The original documents are located in Box D15, folder "House Speech Preserving Peace, January 20, 1960" of the Ford Congressional Papers: Press Secretary and Speech File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

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Mr. Speaker, the Gentleman from ______, in the second speech of this series, outlined the Sino-Soviet peril to peace and freedom. Now I ask: In the decade of the 1960's, can we meet this dire peril? Can we preserve a peace based on justice? Can we move even one step beyond and enlarge freedom throughout the world?

We can. But, I firmly believe that we will, only if we remold seven dynamic spearheads of our free society, the very spearheads which the Republicans already have used to preserve peace since 1953. Because the peril has deepened, these spearheads must be continually sharpened.

1. The first of these spearheads is a consistent and firm American foreign policy designed to clarify our vital commitments in advance, in order that no opponent will be drawn into war through miscalculations.

Twice in this century the absence of such positive diplomacy has produced wars. In 1908, when conflict between Austro-Hungary and Serbia was imminent, Russia backed down on its obligations to come to the aid of Serbia. In 1914, when a similar crisis developed, Austro-Hungary expected Russia to back down again. But Russia did not. Thus, the way to World War I was paved by the Austro-Hungary miscalculation of Russia's position.

As the Gentleman from ______ noted in the previous speech, the American Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, in 1950 outlined the perimeter which America would defend in the Far East. Korea was excluded. Therefore, Soviet strategy quite correctly calculated that the United States would not intervene if they attacked South Korea as a result of their calculation.
Here, then, are examples of two prolonged wars, bred in an atmosphere of miscalculation. Had diplomats made clear, in advance, the positions of their countries, war could have been prevented. Apparently, Russians today recognize all-out war as nuclear suicide.

If so, the most likely possibility of nuclear war during the decade we have just entered would be through miscalculation, that could occur if Soviet leaders believed that they were confronted with a nuclear war. The Band of war, then, administration in Washington would retreat. On Afghanistan

Consequently, we must never introduce into our foreign policy adventurousness and ambivalence, that could ease the relationship with our calculations that could force a war. Today, Russia knows the United States cannot be blackmailed. But throughout the 1960's we must continue to have a President, Vice President, and Secretary of State, who understand the Soviet strategy and who will not unilaterally commit defensive and ambiguous policies, which produced the Korean war.

Is there a difference between the emphasis on policy for a President and then for a Vice President?

Unfortunately, I must conclude that the same differences the Gentleman from California noted in his speech exist today. The Democratic Advisory Council and its spokesmen, Adlai Stevenson and Dean Acheson, make often statements which give Red Russia and Red China the picture of a divided America with ambiguous will and zigzagging diplomacy.

It almost seems that they advocate a return to the zig-zags which brought on the Korean war and guaranteed its indecisive outcome.
2. The second dynamic spearhead is an effective, flexible, military deterrent system which employs a secure retaliatory capacity to respond vigorously at places and with means of our own choosing.

There has developed an increasing tendency among critics of the Administration to judge our deterrent capacity merely in arithmetical terms. This defensive attitude of trying to match and copy everything Russia does would leave the initiative with Russia. It would isolate particular aspects of our deterrent system from the whole.

In order to reverse the pronounced Communist successes throughout the world, the Eisenhower Administration inaugurated a new foreign policy which was the antithesis of the containment strategy of the previous administration.

As was noted in the previous speech, containment had resulted in the United States trying to spread its ground strength around the world so thinly that it became ineffective. During this same period, we had a virtual atomic monopoly. Yet, so poorly was this source of potential strength integrated into our foreign policy that Communist aggression abounded.

Vice President Nixon explained the plight of the new administration when it took office in 1953:

"We found that economically their (the Russians) plan, apparently, was to force the United States to stay armed to the teeth, to be prepared to fight anywhere - anywhere in the world - that they, the men of the Kremlin chose."

The solution of the new administration was expressed by Mr. Dulles:
'The way to deter aggression is for the free community to be willing and able to respond vigorously at places and with means of its own choosing.'

This policy demanded a reshaping of our military forces in order to obtain a mobile retaliatory capacity. Many administration critics were slow, however, to grasp the true implications of this new strategy. They still do not understand it. They insist on saying that the term "massive mobile retaliatory capacity" means only atomic retaliation aimed at cities like Moscow or Peiping.

They maintain that Mr. Dulles inaugurated a one-weapon strategy, an all or nothing at all approach. Ironically, his critics attack, for political reasons, a policy which they fabricated for attack, a straw man which exists only in their own thinking, a ghost of their imaginations which never existed in the thinking of the State Department and the White House.

Mr. Dulles often explained the fallacy of such an interpretation. For example, in a 1954 article published in *Foreign Affairs*, the late Secretary of State noted that the new policy, in relation to Korea, did not mean renewed Communist aggression would result in the United Nations dropping atomic bombs on Peiping or Moscow. It did mean that we will respond, not defensively, but with initiative, at times and places of our own choosing. Of course, we will never alert an opponent in advance to the particular weapon or the particular place we will respond. Keeping him guessing as to the means -- whether we would use naval forces, conventional land forces, tactical atomic weapons, or what -- is part of the psychology of our deterrence. But we will make crystal-clear our aim to defend an area through an initiative which allowed no privileged sanctuaries like Manchuria in the Korean War.

It is indeed unfortunate if the constant literature produced about so-called massive retaliation beclouds the true strategy of the present administration. That strategy ended the Korean War. It deterred war in the Formosa area.
It foiled Communist designs on West Berlin. Throughout the decade ahead, this strategy can preserve the peace, not through appeasement, but through taking the initiative. It involves a system of deterrence where our entire arsenal - from conventional to the most unconventional weapons - is combined with just the right selectivity to apply force exactly calculated to check the specific case of aggression.

Throughout the 1960's, our responses must be affirmative - not just negative and defensive. Our vision must be forward-looking and sensitive to the constantly changing weapons of our military system. Our perspective must consider the intra-relationship of our deterrent system. The energy for our national security must not be wasted on duplication and over-concentration of what is no longer essential.

When it becomes necessary to increase the proportionate share of budget spending to maintain this type of security, the American people, through curtailment of subsidy and non-defense spending programs, must make personal sacrifices. We can afford the defense we need. But we Republicans believe that we must afford it through sacrifice, and not through deficit spending. Democrats like those in their Advisory Council want to afford that defense through charging it to the next generation and bankrupting their freedom. With splintered vision, they want to build up our missile defenses by lowering our economic defenses.

3. And this leads us to consider our next spearhead of maintaining peace with justice in the coming decade: a strong, free, and rapidly growing American economy.

On May 24, 1957, Khrushchev pronounced:

"We do not intend to blow up the capitalist world with bombs. If we catch up with the United States in per capita production of
meat, butter and milk we will hit the pillar of capitalism with the most powerful torpedo yet."

The Gentleman from California (Speech No. 2) described how the Eisenhower policy of using with initiative the total potentialities of our strength ended the Korean War and blocked major aggression by Communists since. As a result, the Communists have shifted their major hopes to an economic offensive.

Their success will depend to a large degree upon the fiscal policies and productive forces within America. For at the base of this Soviet-American economic conflict is the ruble versus the dollar. The fundamentals of the conflict are not new to the Communists. Lenin said:

"The best way to destroy the capitalist system is to debauch the currency."

Plainly, Communist theorists believe that eventually democratic nations will debauch their own currency. There seems to be a mounting danger of this Communist expectation turning into a reality within America.

Our impoverished overseas neighbors, however, have learned through bitter experience an economic lesson in survival. They have adopted balanced budgets and sound economic policies which have produced unprecedented prosperity. The austerity program in England has yielded budget surpluses and a six per cent tax cut. Because of hard money policies in France, her economic stability has greatly increased. The common market has accelerated Europe's over-all economic rise. Japan is enjoying swift recovery and booming industries. And the economic growth of West Germany equals that of Red Russia.

And how do these countries view the United States? I quote from some remarks of William McChesney Martin, Jr.
"To the foreigner, much more than to Americans, the dollar is a symbol of this country's strength. A decline in the value of the dollar would suggest to him a decline in the faith and credit of the United States, signaling in his mind a decline not only in American economic strength but also in moral force."

As we enter the 1960's, the Democratic Advisory Council and liberal Democrats in Congress still scoff at the economic laws which are producing fiscal health overseas. They vigorously oppose efforts to balance the budget.

What makes their complacency over fiscal policies so perilous?

The industrial revolution, which reached its peak years ago in the United States, is just going into full swing in many areas abroad. Especially is this true in the iron curtain countries where the labor force has been reduced to slavery.

This cheap labor market becomes an acute factor in East-West trade competition, since in the United States wages often climb more rapidly than profits. Thus, the final cost of our products has priced us out of many foreign markets. This places us at a disadvantage in a trade war with Russia. Must we add to this the handicap of a decadent dollar?

Because of the importance of the dollar in our foreign policy, fiscal soundness at home has become essential in meeting the Communist peril abroad. This and the other economic essentials will be treated in more detail in a subsequent speech of this series.

4. The fourth dynamic is collective security and solidarity throughout the free world. Mr. Herter said recently:

"Our greatest advantage in the world struggle is that we are not alone. Many countries are with us wholeheartedly and confidently. Many others are with us in spirit, even though they cannot say so."
To maintain this advantage, we must continue to foster our collective security system. In certain respects, this system is an economy measure, for it enables our allies to supplement our own military forces.

The numerous bases in those friendly countries not only provide needed facilities for our air and naval forces, but also afford us missile sites. This dispersion of bases throughout the world makes it impossible for Soviet aircraft and missiles to destroy our retaliatory capacity.

The other vital military contribution of our allies is in terms of manpower. The United States is able to devote primary emphasis to strategic striking forces, to missiles, and to space developments because of this supplementary manpower. So, our conventional war strength can be only partly appraised in terms of U.S. Army combat divisions. It can be fully evaluated in terms of the allied divisions our forces support and train. The technical, logistical and missile capabilities perform a vital function for numerous military assistance groups and provide tactical support to many allies.

Paradoxically, many representatives of the opposition have shouted that our army divisional strength is too small, and then have voted to cut mutual security funds and hence the strength of our allies, which comes at less cost.

At the same time, our entire foreign aid program must be subject to periodic reappraisal. A decade ago the economy of many of our major allies was in a depressed state, and this required us to bear the major burden of both military and general economic aid to the free world. We rejoice in the startling recovery that many of those allies have made, and we call upon
them to accept their full share of responsibility in fostering both the defense and economic health of the free world.

As a result of economic transactions with other countries last year, the United States had a deficit in balance payments of about $3,400,000,000. Why has this deficit resulted? We currently have a surplus of $3,500,000,000 in exports of goods and services. But we have an annual expenditure of about $3,000,000,000 to maintain our military forces overseas. Our loans, grants, and capital outflow that increase our exports amount to about $2,500,000,000 annually, and we have a private capital investment outflow of about $2,000,000,000 a year. Obviously, it is necessary to our economic health that the prosperous free nations bear more of the burden in maintaining efficient defenses, of encouraging private investment and in assisting the less developed areas.

Solidarity of the free world involves more than just the economic aspect. It has a psychological and diplomatic side, too.

It is indeed tragic that the leading foreign policy spokesman of the democratic advisory council, Mr. Dean Acheson, seems to oppose our efforts to promote moral solidarity throughout the world. On the eve of the President's departure for an unprecedentedly long and strenuous trip among our many allies and friends, Mr. Acheson publicly said that little good would come from the trip. While the President tries to promote unity, Acheson to promote disunity. Has he no awareness of the importance attached to statements of a former Secretary of State?

Will he never learn a lesson? About a year ago he was the principal author of an advisory council pamphlet which painted a picture of disunity within the free world and claimed that our position in the world and our alliances were dissolving - "as just a hundred years ago men watched the Union
dissolve under the weak and palsied hand of Buchanan." The release of this vindictive pamphlet was timed to coincide with the week that the NATO ministers were meeting in Washington to reaffirm unity and solidarity. The Berlin crisis had begun, and it was necessary to our diplomacy to present Khrushchev with the picture of a united NATO. And yet, the Democratic Advisory Council used its efforts to propagandize the line of disunity.

When supporting and promoting collective security and solidarity among our allies, the parties should make a constructive contribution. During the 1960's, we call upon responsible Democrats to do something, somehow, to control these non-constructive spokesmen of their Advisory Council. Indeed, we sympathize with those Members on the other side of the aisle who deplore this irresponsibility. The dilemmas of their party disunity, however, in no way relieve them from the duty to curtail this council when its members jeopardize unity in our defenses against the Sino-Soviet peril. For, in the decade ahead, cooperation among our political parties to promote allied unity will be as important as cooperation among the allies themselves.

5. **Science and technology** is the fifth spearhead of a free society which we must vastly sharpen.

The deepest peril we face is that the Russians will concentrate on a few given, but quite decisive areas and develop superior technological skills. In the area of rocket technology, we have seen what they have accomplished in outer space. This did not happen by luck. They had enormous vision and great drive. By 1947, the rocket theories of the German scientist, Sanger, had created a tidal wave of excitement in the Kremlin.

So that a top priority could be set up for the rocket program, Stalin ordered an aerodynamics expert, Colonel Gugori Tokaev, to his office. Tokaev,
who later defected, said that the Kremlin leaders were in almost "an hysterical clamor" for greater details about a super rocket. Neither were the diplomatic implications of this technological adventure lost on Stalin. He told Tokaev that the rocket "would make it easier to talk to the gentleman shopkeeper, Truman."

As Dr. von Braun pointed out at the time Russia shot up her first sputnik, "the United States had no ballistic missile program worth mentioning between 1945 and 1951 ...These six years, during which the Russians obviously laid the groundwork for their large rocket program, are irretrievably lost."

At the outset of the 1960's, we must launch into this field of technology with renewed determination to make up for the lost years. We must surpass Russia. Erratic programming and crash measures are not the answer. Clear lines of leadership, however, are essential. And I hail it as a great step forward that all space projects, including the brilliant team of Dr. von Braun, have now been placed under the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. The news that the Saturn Project may cut two years from Russia's lead time is most heartening.

In the decade ahead, however, we must meet a much broader challenge yet in the fields of science and technology. Many spokesmen of the Democratic Advisory Council appear to advocate responses which exclusively involve greater appropriations of money and greater bureaucratic controls. Paradoxically, Russia has made profound progress in science and technology because in this area she abandoned Marxian centralism and control and inaugurated freedom and incentive. Did not Khrushchev, during his visit to America, boast to the President that Russia used incentives more extensively than did the United States?

In contrast to the approach of the Democratic Advisory Council, the Percy Committee Report emphasized that there are three essentials to the
creation of a strong science and technology:

"The maintenance of an environment of freedom and public understanding in which creativity can flourish.

"The maintenance of a superior educational system which stresses the value of excellence for its own sake and which makes a special effort to search out the most gifted minds, wherever found, and to make available to them the most advanced training which they are capable of absorbing.

"The provision of scientists and engineers with the economic resources with which to pursue their search with the utmost aggressiveness."

This approach will indeed grant our nation a new lease on its heritage, and a renewed faith in its capacity.

And this leads to a consideration of the next dynamic force.

6. The sixth dynamic spearhead is the increased use of the psychological, moral and spiritual resources of a free society.

The Communists have made a god of Karl Marx and a religion of scientific materialism. Undoubtedly, the Marxian gospel exploits the weaknesses of human nature. Its breeding ground is in discontent and in frustrated hopes.

So, we are dealing with a dangerous peril, one involving far more deadly consequences that just missiles, military strategy and geographical battlefields. The peril is not solely from without. It threatens from within as well. It will prey on our every lack of faith in ourselves.

During this age of conflict, the decisive battleground will be in the minds of men.

by

The static lie of Russian Communism can be met only the dynamic
truth of American freedom. Unfortunately, many Americans have not awakened to the basis of the big lie even within their own country. The big lie is found in the materialistic interpretation of man and man’s destiny. Of this, Communism is merely a ruthless manifestation. This materialism is often called, simply, socialism. Our ideas and faith can never be victorious over Communistic ideas through a greater application of materialism, statism, and socialism.

I fear that the Democratic Advisory Council exerts an influence to convert our foreign policy into a materialistic program, to purge it of all principle. Is this not a repetition of the pattern of allowing the Soviet to control the initiative and to choose the framework for conflict?

A strong faith and ideology within America is essential. It is just as essential to carry it to the Russian people themselves. This leads to the next force.

7. The seventh dynamic spearhead is a people-to-people approach. The Vice President’s visit to Soviet Russia last summer was a creative, dynamic and timely breakthrough of the Soviet iron curtain. I say it was creative because it challenged the Communists as never before into a contest of ideas. I say it was dynamic for it was a giant step forward toward a long standing aim of the Eisenhower foreign policy of liberating minds and restoring freedom within the Sino-Soviet bloc.

The Percy Report has splendidly summed up our policy of liberation:

"Our policy of non-violent emancipation, with its long-run perspectives, would spell out the policy of peaceful liberation which some have either not understood or deliberately distorted out of all proportions. The emancipation policy promises to establish much-needed facilities for the peaceable creation of pressures for gradual expansion of freedom within the Communist empire."
During his visit to Russia, Vice President Nixon superbly dramatized American superiority in the production of consumer goods. Granted, much of what he said never got to the Russian masses. But some of what he said had a marked effect. A continued program of this nature, with increased cultural and scientific exchanges will bring to the Russian people and to the satellites the American story of the benefits from a free economy. In turn, this story will create upward pressures on the Soviet rulers. This could deter Soviet aggression and expand Russian and satellite freedoms.

The follow-up to the initial people to people approach has been the personal diplomacy of President Eisenhower. For some time before his death, Secretary of State Dulles had pointed out to the President his tremendous prestige throughout the world. The time might come, insisted Dulles, for the President to use fully this prestige and influence through a series of tours. Obviously, it would have been a cardinal blunder to embark in this personal diplomacy at the wrong time. But, was the time not ideal, before a summit meeting, towards the end of the President's term in office? This would further steal the initiative from Mr. Khrushchev. It would cast the setting for the conflict where we want it -- in the arena of world opinion -- that would make it a battle of ideas and not of missiles.

The casual observer will ask: Have not some of the members of the Democratic Advisory Council been calling for a summit meeting year after year? And is the Republican leadership not now taking us to a summit? So, is there any difference in attitudes in this particular regard?

Most certainly, yes. The difference is in timing and in preparation. Yalta and Potsdam were failures. We tried a summit in 1955 and it became clearly evident that Khrushchev was not yet thoroughly convinced that the
Eisenhower Administration had irrevocably inaugurated a new foreign policy which would not bow to blackmail and to duplicity. It took four more years to educate the Soviet leaders, during crisis after crisis, that America would not compromise vital issues. And the final part of Khrushchev's education was during the Berlin crisis of 1959. He gave America a deadline. He was determined to humiliate us into a summit, when the entire world knew it was blackmail. America stood her ground, despite the fact that a former Truman advisor, George Kennan, declared we should withdraw from Europe altogether.

Khrushchev's education was complete. He was confronted with a new foreign policy, far different from that of the Truman Administration. He had the alternative of plunging his country into an all-out war, or seeking a peaceful means of competition. At this decisive moment, the President took the initiative. He sought to avoid a condition mentioned in the speech of the gentleman from __________________________(Speech No. 2), where a Soviet leader might see no way out and irrationally tumble towards war. Without retreating from the Berlin issue, Mr. Eisenhower invited Mr. Khrushchev to the United States. The Soviet Chairman was further diverted towards peaceful means of competition.

Now we do hold the initiative.

The greatest single challenge of the 1960's is to bring the people to people approach closer and closer to every member of the Communist empire. This policy, however, can backfire if executed by unskilled men with limited ability and limited vision. We must continue to have as President, Vice President and Secretary of State, leaders with judgment and knowledge of world affairs. The future of this country, indeed, the future of freedom throughout the world, cannot be risked, either to rank amateurs in international relations, or to those who produced the ambiguous and faltering diplomacy of the late 1940's.
As we enter the decade of the 1960's, a profound difference emerges between the foreign policy approaches of the Republicans and of the Democratic Advisory Council. Basically, it is this. While the Republicans are looking forward, members of the Democratic Advisory Council, the Stevensons and the Achesons, are looking backward. Against the Russian peril, they still do not understand the need for a consistent, clear policy of firmness. They have splintered vision, and see the Soviet peril only in parts. Their reactions are defensive.

The Republicans undertook the campaign of 1952 with two important foreign policy aims: to end the war in Korea, and to initiate a policy of liberation. Peace in Korea, the Republicans knew, could only come from reshaping a policy of the initiative, which outlawed the privileged sanctuary. Liberation of those in Soviet slavedom could only come by maneuvering the Russian leaders into a climate of exchange of ideas, culture, and competition in consumer production.

This year the Republicans undertake another campaign. More than just political, it is a campaign to promulgate a philosophy for maintaining peace with justice and extending freedom here and throughout the world.

We have summed up this policy for the 1960's in terms of seven spearheads of a free society.

Why is the Republican Party capable of promoting this dynamic policy? Because as a party it possesses the four qualities which the Chairman of the Republican Policy Committee mentioned in the initial speech: unity; philosophy based on principle; representation within party organizations; and vision towards future generations.

With these qualities, the Republicans uniquely are equipped to furnish foreign policy leadership to turn the age ahead from peril to promise.
From the office of Representative Gerald Ford (R-Mich)

Rep. Gerald Ford (R-Mich) told the House today that Republicans "uniquely are equipped to furnish foreign policy leadership to turn the age ahead from peril to promise."

Delivering the third in a series of House speeches on Republican policy, Rep. Ford declared that the Republican Administration since 1953 had implemented "seven dynamic spearheads of peace power."

"Because the peril has deepened," he said, "these spearheads must continually be sharpened."

He said that Democratic foreign policy had resulted in "an atmosphere of miscalculation" which Republican foreign policy has avoided. And he cited the unity of the Republican Party which has enabled it to devise and put into effect "a consistent and firm foreign policy."

Charging Democratic spokesmen, particularly the Democratic Advisory Council, with making "statements which often give Red Russia and Red China the picture of a divided America with ambiguous will," Rep. Ford listed these seven Republican spearheads of peace power:

1. "A consistent and firm American policy," as opposed to the Democratic performance of "stand up to the Communists on one issue, but not on the next."

2. "An effective, flexible military deterrent system," which enables America to select the places and means of retaliation. The Democratic alternative, he said, is "a defensive attitude of trying to match and copy everything Russia does."

3. "A strong, free and rapidly growing American economy." Rep. Ford said that foreign nations had learned "through bitter experience an economic lesson in survival" but he added that, at home, Democrats "still scoff at the economic laws which are producing fiscal health overseas. Most of them vigorously oppose efforts to balance the budget."

4. "Collective security and solidarity throughout the free world." In contrast to Republican efforts, Rep. Ford said, "while the President tries
to promote unity, Acheson seems to promote disunity." Rep. Ford cited Mr. Acheson's advance criticism and doubt of the President's smash-hit visit to 11 nations.

5. "Science and technology," which the United States "must vastly sharpen." Rep. Ford said that the United States "must make up for the lost years" of 1945-51 but he added that "erratic programming and crash measures are not the answer."

6. "Increased use of the psychological, moral and spiritual resources of a free society." Rep. Ford accused the Democratic Advisory Council of exerting "an influence to convert our foreign policy into a materialistic program."

7. "A people to people approach." Rep. Ford cited the Russian journey of Vice President Nixon and the "personal diplomacy of President Eisenhower as dramatic means which "challenged the Communists as never before into a contest of ideas." As a result of these activities plus our firm stand on Berlin, Rep. Ford said, "now we do hold the initiative."

(The text of Rep. Ford's speech is attached.)
From the office of Charles A. Halleck (R-Ind.), House Minority Leader

Republican House Leader Charles A. Halleck today announced that an aggressive group of Republicans will initiate on the House Floor next week a series of speeches about the ways the two major political parties "face the perils and promises of the Sixties."

Halleck said the speeches represent the results of discussions and research conducted by the Congressmen over the past several months.

"These colleagues of mine feel strongly that the Republican Party is the party best equipped and qualified to face the key challenges of the decade we have just entered," Halleck said.

The Minority Leader said the speeches were designed to spell out why four qualities are essential to any political organization "which seeks to serve the country by meeting the issues critical to the survival of freedom."

He said these qualities were party unity, party philosophy based on principles, party democracy and party concern for future generations of Americans.

Rep. Halleck said the group was convinced that the two-party system in America was not working as it should because the Democrat party lacked each of these qualities.

He said the speeches would support charges that "Democrat squabbling forces that party to compromise and blur the issues. They shrink before challenges which could cause their political house to split apart.

"A party that does not have some sort of unity and togetherness just can't face successfully the issues of the Sixties," Halleck said.

"On the other hand," he added, "Republicans are moving into this new age..."
with greater unity than ever before in party history. And united, we have demonstrated our ability to preserve the peace and promote abundance."

First speech in the series, dealing with how democracy works—or doesn't work—in the two parties, will be delivered by Rep. John Byrnes, Chairman of the Republican Policy Committee.

Reps. John Rhodes and Tom Curtis will speak on what Mr. Halleck described as, "the Republican battle for more prosperity for every breadwinner, housewife and child. This is the fight for America's families."

The party's campaign for "preserving peace with justice and avoiding future Koreas" will be told by Reps. Bob Wilson and Jerry Ford, Halleck said.

Republican efforts to promote the economy and maintain good labor-management relations will be the subject of a speech by Rep. Bob Griffin.

Rep. Halleck commended the efforts of his colleagues in sparking this vigorous effort to get across to the public the role and philosophy of the Republicans in the House of Representatives.

"I have felt for a long time that we just haven't done a selling job on the accomplishments for the country's good that have come about under a Republican Administration," Halleck commented.

He said that he had been asked to make the final speech in the series and would do so.

"Out of such efforts," Halleck said, "I hope the public will become better informed, our two-party system restored and our government improved."
The Challenge of Preserving Peace: The Seven Dynamic Spearheads of Peace Power

Mr. Speaker, the Gentleman from California, in the second speech of this series, outlined the Sino-Soviet peril to peace and freedom. Now I ask:

In the decade of the 1960's, can we meet this dire peril?

Can we preserve a peace based on justice?

Can we move even one step beyond and enlarge freedom throughout the world?

We can. But, I firmly believe that we will, only if we remold seven dynamic spearheads of peace power, the very spearheads which the Republicans already have used to preserve peace since 1953. Because the peril has deepened, these spearheads must be continually sharpened.

1. The first of these spearheads is a consistent and firm American foreign policy designed to clarify our vital commitments in advance, in order that no opponent will be drawn into war through miscalculations.

Twice in this century the absence of such positive diplomacy has produced wars. In 1908, when conflict between Austro-Hungary and Serbia was imminent, Russia backed down on its obligations to come to the aid of Serbia. In 1914, when a similar crisis developed, Austro-Hungary expected Russia to back down again. But Russia did not. Thus, the way to World War I was paved by the Austro-Hungary miscalculation of Russia's position.

As the Gentleman from California (Mr. Wilson) noted in the previous speech, the American Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, in 1950 outlined the perimeter which America would defend in the Far East. Korea was excluded. Therefore, the Communists calculated that the United States would not intervene if they attacked South Korea.

Here, then, are examples of two prolonged wars, bred in an atmosphere of miscalculation. Had diplomats made clear, in advance, the positions of their countries, war could have been prevented.

Apparently, Russians today recognize all-out war as nuclear suicide. If so, the most likely possibility of nuclear war during the decade we have just entered would be through Russia miscalculating. That could occur if Soviet leaders
believed that, when confronted with the brink of war, an Administration in Wash-
ington would retreat.

Consequently, we must never introduce into our foreign policy ambigu-
ities and appearances of softness and domestic divisions which might spark the
Communists into a miscalculation that could fuse a war.

Today, Russia knows the United States cannot be bluffed or blackmailed.
Throughout the decade ahead we must continue to have a President, Vice Presi-
dent, and Secretary of State, who understand the Soviet strategy and who will
not employ defensive and ambiguous policies.

Is there a difference between the approaches of the Democratic Advisory
Council and the Republicans to this area of foreign policy?

Unfortunately the same differences the Gentleman from California
(Mr. Wilson) noted in his speech exist today. The Democratic Advisory Council
and its spokesmen, Adlai Stevenson and Dean Acheson, make statements which
often give Red Russia and Red China the picture of a divided America with
ambiguous will and zig zagging diplomacy. Apparently they want to stand up
to the Communists on one issue, but not on the next.

We Republicans shall always abhor this attitude. For we believe it
breeds miscalculations.

2. The second dynamic spearhead of peace power is an effective, flexi-
ble, military deterrent system. It must employ a secure retaliatory capacity
to respond vigorously at places and with means of our own choosing.

There has developed an increasing tendency among critics of the Admin-
istration to judge our deterrent capacity purely in arithmetical terms using only
a part rather than the whole of our deterrent or retaliatory capability for com-
parative purposes. This defensive attitude of trying to match and copy every-
thing Russia does would leave the initiative with Russia. In contrast, we must
look to the total deterrent force in being and planned to determine our real
military posture.

In order to reverse the pronounced Communist successes throughout the
world, the Eisenhower Administration inaugurated a new foreign policy which
was the antithesis of the containment strategy of the previous administration.

As was noted in the previous speech, containment had resulted in the
United States trying to spread its ground strength around the world so thinly that it became ineffective. During this same period, we had a virtual atomic monopoly. Yet, so poorly was this source of potential strength integrated into our foreign policy that Communist aggression abounded.

Vice President Nixon explained the plight of the new administration when it took office in 1953:

"We found that economically their (the Russians) plan, apparently, was to force the United States to stay armed to the teeth, to be prepared to fight anywhere - anywhere in the world - that they, the men of the Kremlin chose."

The solution of the new administration was expressed by Mr. Dulles:

"The way to deter aggression is for the free community to be willing and able to respond vigorously at places and with means of its own choosing."

This policy demanded a reshaping of our military forces in order to obtain a mobile retaliatory capacity. Many administration critics were slow, however, to grasp the true implications of this new strategy. They still do not understand it. They insist on saying that the term "massive mobile retaliatory capacity" envisions exclusively atomic retaliation aimed at cities like Moscow or Peiping.

They maintain that Mr. Dulles inaugurated a one-weapon strategy, an all or nothing at all approach. Ironically, his critics attack, for political reasons, a policy which they fabricated for attack, a straw man which exists only in their own thinking, a ghost of their imaginations which never existed in the thinking of the State Department and the White House.

Mr. Dulles often explained the fallacy of such an interpretation. For example, in a 1954 article published in Foreign Affairs, the late Secretary of State noted that the new policy, in relation to Korea, did not mean that renewed Communist aggression would result in the United Nations dropping atomic bombs on Peiping or Moscow. It did mean that we will respond, not defensively, but with initiative, at times and places of our own choosing.

Of course, we will never alert an opponent in advance to the particular weapon or the particular place we will respond. Keeping him guessing as to the means -- whether we would use naval forces, conventional land forces, tactical atomic weapons, or what -- is part of the psychology of our deterrence. But we
will make crystal-clear our aim to defend an area through an initiative which allowed no privileged sanctuaries. Manchuria in the Korean War was a privileged sanctuary.

It is unfortunate indeed if the constant literature produced about so-called massive retaliation beclouds the true strategy of the present administration. That strategy of the present Administration ended the Korean War. It deterred war in the Formosa area. It foiled Communist designs on West Berlin. Throughout the decade ahead, this same strategy of initiative can preserve the peace.

It involves a system of deterrence where our entire arsenal - from conventional to the most unconventional weapons - is combined with just the right selectivity to apply force exactly calculated to check the specific case of aggression.

Throughout the 1960's, our responses must be affirmative - not just negative and defensive. Our vision must be forward-looking and sensitive to the constantly changing weapons of our military system. Our perspective must consider the intra-relationship of our deterrent system. The energy for our national security must not be wasted on duplication and over-concentration of what is no longer essential.

When it becomes necessary to increase the proportionate share of budget spending to maintain this type of security, the American people, through curtailment of subsidy and non-defense spending programs, must make personal sacrifices. We can afford the defense we need. But we Republicans believe that we must afford it through sacrifice, and not through deficit spending.

Democrats like those in their Advisory Council want to afford that defense through charging it to the next generation and bankrupting their freedom. With splintered vision, they want to build up our missile defenses by lowering our economic defenses.

3. And this leads us to consider our next spearhead of peace power: a strong, free, and rapidly growing American economy.

On May 24, 1957, Khrushchev pronounced:

"We do not intend to blow up the capitalist world with bombs. If we catch up with the United States in per capita production of meat, butter and milk we will have hit the pillar of capitalism with the most powerful torpedo yet."
The Gentleman from California (Speech No. 2) described how the Eisenhower policy of using with initiative the total potentialities of our strength ended the Korean War and blocked major aggression by Communists since. As a result, the Communists have shifted their major hopes to an economic offensive.

Their success will depend to a large degree upon the fiscal policies and productive forces within America. For at the base of this Soviet-American economic conflict is the ruble versus the dollar. The fundamentals of the conflict are not new to the Communists. Lenin said:

"The best way to destroy the capitalist system is to debauch the currency."

Plainly, Communist theorists believe that eventually democratic nations will debauch their own currency. There seems to be a mounting danger of this Communist expectation turning into a reality within America.

Our impoverished overseas neighbors, however, have learned through bitter experience an economic lesson in survival. They have adopted balanced budgets and sound economic policies which have produced unprecedented prosperity. The austerity program in England has yielded budget surpluses and a six per cent tax cut. Because of hard money policies in France, her economic stability has greatly increased. The common market has accelerated Europe's over-all economic rise. Japan is enjoying swift recovery and booming industries. And the economic growth of West Germany equals that of Red Russia.

And how do these countries view the United States? I quote from some remarks of William McChesney Martin, Jr.

"To the foreigner, much more than to Americans, the dollar is a symbol of this country's strength. A decline in the value of the dollar would suggest to him a decline in the faith and credit of the United States, signaling in his mind a decline not only in American economic strength but also in moral force."

As we enter the 1960's, the Democratic Advisory Council and liberal Democrats in Congress still scoff at the economic laws which are producing fiscal health overseas. They vigorously oppose efforts to balance the budget. What makes their complacency over fiscal policies so perilous?

The industrial revolution, which reached its peak years ago in the United States, is just going into full swing in many areas abroad. Especially is this true in the iron curtain countries where the labor force has been
reduced to slavery.

This cheap labor market becomes an acute factor in East-West trade competition, since in the United States wages often climb more rapidly than profits. Thus, the final cost of our products has priced us out of many foreign markets. This places us at a disadvantage in a trade war with Russia. Must we add to this the handicap of a decadent dollar?

Because of the importance of the dollar in our foreign policy, fiscal soundness at home has become essential in meeting the Communist peril abroad. This and the other economic essentials will be treated in more detail in a subsequent speech of this series.

4. The fourth dynamic spearhead of peace power is collective security and solidarity throughout the free world. Mr. Herter said recently:

"Our greatest advantage in the world struggle is that we are not alone. Many countries are with us wholeheartedly and confidently. Many others are with us in spirit, even though they cannot say so."

To maintain this advantage, we must continue to foster our collective security system. In certain respects, this system is an economy measure, for it enables our allies to supplement our own military forces.

The numerous bases in those friendly countries not only provide needed facilities for our air and naval forces, but also afford us missile sites. This dispersion of bases throughout the world makes it impossible for Soviet aircraft and missiles to destroy our retaliatory capacity.

The other vital military contribution of our allies is in terms of manpower. The United States is able to devote primary emphasis to strategic striking forces, to missiles, and to space developments because of this supplementary manpower. So, our conventional war strength can be only partly appraised in terms of U. S. Army combat divisions. It can be fully evaluated in terms of the allied divisions our forces support and train. The technical, logistical and missile capabilities perform a vital function for numerous military assistance groups and provide tactical support to many allies.

Paradoxically, many representatives of the opposition have shouted that our army divisional strength is too small, and then have voted to cut mutual security funds and hence the army divisional strength of our allies,
which comes at less cost to us in dollars and American manpower.

At the same time, our entire foreign aid program must be subject to periodic reappraisal. A decade ago the economy of many of our major allies was in a depressed state, and this required us to bear the major burden of both military and general economic aid to the free world. We rejoice in the startling recovery that many of those allies have made, and we call upon them to accept their full share of responsibility in fostering both the defense and economic health of the free world.

As a result of economic transactions with other countries last year, the United States had a deficit in balance payments of about $3,400,000,000. Why has this deficit resulted? We currently have a surplus of $3,500,000,000 in exports of goods and services. But we have an annual expenditure of about $3,000,000,000 to maintain our military forces overseas. Our loans, grants, and capital outflow that increase our exports amount to about $2,500,000,000 annually, and we have a private capital investment outflow of about $2,000,000,000 a year. Obviously, it is necessary to our economic health that the prosperous free nations bear more of the burden in maintaining efficient defenses, of encouraging private investment and in assisting the less developed areas.

Solidarity of the free world involves more than just the economic aspect. It has a psychological and diplomatic side, too.

It is indeed tragic that the leading foreign policy spokesman of the Democratic Advisory Council, Mr. Dean Acheson, seems to berate our efforts to promote moral solidarity throughout the world. On the eve of the President's departure for an unprecedentedly long and strenuous trip among our many allies and friends, Mr. Acheson publicly said that little good would come from the trip. While the President tries to promote unity, Acheson seems to promote disunity. Has he no awareness of the importance attached to statements of a former Secretary of State?

Will he never learn a lesson? About a year ago he was the principal author of an Advisory Council pamphlet which painted a picture of disunity within the free world and claimed that our position in the world and our alliances were dissolving - "as just a hundred years ago men watched the Union
dissolve under the weak and palsied hand of Buchanan." The release of this vindictive pamphlet was timed to coincide with the week that the NATO ministers were meeting in Washington to reaffirm unity and solidarity. The Berlin crisis had begun, and it was necessary to our diplomacy to present Khrushchev with the picture of a united NATO. And yet, the Democratic Advisory Council used its efforts to propagandize the line of disunity.

When supporting and promoting collective security and solidarity among our allies, both political parties should make a constructive contribution. During the 1960's, we call upon responsible Democrats to do something, somehow, to control these non-constructive spokesmen of their Advisory Council. Indeed, we sympathize with those Members on the other side of the aisle who deplore this irresponsibility.

The dilemmas of their party disunity, however, in no way relieve them from the duty to curtail this council when its members jeopardize unity in our defenses against the Sino-Soviet peril. For, in the decade ahead, cooperation among our political parties to promote allied unity will be as important as cooperation among the allies themselves.

5. **Science and technology** is the fifth spearhead of peace power which we must vastly sharpen.

The deepest peril we face is that the Russians will concentrate on a few given, but quite decisive areas and develop superior technological skills. In the area of rocket technology, we have seen what they have accomplished in outer space. This did not happen by luck. They had enormous vision and great drive. By 1947, the rocket theories of the German scientist, Sanger, had created a tidal wave of excitement in the Kremlin.

So that a top priority could be set up for the rocket program, Stalin ordered an aerodynamics expert, Colonel Gugori Tokayev, to his office. Tokayev, who later defected, said that the Kremlin leaders were in almost "an hysterical clamor" for greater details about a super rocket. Neither were the diplomatic implications of this technological adventure lost on Stalin. He told Tokayev that the rocket "would make it easier to talk to the gentleman shopkeeper, Truman."
As Dr. von Braun pointed out at the time Russia shot up her first sputnik, "the United States had no ballistic missile program worth mentioning between 1945 and 1951 ... These six years, during which the Russians obviously laid the groundwork for their large rocket program, are irretrievably lost."

At the outset of the 1960's, we must launch into this field of technology with renewed determination to make up for the lost years. We must surpass Russia. Erratic programming and crash measures are not the answer. Clear lines of leadership, however, are essential. And I hail it as a great step forward that all space projects, including the brilliant team of Dr. von Braun, have now been placed under the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. The news that the Saturn Project may cut two years from Russia's lead time is most heartening.

In the decade ahead, however, we must meet a much broader challenge yet in the fields of science and technology. Many spokesmen of the Democratic Advisory Council appear to advocate responses which exclusively involve greater appropriations of money and greater bureaucratic controls. Paradoxically, Russia has made profound progress in science and technology because in this area she abandoned Marxian centralism and control and inaugurated freedom and incentive. Did not Khrushchev, during his visit to America, boast to the President that Russia used incentives more extensively than did the United States?

In contrast to the approach of the Democratic Advisory Council, the Percy Committee Report emphasized that there are three essentials to the creation of a strong science and technology:

"The maintenance of an environment of freedom and public understanding in which creativity can flourish.

"The maintenance of a superior educational system which stresses the value of excellence for its own sake and which makes a special effort to search out the most gifted minds, wherever found, and to make available to them the most advanced training which they are capable of absorbing.

"The provision of scientists and engineers with the economic resources with which to pursue their search with the utmost aggressiveness."

This approach will indeed grant our nation a new lease on its heritage, and a renewed faith in its capacity.
And this leads to a consideration of the next dynamic spearhead.

6. The sixth dynamic spearhead of peace power is the increased use of the psychological, moral and spiritual resources of a free society.

The Communists have made a god of Karl Marx and a religion of scientific materialism. Undoubtedly, the Marxian gospel exploits the weaknesses of human nature. Its breeding ground is in discontent and in frustrated hopes.

So, we are dealing with a dangerous peril, one involving far more deadly consequences than just missiles, military strategy and geographical battlefields. The peril is not solely from without. It threatens from within as well. It will prey on our every lack of faith in ourselves.

During this age of conflict, the decisive battleground will be in the minds of men.

The static lie of Russian Communism can be met only by the dynamic truth of American freedom. Unfortunately, many Americans have not awakened to the basis of the big lie even within their own country. The big lie is found in the materialistic interpretation of man and man's destiny. Of this, Communism is merely a ruthless manifestation. This materialism is often called, simply, socialism. Our ideas and faith can never be victorious over Communistic ideas through a greater application of materialism, statism, and socialism.

I fear that the Democratic Advisory Council exerts an influence to convert our foreign policy into a materialistic program, to purge it of all principle. Is this not a repetition of the pattern of allowing the Soviet to control the initiative and to choose the framework for conflict?

A strong faith and ideology within America is essential. It is just as essential to carry it to the Russian people themselves. This leads to the next force.

7. The seventh dynamic spearhead of peace power is a people-to-people approach. The Vice President's visit to Soviet Russia last summer was a creative, dynamic and timely breakthrough of the Soviet iron curtain. I say it was creative because it challenged the Communists as never before into a contest of ideas. I say it was dynamic for it was a giant step forward toward a long
standing aim of the Eisenhower foreign policy of liberating minds and restoring freedom within the Sinò-Soviet bloc.

The Percy Report has splendidly summed up our policy of liberation:

"Our policy of non-violent emancipation, with its long-run perspectives, would spell out the policy of peaceful liberation which some have either not understood or deliberately distorted out of all proportions. The emancipation policy promises to establish much-needed facilities for the peaceable creation of pressures for gradual expansion of freedom within the Communist empire."

During his visit to Russia, Vice President Nixon superbly dramatized American superiority in the production of consumer goods. Granted, much of what he said never got to the Russian masses. But some of what he said had a marked effect. A continued program of this nature, with increased cultural and scientific exchanges will bring to the Russian people and to the satellites the American story of the benefits from a free economy. In turn, this story will create upward pressures on the Soviet rulers. This could deter Soviet aggression and expand freedom within Russia and her satellites.

The follow-up to the initial people to people approach has been the personal diplomacy of President Eisenhower. For some time before his death, Secretary of State Dulles had pointed out to the President his tremendous prestige throughout the world. The time might come, insisted Dulles, for the President to use fully this prestige and influence through a series of tours.

Obviously, it would have been a cardinal blunder to embark in this personal diplomacy at the wrong time. But, was the time not ideal, before a summit meeting, towards the end of the President's term in office? This would further steal the initiative from Mr. Khrushchev. It would cast the setting for the conflict where we want it -- in the arena of world opinion -- that would make it a battle of ideas and not of missiles.

The casual observer will ask: Have not some of the members of the Democratic Advisory Council been calling for a summit meeting year after year? And is the Republican leadership not now taking us to a summit? So, is there any difference in attitudes in this particular regard?

Most certainly, yes. The difference is in timing and in preparation. Yalta and Potsdam were failures. We tried a summit in 1955 and it became clearly evident that Khrushchev was not yet thoroughly convinced that the
Eisenhower Administration had irrevocably inaugurated a new foreign policy which would not bow to blackmail and to duplicity.

It took four more years to educate the Soviet leaders, during crisis after crisis, that the new Administration would not compromise vital issues. And the final part of Khrushchev's education was during the Berlin crisis of 1959. He gave America a deadline. He was determined to humiliate us into a summit, when the entire world knew it was blackmail. America stood her ground, despite the fact that a former Truman advisor, George Kennan, declared we should withdraw from Europe altogether.

Khrushchev's education was complete. He realized that he was confronted with a new foreign policy, far different from that of the Truman Administration. He had the alternative of plunging his country into an all-out war, or seeking a peaceful means of competition. At this decisive moment, the President took the initiative. He sought to avoid a condition mentioned in the speech of the gentleman from California (Speech No. 2), where a Soviet leader might see no way out, feel that he was boxed in, and irrationally tumble towards war. Without retreating from the Berlin issue, Mr. Eisenhower invited Mr. Khrushchev to the United States. Thus the Soviet Chairman, at the decisive moment, was led towards the ways of peaceful competition. The timing of our President was brilliant.

Now we do hold the initiative.

The greatest single challenge of the 1960's is to bring the people to people approach closer and closer to every member of the Communist empire. This policy, however, can backfire if executed by unskilled men with limited ability and limited vision.

We must continue to have as President, Vice President and Secretary of State, leaders with judgment and knowledge of world affairs. The future of this country - indeed, the future of freedom throughout the world - cannot be risked, either to rank amateurs in international relations, or to those who produced the ambiguous and faltering diplomacy of the late 1940's.

As we enter the decade of the 1960's, a profound difference emerges between the foreign policy approaches of the Republicans and of the Democratic Advisory Council. Basically, it is this. While the Republicans are looking
forward, members of the Democratic Advisory Council, the Stevensons and the Achesons, are looking backward. Against the Russian peril, they still do not understand the need for a consistent, clear policy of firmness. They have splintered vision, and see the Soviet peril only in parts. Their reactions are defensive.

The Republicans undertook the campaign of 1952 with two important foreign policy aims: to end the war in Korea, and to initiate a policy of liberation. Peace in Korea, the Republicans knew, could only come from reshaping a policy of the initiative, which outlawed the privileged sanctuary. Liberation of those in Soviet slavedom could only come by maneuvering the Russian leaders into a climate of exchange of ideas, culture, and competition in consumer production.

This year the Republicans undertake another campaign. More than just political, it is a campaign to promulgate a philosophy for maintaining peace with justice and extending freedom here and throughout the world.

We have summed up this policy for the 1960's in terms of seven spearheads of peace power. Not just one, but all seven are needed to spearhead the progress of freedom throughout the world.

Why is the Republican Party capable of promoting this dynamic policy? Because as a party it possesses the four qualities which the Chairman of the Republican Policy Committee mentioned in the initial speech: Party unity; Party philosophy based on principle; Party democracy and Party foresight toward the needs of future generations.

With these qualities, the Republicans uniquely are equipped to see the Sino-Soviet challenge as a whole and not in parts. Uniquely are the Republicans qualified to marshal all the forces and resources of our nation and turn the age ahead from peril to promise.

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