval of this legislation, has pledged to continue his efforts to help achieve a Cyprus solution, improve further United States-Greek and Greek-NATO relations, and to contribute to a broad relaxation of tensions between Greece and Turkey. These are policy objectives we can endorse unanimously. They are also objectives that will be difficult or impossible to realize as long as the embargo on arms to Turkey remains in force.

WILLIAM S. BROOMFIELD.

#### ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF HON. ROBERT J. LAGOMARSINO

Up until last July, I had voted to impose and to continue the arms embargo on Turkey. But two important developments have caused me to reconsider my position. The first of these was the Turkish Government's threat, which has now become reality, to close down U.S. military installations in retaliation for the suspension of U.S. military assistance. Second, the present embargo has not worked in its attempt to defuse the tension on Cyprus. To continue to refuse military assistance to Turkey will do nothing to bring a stable and lasting peace to Cyprus but it will weaken America's national interest in that area. It is for these reasons that I supported S. 846 last July and why I now support S. 2230.

The United States has much to gain from lifting the arms embargo to Turkey. Turkey will be able to fulfill its NATO commitments, and the United States will be able to keep its bases in Turkey which are vital to American and NATO security. Events in Portugal has already weakened NATO's southern flank enough. Both Turkey and NATO will view the easing of the embargo as a re-affirmation of the American commitment to Europe.

The most important aspect of this partial lifting of the embargo, however, is that it will break the stalemate in the Cyprus negotiations. Because of the delicate domestic political balance in Turkey, the Turkish Government, for its own survival, cannot be perceived by the Turkish people to be yielding to external pressure; thus, easing the embargo is necessary for serious negotiations. The diplomatic hand of the United States will be strengthened in dealing with Turkey. The current embargo has made the Turks more resistant to making changes in Cyprus than they were before we imposed it.

Greek Cypriots and their sympathizers are concerned that these weapons may be used against them once again. But in my opinion S. 2230 contains adequate safeguards to prevent the arms from being misused by Turkey. The only arms that can be sold by the United States are those needed by Turkey to fulfill its NATO commitments, and then only after the enactment of legislation authorizing military sales for fiscal year 1976. Arms sales will be halted immediately if Turkey does not observe the Cyprus cease-fire, if it increases the number of troops on Cyprus, or if it transfers any American weapons to Cyprus. Also, the President is requested to initiate discussion with Greece to determine Greek military and economic needs. The President is further directed to cooperate in various multinational programs for the relief of refugees and other dislocated persons on Cyprus. I am convinced that his compromise is a workable solution to a very serious problem.

I am very concerned about the right to self-determination of the Cypriot people. I am also concerned about America's vital interests in this part of the world. S. 2230 as amended is a workable compromise that will promote both of these important goals.

ROBERT J. LAGOMARSINO.

## U.S. Military Assistance to Turkey

*Statement by the President on Congressional Action Partially Lifting the Embargo on Assistance.*  
October 3, 1975

I welcome the passage by the Congress of S. 2230, which provides for a partial lifting of the embargo on U.S. arms for Turkey. This action is an essential first step in the process of rebuilding a relationship of trust and friendship with valued friends and allies in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The Congressional vote reflects a cooperative effort with the Senate and House of Representatives on the difficult question of Cyprus and the vital task of restoring stability and security along NATO's strategically important southern flank.

With the partial lifting of the embargo, I intend to take action in four broad areas in the weeks ahead.

First, we will seek to rebuild our security relationship with Turkey to underscore that Turkey's membership in the Western alliance and partnership with the United States serve the very important interest of both nations.

Second, we will make a major effort to encourage resumption of the Cyprus negotiations and to facilitate progress by the parties involved—Greece, Turkey and Cyprus—toward a peaceful and equitable settlement of this dispute. In this connection, we will fulfill whatever role the parties themselves want us to play in achieving a settlement acceptable to all. In accordance with S. 2230, I will submit to the Congress within 60 days of enactment a report on progress made in reaching a solution to the Cyprus problem.

Third, the Administration will intensify cooperation with appropriate international humanitarian agencies to find ways to alleviate the suffering of the many people displaced as a result of the 1974 hostilities. The plight of these unfortunate people makes progress towards solution of the Cyprus problem all the more important.

Finally, the Administration intends to provide support to the democratic government of Greece. In that regard, we will pursue efforts to help that country overcome its current economic and security problems. Also, in compliance with S. 2230, I will submit within 60 days my recommendations for assistance to Greece for fiscal year 1976.

Our goals in the Eastern Mediterranean in the months ahead—to help the parties involved achieve a Cyprus settlement, to rebuild a relationship of trust and friendship with both Greece and Turkey, to alleviate the suffering on Cyprus, and to meet Greece's needs for assistance—are objectives on which we all can agree. Let us now join in working together to achieve them.

## Veto of School Lunch and Child Nutrition Legislation

*The President's Message to the House of Representatives Returning H.R. 4222 Without His Approval.*  
October 3, 1975

*To the House of Representatives:*

I am returning without my signature H.R. 4222, the National School Lunch and Child Nutrition Act Amendments of 1975.

If this bill provided food for children truly in need, as I proposed in March, I would give it my wholehearted support and approve it immediately. Children of families living in poverty who need help in raising their level of nutrition should receive that help.

It was with this in mind that I recommended early this year a reform of the Federal Government's existing child feeding programs. My proposal would have provided assistance by the Federal Government for all infants and children from families below the poverty level. It would have halted the steady expansion of Federal child nutrition subsidies to increasing numbers of non-needy children. By so doing, it would have concentrated more funds on feeding needy children, yet saved the taxpayers of this Nation almost \$4 billion over the next five years.

I recommended one block grant be made to States to provide them with greater flexibility to tailor food and nutrition programs to their own conditions and preferences. At the same time, States would have been relieved of much administrative and costly red tape. Such an approach would eliminate the wastefulness of present overlapping programs which often subsidize the same meal.

I recognize that H.R. 4222 would enlarge our present efforts to feed the needy children I am concerned about. But it would go far beyond that and greatly expand Federal subsidies to children from families which do not need Federal subsidies.

By extending aid to families not in need, this bill would add \$1.2 billion to my budget proposals for the current fiscal year. I cannot accept such fiscal irresponsibility when we face the real danger that the budget deficit could reach \$70 billion instead of the already high limit of \$60 billion I set earlier this year. As Congress keeps adding to the deficit, Congress adds to inflationary pressures which could push us back into recession.

We should not expand subsidies to families with incomes above the poverty level. I believe the way to help most American families is to take actions to hold down inflation and reduce their tax burdens.

The consolidated food and nutrition program I proposed in March for needy children would have greatly improved our existing programs. The program sent to me

October 3, 1975

Dear Mr. Director:

The following bills were received at the White House on October 3rd:

S. 2230

S. 2375

H.R. 9600

Please let the President have reports and recommendations as to the approval of these bills as soon as possible.

Sincerely,

Robert D. Linder  
Chief Executive Clerk

The Honorable James T. Lynn  
Director  
Office of Management and Budget  
Washington, D. C.