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**May 11, 1976**

**Brent Scowcroft -**

**Application for UN Membership  
by Angola**

**We have been informed the President  
gave Ambassador Scranton verbal  
orders to veto.**

**Jim Connor**

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

May 11, 1976

MR PRESIDENT -

Just heard from Tim Austin -  
the feeling from his area is they  
concur in the recommendation to  
abstain.

Jim Connor

*The President  
gave Scranton  
verbal orders  
to veto.*

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 11, 1976

MR PRESIDENT:

Application for UN Membership  
by Angola

Jack Marsh made the following recommendation on the attached memo from Brent Scowcroft:

"Veto but subject to approval by withdrawal of Cuban troops when and if withdrawal occurs."

We are attempting to obtain a reaction on this subject from Tim Austin but this has not been received at this writing.

We have just been notified by the NSC that UN will begin discussion of this subject at 10:30 this morning, therefore, this paper requires immediate action.

Jim Connor

THE WHITE HOUSE

ACTION MEMORANDUM

WASHINGTON

LOG NO.:

Date: May 10, 1976

Time:

FOR ACTION:

cc (for information):

Jack Marsh  
Tim Austin

FROM THE STAFF SECRETARY

DUE: Date:

Quick Turnaround

Time:

SUBJECT:

Brent Scowcroft memo (undated) re  
Application for UN Membership by Angola

ACTION REQUESTED:

For Necessary Action

For Your Recommendations

Prepare Agenda and Brief

Draft Reply

For Your Comments

Draft Remarks

REMARKS:

We have just learned that the UN will vote on this issue Tuesday afternoon, so the paper requires immediate action.

*Marsh - see comments*

PLEASE ATTACH THIS COPY TO MATERIAL SUBMITTED.

If you have any questions or if you anticipate a delay in submitting the required material, please telephone the Staff Secretary immediately.

Jim Connor  
For the President

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

May 10, 1976

Jim:

We have just learned that the UN will  
vote on this issue Tuesday afternoon,  
so the paper requires immediate action.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'Brent', written in a cursive style.

Brent

CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: Brent Scowcroft *BS*  
SUBJECT: Application for UN Membership by Angola

The Problem

The MPLA, as the Government of Angola, has submitted an application for UN membership to UN Secretary General Waldheim. The application has been forwarded to the President of the Security Council for consideration (France became Security Council President on May 1), and the members of the Council are expected to be asked to meet to consider the application as early as Tuesday, May 11. If the Council approves the application, it would then be submitted to the UN General Assembly this Fall and Angola would be formally admitted to the UN at the time of the General Assembly concurrence.

In view of the application, Ambassador Scranton needs your instructions on how the United States should vote in the Security Council. There are three options: to support, veto, or abstain.

Discussion of the OptionsA. Vote for MPLA application for membership

Our vote would not constitute an act of recognition and Ambassador Scranton could so state. There is adequate precedent for concurring in UN membership for states with which we do not have diplomatic relations, for example, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique. Nevertheless, an affirmative vote would be generally interpreted as a shift in US

CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)

KR 5/12/64

policy of withholding recognition of the MPLA given the continued presence of Cuban troops there. We could, of course, give an affirmative vote while at the same time calling for the departure of the Cubans. While this is a theoretically feasible option, it would represent such a sharp departure from our present posture that I strongly recommend against its consideration.

B. Veto the MPLA application

A veto would dramatically emphasize our position of non-recognition of the MPLA and would be consistent with our posture toward Cuban presence. Our act could be accompanied by a statement that the continuing presence of Cuban forces makes Angola less than independent, thus underscoring our opposition to that presence. A veto, however, would be heavily criticized in the Council and in Africa, and would be considered inconsistent with the positive achievements of Secretary Kissinger's recent trip to Africa. It would contrast sharply with the overwhelming support the application is expected to receive by the non-aligned and even by our European allies. While the veto would point up the Cuban role in Angola, it would highlight that all members of the Security Council except the United States are willing to accord UN membership to Angola despite the Cuban and Soviet role there. Since it would prevent MPLA membership, it would maintain this issue in high profile over the coming months.

C. Abstain on the MPLA application

An abstention would be consistent with our position of non-recognition of the MPLA. It would also be consistent with the statement that Secretary Kissinger made in Monrovia with regard to Angola: "We are willing in principle to open discussion with the Angolan authorities with a view toward normalizing our relations and seeking means of cooperating -- including on economic development. We wish Angola well as a unified and independent state. But before we can go far down that road, we want to know Angola's intention with respect to the presence of foreign forces on its soil." An abstention would probably avoid a bitter debate which a veto could provoke and in which the Cubans and Soviets could gain propaganda advantage. Ambassador Scranton could be instructed to make a tough statement



pointing out our continuing non-recognition of the MPLA and our insistence on the Cuban withdrawal from Angola. An abstention, however, could be criticized as being inconsistent with our strong position on Cuban presence in Angola. We could be accused of shifting from pressing for military measures against the MPLA to allowing them to enter the UN, without any change in the objective situation. The current estimate is that the only company we might find in an abstention would be the Chinese communists, although they have reportedly told the French UN Mission they have "no problems" with the application.

RECOMMENDATION:

Given Secretary Kissinger's recent trip to Africa, what he said about Angola in Monrovia, and our desire eventually to normalize relations with Angola, I recommend that Ambassador Scranton be instructed to abstain, with a tough statement reiterating our uncompromising opposition to the continual presence of Cuban troops.

APPROVE \_\_\_\_\_ DISAPPROVE \_\_\_\_\_

If you disapprove the above, that you authorize Ambassador Scranton to veto the MPLA application for membership in the UN.

APPROVE \_\_\_\_\_ DISAPPROVE \_\_\_\_\_

THE WHITE HOUSE

ACTION MEMORANDUM

WASHINGTON

LOG NO.:

Date: May 10, 1976

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FOR ACTION:

cc (for information):

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Draft Remarks

REMARKS:

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*Veto, but subject to approval by withdrawal of Cuban troops when and if withdrawal occurs. Jim*

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CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)

KR 5/17/88

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