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**THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON**

December 3, 1976

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR:

BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM:

JIM CONNOR *JEC*

SUBJECT:

Leo Cherne's report of 12/3/76

The attached report from Leo Cherne, Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board was returned in the President's outbox with the following notation:

"I have read. Good suggestions and I feel an obligation to initiate several and recommend to J. C. others. What do you think?"

Please follow-up with appropriate action.

cc: Dick Cheney

Complete Original File attached.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Wentworth

I have read.

Had suggestions of
I feel an obligation to
~~include~~ show of recommendation
to J.C. others.

What do you
think?

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

December 3, 1976

Dear Mr. President:

Several months ago you asked the Board to consider the nation's intelligence needs of the future and to report its findings to you. In addressing this charge, several of the members independently researched areas within their special expertise; the Board also requested key intelligence producers and consumers to share their views with it; and, finally, during our two-day October meeting, the members met with a selected group of Government and non-Government officials to deliberate the subject. Our efforts were structured around the following questions and objectives:

-- "What kinds of intelligence support will civilian and military decision-makers require during the period 1977-1985?"

-- "What will the intelligence system need in order that it be capable of responding to the policy-makers' requirements?"

-- "What conceptual and technological innovations should be pursued most vigorously; which among them will most significantly affect the intelligence requirements and the ability of the system to respond?"

Our objectives were to highlight the most significant intelligence gaps and uncertainties in the future conduct of national security affairs; to focus on what in the present structure is least likely to be adaptive to the emerging needs; and to elicit creativity in the shaping of our intelligence system in the next decade.

Our report to you is not a composite of intelligence requirements or systems. Nor have we inventoried intelligence targets by geographic or subject area. Rather, we have attempted to synthesize our own deliberations and insights, along with the briefings provided us and the discussions with principals, into a discrete overview of the prospects, problems, and potential which face intelligence for the future.

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

JK 8/26/77

Unclassified upon removal of enclosures

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The Board is deeply appreciative of the special efforts reflected in the responses to its inquiry and has made selected written material submitted to it available also to the National Security Council staff and to the intelligence community for more detailed review.

With one noteworthy exception, we have made no attempt to place the needs in priority order, since we believe this is a function which should remain with the line organizations having operational responsibilities. The one exception is the requirement which all members of your Board believe to be of transcending importance and which we single out for mention in this covering letter: that is, the necessity for developing public understanding of and support for the function of intelligence in a democratic society and, concomitantly, the reestablishment of public trust in the agencies performing this function.

In the absence of public understanding and trust, we are convinced that the intelligence produced cannot be as effective as it should be; that the development of future, critically important intelligence capabilities will be jeopardized; and, perhaps most serious, that we may be misled in pursuing military, political, and economic policies either through our own ignorance or through the designs of potential adversaries.

To the extent that the American people are well informed as to the needs of the Government for intelligence and as to the rules and supervision under which the intelligence community properly functions, they can be an asset of enormous importance in seeking the broad-based legislative and fiscal support which is essential for the President's foreign policy objectives.

The judgments offered in the attached report are, of necessity, neither certain nor final. Conceptions of the future are, by definition, fallible. In addition, each problem or opportunity presented here must now be subjected to sharp critical analysis, within and outside the intelligence community. The process will result in the discarding of certain perceptions and the modification, change, or addition of others. This, indeed, may prove to be the most promising result of this effort.

Respectfully



Leo Cherne
Chairman

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.