STATEMENT OF REP. GERALD R. FORD (R-MICH.)

The published statement of Defense Secretary McNamara before the Senate Preparedness subcommittee appears to be at odds, not only with the views of all the top military witnesses heard by the committee, but also with the recent actions of President Johnson. Since my August 8 speech to the House on our Vietnam policy, the President apparently has authorized increased military pressure against North Vietnam through selective bombing of more significant targets previously forbidden to U.S. airmen.

Now we find the Secretary of Defense defending the ineffective and deceptive airpower policies of the past two and one-half years in contradiction to the responsible judgment of our best military leaders and the conclusions of both Democratic and Republican Senators who have heard all the evidence. Mr. McNamara is entitled to his convictions but before the President commits more than half a million Americans to the ground war in South Vietnam we, as a nation, should be very sure the Secretary of Defense is right and all the others are wrong. This credibility gap is deadly serious. A nation at war cannot afford confusion and doubt about its basic policies.

I want to support my Commander-in-Chief when we are at war and so do all Americans. But we must know where he stands, where we are going, and how we will get there. It does no good to compound public concern by declassifying more target data and playing meaningless numbers games, as if this terrible war were merely a debate. Forget the past. What is our present policy? What hope is there for future U.S. success in Vietnam? That's what the American people want to know, straight, on the level, from the man in charge.

Only the Commander-in-Chief can clear up this deepening doubt. It should not be too much for the American people to expect that when our nation has been committed to the use of force, and since 1965 has paid a high price to pursue this course, that both the civilian and military leaders responsible should be in substantial agreement and that some end is in sight.

####
TOTAL SIGNIFICANT TARGETS IN NORTH VIETNAM

- UNHIT 70%
- OFF LIMITS 50%
- HIT 30%

- OIL STORAGE DEPOTS
- POWER COMPLEX, ALL HYDRO PLANTS FORBIDDEN
- TRANSPORTATION, LAND & SEA, ALL POWER & COMMUNICATION, MOST REPAIR FACILITIES FORBIDDEN
- WAR MAKING INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX
- AIR DEFENSES, ALL COMMAND & CONTROL, SUB, MOST NAVAL BASES FORBIDDEN
- MILITARY FACILITIES, MAINLY NUKE COFFINS AND ALL NAVAL BASES FORBIDDEN

- HIT
- 25%
- 12%
- 35%
- 50%
- 75%

- UNHIT
- 75%
- 65%
- 35%
- 25%
- 10%
- 25%
- 33%
- 48%

- OFF LIMITS

- 25%
- 35%
- 50%
- 60%
- 90%
- 75%
- 75%
- 75%
- 67%
TOTAL SIGNIFICANT TARGETS IN NORTH VIETNAM

UNHIT 70%
OFF LIMITS 50%
HIT 30%

- OIL STORAGE DEPOTS
  - 75% UNHIT
  - 25% HIT
  - 12% OFF LIMITS

- POWER COMPLEX
  - ALL HYDRO PLANTS
  - 65% HIT
  - 35% OFF LIMITS

- TRANSPORTATION
  - LAND & SEA
  - ALL PORTS & CANAL LOCKS,
  - MOST REPAIR FACILITIES
  - 60% OFF LIMITS

- WAR MAKING
  - INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX
  - 75% UNHIT
  - 25% HIT
  - 10% OFF LIMITS

- AIR. DEFENSES
  - ALL COMMAND & CONTROL
  - HQS, MOST MIG BASES
  - 48% OFF LIMITS

- MILITARY FACILITIES
  - MAINLY AMMO DUMPS
  - HIT, ALL NAVAL BASES
  - 67% UNHIT

FORBIDDEN
### Significant Military Targets in North Vietnam

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Hit</th>
<th>Unhit</th>
<th>Off-limits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Targets</strong> (P.O.L.)</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>12%</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Power Complex</strong></td>
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<td>35%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Transportation</strong></td>
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<td>75%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Industrial Complex</strong></td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Air Defenses</strong></td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Military Facilities</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**All Hydro Plants Forbidden**

**Everything Below Line Cannot Be Attacked Under High-Level Restraints from Washington as of July 1967**

**Combat U.S. Plane Losses Over NVN as of August 1, 1967 - 636 Planes**

(All the above percentages are approximate and should be so qualified.)