The original documents are located in Box D7, folder "Ford Press Releases - Defense, 1967-1973" of the Ford Congressional Papers: Press Secretary and Speech File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

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Congressional Record

PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 90th CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE *June 28, 1967*

ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

(Mr. GERALD R. FORD asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD.)

Mr. GERALD R. FORD. Mr. Speaker, many of us here in the House have long been concerned about our national policy, or lack of policy, on the question of an anti-ballistic missile defense. This has not been a partisan concern, but one of profound differences of judgment between the President and the Secretary of Defense on the one hand, and entire Joint Chiefs of Staff and many of the most knowledgeable members of Congress, Republicans and Democrats, on the other.

In recent weeks my concern over this question has greatly increased. However, in view of the presence of Premier Kosygin in this country and the prospect of his talks with President Johnson I have withheld detailed comment until now.

June 17, 1967, Red China exploded her first Hydrogen Bomb. That was 11 days ago.

October 16, 1964, Red China detonated her first nuclear device. That was 2 years and 8 months ago.

The first atomic explosion by Communist China was rated around 20 kilotons. The latest thermonuclear blast was estimated between 2 to 7 megatons—at least 100 times as powerful as Red China's first atomic explosion.

Each of Red China's six nuclear tests has evidenced more rapid technological progress and greater sophistication than most U.S. experts had predicted.

It took the United States 6 years and 3 months to get from the first Alamogordo atomic test to the first H-Bomb at Eniwetok.

It took the Soviet Union 3 years and 11 months to cover the same stages of development, after the United States had shown the way.

Red China took 2 years and 8 months to join the H-bomb club.

Throughout that entire period of peril, a one-sided debate has paralyzed administration policy on the life-and-death question of an anti-ballistic missile defense system for the United States. The almost unanimous opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Nation's top professional military experts, and the cognizant committees of the Congress has been in favor of proceeding with some form of ABM development and deployment which, the Defense Department estimates, might save millions or tens of millions of American lives.

The debate has been one-sided because President Johnson, as Commander in Chief, and Secretary of Defense McNamara, his civilian deputy, have repeatedly deferred this decision and declined to spend preproduction funds appropriated by Congress for ABM defense.

At first, the administration argument was that an ABM defense was impractical and would be a waste of money. When rumors first spread, through press reports, early in 1963, that the Russians apparently were developing an ABM defense, Secretary McNamara engaged in semantic hair-splitting with congressional questioners which seemed to deny that the Soviet Union had an ABM "system"—defining system in the technical sense of a complete weapons system—and thus implying that the United States was at least even with the U.S.S.R. in this technological race. That was 4 years ago.

More recently, the administration line has shifted to the theme that Soviet leaders might be persuaded, in a hopeful atmosphere of detente, to agree to stop the costly ABM race on which they were well along and the United States had not yet decided to start. But, despite numerous authoritative articles and discussions in the press, there was no official administration confirmation of the deployment of a Soviet ABM defense until November 10, 1966—2 days after the 1966 national elections—when Secretary McNamara announced there was considerable evidence to this effect. He also said it was "much too early to make a decision for a deployment against the Chinese threat." The Red Chinese had just tested a nuclear-tipped 400- to 500-mile ballistic missile on October 27, 1966. That was 8 months ago.

In his latest state of the Union message, January 10, 1967, President Johnson noted two developments, an increase during the past year of Soviet long-range missile capabilities and the beginning of an antiballistic missile defense around Moscow. But his main emphasis was on what he termed his "solemn duty to slow down the arms race between us—the United States and the U.S.S.R.—if that is at all possible, in both conventional and nuclear weapons and defenses."

That was 5 months and 2 weeks ago.

In the Republican appraisal of the state of the Union delivered January 19, 1967, I said:

> The Administration has finally admitted to the American people that the Soviet Union has increased its Intercontinental Ballistic Missile capability and is deploying an Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense System. In anticipation of a life-and-death decision on just such a development, Congress has voted millions of dollars which the Administration did not seek and apparently has not used.
>
> The Congress did its duty and gave the President a clear expression of its will and the means to carry it out.
>
> Before more precious time is lost, Congress and the American people are now entitled to a clear explanation from the President of the perils and problems facing the United States in the new global balance of strategic power.
>
> We, too, seek to avoid a costly new round in the nuclear arms race. But the least the Nation must do now is to speed up its readiness to deploy Anti-Ballistics Missiles in a hurry if our survival requires its.

That was 5 months and 1 week ago. I repeat it again today.

In his budget message to Congress on January 24, 1967, the President spelled out his decision on an ABM defense for the United States, pledging that during fiscal 1968 he would—

> Continue intensive development of Nike-X but *take no action* now to deploy an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defense; initiate discussions with the Soviet Union on the limitation of ABM deployment; in the event these discussions prove unsuccessful, we will reconsider our deployment system.

That was 5 months ago.

Soviet Premier Alexei N. Kosygin gave an oblique answer at a news conference in London on February 9, 1967. This is from the New York Times' account:

> Premier Kosygin suggested at a news conference today that defensive anti-ballistic missile systems were less dangerous to mankind than offensive systems, and therefore more desirable even if they should prove more costly.
>
> While avoiding a direct answer to a question on the subject, he gave no encouragement to hopes for a moratorium on anti-ballistic missile defense development as a means of limiting the arms race between the great powers. . . .
>
> His reply was that "a system that serves to ward off an attack does not heighten the tension but serves to lessen the possibility of an attack that may kill large numbers of people."

It is difficult not to agree with the Communist leader in the way he dismissed the cost-effectiveness argument favored by Mr. McNamara.

> It might be cheaper to build offensive than defensive systems.
>
> Kosygin said—
>
> But this is not the criterion upon which one should base oneself in deciding this problem.

This was 4 months and 2 weeks ago.

Nevertheless, President Johnson continued to support Secretary McNamara or vice versa. Testifying March 6, 1967, before the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, McNamara conceded the continuing split between himself and the entire Joint Chiefs of Staff, represented by their Chairman, Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, on the ABM question.

General Wheeler told the House Armed Services Committee that he had gone to President Johnson, on his own initiative, to present the Joint Chiefs' case to the Commander in Chief in this important difference of opinion with the Secretary of Defense.

In the heavily censored transcript of committee testimony, it is evident that Mr. McNamara still felt that the Russians were wasting their resources on defensive measures against a missile attack and that the United States should not follow suit. He argued that the U.S. response to a Soviet ABM system should not be a U.S. ABM system, but a step-up in our deterrent offensive capability. If we embarked upon an ABM defense, Mr. McNamara assumed that Soviet planners would use the same reasoning as he used and increase their offensive capability. At the same time he acknowledged that, even though the United States had widely advertised that it was not proceeding with any ABM deployment, the Soviet Union was increasing its offensive missile capability anyway. But he persisted in the view that the United States should not expedite an ABM deployment.

General Wheeler took the position that "the Soviets will undoubtedly improve the Moscow system as time goes on and extend ABM defense to other high-priority areas of the Soviet Union." He estimated that they have the resources to do so and are willing to spend whatever it takes to gain strategic superiority or strategic parity with the United States.

On behalf of his colleagues of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Wheeler testified that the Soviet objective—both in offensive and defensive strategy—is "to achieve an exploitable capability, permitting them freedom to pursue their national aims at conflict levels less than general nuclear war."

While the debate on the desirability of a U.S. ABM defense system has concentrated until very recently on sharply varying U.S. estimates of Soviet inten-

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tions and capabilities, Red China's breakthrough into the select group of four thermonuclear superpowers injects an entirely new factor.

The timing of Red China's H-bomb breakthrough was most significant. It came as the whole world was groping to assess the lessons of the Israel-Arab war and the near-confrontation of great powers that had been averted. The most immediate conclusions from this crisis are:

First. As proved by Israel, a sudden and preemptive air strike has not been summarily discarded by military planners of other nations. This is especially true if the odds against a successful defense are very unfavorable.

Second. As proved by Nasser, fanatic and authoritarian regimes do not necessarily act rationally or evaluate risks by the same standard we do. Furthermore, they can suffer what a Western government would consider inacceptable human and material losses and still survive politically.

Third. As proved by the United States and the Soviet Union, when the two superpowers neutralize each other with their mutual nuclear deterrents, lesser nations are pretty much left free to resolve regional issues by force.

None of these lessons, I am sure, was lost on Red China or on the other nations of Asia.

I hope they are not lost upon Secretary McNamara, and will cause him quickly to reverse his 1966 postelection view that it is "much too early to make a decision for a deployment against the Chinese threat."

Even those who cherish the most optimistic hopes that Russian Communist leaders will act reasonably and with restraint in their thermonuclear strategy cannot possibly put the Chinese Communist leaders in the same category. Peiping itself does not.

Red China's capability in the field of nuclear weaponry consistently has been downgraded and underestimated by administration policymakers. When Red China achieved atomic status, Americans were told it would take many years for them to perfect advanced systems for delivering a nuclear weapon. When, within 6 months, Red China mounted an atomic warhead on a 500-mile ballistic missile, Americans were reassured that it would be many more years before the Chinese could pose any intercontinental threat to the United States.

Secretary McNamara testified on January 25, 1966 before the House Armed Services Committee that "the Chinese Communists have detonated two nuclear devices and could possibly develop and deploy a small force of ICBMs by the mid-to-latter part of the 1970's." Whether this estimate is better or worse than Mr. McNamara's previous estimates on the Vietnam war, the necessity of a U.S. merchant marine, the usefulness of Reserve forces and the future of manned aircraft and nuclear-powered ships, cannot yet be determined. His danger date, however, is only 8 to 10 years away.

Other Pentagon officials have pointed out that a primitive submarine-launched nuclear-tipped missile could be developed by Red China in a much shorter period, and conceivably could already exist.

Fortune magazine in an authoritative June 1967 article on ABM defense estimates that 5 to 7 years, from the time the go-ahead is given, would be needed to deploy even a thin U.S. anti-ballistic missile defense. Cost estimates, depending upon the degree of protection provided, range from $3 billion to $40 billion, spread over a period of years.

The article quotes Lt. Gen. Austin Betts, Chief of the Army's Nike X research and development, as believing the optimum moment has arrived to begin production. It points out that further delay could mean the breakup of contractor teams and the onset of obsolescence in components.

There appears to be general agreement that the current fiscal 1968 Defense Appropriation, voted 407 to 1, contains as much money as could be used in the coming 12 months—some $908 million on top of the $4 billion previously provided for antiballistic missile research and development. This includes the extra $167.8 million which Congress voted last year for initial deployment which the administration declined to use.

I can no longer see any logic in delaying this crucial decision for an indefinite time while the United States attempts to get agreement with the Soviet Union to slow down an expensive ABM race. Premier Kosygin threw cold water on any ABM moratorium at his U.N. news conference June 25 and President Johnson has not revealed any progress on this subject during their private talks at Holly Bush.

What is perfectly clear is that U.S. reluctance to move forward on ABM defense deployment has in no way slowed the Soviet program, defensively or offensively, nor impaired the thermonuclear progress of Red China. Both are moving full speed ahead.

Gen. Harold Johnson, the Army Chief of Staff, summed up the sentiment of professional military leaders when he told the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee on March 10, 1967:

> Now, one cannot argue against discussing the issues that are to be discussed with the Soviets, you cannot argue that at all. However, the uneasiness that I feel is basically this: *When do we stop discussing and when do we reach a decision point?*

That was 3 months and 2 weeks ago.

Representative GLENARD P. LIPSCOMB of California, ranking Republican on the subcommittee, summed up the House Appropriations Committee's answer to the President and Secretary McNamara on the House floor June 13, 1967. He said:

> In commenting on the reluctance to begin to deploy the Nike-X system on the part of the Administration, our committee report states:
>
> "It would appear that the initiation of deployment of light or thin defense, now, may very well be a most useful first step toward whatever level of ballistic missile defense ultimately appears necessary." In other words the report, adopted unanimously by the committee, says: "Get Going!"

That was 2 weeks ago. The key word is "now."

Four days after the House overwhelmingly endorsed this view of the urgency to get going on ABM, the Red Chinese H-bomb was exploded.

Initial reports on this significant event, overshadowed by the U.N. wrangling on the Middle East, quoted Washington weapons specialists as surmising that "Red China would be more likely to set it off on a test stand so that its yield and other effects could be measured more precisely"—another disturbing sign of assuming a potential enemy thinks exactly as we do.

Later, after Japanese atomic scientists said their analysis showed the bomb had been exploded at a high altitude, the Washington Post on June 22 quoted Washington intelligence officials as believing the Red Chinese H-bomb was dropped from an airplane. It added that—

> The Pentagon has said of the Chinese H-bomb that it does not require any change in U.S. military strategy.

I disagree.

With the United States and the U.S.S.R. standing each other off in nuclear deterrents, the possession of even one Red Chinese nuclear weapon that can be carried in one conventional bomber radically alters the balance of power in East Asia and the Western Pacific—areas which President Johnson has specifically proclaimed as vital to America's national interest and the fate of the free world.

If the elementary weapons system represented by what Red China evidently has already produced is not an immediate threat to the continental United States, or even to Alaska, Hawaii and Guam, what about its threat to Japan, South Korea, Formosa, South Vietnam, Thailand, and the Philippines which the United States has solemn treaty obligations to defend?

Time, unlike money, cannot be recovered. Wasting time is therefore a far more serious matter than wasting funds. The arguments about the cost effectiveness of ABM defense which Mr. McNamara has argued for years and years, backed by the President, must now give way to the unanimous opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the cognizant committees of Congress that the United States cannot risk running second in any aspect of this grim game.

If any practical step could conceivably save 100 million American lives—or 1 million or 1,000—how much is too much to spend on it? Yet what we lack is not the money but the decision to "Get going." The funds have been provided. I call upon President Johnson to act without another day's delay.

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

CONGRESSMAN
GERALD R. FORD
HOUSE REPUBLICAN LEADER

NEWS RELEASE

--FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE--
June 28, 1967

STATEMENT OF REP. GERALD R. FORD (R-MICH.) HOUSE MINORITY LEADER

June 17, 1967, Red China exploded her first Hydrogen Bomb.

That was eleven days ago.

October 16, 1964, Red China detonated her first nuclear device.

That was two years and eight months ago.

The first atomic explosion by Communist China was rated around 20 kilotons. The latest thermonuclear blast was estimated between 2 to 7 Megatons--at least 100 times as powerful as Red China's first atomic explosion.

Each of Red China's six nuclear tests has evidenced more rapid technological progress and greater sophistication than most U.S. experts had predicted.

It took the United States six years and three months to get from the first Alamo gordo atomic test to the first H-Bomb at Eniwetok.

It took the Soviet Union three years and eleven months to cover the same stages of development, after the United States had shown the way.

Red China took two years and eight months to join the H-Bomb Club.

Throughout that entire period of peril, a one-sided debate has paralyzed Administration policy on the life-and-death question of an Anti-Ballistic Missile defense system for the United States. The almost unanimous opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the nation's top professional military experts, and the cognizant committees of the Congress has been in favor of proceeding with some form of ABM development and deployment which, the Defense Department estimates, might save millions or tens of millions of American lives.

The debate has been one-sided because President Johnson, as Commander in Chief, and Secretary of Defense McNamara, his civilian deputy, have repeatedly deferred this decision and declined to spend pre-production funds appropriated by Congress for ABM defense.

At first, the Administration argument was that an ABM defense was impractical and would be a waste of money. When rumors first spread, through press reports, early in 1963, that the Russians apparently were developing an ABM defense, Secretary McNamara engaged in semantic hair-splitting with Congressional questioners which seemed to deny that the Soviet Union had an ABM "system" (defining system in the technical sense of a complete weapons system) and thus implying that the United States was at least even with the USSR in this technological race.

That was four years ago.

More recently, the Administration line has shifted to the theme that Soviet leaders might be persuaded, in a hopeful atmosphere of "detente," to agree to stop the costly ABM race on which they were well along and the United States had not yet decided to start. But, despite numerous authorative articles and discussions in the press, there was no official Administration confirmation of the deployment of a Soviet ABM defense until Nov. 10, 1966 -- two days after the 1966 national elections -- when Secretary McNamara announced there was "considerable evidence" to this effect. He also said it was "much too early to make a decision for a deployment against the Chinese threat." (The Red Chinese had just tested a nuclear-tipped 400-500 mile ballistic missile on Oct. 27, 1966.)

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In his latest State of the Union Message, Jan. 10, 1967, President Johnson noted two developments -- an increase during the past year of Soviet long-range missile capabilities and the beginning of an Anti-Ballistic Missile defense around Moscow. But his main emphasis was on what he termed his "solemn duty to slow down the arms race between us (the U.S. and the USSR) if that is at all possible, in both conventional and nuclear weapons and defenses."

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"The Administration has finally admitted to the American people that the Soviet Union has increased its Intercontinental Ballistic Missile capability and is deploying an Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense System. In anticipation of a life-and-death decision on just such a development, Congress has voted millions of dollars which the Administration did not seek and apparently has not used.

"The Congress did its duty and gave the President a clear expression of its will and the means to carry it out.

"Before more precious time is lost, Congress and the American people are now entitled to a clear explanation from the President of the perils and problems facing the United States in the new global balance of strategic power.

"We, too, seek to avoid a costly new round in the nuclear arms race. But the least the Nation must do now is to speed up its readiness to deploy Anti-Ballistics Missiles in a hurry if our survival requires it."

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"His reply was that 'a system that serves to ward off an attack does not heighten the tension but serves to lessen the possibility of an attack that may kill large numbers of people.'"

It is difficult not to agree with the Communist leader in the way he dismissed the "cost-effectiveness" argument favored by Mr. McNamara.

"It might be cheaper to build offensive than defensive systems," Kosygin said, "but this is not the criterion upon which one should base oneself in deciding this problem."

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(2) As proved by Nasser, fanatic and authoritarian regimes do not necessarily act rationally or evaluate risks by the same standards we do. Furthermore, they can suffer what a Western government would consider inacceptable human and material losses and still survive politically.

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"In commenting on the reluctance to begin to deploy the Nike-X system on the part of the Administration, our committee report states:

"'It would appear that the initiation of deployment of light or thin defense, now, may very well be a most useful first step toward whatever level of ballistic missile defense ultimately appears necessary.' In other words the report, adopted unanimously by the committee, says: 'Get Going!'" Lipscomb declared.

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That was two weeks ago. The key word is "NOW."

Four days after the House overwhelmingly endorsed this view of the urgency to get going on ABM, the Red Chinese H-Bomb was exploded.

Initial reports on this significant event, overshadowed by the U.N. wrangling on the Middle East, quoted Washington "weapons specialists" as surmising that "Red China would be more likely to set it off on a test stand so that its yield and other effects could be measured more precisely" -- another disturbing sign of assuming a potential enemy thinks exactly as we do.

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I disagree.

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Statement by Rep. Gerald R. Ford, R-Mich., Minority Leader, U.S. House of Representatives.

WHY A MISSILE DEFENSE?

Whether or not to deploy the Safeguard Anti-Ballistic Missile System has become a national issue. This is reflected in letters I have received.

There apparently is considerable confusion about the issue. I therefore would like to make some points which may clarify the situation.

1. The Institute for Strategic Studies in London, England, an independent and admittedly authoritative agency that keeps an account of the military capabilities of all nations, recently reported that by mid-1969 Russia would overtake the United States in intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and achieve equal status in strategic power.

2. The Soviet Union has already deployed an ABM system which largely protects Moscow and its surrounding area.

3. The Soviet Union is continuing the deployment of very large ICBMs (the SS-9) which are capable of destroying our 1,000 Minuteman ICBMs despite their location in "hardened" sites.

4. The Soviet Union is substantially increasing the size of its submarine-launched ballistic missile force.

5. The Soviet Union is developing anti-submarine measures which are a threat to our 656-missile Polaris deterrent force.

6. The Soviet Union has developed a semi-orbital nuclear weapons system (FOBS), which threatens to rain nuclear destruction down on us from outer space.

7. Since the Soviet Union apparently will surpass the United States in numbers of ICBMs by the middle of this year or at least attain equal status, the American people are faced with a fresh decision on how best to avoid nuclear war or how best to survive a nuclear holocaust should it occur.

8. Former Defense Secretary McNamara responded to Soviet deployment of an ABM system by scheduling an increase in U.S. offensive missilry forces. There was no public outcry in the United States.

9. Former Defense Secretary McNamara initially opposed U.S. deployment of an ABM system because he believed a go-ahead on ABM would cause the Soviet Union to expand its offensive nuclear power. The Soviet Union greatly increased its offensive nuclear power in any case.

10. In the April 1969 issue of Foreign Affairs, Dr. D. G. Brennan, dean of U.S. arms control experts, states that U.S. funds committed to increase our offensive missile forces might better be used to increase our

defenses. Dr. Brennan argues that an American ballistic missile defense system such as President Nixon has proposed obviously reduces the Soviet threat to our national security. At the same time, he asserts, by concentrating on a missile defense system instead of expanding our nuclear offensive capability we "reduce both the extent to which the Soviets might gain by attacking us, and the extent to which we are intensely motivated to deter the attack."

11. The chief argument made against President Nixon's Safeguard ABM System or BMD (ballistic missile defense) is that it makes the U.S. appear provocative and endangers the possibility of arms control talks and a possible meaningful arms limitation. The facts indicate that the opposite is true.

12. After the Johnson-McNamara decision to deploy the Sentinel ABM system was announced in September 1967, some of our allies and neutral friends attacked the decision on the grounds it threatened approval of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. The Soviet Union declared that prospects for the nonproliferation treaty were not damaged by the U.S. ABM decision, and this proved accurate.

13. On Feb. 9, 1967, Soviet Premier Kosygin was asked at a press conference in London, England: "Do you believe it is possible to agree on a moratorium on the (deployment) of an anti-missile defense system (then being discussed in the United States) and if possible on what condition?" Kosygin replied in part: "I believe that defensive systems, which prevent attack, are not the cause of the arms race, but constitute a factor preventing the death of people. Some argue like this: What is cheaper, to have offensive weapons which can destroy towns and whole states or to have defensive weapons which can prevent this destruction? At present the theory is current somewhere that the system which is cheaper should be developed. Such so-called theoreticians argue as to the cost of killing a man -- $500,000 or $100,000. Maybe an anti-missile system is more expensive than an offensive ysstem, but it is designed not to kill people but to preserve human lives. I understand that I do not reply to the question I was asked, but you can draw yourselves the appropriate conclusions." And in comment on that Kosygin statement, Dr. Brennan says: "Indeed, one can."

14. Dr. Brennan asserts in his "Foreign Affairs" article that "the attitude exemplified by the Kosygin quotation is very widely held in the Soviet Union."

15. Four days after former President Johnson announced a decision to ring major American cities with ABM installations, the Soviet Union proposed U.S.-Soviet arms control talks.

16. Dr. Brennan declares in the highly respected publication, "Foreign Affairs:" "The primary objectives of arms control have often been stated to be reduction of the likelihood of war or mitigation of its consequences if it occurs. It seems to me highly probable that deployment of missile defenses will contribute to both of these objectives, while abstaining

from defenses will likely contribute to neither. If the deployments (of missile defenses) are managed with at least modest intelligence on both sides, there need not be an arms race nor appreciably higher expenditures."

17. To rule out any kind of missile defense is to assume that nuclear war is so unthinkable and therefore impossible that the United States need not concern itself about either Russian or Red Chinese nuclear capabilities...or to assume that the United States must forever concern itself with nuclear offensive superiority relative to the Soviet Union. The latter is a dubious position because of the tremendously powerful and accurate Soviet SS-9 missile and the fact that the Soviets already have deployed a defense against our missiles.

18. The United States has already proposed reductions in strategic offensive forces, but the Soviet Union has consistently opposed inspection as a guarantee of compliance.

19. Deployment of a U.S. missile defense might reduce the need for such inspection and thus hasten an actual reduction in offensive missile forces.

20. Critics say the Safeguard system would not be reliable and might not work in event of nuclear war, but all tests of the component parts of the system indicate it should work as planned.

21. The Safetuard system would employ Spartan and Sprint ABMs. The Spartans would be used to break up high density raids while the Sprint would operate on an one-on-one basis. Only those enemy warheads coming within a very limited area would have to be considered for attack. Low altitude intercepts by Sprint would allow the U.S. to take full advantage of the separation of real warheads from chaff and decoys by the atmosphere. Since the Sprint warheads can be of relatively low yield, radar blackout problems are minimized.

22. As Freeman Dyson of the Princeton Institute for Advanced Study points out, what is certain is that a missile defense system saves those targets which are not attacked. An offense generally is based on the theory that if a target cannot be destroyed with 95 per cent probability, it is better not to attack it. As a result, says Dyson, the attacker "passes over" certain targets and "the defense works independently of whether it does well in the technical sense."

23. In the case of our Minuteman missiles, Dyson notes, there are a thousand targets. He comments, "A good defense of the Minuteman force would be one in which, say, 500 of these survived and it doesn't matter which 500. So you can concentrate your defenses on particular places, you can allow a wide margin of uncertainty in the effectiveness of the defense and you will still have a good defense of your military force."

24. The best that we can expect from a missile defense is that the number of people who would be killed in a nuclear war would be tens of millions on each side instead of hundreds of millions.

25. But the possibility of even that outcome should be a sufficient deterrent, Dyson declares. President Nixon's objective is to deter nuclear war, to use the Safeguard System as a weapon for peace.

26. The choice currently is whether to put our money into offensive or defensive nuclear weapons, not whether the United States should engage in unilateral disarmament.

The Safeguard System is estimated to cost $6 to $7 billion over a period of years. Roughly $800 million would be spent on the system during fiscal 1970, as compared with the $1.8 billion requested by President Johnson for the Sentinel ring-around-the-cities system. There are those who contend all funds programmed for missile defense should be spent on social needs. I believe both our national security and our social needs must be met within a balanced framework of fiscal responsibility. The needs of domestic social programs must be balanced against the threat of enemy missile attack.

I support President Nixon's Safeguard System because I believe it is a deterrent to nuclear war. I believe it will facilitate an arms control agreement between the U.S. and the Soviet Union and that failure to deploy at least a limited missile defense would be to take an unacceptable gamble with the national security of the United States.

# # #

9 August 1967

U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES **REPUBLICAN POLICY** COMMITTEE

REP. JOHN J. RHODES, (R.-ARIZ.) CHAIRMAN • 140 CANNON HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING • TELEPHONE 225-6168

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HOUSE REPUBLICAN POLICY COMMITTEE STATEMENT ON THE DEPLOYMENT OF AN ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEM

The House Republican Policy Committee urges the Johnson-Humphrey Administration to provide the American people with an effective Anti-Ballistic Missile system. The Soviets have been building and deploying their ABM system for some time. The Joint Chiefs of Staff unanimously support the position that this country should now proceed to deploy. Congress has appropriated sufficient funds for this purpose. The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy has warned, "A low order of magnitude attack could possibly be launched by the Chinese Communists against the United States by the early 1970's. At present we do not have an effective anti-ballistic missile system which could repel such a suicidal (for the Chinese) but nevertheless possible strike." Time and the rush of events demand action.

As early as 1963 there were rumors that the Russians were developing an ABM defense. However, Secretary McNamara when questioned about this, engaged in a dialogue of evasion that appeared to deny that the Soviets had such a system. It was not until November 10, 1966, two days after the 1966 election, that McNamara announced there was considerable evidence of the existence of a Soviet ABM system. Moreover, information from the intelligence community now indicates that the Soviets are indeed deploying one and possibly two ABM systems. Also, the Soviets probably will extend and improve their defenses over the coming year and they have accelerated the deployment of hardened offensive intercontinental ballistic missiles.

It is significant that in response to a news conference question about the Soviet anti-ballistic missile system, General Paul G. Kurochin, head of the Soviet Frunze Military Academy, stated that missiles fired at the Soviet Union would not hit their targets. He also stated that, "Detecting missiles in time and destroying them

(over)

in flight is no problem." Under the circumstances, it is little wonder that Soviet Premier Kosygin has given no encouragement to hopes for a moratorium on anti-ballistic missile defense development as a means of limiting the arms race between the great powers.

There is a continuing split between Secretary McNamara and the entire Joint Chiefs of Staff on the anti-ballistic missile defense question. For years the Joint Chiefs of Staff have unanimously supported the position that this country should deploy Nike X. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Wheeler, testified that he had gone to President Johnson on his own initiative to present the Joint Chiefs' case. According to General Wheeler, "the Soviets will undoubtedly improve the Moscow system as time goes on and extend ABM defense to other high priority areas of the Soviet Union." In his opinion, the Soviet objective is "to achieve an exploitable capability, permitting them freedom to pursue their national aims at conflict levels less than general nuclear war."

On March 10, 1967, General Harold Johnson, the Chief of Staff of the U. S. Army, in his testimony before the House Appropriations Committee, clearly expressed the position of the prefessional military leaders when he stated, "When do we stop discussing and when do we reach a decision point?"

With the shock of the recent Chinese thermonuclear explosion on June 17, 1967, efforts to downgrade the potential menace of Communist China have disappeared. It took the United States 8 years to move from the atomic bomb to the hydrogen bomb. It took the Soviet Union 4 years to accomplish the same result. In just 2 years and 8 months, Red China has joined the H-bomb club. In a recent report on the Red Chinese threat, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy stated:

> "We believe that the Chinese will continue to place a high priority on thermonuclear weapon development. With continued testing, we believe they will be able to develop a thermonuclear warhead in the ICBM weight class with a yield in the megaton range by about 1970. We believe that the Chinese can have an ICBM system ready for deployment in the early 1970's. On the basis of our present knowledge, we believe that the Chinese probably will achieve an operational ICBM capability before 1972. Conceivably, it could be ready as early as 1970-71.

It has been estimated that from 5 to 7 years, from the time the go-ahead is given, would be needed to deploy even a thin U. S. anti-ballistic missile defense. Any lingering doubt over whether or not such a system should be developed has been dispelled by China's amazing progress with nuclear weapons. In a report dated August 4, 1967, the Senate Committee on Appropriations noted that during fiscal year 1968, there will be approximately $970 million available for an ABM defense system. The Committee also stated, "The Congress has met its constitutional responsibilities in this matter, and the responsibility for further delaying this system clearly rests with the executive branch of the government."

These funds must be put to use without further delay. The secret of mass destruction is now in the hands of those who may be tempted to use it. Our defenses must be prepared to meet this challenge.



CONGRESSMAN
GERALD R. FORD
HOUSE REPUBLICAN LEADER

NEWS RELEASE

--FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE--
January 24, 1968

Statement by Rep. Gerald R. Ford, R-Mich.

If all sensible attempts at diplomacy fail, the United States must take whatever military action is necessary to recover the U.S. Navy intelligence ship, Pueblo. We must be concerned first and foremost with the lives and safety of the ship's crew, and therefore we must exhaust all diplomatic means at our command before taking military measures. This approach having been fruitless, we will be forced to take whatever military actions are most appropriate in response to this act of piracy by North Korea. The North Koreans had better believe that the United States is not to be trifled with. I am fully in accord with the decision to send the carrier Enterprise and other U.S. ships to the scene as a show of force. Above all, the credibility and prestige of the United States must be maintained. The silence at the White House has not been helpful in this regard.

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

CONGRESSMAN
GERALD R. FORD
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NEWS RELEASE

FOR RELEASE
Wednesday, Jan. 24, and thereafter

Rep. Gerald R. Ford today said the Department of the Army has promised him "corrective action" will be taken in response to complaints about the Fort Wayne Examining Station by parents of Grand Rapids area draftees.

Ford drew the pledge from the Commanding General, U.S. Army Recruiting Command, after forwarding to the Army the numerous complaints he has received about "rough treatment" of Grand Rapids area inductees at the Fort Wayne installation.

Ford had demanded "a complete investigation of all complaints and prompt action to remedy the situation."

In a letter to Ford, Col. J. L. Blackwell, the Army's chief of legislative liaison, declared: "I have called this matter to the personal attention of the Commanding General, U.S. Army Recruiting Command, who informs me that he will direct further investigation into these allegations and take corrective action where appropriate."

Ford said the Commanding General is to inform him directly at a later date what his findings are and what has been done to meet the various complaints.

A flood of complaints from Grand Rapids area parents developed after Floyd Hilliker of 1478 Beech Street S.W., Grand Rapids, declared that his son and other prospective draftees had gone for 14 or 15 hours without food and had been exposed to the cold while undergoing pre-induction physical examinations at Fort Wayne. Other parents told Ford the men handling the draftees swore at their sons.

Col. Peter F. Bermingham, deputy commander of the Recruiting Command Headquarters at Hampton, Va., told Ford the Detroit Armed Forces Examining and Entrance Station will be relocated "in the near future." He said the Fort Wayne facility has neither central heating nor air conditioning, and that some windows have to be opened for ventilation.

He said some of the processing was done during the lunch hour on the day the Hilliker youth and others were examined, and this accounted for their getting nothing to eat. He promised there would be no recurrence of the incident.

Commenting recently on complaints about Fort Wayne, Col. Arthur A. Holmes, state selective service director, said the Fort Wayne facility is "inadequate." He said the remedy is "up to the Department of Defense."

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

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# # #

Approved by the
Republican Coordinating Committee
May 6, 1968

Presented by the Task Force on
National Security

Office Copy

DECISIONS IN NATIONAL SECURITY: PATCHWORK OR POLICY?

Prepared under the direction of:
The Republican National Committee
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DECISIONS IN NATIONAL SECURITY: PATCHWORK OR POLICY?

"Good national security policy requires both good policymakers and good policy machinery. One cannot be divided from the other."

- U.S. Senate Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery; Committee on Government Operations, 1961

War and the threat of war continue to add an ominous dimension to our search for peace. In an international environment where true peace continues to elude us, we must maintain the highest priority on efforts to ensure our nation's security.

Providing for our security absorbs more of our human and material resources than any other single function of government. Fortunately, our nation is endowed with these great resources. However, wise policies and efficient organization and management are as essential as the resources themselves.

Our review concludes that the effectiveness of our security structure has declined, due to indecisive policies -- faulty policy-making machinery -- over-centralization in the Department of Defense -- over-management of our security structure -- over-reliance on cost accounting procedures and computer techniques -- and a downgrading of seasoned human judgment.

We are concerned with the self-imposed isolation of top civilians in the Pentagon who have too often dismissed or altered solid recommendations of the service Secretaries or the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and distorted the authority of unified and field commanders.

The technological explosion has forced new political - military relationships. The civilian administrator must understand the soldier and the scientist. The soldier must understand the civilian administrator and the scientist. This new relationship has fared poorly in recent years, to the detriment of our policies and policy making machinery. We see the result in dealing with crucial international events, in years of indecisiveness over Vietnam, in our failure to develop new advanced weapons systems, and in the erosion of America's prestige throughout the world.

History sternly warns that weakness invites aggression. The weakness may be in armaments. But even with ample superior armaments, a nation can invite aggression by a lack of will and determination. Such a condition is often revealed by a hesitancy or inability to reach timely and forthright decisions.

Responsibility for National Security

Within policies and requirements specified by Congress, the President determines and directs our national security efforts. By constitutional provision and historical precedent, he is responsible for the conduct of foreign relations. He is Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. He directs all departments and agencies in the Executive Branch.

National security policy formulation and implementation processes have become interdepartmental. Not only the Department of Defense, but also State, Treasury, Commerce, Interior and Agriculture, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Export-Import Bank, the Development Loan Fund and a score of other agencies are involved. Almost every major element of the Federal Government is involved to some extent in national security policy.

National security planning and execution cut across agency and departmental lines, and make the President's administrative task difficult and complex. The

effective management of this responsibility, however, remains critical for the American people.

National Security Policy Making Machinery

In 1961, the National Security Council, its Planning Board and Operations Coordinating Board, were inherited from the Eisenhower Administration, as organized, functioning and prestigious policy-making instruments. Immediately, and without careful consideration of possibly fateful consequences, both Boards were abolished. The effectiveness of the National Security Council was compromised.

The National Security Council,* created by the National Security Act of 1947, is charged with advising the President:

> "With respect to the integration of domestic, foreign and military policy relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies to cooperate more effectively in matters involving national security."

The National Security Council was to be the keystone of our nation's security structure. It was established not to restrict but to advise a President, by assuring thoughtful analysis and careful coordination of every significant aspect of national security policy. It assumed competent management of current problems and contingency planning for the future. It was to be insurance against hasty action -- a device to ensure that every factor bearing on vital security policies and programs would be presented to the President for action.

During the Eisenhower Administration, the National Security Council -- meeting frequently and formally throughout the eight years -- proved its indispensability to the nation.

Its procedures and deliberations were not flawless, but over this span of

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* See Appendix I

time it was invaluable in assuring comprehensive analyses, in producing timely recommendations in critical security issues, and in coordinating activities of the members of the Council.

Since then, the entire supporting structure has so changed, or even disappeared, as to now produce little more than mechanical compliance with the law. The procedures for integrating military, political and economic considerations often have given way to informal and impromptu consultations with staff assistants and other individuals or ad hoc groups. The results have been harmful to our country.

National security policies have become unclear and indecisive. Others urgently needed have been left unmade. Reaction to crisis -- not avoidance of of crisis -- has been the inescapable result.

Continuous review and planning has been substantially eliminated, in the downgrading of formal policy planning. Thus, when an immediate crisis looms, there is hope that crash handling will avoid a fundamental compromise of our national security. A solid and effective structure can permit the development of a policy which can be appropriately carried out at the tactical level.

Over-centralization in the Department of Defense

The progression toward a centrally-directed defense establishment began long before the 1960's. The National Security Act of 1947, and the 1949 and 1958 amendments to the Act, progressively strengthened the role of the Secretary of Defense as the principal advisor to the President on national security matters.* In 1961, however, centralization became not policy but dogma, and the Secretary became "first among equals" as advisor to the President.

Ultimate responsibility for the defense establishment must be exercised by the Secretary of Defense under Presidential direction and within the statuatory guidelines set by Congress. The function assumes highest-level policy guidance

* Largely reflecting the recommendations of The Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government on National Security Organization (Hoover Report).

and the resolution of policy differences -- such policies, for example, as the formulation of national security operations, criteria for organizing forces, and the development of the defense budget. In these activities, the civilian authorities are responsible to the President, the Congress and the electorate.

Under civilian control and within civilian established guidelines, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the uniformed services must direct the planning and management of all military forces. In force planning and operations, the military leadership must be responsive through the Secretary of Defense to the President.

A careful delineation of these roles of civilian policy-makers and military managers is absolutely essential for a secure and balanced national security posture.

Implementing Policies and Programs

Civilian Operational Planning and Control

Major organizational changes and new procedures have created a serious over-centralization of civilian management at the top of the defense establishment. The practice of lower-level civilians in the OSD superimposing themselves in originating and developing analyses for the Secretary does injustice to the competence of the military services. The most current and disturbing example of the reduced role of the military in strategic and tactical decisions is Vietnam. A policy of gradualism* largely dictated by civilians has been imposed, which has prolonged the war, increased the casualties and costs and divided the American people.

Civilian control over the details of the air war has been particularly questionable. Testimony before the Senate Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee last August disclosed that tactical decisions were frequently being made by civilians in Washington. Military witnesses stated that many target recommendations approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff were being denied and others delayed, thus impairing

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* See Republican Coordinating Committee report "Gradualism -- Fuel of Wars" March 1968.

the war effort. The Subcommittee was also advised that operational decisions were at times being made without the involvement of responsible military professionals on the scene.

It is axiomatic that when a tactical commander is given a mission, once a policy has been approved, he must also be given latitude and control over intelligence and military capability to accomplish the mission. Continuing support within the defense establishment and the Administration is necessary for the commanders as they carry out assigned tasks.

Civilians in the Office of the Secretary of Defense have assumed greater control of contingency planning and military preparedness, and often have abandoned or ignored contingency plans in favor of rapidly conceived ad hoc decisions. Military operations, directed principally by civilians, have occurred, and illustrate suppression of the proper command and military role in our defense structure.

Research, Development and Procurement Practices

Civilian authority has been administered to over-control research, development and procurement. Under present procedures, new weapons systems will not be approved unless they are justified as a response to a visible new threat. Nor can a new system be approved until all technology and cost data are "in hand." Thus, research and development* policies threaten to deprive our nation of the military superiority sufficient to maintain our security.

Military judgment -- in a number of cases the considered judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff -- has not been followed in weapons selection and procurement. Many urgently-needed weapons systems have fallen victim to a misapplication of the cost effectiveness process, or become lost in a morass of civilian boards or working groups increasingly capable of vetoing proposals.

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* See Republican Coordinating Committee report "Research and Development: Our Neglected Weapon" May 1968.

The weapons systems evaluation capability of the Department of Defense is experienced and comprehensive. The individual services and the OSD Weapons Systems Evaluation Group prepare extensive evaluations of proposed new weapons systems. Frequently this process has been compromised, bypassed or ignored, the findings obscured. Civilian leaders have substituted judgments based on "other reasons."

A notable example is the TFX contract award. The contractor unanimously recommended by both the military analysts and the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group was rejected. Recently, the commonality feature of the aircraft imposed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense upon the Navy was rejected -- six years and many millions of dollars later. The development of a new aircraft for the Navy now will cost considerably more in new expenditure and lost time, while leaving the service arm with a present complement and types of planes it feels is inadequate.

A similar incident was the X-22 VSTOL aircraft contract award. The Senate Preparedness Subcommittee found that both civilian and military evaluators were over-ridden. The Subcommittee concluded that the final decision was made in thirty minutes by a Deputy Secretary of Defense with a handful of civilian advisors, discarding analyses of 75 Navy experts who had spent 4,000 man hours assessing competing designs.

As a result of frequent OSD rejections and cutbacks, the services have gravitated toward a policy of "half a loaf," which is simply acquiescence in inadequacy. This approach is unsound and cannot be condoned.

The Cost Effectiveness Hurdle

Proposed weapons systems for the military services must pass, under current OSD procedures, a cost effectiveness test -- an analysis requiring precise cost data, application definitions and a demonstration of utility against a specific military threat. Over-reliance on a theoretical and mechanical cost effectiveness procedure has distorted the national security decision-making process.

Decisions on weapons systems, strategy and tactics demand the additional input of practical, professional knowledge. Intuition and other human factors must be introduced into decision-making. War and defense preparations, with all of their unpredictabilities, are matters of judgment. Innovation cannot be predicted or quantified. Defense is an inexact science.

A former top civilian official of the Administration recently wrote on the organizational and procedural changes of the past seven years:

> "The second reason for (organizational) change made it essential for political leadership of the country to consider the implications of any military move no matter how minor. If war had already become too important to leave to the generals, the selection and deployment of weapons and forces to deter war were now at least equally important.
>
> "The need for more active political management could not have been made if the tools had not been available, and the tools might not have been picked up without the need to find and use them."*

The "tool" is primarily the cost effectiveness study. Many witnesses before Congressional committees have testified that the cost effectiveness study has often been used to cloud issues or to legitimize previously determined positions.

Appropriate applications of the cost effectiveness technique are necessary and important in the vast Defense Department structure. Indeed, in response to Hoover Commission recommendations, then Secretary of Defense James V. Forrestal introduced financial management procedures into the Department. Thereafter the system was continuously and properly expanded.

Such procedures are vital from a position of fiscal responsibility and orderliness. However, weaponry cost estimates cannot be allowed to remain as virtually the sole determinant on which national security decisions are based. Our nation's security demands a flexible assessment system for determining threats and the most effective response to them.

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* See Atlantic Monthly, September 1967

Misapplications of the cost effectiveness process can create critical conditions, some of which became evident in the Administration's FY 1969 budget. Items previously reduced or rejected by the Secretary of Defense were suddenly requested. For example, several thousand additional helicopters, long before requested by the Army, were provided for, in addition to several billion dollars for aircraft spare parts for all services. Since national security rests in part upon adequate "lead time" for the procurement of weapons and supporting materials, deliveries in the two categories above in 1969 or later may well render a part of our military establishment vulnerable or incapable of performing at an effective level.

Under this procedure, rejections or reduction in military requests are most frequently reported only verbally. Back-up material is not made available. Committees of the Congress are generally unable to examine cost effectiveness studies supporting a given decision. The Chairman of the National Security and International Operations Subcommittee, Senate Government Operations Committee, concluded after a hearing in 1967 that the analysis process has been so used that it may well be damaging to our nation's security.

Effects of Over-centralization

Over-centralization ensures greater control. It also can produce delays, depress creativity and initiative, and can prevent the emergence of new ideas from lower echelons -- the most fertile source. The Administration's zeal for over-centralization appears to stem from a desire to control policy, people and events. It has resulted in numerous instances of control of news, public information and intelligence.

An example is the TFX program. A policy memorandum was issued directing that all news releases on the program would uphold the validity of the decisions of the Secretary of Defense. Such is the internal power of an

over-centralized, publicly unresponsive structure. Under such circumstances, it is not surprising that the Administration's credibility has come under severe and sustained criticism.

The problem reaches into Congress, where defense committees expect to receive a free exchange of views on critical aspects of our national security. However, in observance of Administration and Defense Department restrictions, witnesses testify under a directive stating that they must express the views of the Administration unless "pressed." When "pressed," before stating his own views, the witness must first reiterate the views of the Administration.

On completion of Congressional hearings, testimony is examined by Defense Department officials for the purpose of deleting information the release of which might harm the nation's security. Frequently, however, deletions have been made not for security reasons but for political reasons. Examples of this practice are numerous, and are a matter of public record.

The August, 1967, report by the Senate Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee reflects the lack of candor between Defense Department civilians and the Congress. The subject was the war in Vietnam. The bipartisan Subcommittee arrived at such conclusions as these:

It was clearly implied by the Defense official that few, if any, important military targets remained unstruck. The great weight of the military testimony was to the contrary.

The Defense official said that North Vietnam could sustain its required import rate by way of land, rail and water from Red China. This position contrasts sharply with the views of military experts.

The Administration has asserted for years that the Defense Department cost reduction program has been highly effective. A report by the House Armed Services Committee and the General Accounting Office, on analysis of such claims, con-

cluded that not more than 50 percent of the alleged savings were valid. Nor does this figure take into account that Congressional budget cuts, if adhered to by the DOD, were considered "cost savings."

From the management standpoint, over-centralization of authority inevitably will produce increased costs and gross inefficiencies in an organization as large as the Department of Defense. Decisions on routine matters are posponed, and major decisions must also be delayed or too hastily reached. In many decisions, particularly those related to combat in Southeast Asia, the time factor is such that when the decisions are finally made and communicated, circumstances may have changed, opportunities lost, the decisions no longer applicable.

In research and development, where timing is critical, delays of decision have caused paralysis. Defense industry spokesmen have indicated that in the past, some four to six months would be required in the Pentagon between the time proposals were submitted and final approval. Today, it averages twelve months. Some take two years. This must be added to the extremely long lead-time of 5 to 10 years common to weapons research projects.

In the current research and development cycle, too many individuals can say "no" and very few can say "yes." Confusion has resulted from the separation of responsibility and authority. While a measure of review is necessary and advisable, a current typical review of a major new weapons system will be made by 17 different staff agencies and over 700 people before receiving final approval.

As reported in official organization charts,* the recent rapid increase of personnel in the Office of the Secretary of Defense has brought into serious imbalance the process required for sound assessment and implementation of national security policies. This is another illustration of the structural dislocations which have come to frustrate comprehensive policy analysis.

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* See Appendix II.

Effect on Morale

The effects of over-centralization on the morale of both military and civilian personnel are grave. Responsibility without commensurate authority is frustrating and demoralizing. The exercise of authority, so necessary to the experience of a military professional seeking a career, is difficult under current conditions. It is a capability on which this nation must rely in time of emergencies and conflicts. Further, the initiative necessary for both military and technical civilian personnel is an imperative for a responsive national security structure. The cumulative effect of the current policies, procedures and organization is to weaken this vital ingredient.

Recommendations

The principle of civilian control over our national security structure requires that authority reside in the President. The two major counselors to him must be the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State. Focus at this level should primarily assume a broad policy-making and enforcing function.

In view of the threatening international environment, the collapse of time, and our exceedingly complex governmental structure, adherence to a formal decision-making process such as the National Security Council is a necessary prerequisite for effectively providing for the nation's security.

We must have a more articulate definition of our national interests and the steps required to promote them. Upon such determinations a clear policy must be set.

A crucial point in the national security process is placing the most capable people in key positions. Good national security policy requires good policy makers as well as good policy machinery.

The policy decision-making process must be planned and organized, and must make use of the talents of responsible individuals within the structure. Timely and regular meetings must be held. A coordination function must be established to ensure prompt and effective implementation. Follow-through and analysis of the effect of promulgated policies must be reinstituted, with reports from all involved sectors.

Detailed implementation of both planning and operations should be delegated to lower echelons, which must have both the necessary authority and responsibility to carry out assignments.

There must be reaffirmation of the responsibility to better inform both Congress and the electorate on issues affecting our national security, within appropriate safeguards.

Budgetary policy guidelines to the services must be clarified. There should be greater emphasis on the reestablishment of the priority budget concept utilizing to the extent practicable the "mission" basis.

The role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be reaffirmed, ensuring their direct and active participation in the development of policy, weapons system and force planning.

Advanced management techniques should be utilized in their proper role as tools, not as ends in themselves.

Conclusion

The extreme over-centralization and over-management of our national security structure on the one hand, and the extensive ad hoc policy deliberations on the other, developed in the past seven years, have weakened our national security position and created increased risks. It has brought into question this nation's ability to respond in a timely and effective manner to crises which threaten America's vital interests.

Regarding overcentralization, in 1949 Ferdinand Eberstadt, one of the foremost students of defense organization, testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee, stating:

> "From shattered illusions that mere passage of a unification act would produce a military utopia, there has sprung an equally illusory belief that present shortcomings will immediately disappear if only more and more authority is conferred in the Secretary of Defense and more and more people added to his staff... I suggest that great care be exercised lest the Office of the Secretary of Defense, instead of being a small and efficient unit which determines the policies of the military establishment and controls and directs the departments, feeding on its own growth, becomes a separate empire."

Today the separate empire exists. Balance must be restored, to ensure our nation's security, and to reinforce our ability to respond quickly to challenge.

Equally important are policies and an organization structure that will at all times conform to our representative form of government, with its system of checks and balances.

APPENDIX I

Title 50 - U. S. Code

Section 402. National Security Council.

(a) Establishment; presiding officer; functions; composition.

There is established a council to be known as the National Security Council (hereinafter in this section referred to as the "Council").

The President of the United States shall preside over meetings of the Council: Provided, That in his absence he may designate a member of the Council to preside in his place.

The function of the Council shall be to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security.

The Council shall be composed of--

(1) the President;
(2) the Vice President;
(3) the Secretary of State;
(4) the Secretary of Defense;
(5) the Director for Mutual Security;
(6) The Chairman of the National Security Resources Board; and
(7) the Secretaries and Under Secretaries of other executive departments, the Chairman of the Munitions Board, and the Chairman of the Research and Development Board, when appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to serve at his pleasure.

(b) Additional functions.

In addition to performing such other functions as the President may direct, for the purpose of more effectively coordinating the policies and functions of the departments and agencies of the Government relating to the national security, it shall, subject to the direction of the President, be the duty of the Council --

(1) to assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States in relation to our actual and potential military power, in the interest of national security, for the purpose of making recommendations to the President in connection therewith; and

(2) to consider policies on matters of common interest to the departments and agencies of the Government concerned with the national security, and to make recommendations to the President in connection therewith.

APPENDIX I (continued)

(c) Executive secretary; appointment and compensation; staff employees.

The Council shall have a staff to be headed by a civilian executive secretary who shall be appointed by the President. The executive secretary, subject to the direction of the Council, is authorized, subject to the civil-service laws and the Classification Act of 1949, to appoint and fix the compensation of such personnel as may be necessary to perform such duties as may be prescribed by the Council in connection with the performance of its functions.

(d) Recommendations and reports.

The Council shall, from time to time, make such recommendations, and such other reports to the President as it deems appropriate or as the President may require. (July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title I, Section 101, 61 Stat. 497; Aug. 10, 1949, ch. 412, Section 3, 63 Stat. 579; Oct. 28, 1949, ch. 782, title XI, Section 1106 (a), 63 Stat. 972; Oct. 10, 1951, ch. 479, title V, Section 501 (e) (1), 65 Stat. 378.)

APPENDIX II

ORGANIZATION OF FEDERAL EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (exclusive of separate services personnel)

Personnel - 1/1/61

Office of the Secretary of Defense	**136**
Secretary of Defense	7
Deputy Secretary of Defense	4
Office of Administrative Secretary	25
Administrative Office of the Secretary	100
Director of Defense Research and Engineering	**265**
Office of the Director	234
Weapons Systems Evaluation Group	31
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)	**170**
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health and Medical)	**11**
Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)	**212**
Office of Assistant Secretary	185
Defense Representative, NA and MA and U. S. Rep. USRO	27
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Personnel and Reserve)	**86**
Office of Assistant Secretary	82
Reserve Forces Policy Board	4
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Properties and Installations)	**57**
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)	**74**
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Supply and Logistics)	**166**
General Counsel	**56**
Assistant to the Secretary (Atomic Energy)	**12**
Assistant to the Secretary (Legislative Affairs)	**7**
Assistant to the Secretary (Special Operations)	**17**
Special Programs	**15**
Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff	**302**
Office of the Chairman	10
Joint Staff	187
Other Joint Chiefs of Staff Activities	105
Other Activities	**223**
Advanced Research Projects Agency	80
Standing Group—NATO	41
U. S. Court of Military Appeals	38
Interdepartmental Activities	5
Defense Communications Agency	59
Total employees (47 WOC)	[1] **1,809**

[1] Includes 40 part-time and WAE, and 38 overseas employees.

Personnel - 1/1/67

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE	**2,124**
Secretary of Defense	**4**
Deputy Secretary of Defense	**5**
Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Office of the Director	**212**
Advanced Research Projects Agency	138
Weapons Systems Evaluation Group	36
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Administration)	**226**
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)	**325**
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics)	**282**
Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)	**233**
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower)	**250**
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)	**87**
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis)	**142**
General Counsel	**54**
Miscellaneous Activities	**40**
Special Staff Assistants	**46**
USRO	**32**
NATO Force Planning	**11**
Special Project	**1**
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ORGANIZATION	**467**
Office of the Chairman	14
Joint Staff	225
Other Joint Chiefs of Staff Activities	228
OTHER DEFENSE ACTIVITIES	**73,265**
Armed Forces Information and Education	**403**
Defense Contract Audit Agency	**3,745**
Defense Atomic Support Agency	**2,198**
Defense Communications Agency	**1,235**
Classified Activities	**3,328**
Defense Supply Agency	**62,356**
Interdepartmental Activities	**37**
International Military Activities	**59**
Total employees (35 WOC)	[1] **75,952**

[1] Includes 3,450 part-time and WAE employees, and 913 employees outside U.S., of which 415 are American citizens.

Office of the Secretary (including Other Defense Activities)	**75,952**
Department of the Army	**455,523**
Department of the Navy	**376,879**
Department of the Air Force	**321,425**
Total, DOD (43 WOC)	[2] **1,229,779**

[2] Includes a total of 20,588 WAE employees and 153,541 employees outside U.S., of whom 35,266 are American citizens and 118,275 nationals of other countries.

Source: Organization of Federal Executive Departments and Agencies, U. S. Senate Committee on Government Operations.

APPENDIX II

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY (exclusive of separate services personnel)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY	As of 1/1/61
Secretary of Defense Area	**41**
Office of the Director of Armed Forces Information and Education	39
Office of Industrial Personnel Access Authorization Review	2
Secretary of Army Area	**671**
Office of the Secretary and the Under Secretary of the Army	38
Office, Assistant Secretary of the Army (MP and RF)	26
Office, Assistant Secretary of the Army (FM)	22
Office, Assistant Secretary of the Army (Logistics)	28
Office, Director of Research and Development	8
Office, Administrative Assistant to Secretary of the Army	8
Office, Chief of Public Information	5
Office, Chief of Legislative Liaison	48
Office of General Counsel	19
Administrative Support Group	35
Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals	16
Armed Services Explosive Safety Board	11
Army Board for Correction of Military Records	20
Army Civilian Lawyer Career Committee	3
Army Council of Review Boards	14
Grievance and Employment Policy Board	7
Defense Supply Service	177
Defense Telephone Service	103
Employment Coordination Office	6
Management Office	9
Office, Personnel Manager	15
Office of Management Analysis	5
National Board for Promotion of Rifle Practice	20
Security Review and Security Screening Boards	3
Space Management Service	4
Per Diem Travel and Transportation Allowance Committee	21
Army Staff (Departmental and Field)	[1] **18,717**
Office, Chief of Staff	128
General Staff Committee on National Guard and Review Policy	2
Comptroller of the Army	260
Army Audit Agency	1,312
Chief of Information	112
Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel	477
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence	948
Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations	337
Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics	524
Chief of Finance	4,186
Industrial College of the Armed Forces	104
Office of The Inspector General	48
Office of the Chief of Military History	63
The Judge Advocate General	218
Armed Forces Information and Education, DOD	385
National War College	88
National Guard Bureau	189
Office of the Chief, Army Reserve and ROTC Affairs	40
Office of the Chief of Civil Affairs	37
Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve Components	20
United States Military Academy	1,934
The Adjutant General	4,010
Chief of Chaplains	57
Provost Marshal General	156
Chief of Research and Development	175
Army Physical Review Council	7
Military Communications and Electronics Board	2
Army Special and Joint Activities	2,898
Miscellaneous Area Activities	**4**
Army Air Defense Command	**117**
Civil Functions Corps of Engineers	**27,268**
Technical Services	**208,147**
Chief Chemical Officer	8,698
Chief of Ordnance	95,447
Quartermaster General	29,364
Chief Signal Officer	24,585
Surgeon General	8,449
Chief of Transportation	14,630
Chief of Engineers, Military Functions	26,974
Continental Army Command	**67,445**
U. S. Continental Army Command	948
First U. S. Army	8,271
Second U. S. Army	10,443
Third U. S. Army	15,336
Fourth U. S. Army	10,710
Fifth U. S. Army	10,543
Sixth U. S. Army	9,269
Military District of Washington, U. S. Army	1,925
Alaska	[2] **2,793**
Hawaii	[2] **5,032**
Total continental United States	**330,225**
Total outside continental United States	**50,439**
Total employees (7 WOC)	[3] **380,674**

[1] Excludes 5,053 Technical Staff personnel (departmental) included with Technical Services.
[2] Data shown for Alaska and Hawaii are by geographical area, not by command.
[3] Includes 1,298 part-time and WAE employees and 50,439 overseas employees, of which 13,616 are American citizens and 36,823 are nationals of other countries.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY	As of 1/1/67
Secretary of the Army Area (Departmental and Field)	**1,101**
Office of the Secretary and the Under Secretary of the Army	45
Office, Assistant Secretary of the Army (FM)	17
Office, Assistant Secretary of the Army (I&L)	56
Office, Assistant Secretary of the Army (R&D)	14
Office, Administrative Assistant to Secretary of the Army	9
Office, Chief of Public Information	6
Office, Chief of Legislative Liaison	69
Office of General Counsel	21
Administrative Support Group	35
Army Board for Correction of Military Records	22
Army Council of Review Boards	11
Grievance and Employment Policy Board	13
Employment Coordination Service	7
Management Office	16
Office, Personnel Manager	15
National Board for Promotion of Rifle Practice	21
Space Management Service	4
Office of Civil Defense	720
Army Staff Area (Departmental and Field)	**45,451**
Office, Chief of Staff	350
General Staff Committee on National Guard and Review Policy	2
Special Assistant for Army Information and Data Systems	332
Comptroller of the Army	285
Army Audit Agency	741
Chief of Information	126
Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel	510
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence	887
Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development	333
Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations	258
Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics	649
Chief of Finance	4,659
Office of The Inspector General	44
Office of the Chief of Military History	74
The Judge Advocate General	235
National Guard Bureau	118
Office of the Chief, Army Reserve	51
Office of the Chief, Reserve Components	51
Office of Personnel Operations	1,122
Office of the President	4
United States Military Academy	2,271
The Adjutant General	4,467
Chief of Chaplains	33
Provost Marshal General	58
Chief of Research and Development	559
Chief of Engineers, Military Functions	12,699
Chief of Communications—Electronics	360
Chief of Support Services	1,050
Surgeon General	10,584
U S Army Recruiting Command	2,557
DOD and Joint Activities	**1,322**
Joint Brazil-U.S. Defense Commission	1
Joint Mexican-U.S. Defense Commission	1
Office, Industrial Personnel Access Authorization Review	6
Industrial College of the Armed Forces	92
National War College	69
SHAPE Liaison	2
Armed Services Explosive Safety Board	12
Defense Supply Service	199
Defense Telephone Service	95
Per Diem Travel and Transportation Allowance Committee	23
Defense Language Institute	779
Defense Information School	43
Army Security Agency	**1,077**
Army Air Defense Command	**295**
Combat Developments Command	**1,022**
Army Materiel Command	**161,007**
Headquarters, AMC	2,601
U.S. Army Tank Automotive Center	6,846
U.S. Army Aviation Materiel Command	3,879
U.S. Army Electronics Command	11,338
U.S. Army Missile Command	9,851
U.S. Army Mobility Command	4,580
U.S. Army Munitions Command	26,522
U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command	12,975
U.S. Army Supply and Maintenance	63,075
U.S. Army Weapons Command	12,635
Other Activities	9,705
Continental Army Command	**107,134**
U.S. Continental Army Command	1,133
First U.S. Army	31,117
Third U.S. Army	27,278
Fourth U.S. Army	19,310
Fifth U.S. Army	14,760
Sixth U.S. Army	11,139
Military District of Washington, U.S. Army	2,417
Military Traffic Management Service	**6,212**
Intelligence Corps Command	**911**
Army Strategic Communications Command	**2,681**
Civil Functions, Corps of Engineers	**30,701**
Miscellaneous	**7**
Alaska [1]	**2,987**
Hawaii [1]	**5,899**
Total United States	**361,941**
Total outside U.S.	**84,696**
Total employees (4 WOC)	**455,523**

[1] Data shown is by geographical area, not by command.
[2] Includes 7,127 part-time and WAE employees and 84,696 employees outside U.S., of whom 15,440 are American citizens and 69,256 are nationals of other countries.

Source: Organization of Federal Executive Departments and Agencies, U. S. Senate Committee on Government Operations

APPENDIX II (continued)

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY (exclusive of separate services personnel)

As of 1/1/61

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY	
Executive Office of the Secretary	**2,144**
Office of Secretary of the Navy	25
Office of Under Secretary of the Navy	4
Office of Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Material)	16
Office of Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research and Development)	5
Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Personnel and Reserve Forces)	8
Office of Admin. Asst. to Sec. Navy	7
Office of Analysis and Review	23
Administrative Office	785
Office of the Comptroller	346
Office of the General Counsel	26
Office of Industrial Relations	133
Office of Information	13
Navy Management Office	66
Office of Naval Material	191
Office of Naval Petroleum Reserves	4
Office of Naval Research	400
Board for Correction of Naval Records	12
Naval Physical Disability Review Board	16
Naval Physical Review Council	5
Special Assignments and Details to Other Agencies	2
Electronics Production Resources Agency	21
Office of Industrial Personnel Access Authorization Review	3
Office of Legislative Affairs	20
Savings Bonds Office	1
Navy Panel, Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals	12
Office of the Judge Advocate General	**97**
Office of Chief of Naval Operations	**1,046**
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations	3
Staff Offices	26
Assistant Vice Chief of Naval Operations/Director of Naval Administration	240
Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence)	357
Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Communications)	76
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Personnel and Naval Reserve)	14
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Fleet Operations and Readiness)	35
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Logistics)	107
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air)	95
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Plans and Policy)	29
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Development)	64
Bureau of Medicine and Surgery	**375**
Office of the Chief	12
Assistant Chief for Personnel and Professional Operations	157
Assistant Chief for Planning and Logistics	165
Assistant Chief for Aviation Medicine	9
Assistant Chief for Dentistry	12
Assistant Chief for Research and Military Medical Specialties	20
Bureau of Naval Personnel	**1,699**
Office of the Chief	12
Administrative and Management Division	113
Inspector General	1
Special Assistant to the Chief for Leadership	5
Personnel Research Division	23
Office of Liaison and Technical Information	5
Manpower Information Division	220
Assistant Chief for Plans	61
Assistant Chief for Personnel Control	442
Assistant Chief for Education and Training	135
Assistant Chief for Naval Reserve and Naval District Affairs	8
Assistant Chief for Records	473
Assistant Chief for Performance	39
Assistant Chief for Morale Services	68
Assistant Chief for Finance	73
Chief of Chaplains	10
Assistant Chief for Property Management	11
Bureau of Naval Weapons	**3,318**
Office of the Chief and Deputy Chief	8
Assistant Chief for Program Management	256
Inspector General and Assistant Chief for Administration	478
Assistant Chief for Fleet Readiness	426
Office of Counsel	46
Office of the Comptroller	155
Assistant Chief for Contracts	361
Assistant Chief for Production and Quality Control	290
Assistant Chief for Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation	943
Assistant Chief for Field Support	108
Special Projects Office	247
Bureau of Ships	**3,083**
Office of the Chief	40
Assistant Chief for Plans and Administration, and Inspector General	475
Assistant Chief for Research and Development	91
Assistant Chief for Design, Shipbuilding and Fleet Maintenance	601
Assistant Chief for Technical Logistics	1,279
Assistant Chief for Field Activities	172
Assistant Chief for Nuclear Propulsion	67
Contract Division	214
Comptroller Division	144
Bureau of Supplies and Accounts	**754**
Office of the Chief	89
Director of Planning	41
Director of Management Engineering	69
Director of Industrial Relations	35
Director of Naval Personnel	26
Comptroller of the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts	183
Assistant Chief for Supply Mgt.	111
Assistant Chief for Transportation	112
Director of Mutual Security Programs	34
Assistant Chief for Purchasing	33
Assistant Chief for Research and Development	21
Bureau of Yards and Docks	**841**
Office of the Chief	33
Assistant Chief for Administration and Comptroller	272
Assistant Chief for Planning and Design	228
Assistant Chief for Construction	109
Assistant Chief for Maintenance and Materiel	113
Assistant Chief for Real Estate	40
Assistant Chief of Housing	46
Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps	**1,083**
Office of the Commandant	6
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1	20
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3	20
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4	16
Personnel Department	311
Division of Aviation	18
Administrative Division	86
Supply Department	434
Inspection Division	4
Division of Information	5
Fiscal Division	47
Division of Reserve	10
Marine Corps Boards	4
Data Processing Division	102
Total departmental	**14,440**
Continental U. S.	**320,925**
Overseas	**[1]22,054**
Total all areas (1 WOC)	**[2]342,979**

[1] Includes 6,778 American citizens and 15,276 nationals of other countries.
[2] Includes 934 part-time and WAE employees

As of 1/1/67

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY	
Executive Office of the Secretary	**116**
Office of Secretary of the Navy	38
Office of Under Secretary of the Navy	9
Office of Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Installations and Logistics)	42
Office of Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research and Development)	11
Office of Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management)	5
Office of the Special Asst. to Sec. Navy	4
Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of the Navy (Manpower)	7
Department of the Navy Staff Offices	**1,318**
Office of Program Appraisal	14
Administrative Office	226
Office of the Comptroller	237
Office of the General Counsel	21
Office of Civilian Manpower Management	235
Office of Information	39
Office of Management Information	41
Office of Petroleum Reserves	6
Office of Naval Research	400
Board for Correction of Naval Records	14
Navy Council of Personnel Boards	16
Physical Review Council	6
Office of Legislative Affairs	28
Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals	35
Office of the Judge Advocate General	**79**
Office of Chief of Naval Operations	**990**
Staff Offices	14
Assistant Vice Chief of Naval Operations/Director of Naval Administration	255
Navy Program Planning Office	66
Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence)	150
Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Communications)	60
Office of Anti-Submarine Warfare Programs	10
Office of Naval Inspector General	24
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Manpower and Naval Reserve)	39
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Fleet Operations and Readiness)	64
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Logistics)	110
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air)	94
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Plans and Policy)	33
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Development)	71
Bureau of Medicine and Surgery	**327**
Office of the Chief	10
Assistant Chief for Personnel and Professional Operations	151
Assistant Chief for Planning and Logistics	126
Assistant Chief for Aviation Medicine	9
Assistant Chief for Dentistry	12
Assistant Chief for Research and Military Medical Specialties	19
Bureau of Naval Personnel	**1,771**
Office of the Chief	10
Administrative and Management Division	115
Office of Inspector General	1
Office of Liaison and Technical Information	5
Manpower Information Division	248
Assistant Chief for Plans	78
Assistant Chief for Personnel Control	451
Assistant Chief for Education and Training	157
Assistant Chief for Naval Reserve and Naval District Affairs	7
Assistant Chief for Records	465
Assistant Chief for Performance	41
Assistant Chief for Morale Services	66
Assistant Chief for Finance	89
Chief of Chaplains	10
Assistant Chief for Property Management	12
Special Assistant to Chief for Retention Task Force	3
Navy Department Board of Decorations and Medals	7
Board for Correction of Records	1
Outside Bureau Details	5
Office of Naval Material	**460**
Office of the Chief	12
Deputy Chief of Naval Material for Program and Financial Management	98
Deputy Chief of Naval Material for Procurement	106
Deputy Chief of Naval Material for Development	95
Deputy Chief of Naval Material for Logistic Support	84
Deputy Chief of Naval Material for Management and Organization	65
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps	**1,244**
Office of the Commandant	42
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1	22
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3	17
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4	40
Personnel Department	342
Administrative Division	151
Supply Department	309
Inspection Department	3
Division of Information	8
Fiscal Division	158
Division of Reserve	10
Marine Corps Boards	4
Data Processing Division	138
Military Sea Transportation Service	**292**
Total departmental service	**6,597**
Total United States	**344,648**
Total outside U.S.	**32,231**
Total all areas (1 WOC)	**[2]376,879**

[1] Includes 9,790 American citizens and 22,441 nationals of other countries
[2] Includes 5,488 part-time and WAE employees

Source: Organization of Federal Executive Departments and Agencies, U. S. Senate Committee on Government Operations

APPENDIX II (continued)

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE (exclusive of separate services personnel)

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE	As of 1/1/61
Office of the Secretary	**307**
Secretary of the Air Force	6
Under Secretary of the Air Force	6
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Materiel)	27
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management)	12
Special Assistant to the Secretary (Manpower, Personnel and Reserve Forces)	9
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Research and Development)	9
Special Assistant for Installations	7
Administrative Assistant	61
General Counsel	32
Office of Legislative Liaison	84
Office of Information Services	38
Secretary of the Air Force Personnel Council	10
Office, Missile and Satellite Systems	6
Headquarters, U. S. Air Force	**4,446**
Chief of Staff	9
Vice Chief of Staff	18
Scientific Advisory Board	68
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence	122
Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve Forces	9
The Inspector General	34
The Surgeon General	193
The Judge Advocate General	90
Secretary of the Air Staff	277
Directorate of Administrative Services	499
Comptroller of the Air Force	641
Deputy Chief of Staff, Development	122
Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations	646
Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Programs	152
Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel	605
Deputy Chief of Staff, Materiel	321
Central Control Group	528
Mutual Defense Aid Program	112
Air Materiel Command	**151,013**
Headquarters and Subsidiary Units	17,090
Aeronautical Systems Center	1,378
Ballistic Missiles Center	669
Central Contract Management Region	3,177
Eastern Contract Management Region	3,576
Electronic Systems Center	371
Western Contract Management Region	3,476
Middletown, Pa., Air Materiel Area	10 544
Mobile, Ala., Air Materiel Area	15 001
Ogden, Utah, Air Materiel Area	11 327
Oklahoma City, Okla., Air Materiel Area	18 601
Rome, N.Y., Air Materiel Area	7,682
San Antonio, Tex., Air Materiel Area	19 596
Sacramento, Calif., Air Materiel Area	13 602
San Bernardino, Calif., Air Materiel Area	9 906
Warner-Robins, Georgia Air Materiel Area	15 023
Strategic Air Command	**18,065**
Headquarters and Subsidiary Units	1 767
Second Air Force	6 187
Eighth Air Force	4 528
Fifteenth Air Force	5 583
Tactical Air Command	**6,649**
Headquarters and Subsidiary Units	1 254
Ninth Air Force	1,194
Twelfth Air Force	4 196
Nineteenth Air Force	5
Aeronautical Chart and Information Center	**3,261**
Air Defense Command	**9,031**
Air Force Accounting and Finance Center	**1,732**
Air Research and Development Command	**22,956**
Air Training Command	**23,909**
Air University	**2,361**
Continental Air Command	**9,761**
Headquarters Command, USAF	**6,017**
Military Air Transport Service	**10,111**
U. S. Air Force Academy	**1,739**
USAF Security Service	**875**
Total continental U. S.	**273,033**
Overseas	[1]**33,538**
Total employees (46 WOC)	[2]**306,571**

[1]Includes 14,179 American citizens and 19 359 nationals of other countries
[2]Includes 755 WAE employees

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE	As of 1/1/67
Office of the Secretary	**347**
Secretary of the Air Force	6
Under Secretary of the Air Force	3
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Installations and Logistics)	28
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management)	17
Special Assistant to the Secretary for Manpower	14
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Research and Development)	18
Deputy Undersecretary (International Affairs)	3
Air Force Board for the Correction of Military Records	12
Administrative Assistant	78
General Counsel	33
Office of Legislative Liaison	83
Office of Information	40
Secretary of the Air Force Personnel Council	12
Headquarters, U.S. Air Force	**2,983**
Chief of Staff	8
Vice Chief of Staff	14
Scientific Advisory Board	8
Director, Secretariat	11
Director of Administrative Services	147
Secretary of the Air Staff	141
Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve Forces	5
Chief, Operations Analysis	41
Chief of Chaplains	12
The Inspector General	26
The Judge Advocate General	61
The Surgeon General	146
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence	112
Comptroller of the Air Force	419
Deputy Chief of Staff, Programs and Resources	476
Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel	295
Deputy Chief of Staff, Research and Development	173
Deputy Chief of Staff, Systems and Logistics	418
Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Operations	204
Central Control Group	167
Military Assistance Program	99
Air Force Logistics Command	**131,336**
Headquarters and Subsidiary Units	16,522
Middletown Air Materiel Area	2,427
Mobile Air Materiel Area	6,842
Oklahoma City Air Materiel Area	23,191
Ogden Air Materiel Area	17,371
Rome Air Materiel Area	3,072
San Antonio Air Materiel Area	23,334
Sacramento Air Materiel Area	19,689
Warner Robins Air Materiel Area	18,888
Air Force Systems Command	**32,238**
Headquarters and Subsidiary Units	1,148
Arnold Engineering Development Center	145
Air Force Flight Test Center	2,074
Aeronautical Systems Division	3,364
Ballistic Systems Division	740
Electronic Systems Division	2,277
Air Force Missile Development Center	1,637
Space Systems Division	1,114
Research and Technology Division	6,260
Air Proving Ground Center	2,649
Air Force Special Weapons Center	1,263
Aerospace Medical Division	1,782
Foreign Technology Division	895
National Range Division	3,071
Air Force Contract Management Division	3,819
Strategic Air Command	**20,648**
Headquarters and SubsidiaryUnits	1,689
Second Air Force	5,802
Eighth Air Force	5,456
Fifteenth Air Force	6,461
1st Strategic Aerospace Division	1,240
Tactical Air Command	**11,292**
Headquarters and Subsidiary Units	1,468
Ninth Air Force	3,499
Twelfth Air Force	5,586
Nineteenth Air Force	6
USAF, Special Air Warfare Center	676
USAF, Tactical Air Warfare Center	32
USAF, Tactical Air Reconnaissance Center	25
Aeronautical Chart and Information Center	**3,728**
Air Defense Command	**12,511**
Air Force Accounting and Finance Center	**1,793**
Air Force Communications Service	**4,292**
Air Training Command	**21,860**
Air University	**2,521**
Continental Air Command	**8,938**
Headquarters Command, USAF	**6,726**
Military Air Transport Service	**15,236**
Office of Aerospace Research	**1,388**
U.S. Air Force Academy	**1,898**
U.S. Air Force Security Service	**1,202**
Alaskan Air Command in Alaska	**2,422**
Pacific Air Forces in Hawaii	**2,365**
Total United States	**285,724**
Total outside U.S.	[1]**35,701**
Total employees (4 WOC)	[2]**321,425**

[1]Includes 9,621 American citizens and 26 080 nationals of other countries
[2]Includes 4,523 WAE employees

Source: Organization of Federal Executive Departments and Agencies, U. S. Senate Committee on Government Operations

Office Copy

Republican National Committee

1625 EYE STREET, NORTHWEST, WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006 NATIONAL 8-6800

NEWS

FOR RELEASE

MONDAY A.M.'s
May 27, 1968

REPUBLICAN COORDINATING COMMITTEE URGES IMMEDIATE STEPS TO REBUILD LAGGING RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT OF WEAPONS

The Republican Coordinating Committee today called for an "aggressive" research and development program in the field of weapons development to reverse an "appalling record" in which not one new start has been made on advanced strategic or nuclear weapons systems in the last seven years.

In a 37-page report entitled "Research and Development: Our Neglected Weapon," the GOP policy group blamed the situation on fear within Democratic regimes that new improvements would excite "undesirable Soviet reactions," on acceptance of a policy of parity with Russia, and on an overly optimistic assessment of Soviet intentions.

The report, which was prepared by the Coordinating Committee's Task Force on National Security, was released today by Republican National Chairman Ray C. Bliss. Former Secretaries of Defense Neil H. McElroy and Thomas S. Gates, Jr., are Co-Chairmen of the Task Force, which consists of civilian and military experts.

Emphasizing that the time lag in producing a new weapons system is from five to 15 years, the Coordinating Committee warned that the restrictions which Democratic Administrations of the present decade have imposed on weapons development may result in "obsolescent" weapons systems being produced before they reach the field.

-MORE-

The Committee said:

"Because of this long lead time--because also each scientific breakthrough feeds and spurs other discoveries--the nation that falls behind the weapons system cycle will likely have neither the time nor the capability to catch up."

While the United States has placed shackles on its research and development program, the Coordinating Committee said, the Russians are pushing forward in numerous directions, driving relentlessly for superiority.

The Republican policy-makers said:

"Against this obvious Soviet reach for technological and military supremacy, what has been the U.S. record these past seven years?

"Overall, it is an appalling record. During all this period, there has not been one new start on advanced strategic or nuclear weapon systems. Every ICBM and every strategic bomber in America's arsenal today was a legacy from the Eisenhower Administration...

"Even in military space systems the major emphasis has consistently been on passive satellites until the recent approval of the Manned Orbital Laboratory program--a program delayed for years. Advanced programs under development by the Eisenhower Administration--Dyna-Soar and SPAD--were cancelled.

"In the tactical area, the aircraft carrying the burden in Vietnam--the F-4, F-105, and the A-6--were all initiated in the 1950s. The primary missiles used by these aircraft, such as Sidewinder, Bullpup, and Shrike, are all Eisenhower Administration developments...

"Still less comprehensible is the Administration's decision to rely on the F-106 of the early fifties' technological vintage for our air defense forces. For more than five years we have had far superior Mach 3 fighters such as the F-12 flying on test.

"The F-106 is slower than the French Concorde, a transport. It is at least one generation behind the F-12 engine, materials and performance figures. The

fact that for at least three years we could have built F-12 fighters superior to any aircraft in the Soviet inventory, and to date have deliberately passed the opportunity by, further suggests that the Administration is less than zealous in keeping the United States ahead."

The Republican policy group said that the Administration "has also been content to drift" in the development of smaller tactical weapons, and that forced to act at last by the Vietnam war "it began a crash program with the high costs, inefficiencies and waste that always attend such programs."

Pointing to the troubles with the TFX (F-111), the Coordinating Committee said the plane is costing $6 million each instead of the $2.4 million originally estimated, that the Navy version has been found unacceptable, and that the bomber version "does not meet Air Force requirements for an advanced bomber in the 1970 time frame."

To reverse the lag in weapons development, the Committee recommended the following steps:

--"A firm policy of assuring military superiority for the United States must be adopted and implemented.

--"Establishment of priorities for weapons systems development must be derived from an objective assessment of the threat, on the one hand, and the pace of technology, on the other, then aggressively pursued with adequate funding.

--"Redefinition of authority at a lower level, restoring responsibility and initiative to responsible commands of the military departments.

--"Reintroduction of healthy, but controlled, inter-service competition to include actual weapons development in addition to paper studies.

--"Revision of organization and procedures to help encourage initiative and foster creativity in research and development.

--"An adequate technical facility base, both government and private, must be reestablished and maintained.

--"An increased level of joint research and development effort with our allies should be encouraged."

The GOP policy-makers said:

"This nation's research and development effort has not been progressing at a pace equal to either the accelerating spiral of science and technology or the expanding threat. The Soviets in particular have exhibited an aggressive research and development effort to win the technological race...

"In our view, technological superiority is demanded by both military requirements and economic necessity. Since the means to achieve superiority will have been determined years before, and we have already forfeited years, decisions must be made with great urgency to reorient our research and development programs.

"Advances in technology must be exploited in weapons development with imagination, determination and zeal. At stake is the peace and security of the United States and the free world."

The Coordinating Committee said the United States could not be content "with stalemate or parity." Yet, the Committee said, "current policies appear to accept, if not to seek, parity with the USSR."

The Republican policy group said:

"The Administration's approach has been passive--a sterile, inadequate 'reaction'. New developments have achieved emphasis only when justified as responses to visible new threats. Yet, new enemy threats can be secretly in development for five or six years before they are detected. In any area, therefore, we can fall years behind if our advances in the same area are contingent on the know progress of other nations."

The Coordinating Committee said that implicit in the present policy "are conceptual barriers to the pursuit of aggressive research and development."

The Committee added:

"People powerfully situated in this Administration have believed that for the foreseeable future the United States and the Soviet Union will be at a standoff in advanced military technology and little can be done to alter this balance."

With reference to the slowdown in weapons development, the Committee said:

"This delay is induced by the Administration's inclination to give greater weight to optimistic assessments of Soviet intentions than to hard-headed measurements of capabilities.

"For example, the Administration persuaded itself that the Soviets would probably not deploy an orbital bombardment vehicle or an anti-ballistic missile system. Part of the problem is 'mirror thinking'. Our leaders having decided against utilizing these systems, they assumed the Soviets would reason similarly. It was a gross mistake.

"In a period when science and technology are making significant strides and the evidence is that the Soviets are aggressively advancing the state of the art, this nation must weigh heavily the Soviet capabilities.

"An example is the Soviet achievement of 'fractional' orbital capability. Knowing also that they have adequate control and thrust, we must assume that they now have or soon will have a complete orbital capability, international treaties notwithstanding.

"We must not wait until we suddenly discover that such a vehicle is being tested. This precautionary approach must be applied across the whole weapons spectrum...

"Although never outwardly stated as policy, it is evident that this Administration is applying arms control considerations early in the R and D cycle. This

is reasonable only if there is concrete knowledge that our enemies are also applying the same considerations at the same place."

The GOP policy-makers recalled that in February the Director of Research and Engineering for the Defense Department said that since 1964 the overall research and technological effort had declined by a "critical" 30 per cent.

The Coordinating Committee said that three basic restrictions have brought about the lag in weapons development:

--An unwise use of the"cost-effectiveness" system, in which costs analysts have become dominant in the decision-making process, and conclusions often are reached that "discard valid military judgment."

--A requirement that military services show that all necessary technology is "in hand" as a prerequisite for approving new programs, that is, that the services must demonstrate that the technology can be produced.

--A demand that "excessive assurance of a clear-cut military requirement" be given before proceeding with the research and development of a new weapons system.

With regard to the use made of cost effectiveness in recent years, the Coordinating Committee pointed out that it is not a new instrument in evaluating military programs.

The Committee added:

"In recent years, however, the tool has become, not the servant, but the master of management...

"The Congressional Committees concerned with defense have found it extremely difficult and often impossible to obtain the actual cost-effectiveness studies upon which critical decisions have been based..

"Second, cost-effectiveness studies demand elaborate costing data. Technology must be in hand in order for precise costing information to be obtained.

"A research program pushing the state of the art has too many unknowns to be costed precisely. Further, a proposed improvement in a system growing out of a technological advance requires another round of cost-effectiveness analysis on that system.

"Cost-effectiveness studies as currently developed give maximum priority to quantifiable data and tend to subordinate subjective factors, even human life.

"These studies appear modern, scientific and objective. Applied properly, they can be. But they are misused when their conclusions are permitted to dominate essentially military decisions or justify predetermined views."

With regard to the requirement that the services show that necessary technology is "in hand," the Republican policy group said:

"The goal of budget saving has been laudable, but the net effect produces second-best, obsolescent systems compared to those of countries willing to press technology forward throughout the development cycle.

"If all technology must be in hand six months to a year before contract, and five or more years must elapse between contract and delivery, subsequent technological advances can be incorporated in the final systems only as retrofits.

"Systems so developed are likely to be obsolescent before they reach the field. However, even with 'technology in hand' there have been proposed new systems that have been denied."

With regard to the requirement that a clear-cut military requirement be shown before proceeding with a new weapons system, the Coordinating Committee said:

"In years past, intelligence estimates permitted responsible planning three to five years ahead, by identifying new threats, then establishing requirements for countering systems in time to cope with the conditions.

"Today the operating commanders cannot forecast requirements with assurance because the intelligence visibility cannot project far enough. They are, therefore, unable to establish the concrete requirements demanded by current policy. The policy is directly at odds with the realities of modern science and technology."

Pointing out that "invention cannot be predicted," the Committee said:

"The scientist must have challenge, opportunity and a program which will allow him to prove or disprove his concepts.

"Various restrictions imposed by Administration policies--procedural and intellectual--tend to stifle creativity, the evolution of new ideas, and the incentive to explore new horizons.

"These creative individuals, not being at the top of the pyramid, have been increasingly buried by over-centralization and over-regulation."

The Coordinating Committee said that "neither Congress nor the public were consulted about, or informed of, the portentous shift made in recent years of the direction of our research and defense policies."

The Committee said that whether or not the total research, development, test and evaluation budget should be increased or decreased "is not easily determined."

"On the one hand," the Committee added, "the fiscal juggling, increases in non-productive studies and excessive red tape would suggest that the budget can be cut. On the other hand, necessary programs have been delayed, others have not started, the Soviets continue their aggressive effort and the pace of science and technology is continuing to spiral, all suggesting a budget increase.

"These and other factors urgently need analysis in depth and an objective answer developed for the sake of our national security."

Adopted by
The Republican Coordinating Committee
May 6, 1968

Presented by the
Task Force on National Security

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT: OUR NEGLECTED WEAPON

Prepared under the direction of:
Republican National Committee
Ray C. Bliss, Chairman
1625 Eye Street, Northwest
Washington, D. C. 20006

REPUBLICAN COORDINATING COMMITTEE

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Former President

Dwight D. Eisenhower

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on National Security

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Thomas S. Gates, Jr., Co-Chairman
Secretary of Defense, 1959-1961
Wilfred J. McNeil, Vice Chairman
Assistant Secretary of Defense and Comptroller, 1949-1959
E. Perkins McGuire, Vice Chairman
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Supply and Logistics, 1956-1961
Dewey F. Bartlett
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William H. Bates
Member of Congress from Massachusetts
Arleigh A. Burke
Chief of U. S. Naval Operations, 1955-1961
George H. Decker
Chief of Staff, United States Army, 1960-1962
James H. Douglas, Jr.
Deputy Secretary of Defense, 1959-1961
Harry D. Felt
Commander in Chief in Pacific, 1958-1964
T. Keith Glennan
Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1958-1961
Alfred M. Gruenther
Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, 1953-1956
Craig Hosmer
Member of Congress from California
William E. Minshall
Member of Congress from Ohio
James B. Pearson
United States Senator from Kansas
Arthur W. Radford
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Bernard A. Schriever
Commander, Air Force Systems Command, 1961-1966
Mansfield D. Sprague
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, 1957-1958
Nathan W. Twining
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1957-1960
John G. Tower
United States Senator from Texas

Ex-Officio Members:

Robert C. Hill
United States Ambassador to Mexico, 1957-1961
Maurice H. Stans
Director of the Bureau of the Budget, 1958-1961

Anthony J. Jurich
Secretary to the Task Force

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT: OUR NEGLECTED WEAPON

"It is customary in democratic countries to deplore expenditures on armaments as conflicting with the requirements of the social services. There is a tendency to forget that the most important social service that a government can do for its people is to keep them alive and free."

Air Chief Marshal
SIR JOHN SLESSOR

INTRODUCTION

Peace with freedom is our nation's goal. Strength and determination are the keys but technological superiority is indispensable to our continued strength.

Only through technological superiority can our nation excel in discovering and developing advanced weapon systems. With the will to maintain military superiority, our nation can expect to deter war or defeat an aggressor should deterrence fail.

By 1961 the United States had stayed at peace for eight years through weapon superiority and skillful use of diplomacy and military power. The weapon superiority was achieved through aggressive scientific and technological research and development.

Present defense policies are depriving America of this critical superiority. There is wishful thinking about our present and future security.

Fearful lest new developments might provoke undesirable Soviet reactions, the Administration has failed to exploit boldly new concepts in science and technology. There has been a euphoric hope that the world's pace of military science and technology can somehow be slowed -- that man's inquisitiveness and ingenuity can be diverted or curbed. As a result our country's research and development has not been aggressively pursued and the consequence has been a slowdown in new weapons development. Decisions so premised seriously endanger the nation.

A major technological breakthrough can decisively tilt the balance of power. Lead time -- the time required to advance a new weapons system from concept to production and use is now five to 10 to as much as 15 years. Because of this long lead time -- because, also, each scientific breakthrough feeds and spurs other discoveries -- the nation that falls behind the weapons system cycle will likely have neither the time nor the capability to catch up.

The outcome of a future major war will probably be determined in scientific research laboratories and factories long before hostilities start. Never again can any major nation reasonably expect to prepare and catch up after war has begun. The technological war is being actively waged today and tomorrow and the day after tomorrow. On its outcome will hinge the survival of our nation and the free world. 2/

RECOMMENDED UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES

The United States Government should proclaim America's military scientific and technological objectives firmly and clearly. At the minimum, these objectives should include:

* Retention of a dominant deterrent posture.
* An aggressive research and development effort to ensure technological superiority.
* Technological leadership in weapons systems for both general and limited war.

To achieve these objectives, the United States must pursue preeminence in all scientific disciplines. This nation cannot content itself with stalemate or parity.

PRESENT POLICIES

During the past few years our national security policies and programs have fallen critically short of these objectives. There has been a lack of effort to achieve and maintain technological superiority. There has been a failure to acquire and deploy new systems on a timely basis. We imperatively require new weapons -- weapons which will maintain for America in the 1970's the military superiority we have enjoyed in the 1960's as a result of vigorous research, development and procurement in the 1950's.*

Neither Congress nor the public were consulted about, or informed of, the portentous shift made in recent years of the direction of our research and defense policies. Until the 1960's we sought clear-cut American superiority. In contrast current policies appear to accept, if not to seek, parity with the USSR.

The Administration's approach has been passive -- a sterile, inadequate "reaction."[3/] New developments have received emphasis only when justified as responses to visible new threats. Yet, new enemy threats can be secretly in development for five or six years before they are detected.** In any area, therefore, we can fall years behind if our advances in the same area are contingent on the known progress of other nations.

For seven years the Administration has concentrated on reducing the risk and expense in new weapons procurement. It has required the military services to show that all necessary technology is "in hand" as a prerequisite for approving new programs.[4/] The goal of budget saving has been laudable, but the net effect produces second-best, obsolescent systems compared to those of countries willing to press technology forward throughout the development cycle. If all technology must be in hand six months to a year before contract, and

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* See Appendix I
** See Appendix II

five or more years must elapse between contract and delivery, subsequent technological advances can be incorporated in the final systems only as retrofits. Systems so developed are likely to be obsolescent before they reach the field. However, even with "technology in hand" there have been proposed new systems that have been denied.

The Administration further demands excessive assurance of a clear-cut military requirement[5/] before proceeding with the research and development of a new weapons system.

In years past, intelligence estimates permitted responsible planning three to five years ahead, by identifying new threats, then establishing requirements for countering systems in time to cope with the conditions. Today the operating commanders cannot forecast requirements with assurance because the intelligence visibility cannot project far enough. They are, therefore, unable to establish the concrete requirements demanded by current policy. The policy is directly at odds with the realities of modern science and technology.

Implicit in today's policy and procedural impediments are conceptual barriers to the pursuit of aggressive research and development.

People powerfully situated in this Administration have believed that for the foreseeable future the United States and the Soviet Union will be at a standoff in advanced military technology and little can be done to alter this balance. The political derivative of this concept has been that the standoff or stalemate enhances world stability and improves the prospect for peace. The military derivative has been that, under an umbrella of technological standoff, future conflicts will be confined to low orders of intensity.

It is claimed by some that we have reached a technological "plateau."[6] The contention is that further improvements can contribute only marginally to our military strength and are likely to disturb the international equilibrium, increase tensions, and thereby increase the likelihood of war.

There is increasing concern in the scientific, industrial and military communities that these policies and concepts will cause us to fall critically behind.[7]

In February this year the Director of Research and Engineering for the Department of Defense testified that since 1964 the over-all research and technological effort has decreased by a "critical" 30 percent. He concluded, "I have become convinced that the net effect of continuing this trend will be a serious weakening of our long term national security position."[8]

The trend has been made even more disturbing by

-- unwise application of cost effectiveness*
-- misuse of the "building block" approach[9] to research and development
-- current budgetary practices**
-- administrative impediments flowing from overcentralization and over-regulation in the Department of Defense[10]
-- the stifling of creativity[11]
-- faulty application of arms control concepts,[12] and
-- a lack of leadership and purpose necessary to create a climate of understanding and participation by the academic community.

THE SHIFTING BALANCE

So restrained and inhibited, the United States has been gradually losing its technological and military preeminence. Meanwhile, the Soviets have unrelentingly

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* See Appendix III.
** See Appendix IV.

pursued superiority.***

The Administration acknowledges that the Soviets are increasing both the quantity and quality of their ICBM and submarine forces. For the first time the Soviets are deploying large naval forces in the Mediterranean. They have already built and deployed an ABM system. They admit to developing and testing an Orbital Bombardment System. They are known to be building at least three new fighter aircraft systems, a supersonic transport, and a VSTOL system (Vertical Short Takeoff and Landing Aircraft). Their tactical forces are being equipped with new IRBM's (SCAMP), and their surface fleet has a new class of surface-to-surface missiles. Their submarine missile forces are being augmented and modernized with new boats and second generation missiles. There is every reason to believe that they are still building and stockpiling very high yield nuclear weapons, 20 to 50 megatons or more, while testing underground new families of small and lower yield tactical and naval nuclear weapons.

In another arena of potential conflict the Soviets are also making great strides. Their nuclear submarine fleet is overtaking ours in quality and quantity. While our own development and construction of advanced nuclear submarines have been impeded by top level vacillation, Russia's newest vessels are running deeper, faster and quieter than previously, according to recent testimony given to the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee by Vice Admiral Hyman Rickover and Rear Admiral Eugene B. Fluckey. In another naval development the Soviets are constructing aircraft carriers for helicopters and short-take-off aircraft designed to assist their expanding sphere of influence.

In research and development we must assume the Soviets are working on multiple warheads (MIRV). This is a serious threat, since their ICBM boosters

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*** See Appendix V.

can carry much greater payloads than ours, thus out-matching the Administration MIRV programs in quantity or yield or both. They are already recognized leaders in cybernetics, and seek to surpass the United States in other technologies such as laser, hypersonic propulsion, biological research, and all aspects of space research. Test facilities are a key to progress; the Soviet wind tunnels, accelerator and test chambers at their science city of Novosibirsk far exceed the capabilities of those we have built in recent years.

Against this obvious Soviet reach for technological and military supremacy, what has been the U. S. record these past seven years?

Over-all, it is an appalling record. During all this period there has been not one new start on advanced strategic or nuclear weapon systems. Every ICBM and every strategic bomber in America's arsenal today was a legacy from the Eisenhower Administration of the 1950's.

Even in military space systems the major emphasis has consistently been on passive satellites until the recent approval of the Manned Orbital Laboratory program -- a program delayed for years. Advanced programs under development by the Eisenhower Administration -- Dynasoar and SPAD -- were cancelled.

In the tactical area, the aircraft carrying the burden in Vietnam -- the F-4, F-105, and the A-6 -- were all initiated in the 1950's. The primary missiles used by these aircraft, such as Sidewinder, Bullpup and Shrike, are all Eisenhower Administration developments.

The effort to transform the TFX (F-111) into an all-purpose, all-service aircraft has created serious problems. Against military advice, the F-111 was selected as a superior, yet economical, weapons system based upon a misguided and overstated emphasis on commonality. The aircraft were to cost approximately $2.4 million each. Now they are priced at more than $6 million each. How

ironic that an Administration which has advocated primary reliance on conventional limited warfare and extolled "cost effectiveness" has fixed upon the TFX for this role -- a plane designed primarily as a nuclear delivery system and cost-effective only as such! In view of the recent decision that the F-111B, the Navy version, is unacceptable and a substitute aircraft has been initiated, the final cost of the program will increase enormously coupled with years of delay. The program has resulted in the Air Force having a new aircraft that does not meet the original requirements nor even the down-graded performance agreed to when they were forced into the commonality decision. The F-111B Navy version has been found unacceptable and the FB-111 Bomber version does not meet Air Force requirements for an advanced bomber in the 1970 time frame.

Still less comprehensible is the Administration's decision to rely on the F-106 of the early fifties' technological vintage for our air defense forces. For more than five years we have had far superior Mach 3 fighters such as the F-12 flying on test. The F-106 is slower than the French Concorde, a transport. It is at least one generation behind the F-12 engine, materials, and performance figures. The fact that for at least three years we could have built F-12 fighters superior to any aircraft in the Soviet inventory, and to date have deliberately passed the opportunity by, further suggests that the Administration is less than zealous in keeping the United States ahead.

In the development of smaller tactical weapons the Administration has also been content to drift. Forced at last to act by the war in Vietnam, it began a crash program with the high costs, inefficiencies and waste that always attend such programs. Dr. Eugene G. Fubini, Deputy Director of Defense Research and Engineering from 1963-1965, said that because the many weapons requirements for

the Vietnam war had not been anticipated, the United States was forced to wage the war not as it ought to be fought, but according to the weapons available. After citing a number of new weapons requirements for fighting the limited type of war, he said, "I hope these requirements are properly documented today, but I am not sure."[13/]

Shortly after escalation of the conflict in Vietnam, the Department of Defense submitted to Congress the first of a number of emergency supplemental requests, including $152 million for research and development. These additional funds provided for such items as jungle communications equipment, emergency airfield equipment and jungle boots, all obviously necessary for military action in a tropical environment. Some work in such areas had been in progress, but at a far more leisurely pace than dictated by a realistic appraisal of the threat and need. This dilatory approach typifies the Administration's "crisis-reaction" approach to preparedness.[14/]

This capsulated review illustrates that our nation's efforts in military science technology and new weapon procurement have been critically deficient for seven years. In the strategic area alone we should have new advanced systems in being today. If we did, our deterrent posture and hence the cause of world peace would be strengthened.

Improvement of existing weapon systems are often cited by the Administration as proof of its zeal for technological superiority. However, the improvements have often been parts of original systems concepts and carried out in the normal development cycle.

Where are the new developments dictated by objective assessment of the threat and the pace of technology? What will be our security posture five to ten years from now? What is this Administration's legacy to our nation?

SOVIET POLICY

The objectives of the Soviet scientific and technological effort have been openly stated by their leaders and are apparent in their achievements. In 1962, the Soviet Minister of Defense, the late Marshal Rodion Malinovsky, stated that the USSR had to accelerate its efforts to exploit the strategic potentials of modern science and technology. He said, "We do not intend to follow behind in development or be inferior to our public enemies in any way ... in the competition for quality or armament in the future ... (our) superiority will evermore increase."

Since the late 1950's, Soviet budgetary allocations for research and development have been rising sharply.* They are expected to continue to rise.

RECOMMENDATIONS

In order for the United States to maintain technological superiority to serve both military and economic ends, the following steps are urgently needed:

* A firm policy of assuring military superiority for the United States must be adopted and implemented.

* Establishment of priorities for weapons systems development must be derived from an objective assessment of the threat, on the one hand, and the pace of technology, on the other, then aggressively pursued with adequate funding.

* Redefinition of authority at a lower level, restoring responsibility and initiative to responsible commands of the military departments.

* Reintroduction of healthy, but controlled, inter-service competition to include actual weapons development in addition to paper studies.

* Revision of organization and procedures to help encourage initiative and foster creativity in research and development.

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* See Appendix V.

* An adequate technical facility base, both government and private, must be reestablished and maintained.

* An increased level of joint research and development effort with our allies should be encouraged.

CONCLUSIONS

This nation's research and development effort has not been progressing at a pace equal to either the accelerating spiral of science and technology or the expanding threat. The Soviets in particular have exhibited an aggressive research and development effort to win the technological race. We must also realize that any other nation may achieve a technological surprise. A new event can happen in any scientific discipline; innovations are not restricted to scientists associated only with the military or with any particular nation.

In our view, technological superiority is demanded by both military requirements and economic necessity. Since the means to achieve superiority will have been determined years before, and we have already forfeited years, decisions must be made with great urgency to reorient our research and development programs. Advances in technology must be exploited in weapons development with imagination, determination and zeal. At stake is the peace and security of the United States and the Free World.

APPENDIX I (part 1)

NEW GUIDED MISSILE "STARTS" AND MISSILE TYPES IN PRODUCTION

POST-KOREAN PERIOD

GOVERNMENT FISCAL YEARS

	1954-1957		1958-1961		1962-1965		1966-1968	
	New Starts	In Prod.	New Starts	In Prod.	New Starts	In Prod.	New Starts	In Prod.
ICBM	3	0	1	3	0	4	0	2
Air-To-Air	0	3	0	3	1	3	0	2
Air-To-Surface	3	0	3	3	1	6	2	5
Surface-To-Air	1	2	2	7	1	8	1	5
Surface-To-Surface	4	7	2	9	3	13	1	4
ASW	1	0	1	1	0	2	0	2
Totals	12	12	9	26	6	36	4	20

NOTE: Does not include cancelled programs or research programs, or program definition efforts.

Multiple-use weapons are considered one program.

APPENDIX I (part 2)

NEW AIRCRAFT "STARTS AND AIRCRAFT TYPES IN PRODUCTION

POST-KOREAN PERIOD

GOVERNMENT FISCAL YEARS

TYPE	1954-1957		1958-1961		1962-1965		1966-1968	
	New Starts	In Prod.	New Starts	In Prod.	New Starts	In Prod.	New Starts	In Prod.
Bomber	0	5	0	4	0	0	0	1
Attack	2	2	0	4	1	6	0	2
Fighter	2	12	1	13	1	4	0	3
Cargo/Transport	3	6	3	7	1	8	0	6
ASW/Surveillance	2	4	2	7	0	4	0	3
Trainer	3	5	0	5	0	5	0	5
Utility	5	6	3	12	0	17	2	12
Totals	17	40	9	52	3	44	2	32

NOTE: Does not include cancelled or research programs, or program definition efforts.

Multiple-use airframes are considered one program.

APPENDIX II INTELLIGENCE VISIBILITY

A fundamental of the decision-making process for research and development is the intelligence input.

The intelligence visibility chart (Chart 1), portraying the development cycle of a weapons system over the average span of 10-15 years, reveals that we ordinarily receive fairly good intelligence in the early basic research period. However, once a practical military application or potential is identified, this visibility usually disappears for the next five to six years. The new weapons systems then suddenly appear in a Soviet May Day parade or during testing, having by that point completed the basic development cycle. Thus, our present policies, which require "hard" evidence before we undertake an aggressive development program of our own, tend to keep us six or more years behind.

This delay is induced also by the Administration's inclination to give greater weight to optimistic assessments of Soviet intentions than to hard-headed measurements of capabilities. For example, the Administration persuaded itself that the Soviets would probably not deploy an orbital bombardment vehicle or an anti-ballistic missile system. Part of the problem is "mirror thinking." Our leaders having decided against utilizing these systems, they assumed the Soviets would reason similarly. It was a gross mistake.

In a period when science and technology are making significant strides and the evidence is that the Soviets are aggressively advancing the state of the art, this nation must weigh heavily the Soviet capabilities. An example is the Soviet achievement of "fractional" orbital capability. Knowing also that they have adequate control and thrust, we must assume that they now have or soon will have a complete orbital capability, international treaties notwithstanding. We must not wait until we suddenly discover that such a vehicle is being tested. This precautionary approach must be applied across the whole weapons spectrum.

NATIONAL STRATEGY & RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT POLICY



CHART 1

APPENDIX III COST-EFFECTIVENESS APPLICATIONS

The use of cost-effectiveness in evaluating military programs is not new. This management tool has been used for many years. In recent years, however, the tool has become, not the servant, but the master of management.

This result may not have been intended but has developed in the Department of Defense as costs analysts have become dominant in the decision-making process. Not infrequently conclusions so reached discard valid military judgment.

Vice Admiral Hyman G. Rickover (Ret.), a frequent critic of the way "cost-effectiveness" criteria have been applied, asserted that if "cost-effectiveness" had ruled in 1948, the U. S. would not then have built its first atomic submarine. He stated also that in calculating the relative worth of a weapon or type of defense cost-effectiveness studies make no allowance for the value of human life.

In testimony before the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee in 1966, Admiral Rickover revealed a most important flaw in this process, stating that, "In some cases decisions appear to have been made ahead of time and subsequently justified." The Congressional committees concerned with defense have found it extremely difficult and often impossible to obtain the actual cost-effectiveness studies upon which critical decisions have been based.

The currently used cost-effectiveness procedure impairs new weapons developments in two ways. It makes the gaining of Defense Department approval for the development and production of new weapons an extremely involved process, intruding another time-consuming procedure in an already excessively complicated decision-making process.

Second, cost-effectiveness studies demand elaborate costing data. Technology must be in hand in order for precise costing information to be

APPENDIX III (continued)

obtained. A research program pushing the state of the art has too many unknowns to be costed precisely. Further, a proposed improvement in a system growing out of a technological advance requires another round of cost-effectiveness analysis on that system.

Cost-effectiveness studies as currently developed give maximum priority to quantifiable data and tend to subordinate subjective factors, even human life.

These studies appear modern, scientific and objective. Applied properly, they can be. But they are misused when their conclusions are permitted to dominate essentially military decisions or justify predetermined views.

Prejudgment validation seems to have occurred when the Department of Defense was attempting to justify its TFX position before the National Security and International Operations Subcommittee of the Senate Government Operations Committee. Alain Enthoven, Assistant Secretary for Systems Analysis, was asked by the Chairman, Senator Jackson, if a cost-effectiveness study had been made on the TFX. He replied no, that at the time the cost-effectiveness technique had not been fully developed. Yet in subsequent discussions he justified the cancellation of the Skybolt program on the basis of cost-effectiveness studies developed in the same period the TFX decision was made.

Thousands of studies costing millions of dollars have been undertaken the past few years. These repeated studies were described by Admiral Rickover as "fog bombs," serving only to conceal the issues under a blanket of fog.

Atomic Energy Commissioner Ramey expressed the problem in these terms: "I would conclude that the abuse of the cost-effectiveness techniques can be just as lethal to a new development project as the unscrupulous use of the requirements system."

APPENDIX III (continued)

The combination of the "requirements" and "cost-effectiveness" criteria have been the major reasons given for not aggressively pursuing such programs as an advanced bomber, the advance manned interceptor, and military applications in space.

APPENDIX IV

BUDGETARY CONSIDERATIONS

Fiscal responsibility is a requisite in the Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) budget, as in any other budget. Fiscal responsibility, however, does not mean instituting excessive controls and red tape. It does mean having an orderly and effective procedure which enables timely and complete information to be presented for approval. It means effective controls, but in R&D where developments cannot be precisely predicted flexibility is required to prevent the stifling of innovation.

The major requirement in research and development is disciplined, imaginative intelligence. Funds must be provided to support the intelligence, but the quantity of dollars is not an absolute index of effective research effort.

Since funds are never unlimited, priorities must be established. Once they are established, sufficient funding must be applied to produce the weapons system in the time frame dictated by the pace of technology and the assessment of the threat.

The Administration contends that in their years of managing defense research and development programs they have increased the funding by over 300 percent. In gross numbers by current definitions, perhaps this is correct, but at least two other factors have an important bearing on the validity of this contention. First, in 1963, the accounting system was changed. Many items originally considered production funds are now in R&D. Items such as prototypes that formerly were paid from the production account are not in the RDT&E account.

Second, inflation and higher wages have imposed cost increases of well over five percent each year.

An evaluation of these items, coupled with the ever greater cost of more sophisticated weapons systems, suggests that rather than a 300 percent increase there has been no increase or even a reduction in the total effective R&D total.

APPENDIX IV (continued)

Secretary McNamara's Defense Posture Statement for Fiscal Year 1969 admitted that basic research funding has declined: "During FY 1965-68, after adjusting for inflation, research funding declined."

The Statement further described this category as the source for the development of major systems and added, "... the effectiveness of the weapons systems we will have a decade hence and our technological strength generally, will depend critically on how well we conduct these two categories of R&D over the next few years."

Viewing this problem in perspective requires an evaluation of the past seven years. There is evidence in this paper of serious, if not critical, difficulties.

Since most research and development programs are not broadly understood or appreciated, their funding in times of fiscal stringency is deferrable without immediate adverse reaction. The complexity of research and development programs makes it difficult for those not intimately familiar with defense R&D requirements to assess their importance. For fiscal and political reasons, therefore, R&D frequently is subjected to fiscal manipulations, the full impact of which is not felt for five or six years.

For example, in the Fiscal Year 1968 budget, the Administration has asked the Department of Defense to cut back in an attempt to prevent the need for a supplemental request during an election year. The cutback figures reported are in excess of 6 billion dollars. Part of this cutback applies to research and development funds. The technique is not to discontinue the whole program, but to reduce the funding level and thereby impose delays.

Whether or not the total Research, Development, Test and Evaluation budget should be increased or decreased is not easily determined. On the one hand, the fiscal juggling, increases in non-productive studies and excessive

APPENDIX IV (continued)

red tape would suggest that the budget can be cut. On the other hand, necessary programs have been delayed, others have not started, the Soviets continue their aggressive effort and the pace of science and technology is continuing to spiral, all suggesting a budget increase. These and other factors urgently need analysis in depth and an objective answer developed for the sake of our national security.

APPENDIX V

THE SHIFTING BALANCE

United States military superiority today is largely an Eisenhower legacy. In the all-important strategic area, for example, the post-Eisenhower Administrations inherited both the MINUTEMAN and the POLARIS systems. Our strategic bombers, the B-52's and the B-58's, were developed prior to the 1960's.

In the strategic aircraft field, there has been no new development of a bomber as a bomber. The modification of the F-111 does not significantly advance the state of the art nor can it adequately perform the mission required of a new strategic bomber in the coming decade.

In the past seven years, this Administration has not developed or produced a prototype of any new Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) system. There has been significant development effort on multiple individually guided warheads (MIRV). This program must be given a high priority so that we will have proven production units as rapidly as possible.

The Air Force WS-120A, the advanced ICBM weapons systems program, repeatedly delayed, was scheduled to go into contract definition phase in fiscal 1968. It will not go into that phase until after Fiscal Year 1969, if at all.

In the tactical area, the aircraft carrying the burden in Vietnam -- the F-4, F-105, and the A-6 -- all were initiated in the 1950's. The primary missiles being used by these aircraft, such as Sidewinder, Bullpup and Shrike, are all Eisenhower developments.

In the attack aircraft category, the Administration has introduced the A-7 (VAL) aircraft which is actually an improved F-8 of 1953 vintage, which in no way materially advances the state of the art.

The most advanced aircraft we have today is the F-12 or SR-71 whose genesis was the secret A-11 started in 1958 under security wraps. Although we have in this aircraft a proven and necessary system, only a few reconnaissance

APPENDIX V (continued)

versions have been purchased, notwithstanding repeated Service demands expressing the advantage of an air defense version. This Administration has not even provided funds to keep open a production line so that additional aircraft can be readily procured when required at reasonable costs.

In the cargo-transport area, there has been one addition since 1961 -- the C-5A. In accordance with existing policy, the C-5A, although a new development, is based upon current technology. It is primarily an increase in size.

The increase in Soviet submarine activity and capability makes our anti-submarine warfare ability increasingly important. The major aircraft role is being handled by the P-3, started in 1958. In the anti-submarine warfare missile category, ASROC and SUBROC were started in 1956 and 1958 respectively.

As of this time, no advanced anti-submarine warfare aircraft has been developed.

There has been one new development start on an air-to-air missile, the PHOENIX (SCRAM); two in the surface-to-air, SPRINT and SPARTAN; and two in the tactical surface-to-surface category, LANCE and TOW.

In the crucial area of military use of space, positive direction and aggressive effort are lacking. Our efforts have been largely defensive, rather than a balanced mix of offense and defense. During a Congressional hearing in 1966, Lieutenant General Ferguson, Chief of Air Force research and development, was asked how well we are doing in outpacing Soviet technology in the field of space. He answered, "...I am frankly concerned at the outlook...." Various Congressional committees have expressed the same concern. The House Committee on Government Operations in a 1966 report stated: "The Committee believes that in the interest of national security the potential manned military uses of space deserve immediate increased attention."*

* Report "Government Operations in Space."

The Army has been struggling for approval of the development of an armed helicopter since the early 1960's and finally was given approval in the Fiscal Year 1966 budget. Even here it should be noted that the program was not in the original FY 1966 budget request, although by that time the war in Vietnam had clearly established the need.

In discussing the effects of current policies on Army R&D projects, General Harold K. Johnson, Army Chief of Staff, told the Senate Armed Services Committee in discussing the Fiscal Year 1969 defense budget:

> "Repeated stretch-outs of equipment development projects not only lead to increases in total costs, but also invite the risk of fielding new -- but already obsolescent -- equipment when it finally is accepted as standard issue. This provides only marginal improvement of the replaced equipment, which in the interim has had to be modified -- at added cost -- in order to maintain its usefulness in coping with an everchanging threat."

* * *

"The Soviet government is not limiting itself to those military means which the adversary has. Undoubtedly, this would be insufficient. The creation of new methods of combat which the imperialistic aggressor still does not possess is a task of Soviet science and technology."

WAR AND POLITICS
USSR Ministry of Defense, 1962

APPENDIX V (continued)

In 1962, during a closed-door Senate hearing on the FY-66 defense budget, the Secretary of Defense was asked, "Is it just a matter of time before the Russians catch up with the U.S. in strategic nuclear forces?" The Secretary responded, "There is no indication that they are catching up or planning to catch up -- I am simply saying that there is no indication they are in a race at this time."

As a result of sustained efforts, the Soviet leaders have made tremendous strides in their nation's scientific and technological posture and have translated these gains into the whole spectrum of military hardware. The major emphasis has been to concentrate on what is called the high payoff area; that is, nuclear weapons and advanced delivery systems for those weapons.

A major acceleration by the Soviets has taken place since the extensive 1961-62 nuclear test series.

Since the 58 megaton test in 1961, they have claimed to possess a 100 megaton weapon. The claim has feasibility. In November 1964, a second generation ICBM, THE SS-7 or SASIN, was first displayed in a Moscow parade. In the early 1960's, the second generation ICBM missile SS-8 was deployed. In the 1965 May Day Parade, the Soviets displayed a smaller ICBM -- the SAVAGE which appears to be similar to the MINUTEMAN. The SCRAG was again shown in November 1965 and the Soviets now claim it is a missile with an orbital bombardment capability. Also, in 1965, the Soviets first paraded a large mobile missile, the SCROOGE enclosed in a pod on a carrier. Statements and evidence suggest that they are developing mobile missiles and launchers for both their ICBM and IRBM.

Observers at the November 1967 Parade reported a new ICBM, a new generation I/MRBM, and a new POLARIS-type missile.

APPENDIX V (continued)

Extensive work is known to be going on in aerospace propulsion and related items. At least three new air-to-air missiles have been seen since 1962, each deployed with a different new fighter. The three new missiles have been code named ALKALI, ASH and AWL. The three new fighters bear the western code name FISHPOT C (a limited all-weather fighter), FIDDLER (a long-range interceptor and reconnaissance aircraft) and FLIPPER (also known as Mig 23).

During the 1967 Domodedovo Air Show, three other new aircraft were shown, including one with VSTOL capability. During this show, Chief Marshal Vershinin and Marshal Krasovski, emphasized Soviet ability in air launched strategic missiles. They also indicated intense interest in anti-submarine warfare, saying that the Soviet naval aircraft, presumably the Beriev Be 8, had been equipped with "an assortment of means to detect and destroy underwater vessels."

It is almost certain that the Soviet equivalent of the U. S. Supersonic Transport (SST) could readily become a bomber.

In naval developments, the Soviets displayed a new ballistic missile -- SARK -- in 1962, which was described as both a shipboard and a field weapon. Two years later in the November Anniversary Parade, a second generation solid fueled inertially guided Sub-Launched Ballistic missile (SLBM), the SERB, was displayed.

To develop a POLARIS defense the Soviets are diverting part of their bomber fleet with improved sensing devices and offensive capability. They also are developing anti-submarine warfare aircraft carriers and a growing fleet of POLARIS-type nuclear missile submarines.

By the early 1960's, the Soviet service fleet was also being equipped with new classes of short-range surface-to-surface missiles.

APPENDIX V (continued)

In the May Day Parade in 1965, the SCAMP, a mobile IRBM with solid propellent, was first displayed.

Certainly the most dramatic Soviet development in recent years has been the development and deployment of their ABM system. Although its precise effectiveness and extensiveness is a matter of debate in our intelligence community, work is continuing.

The recent tests of the Orbital Bombardment System have been said to be fractional. Nevertheless, the Soviets have exhibited the capability for a complete Orbital Bombardment System.

Also being reported is Soviet effort in multiple warheads, a dramatic and serious new development. It is probable a program in this area would include individually guided warheads.

Development of military transports ranging up to the giant Antonov An-22 are being pursued. Reports also indicate a wide variety of specifically designed air transportable tanks, armored personnel carriers and self-propelled artillery with increasing emphasis on the lower levels of weapons.

The Soviets are known to be doing an enormous amount of work in the area of computers, information process and cybernetics. This capability itself will provide tremendous assistance to all the other phases of military R&D.

Lasers seem to be an area of particular interest to the Soviets.

Clearly the Soviets are placing extensive effort in new weapons developments. There are many other examples. Those cited here show the broad spectrum of activity and the level of effort. The Soviets have not slowed down. They have not pushed their developments merely as a reaction to U. S. developments. They clearly appear to be striving for scientific and technological superiority. (See Charts 2 and 3.)

ESTIMATED SOVIET RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT COSTS*



* Center for Strategic Studies estimate based on published Soviet budgets.

CHART 2

CHART 3



Air Force Magazine-January1968

The maximum-minimum range of USSR expenditures is based on analysis by the Strategic Studies Center of Stanford Research Institute of published Soviet data. US outlays were plotted from more explicit official statistics. (RDT&E related to the Vietnam conflict is omitted from the US curve.)

APPENDIX VI

An important measure of science and technology is the level of qualified manpower. Since about 1952, the Soviet Union has been graduating more scientists and engineers per year than the United States. (See Chart 4.)

By 1965, the Soviet Union had developed a scientific and technical labor pool of about 1,700,000 working on research, development test and evaluation. Comparatively, the United States had 1,077,000. Inclusion of NATO would add approximately 670,000.

In 1950, the Soviet Union graduated some 35,000 new engineers. Now, more than 150,000 new engineers are graduated each year. At this rate, the Soviets are graduating about three engineers for every one graduated in the United States.

ENGINEER GRADUATES

US - USSR

ANNUAL
IN THE 1960s



SOURCES: Soviet estimates taken from "Scientific and Engineering Manpower Resources of the U.S.S.R. and Its R&D Effort: 1961-1966," by Joseph P. Kozlowski, to be published by Johns Hopkins University Press, summer of 1968. U.S. figures taken from the U.S. Office of Education Report, *Journal of Engineering Education*, September 1967, p. 44.

CHART 4

FOOTNOTES -- RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

1/ Although knowledge doubled only once between 1750 and 1900 and again between 1900 and 1950, the scientific community estimates that it has doubled again between 1950 and 1960 and will double again by 1970.

2/ This reality is clearly recognized by the Soviets. In an article in Communist of The Armed Forces, Lt. Col. B. Bondarenko wrote in 1966:

> "In the past it was possible to change the relationship between forces during the course of a war. This was characteristic even of the Second World War. Now, in connection with the revolution which has occurred in military matters, the significance of military technological superiority even in peacetime has increased greatly. Under the influence of nuclear weapons . . . the importance of an early period of a war has increased and it has become increasingly more difficult to change the relation between forces during the course of the war."

3/ The clearest public expression of this "reaction" policy was given by Secretary of Defense McNamara on September 18, 1967, in San Francisco when he was discussing the ABM problem. He stated that we were spending additional money on offensive weapons systems programs to offset the Soviet ABM deployment. Then he went on to say:

> "But we should bear in mind that it is money spent because of the action-reaction phenomenon."

4/ Department of Defense Directive No. 3200.9, pp. 4-5. "It is intended that the technology that is required to meet a system specification not exceed in quantitative performance that which can be demonstrated either in developmental form or in laboratory form. Projection into Engineering Development of anticipated developmental achievement will be permitted only when sufficient quantitative results have been obtained, in laboratory or experimental devices, to allow such projection with a high confidence. In general, these projections will assume the probability of Engineering Developments matching but not exceeding laboratory results."

FOOTNOTES - R&D (continued)

5/ As Mr. James T. Ramey, Commissioner of the Atomic Energy Commission, said, the government must get rid of the "requirements merry-go-rounds." He pointed out that every new project had to be justified on the basis of "military requirements" and that many promising developments particularly in space could never be pushed or even demonstrated if development had to wait for the establishment of requirements. As Dr. Edward C. Welch, Executive Secretary of the National Aeronautics and Space Council, said, "If we had required a clear cut prior mission, we would probably have developed no airplanes, no space craft or, in fact, no wheel."

6/ Dr. James R. Killian, Jr., Chairman of the Corporation of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, recently stated that we cannot "rest on our oars" thinking that the race has been won. "We may be only at the beginning of unexampled scientific and engineering achievement," he said.

Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson told a Congressional committee on April 27, 1966:

> "It is clear that the Russians do not accept the notion that military technology has reached a plateau and that the present military balance is fixed for the future. They are gambling enormous resources on the chance that they may score a decisive advance in weapons systems."

In testimony before Congress on the Fiscal Year 1969 Defense budget, the Director of Research and Engineering for the Department of Defense stated, "There is no technological plateau now nor is one about to be created. We are convinced that research and exploratory development efforts require increased support during the next few years to insure many options -- a margin of safety -- against technological challenge."

FOOTNOTES - R&D (continued)

7/ Dr. Harold Agnew, Weapons Division Leader at the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory recently stated:

> "The apparent drift in national policy on the concept of balance of power and stability is resulting in a stifling of innovation. We find ourselves being authorized to build or to consider only those systems which respond to a clearly defined threat.
>
> "As a result, we are continually reacting on the defensive. The initiative no longer seems to be up to us. The initiative always seems to be in the other fellow's camp.
>
> "Since we react only to those systems or threats which have been proven to exist, and it takes several years to react, we are continually in danger of coming up with answers to threats which have changed, if indeed come up with answers in a time frame which is relevant at all."

8/ The Director of Defense Research & Engineering for the Department of Defense stated to the Senate Armed Services Committee during a discussion of the Fiscal Year 1969 defense budget:

"A lesson reinforced over and over throughout history, especially in our era, is that science and engineering continuously make possible completely new military capabilities and threats. National security today is more directly linked than ever before to the practice of first rank science and engineering. We have a strong technical-military position today only because we built a strong research and technology base in the past. We must maintain this position . . . .

"Yet there are some indications that the program is eroding, that we must act forcefully to reverse the recent funding trend. Some of this reduction /from Fiscal 1964 to 1968/ has produced healthy belt tightening, a sorting out of the good from the bad. And we have used these funds -- in a sense savings -- for other high priority projects. But, as I emphasized earlier, the net effect of continuing this trend will be a serious weakening of our long-term national security position.

"Moreover, these numbers do not tell the whole story. The cost of doing research has steadily increased at a rate of at least 5% a year. If we adjust by this rate, then our research and technology effort in Fiscal 1968 was about 70% that of the Fiscal 1964 level, a critical 30% reduction.

" During the past three years, in terms of dollars not discounted for increased costs, our exploratory development funding to industry has decreased by about 35%; to universities by 19%, and to in-house military laboratories by 8%.

"Last summer, I asked a special panel of the Defense Science Board to consider the adequacy of our research and technology base to meet future needs. Their unequivocal answer was that the recent cuts were so deep that the Defense Dept. may begin to run the risk of not meeting its genuine technological goals."

FOOTNOTES - R&D (continued)

9/ This Administration, applying its concept of the "building block" approach, claims to be developing the "options" necessary to blunt any technological surprise by an enemy. Such an approach, to be effective, must be adequatedly funded. Money alone, however, is not enough; with today's increasingly sophisticated systems, there is no high degree of assurance that a system will work until it is all assembled as a working system. As "Kelly" Johnson, Vice President of Lockheed Aircraft, one of the foremost aviation experts in the world today, has said, the "building block" system "optimized the component" and does that "more on paper than in fact" instead of optimizing the entire system.

If a system starts to be pulled together only after a visible threat appears, generally in the prototype or test stage, there is no time to complete development, produce and deploy a system prior to the enemy's deployment.

10/ Progress in research and development has been considerably impeded by over-centralization and over-regulation in the Department of Defense - a subject to be covered thoroughly in another paper.

One of the most serious of these "road blocks" is the number of approval levels a new program must go through. They have increased enormously -- some 16 levels can now comment. Nearly all can stop a program, but very few can approve. Those responsible for research and development projects have reported that at times it has taken up to three years to get final approval.

Also, reported by the noted defense writer, Hanson Baldwin, on February 16, 1965, "Before a final contract for a project is signed and actual development starts, an average of at least 50 signatures or approvals is required -- sometimes as many as 100 or 200. Some individuals, required by legal or administrative reasons to sign twice, have had to be briefed twice; by the time the second signature was needed, they had forgotten what the contract was about."

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Republican National Committee

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NEWS

FOR RELEASE

WEDNESDAY A.M.'s
May 29, 1968

REPUBLICAN COORDINATING COMMITTEE SAYS NATIONAL SECURITY HAS BEEN WEAKENED BY OVER-CENTRALIZATION IN PENTAGON

The Republican Coordinating Committee warned today that the nation's security has been weakened by an over-centralized civilian control of the defense establishment, and that "balance must be restored" in the management of defense to reinforce the ability of the armed services to respond quickly to crises.

In a 20-page report entitled "Decisions in National Security: Patchwork or Policy?", the GOP policy group pointed to the assumption by the Office of Secretary of Defense since 1961 of an isolated and dominant control of defense policies, with the result that the experts frequently have been overruled or ignored.

The report, prepared by the Coordinating Committee's Task Force on National Security, was released today by Republican National Chairman Ray C. Bliss. Former Secretaries of Defense Neil H. McElroy and Thomas S. Gates, Jr., are Co-Chairmen of the Task Force, which consists of civilian and military experts.

The Committee stressed in particular the need for a revival of the National Security Council, as it existed in the Eisenhower Administration, as a policy-making instrument, and deplored the abolition of the Council's planning and operations coordinating boards and the introduction of informal and piecemeal decisions by small official groups dealing with individual problems.

-MORE-

Recalling a warning in 1949 by Ferdinand Eberstadt, a leading student of defense organization, that care would have to be taken to prevent the Office of the Secretary of Defense from becoming a "separate empire" rather than a small and efficient control unit, the Coordinating Committee said:

"Today the separate empire exists. Balance must be restored, to insure our nation's security, and to reinforce our ability to respond quickly to challenge.

"Equally important are policies and an organization structure that will at all times conform to our representative form of government, with its system of checks and balances...

"The extreme over-centralization and over-management of our national security structure on the one hand, and the extensive ad hoc policy deliberations on the other, developed in the past seven years, have weakened our national security position and created increased risks.

"It has brought into question this nation's ability to respond in a timely and effective manner to crises which threaten America's vital interests."

The Republican policy-makers emphasized that "wise policies and efficient organization and management" are as essential as resources, and said:

"Our review concludes that the effectiveness of our security structure has declined, due to indecisive policies, faulty policy-making machinery, over-centralization in the Department of Defense, over-management of our security structure, over-reliance on cost accounting procedures and computer techniques, and a downgrading of seasoned human judgment.

"We are concerned with the self-imposed isolation of top civilians in the Pentagon who have too often dismissed or altered solid recommendations of the service Secretaries or the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and distorted the authority of unified and field commanders."

The Coordinating Committee said the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff "should be reaffirmed, insuring their direct and active participation in the development of policy, weapons system and force planning."

The Committee pointed out that civilian control of the national security structure requires that authority rest in the President, and that the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State should be his two major advisers.

The GOP policy group said:

"In view of the threatening international environment, the collapse of time, and our exceedingly complex governmental structure, adherence to a formal decision-making process such as the National Security Council is a necessary prerequisite for effectively providing for the nation's security.

"We must have a more articulate definition of our national interests and the steps required to promote them. Upon such determinations a clear policy must be set.

"A crucial point in the national security process is placing the most capable people in key positions. Good national security policy requires good policy-makers as well as good policy machinery.

"The policy decision-making process must be planned and organized, and must make use of the talents of responsible individuals within the structure. Timely and regular meetings must be held. A coordination function must be established to insure prompt and effective implementation. Follow-through and analysis of the effect of promulgated policies must be reinstituted, with reports from all involved sectors.

"Detailed implementation of both planning and operations should be delegated to lower echelons, which must have both the necessary authority and responsibility to carry out assignments.

"There must be reaffirmation of the responsibility to better inform both Congress and the electorate on issues affecting our national security, within appropriate safeguards.

"Budgetary policy guidelines to the services must be clarified. There should be greater emphasis on the reestablishment of the priority budget concept utilizing to the extent practicable the 'mission' basis."

The Coordinating Committee recalled that in 1961 the incoming Democratic regime inherited from the Eisenhower Administration the National Security Council, with its Planning Board and Operations Coordinating Board, as policy-making instruments.

The Committee added:

"Immediately, and without careful consideration of possibly fateful consequences, both boards were abolished. The effectiveness of the National Security Council was compromised...

"Since then, the entire supporting structure has so changed, or even disappeared, as to now produce little more than mechanical compliance with the law. The procedures for integrating military, political and economic considerations often have given way to informal and impromptu consultations with staff assistants and other individuals or ad hoc groups. The results have been harmful to our country.

"National security policies have become unclear and indecisive. Others urgently needed have been left unmade. Reaction to crisis, not avoidance of crisis, has been the inescapable result.

"Continuous review and planning has been substantially eliminated, in the downgrading of formal policy planning. Thus, when an immediate crisis looms, there is hope that crash handling will avoid a fundamental compromise of our national security."

The Republican policy-makers recalled that the role of the Secretary of Defense as the principal adviser to the President on national security matters had been progressively strengthened by successive acts of Congress.

The Coordinating Committee continued:

"In 1961, however, centralization became not policy but dogma, and the Secretary became 'first among equals' as adviser to the President.

"Ultimate responsibility for the defense establishment must be exercised by the Secretary of Defense under Presidential direction and within the statutory guidelines set by Congress...

"Under civilian control and within civilian established guidelines, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the uniformed services must direct the planning and management of all military forces. In force planning and operations, the military leadership must be responsive through the Secretary of Defense to the President."

The Committee commented that the practice of lower-level civilians in the Office of the Defense Secretary "superimposing themselves in originating and developing analyses for the Secretary does injustice to the competence of the military services."

The Committee added:

"The most current and disturbing example of the reduced role of the military in strategic and tactical decisions is Vietnam. A policy of gradualism largely dictated by civilians has been imposed, which has prolonged the war, increased the casualties and costs and divided the American people.

"Civilian control over the details of the air war has been particularly questionable. Testimony before the Senate Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee last August disclosed that tactical decisions were frequently being made by civilians in Washington.

"Military witnesses stated that many target recommendations approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff were being denied and others delayed, thus impairing

the war effort. The Subcommittee was also advised that operational decisions were at times being made without the involvement of responsible military professionals on the scene...

"Civilians in the Office of the Secretary of Defense have assumed greater control of contingency planning and military preparedness, and often have abandoned or ignored contingency plans in favor of rapidly conceived ad hoc decisions.

"Military operations, directed principally by civilians, have occurred, and illustrate suppression of the proper command and military role in our defense structure."

The GOP policy group said the Democratic Administration's "zeal for over-centralization appears to stem from a desire to control policy, people and events," and that this had resulted "in numerous instances of control of news, public information and intelligence."

The Coordinating Committee said:

"An example is the TFX program. A policy memorandum was issued directing that all news releases on the program would uphold the validity of the decisions of the Secretary of Defense. Such is the internal power of an over-centralized, publicly unresponsive structure.

"Under such circumstances, it is not surprising that the Administration's credibility has come under severe and sustained criticism."

The Committee said that the report of the Senate Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee in August, 1967, dealing with the Vietnam war, "reflects the lack of candor between Defense Department civilians and the Congress."

The Coordinating Committee recalled that the bipartisan Subcommittee arrived at such conclusions as the following:

"It was clearly implied by the Defense official that few, if any, important military targets remained unstruck. The great weight of the military testimony

was to the contrary.

"The Defense official said that North Vietnam could sustain its required import rate by way of land, rail and water from Red China. This position contrasts sharply with the views of military experts.

"The Administration has asserted for years that the Defense Department cost reduction program has been highly effective. A report by the House Armed Services Committee and the General Accounting Office, on analysis of such claims, concluded that not more than 50 per cent of the alleged savings were valid. Nor does this figure take into account that Congressional budget cuts, if adhered to by the DOD (Department of Defense), were considered 'cost savings'.

"From the management standpoint, over-centralization of authority inevitably will produce increased costs and gross inefficiencies in an organization as large as the Department of Defense.

"Decisions on routine matters are postponed, and major decisions must also be delayed or too hastily reached.

"In many decisions, particularly those related to combat in Southeast Asia, the time factor is such that when the decisions are finally made and communicated, circumstances may have changed, opportunities lost, the decisions no longer applicable."

The Republican policy-makers emphasized that, in the technological explosion of the present era, there must be mutual understanding among civilian administrators, soldiers and scientists.

The Coordinating Committee said:

"This new relationship has fared poorly in recent years, to the detriment of our policies and policy-making machinery.

"We see the result in dealing with crucial international events, in years of indecisiveness over Vietnam, in our failure to develop new advanced weapons systems, and in the erosion of America's prestige throughout the world.

"History sternly warns that weakness invites aggression. The weakness may be in armaments. But even with ample superior armaments, a nation can invite aggression by a lack of will and determination. Such a condition is often revealed by a hesitancy or inability to reach timely and forthright decisions."

5/22/68

Approved by the
Republican Coordinating Committee
May 6, 1968

Presented by the Task Force on
National Security

DECISIONS IN NATIONAL SECURITY: PATCHWORK OR POLICY?

Prepared under the direction of:
The Republican National Committee
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DECISIONS IN NATIONAL SECURITY: PATCHWORK OR POLICY?

"Good national security policy requires both good policymakers and good policy machinery. One cannot be divided from the other."

- U.S. Senate Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery; Committee on Government Operations, 1961

War and the threat of war continue to add an ominous dimension to our search for peace. In an international environment where true peace continues to elude us, we must maintain the highest priority on efforts to ensure our nation's security.

Providing for our security absorbs more of our human and material resources than any other single function of government. Fortunately, our nation is endowed with these great resources. However, wise policies and efficient organization and management are as essential as the resources themselves.

Our review concludes that the effectiveness of our security structure has declined, due to indecisive policies -- faulty policy-making machinery -- over-centralization in the Department of Defense -- over-management of our security structure -- over-reliance on cost accounting procedures and computer techniques -- and a downgrading of seasoned human judgment.

We are concerned with the self-imposed isolation of top civilians in the Pentagon who have too often dismissed or altered solid recommendations of the service Secretaries or the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and distorted the authority of unified and field commanders.

The technological explosion has forced new political - military relationships. The civilian administrator must understand the soldier and the scientist. The soldier must understand the civilian administrator and the scientist. This new relationship has fared poorly in recent years, to the detriment of our policies and policy making machinery. We see the result in dealing with crucial international events, in years of indecisiveness over Vietnam, in our failure to develop new advanced weapons systems, and in the erosion of America's prestige throughout the world.

History sternly warns that weakness invites aggression. The weakness may be in armaments. But even with ample superior armaments, a nation can invite aggression by a lack of will and determination. Such a condition is often revealed by a hesitancy or inability to reach timely and forthright decisions.

Responsibility for National Security

Within policies and requirements specified by Congress, the President determines and directs our national security efforts. By constitutional provision and historical precedent, he is responsible for the conduct of foreign relations. He is Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. He directs all departments and agencies in the Executive Branch.

National security policy formulation and implementation processes have become interdepartmental. Not only the Department of Defense, but also State, Treasury, Commerce, Interior and Agriculture, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Export-Import Bank, the Development Loan Fund and a score of other agencies are involved. Almost every major element of the Federal Government is involved to some extent in national security policy.

National security planning and execution cut across agency and departmental lines, and make the President's administrative task difficult and complex. The

effective management of this responsibility, however, remains critical for the American people.

National Security Policy Making Machinery

In 1961, the National Security Council, its Planning Board and Operations Coordinating Board, were inherited from the Eisenhower Administration, as organized, functioning and prestigious policy-making instruments. Immediately, and without careful consideration of possibly fateful consequences, both Boards were abolished. The effectiveness of the National Security Council was compromised.

The National Security Council,* created by the National Security Act of 1947, is charged with advising the President:

> "With respect to the integration of domestic, foreign and military policy relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies to cooperate more effectively in matters involving national security."

The National Security Council was to be the keystone of our nation's security structure. It was established not to restrict but to advise a President, by assuring thoughtful analysis and careful coordination of every significant aspect of national security policy. It assumed competent management of current problems and contingency planning for the future. It was to be insurance against hasty action -- a device to ensure that every factor bearing on vital security policies and programs would be presented to the President for action.

During the Eisenhower Administration, the National Security Council -- meeting frequently and formally throughout the eight years -- proved its indispensability to the nation.

Its procedures and deliberations were not flawless, but over this span of

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* See Appendix I

time it was invaluable in assuring comprehensive analyses, in producing timely recommendations in critical security issues, and in coordinating activities of the members of the Council.

Since then, the entire supporting structure has so changed, or even disappeared, as to now produce little more than mechanical compliance with the law. The procedures for integrating military, political and economic considerations often have given way to informal and impromptu consultations with staff assistants and other individuals or ad hoc groups. The results have been harmful to our country.

National security policies have become unclear and indecisive. Others urgently needed have been left unmade. Reaction to crisis -- not avoidance of of crisis -- has been the inescapable result.

Continuous review and planning has been substantially eliminated, in the downgrading of formal policy planning. Thus, when an immediate crisis looms, there is hope that crash handling will avoid a fundamental compromise of our national security. A solid and effective structure can permit the development of a policy which can be appropriately carried out at the tactical level.

Over-centralization in the Department of Defense

The progression toward a centrally-directed defense establishment began long before the 1960's. The National Security Act of 1947, and the 1949 and 1958 amendments to the Act, progressively strengthened the role of the Secretary of Defense as the principal advisor to the President on national security matters.* In 1961, however, centralization became not policy but dogma, and the Secretary became "first among equals" as advisor to the President.

Ultimate responsibility for the defense establishment must be exercised by the Secretary of Defense under Presidential direction and within the statuatory guidelines set by Congress. The function assumes highest-level policy guidance

* Largely reflecting the recommendations of The Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government on National Security Organization (Hoover Report).

and the resolution of policy differences -- such policies, for example, as the formulation of national security operations, criteria for organizing forces, and the development of the defense budget. In these activities, the civilian authorities are responsible to the President, the Congress and the electorate.

Under civilian control and within civilian established guidelines, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the uniformed services must direct the planning and management of all military forces. In force planning and operations, the military leadership must be responsive through the Secretary of Defense to the President.

A careful delineation of these roles of civilian policy-makers and military managers is absolutely essential for a secure and balanced national security posture.

Implementing Policies and Programs

Civilian Operational Planning and Control

Major organizational changes and new procedures have created a serious over-centralization of civilian management at the top of the defense establishment. The practice of lower-level civilians in the OSD superimposing themselves in originating and developing analyses for the Secretary does injustice to the competence of the military services. The most current and disturbing example of the reduced role of the military in strategic and tactical decisions is Vietnam. A policy of gradualism* largely dictated by civilians has been imposed, which has prolonged the war, increased the casualties and costs and divided the American people.

Civilian control over the details of the air war has been particularly questionable. Testimony before the Senate Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee last August disclosed that tactical decisions were frequently being made by civilians in Washington. Military witnesses stated that many target recommendations approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff were being denied and others delayed, thus impairing

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* See Republican Coordinating Committee report "Gradualism -- Fuel of Wars" March 1968.

the war effort. The Subcommittee was also advised that operational decisions were at times being made without the involvement of responsible military professionals on the scene.

It is axiomatic that when a tactical commander is given a mission, once a policy has been approved, he must also be given latitude and control over intelligence and military capability to accomplish the mission. Continuing support within the defense establishment and the Administration is necessary for the commanders as they carry out assigned tasks.

Civilians in the Office of the Secretary of Defense have assumed greater control of contingency planning and military preparedness, and often have abandoned or ignored contingency plans in favor of rapidly conceived ad hoc decisions. Military operations, directed principally by civilians, have occurred, and illustrate suppression of the proper command and military role in our defense structure.

Research, Development and Procurement Practices

Civilian authority has been administered to over-control research, development and procurement. Under present procedures, new weapons systems will not be approved unless they are justified as a response to a visible new threat. Nor can a new system be approved until all technology and cost data are "in hand." Thus, research and development* policies threaten to deprive our nation of the military superiority sufficient to maintain our security.

Military judgment -- in a number of cases the considered judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff -- has not been followed in weapons selection and procurement. Many urgently-needed weapons systems have fallen victim to a misapplication of the cost effectiveness process, or become lost in a morass of civilian boards or working groups increasingly capable of vetoing proposals.

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* See Republican Coordinating Committee report "Research and Development: Our Neglected Weapon" May 1968.

The weapons systems evaluation capability of the Department of Defense is experienced and comprehensive. The individual services and the OSD Weapons Systems Evaluation Group prepare extensive evaluations of proposed new weapons systems. Frequently this process has been compromised, bypassed or ignored, the findings obscured. Civilian leaders have substituted judgments based on "other reasons."

A notable example is the TFX contract award. The contractor unanimously recommended by both the military analysts and the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group was rejected. Recently, the commonality feature of the aircraft imposed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense upon the Navy was rejected -- six years and many millions of dollars later. The development of a new aircraft for the Navy now will cost considerably more in new expenditure and lost time, while leaving the service arm with a present complement and types of planes it feels is inadequate.

A similar incident was the X-22 VSTOL aircraft contract award. The Senate Preparedness Subcommittee found that both civilian and military evaluators were over-ridden. The Subcommittee concluded that the final decision was made in thirty minutes by a Deputy Secretary of Defense with a handful of civilian advisors, discarding analyses of 75 Navy experts who had spent 4,000 man hours assessing competing designs.

As a result of frequent OSD rejections and cutbacks, the services have gravitated toward a policy of "half a loaf," which is simply acquiescence in inadequacy. This approach is unsound and cannot be condoned.

The Cost Effectiveness Hurdle

Proposed weapons systems for the military services must pass, under current OSD procedures, a cost effectiveness test -- an analysis requiring precise cost data, application definitions and a demonstration of utility against a specific military threat. Over-reliance on a theoretical and mechanical cost effectiveness procedure has distorted the national security decision-making process.

Decisions on weapons systems, strategy and tactics demand the additional input of practical, professional knowledge. Intuition and other human factors must be introduced into decision-making. War and defense preparations, with all of their unpredictabilities, are matters of judgment. Innovation cannot be predicted or quantified. Defense is an inexact science.

A former top civilian official of the Administration recently wrote on the organizational and procedural changes of the past seven years:

> "The second reason for (organizational) change made it essential for political leadership of the country to consider the implications of any military move no matter how minor. If war had already become too important to leave to the generals, the selection and deployment of weapons and forces to deter war were now at least equally important.
>
> "The need for more active political management could not have been made if the tools had not been available, and the tools might not have been picked up without the need to find and use them."*

The "tool" is primarily the cost effectiveness study. Many witnesses before Congressional committees have testified that the cost effectiveness study has often been used to cloud issues or to legitimize previously determined positions.

Appropriate applications of the cost effectiveness technique are necessary and important in the vast Defense Department structure. Indeed, in response to Hoover Commission recommendations, then Secretary of Defense James V. Forrestal introduced financial management procedures into the Department. Thereafter the system was continuously and properly expanded.

Such procedures are vital from a position of fiscal responsibility and orderliness. However, weaponry cost estimates cannot be allowed to remain as virtually the sole determinant on which national security decisions are based. Our nation's security demands a flexible assessment system for determining threats and the most effective response to them.

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* See Atlantic Monthly, September 1967

Misapplications of the cost effectiveness process can create critical conditions, some of which became evident in the Administration's FY 1969 budget. Items previously reduced or rejected by the Secretary of Defense were suddenly requested. For example, several thousand additional helicopters, long before requested by the Army, were provided for, in addition to several billion dollars for aircraft spare parts for all services. Since national security rests in part upon adequate "lead time" for the procurement of weapons and supporting materials, deliveries in the two categories above in 1969 or later may well render a part of our military establishment vulnerable or incapable of performing at an effective level.

Under this procedure, rejections or reduction in military requests are most frequently reported only verbally. Back-up material is not made available. Committees of the Congress are generally unable to examine cost effectiveness studies supporting a given decision. The Chairman of the National Security and International Operations Subcommittee, Senate Government Operations Committee, concluded after a hearing in 1967 that the analysis process has been so used that it may well be damaging to our nation's security.

Effects of Over-centralization

Over-centralization ensures greater control. It also can produce delays, depress creativity and initiative, and can prevent the emergence of new ideas from lower echelons -- the most fertile source. The Administration's zeal for over-centralization appears to stem from a desire to control policy, people and events. It has resulted in numerous instances of control of news, public information and intelligence.

An example is the TFX program. A policy memorandum was issued directing that all news releases on the program would uphold the validity of the decisions of the Secretary of Defense. Such is the internal power of an

over-centralized, publicly unresponsive structure. Under such circumstances, it is not surprising that the Administration's credibility has come under severe and sustained criticism.

The problem reaches into Congress, where defense committees expect to receive a free exchange of views on critical aspects of our national security. However, in observance of Administration and Defense Department restrictions, witnesses testify under a directive stating that they must express the views of the Administration unless "pressed." When "pressed," before stating his own views, the witness must first reiterate the views of the Administration.

On completion of Congressional hearings, testimony is examined by Defense Department officials for the purpose of deleting information the release of which might harm the nation's security. Frequently, however, deletions have been made not for security reasons but for political reasons. Examples of this practice are numerous, and are a matter of public record.

The August, 1967, report by the Senate Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee reflects the lack of candor between Defense Department civilians and the Congress. The subject was the war in Vietnam. The bipartisan Subcommittee arrived at such conclusions as these:

It was clearly implied by the Defense official that few, if any, important military targets remained unstruck. The great weight of the military testimony was to the contrary.

The Defense official said that North Vietnam could sustain its required import rate by way of land, rail and water from Red China. This position contrasts sharply with the views of military experts.

The Administration has asserted for years that the Defense Department cost reduction program has been highly effective. A report by the House Armed Services Committee and the General Accounting Office, on analysis of such claims, con-

cluded that not more than 50 percent of the alleged savings were valid. Nor does this figure take into account that Congressional budget cuts, if adhered to by the DOD, were considered "cost savings."

From the management standpoint, over-centralization of authority inevitably will produce increased costs and gross inefficiencies in an organization as large as the Department of Defense. Decisions on routine matters are posponed, and major decisions must also be delayed or too hastily reached. In many decisions, particularly those related to combat in Southeast Asia, the time factor is such that when the decisions are finally made and communicated, circumstances may have changed, opportunities lost, the decisions no longer applicable.

In research and development, where timing is critical, delays of decision have caused paralysis. Defense industry spokesmen have indicated that in the past, some four to six months would be required in the Pentagon between the time proposals were submitted and final approval. Today, it averages twelve months. Some take two years. This must be added to the extremely long lead-time of 5 to 10 years common to weapons research projects.

In the current research and development cycle, too many individuals can say "no" and very few can say "yes." Confusion has resulted from the separation of responsibility and authority. While a measure of review is necessary and advisable, a current typical review of a major new weapons system will be made by 17 different staff agencies and over 700 people before receiving final approval.

As reported in official organization charts,* the recent rapid increase of personnel in the Office of the Secretary of Defense has brought into serious imbalance the process required for sound assessment and implementation of national security policies. This is another illustration of the structural dislocations which have come to frustrate comprehensive policy analysis.

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* See Appendix II.

Effect on Morale

The effects of over-centralization on the morale of both military and civilian personnel are grave. Responsibility without commensurate authority is frustrating and demoralizing. The exercise of authority, so necessary to the experience of a military professional seeking a career, is difficult under current conditions. It is a capability on which this nation must rely in time of emergencies and conflicts. Further, the initiative necessary for both military and technical civilian personnel is an imperative for a responsive national security structure. The cumulative effect of the current policies, procedures and organization is to weaken this vital ingredient.

Recommendations

The principle of civilian control over our national security structure requires that authority reside in the President. The two major counselors to him must be the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State. Focus at this level should primarily assume a broad policy-making and enforcing function.

In view of the threatening international environment, the collapse of time, and our exceedingly complex governmental structure, adherence to a formal decision-making process such as the National Security Council is a necessary prerequisite for effectively providing for the nation's security.

We must have a more articulate definition of our national interests and the steps required to promote them. Upon such determinations a clear policy must be set.

A crucial point in the national security process is placing the most capable people in key positions. Good national security policy requires good policy makers as well as good policy machinery.

The policy decision-making process must be planned and organized, and must make use of the talents of responsible individuals within the structure. Timely and regular meetings must be held. A coordination function must be established to ensure prompt and effective implementation. Follow-through and analysis of the effect of promulgated policies must be reinstituted, with reports from all involved sectors.

Detailed implementation of both planning and operations should be delegated to lower echelons, which must have both the necessary authority and responsibility to carry out assignments.

There must be reaffirmation of the responsibility to better inform both Congress and the electorate on issues affecting our national security, within appropriate safeguards.

Budgetary policy guidelines to the services must be clarified. There should be greater emphasis on the reestablishment of the priority budget concept utilizing to the extent practicable the "mission" basis.

The role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be reaffirmed, ensuring their direct and active participation in the development of policy, weapons system and force planning.

Advanced management techniques should be utilized in their proper role as tools, not as ends in themselves.

Conclusion

The extreme over-centralization and over-management of our national security structure on the one hand, and the extensive ad hoc policy deliberations on the other, developed in the past seven years, have weakened our national security position and created increased risks. It has brought into question this nation's ability to respond in a timely and effective manner to crises which threaten America's vital interests.

Regarding overcentralization, in 1949 Ferdinand Eberstadt, one of the foremost students of defense organization, testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee, stating:

> "From shattered illusions that mere passage of a unification act would produce a military utopia, there has sprung an equally illusory belief that present shortcomings will immediately disappear if only more and more authority is conferred in the Secretary of Defense and more and more people added to his staff... I suggest that great care be exercised lest the Office of the Secretary of Defense, instead of being a small and efficient unit which determines the policies of the military establishment and controls and directs the departments, feeding on its own growth, becomes a separate empire."

Today the separate empire exists. Balance must be restored, to ensure our nation's security, and to reinforce our ability to respond quickly to challenge.

Equally important are policies and an organization structure that will at all times conform to our representative form of government, with its system of checks and balances.

APPENDIX I

Title 50 - U. S. Code

Section 402. National Security Council.

(a) Establishment; presiding officer; functions; composition.

There is established a council to be known as the National Security Council (hereinafter in this section referred to as the "Council").

The President of the United States shall preside over meetings of the Council: Provided, That in his absence he may designate a member of the Council to preside in his place.

The function of the Council shall be to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security.

The Council shall be composed of--

(1) the President;
(2) the Vice President;
(3) the Secretary of State;
(4) the Secretary of Defense;
(5) the Director for Mutual Security;
(6) The Chairman of the National Security Resources Board; and
(7) the Secretaries and Under Secretaries of other executive departments, the Chairman of the Munitions Board, and the Chairman of the Research and Development Board, when appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to serve at his pleasure.

(b) Additional functions.

In addition to performing such other functions as the President may direct, for the purpose of more effectively coordinating the policies and functions of the departments and agencies of the Government relating to the national security, it shall, subject to the direction of the President, be the duty of the Council --

(1) to assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States in relation to our actual and potential military power, in the interest of national security, for the purpose of making recommendations to the President in connection therewith; and

(2) to consider policies on matters of common interest to the departments and agencies of the Government concerned with the national security, and to make recommendations to the President in connection therewith.

APPENDIX I (continued)

(c) Executive secretary; appointment and compensation; staff employees.

The Council shall have a staff to be headed by a civilian executive secretary who shall be appointed by the President. The executive secretary, subject to the direction of the Council, is authorized, subject to the civil-service laws and the Classification Act of 1949, to appoint and fix the compensation of such personnel as may be necessary to perform such duties as may be prescribed by the Council in connection with the performance of its functions.

(d) Recommendations and reports.

The Council shall, from time to time, make such recommendations, and such other reports to the President as it deems appropriate or as the President may require. (July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title I, Section 101, 61 Stat. 497; Aug. 10, 1949, ch. 412, Section 3, 63 Stat. 579; Oct. 28, 1949, ch. 782, title XI, Section 1106 (a), 63 Stat. 972; Oct. 10, 1951, ch. 479, title V, Section 501 (e) (1), 65 Stat. 378.)

APPENDIX II

ORGANIZATION OF FEDERAL EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (exclusive of separate services personnel)

Personnel - 1/1/61

Office of the Secretary of Defense	**136**
Secretary of Defense	7
Deputy Secretary of Defense	4
Office of Administrative Secretary	25
Administrative Office of the Secretary	100
Director of Defense Research and Engineering	**265**
Office of the Director	234
Weapons Systems Evaluation Group	31
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)	**170**
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health and Medical)	**11**
Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)	**212**
Office of Assistant Secretary	185
Defense Representative, NA and MA and U. S. Rep. USRO	27
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Personnel and Reserve)	**86**
Office of Assistant Secretary	82
Reserve Forces Policy Board	4
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Properties and Installations)	**57**
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)	**74**
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Supply and Logistics)	**166**
General Counsel	**56**
Assistant to the Secretary (Atomic Energy)	**12**
Assistant to the Secretary (Legislative Affairs)	**7**
Assistant to the Secretary (Special Operations)	**17**
Special Programs	**15**
Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff	**302**
Office of the Chairman	10
Joint Staff	187
Other Joint Chiefs of Staff Activities	105
Other Activities	**223**
Advanced Research Projects Agency	80
Standing Group—NATO	41
U. S. Court of Military Appeals	38
Interdepartmental Activities	5
Defense Communications Agency	59
Total employees (47 WOC)	[1] **1,809**

[1] Includes 40 part-time and WAE, and 38 overseas employees.

Personnel - 1/1/67

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE	**2,124**
Secretary of Defense	**4**
Deputy Secretary of Defense	**5**
Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Office of the Director	**212**
Advanced Research Projects Agency	138
Weapons Systems Evaluation Group	36
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Administration)	**226**
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)	**325**
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics)	**282**
Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)	**233**
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower)	**250**
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)	**87**
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis)	**142**
General Counsel	**54**
Miscellaneous Activities	**40**
Special Staff Assistants	**46**
USRO	**32**
NATO Force Planning	**11**
Special Project	**1**
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ORGANIZATION	**467**
Office of the Chairman	14
Joint Staff	225
Other Joint Chiefs of Staff Activities	228
OTHER DEFENSE ACTIVITIES	**73,265**
Armed Forces Information and Education	**403**
Defense Contract Audit Agency	**3,745**
Defense Atomic Support Agency	**2,198**
Defense Communications Agency	**1,235**
Classified Activities	**3,328**
Defense Supply Agency	**62,356**
Interdepartmental Activities	**37**
International Military Activities	**59**
Total employees (35 WOC)	[1] **75,952**

[1] Includes 3,450 part-time and WAE employees, and 913 employees outside U.S., of which 415 are American citizens.

Office of the Secretary (including Other Defense Activities)	**75,952**
Department of the Army	**455,523**
Department of the Navy	**376,879**
Department of the Air Force	**321,425**
Total, DOD (43 WOC)	[1] **1,229,779**

[1] Includes a total of 20,588 WAE employees and 153,541 employees outside U.S., of whom 35,266 are American citizens and 118,275 nationals of other countries.

Source: Organization of Federal Executive Departments and Agencies, U. S. Senate Committee on Government Operations.

APPENDIX II

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY (exclusive of separate services personnel)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY	As of 1/1/61
Secretary of Defense Area	**41**
Office of the Director of Armed Forces Information and Education	39
Office of Industrial Personnel Access Authorization Review	2
Secretary of Army Area	**671**
Office of the Secretary and the Under Secretary of the Army	38
Office, Assistant Secretary of the Army (MP and RF)	26
Office, Assistant Secretary of the Army (FM)	22
Office, Assistant Secretary of the Army (Logistics)	28
Office, Director of Research and Development	8
Office, Administrative Assistant to Secretary of the Army	8
Office, Chief of Public Information	5
Office, Chief of Legislative Liaison	48
Office of General Counsel	19
Administrative Support Group	35
Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals	16
Armed Services Explosive Safety Board	11
Army Board for Correction of Military Records	20
Army Civilian Lawyer Career Committee	3
Army Council of Review Boards	14
Grievance and Employment Policy Board	7
Defense Supply Service	177
Defense Telephone Service	103
Employment Coordination Office	6
Management Office	9
Office, Personnel Manager	15
Office of Management Analysis	5
National Board for Promotion of Rifle Practice	20
Security Review and Security Screening Boards	3
Space Management Service	4
Per Diem Travel and Transportation Allowance Committee	21
Army Staff (Departmental and Field)	[1] **18,717**
Office, Chief of Staff	128
General Staff Committee on National Guard and Review Policy	2
Comptroller of the Army	260
Army Audit Agency	1,312
Chief of Information	112
Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel	477
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence	948
Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations	337
Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics	524
Chief of Finance	4,186
Industrial College of the Armed Forces	104
Office of The Inspector General	48
Office of the Chief of Military History	63
The Judge Advocate General	218
Armed Forces Information and Education, DOD	385
National War College	88
National Guard Bureau	189
Office of the Chief, Army Reserve and ROTC Affairs	40
Office of the Chief of Civil Affairs	37
Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve Components	20
United States Military Academy	1,934
The Adjutant General	4,010
Chief of Chaplains	57
Provost Marshal General	156
Chief of Research and Development	175
Army Physical Review Council	7
Military Communications and Electronics Board	2
Army Special and Joint Activities	2,898
Miscellaneous Area Activities	**4**
Army Air Defense Command	**117**
Civil Functions Corps of Engineers	**27,268**
Technical Services	**208,147**
Chief Chemical Officer	8,698
Chief of Ordnance	95,447
Quartermaster General	29,364
Chief Signal Officer	24,585
Surgeon General	8,449
Chief of Transportation	14,630
Chief of Engineers, Military Functions	26,974
Continental Army Command	**67,445**
U. S. Continental Army Command	948
First U. S. Army	8,271
Second U. S. Army	10,443
Third U. S. Army	15,336
Fourth U. S. Army	10,710
Fifth U. S. Army	10,543
Sixth U. S. Army	9,269
Military District of Washington, U. S. Army	1,925
Alaska	[2] **2,793**
Hawaii	[2] **5,032**
Total continental United States	**330,225**
Total outside continental United States	**50,439**
Total employees (7 WOC)	[3] **380,674**

[1] Excludes 5,053 Technical Staff personnel (departmental) included with Technical Services.
[2] Data shown for Alaska and Hawaii are by geographical area, not by command.
[3] Includes 1,298 part-time and WAE employees and 50,439 overseas employees, of which 13,616 are American citizens and 36,823 are nationals of other countries.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY	As of 1/1/67
Secretary of the Army Area (Departmental and Field)	**1,101**
Office of the Secretary and the Under Secretary of the Army	45
Office, Assistant Secretary of the Army (FM)	17
Office, Assistant Secretary of the Army (I&L)	56
Office, Assistant Secretary of the Army (R&D)	14
Office, Administrative Assistant to Secretary of the Army	9
Office, Chief of Public Information	6
Office, Chief of Legislative Liaison	69
Office of General Counsel	21
Administrative Support Group	35
Army Board for Correction of Military Records	22
Army Council of Review Boards	11
Grievance and Employment Policy Board	13
Employment Coordination Service	7
Management Office	16
Office, Personnel Manager	15
National Board for Promotion of Rifle Practice	21
Space Management Service	4
Office of Civil Defense	720
Army Staff Area (Departmental and Field)	**45,451**
Office, Chief of Staff	350
General Staff Committee on National Guard and Review Policy	2
Special Assistant for Army Information and Data Systems	332
Comptroller of the Army	285
Army Audit Agency	741
Chief of Information	126
Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel	510
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence	887
Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development	333
Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations	258
Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics	649
Chief of Finance	4,659
Office of The Inspector General	44
Office of the Chief of Military History	74
The Judge Advocate General	235
National Guard Bureau	118
Office of the Chief, Army Reserve	51
Office of the Chief, Reserve Components	51
Office of Personnel Operations	1,122
Office of the President	4
United States Military Academy	2,271
The Adjutant General	4,467
Chief of Chaplains	33
Provost Marshal General	58
Chief of Research and Development	559
Chief of Engineers, Military Functions	12,699
Chief of Communications—Electronics	360
Chief of Support Services	1,05?
Surgeon General	10,564
U S Army Recruiting Command	2,557
DOD and Joint Activities	**1,322**
Joint Brazil-U.S. Defense Commission	1
Joint Mexican-U.S. Defense Commission	1
Office, Industrial Personnel Access Authorization Review	6
Industrial College of the Armed Forces	92
National War College	69
SHAPE Liaison	2
Armed Services Explosive Safety Board	12
Defense Supply Service	199
Defense Telephone Service	95
Per Diem Travel and Transportation Allowance Committee	23
Defense Language Institute	779
Defense Information School	43
Army Security Agency	**1,077**
Army Air Defense Command	**295**
Combat Developments Command	**1,022**
Army Materiel Command	**161,007**
Headquarters, AMC	2,601
U.S. Army Tank Automatic Center	6,846
U.S. Army Aviation Materiel Command	3,879
U.S. Army Electronics Command	11,338
U.S. Army Missile Command	9,851
U.S. Army Mobility Command	4,580
U.S. Army Munitions Command	26,522
U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command	12,975
U.S. Army Supply and Maintenance	63,075
U.S. Army Weapons Command	12,635
Other Activities	9,705
Continental Army Command	**107,154**
U.S. Continental Army Command	1,133
First U.S. Army	31,117
Third U.S. Army	27,278
Fourth U.S. Army	19,310
Fifth U.S. Army	14,760
Sixth U.S. Army	11,139
Military District of Washington, U.S. Army	2,417
Military Traffic Management Service	**6,212**
Intelligence Corps Command	**911**
Army Strategic Communications Command	**2,681**
Civil Functions, Corps of Engineers	**30,701**
Miscellaneous	**7**
Alaska [1]	**2,987**
Hawaii [1]	**5,899**
Total United States	**361,941**
Total outside U.S.	**84,696**
Total employees (4 WOC)	**435,323**

[1] Data shown is by geographical area, not by command.
[2] Includes 7,127 part-time and WAE employees and 84,696 employees outside U.S., of whom 15,440 are American citizens and 69,256 are nationals of other countries.

Source: Organization of Federal Executive Departments and Agencies, U. S. Senate Committee on Government Operations

APPENDIX II (continued)

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY (exclusive of separate services personnel)

As of 1/1/61

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY	
Executive Office of the Secretary	**2,144**
Office of Secretary of the Navy	25
Office of Under Secretary of the Navy	4
Office of Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Material)	16
Office of Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research and Development)	5
Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Personnel and Reserve Forces)	8
Office of Admin. Assistc Sec. Navy	7
Office of Analysis and Review	23
Administrative Office	785
Office of the Comptroller	346
Office of the General Counsel	26
Office of Industrial Relations	133
Office of Information	13
Navy Management Office	66
Office of Naval Material	191
Office of Naval Petroleum Reserves	4
Office of Naval Research	400
Board for Correction of Naval Records	12
Naval Physical Disability Review Board	16
Naval Physical Review Council	5
Special Assignments and Details to Other Agencies	2
Electronics Production Resources Agency	21
Office of Industrial Personnel Access Authorization Review	3
Office of Legislative Affairs	20
Savings Bonds Office	1
Navy Panel, Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals	12
Office of the Judge Advocate General	**97**
Office of Chief of Naval Operations	**1,046**
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations	3
Staff Offices	26
Assistant Vice Chief of Naval Operations/Director of Naval Administration	240
Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence)	357
Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Communications)	76
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Personnel and Naval Reserve)	14
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Fleet Operations and Readiness)	35
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Logistics)	107
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air)	95
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Plans and Policy)	29
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Development)	64
Bureau of Medicine and Surgery	**375**
Office of the Chief	12
Assistant Chief for Personnel and Professional Operations	157
Assistant Chief for Planning and Logistics	165
Assistant Chief for Aviation Medicine	9
Assistant Chief for Dentistry	12
Assistant Chief for Research and Military Medical Specialties	20
Bureau of Naval Personnel	**1,699**
Office of the Chief	12
Administrative and Management Division	113
Inspector General	1
Special Assistant to the Chief for Leadership	5
Personnel Research Division	23
Office of Liaison and Technical Information	5
Manpower Information Division	220
Assistant Chief for Plans	61
Assistant Chief for Personnel Control	442
Assistant Chief for Education and Training	135
Assistant Chief for Naval Reserve and Naval District Affairs	8
Assistant Chief for Records	473
Assistant Chief for Performance	39
Assistant Chief for Morale Services	68
Assistant Chief for Finance	73
Chief of Chaplains	10
Assistant Chief for Property Management	11
Bureau of Naval Weapons	**3,318**
Office of the Chief and Deputy Chief	8
Assistant Chief for Program Management	256
Inspector General and Assistant Chief for Administration	478
Assistant Chief for Fleet Readiness	426
Office of Counsel	46
Office of the Comptroller	155
Assistant Chief for Contracts	361
Assistant Chief for Production and Quality Control	290
Assistant Chief for Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation	943
Assistant Chief for Field Support	108
Special Projects Office	247
Bureau of Ships	**3,083**
Office of the Chief	40
Assistant Chief for Plans and Administration, and Inspector General	475
Assistant Chief for Research and Development	91
Assistant Chief for Design, Shipbuilding and Fleet Maintenance	601
Assistant Chief for Technical Logistics	1,279
Assistant Chief for Field Activities	172
Assistant Chief for Nuclear Propulsion	67
Contract Division	214
Comptroller Division	144
Bureau of Supplies and Accounts	**754**
Office of the Chief	89
Director of Planning	41
Director of Management Engineering	69
Director of Industrial Relations	35
Director of Naval Personnel	26
Comptroller of the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts	183
Assistant Chief for Supply Mgt.	111
Assistant Chief for Transportation	112
Director of Mutual Security Programs	34
Assistant Chief for Purchasing	33
Assistant Chief for Research and Development	21
Bureau of Yards and Docks	**841**
Office of the Chief	33
Assistant Chief for Administration and Comptroller	272
Assistant Chief for Planning and Design	228
Assistant Chief for Construction	109
Assistant Chief for Maintenance and Materiel	113
Assistant Chief for Real Estate	40
Assistant Chief of Housing	46
Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps	**1,083**
Office of the Commandant	6
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1	20
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3	20
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4	16
Personnel Department	311
Division of Aviation	18
Administrative Division	86
Supply Department	434
Inspection Division	4
Division of Information	5
Fiscal Division	47
Division of Reserve	10
Marine Corps Boards	4
Data Processing Division	102
Total departmental	**14,440**
Continental U. S.	**320,925**
Overseas	[1]**22,054**
Total all areas (1 WOC)	[2]**343,979**

[1] Includes 6,778 American citizens and 15,276 nationals of other countries.
[2] Includes 934 part-time and WAE employees

As of 1/1/67

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY	
Executive Office of the Secretary	**116**
Office of Secretary of the Navy	38
Office of Under Secretary of the Navy	9
Office of Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Installations and Logistics)	42
Office of Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research and Development)	11
Office of Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management)	5
Office of the Special Asst. to Sec. Navy	4
Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of the Navy (Manpower)	7
Department of the Navy Staff Offices	**1,318**
Office of Program Appraisal	14
Administrative Office	226
Office of the Comptroller	237
Office of the General Counsel	21
Office of Civilian Manpower Management	235
Office of Information	39
Office of Management Information	41
Office of Petroleum Reserves	6
Office of Naval Research	400
Board for Correction of Naval Records	14
Navy Council of Personnel Boards	16
Physical Review Council	6
Office of Legislative Affairs	28
Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals	35
Office of the Judge Advocate General	**79**
Office of Chief of Naval Operations	**990**
Staff Offices	14
Assistant Vice Chief of Naval Operations/Director of Naval Administration	255
Navy Program Planning Office	66
Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence)	150
Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Communications)	60
Office of Anti-Submarine Warfare Programs	10
Office of Naval Inspector General	24
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Manpower and Naval Reserve)	39
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Fleet Operations and Readiness)	64
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Logistics)	110
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air)	94
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Plans and Policy)	33
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Development)	71
Bureau of Medicine and Surgery	**327**
Office of the Chief	10
Assistant Chief for Personnel and Professional Operations	151
Assistant Chief for Planning and Logistics	126
Assistant Chief for Aviation Medicine	9
Assistant Chief for Dentistry	12
Assistant Chief for Research and Military Medical Specialties	19
Bureau of Naval Personnel	**1,771**
Office of the Chief	10
Administrative and Management Division	115
Office of Inspector General	1
Office of Liaison and Technical Information	5
Manpower Information Division	248
Assistant Chief for Plans	78
Assistant Chief for Personnel Control	451
Assistant Chief for Education and Training	157
Assistant Chief for Naval Reserve and Naval District Affairs	7
Assistant Chief for Records	465
Assistant Chief for Performance	41
Assistant Chief for Morale Services	66
Assistant Chief for Finance	89
Chief of Chaplains	10
Assistant Chief for Property Management	12
Special Assistant to Chief for Retention Task Force	3
Navy Department Board of Decorations and Medals	7
Board for Correction of Records	1
Outside Bureau Details	5
Office of Naval Material	**460**
Office of the Chief	12
Deputy Chief of Naval Material for Program and Financial Management	98
Deputy Chief of Naval Material for Procurement	106
Deputy Chief of Naval Material for Development	95
Deputy Chief of Naval Material for Logistic Support	84
Deputy Chief of Naval Material for Management and Organization	65
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps	**1,244**
Office of the Commandant	42
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1	22
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3	17
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4	40
Personnel Department	342
Administrative Division	151
Supply Department	309
Inspection Department	3
Division of Information	8
Fiscal Division	158
Division of Reserve	10
Marine Corps Boards	4
Data Processing Division	138
Military Sea Transportation Service	**292**
Total departmental service	**6,397**
Total United States	**344,648**
Total outside U.S.	**32,231**
Total all areas (1 WOC)	**376,879**

[1] Includes 9,790 American citizens and 22,441 nationals of other countries.
[2] Includes 5,488 part-time and WAE employees.

Source: Organization of Federal Executive Departments and Agencies, U. S. Senate Committee on Government Operations

APPENDIX II (continued)

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE (exclusive of separate services personnel)

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE	As of 1/1/61
Office of the Secretary	**307**
Secretary of the Air Force	6
Under Secretary of the Air Force	6
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Materiel)	27
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management)	12
Special Assistant to the Secretary (Manpower, Personnel and Reserve Forces)	9
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Research and Development)	9
Special Assistant for Installations	7
Administrative Assistant	61
General Counsel	32
Office of Legislative Liaison	84
Office of Information Services	38
Secretary of the Air Force Personnel Council	10
Office, Missile and Satellite Systems	6
Headquarters, U. S. Air Force	**4,446**
Chief of Staff	9
Vice Chief of Staff	18
Scientific Advisory Board	68
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence	122
Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve Forces	9
The Inspector General	34
The Surgeon General	193
The Judge Advocate General	90
Secretary of the Air Staff	277
Directorate of Administrative Services	499
Comptroller of the Air Force	641
Deputy Chief of Staff, Development	122
Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations	646
Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Programs	152
Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel	605
Deputy Chief of Staff, Materiel	321
Central Control Group	528
Mutual Defense Aid Program	112
Air Materiel Command	**151,013**
Headquarters and Subsidiary Units	17,090
Aeronautical Systems Center	1,372
Ballistic Missiles Center	669
Central Contract Management Region	3,177
Eastern Contract Management Region	3,576
Electronic Systems Center	371
Western Contract Management Region	3,476
Middletown, Pa., Air Materiel Area	10 544
Mobile, Ala., Air Materiel Area	15 001
Ogden, Utah, Air Materiel Area	11 327
Oklahoma City, Okla., Air Materiel Area	18 601
Rome, N.Y., Air Materiel Area	7,682
San Antonio, Tex., Air Materiel Area	19 596
Sacramento, Calif., Air Materiel Area	13 602
San Bernardino, Calif., Air Materiel Area	9 906
Warner-Robins, Georgia Air Materiel Area	15 023

Strategic Air Command	**18,065**
Headquarters and Subsidiary Units	1 767
Second Air Force	6 187
Eighth Air Force	4 528
Fifteenth Air Force	5 583
Tactical Air Command	**6,649**
Headquarters and Subsidiary Units	1 254
Ninth Air Force	1.194
Twelfth Air Force	4 196
Nineteenth Air Force	5
Aeronautical Chart and Information Center	**3,861**
Air Defense Command	**9,831**
Air Force Accounting and Finance Center	**1,732**
Air Research and Development Command	**22,956**
Air Training Command	**23,909**
Air University	**2,361**
Continental Air Command	**9,761**
Headquarters Command, USAF	**6,017**
Military Air Transport Service	**10,111**
U. S. Air Force Academy	**1,739**
USAF Security Service	**875**
Total continental U. S.	**273,033**
Overseas	[1]**33,538**
Total employees (46 WOC)	[2]**306,571**

[1]Includes 14,179 American citizens and 19 359 nationals of other countries
[2]Includes 755 WAE employees

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE	As of 1/1/67
Office of the Secretary	**347**
Secretary of the Air Force	6
Under Secretary of the Air Force	3
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Installations and Logistics)	28
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management)	17
Special Assistant to the Secretary for Manpower	14
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Research and Development)	18
Deputy Undersecretary (International Affairs)	3
Air Force Board for the Correction of Military Records	12
Administrative Assistant	78
General Counsel	33
Office of Legislative Liaison	83
Office of Information	40
Secretary of the Air Force Personnel Council	12
Headquarters, U.S. Air Force	**2,983**
Chief of Staff	8
Vice Chief of Staff	14
Scientific Advisory Board	8
Director, Secretariat	11
Director of Administrative Services	147
Secretary of the Air Staff	141
Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve Forces	5
Chief, Operations Analysis	41
Chief of Chaplains	12
The Inspector General	26
The Judge Advocate General	61
The Surgeon General	146
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence	112
Comptroller of the Air Force	419
Deputy Chief of Staff, Programs and Resources	476
Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel	295
Deputy Chief of Staff, Research and Development	173
Deputy Chief of Staff, Systems and Logistics	418
Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Operations	204
Central Control Group	167
Military Assistance Program	99
Air Force Logistics Command	**131,336**
Headquarters and Subsidiary Units	16,522
Middletown Air Materiel Area	2,427
Mobile Air Materiel Area	6,842
Oklahoma City Air Materiel Area	23,191
Ogden Air Materiel Area	17,371
Rome Air Materiel Area	3,072
San Antonio Air Materiel Area	23,334
Sacramento Air Materiel Area	19,689
Warner Robins Air Materiel Area	18,888

Air Force Systems Command	**32,238**
Headquarters and Subsidiary Units	1,148
Arnold Engineering Development Center	145
Air Force Flight Test Center	2,074
Aeronautical Systems Division	3,364
Ballistic Systems Division	740
Electronic Systems Division	2,277
Air Force Missile Development Center	1,637
Space Systems Division	1,114
Research and Technology Division	6,260
Air Proving Ground Center	2,649
Air Force Special Weapons Center	1,263
Aerospace Medical Division	1,782
Foreign Technology Division	895
National Range Division	3,071
Air Force Contract Management Division	3,819
Strategic Air Command	**20,648**
Headquarters and SubsidiaryUnits	1,689
Second Air Force	5,802
Eighth Air Force	5,456
Fifteenth Air Force	6,461
1st Strategic Aerospace Division	1,240
Tactical Air Command	**11,292**
Headquarters and Subsidiary Units	1,468
Ninth Air Force	3,499
Twelfth Air Force	5,586
Nineteenth Air Force	6
USAF, Special Air Warfare Center	676
USAF, Tactical Air Warfare Center	32
USAF, Tactical Air Reconnaissance Center	25
Aeronautical Chart and Information Center	**3,728**
Air Defense Command	**12,511**
Air Force Accounting and Finance Center	**1,793**
Air Force Communications Service	**4,292**
Air Training Command	**21,860**
Air University	**2,521**
Continental Air Command	**8,938**
Headquarters Command, USAF	**6,726**
Military Air Transport Service	**15,236**
Office of Aerospace Research	**1,388**
U.S. Air Force Academy	**1,898**
U.S. Air Force Security Service	**1,202**
Alaskan Air Command in Alaska	**2,422**
Pacific Air Forces in Hawaii	**2,365**
Total United States	**285,724**
Total outside U.S.	[1]**35,701**
Total employees (4 WOC)	[2]**321,425**

[1]Includes 9,621 American citizens and 26 080 nationals of other countries
[2]Includes 4,523 WAE employees

Source: Organization of Federal Executive Departments and Agencies, U. S. Senate Committee on Government Operations

THE REPUBLICAN LEADERSHIP OF THE CONGRESS

Press Release

Issued following a Leadership Meeting

July 18, 1968

REPRESENTATIVE FORD: IMMEDIATE RELEASE

The defense of the nation is the first duty of any Administration. In this, the Johnson-Humphrey Administration is failing the American people. Its short-sighted and wishful defense policies, unless promptly reversed, may expose our country to grave danger in the decade ahead.

Gen. Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has said that "The growth of Soviet nuclear power and the trend of certain defense policies combine to make me anxious about the nation's future capacity for survival."

When Admiral Rickover, father of our nuclear submarine fleet, was asked by members of the Senate Armed Services Committee whether he would today more confidently command the American or the Soviet submarine force he answered instantly: "The Soviet submarine force."

Many professional military leaders believe our nation will eventually be imperilled by recent and present defense policies. In this era of increasingly sophisticated and complex technology, the lead time of most weapons systems exceeds the Constitutional limit on Presidential tenure. Thus, ironically, the far-sighted defense decisions of the Eisenhower Administration provide our margin of safety today. But where will we stand in the 1970's if we continue the Johnson-Humphrey Administration policies?

President Eisenhower sought peace through a defense posture second to none, the traditional American concept. He was able to bring peace to Korea and his successor was able to avert war in the Cuban missile crisis because the United States still had clear strategic superiority. But the Johnson-Humphrey Administration over the past five years has:

1. Curtailed expansion of our long-range strategic missile force;

2. Watched in bewilderment as the Russians have doubled the number of their intercontinental ballistic missiles in one year;

Room S-124 U.S. Capitol—(202) 225-3700
Consultant to the Leadership—John B. Fisher

3. Ended big bomber production, reduced our existing force, refused to approve an advanced, manned strategic bomber, and wasted time and resources on development of the TFX aircraft, that, as experts predicted, proved totally unsuitable for Navy use.

4. Delayed the improvement of our nuclear Navy, permitted the Soviet Union rapidly to close the gap in nuclear-powered submarines and allowed the Russians to establish and expand their fleets in the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean.

5. Half-heartedly, under heavy pressure from Republicans and concerned Democrats in the Congress, agreed to the deployment of a thin anti-ballistic missile defense for the protection of our people.

6. Weakened our ability to respond to emergency situations such as the seizure of the USS Pueblo by concentrating attention on Vietnam and spreading other available forces, at high risk, too thinly around the world. (This is the 178th day since the Pueblo's seizure.)

7. Allowed the American merchant marine to shrink into virtual insignificance and avoided adoption of a comprehensive maritime strategy and program at the very time the Soviets are stepping up theirs.

8. Diluted and dissipated the successful and prudent posture of seeking peace through strength, which had been bipartisan American policy since World War II, to the point where Soviet spokesmen are openly claiming strategic parity as the price of peace.

It is highly significant that Soviet Communist Party chief Brezhnev recently assailed the Republican Coordinating Committee's endorsement of the doctrine of strategic superiority for the United States. Brezhnev said the Soviet Union would "remain vigilant, increase its military preparedness and 'keep our powder dry'."

The next U.S. Administration must be equally diligent to keep America's powder dry, to ensure our long-range survival through adequate defense planning. The Johnson-Humphrey defense policies have demonstrably failed to face up to the realities of peace and security in a perilous world. They have left us with a genuine and growing strategic <u>capability gap</u> that <u>must</u> be closed quickly.

The defense of the nation is not alone a matter of military force. It depends also upon foreign policies realistic in concept and unflinching in spirit.

All around the globe we see our foreign policies in disarray.

In Western Europe there is growing distrust of the United States and dismay as to the future. NATO, freedom's shield on that continent, has been allowed virtually to disintegrate. In the Middle East indecision alienates our friends and heartens our enemies, and Russian diplomatic and military--especially naval -- power has moved into the vacuum the Administration has permitted there.

In Latin America, the Administration's fumbling with the alleged "Alliance for Progress" proves it to be neither an alliance of promise nor one capable of progress in present hands.

The dangerously disturbed state of affairs almost everywhere alarms us with good reason, for we fail to see in this Administration's policies, practices and philosophy any hope of solution for it.

By way of vivid example, we have hoped for months for Administration support of the atomic desalinization plan placed before it long ago by Americans of unquestioned eminence and ability and enthusiastically endorsed by thousands of citizens around the world.

The Middle East is again a powder-keg immensely dangerous to world peace. Even so, the Administration continues to maintain that this extraordinary atomic project-for-peace, which promises to replace ancient hatreds with hope in the Eastern Mediterranean, is "not politically feasible".

This we cannot accept. The proposal is a thoughtful, practical initiative for peace without parallel in recent years. It might well restore stability in that tormented region. We strongly urge the adoption of that Eisenhower-Strauss proposal at the earliest possible moment.

The improved military capability of Arab nations with French and Soviet planes and weapons has created a power imbalance in the Middle East which is dangerous to peace. It can be corrected only if this nation will make available suitable and necessary weapons and F-4 Phantom jet planes to the Republic of Israel.

Mr. Dirksen

The defense of this nation is tied as surely to statesmanlike economic proposals such as this as it is to military hardware. We serve neither America nor mankind with sanity by ignoring them.

We repeat that the defense of our nation is the first duty of this Administration. It is clear and alarming that this primary responsibility is not being met.



CONGRESSMAN
GERALD R. FORD
HOUSE REPUBLICAN LEADER

NEWS RELEASE

--FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE--
November 6, 1968

The 1968 election results represent a great advance for the Republican Party. We would have won control of the House of Representatives as well as the White House except for complications resulting from the third-party candidacy of George Wallace and the President's order of a bombing halt just five days before the election. Those observations aside, there is no doubt in my mind that the 91st Congress will far more accurately reflect the wishes of the American people than the 90th and will be still more in line with the thinking of the people than the rubber-stamp 89th Congress. It will reflect the fact that the Republican Party has moved upward almost miraculously in the people's favor since 1964. We will continue to grow in strength. I believe that in 1970 the people will see the wisdom of turning control of the Congress over to the Republican Party. Apparently this changeover was too much to hope for in '68. I personally know of nothing we could have or should have done differently in our congressional campaigns.

# # #

Office Copy
April, 1969

"Major Issues" Statement by Rep. Gerald R. Ford, R-Mich., Republican Leader, U.S. House of Representatives, prepared by the National Federation of GOP Women.

"Safeguard: A Step Toward Peace"

BY JERRY FORD

In deciding to deploy the Safeguard Anti-Ballistic Missile, President Nixon has but one goal: To preserve world peace.

President Nixon would keep the nuclear peace by protecting our nuclear deterrent -- making certain that no enemy could destroy the U.S. capability of responding to a nuclear attack.

Former President Johnson had decided to construct ABM installations near major U.S. cities. In reviewing that decision, Mr. Nixon ruled out the placement of ABM's near large American cities. Making a judgment in the light of latest developments, Mr. Nixon decided that the national security dictated placing ABM's as protectors of our Minuteman missile sites.

Nobody is criticizing President Nixon for abandoning Mr. Johnson's ABM ring -around-the-cities plan.

But leading Senate Democrats and a few Senate Republicans are opposing any kind of deployment of the ABM.

Their chief argument appears to be that U.S. action to deploy the ABM to protect America's ability to strike back at a nuclear attacker will "provoke" the Soviet Union and will spur the nuclear arms race at a time when arms control talks with the Russians seem imminent.

A corollary argument is made to the effect that the ABM won't work anyway.

Let's take the first argument first -- that deployment of ABM's to protect our Minuteman missile bases is provocative.

This contention that the President's ABM plan is provocative simply does not stand up before the facts.

Will the Safeguard plan spur the nuclear arms race and destroy the possibility of arms control?

In that regard, let me quote the following:

"Which weapons should be regarded as a tension factor -- offensive or defensive weapons? I think that a defense system which prevents attack is not a cause of the arms race but represents a factor preventing the death of people."

Who made that statement? President Nixon? Defense Secretary Laird? Jerry Ford? No, it was made by Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin, when he discussed anti-ballistic-missiles at a press conference Feb. 9, 1967, in London.

That, I think, is the best possible answer to the argument that deployment of the Safeguard ABM System to protect Minuteman missile sites will trigger a new round in the arms race.

Where were Mr. Nixon's critics when Soviet leaders began deploying their ABM system in areas around Moscow? I do not recall their saying then that the Soviet Union was engaging in provocative action.

What about the effect of the President's ABM decision on arms control talks?

Four days after the Johnson Administration's decision to deploy the ABM around major American cities, the Soviet Union indicated a desire to engage in arms limitation talks with the United States.

Destroy the possibility of arms control talks? On the contrary, past experience indicates our decision to deploy the ABM will have the opposite effect on Soviet leaders.

Critics of the President's ABM decision would do well to remember that the Soviet Union already has 67 ABM installations around Moscow and is developing a sophisticated new ABM system.

Will the ABM work? The Russians obviously think so.

There are many prominent scientists who question ABM reliability. Just so, there were a great number of leading scientists who thought the atom could not be split and that it was impossible to build an H-bomb. I shudder to think of the consequences had we not gone ahead with these developments while the Soviet Union did.

Longrange Nixon Administration plans call for 12 ABM installations -- 11 around Minuteman bases and one around Washington, D. C., as the national command center.

Initial construction involves only two sites -- at Malstrom Air Force Base in Montana and Grand Forks AFB in North Dakota. Development of these two sites will provide tests of feasibility.

Why protect our Minuteman missile sites?

The primary reason is that the Soviet Union is reaching parity with the United States in land-based and submarine-based missiles. And with the SS-9, an accurate intercontinental ballistic missile with a large warhead, the Soviet Union

would be capable of knocking out a large portion of the 1,000-missile U.S. Minuteman force.

What about our Polaris submarine-borne missiles?

Soviet anti-submarine warfare developments are a threat to our 656-missile Polaris deterrent force.

Thus if the U.S. is to maintain its deterrent strength, we have no realistic alternative but to protect some of the Minuteman bases with the Safeguard System.

The Safeguard ABM not only will take on any Soviet land or sea-based missiles that might be fired at the United States, it also is intended to defend against the Russian Fractional Orbiting Bombardment System (FOBS).

FOBS is the Russian-developed low-trajectory weapon which would be delivered by a satellite which travels the southern or trans-Antarctic course to approach the U.S. from below.

I know of no American who did not shudder with apprehension when former Defense Secretary McNamara announced that the Soviet Union had developed the FOBS as a new weapon.

As for the SS-9, the Soviet Union began deploying the monster ICBM in underground silos in 1966. We learned this only through our reconnaissance satellites.

In my view, we must protect some of our Minuteman bases with the Safeguard System if the United States is to maintain its deterrent strength as a preventive of nuclear war.

To conclude otherwise is to assume that Soviet leaders in years ahead -- no matter what their identity and their mental and emotional makeup -- would never entertain the notion of launching a first strike against the United States even if they became convinced of the Soviet Union's nuclear superiority.

To rule out the Safeguard system, one would have to say to himself that nuclear war could never occur under any circumstances.

Should there be those who are wedded to that view, then they must believe that neither Soviet nor Red Chinese leaders would ever consider a first strike against the United States.

Our Defense Department now estimates that the Red Chinese will have 20 to 30 intercontinental ballistic missiles by 1975 -- missiles that could hit the United States. With its huge land mass and population of more than 700 million, Red China might seriously consider it acceptable strategy to launch a nuclear strike against the United States.

President Nixon has promised that the Safeguard ABM System will be reviewed annually from three standpoints -- the magnitude of the threat from the Soviet Union, evaluation of the arms control talks we may be having with the Soviet Union, and technological progress in research and development of defensive missiles.

It is the deterrent power of the United States that has avoided world war in the decades since World War II. It was U.S. nuclear superiority that persuaded the Soviet Union to remove intermediate range ballistic missiles from Cuba in 1962.

I think the way of strength is the way of peace. We need to be sufficiently strong to keep the peace. And the Safeguard ABM system is necessary to give us sufficient deterrent strength.

I would be remiss in my duty if I did not support the Safeguard ABM system as a necessary measure to protect our national security. I am convinced there is no alternative.

# # #

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

CONGRESSMAN
GERALD R. FORD
HOUSE REPUBLICAN LEADER

NEWS RELEASE

--FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE--
July 10, 1969

Statement by Rep. Gerald R. Ford, Republican leader, U.S. House of Representatives, regarding overseas reductions in U.S. troops and civilian employes.

President Nixon's order withdrawing 14,900 military personnel from U.S. bases overseas and reducing federal civilian employes overseas by 5,100 is meaningful in terms of efficiency, budgetary savings and improvement in our balance of payments situation.

The cutback does not weaken the U.S. stance abroad in any way. It simply streamlines our overseas forces and staffs while cutting government costs.

It is important that the United States periodically review the numbers and operations of its overseas personnel and trim away the fat. If this is not done, our overseas staffs grow upon themselves and tend to become bloated.

The President has taken a needful step with his cutback order. It is a proper and desirable action.

I would also applaud the agreement reached between our government and the West German government under which the West Germans will buy more U.S. goods to help offset international payments losses resulting from the stationing of our troops in West Germany.

This agreement will be far more effective and beneficial as regards our balance of payments situation than the pact which expired last June 30 and primarily involved West German purchase of U.S. Treasury bonds.

# # #

Press Galleries only 11:30 a.m. 1/29/71 Office Copy

CONGRESSMAN
GERALD R. FORD
HOUSE REPUBLICAN LEADER

NEWS RELEASE

--FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE--
January 29, 1971

Rep. Gerald R. Ford, R-Grand Rapids, today urged "a full and complete" congressional investigation of the crash of a B-52 bomber in Lake Michigan near Charlevoix last Jan. 7.

Ford made the statement in response to a plea for such an investigation from Peter W. Steketee, chairman of the West Michigan Environmental Action Council with headquarters in Grand Rapids.

Steketee told Ford the plane apparently was using the Consumers Power Company nuclear power plant at Big Rock, Mich., as a practice bombing target at the time of the crash and was flying at an extremely low level. He termed this "an extremely dangerous practice." Steketee speculated that if a B-52 should ever crash into the power plant the result could conceivably be a spread of radiation and could be disastrous. He urged that all such planes be routed away from nuclear power plants.

Ford told Steketee he agrees with his demand for an investigation and said he urged the Air Force prior to the Charlevoix crash to alter the B-52 practice run route. Ford said he had acted at the request of Consumers Power.

He said the Air Force replied that the matter was "under consideration" and that the efforts were being made to reroute the training runs. Ford said the Air Force attitude appeared "cooperative."

# # #

U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES **REPUBLICAN POLICY** COMMITTEE

REP. JOHN J. RHODES, (R.-ARIZ.) CHAIRMAN • 1616 LONGWORTH HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING • TELEPHONE 225-6168

93rd Congress
First Session

May 8, 1973
Statement Number 9

HOUSE REPUBLICAN POLICY COMMITTEE STATEMENT ON H.R. 7447,

SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1973

The House Republican Policy Committee supports the provision of additional transfer authority of $430 million for the Department of Defense in H.R. 7447, the Second Supplemental Appropriation Bill, 1973.

The proposed transfer authority would permit the use of funds from Procurement accounts to cover unanticipated costs related to currency revaluation, subsistence, and activity in Southeast Asia. Denial of the authority would require these costs to be financed completely from funds earmarked for Operation, Maintenance and Personnel. This would cause a re-ordering of priorities which, in turn, would require a general worldwide curtailment of our defense efforts in areas other than Southeast Asia.

We cannot degrade the readiness of our armed forces, even for a few months. The House Republican Policy Committee urges the approval of the transfer authority of $430 million for the Department of Defense provided by H.R. 7447, the Second Supplemental Appropriation Bill, 1973.

CONGRESSMAN
GERALD R. FORD
HOUSE REPUBLICAN LEADER

NEWS RELEASE

--FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE--
June 21, 1973

Statement by House Republican Leader Gerald R. Ford

The signing of the Strategic Arms Limitation Seven Principles Agreement by President Nixon and Soviet leader Brezhnev is an event of the greatest significance for the future of world peace.

There is good reason to believe that this agreement will culminate by the end of next year in a U.S.-Soviet treaty that would limit and reduce offensive nuclear weapons, a companion pact to last year's agreements limiting defensive nuclear missiles and submarines.

President Nixon has led us to a most promising point in the development of peaceful relations between the two superpowers of the world. The words, a generation of peace, have become a phrase that accurately sums up the prospect for the future of mankind.

# # #

U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES **REPUBLICAN POLICY** COMMITTEE

REP. JOHN J. RHODES, (R.-ARIZ.) CHAIRMAN • 1616 LONGWORTH HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING • TELEPHONE 225-6168

93rd Congress
First Session

September 10, 1973
Statement No. 18

HOUSE REPUBLICAN POLICY COMMITTEE STATEMENT ON H.R. 7645, THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE APPROPRIATIONS AUTHORIZATION ACT OF 1973

The House Republican Policy Committee opposes the passage of H.R. 7645, the Department of State Appropriations Authorization Act of 1973, as reported by the Committee of Conference, unless Sections 10 and 13 thereof are deleted.

Section 10 would require advice and consent of the Senate or approval by concurrent resolution of both Houses of any international agreement "providing for the establishment of a military installation in (a foreign) country at which units of the armed forces of the United States are to be assigned to duty ...." Such a requirement would strike at the authority of the President to negotiate and conclude international agreements and would raise practical difficulties by impairing the ability of the President to respond quickly to international crises. The Congress may and does actively participate in decisions to establish and maintain military installations through its constitutional authority to appropriate or deny necessary funds. Many agreements, however, involve relatively minor issues and insignificant expenditures, and many are designed as quick resolution of unforeseen but minor issues in larger programs approved by the Congress.

(OVER)

Section 13 would provide an automatic cutoff of all authority of the Department of State to obligate funds if any documents or other materials of the Department requested by the Senate Foreign Relations or House Foreign Affairs Committee are not delivered within thirty-five days. This legislative attempt to restrict the authority and duty of the President is of doubtful constitutionality. The requirement would cripple the Department's ability to exert leadership in the foreign affairs field; it would inhibit foreign officials from holding confidential exchanges; it would limit innovative critical examinations essential to the development of imaginative policies; it would result in sensitive intelligence being withheld by other government agencies from the State Department; and it would foster the release of secure personnel files to public scrutiny. The enactment of this requirement into law would be a grave and serious mistake.

Sections 10 and 13 of H.R. 7645, as reported by the Conference Committee, propose intolerable limitations upon the constitutional authority of the Chief Executive, limitations which the Congress should oppose. If the Congress is genuinely desirous of eliminating the present impasse of authorizations for the Department of State, these provisions must be deleted. Unless such amendments are adopted, the House Republican Policy Committee opposes approval of the Conference Report on H.R. 7645, the Department of State Appropriations Authorization Act of 1973.