The original documents are located in Box D20, folder "Wake Forest College, Winston-Salem, NC, April 25, 1966" of the Ford Congressional Papers: Press Secretary and Speech File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

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Wake Forest College Winston - Salem, n.C. 4/25/66

# FOREIGN POLICY SPEECH

I am by nature an optimist. I would like to be hopeful tonight --1 hopeful about prospects for peace in a free Vietnam--peace in that unfortunate little country where thousands of fine young American men have lost their lives in the cause of freedom--breathed their last in the steaming jungles and rice paddies where world communism has chosen to make its latest assault against the free world.

I would like to be hopeful, but I cannot.

I am a lover of peace, just as you are. I desperately want the 240,000 men we now have in our ground forces in Vietnam to come home, just as you do. But they can't come home--not for a long time yet. We are fighting for something big in Vietnam--something so big that it is completely unrealistic to dismiss the conflict there as "that dirty little war" and to say that Vietnam is not important to us. We must stay in Vietnam as long as necessary. We must stay there to avoid the ultimate trampling under of all men's rights, the extinguishing of the torch of

freedom wherever it now burns.

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I would like to tell you that I think the Vietnam war will end soon. I cannot because I do not believe this.

I would like to tell you I think that the current civil unrest in Vietnam will produce a constituent government which will move forward with great vigor on both the military and social progress fronts in Vietnam. I cannot because I have great doubts that this will come to pass.

The present domestic political troubles in Vietnam may well bring into being a government in which the Viet Cong will be strongly represented. The result of the promised elections in Vietnam may well be to hand that country over to Ho Chih Minh without his achieving a military victory.

#### \* \* \*

How would the promised elections be supervised? Who is to determine whether a man who presents himself to cast his vote is eligible? What will the rules of eligibility be? In view of the ease with which the North Vietnamese have infiltrated South Vietnam to make war against the legitimate government of South Vietnam, what is to prevent them from posing as South Vietnamese and voting in the so-called constituent election? All of the recent developments on Vietnam's domestic political scene

seem to me to flow from the celebrated conference between President Johnson and South Vietnamese Premier Ky last February at Honolulu.

Mr. Johnson denies this, but the evidence leads inevitably to that conclusion in the minds of thinking men.

Up to this point, the Johnson-Humphrey Administration has been talking about free, supervised elections <u>after</u> a peace settlement at the conference table.

Vice-President Humphrey castigated a proposal by Sen. Robert F. Kennedy, D-N.Y., that the Viet Cong be admitted to a coalition government as a price for peace. He said this was like putting a fox in the chicken coop with the chickens.

I say that the same consequences may result from elections conducted while Vietnam still is at war.

The new government may just "invite us out," as the saying goes--and Ho Chih Minh will have taken over in South Vietnam, the Communists will have gained another victory that diminishes the forces of freedom throughout the world.

If this happens, it will be as an indirect result of the Honolulu conference. (MORE)

Reports from reliable and highly respected newsmen in Saigon indicate clearly that when President Johnson made a big fuss over Premier Ky at Honolulu the Buddhist leaders in Saigon began calling Ky "an American puppet."

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Observers on the Saigon scene also agree that if the conference had never been held, Ky never would have felt strong and secure enough to fire Lt. Gen. Thi, the commander of the South Vietnamese 1st Corps at Danang.

And it was the firing of Gen. Thi that touched off all the civil disorder which plagued Vietnam for more than five weeks and which is still continuing. There is, in fact, still danger of civil war in Vietnam despite the Ky government's promise of a constituent election next fall.

The Johnson-Humphrey Administration would have everyone believe that actually this civil unrest in Vietnam was a good thing--that from it will emerge a more unified country.

I would like to remind the administration that the results may well be disastrous--in fact, the danger far outweighs the possible benefits.

I would also like to remind the administration that the Ky government was doing a good job of running the war until the civil disorders broke out,

and that during the turmoil the war effort was disrupted and slowed down.

I would also like to remind the administration of a report that the recent political trouble in Saigon made it easier for Communist guerrillas to attack an air base near Saigon on April 13. In that raid on Tansonnhut Air Base, seven U. S. servicemen were killed and 155 American and South Vietnamese servicemen were wounded.

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Following on the political turmoil in Vietnam and Premier Ky's promise of elections next fall, Senate Majority Leader Mansfield has called for a confrontation at the conference table somewhere in Asia between Red China, North Vietnam and the Viet Cong on the one side, and South Vietnam and the United States on the other.

Meantime we have bombed missile sites near North Vietnam's capital of Hanoi and a power plant near the North Vietnam port of Haiphong.

It strikes me this is the same pattern that was followed late last year just before the long bombing lull ordered by the President.

At that time, too, we bombed missile sites near Hanoi and knocked out the power plant near Haiphong.

At that time, too, we launched a peace offensive--only that time it was a direct administration peace effort and not a trial balloon released by the Senate Majority Leader.

As I said at the outset, I am an optimist by nature and I would like to believe that the current peace move will lead to good solid negotiations. But I doubt it.

I doubt it because, as I noted previously, the present political turmoil in Vietnam may in time mean that Ho Chih Minh will take over without his paying a high military price. Why should Ho be more inclined to respond to a peace feeler at this time than he was last December?

The only difference in the peace proposal itself, between now and late last year, is the suggestion the conference table be set up somewhere in

Asia--in Burma or Japan, for instance--instead of in Geneva.

This would indicate that the administration might well have advanced the peace proposal through U Thant of Burma, Secretary General of the United Nations, instead of through a high-ranking American politician.

The administration again appears to have ignored the good offices of U Thant, who has previously had occasion to feel spurned and ignored in the matter of Vietnam peace negotiations.

Let me turn now to Europe to call to your attention a matter which is being generally overlooked in the preoccupation of the American people with Vietnam.

Something which is little realized by the American people is that there has been a continuous shift of men and material from Europe to Vietnam over a period of more than 18 months. As a result of this, our readiness in Europe currently is at a lower level than at any time since before the Berlin crisis of 1961.

Clearly, the Johnson-Humphrey Administration was not ready in February, 1965, to make the tremendous step-up in war aid that we have since given South Vietnam.

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The consequence has been an imperilling of our position and that of our allies in Europe vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. We are now in a weakened position, accentuated by France's impending withdrawal from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Returning to the Vietnam situation, I would like to emphasize that the war there must be fought vigorously on two fronts--the military and the social. The military struggle cannot really be won unless the basic economic and social needs of the people are met.

The military and economic struggle in Vietnam is, of course, only a piece of the overall collision throughout the globe of the Free World and World Communism. That never-ending conflict is a ceaseless one only because the big Communist powers <u>will</u> it so.

How can the Free World win the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese peasants and of emerging peoples elsewhere in the world?

Our best hope is a program which is the target of constant criticism but which I have consistently supported--foreign aid. I have voted for cuts in the program from time to time but I have never voted to abandon it.

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I urge that the Johnson Administration take immediate steps to provide adequate medical treatment for Vietnamese civilians and meet other basic social and economic needs of the population.

I have deliberately talked first about a specific in the Foreign Aid Program--VIETNAM. Let us now look at the aid program in the aggregate.

Republicans support the basic objective of the Foreign Aid Program, of but we have long felt it is improperly administered.

The U. S. government now provides about 60 per cent of the total aid given to other nations by the governments of the Free World. Republicans believe other nations should carry more of the load.

One answer is to increase the number of multi-lateral aid agencies and to place more and more emphasis on loans rather than grants. The Asian Development Bank, recently launched, is the best example of this approach. It is a regional movement without heavy U. S. participation. Republicans in Congress look upon this kind of multi-country lending establishment as a healthy new trend in assisting underdeveloped nations.

There have been improvements in administration of our foreign aid program under AID Administrator David Bell, but these forward steps have been too tiny.

We Republicans want the entire Aid Program revamped so that it is focused on clearly defined and attainable objectives.

We Republicans also believe administration of the Aid Program can be considerably tightened, with all due respect to Mr. Bell. Instances of continuing waste in the program are spelled out clearly in reports

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from the Government Accounting Office, Congress's watchdog over Executive Branch spending.

The underlying thrust of the Foreign Aid Program must be, as a House Republican Task Force recently stated: "To guide the revolution of rising expectations in a peaceful course toward political stability and economic prosperity."

If we do not succeed in this endeavor, we will be drawn repeatedly into "wars of national liberation" in far quarters of the globe or become a Fortrees America in a world where the torch of freedom is constantly threatened with extinction.

To help other governments help satisfy the rising expectations of their people, we must:

<u>l</u>. Lay down criteria for recipients of U. S. aid, making sure they are interested in serving the needs of their people and in meeting those needs efficiently.

<u>2</u>. Give special attention to training persons in aid-receiving countries in government administration and political science.

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<u>3</u>. Give increased emphasis to agricultural development of those nations through a more positive food aid program and assistance in agricultural technology.

<u>4.</u> Promote greater use of private U. S. investment and multi-lateral aid institutions like the new Asian Development Bank to finance purely economic development projects.

5. Use greater selectivity in choosing aid recipients, with special emphasis on Asia and Latin America.

<u>6</u>. Arrange for American business firms with foreign branches to provide technical and management training for qualified persons in aidrecipient nations.

As the House GOP Task Force has said: "If there is an undeniable lesson from the history of Vietnam, it is that the same thing can happen in any country where Communist promises have appeal because rising expectations have been inadequately fulfilled. U. S. foreign aid must place new emphasis on building the capacity of governments to administer development. Unless we do so, most foreign aid funds will be wasted-----and worse, the revolution of rising expections, inflamed by Communist promises, will turn violent." (MORE)

We have talked about military and social problems in Vietnam and the U. S. foreign aid program. Let us turn now to that brooding communistic giant that keeps tossing belligerent imprecations at us and constantly engages in a hate-America campaign while feuding with the Soviet Union.

<u>Red China</u> in recent days has been under special scrutiny by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Some witnesses before that committee have advised trying to open up China to the world.

Vice President Humphrey has said that our policy toward Red China should be one of containment but not isolation.

Secretary of State Rusk has stated flatly that Red China's isolation is self-imposed. He has implied that there really is little or nothing to talk about in considering a possible U. S. policy change involving Red China because the Red Chinese insist on being shut off from the rest of the world.

Since that time our ambassador to the United Nations, Arthur Goldberg, has said the United States is willing to have Red China admitted to the UN if--among other things--Peking would withdraw its demand that Nationalist

(MORE)

China be expelled from the UN.

The other conditions are that Red China stop demanding that the UN brand the United States role in the Korean War as that of an aggressor, that Red China drop its demand that the UN be reorganized and certain unnamed "lackeys" of the U. S. be expelled, and--on a positive note--that Red China promise to live up to the UN Charter which was written theoretically as a group of bylaws to be followed by peace-loving nations. The administration also has urged an exchange of newsmen, scientists and scholars with China in an attempt to draw China into the world.

I agree heartily with the exchange program suggestion. But with regard to Red China's admission to the UN, I can only conclude that the Johnson-Humphrey Administration suddenly has become naive or is playing a little game. I am inclined to believe it is the latter.

I think the Administration is simply trying to place the burden of proof on Red China.

I'm convinced the administration is making this offer to Red China in the belief that Red China will never accept it.

Wouldn't it be an ironic twist if the Red Chinese rulers did agree

to drop all of their absurd conditions for entering the UN--joining the world of nations--and agreed to the points raised by Goldberg?

I assume admission of Red China to the UN would mean making her a member of the Security Council where she would enjoy a veto along with the Soviet Union. That would be a very interesting situation, indeed.

The Republican view of Red China is that we must continue to contain her and to frustrate by various means all her attempts to extend her sphere of influence in Asia. When I say "by various means," I am saying that open warfare is not necessarily the tool that must be employed. War is always the last resort of a peace-loving nation like ours.

Of course, it would be desirable for Red China to become an active member of the world community. But how does one make a law-abiding citizen out of an international renegade?

How does Red China react to gestures of conciliation? If past history is any guide, the Red Chinese will slap the hand that is offered them in friendship. Gen. George C. Marshall attempted conciliation in 1947 and

was rebuffed. He publicly admitted the failure of that policy. There is no more reason to believe it would work now than then.

Some people appear to believe that granting diplomatic recognition to Red China would in itself effect a kind of miracle in U.S.-Red Chinese relations. England recognized Red China in 1950. France gave Red China the official nod two years ago. There is no evidence that either England or France has benefited by this action.

It may seem to some that there is no basis for believing mainland China someday will be rid of Communist rule. History shows us that other despotic regimes have fallen although they looked unshakable.

To recognize Red China simply because she exists would be like giving a gangster a medal.

To admit her to the UN would be to strengthen the hand of the Soviet Union and all those forces engaged in the never-ending conflict between world communism and the Free World.

Let's take a look at theoretical peaceful co-existence with Red China, again relying on a lesson from history.

Prime Minister Nehru of India recognized Red China in 1950 and worked out "Five Principles of Co-existence" with Chou En-lai. Red China ultimately invaded India and proved that Nehru's policy of peaceful

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co-existence with her was a foolish dream.

\* \* \*

Let us turn now from Asia to Europe and what is happening to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

NATO has been thrown into crimis by French President Charles deGaulle's ultimatum that U. S. and allied bases must be removed from France by April 1, 1967, with France to withdraw from NATO by July 1. We are insisting on two years' time to remove our bases.

There can be a NATO without France, but France's withdrawal is a serious blow to the morale of other members of the alliance and to free nations everywhere.

French soil was the ideal location for NATO's bases. DeGaulle's insistence that we move them out places the Alliance in a less favorable military position from the standpoint of dispersal of our bases and their distance from the potential enemy.

Loss of France as a military partner also makes cooperation among the Atlantic Treaty nations more difficult in <u>non-military</u> fields because

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such an action based on apparent suspicion and hostility infects relations in all fields.

Whether deGaulle could have been influenced to act otherwise, it is impossible to say with certainty. But there's no question the Administration has not made the effort to conciliate him that it has made to lure North Vietnam to the conference table.

Prior to the current NATO crisis, Republicans repeatedly urged that President Johnson seek a face-to-face meeting with deGaulle in an attempt to keep France in NATO. His failure to do so is a clear indication of his refusal to meet NATO problems head on.

It is obvious that relations with our European allies have not had high priority in this administration. By contrast, NATO's problems received closest consideration in the Eisenhower Administration.

The Kennedy-Johnson Administration cannot be held blameless in the split with deGaulle. It and our other NATO allies failed, notably in 1962, to consult with deGaulle on decisions of great importance.

The Nassau Conference in December of 1962 between the late President Kennedy and former British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan was taken

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by deGaulle as a rebuff when he was neither informed nor consulted about a major change in military arrangements agreed upon there.

Again in 1962, the U. S. shifted its strategy without consulting deGaulle. This occurred when we adopted our policy of a "flexible response."

Sen. Jackson's Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations recently reported that "the shift (in strategy) was explained in terms which...caused doubt and confusion about what kind of counterblows the United States might be planning in the event of a Soviet attack on Europe. To some in Europe it looked as though the United States would rather switch than fight."

Our shift in strategy caused our allies to change <u>their</u> military doctrines as well and made it painfully clear to them how little influence they have on U. S. policies. Yet, as the Jackson Subcommittee pointed out, these U. S. policies are "of life and death importance to them."

The subcommittee added: "The difficulties thereby created have not yet been overcome, especially in relations with France, whose president, like most chiefs of state, does not accept short-shift easily."

It is natural for Americans simply to charge deGaulle with being a

fanatical nationalist, but the fact remains that the Kennedy-Johnson Administration has not dealt very adroitly with deGaulle and has also confused other members of NATO.

In future, any change in U. S. strategy or policy which affects NATO should be made only after full consultation with all of our NATO allies.

Within the working mechanism of NATO itself, there should be set up close communication between the key people in all of the governments involved.

In addition, allied military officers--and by that I mean top-ranking officers in the 13 NATO nations apart from France--should be involved with our own military people in devising plans for the common defense of Europe and the United States.

What I am saying is that NATO should truly be a partnership--not something drawn up on paper.

There should be no more palliatives like the multilateral nuclear force to give the outward appearance of nuclear sharing. This plan was unworkable from the beginning and never should have been proposed. It

was just a poultice hastily slapped on a sore that has been festering for years.

Our attitude toward NATO relates directly to our posture toward the Soviet Union.

We Republicans do not believe the U. S. should relax its vigilance concerning the Soviet Union and its aims for one moment.

Pictures of Soviet intermediate range missiles in Cuba should remain forever imprinted on the minds of the American people.

While relations between the United States and the Soviet Union are considerably less frigid than in the Stalin era, Russia's aims have not changed a whit. Her goals are basically those of Red China--a world in which all nations live under Communist rule.

We Republicans believe Communist nations with expansionist aims understand only firmness and will respect the United States only so long as she maintains a military establishment second to none.

This superior military machine is one of the cornerstones of U.S. foreign policy, along with our NATO and SEATO mutual assistance pacts

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and economic aid aimed at helping satisfy the rising expectations of impoverished peoples.

At the same time, we must seek to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. We must succeed in limiting membership in the nuclear club. It is only reasonable to assume that the more numerous the nations possessing nuclear weapons, the greater the risk of a nuclear holocaust.

Under current circumstances, it is futile to talk of general disarmament, and I will spend no time on that.

We turn finally to that force for peace which always drew strong support from President Eisenhower--the United Nations.

We Republicans believe the United Nations has been a great force for peace. We also believe it should be and could be strengthened.

The key problem is that of financing the UN. Failure of the Johnson Administration to achieve a definitive solution for this problem continues to threaten the very existence of the UN.

It is a crippling weakness indeed when a member of an international peace-keeping organization can--with impunity--withhold payment of its

assessments for a peace-keeping operation in some part of the world because it disagrees with action taken by the UN majority.

There must be a way of erasing this deficiency, this flaw in the functioning of the UN.

The UN also would be strengthened if its peace-keeping actions were coordinated closely with those taken on a regional basis by, for instance, the Organization of American States.

In the Dominican crisis in 1965 the Administration pursued an ambiguous policy by voting to have both OAS and UN missions go to Santo Domingo. There was no coordination. OAS actions were simply reported to the UN.

In any discussion of the UN, it again is appropriate to emphasize that Red China does not qualify for UN membership under that organization's charter because it is not a peace-loving nation.

It would seem inconsistent that Red China should be excluded from the UN while Soviet Russia is a member. The answer is that Russia was admitted to the UN at the time of its founding. This was a time when the

#### -23-

Soviet Union pretended to be peace-loving and fully willing to cooperate with other nations in the interest of world peace.

A political news analyst recently wrote that Secretary of State Dean Rusk is becoming more like the late John Foster Dulles every day.

That may be, but we Republicans firmly believe that we could run the foreign affairs of this nation more effectively than the present administration. If we didn't think so, we would have no right to count ourselves a major political party and to seek the right to become the policy makers of the nation.

\* \* \*

Wake Forest College Winston Salem, n.C. April 25, 1966 (Evening)

# FOREIGN POLICY SPEECH

FILE COPY

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from the Government Accounting Office, Congress's watchdog over Executive Branch spending.

The underlying thrust of the Foreign Aid Program must be, as a House Republican Task Force recently stated: "To guide the revolution of rising expectations insa peaceful course toward political stability and economic prosperity."

If we do not succeed in this endeavor, we will be drawn repeatedly into "wars of national liberation" in far quarters of the globe or become a Fortress America in a world where the torch of freedom is constantly threatened with extinction.

To help other govefrments help satisfy the rising expectations of their people, we must:

1. Ley down criteria for recipiends of U. S. aid, making sure they are interested in serving the needs of their people and in meeting those needs efficiently.

2. Give special attention to training persons in aid-receiving countries in government administration and political science.

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3. Give increased emphasis to agricultural development of those nations through a more positive food aid program and assistance in agricultural technology.

4. Promote greater use of private U. S. investment and multi-lateral aid institutions like the new Asian Development Bank to finance purely economic development projects.

5. Use greater selectivity in choosing aid recipients, with special emphasis on Asia and Latin America.

6. Arrange for American business firms with foreign branches to provide technical and management training for qualified persons in aidrecipient nations.

As the House GOF Task Force has said: "If there is an undemiable lesson from the history of Vietnam, it is that the same thing can happen in any country where Communist promises have appeal because rising expectations have been inadequately fulfilled. U. S. foreign aid must place new emphasis on building the capacity of governments to administer development. Unless we do so, most foreign aid funds will be wasted-----and worse, the revolution of rising expections, inflamed by Communist promises, will turn violent." (MORE)

We have talked about military and social problems in Vietnam and the U.S. foreign aid program. Let us turn now to that brooding communistic giant that keeps tossing belligerent impresations at us and constantly engages in a hate-America campaign while fouding with the Soviet Union.

Red China in recent days has been under special scrutiny by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Some witnesses before that committee have advised trying to open up China to the world.

Vice President Humphrym has said that our policy toward Red China should be one of containment but not isolation.

Secretary of Shte Rusk has stated flatly that Red China's isolation is self-imposed. He has implied that there really is little or nothing to talk about in considering a possible U. S. policy change involving Red China because the Red Chinese insist on being shut off from the rest of the world.

Since that time our ambassador to the United Nations, Arthur Goldberg, has said the United States is willing to have Red China admitted to the UN if--among other things--Peking would withdraw its demdnd that Nationalist

China be expelled from the UN.

The other conditions are that Red China stop demanding that the UN brand the United States role in the Korean War as that of an aggressor, that Red China drop its demand that the UN be reorganized and certain unnamed "lackeys" of the U. S. be expelled, and--on a positive note--that Red China promise to live up to the UN Charter which was writtume theoretically as a group of bylaws to be followed by peace-loving nations. The Administration also has urged an exchange of newsmen, scientists and scholars with China in an attempt to draw China into the world.

I agree heartily with the exchange program suggestion. But with regard to Red China's admission to the UN, I can only conclude that the

Johnson-Humphrey Administration suddenly has become naive or is playing

a little game. I am inclined to believe it is the latter.

I think the Administration is simply trying to place the burden of proof on Red China.

I'm convinced the administration is making this offer to Red China in the belief that Red China will never accept it.

Wouldn't it be an ironic twist if the Red Chinese rulers did agree

to drop all of their absurd conditions for entering the UN--joining the world of nations--and agreed to the points raised by Goldberg?

I assume admission of Red China to the UN would mean making her a member of the Security Council where she-would enjoy a veto along with the Soviet Union. That would be a very interesting situation, indeed.

The Republican view of Red China is that we must continue to contain her and to frustrate by various means all her attempts to extend her sphere of influence in Asia. When I say "by vatious means," I am saying that open warfare is not necessarily the tool that must be employed. War is always the last resort of a peace-loving nation like ours.

Of course, it would be desirable for Red China to become an active member of the world community. But how does one make a law-abiding citizen out of an international renegade?

How does Red China react to gestures of conciliation? If past history is any guide, the Red Chinese will slap the hand that is offered them in friendship. Gen. George C. Marshall attempted conciliation in 1947 and

was rebuffed. He publicly admitted the failure of that policy. There is no more reason to believe it would work now than then.

Some people appear to believe that granting diplomatic recognition to Red China would in itself effect a kind of miracle in U.S.-Red Chinese relations. Hagland recognized Red China in 1950. France gave Red China the official nod two years ago. There is no evidence that either Hagland or France has benefited by this action.

It may seem to some that there is no basis for believing mainland China semeday will be rid of Communist rule. Mistery shows us that other despotic regimes have fallen although they looked unshakable.

To recognize Red China simply because she exists would be like giving a gangster a medal.

To admit her to the UN would be to strengthen the hand of the Soviet Union and all those forces engaged in the never-ending conflict between world communism and the Free World.

Let's take a look at theoretical peaceful co-existence with Red China, again relying on a lesson from history.

Prime Minister Mehru of India recognized Red China in 1950 and worked out "Five Principles of Co-existence" with Chou Mn-lai. Red China ultimately invaded India and proved that Mehru's policy of peaceful

co-existence with her was a foolish dream.

Let us turn now from Asia to Europe and what is happening to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

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NATO has been thrown into critis by French President Charles deGaulle's ultimatum that U. S. and allied bases must be removed from France by April 1, 1967, with France to withdraw from NATO by July 1. We are insisting on two years' time to remove our bases.

There can be a NATO without France, but France's withdrawal is a serious blow to the morale of other members of the alliance and to free nations everywhere.

French soil was the ideal location for MATO's bases. DeGaulle's insistence that we move them out places the Alliance in a less favorable military position from the standpoint of dispersal of our bases and their distance from the potential enemy.

Loss of France as a military partner also makes cooperation among the Atlantic Treaty nations more difficult in <u>non-military</u> fields because

such an action based on apparent suspicion and hestility infects relations in all fields.

Whether deGaulle could have been influenced to act otherwise, it is impossible to say with certainty. But there's no question the Administration has not made the effort to conciliate him that it has made to lure North Vietnam to the conference table.

Prior to the current NATO crisis, Republicans repeatedly urged that President Johnson seek a face-to-face meeting with deGaulle in an attempt to keep France in NATO. His failure to do so is a clear indication of his refusal to meet NATO problems head on.

It is obvious that relations with our European allies have not had high priority in this administration. By contrast, NATO's problems received closest consideration in the Eisenhower Administration.

The Kennedy-Johnson Administration cannot be held blameless in the split with deGaulle. It and our other NATO allies failed, notably in 1962, to consult with deGaulle on decisions of great importance.

The Massau Conference in December of 1962 between the late President Kennedy and former British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan was taken

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by deGaulle as a rebuff when he was neither informed nor consulted about a major change in military arrangements agreed upon there.

Again in 1962, the U. S. shifted its strategy without consulting deGaulle. This occurred when we adopted our policy of a "flexible response."

Sen. Jackson's Subcommittee on Mational Security and International Operations recently reported that Ethe shift (in strategy) was explained in terms which...caused doubt and confusion about what kind of counterblows the United States might be planning in the event of a Soviet attack on Europe. To some in Europe it looked as though the United States would rather switch than fight."

Our shift in strategy caused our allies to change <u>their</u> military doctrines as well and made it painfully clear to them how little influence they have on U. S. policies. Yet, as the Jackson Subcommittee pointed out, these U. S. policies are "of life and death importance to them."

The subcommittee added: "The difficulties thereby created have not yet been overcome, especially in relations with France, whose president, like most chiefs of state, does not accept short-shift easily."

It is natural for Americans simply to charge deGaulle with being a

fanatical nationalist, but the fact remains that the Kannedy-Johnson Administration has not dealt very adroitly with deGaulle and has also confused other members of NATO.

In future, any change in U. S. strategy or policy which affects NATO should be made only after full consultation with all of our NATO allies.

Within the working mechanism of NATO itself, there should be set up close communication between the key people in all of the governments involved.

In addition, allied military officers--and by that I mean top-ranking officers in the 13 NATO nations apart from France--should be involved with our own military people in devising plans for the common defense of Burope and the United States.

What I am saying is that NATO should truly be a partnership--net something drawn up on paper.

There should be no more palliatives like the multilateral nuclear force to give the outward appearance of nuclear sharing. This plan was unworkable from the beginning and never should have been proposed. It

was just a poultice hastily slapped on a sore that has been festering for years.

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Our attitude toward NATO relates directly to our posture toward the Soviet Union.

We Republicans do not believe the U.S. should relax its vigilance concerning the Soviet Union and its aims for one moment.

Pictures of Somiet intermediate range missiles in Cuba should remain forever imprinted on the minds of the American people.

While relations between the United States and the Soviet Union are considerably less frigid than in the Stalin era, Russia's aims have not changed a whit. Her goals are basically those of Red China--a world in which all nations live under Communist rule.

We Republicans believe Communist nations with expansionist aims understand only firmness and will respect the United States only so long as she maintains a military establishment second to none.

This superior military machine is one of the cornerstones of U. S. foreign policy, along with our NATO and SEATO mutual assistance pacts

and economic aid aimed at helping satisfy the rising expectations of impoverished peoples.

At the same time, we must seek to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. We must succeed in limiting membership in the nuclear club. It is only reasonable to assume that the more numerous the nations possessing nuclear weapons, the greater the risk of a nuclear holocaust.

Under current circumstances, it is futile to talk of general disarmament, and I will spend no time on that.

We turn finally to that force for peace which always drew strong support from President Risenhower--the United Nations.

We Republicans believe the United Nations has been a great force for peace. We also believe it should be and could be strengthened.

The key problem is that of financing the UN. Failure of the Johnson Administration to achieve a definitive solution for this problem continues to threaten the very existence of the UN.

It is a crippling weakness indeed when a member of an international peace-keeping organization can--with impunity--withhold payment of its

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assessments for a peace-keeping operation in some part of the world because it disagrees with action taken by the UN majority.

There must be a way of erasing this deficiency, this flaw in the functioning of the UN.

The UN also would be strengthened if its peace-keeping actions were coordinated elesely with those taken on a regional basis by, for instance, the Organization of American States.

In the Dominican crisis in 1965 the Administration pursued an ambiguous policy by voting to have both QAS and UN missions go to Santo Domingo. There was no coordination. QAS actions were simply reported to the UN.

In any discussion of the UN, it again is appropriate to emphasize that Red China does not qualify for UN membership under that organization's charter because it is not a peace-loving nation.

It would seem inconsistent that Red China should be excluded from the UN while Soviet Russia is a member. The answer is that Russia was admitted to the UN at the time of its founding. This was a time when the

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Soviet Union pretended to be peace-loving and fully willing to cooperate with other nations in the interest of world peace.

A political news analyst recently wrote that Secretary of State Dean Rusk is becoming more like the late John Foster Dulles every day.

That may be, but we Republicans firmly believe that we could run the foreign affairs of this nation more effectively than the present administration. If we dimn't think so, we would have no right to count ourselves a major political party and to seek the right to become the policy makers of the nation.

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