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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN...

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 27, 1976

MR PRESIDENT:

Brent Scowcroft's memorandum of 1/26/76
 re: National Security Decision Memorandum
on Israeli Arms Requirements

Jack Marsh reviewed Brent's memorandum on Israeli Arms Requirements and offered the following comments:

"I agree with the purpose of the attached proposal to establish a Proposed Arms Review Panel; however, I have some question as to the procedures and mechanics whereby this is achieved. In addition to the considerations set out on page 3, I would add the question of concern as to whether this might be interpreted as an anti-Israeli proposal. The particular timing of the proposal and the fact that the NSDM in which it is proposed is one in which the titled subject is military assistance for Israel make it incumbent that the charge be avoided that this is titled against Israel.

The language in paragraph 4 of the NSDM "...to Israel and such countries of the Mideast as may be designated." indicates a geographic measure rather than just Israel. If this is the intent, it should be emphasized. However, its inclusion in a memo principally related to Israel downgrades its geographical nature in my opinion."

Brent indicated that he did not construe the problem in the same way as did Jack but agreed that it may be open to the kind of interpretation that Jack made.



Jim Connor

President approved NSC's recommendation. Original returned to NSC 1/30/76.

January 27, 1976

MR PRESIDENT:


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Jim Connor

up 1/27/76

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET - XGDS

January 26, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS*

SUBJECT: National Security Decision Memorandum
on Israeli Arms Requirements

The draft National Security Decision Memorandum attached at Tab I reflects the consensus reached at the January 13 meeting of the National Security Council on U. S. policy toward Israeli arms requirements. The draft NSDM has the concurrence of the Departments of State and Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence and the Office of Management and Budget. All agree that the guidelines set forth therein will provide a very useful set of common procedures for a more systematic analysis of Israel's military needs and improved control of Israel's military procurement from the United States. This has become essential in view of the rapid expansion of Israeli military procurement since October 1973 and the increased significance of the Israeli arms requirements for the situation in the Middle East, for the readiness of U. S. forces, and for the level of security assistance we request from the U. S. Congress.

The cost figures provided by the Department of Defense for the January 13 NSC meeting showed a \$2.2 billion total value for the 1975/76 Israeli list, without the F-16's. We have since discovered that for two major items on the 1975/76 list, 25 F-15 aircraft and 4 E-2C aircraft, for which Israel has already signed firm letters of offer, the cost figures of \$76 million represented the initial payment due in FY 76 rather than the full cost of \$926 million. In order to establish the principle of full-funding accountability in dealing with present and future Israeli arms requests, we have revised the value of the 1975/76 list from \$2.2 billion to \$2.95 billion. The value of the reduced response list, recommended by State and Defense, has been revised from \$1.5 billion to \$2.0 billion, including the 25 F-15 and 4 E-2C.

The 250 F-16's which Israel had requested approval to order in 1976 were considered separately at the January 13 NSC meeting because of their military and political impact on the balance in the Middle East and their high cost (\$3.2 billion for 250 aircraft). Israel has subsequently informed the Department of Defense that it wishes to withdraw the F-16 request and have it held in abeyance until some unspecified future date

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SECRET - XGDS

MR 01-23 #3; OSO-etc 6/22/01; etc-etc 2/12/02

By dal NARA, Date 3/8/02

at which time discussions will be held as to order and delivery dates and quantities. Therefore, while the F-16 is on the list of items approved for release (Tab B), it is not included on the list of items to be sold in 1976 (Tab A). Its cost is not a factor for FY 76 and may not be one for FY 77, although it is likely to reappear by FY 78.

The principal decisions incorporated in the draft NSDM are as follows:

-- A response to Israel's composite 1975/76 list of military procurement requests (Tab A) which sets the overall procurement level through FMS and commercial procedures at about \$2.0 billion and provides an indicative list of items and quantities whose procurement the USG would approve. [This follows the precedent you established in NSDM 270 September 24, 1974, of approving a specific amount of equipment in response to a larger request. For the first time it applies to commercial as well as FMS purchases.]

-- A response to Israel's requests for certain weapons and equipment of an advanced, sophisticated or politically sensitive nature (Tab B), noting those previously approved, those whose release is now approved, and those whose release should be disapproved. [As with the list of regular items, Israel could, if it felt strongly about individual items, request reconsideration. The Department of Defense has sound arguments to justify and explain those items marked for disapproval at this time.]

-- Establishment of a Middle East Arms Transfer Panel within the National Security Council system to supervise the transfer of arms and equipment to Israel and other Middle East countries. [Heretofore, there has been no formal interagency body to deal with the policy issues and effectuate the necessary coordination of foreign policy, military and funding considerations which arise in connection with Middle East arms requests.]

-- A requirement that, as a general rule, Israeli requests for production and delivery of arms and equipment follow the standard procedures of the Department of Defense for sales to foreign countries. [This is consonant with your earlier decision that arms for foreign countries should not adversely affect the inventories of or production schedules for our own military establishment. Exceptions can be made at the recommendation of the Arms Transfer Panel.]

-- A requirement that the procedure used by State, Defense, the DCI and OMB to analyze the current Israeli arms request be used to prepare at least once a year an interagency review of Israel's needs for weapons and military equipment for consideration by the Senior Review Group and, if necessary, the NSC. [You expressed your approval of this procedure at the January 10 NSC meeting. It has long been needed.]

-- An authorization for the Department of Defense to continue talks with Israel on the emergency resupply of military equipment and make recommendations on a plan for appropriate action.

-- An authorization for the Department of Defense to continue cooperation between Israel and the United States in military co-production, research and development, and technology transfer under existing procedures.

There are three important considerations of which you need to be aware in making a decision on the draft NSDM, since Israel cannot be expected to be pleased with the decisions:

-- The indicative list valued at about \$2.0 billion for Israeli procurement is a substantial reduction from the overall composite list originally requested for 1975/76 and valued at \$2.9 billion. However, \$400 million of this figure is in sensitive items (such as the Pershing Missiles) whose release has been disapproved, so that the realistic cut represents only 20 percent of the total figure. Attached at Tab II is the detailed comparison of the two lists, including the quantities and value of each item. Suggested reductions were made bearing in mind the concept of force modernization and replacement rather than expansion, a rationale which Israeli Minister of Defense Peres used with Congress last month to explain Israel's need for more military equipment. The problem of funding for Israel's purchases was also a factor bearing on the size of the suggested reduction, as was the analysis by the Director of Central Intelligence on Israel's realistic needs (which you heard at the January 10 NSC meeting).

-- The funding problem will be difficult for FY 1977 and much more difficult in FY 78 and FY 79, assuming that you approve the \$2.0 billion approximate ceiling for 1976 and given Israel's presently projected plan to acquire additional arms and equipment

worth at least \$1.5 billion (and more likely \$2.5 billion) in both 1977 and 1978. This problem is shown graphically in the chart which OMB has prepared at Tab III and OMB is concerned over the implications of approving the \$2.0 billion list for 1976. The funding problem is a key element in setting an approximate overall ceiling on Israeli arms requests which we can approve, since the past pattern has been for Israel to obtain in U.S. assistance amounts roughly equivalent to what it must pay for military procurement in any given year.

-- Commercial as well as FMS procurement is subject to control for the first time. The precise extent and the methods by which commercial purchases are to be controlled will be worked out by State and Defense with the Israelis. However, unless there are controls on commercial purchases as well as FMS, it is not possible to place effective controls on the overall level of Israeli procurement in this country.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve the draft NSDM attached at Tab I.

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____

00614

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506



TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

National Security Decision Memorandum

TO: The Secretary of State
 The Secretary of Defense
 The Director of Central Intelligence
 The Director, Office of Management and Budget

SUBJECT: Military Assistance for Israel

The President has reviewed the NSSM 231 response and the options for military assistance for Israel which were discussed at the National Security Council meeting of January 13, 1976.

The President has decided, in response to Israel's revised request for military equipment from the United States, which was submitted to the Department of Defense on January 8, 1976, that the United States Government should approve the placement of orders by Israel under FMS and commercial procedures for military equipment of a value not exceeding a total of about \$2.0 billion, as indicated by the list attached at Tab A. The Government of Israel will be permitted to request revisions in the list, particularly with respect to quantities of specific items, provided the revisions are consistent with the overall value and types of equipment on the list.

The President has also made a determination with respect to Israeli requests for certain weapons and equipment of an advanced, sophisticated or politically sensitive nature, as indicated in the list at Tab B.

A Middle East Arms Transfer Panel, composed of representatives of the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the NSC Staff and chaired by the representative of the Department of Defense, will be constituted within the National Security Council system to control the transfer of arms and equipment under FMS and commercial procedures to Israel and such other countries of the Mideast as may be designated.

The President has also directed that Israeli requests for production and delivery of items contained on the list at Tab A, or any subsequent revision, should be handled in accordance with the standard procedures

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AUTHORITY NSC letter 4/16/96 (NSDM 315)

BY KPH NLF, DATE 5/3/01

of the Department of Defense for sales to foreign countries. Any exceptions to standard procedures for arms transfers or amended requests for high sensitivity items should be referred, through the Middle East Arms Transfer Panel, to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

Israel's needs for the acquisition of weapons and military equipment are to be kept under continuous review. An interagency review will be conducted annually, or more frequently if necessary, by the Middle East Arms Transfer Panel for consideration by the Senior Review Group and, if necessary, the NSC, prior to the OMB submission of budget review materials to the President for the following fiscal year. In preparation for each annual review:

The Director of Central Intelligence will prepare an overall assessment of the Middle East military balance and situation projected over a period of five years. This assessment should include an estimate of both the most likely and the worst-case threats to Israel.

The Department of Defense will prepare an analysis of current Israeli arms requests and future plans for weapons procurement, including the impact of these requests and plans on future fund requirements, on U.S. inventories and procurement and on commitments to other nations for arms transfers, and the early identification of sensitive technology.


The Department of State will assess Israeli requests for military arms, equipment, supplies and technology, and the impact which providing such items would have on the Middle East and world political situation.

The Office of Management and Budget will prepare an assessment of the funding implications of the Israeli requests.

With regard to Israel's desire to conclude an agreed logistic plan for emergency resupply of military equipment and supplies in the event of resumed hostilities in the Middle East, the President has authorized the Department of Defense to continue preliminary talks with the Israeli Ministry of Defense to elicit and to evaluate specific Israeli views, and to make appropriate recommendations, through the Middle East Arms Transfer Panel and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, to the President.

The President has approved the continuation of cooperation between Israel and the United States regarding military co-production, research and development, and technology transfer, under existing Department of Defense procedures and the examination of requests on a case-by-case basis, under the general guidance of the Middle East Arms Transfer Panel.

cc: The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff



APPROVED ITEMS

<u>Item</u>	<u>Quantity</u>
<u>Tanks</u>	
Tank Medium	126
Bridging Tank	25
Tank Dozer M728	15
Recovery Tank M88	32
<u>APCs</u>	
APC M113 Family	735
<u>Artillery</u>	
SP Gun 175mm/8in M107	36
SP Howitzer 155mm M109	0
Howitzer 105 mm M204	12
<u>Infantry Weapons</u>	
TOW Missiles	5,200
Rifle M16	50,000
Grenade Machine Gun MK19	500
Launcher M202	200
Launcher M203	11,500
<u>Radars/Measuring Devices</u>	
Surveillance Radar AN/TPS-58A1	4
Muzzle Velocity Radar	60
Laser Range Finder AN/GVS-5	3,000
<u>Mineclearing</u>	
Propelled Charge for Minefield Clearing	22
<u>EOD</u>	
EOB Shop Set	3
<u>Vehicles</u>	
Heavy Recovery Vehicle	42
Truck 5-ton	175
Ambulance	115
Ammo Carrier M548	112
<u>Ammunition, Ground</u>	
TK/Arty Ammunition **	-
Grenades 40mm	2.2M
Fuzes MT-565	4,000

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MIS 01-23 P5 OSD/DA/6/22/01: AT-151, 2/12/02

By dal NARA Date 3/8/02

Spare Parts

Engines & Transmissions**	--
Others **	--

Miscellaneous

Equipment & Tools for Rifle M16**	--
Tank Tools & Accessories**	--
Rough Terrain Fork Lift	100
Image Converter Tubes*	--
Armor Steel*	500 Ton
Air Drop Equipment **	--
Training Aids **	--
General Electronic Test ** and Manning Equipment	--

Communications

VHF Radio AN/VRC 43/46	2,250
VHF FM Receiver R-442	2,250
Portable VHF FM Radio AN/PRC77	1,250
Switchboard	50

Ground Surveillance Radar

Radar AN/PPS-15	5
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EW

HF Receiver, WJ-8888	20
Dipole Antenna HFAS-40	30
UHF Jammer 100-500 MHz Range	3

Aircraft Fixed Wing

F-15 Eagle	25
E-2C Hawkeye	4
OV-ID Mohawk/w/SLAR APS-940	2/3

Helicopters

CH-53 **	--
AH-IG/J with TOW**	--
Spares for CH-53, Bell 206**	--
"Delilah" SSM	725
Maxi-decoy	500

Air Defense

VULCAN Fire Unit	12
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*Approved in principle depending on specifications of item desired.

**Approved but quantities yet to be determined.

Cluster Bombs

CBU 59	3,000
60 MK75 Destructor	2,200

Iron Bombs

MK 83 **	--
MK 84	2,000

Chaff and Flares

Cartridge RR-129	100K
Flare Cartridge Tracer	100K
IR Flare MK 46	75K

Fuzes

TDD MK 43	10K
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Air to Air Missiles

AIM 7F	180 (130 add'l)
AIM 9H	300
AGM-45-9 SHRIKE	400
AGM-45-10 SHRIKE	200

Terminal Guided Weapons

AGM-65A MAVERICK	200
LGB MK 82 KMU 388	250
LGB MK 84 KMU 351/B	250 (125 add'l)
PAVE SPIKE LGB Designator	20 (15 add'l)

EO Ordnance

HOB0 MK 84	370
WALLEYE	200
Data Link WALLEYE	100
BOGB-2	100

Night Vision

CAV-NAV Goggles F-4907	25
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<u>Airborne Laser Designators</u>	
Laser Ground Designator*	30
<u>ECM</u>	
ALO 119 COMPASS TIE	50
Ground Jammer High Powered*	20
CW Jammer High Powered*	2
AAQ IR Defense	25
<u>Tactical Intelligence</u>	
Mini RPV w/TV Data Link	12
<u>Command and Control</u>	
Miscellaneous*	--
<u>Navigation</u>	
Miscellaneous*	--
<u>Early Warning/Surveillance</u>	
Primary Ground Rader Replacement**	--
Computer CC, 407L**	--
Wide Screen Display**	--
Air Surveillance, ASR-7	6
<u>Infrastructure</u>	
Miscellaneous*	--
<u>Training</u>	
Miscellaneous*	--
<u>Naval</u>	
Hydrofoil (Other than NATO PHM)	2
Acoustic Equipment S-3802	25

*Approved in principle depending on specifications of items desired.

HIGH TECHNOLOGY OR OTHERWISE
SENSITIVE ITEMS REQUESTED BY ISRAEL
HELD PENDING NSC REVIEW

I. Items Previously Approved

25 F-15 Fighter Aircraft. Release approved, Israel informed and Letter of Offer sent to Congress.

4 E-2C HAWKEYE Airborne Early Warning Aircraft. Release Approved. Israel informed and Letter of Offer sent to Congress.

2 OV-ID MOHAWK Aircraft. Release Approved. Israel informed.

40 Laser-Guided Bomb Designators plus 1000 Bomb Kits. Release approved for 5 designators and 125 bomb kits. Israel informed.

200 AGM-65A MAVERICK Air to Ground Missiles. Release Approved. Israel informed.

425 AGM-45A-4/6/7 SHRIKE Air to Ground Missiles. Government of Israel has cancelled request for these.

600 AGM-45A-9/10 SHRIKE Air to Ground Missiles. Release approved. Israel informed.

1 MGM-52A LANCE Missile Battalion with 117 Missiles. Release approved and delivery completed.

3000 AN/GVS-5 Laser Rangefinders. Release Approved. Israel informed.

4000 MT-565 Fuses for 155 mm. Shells. Release Approved. Israel informed.

25 sets S-3802 Acoustic Equipment for Swimmers. Release approved. Israel informed.

XGDS of E. O. 11652 by authority of Brent Scowcroft; Exemption Category (Section 5(B)(3)).

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6

201/1-13-84. OSD/DA/6/23/01. 25-252/1-102
By dlc NARA Date 3/8/02

II. New Items Approved (without reference to quantities, cost or delivery dates)

F-16 Aircraft. Approved in principle. Numbers and delivery dates to be considered at a later date when Israel resubmits its request.

AH 1G/J Cobra Helicopters with TOW Missiles.

EOGB-11 Missiles.

AIM-7F Sparrow Air-to-Air Missiles.

M-88 Tank Recovery Vehicles.

Hydrofoils. Sale of commercially available platform approved; NATO PHM disapproved, because of problems with other NATO Governments.

III. Items Disapproved

PERSHING Missile Battalion.

Mobile Assault Bridge

EOD Cryogenic System

EA-6B Prowler ECM Aircraft with ALQ-99 Pods

SP Data Link HAWK

CHAPPARAL Missile Improvement

SUU 54/B Dispensers

CBU-72 (Fuel Air Explosive)

CBU-84 (originally requested as CBU-71) GATOR Mine Dispensers

XFIM-92A STINGER (Ground-to-Air Missiles)

GBU-1/B Bomb Dispensers

GBU-2 Bomb Dispensers

FLIR Thermal Imaging Equipment

ALQ-132

SIFF-76/81

COMSEC Equipment. (commercially available equipment approved with
USG assistance to upgrade capability)

KY-38 TSEC

KY-8 and KY2T TSEC

KG-27

KW-7

SDV-9 Swimmer Delivery Vehicles

Underwater Communications Systems

MK 404 Proximity Fuse for 76mm. Gun

AMSD Point Defense System

Mini-RPV System, Real Time.

Mobile Reconnaissance Battalion with FLIR

(all items)

Full Request
QTY Requested
(Cost \$M)²Reduced Request
QTY Requested
(Cost \$M)²Tanks

1. Tank M60A1 Medium	180 (121)	126 (84.7)
2. Bridging Tank	36 (21)	25 (14.5)
3. Tank Dozer M728	21 (14)	15 (10)
4. Recovery Tank M88	45 (29)	32 (20.3)

APCs

5. APC M113 Family	1,050 (124)	735 (86.8)
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Artillery

6. SP Gun 175mm/8in M107	48 (26)	36 (19.5)
7. SP Howitzer 155mm M109	94 (53)	0 (0)
8. Howitzer 105mm M204	12 (1.1)	12 (1.1)

Infantry Weapons

9. TOW Missiles	7,520 (30)	5,200 (21)
10. Rifle M16	70,000 (14)	50,000 (10)
11. Grenade Machine Gun MK19	500 (6.0)	500 (6.0)
12. Launcher M202	200 (.07)	200 (.07)
13. Launcher M203	11,500 (1.0)	11,500 (1.0)

SSM

14. PERSHING Missile Bn	1 Bn(200)	0-(0) <u>DISAPPROVED</u>
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Radars/Measuring Devices

15. Surveillance Radar AN/TPS-58A1	4 (1.6)	4 (1.6)
16. Muzzle Velocity Radar	60 (0.9)	60 (0.9)
17. Laser Range Finder AN/GVS-5 ¹	3,000 (22)	3,000 (22)

Mineclearing

18. Propelled Charge for Minefield Clearing	22 (0.1)	22 (0.1)
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EOD

19. EOD Cryogenic System	2 (Unk)	0-(0) <u>DISAPPROVED</u>
20. EOD Shop Set	3 (Unk)	3 (Unk)

Vehicles

21. Heavy Recovery Vehicle	60 (2.2)	42 (1.5)
22. Truck 5-ton	250 (14)	175 (9.8)
23. Ambulance	115 (1.1)	115 (1.1)
24. Ammo Carrier M548	160 (23)	112 (16.1)

Ammunition, Ground

25. TK/Arty Ammunition	- (257)	- (200)
26. Grenades 40mm ¹	2.2M (8.8)	2.2M (8.8)
27. Fuzes MT-565 ¹	4,000 (0.1)	4,000 (0.1)

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	Full Request QTY Requested (Cost \$M)	Reduced Request QTY Requested (Cost \$M)
<u>Spare Parts</u>		
28. Engines & Transmissions	- (64.7)	- (50)
29. Others	- (256.5)	- (200)
<u>Miscellaneous</u>		
30. Equipment & Tools for Rifle M16	- (1.8)	- (1.8)
31. Tank Tools & Accessories	- (4.3)	- (4.3)
32. Rough Terrain Fork Lift	100 (2.0)	100 (2.0)
33. Image Converter Tubes*	- (1.7)	0 (1.7)
34. Armor Steel*	500 Ton (0.5)	500 Ton (0.5)
35. Air Drop Equipment	- (5.0)	- (5.0)
36. Training Aids	- (3.0)	- (3.0)
37. General Electronic Test and Manning Equipment	- (0.6)	- (0.6)
<u>Communications</u>		
38. VHF Radio AN/VRC 43/46	2,250 (6.8)	2,250 (6.8)
39. VHF FM Receiver R-442	2,250 (2.3)	2,250 (2.3)
40. Portable VHF FM Radio AN/PRC77	1,250 (1.3)	1,250 (1.3)
41. Switchboard SB-3614	50 (.02)	50 (.02)
<u>Ground Surveillance Radar</u>		
42. Radar AN/PPS-15	5 (0.2)	5 (0.2)
<u>EW</u>		
43. HF Receiver, WJ-8888	20 (0.2)	20 (0.2)
44. Dipole Antenna HFAS-40	30 (0.2)	30 (0.2)
45. UHF Jammer 100-500 MHz Range	3 (1.2)	3 (1.2)
<u>Aircraft Fixed Wing</u>		
46. F-15 Eagle ¹	25 (655.0)	(655.0)
47. E-2C Hawkeye ¹	4 (171.0)	(171.0)
48. EA-6B Prowler	6 (144)	0-(0) <u>DISAPPROVED</u>
49. OV-ID Mohawk/w/SLAR APS-940 ¹	2/3 (4.0)	2/3 (4.0)
<u>Helicopters</u>		
50. CH-53	5 (25)	0 (0)
51. AH-IG/J with TOW	6 (12)	0 (0)
52. Spares for CH-53, Bell 206	- (3.5)	- (3.5)
53. "Delilah" SSM	725 (10)	725 (10)
54. Maxi-decoy	500 (10)	500 (10)
<u>Air Defense</u>		
55. VULCAN Fire Unit	12 (14)	12 (14)
56. SP Data Link HAWK	- (1.0)	- (1.0) <u>DISAPPROV</u>
57. CHAPARRAL Missile Improvement	- (Unk)	- (Unk) <u>DISAPPROV</u>

*Approved in principle depending on specifications of item desired.

	Full Request QTY Requested (Cost \$M)	Reduced Request QTY Requested (Cost \$M)
<u>Cluster Bombs</u>		
58. SUU 54/B	200 (0.6)	0-0 DISAPPROVED
59. CBU 59	6,000 (18)	3,000 (9)
60. 60 MK75 Destructor	2,200 (3.5)	2,200 (3.5)
61. CBU 72/B FAE	250 (11)	0-0 DISAPPROVED
62. CBU 72 84 GATOR	11,000 (Unk)	0-0 DISAPPROVED
<u>Iron Bombs</u>		
63. MK 83	250 (0.2)	0 (0)
64. MK 84	2,000 (2.0)	2,000 (2.0)
<u>Chaff and Flares</u>		
65. Cartridge RR-129	100K (0.5)	100K (0.5)
66. Flare Cartridge Tracer	100K (3.0)	100K (3.0)
67. IR Flare MK 46	75K (2.3)	75K (2.3)
<u>Fuzes</u>		
68. TDD MK 43	10K (Unk)	10K (Unk)
<u>Air to Air Missiles</u>		
69. AIM 7F ¹	180 (9.7)	180 (150 130 add'1) (9.7)
70. AIM 9H	600 (11.8)	300 (5.9)
71. AGM-45-9 SHRIKE ¹	400 (24)	400 (24)
72. AGM-45-10 SHRIKE ¹	200 (12)	200 (12)
<u>Ground to Air Missiles</u>		
73. STINGER	2,000 (57.3)	0-0 DISAPPROVED
<u>Terminal Guided Weapons</u>		
74. AGM-65A MAVERICK ¹	200 (8.3)	200 (8.3)
75. LGB MK 82 KMU 388	500	250
76. LGB MK 84 KMU 351/B ¹	500	250(125 add'1)
77. PAVE SPIKE LGB Designator ¹	40	20(15 add'1)
78. ROCKEYE GBU 1/B	200 (1.0)	0-0 DISAPPROVED
<u>EO Ordnance</u>		
79. HOBO MK 84	370 (6.8)	370 (6.8)
80. WALLEYE	200 (3.2)	200 (3.2)
81. Data Link WALLEYE	100 (9.0)	100 (9.0)
82. BOGB-2	200 (18)	100 (9)
<u>Night Vision</u>		
83. FLIR for Helicopters	75 (25)	0-0 DISAPPROVED
84. CAV-NAV Goggles F-4907	25 (0.4)	25 (0.4)
<u>Airborne Laser Designators</u>		
85. Laser Ground Designator*	30 (2.0)	30 (2.0)

*Approved in principle depending on specification of item desired.

	Full Request QTY Requested (Cost \$M)	Reduced Request QTY Requested (Cost \$M)
<u>ECM</u>		
86. ALO 119 COMPASS TIE	50 (Unk)	50 (Unk)
87. ALQ-132 <u>Disapproved</u> /AAQ-8 IR Defense	25 (1.3)	25 (1.3)
88. SIFF APX 81/82	10 (0.5)	10 (0.5) <u>Disapproved</u>
89. Ground Jammer High Powered*	20 (3.0)	20 (3.0)
90. CW Jammer High Powered*	2 (7.0)	2 (7.0)
<u>Tactical Intelligence</u>		
91. Mini RPV w/TV Data Link	12 (4.8)	12 (4.8)
<u>Command and Control</u>		
92. Miscellaneous*	- (10.3)	- (10.3)
<u>Navigation</u>		
93. Miscellaneous*	- (5.0)	- (5.0)
<u>Early Warning/Surveillance</u>		
94. Primary Ground Radar Replacement	- (8.0)	- (8.0)
95. Computer CC, 407L	- (7.0)	- (7.0)
96. Wide Screen Display	- (3.0)	- (3.0)
97. Air Surveillance, ASR-7	6 (7.5)	6 (7.5)
<u>Infrastructure</u>		
98. Miscellaneous	- (8.5)	- (8.5)
<u>Training</u>		
99. Miscellaneous	- (0.5)	- (0.5)
<u>Naval</u>		
100. Hydrofoil (Other than NATO PHM)	3 (150)	2 (100)
101. Swimmer Delivery Vehicle SDV-9	6 (3.0)	6 (3.0) <u>Disapproved</u>
102. Acoustic Equipment S-3802 ¹	25 (2.4)	25 (2.4)
103. Anti-Ship Missile Defense System (ASMD)	12 (unk)	12 (unk) <u>Disapproved</u>
<u>Intelligence</u>		
104. Mini RPV System, Real Time	Unk (unk)	Unk (unk) <u>Disapproved</u>
105. Mobile Recon Bn with FLIR, Observation Systems	72 (unk)	72 (unk) <u>Disapproved</u>
106. FLIR, Long Range Surveillance System	Unk (unk)	Unk (unk) <u>Disapproved</u>

*Approved in principle depending on specifications of items desired.


~~SECRET~~

	Full Request QTY Requested (Cost \$M)	Reduced Request QTY Requested (Cost \$M)
<u>Support</u> (Miscellaneous)	- (72)	- (72)
TOTAL COST	(\$2,946.5)	
less those sensitive items disapproved at Tab B	-442.6	
TOTAL COST		
less disapproved items	(\$2,503.9) ³	(\$2,045.0) ³

1. Already approved in quantities shown except:
AIM-7F (50 of 180 approved)
LGB MK 84 (125 of 500 approved)
PAVE SPIKE (5 of 40 approved)
2. Full program costs are included for all items.
3. Commercial purchases would be covered as of February 1, 1976. The list total includes an a significant but undetermined part of Israel's projected commercial purchases for CY 1976.

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COMPARISON OF ILLUSTRATIVE ISRAELI FUNDING REQUIREMENTS AND AVAILABILITY ESTIMATES



Assumptions:

- (1) FY 76 - \$2.0B orders approved.
- (2) FY 77, 78, 79 - \$1.5B orders approved.
- (3) USG credit of \$1.5B FY 76 and \$1.0B each FY 77-79.

LEGEND:

- Payments due on past orders - 1975 and earlier.
- Recurring support requirements - FMS and commercial.

True News
X Paper (Am)

(11)



Department of State

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NOD768

Distribution?
Scowcroft
Myland
Cable
Granger

PAGE 01 TEL AV 02341 141833Z

44
ACTION NODS-00

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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 7001 W

097231

P 141712Z JAN 76
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9739

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TEL AVIV 0341

NODIS

R.D. 11052: GDA
TAGS: MASS, IS
SUBJ: PERES: VIEW OF ISRAEL'S MILITARY SUPPLY PROBLEMS

SUMMARY: IN YOUR C/HORIZON WITH MINDEF PERES ON JAN 13, AMBASSADOR RAISED SUBJECT OF PERES' RECENT MEETING WITH SECDEF RUMSFELD AS WELL AS CURRENT STATUS OF ISRAEL'S MILITARY SUPPLY. PERES EXPRESSED GENERAL SATISFACTION WITH HIS MEETING BUT SAID THERE WERE STILL SOME BOTTLENECKS IN THE ARMS SUPPLY LINE. END SUMMARY.

1. PERES SAID THAT HIS MEETING WITH SECDEF WENT WELL - "NOT PRAGMATIC BUT PLEASANT". FROM HIS POINT OF VIEW, A PRINCIPAL PURPOSE WAS TO RESPOND TO ALLEGED PENTAGON CRITICISM OF ISRAEL. PERES SAID GENESIS WAS 1974 PENTAGON REQUEST THAT ISRAEL SUBMIT ARMS REQUIREMENTS FOR NEXT 5-10 YEARS. RESULT WAS MATRON B WHICH PERES SAID TRIGGERED CRITICISM IN THE PENTAGON.

2. RESULT OF MATRON B, ACCORDING TO PERES, WAS A CONSENSUS IN THE PENTAGON THAT ISRAEL:

- A. EXAGGERATED THE THREAT;
- B. WAS TOO GREEDY;
- C. WANTED TO EMPTY U.S. ARMS STORES;
- D. WAS TOO HASTY IN '00;

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MR 01-24 27; 02 23 8/6/01
By dal NARA, Date 10/4/01

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PAGE 02 TEL AV 00341 141833Z

E. WAS STRONGER THAN SHE ADMITTED; AND

F. WAS NOT SUFFICIENTLY CANDID (ISRAELI DEFENSE EXPORTS GIVEN AS EXAMPLE).

3. PERES ALSO CITED ALLEGED PENTAGON PERCEPTION THAT A STRONG ISRAEL WOULD AUTOMATICALLY BE INTRANSIGENT AND THAT A WEAKER ISRAEL WOULD BE MORE TRACTABLE. IN ANY CASE, HE SAID, THIS U.S. CRITICISM/HOSTILITY HAD CAUSED ISRAEL TO SUBMIT A REVISED REQUEST FOR ARMS- "A CORRECTIVE LIST". (COMMENT: THIS IS FIRST WE HAD HEARD OF NEW LIST WHICH, ACCORDING TO PERES, PROPS SOME ITEMS WHICH THE U.S. HAD FOUND OBJECTIONABLE. HE CITED U.S. AIRCRAFT AS EXAMPLE, ADDING PARENTHETICALLY THAT ISRAEL WAS THINKING OF A SMALL SATELLITE IN ABOUT TEN YEARS TIME AS THE ANSWER TO HER RECONNAISSANCE PROBLEMS.)

4. HE ALSO CLAIMED THAT OTHER REQUESTS HAD BEEN REDUCED IN NUMBERS TO LEVELS THAT WERE MORE ACCEPTABLE TO THE U.S. ISRAEL NOW CONSIDERED HERSELF TO BE JUST A "REGULAR MILITARY BUYER" AND WAS REQUESTING NOTHING FROM U.S. ARMS STORES.

5. PERES ALSO HAD MEETINGS ON THE HILL. HIS PITCH THERE (AT SECDEF'S SUGGESTION, ACCORDING TO PERES) WAS THAT PRIMARY PURPOSE OF ARMS REQUESTS WAS TO MODERNIZE THE IDF, NOT TO ENLARGE IT. CONGRESSIONAL CONCERN HAD BEEN EXPRESSED ON TWO ISSUES: SIZE OF ISRAELI ARMS REQUESTS, AND OUTLOOK FOR PEACE IN MIDDLE EAST.

6. TURNING TO STATUS OF MILITARY SUPPLY, PERES SAID ISRAEL WAS STILL AWAITING ANSWERS (EXPECTED LAST JUNE) ON MANY ITEMS ON THEIR 1975 SHOPPING LIST. IN HIS OPINION THE NSC WAS THE STUMBLING BLOCK. HE SAID HE WAS TALKING ABOUT THINGS LIKE TANKS, GUNS, AND APC'S, "BREAD A-D BUTTER" EQUIPMENT, NOT ANYTHING "SENSATIONAL". (THIS SEEMED TO IMPLY ISRAELI SATISFACTION WITH U.S. APPROVALS OF THE MORE GLAMOROUS ITEMS: F-15, LAWR. LASER GUIDED BOMBS, HARVEY AIRCRAFT, ETC.)

7. COMMENT: DURING HIS COMING VISIT, PRIMIN RABIN IS NOT LIKELY TO INVOLVE HIMSELF IN SPECIFIC ARMS REQUESTS. HOWEVER,

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 03 TEL AV 00341 141833Z

HE MIGHT WELL RAISE THE GENERAL ISSUE OF "OVERDUE" APPROVALS MENTIONED BY PERES AND IT IS PERES' STATED IMPRESSION THAT THESE APPROVALS MAY WELL BE PURPOSELY WITHHELD UNTIL RABIN VISIT. THE LEVEL OF MILITARY AID WILL PROBABLY BE OF MORE CONCERN TO RABIN THAN PARTICULAR ITEMS.
TODM

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NOV 1973

THE WHITE HOUSE

ACTION MEMORANDUM

WASHINGTON

LOG NO.:

Date: January 26, 1976

Time:

FOR ACTION:

cc (for information):

Jack Marsh

~~Rogers Morton~~ *not here*

FROM THE STAFF SECRETARY

DUE: Date: Quick Turn Around

Time:

SUBJECT:

SECRET ATTACHMENT

Brent Scowcroft memo of 1/26/76
re: National Security Decision Memorandum
on Israeli Arms Requirements

ACTION REQUESTED:

For Necessary Action

For Your Recommendations

Prepare Agenda and Brief

Draft Reply

For Your Comments

Draft Remarks

REMARKS:

*1/26/76
up without Marsh's comments.*

PLEASE ATTACH THIS COPY TO MATERIAL SUBMITTED.

If you have any questions or if you anticipate a delay in submitting the required material, please telephone the Staff Secretary immediately.

Jim Connor
For the President

