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January 13, 1976

MR PRESIDENT:

SALT Compliance Issues

We staffed Brent Scowcroft's memorandum on SALT Compliance Issues to Jack Marsh. Brent proposes that a White Paper (attached) be transmitted to the Congress explaining the status of SALT Compliance. Jack Marsh has made the following comments:

"I would recommend that Brent's cover memo to the President be amplified to discuss the following points:

1. Wouldn't transmission of this "white paper" to the Congress itself violate the provisions of Paragraph 8 of the SSC regulations (which require that the consultations be kept private)? It seems to me that the President would have to assume that there will be leaks of this document, based on the record of the past year of Congressional handling of classified documents.
2. Which Congressional leaders would be briefed? It seems to me that once this paper is known to exist on the Hill, there will be demands from all the SALT opponents to see it, and this will be an unstoppable process.
3. Does the "white paper" raise more issues than it settles?
4. Is there some way that this subject can be summarized in an unclassified document or, alternatively, in a document with a lower classification, thereby permitting broader dissemination?

The memorandum has not been staffed to anyone else.

Jim Connor

SENSITIVE

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 13, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR JACK MARSH
FROM: MIKE DUVAL *Mike*
SUBJECT: WHITE PAPER ON SALT COMPLIANCE ISSUES

I would recommend that Brent's cover memo to the President be amplified to discuss the following points:

1. Wouldn't transmission of this "white paper" to the Congress itself violate the provisions of Paragraph 8 of the SSC regulations (which require that the consultations be kept private)? It seems to me that the President would have to assume that there will be leaks of this document, based on the record of the past year of Congressional handling of classified documents.
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3. Does the "white paper" raise more issues than it settles?
4. Is there some way that this subject can be summarized in an unclassified document or, alternatively, in a document with a lower classification, thereby permitting broader dissemination?

THE WHITE HOUSE

ACTION MEMORANDUM

WASHINGTON

LOG NO.:

Date: December 31, 1975

Time: 7:00 pm

FOR ACTION:

cc (for information):

JACK MARSH

FROM THE STAFF SECRETARY

DUE: Date: Tuesday, January 6, 1976

Time: 12:00 noon

SUBJECT:

Scowcroft Memo to the President re Presentation of White Paper on Compliance Issues to Selected Congressional Committees

ACTION REQUESTED:

For Necessary Action

For Your Recommendations

Prepare Agenda and Brief

Draft Reply


For Your Comments

Draft Remarks

REMARKS:

PLEASE ATTACH THIS COPY TO MATERIAL SUBMITTED.

If you have any questions or if you anticipate a delay in submitting the required material, please telephone the Staff Secretary immediately.


JAMES E. CONNOR
For the President

ITEM WITHDRAWAL SHEET
WITHDRAWAL ID 00581

Collection/Series/Folder ID No. : 004700181
Reason for Withdrawal : NS,National security restriction
Type of Material : MEM,Memo(s)
Creator's Name : Brent Scowcroft
Receiver's Name : President
Description : re presentation of White Paper on
compliance issues to selected congressional committees
Creation Date : 12/31/1975
Volume (pages) : 2
Date Withdrawn : 05/03/1988

ITEM WITHDRAWAL SHEET
WITHDRAWAL ID 00582

Collection/Series/Folder ID No. : 004700181
Reason for Withdrawal : NS,National security restriction
Type of Material : REP,Report(s)
Description : re SALT compliance issues
Creation Date : 12/1975?
Volume (pages) : 37
Date Withdrawn : 05/03/1988

SUMMARY OF U.S. OFFICIAL STATEMENTS

1. President Ford, during his news conference on December 2, 1974

Q: Mr. President, are you satisfied that the Soviets are carrying out the spirit and the letter of the 1972 arms limitation agreements?

A: We know of no violations, either on the part of the Soviet Union or by ourselves. There have been some allegations that the Soviet Union has violated the SALT I agreement. We don't think they have.

There are, however, some ambiguities. When the SALT I agreement was agreed to, there was established a standing consultative commission made up of the Soviet Union and the United States. That commission can meet twice a year to analyze any allegations as to violations of SALT I. It is our intention to call for a meeting of that group--I think in January of next year--to analyze any of the ambiguities that have been alleged. We don't think there have been any violations, but I have a responsibility to find out, and we intend to follow through under the agreed procedure of the 1972 agreements.

2. Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, during his news conference of December 6, 1974:

Q: Mr. Secretary, does the United States have any evidence that the Soviet Union has violated, is violating, or may be preparing to violate the terms of the SALT I treaty or the interim agreement?

A: There is no conclusive evidence of any violations. There are, as the President indicated the other evening, a number of ambiguities and there is an established procedure for dealing with those ambiguities through the Standing Consultative Commission.

We shall be raising a number of questions in that Standing Consultative Commission in January. So there are ambiguities, but there is no conclusive evidence of violation.

Q: When you say conclusive, do you mean there is some evidence?

A: What I've said is that there are ambiguities here and that suggests that there are developments that must be further reviewed.

3. Department of State press briefing, June 6, 1975:

Q: And what about the commission to talk about possible violations of the Treaty?

A: I don't know whether they were described as violations, but there was discussion about certain questions that had arisen about that.

Q: Is that still going on?

A: I believe those were concluded satisfactorily.

Q: And were we satisfied that there were no violations on the Soviet side?

A: Again, I will repeat, we have never said that there was any question of violation. Some questions had arisen as well as some ambiguities that we were trying to clarify, and I think they were satisfactorily clarified or are being satisfactorily clarified.

4. Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, during his news conference of June 20, 1975:

Q: Mr. Secretary, are we satisfied that the Soviet Union is not violating the Interim Agreement or attempting to violate the Interim Agreement by camouflage, deceit, or otherwise?

A: I have, I think, mentioned before that there have been some ambiguities in this area; that we have taken these ambiguities to the Standing Consultative Commission which is the body which is designed to deal with any questions that arise. These ambiguities are under study and I hope in the process of resolution. I would reiterate that we cannot state that the Soviets have violated the Interim Agreement.

Q: Is there still some confusion about whether they're building silos or command posts within their silo fields? This seems to be a major issue.

A: I'm not sure that the command post issue is a major issue. I think that we will have clear indications whether or not those silos are employed for command control purposes. I

think that there is a kind of ambiguity that results from the language of the original agreement which, of course, cannot be altogether precise. The Soviets are precluded from deploying silos for the purpose of deploying additional missiles; whether one would regard a silo-like configuration as intended for command control to fall under that ban, of course, is something that one has retrospective judgments on.

5. Secretary of State Kissinger, during an interview published in the June 23, 1975, issue of "U.S. News and World Report":

Q: Mr. Secretary, are you satisfied that the Russians are not cheating on the strategic arms limitation agreement that was signed in 1972?

A: When you have strategic forces on both sides in the present state of technical complexity and in the process of modernization, it is inevitable that questionable actions will emerge.

The Soviets have worried us in several areas. We have taken those up in the Soviet-American Standing Commission which is designed to deal with such complaints. With respect to a number of these issues we have received answers which-while not fully satisfactory-are moving in the right direction. One or two issues are still unsettled, but they do not go to the heart of the SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) agreement. But we will pursue them nevertheless. One or two issues that have been reported in the newspapers seem to me mischievous and special pleading.

6. President Ford, during his news conference of June 25, 1975:

Q: Mr. President, your old sidekick, the former Secretary of Defense, Melvin Laird, has written in a magazine article that the Russians have repeatedly violated the SALT agreement and have mocked detente, and he also has some things to say about what they are doing in Portugal and the Middle East. How concerned are you about these charges?

A: I have investigated the allegations that the Soviet Union has violated the SALT agreements, that they have used loopholes to do certain things that were intended not to be done under the agreement.

I have found that they have not violated the SALT agreement, they have not used any loopholes. And in order to determine whether they have or they have not, there is a standing consultative group that is an organization for the purpose of deciding after investigation whether there have been any violations. And that group, after looking into the allegations, came to the conclusion there had been no violations.

7. Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, during a press interview with the Godfrey Sperling Group on July 1, 1975:

Q: About the disarming first strikes; President Ford at the press conference said that he was satisfied that the Soviets have not cheated on SALT I. There are reports that you testified very strongly before the Jackson-Armed Forces Subcommittee of certain evidence of the Soviet violations in SALT I. There have been a number of articles; Tad Szulc had a very detailed article in the New Republic, Aviation Week has had a number of highly technical articles of alleged jamming of American telemetry measurements and other forms of cheating. Are you satisfied in your own mind, there has been no Soviet cheating on SALT I? Are you satisfied that verification procedures for SALT II will be adequate?

A: I think what the President indicated was that we have no firm evidence of proof that the Soviets have indeed violated the SALT I Agreement. When questions arise they go to the Standing Consultative Commission. A number of ambiguities have arisen and have gone to the Commission for review. Some of the answers that we have received have been satisfactory up to a point. Other answers are yet to be delivered, but, as yet, we have no demonstrated case of violation by the Soviet Union. There have been ambiguities in a number of areas. I think that with regard to the second half of your question, one must recognize that verification in the forthcoming SALT Agreement cannot be absolutely foolproof. What we must have is a verification procedure that gives us very high confidence that any significant amount of testing or violation over time would be detected by our intelligence apparatus and therefore by insuring that verification would preclude significant violation, we diminish substantially the incentive for those very small violations that might have no effect on the strategic balance.

* * * *

APPENDIX A

(more)

Q: Does it help in this public discussion to have a former Secretary of Defense make flat charges against Russia as he has and then have the President come out and deny them? How can the public reach any understanding or any conclusion about the accuracy of this? Who do you agree with, Mr. Laird or the President?

A: Of course, I support the President's position. I think that I stated that position as I understand it a moment ago. I think that what we have repeatedly said, is that there are ambiguities that must be resolved by reference through the Standing Consultative Commission and there are ambiguities. Those who are too impatient to allow the deliberative processes or consultative processes established by the Moscow Agreement and Treaty in the form of the Standing Consultative Commission are not patient enough to wait for those processes to work themselves out and therefore they are prepared to leap to conclusions but let me reassert that all of the issues are ambiguous and for that reason they must be discussed in the negotiating framework if we are to make any kind of an agreement on arms control work.

8. Dr. Fred C. Ikle, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, during an appearance on "Meet the Press", August 3, 1975:

Q: (Mr. Gwertzman): Dr. Ikle, as you know, there has been considerable criticism that the Soviet Union has not lived up to the SALT I Agreements, that they have violated either the letter or the spirit of some provisions. Has this government taken up these criticisms with the Soviet Union, and what is your impression of whether they have or have not lived up to these agreements?

A: We have no information that there has been a violation of the agreed text of our SALT agreements, these arms control agreements. There have been some ambiguities and we have had extensive and fruitful discussions to clarify these ambiguities with the Russians in a special forum in Geneva that was created for that purpose by the SALT agreements in '72.

the president, during his interview on Public Broadcasting System TV, August 7, 1975:

- Q: Well, Mr. President, to go back to SALT I for a moment, you said at a recent news conference that according to your investigation the Russians had not cheated on the agreement limiting the use of certain strategic weapons. Your old friend, Melvin Laird, had written an article suggesting that they had cheated. Since then you have talked to Mr. Laird. Have you changed your mind about what you said?
- A: I naturally investigated the allegations that were made by a number of people, including Mel. After a thorough investigation I have come to the conclusion that a person might legitimately make the charge that there had been violations, but on complete and total investigation I think any person who knew the facts as I know them would agree that there had been no violations of any consequence. There are some ambiguities--I want to be frank about it--but all of the responsible knowledgeable people in the Pentagon or in any of the other responsible agencies would agree with me there have been no serious violations and any that have been called to their attention have been stopped.
- Q: But you are suggesting there have been some infractions, then?
- A: Very minor, but we have what we call a consultative group where if we think they are violating something, we make that point. It is investigated and in the cases where there was any instance that might be an honest charge of a violation, they have been stopped. The Soviet Union has raised some questions about certain activities that we have undertaken and we have investigated them, and I think that arrangement of the consultative group has been very effective in making sure that SALT I was lived up to.

MINUTEMAN Shelters

1. The United States has in progress a program for improving the survivability of its MINUTEMAN ICBM force to nuclear attack by upgrading MINUTEMAN silos. This program has two aspects:

a. Suspension system modification, electromagnetic pulse and thermal neutron protection work, installation of a debris removal system, and installation of an improved silo door seal. These activities require considerable above-ground welding under controlled conditions. Welding activities in ambient temperatures below 35 degrees Fahrenheit require preheating of metal surfaces to at least 70 degrees. Maximum permissible wind velocity for welding is 5 Knots.

b. Blast hardening, during which 10 inches of reinforced concrete is poured and bonded to the existing silo door with epoxy. The epoxy must remain at temperatures between 60-90 degrees Fahrenheit after mixing, for from 16 to 100 hours (the lower the temperature, the longer the time required). The concrete itself must be kept at temperatures between 50-90 degrees Fahrenheit for pouring (1 day) and between 50-150 degrees Fahrenheit for curing (4 days).

In addition to the requirement to maintain acceptable temperature and wind velocity conditions in order to accomplish the above activities, a reasonable environment must be provided for workers during periods of severe weather.

2. In order to provide environmental protection for these activities, shelters are installed over MINUTEMAN silos which are being upgraded. The size of such shelters has varied over the years.

a. During initial silo construction, which began in 1962, the shelter size was approximately 700 square feet.

b. During upgrade of Wing II at Ellsworth AFB in 1972 (which did not include the addition of concrete) the shelter size was approximately 300 square feet.

c. During upgrade of Wing V at Warren AFB in 1973 and 1974 the shelter size was approximately 2000 square feet.

d. For upgrade of Wing III at Minot AFB currently in progress, the shelter size is approximately 2700 square feet (a 600 square foot extension was added to the shelter used at Wing V to facilitate shift work, thereby improving cost effectiveness).

APPENDIX B

DECLASSIFIED

AUTHORITY RACINE-PHF-4-1-2-15/5/08

BY Ma NARA, DATE 11/17/09

~~SECRET~~

Completion of upgrade for all MINUTEMAN is scheduled for September 1979.

3. Currently 8 insulated, portable aluminum shelters are in use at Wing III and 4 are in storage. These shelters remain over a silo for from 10 days to 4 weeks, depending upon the severity of the weather.

4. The Air Force is currently considering two alternatives to the use of the present type of MINUTEMAN shelters:

a. Rollaway Shelter Concept.

(1) Concept. Large 50' X 40' portable building would be carried to launch facility on a large flatbed trailer. Building would be erected within about twelve hours and rolled over launch facility at night and removed during daylight. Rollaway time: 30 minutes. Shelter would be used during winter months, October through April. Existing small temporary shelters would be used during summer, May through September. No rollaways would be used at Wing III, where upgrade silo is currently in progress.

(2) Cost and Schedule. Depends on amount of notice prior to implementation. Baseline cost is \$33.0 million with 120 days notice and orderly transition to the rollaway concept. Other options and costs additive to baseline costs are provided below:

<u>Cost</u>	<u>Notice</u>	<u>Transition</u>
+\$2.0M	75 Days	Accelerated
+\$7.3M	No Notice	Immediate*

*120 days before first shelter available.

b. Seasonal Concept.

(1) Concept. Only limited topside work would be accomplished during winter months, October through April. Small noninterfering shelters would be used. Concrete work would be accomplished during summer months, May through September. This concept causes multiple site configuration regarding degree of completion, extensive documentation changes, additional missiles off alert and delays full upgrade capability at three Wings.

(2) Cost and Schedule. Cost depends on amount of notice prior to implementation. Baseline cost is \$45.6 million with 60 days notice and orderly transition to the seasonal concept. Other options with delta costs to the baseline cost are provided below:

<u>Cost</u>	<u>Notice</u>	<u>Transition</u>
+\$1.5M	75 Days	Slower
+\$2.6M	No Notice	Immediate

ABM TREATY
(Extract)

Article XIII

1. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties shall establish promptly a Standing Consultative Commission, within the framework of which they will:

(a) consider questions concerning compliance with the obligations assumed and related situations which may be considered ambiguous;

(b) provide on a voluntary basis such information as either Party considers necessary to assure confidence in compliance with the obligations assumed;

(c) consider questions involving unintended interference with national technical means of verification;

(d) consider possible changes in the strategic situation which have a bearing on the provisions of this Treaty;

(e) agree upon procedures and dates for destruction or dismantling of ABM systems or their components in cases provided for by the provisions of this Treaty;

(f) consider, as appropriate, possible proposals for further increasing the viability of this Treaty, including proposals for amendments in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty;

(g) consider, as appropriate, proposals for further measures aimed at limiting strategic arms.

2. The Parties through consultation shall establish, and may amend as appropriate, Regulations for the Standing Consultative Commission governing procedures, composition and other relevant matters.



INTERIM AGREEMENT
(Extract)

Article VI

To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Interim Agreement, the Parties shall use the Standing Consultative Commission established under Article XIII of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems in accordance with the provisions of that Article.



SESSIONS OF THE STANDING CONSULTATIVE

COMMISSION HELD TO DATE (November 5, 1975)

November 21 - December 21, 1972 and
March 12 - May 30, 1973

A Joint Working Group of the SALT Delegations negotiated the Memorandum of Understanding establishing the SCC, and the Regulations of the SCC.

SCC-I : May 30 - July 5, 1973

SCC-II : September 25 - November 16, 1973

SCC-III: April 2 - June 19, 1974

SCC-IV : September 24 - October 28, 1974

SCC-V : January 28 - February 13, 1975

SCC-VI : March 24 - May 6, 1975

SCC-VII: September 22, 1975 - October 29, 1975

SCC-VIII: Planned to begin March 29, 1976

APPENDIX C

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526 (as amended) SEC 3.3
NSC Memo, 3/30/00, State Dept. Guidelines
By HR NARA, Date 9/5/12

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
REGARDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION

I.

The Government of the United States of America and
the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
hereby establish a Standing Consultative Commission.

II.

The Standing Consultative Commission shall promote
the objectives and implementation of the provisions of the
Treaty between the USA and the USSR on the Limitation of
Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, the Interim
Agreement between the USA and the USSR on Certain Measures
with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms
of May 26, 1972, and the Agreement on Measures to Reduce
the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War between the USA and
the USSR of September 30, 1971, and shall exercise its
competence in accordance with the provisions of Article XIII
of said Treaty, Article VI of said Interim Agreement, and
Article 7 of said Agreement on Measures.

2.

III.

Each Government shall be represented on the Standing Consultative Commission by a Commissioner and a Deputy Commissioner, assisted by such staff as it deems necessary.

IV.

The Standing Consultative Commission shall hold periodic sessions on dates mutually agreed by the Commissioners but no less than two times per year. Sessions shall also be convened as soon as possible, following reasonable notice, at the request of either Commissioner.

V.

The Standing Consultative Commission shall consider all matters relating to the Commission's procedures and other relevant matters and may amend them as it deems appropriate.


3.

VI.


The Standing Consultative Commission will meet in Geneva. It may also meet at such other places as may be agreed.

Done in Geneva, on December 21, 1972, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Government
of the
United States of America



For the Government
of the
Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics




STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION


PROTOCOL

Pursuant to the provisions of the Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the Establishment of a Standing Consultative Commission, dated December 21, 1972, the undersigned, having been duly appointed by their respective Governments as Commissioners of said Standing Consultative Commission, hereby establish and approve, in the form attached, Regulations governing procedures and other relevant matters of the Commission, which Regulations shall enter into force upon signature of this Protocol and remain in force until and unless amended by the undersigned or their successors.

Done in Geneva on May 30, 1973, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.



Commissioner,
United States
of America



Commissioner,
Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics

APPENDIX C

STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION

REGULATIONS

1. The Standing Consultative Commission, established by the Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the Establishment of a Standing Consultative Commission of December 21, 1972, shall consist of a U. S. component and Soviet component, each of which shall be headed by a Commissioner.

2. The Commissioners shall alternately preside over the meetings.

3. The Commissioners shall, when possible, inform each other in advance of the matters to be submitted for discussion, but may at a meeting submit for discussion any matter within the competence of the Commission.

4. During intervals between sessions of the Commission, each Commissioner may transmit written or oral communications to the other Commissioner concerning matters within the competence of the Commission.



5. Each component of the Commission may invite such advisers and experts as it deems necessary to participate in a meeting.

6. The Commission may establish working groups to consider and prepare specific matters.

7. The results of the discussion of questions at the meetings of the Commission may, if necessary, be entered into records which shall be in two copies, each in the English and the Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

8. The proceedings of the Standing Consultative Commission shall be conducted in private. The Standing Consultative Commission may not make its proceedings public except with the express consent of both Commissioners.

9. Each component of the Commission shall bear the expenses connected with its participation in the Commission.

THE WHITE HOUSE

ACTION MEMORANDUM

WASHINGTON

LOG NO.:

Date: December 31, 1975

Time: 7:00 pm

FOR ACTION:

cc (for information):

JACK MARSH

FROM THE STAFF SECRETARY

DUE: Date: Tuesday, January 6, 1976

Time: 12:00 noon

SUBJECT:

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ACTION REQUESTED:

For Necessary Action

For Your Recommendations

Prepare Agenda and Brief

Draft Reply

For Your Comments

Draft Remarks

REMARKS:

*as of 1/8/76
Michael is working
on this for Jack Marsh - might
be a few days*

PLEASE ATTACH THIS COPY TO MATERIAL SUBMITTED.

If you have any questions or if you anticipate a delay in submitting the required material, please telephone the Staff Secretary immediately.

JAMES E. CONNOR

For the President

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 15, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

This file was returned from the
President without a decision.

*File returned to
N&C 1/15/76*

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 13, 1976

MR PRESIDENT:

SALT Compliance Issues

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Jim Connor

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WITHDRAWAL ID 00585

Collection/Series/Folder ID No. : 004700181
Reason for Withdrawal : NS,National security restriction
Type of Material : MEM,Memo(s)
Creator's Name : Brent Scowcroft
Receiver's Name : President
Description : re presentation of White Paper on
compliance issues to selected congressional committees
Creation Date : 12/31/1975
Volume (pages) : 2
Date Withdrawn : 05/03/1988