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
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 19, 1975

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: RON NESSEN
FROM: JIM CONNOR 
SUBJECT: Meeting with Bob Bartley of
 Wall Street Journal

The attached Recommended Telephone Call was received in the President's outbox with the following notation:

"9/17/75 Thanked him. Suggested he come in to say hello when he is in D. C. Said Ron would arrange with Wall Street Journal D. C. office for such a visit."

Please follow-up with appropriate action.

cc: Don Rumsfeld
 Jerry Jones

Attachment: Copy of Recommended Telephone Call to Robert (Bob) L. Bartley

MEMORANDUM

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN.....

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 18, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR:

JIM CONNOR

FROM:

DONALD RUMSFELD

Here is something from the President's outbox concerning Bartley. Please see that it is handled properly, Nessen's office.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Action Required

p. 2.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

RECOMMENDED TELEPHONE CALL

TO: Robert (Bob) L. Bartley, Editorial Page Editor
The Wall Street Journal

DATE: Within next few days

RECOMMENDED BY: Margita White
Don Rumsfeld *DR*

PURPOSE: To express appreciation for The Wall Street Journal's editorial page carrying excellent article by Edward Jay Epstein "How Liberals Aided Israel's Foes" as well as for Journal's editorial stance on the Turkish aid issue.

BACKGROUND: The Journal on Friday, August 29, 1975, carried Epstein's article (Tab A) which argues persuasively that the House action to suspend military aid for Turkey, "in a fit of moral indignation inspired by a handful of Congressmen," dangerously weakens U.S. defenses in the Eastern Mediterranean and reduces our ability to guarantee Israel's or even Greece's security.

Editorially, the Journal strongly supported the efforts for compromise prior to the House vote, criticizing the "unsuccessful experiment by Congress in the direct conduct of U.S. foreign policy" and predicting that "if Congress persists in playing a losing game, the consequences for the U.S. position in the Eastern Mediterranean could be disastrous. And none of our friends there, Greek, Turkish or Israeli, can benefit from that." (Tab B)

TALKING POINTS:

1. I recently read the August 29 article on your editorial page by Edward Jay Epstein which was an excellent analysis of damaging results of the House vote to suspend shipments of arms to Turkey.
2. I very much appreciate the strong stand the Journal has taken on this vital issue and believe you are making an important contribution to public understanding of what is at stake.
3. You certainly were prophetic in editorializing before the House vote that if the House refused to compromise on the embargo question "the consequences for the U.S. position in the Eastern Mediterranean could be disastrous."

Date of submission: September 5, 1975

Action

9/17/75

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How Liberals Aided Israel's Foes

By EDWARD JAY EPSTEIN

The House of Representatives may have inadvertently altered the balance of power in the Middle East and critically diminished Israel's chances for survival when, in a fit of moral indignation inspired by a handful of Congressmen, it voted last month to continue the suspension of military aid for Turkey. In direct response to this vote, Turkey denied the U.S. control over more than 20 "common defense" installations in its territory which electronically monitored, among other things, shipments of military equipment, aircraft, and industrial goods to Middle East nations.

The strategic implications of the House coup proceed from Turkey's unique position in the geography of the Middle East. This NATO ally straddles Europe and Asia and physically separates the Soviet Union from the Arab states which depend on it for arms and ammunition. To reach the Mediterranean from their ports in the Black Sea, Soviet ships must pass through the narrow Turkish Dardanelles.

Before the congressional action, their cargoes could be surreptitiously analyzed by U.S. equipment at bases along the shores. To reach Syria and Iraq, Soviet aircraft must either overfly Turkish territory, where they can be "counted," or interdicted in a crisis, or be diverted several thousand miles over Bulgaria, Greece and the Mediterranean. Thus the main flow of Soviet arms traffic to the Middle East is vulnerable either to being "counted" or ultimately cut off because Turkey remains—for the moment at least—a NATO ally (which, not incidentally, maintains both diplomatic and economic ties with Israel).

A 'Window' on Russia

To be sure, the strategic importance of Turkey extends well beyond the security of Israel and the Middle East. Because it has a 1,000-mile border with the Soviet Union along the Black Sea, it provides an irreplaceable window on military and missile activity within the Soviet heartland. The monitoring equipment at U.S.-built bases along the Turkish Black Sea coast could detect the movement of Soviet planes, ships, submarines and tanks, as well as the heat generated by the preparation of Soviet missiles.

Over-the-horizon radar provided an integral link in the early warning system used by NATO and the U.S. and monitored the progress of Soviet missile technology. The American "machinery" was even sensitive enough to intercept walkie-talkie, ground-to-air and microwave telephone messages between military units (which meant in effect that any major military alert or troop movements would probably be monitored).

Aside from the intelligence facilities, Turkey also provided the U.S. bases for nuclear-armed fighters capable of penetrating Soviet defenses over the depression of the Black Sea. These "Quick Alert" bombers, parked on the edge of Turkish airfields with motors running, were by tacit agreement with the Soviets not counted as strategic bombers under the limitations of the SALT treaty, thus they served as an important counterbalance to the apparent Soviet missile superiority. If Turkey were to prohibit American use of these airbases, as it well could do, the entire SALT "balance of terror" would be tilted against the United States.

In more conventional terms, Turkey, with its 500,000-man army, secures the

eastern flank of NATO, and that ultimately involves the security of Greece. Congressmen who voted to override these strategic considerations may have believed that detente has advanced to the point where nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union is improbable—and may therefore consider the early warning system and strate-

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gic balances unnecessary. That assumption is doubtful, at best, but surely there is little doubt about the threat to the Middle East.

In October 1973, the installations in Turkey detected: the passage of nuclear warheads through the Dardanelles en route to Egypt or Syria; the mobilizing of paratrooper divisions at Soviet bases through Odessa (land-mobile communications between units were overheard); and the gathering of wide-bodied transports capable of carrying these troops to the Middle East. All signs, including diplomatic signals, pointed towards Soviet military intervention against the Israelis, who at the time had cut off an Egyptian army in the Sinai. But President Nixon decisively called a world-wide military alert. And faced with the distinct possibility that their supply routes through Turkish water and airspace could be interrupted, the Soviets quickly abandoned their apparent plan.

Today the situation is radically different. If another such crisis occurred with the Turkish bases shut down, the President might never know of Soviet troop movements until too late. Even if no dramatic confrontations occur, the interruption of intelligence may ultimately present as serious a threat to the security of Israel as direct Soviet troop intervention. The balance of power in the Middle East depends on the U.S. ability to ascertain the quality and quantity of arms which the Soviet Union is providing its clients, since new weapon systems and military capabilities could obviously give an invading force a decisive advantage.

With the Turkish bases in operation, the United States would probably at least be forewarned of any change in Soviet arms shipments, thus having the option of redressing the balance or informing Israel of the potential danger. Without these monitoring facilities, Israel stands a higher risk of a successful surprise attack.

Why would the House of Representatives vote as it did even after it had been warned of the consequences by Secretary of State Kissinger? One can understand and even admire the brilliant tactics of the Greek lobby, which manipulated Congress into declaring an embargo on aid to Turkey over a dubious legality. In July 1974, after the Greek junta arranged a successful coup against the legitimate government of Cyprus, Turkey intervened with troops

to "protect" the sizable Turkish minority from the group of terrorists that assumed control of Cyprus in the coup.

Turkey had the right to intervene as it did under the 1960 "Treaty of Guarantee" in which Greece, Turkey and Great Britain all pledged the integrity of the constitutional government which allocated governmental offices between Greek and Turkish-speaking Cypriotes under a complex formula. It also claimed that the coup endangered the defenses of its southern airbases.

In any case, the intervention quickly led to the brutal displacement of thousands of Greek Cypriotes from their homes, and the Greek community in the U.S. became understandably concerned over the fate of Cyprus (even though a Greek junta precipitated the crisis). Perhaps the most effective organizer of the Cypriote cause in the U.S. was Eugene T. Rossides, a Washington lawyer, who had formerly served as a close aide to Archbishop Makarios, the President of Cyprus.

While Mr. Rossides was Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Enforcement and Operations from 1969-1973, he spearheaded the drive to deprive Turkey of military and economic aid over the poppy issue. (Although Turkey grew only 2% of the world's opium supply, it was blamed by Mr. Rossides and others for the American heroin problem.) With the aid of G. Gordon Liddy, his assistant on "international narcotics" who later went on to other things, Mr. Rossides nearly managed to drive Turkey out of NATO.

Eventually cooler heads in the National Security Council prevailed. Nevertheless, Mr. Rossides had garnered support in his anti-Turkey cause among a large number of Congressmen concerned about drugs in their districts.

The 'Self-Defense' Argument

After Turkey's military intervention on Cyprus, the Greek lobby began arguing in Congress that American aid was limited by law to "self defense." What constitutes "defense" is somewhat ambiguous: Under the strict interpretation asserted by the Greek lobby, all military aid to such American allies as Great Britain, France and Israel (which periodically attacks guerrilla bases in Lebanon) could also be cut off. At the time of Watergate, with Congress legitimately concerned about transgressions of law, the Greek lobby managed to organize considerable support for an embargo against Turkey.

But while the shrewd efforts of the Greek lobby are fathomable, it defies explanation why the contingent of liberal Democrats, who in their campaigns and earlier votes had strongly supported Israel, would now join an effort that jeopardizes the Middle East security arrangements vital to the survival of Israel. Certainly, they must realize that giving the Soviet Union unmonitored passage for arms shipments would at the very least heighten the dangers of a surprise attack on Israel. They must also be aware that weakening U.S. defenses in the Eastern Mediterranean, now heavily dependent on Turkish air and naval bases, would reduce our ability to guarantee Israel's or even Greece's security.

Mr. Epstein, author of several books and a contributor to the New Yorker and other publications, writes frequently on political subjects.

The Turkish Compromise

An unsuccessful experiment by Congress in the direct conduct of U.S. foreign policy will be ended if the House next week approves an administration-backed measure ending the embargo on U.S. arms shipments to Turkey. The embargo, imposed by Congress five months ago to try to force a Turkish compromise on the Cyprus question, has backfired so badly that even face-saving is difficult. But perhaps a lesson has been learned.

The bill before the House would permit resumption of arms shipments but require the White House to report to Congress every two months on progress of the Cyprus talks. While that implies possible further action if there is no progress, it nonetheless largely restores the traditional discretionary powers of the Executive Branch in initiating foreign policy.

The vote may have been timed to avoid the appearance of capitulation to a Turkish deadline. Ankara said last month that if the embargo weren't lifted by July 17, which is day after tomorrow, it would review the status of the 24 American bases on its territory. Just what this review would entail, or whether it might still take place, isn't clear. But even though Congress is not meeting the deadline there should

be little doubt that it has been badly outmaneuvered at the game of applying diplomatic pressure.

Congressional pressure failed in the most spectacular manner. The Cyprus talks are now deadlocked. The Turkish Cypriots have announced an autonomous republic, and the Turkish government threatened its "reassessment." This embargo could hardly have done otherwise, coming at a moment of political stalemate in Turkey. The hero of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, Bulent Ecevit, resigned as premier hoping to capitalize on his success at the polls, but his opponents have taken over the government and so far succeeded in blocking new elections. The deadlock is not the stuff of which foreign policy compromise is made, especially since Turkey does in fact hold a strong hand in its talks with the U.S.

If Congress persists in playing a losing game, the consequences for the U.S. position in the eastern Mediterranean could be disastrous. And none of our friends there, Greek, Turkish or Israeli, can benefit from that. The best course would be for Congress to lose a little bit of face and hope that the chastening experience will teach it something about the right way to conduct foreign policy.

The Wall Street Journal

Tuesday, July 15, 1975

B

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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TO: Robert (Bob) L. Bartley, Editorial Page Editor
The Wall Street Journal

DATE: Within next few days

RECOMMENDED BY: Margita White
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But while the shrewd efforts of the Greek lobby are fathomable, it defies explanation why the contingent of liberal Democrats, who in their campaigns and earlier votes had strongly supported Israel, would now join an effort that jeopardizes the Middle East security arrangements vital to the survival of Israel. Certainly, they must realize that giving the Soviet Union unmonitored passage for arms shipments would at the very least heighten the dangers of a surprise attack on Israel. They must also be aware that weakening U.S. defenses in the Eastern Mediterranean, now heavily dependent on Turkish air and naval bases, would reduce our ability to guarantee Israel's or even Greece's security.

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The Wall Street Journal
Tuesday, July 15, 1975

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

RECOMMENDED TELEPHONE CALL

TO: Robert (Bob) L. Bartley, Editorial Page Editor
The Wall Street Journal

DATE: Within next few days

RECOMMENDED BY: Margita White
Don Rumsfeld

PURPOSE: To express appreciation for The Wall Street Journal's editorial page carrying excellent article by Edward Jay Epstein "How Liberals Aided Israel's Foes" as well as for Journal's editorial stance on the Turkish aid issue.

BACKGROUND: The Journal on Friday, August 29, 1975, carried Epstein's article (Tab A) which argues persuasively that the House action to suspend military aid for Turkey, "in a fit of moral indignation inspired by a handful of Congressmen," dangerously weakens U.S. defenses in the Eastern Mediterranean and reduces our ability to guarantee Israel's or even Greece's security.

Editorially, the Journal strongly supported the efforts for compromise prior to the House vote, criticizing the "unsuccessful experiment by Congress in the direct conduct of U.S. foreign policy" and predicting that "if Congress persists in playing a losing game, the consequences for the U.S. position in the Eastern Mediterranean could be disastrous. And none of our friends there, Greek, Turkish or Israeli, can benefit from that." (Tab B)

TALKING POINTS:

1. I recently read the August 29 article on your editorial page by Edward Jay Epstein which was an excellent analysis of damaging results of the House vote to suspend shipments of arms to Turkey.
2. I very much appreciate the strong stand the Journal has taken on this vital issue and believe you are making an important contribution to public understanding of what is at stake.
3. You certainly were prophetic in editorializing before the House vote that if the House refused to compromise on the embargo question "the consequences for the U.S. position in the Eastern Mediterranean could be disastrous."

Date of submission: September 5, 1975

Action _____

How Liberals Aided Israel's Foes

By EDWARD JAY EPSTEIN

The House of Representatives may have inadvertently altered the balance of power in the Middle East and critically diminished Israel's chances for survival when, in a fit of moral indignation inspired by a handful of Congressmen, it voted last month to continue the suspension of military aid for Turkey. In direct response to this vote, Turkey denied the U.S. control over more than 20 "common defense" installations in its territory which electronically monitored, among other things, shipments of military equipment, aircraft, and industrial goods to Middle East nations.

The strategic implications of the House coup proceed from Turkey's unique position in the geography of the Middle East. This NATO ally straddles Europe and Asia and physically separates the Soviet Union from the Arab states which depend on it for arms and ammunition. To reach the Mediterranean from their ports in the Black Sea, Soviet ships must pass through the narrow Turkish Dardanelles.

Before the congressional action, their cargoes could be surreptitiously analyzed by U.S. equipment at bases along the shores. To reach Syria and Iraq, Soviet aircraft must either overfly Turkish territory, where they can be "counted" or interdicted in a crisis, or be diverted several thousand miles over Bulgaria, Greece and the Mediterranean. Thus the main flow of Soviet arms traffic to the Middle East is vulnerable either to being "counted" or ultimately cut off because Turkey remains—for the moment at least—a NATO ally (which, not incidentally, maintains both diplomatic and economic ties with Israel).

A 'Window' on Russia

To be sure, the strategic importance of Turkey extends well beyond the security of Israel and the Middle East. Because it has a 1,000-mile border with the Soviet Union along the Black Sea, it provides an irreplaceable window on military and missile activity within the Soviet heartland. The monitoring equipment at U.S.-built bases along the Turkish Black Sea coast could detect the movement of Soviet planes, ships, submarines and tanks, as well as the heat generated by the preparation of Soviet missiles.

Over-the-horizon radar provided an integral link in the early warning system used by NATO and the U.S. and monitored the progress of Soviet missile technology. The American "machinery" was even sensitive enough to intercept walkie-talkie, ground-to-air and microwave telephone messages between military units (which meant in effect that any major military alert or troop movements would probably be monitored).

Aside from the intelligence facilities, Turkey also provided the U.S. bases for nuclear-armed fighters capable of penetrating Soviet defenses over the depression of the Black Sea. These "Quick Alert" bombers, parked on the edge of Turkish airfields with motors running, were by tacit agreement with the Soviets not counted as strategic bombers under the limitations of the SALT treaty, thus they served as an important counterbalance to the apparent Soviet missile superiority. If Turkey were to prohibit American use of these airbases, as it well could do, the entire SALT balance of terror would be tilted against the United States.

In more conventional terms, Turkey with its 500,000-man army, secures the

eastern flank of NATO, and that ultimately involves the security of Greece. Congressmen who voted to override these strategic considerations may have believed that détente has advanced to the point where nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union is improbable—and may therefore consider the early warning system and strate-

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gic balances unnecessary. That assumption is doubtful, at best, but surely there is little doubt about the threat to the Middle East.

In October 1973, the installations in Turkey detected the passage of nuclear warheads through the Dardanelles en route to Egypt or Syria; the mobilizing of paratrooper divisions at Soviet bases through Odessa (land-mobile communications between units were overheard); and the gathering of wide-bodied transports capable of carrying these troops to the Middle East. All signs, including diplomatic signals, pointed towards Soviet military intervention against the Israelis, who at the time had cut off an Egyptian army in the Sinai. But President Nixon decisively called a world-wide military alert. And faced with the distinct possibility that their supply routes through Turkish water and airspace could be interrupted, the Soviets quickly abandoned their apparent plan.

Today, the situation is radically different. If another such crisis occurred with the Turkish bases shut down, the President might never know of Soviet troop movements until too late. Even if no dramatic confrontations occur, the interruption of intelligence may ultimately present as serious a threat to the security of Israel as direct Soviet troop intervention. The balance of power in the Middle East depends on the U.S. ability to ascertain the quality and quantity of arms which the Soviet Union is providing its clients, since new weapon systems and military capabilities could obviously give an invading force a decisive advantage.

With the Turkish bases in operation, the United States would probably at least be forewarned of any change in Soviet arms shipments, thus having the option of redressing the balance or informing Israel of the potential danger. Without these monitoring facilities, Israel stands a higher risk of a successful surprise attack.

Why would the House of Representatives vote as it did even after it had been warned of the consequences by Secretary of State Kissinger? One can understand and even admire the brilliant tactics of the Greek lobby, which manipulated Congress into declaring an embargo on aid to Turkey over a dubious legality. In July 1974, after the Greek junta arranged a successful coup against the legitimate government of Cyprus, Turkey intervened with troops

to "protect" the sizable Turkish minority from the group of terrorists that assumed control of Cyprus in the coup.

Turkey had the right to intervene as it did under the 1960 "Treaty of Guarantee" in which Greece, Turkey and Great Britain all pledged the integrity of the constitutional government which allocated military offices between Greek and Turkish-speaking Cypriotes under a complex formula. It also claimed that the coup endangered the defenses of its southern airbases.

In any case, the intervention quickly led to the brutal displacement of thousands of Greek Cypriotes from their homes, and the Greek community in the U.S. became understandably concerned over the fate of Cyprus (even though a Greek junta precipitated the crisis). Perhaps the most effective organizer of the Cypriote cause in the U.S. was Eugene T. Rossides, a Washington lawyer, who had formerly served as a close aide to Archbishop Makarios, the President of Cyprus.

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