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ITEM WITHDRAWAL SHEET
WITHDRAWAL ID 00494

Collection/Series/Folder ID No. : 004700181
Reason for Withdrawal : NS,National security restriction
Type of Material : MEM,Memo(s)
Creator's Name : Henry Kissinger
Receiver's Name : President
Description : analysis of Reagan article on SAL
Creation Date : 07/14/1975
Volume (pages) : 3
Date Withdrawn : 04/28/1988

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON


June 25, 1975

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR:

HENRY KISSINGER

FROM:

JIM CONNOR 

The President has read the attached column by Ronald Reagan. He characterized it as over-simplified and with some inaccuracies.

He would appreciate NSC preparing an analysis of the column for him.

cc: Don Rumsfeld



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Don R

Over-simplification
of some insurance.

Have NSC. give
me an analysis.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 24, 1975

Don Rumsfeld -

The attached was received
in the President's outbox.

Jim Connor

Jim - ~~your~~ your
Action
D

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 23, 1975

MR PRESIDENT:

Attached is the latest
Reagan column.

Don Rumsfeld

THE RONALD REAGAN COLUMN
(For Release In Papers Of Friday, June 20, And Thereafter)

By RONALD REAGAN

Copley News Service

Although parity in strategic arms has been the announced goal of the United States and Russia in their SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty) negotiations, the results of SALT II may turn out to be about as equal as horse-and-rabbit stew: one horse and one rabbit--with the United States on the short end of the recipe.

Indications are that the negotiators are under pressure to come up with an agreement in time for President Ford and Soviet party boss Leonid Brezhnev to sign when the latter visits the United States in early fall. Placing a premium on speed suggests that a poor agreement is believed to be better than no agreement.

The Ronald Reagan Column -- 2

This could prove disastrous for U.S. security in the long run. And it isn't necessary.

The speed with which Congress passed the defense bill after its recent recess suggests, instead, that plenty of congressmen found the folks at home won't sit still for a weakened U.S. defense system. Against this background, the U.S. negotiating posture should be a tough one. The worry is that it won't be.

The major drawback of the proposed SALT agreement announced by Messrs. Ford and Brezhnev at Vladivostok last fall is its failure to provide for parity in missile payloads ("throw weight").

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In 1972, the United States already was at a 4 to 1 disadvantage on this score.

The Ronald Reagan Column -- 3

The Soviets have since engaged in an aggressive research and development program involving five new ICBMs and a new submarine missile. If they replace their existing land-based missiles with the new models and we don't deploy a new ICBM to replace our Minuteman, the payload gap will widen to 10 to 1 in the 1980s.

The grim significance of this disparity is underscored by former Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Nitze in a recent article in "Foreign Policy." He postulates that if the Soviets wish to destroy 1,200 fixed targets (such as our missile silos), "blanket 400 squares miles of aircraft escape area, and barrage 100 aim points at sea," they would have enough throw weight available to still keep half in reserve. In other words, first-strike capability with plenty left over.

The Ronald Reagan Column -- 4

Another threat to our military forces and our cities is posed by the Soviets' new supersonic bomber. They don't want this counted in the USSR weapons total. The U.S. negotiators seem willing to go along with this idea, despite the dangers. There may be a quid pro quo in the works, but virtually nothing is being said publicly.

Though the Vladivostok proposal calls for limiting the number of strategic weapons, it doesn't prevent them from being fitted with multiple warheads (MIRVs). This makes it all the more essential that we negotiate an agreement which provides for accurate MIRV verification and, at the same time, calls for equality of throw weight.

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