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## THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

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## MEMORANDUM

TO:

President Ford

DATE: June 27, 1975

FROM:

J. W. Fulbright

SUBJECT: The Middle East - An American Policy

In his speech at Atlanta on June 24, Secretary Kissinger pointed to the range of vital American interests in the Middle East -- the security of Israel, access to Arab oil, the strain on the Western alliance posed by each successive crisis, the threat to the world economy of a new oil crisis, and the chronic danger of confrontation with the Soviet Union. The Secretary emphasized that the United States "must do its utmost to protect all its interests in the Middle East."

Having recently returned from an extended tour of the Middle East, I take the liberty of conveying to you my strong sense of both the import and urgency of the Secretary's observations. Time is working against us, and against our interests. The status quo is not benign. It is not allowing tensions to abate; on the contrary, it fosters a steady and accelerating slide toward war. The Secretary was, if anything, understating the matter when he said at Atlanta that "We are now at a point where there must be a turn either toward peace or toward new crises." Virtually every Arab leader I met on my trip expressed not just apprehension but certainty that if significant progress toward a settlement does not come soon, war will follow within a year or so, and with it a new oil embarg

The principal Arab countries -- including Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia -- are all at present led by moderate and responsible men. These leaders are united in a consensus for making peace with Israel on the basis of the 1967 borders. All of them say so, explicitly and without qualification, and Mr. Arafat says so too, guardedly and by indirection, but to my ear, unmistakably. The emergence of this consensus for the acceptance of Israel is the most important and promising development in the Arab world since the 1967 war. It has created what Arab leaders describe as a "golden opportunity" for peace.

Emphatic as they are in pointing to this "golden opportunity," Arab leaders are no less emphatic that if not seized upon now, the opportunity will soon be lost, perhaps irretrievably. As in our own politics, no approach to a problem -- especially a risky and controversial one -- can be pressed indefinitely if it does not bring results. The continued occupation of Arab lands is a threat not only to moderation but to the moderate leaders themselves. Mr. Arafat hints that he could be more forthcoming if he had something to show for it, and also warns that if he does not succeed he will be replaced by extremists. One also hears -- with disturbing frequency -- warnings that President Sadat himself may be in trouble if he does not soon achieve some progress toward peace.

American interests. The Arab-Israel conflict and the oil problem are not only related but inseparable. Israel is largely a creation of the conscience of the West, particularly that of the United States; for that reason alone, her survival qualifies as an American national interest. At the same time we have a most vital interest in access to Arab oil -- all the more as the Gulf states account for a steadily rising portion of our imports and Congress shows little inclination to cooperate with you in meaningful energy-conservation. The problem of statecraft is to reconcile these interests, surely not to allow ourselves to drift, or be maneuvered, into a position in which one must be sacrificed to the other. The only way to reconcile these interests is by bringing the Arab states and Israel to a settlement.

The stakes are high, either for disaster, or as is not always sufficiently recognized, for great good. If there is another war, it may well bring a confrontation with the Soviet Union, and it will surely bring an embargo, which in turn could precipitate the disintegration of our alliances with Europe and Japan.

On the other hand, Saudi Arabia has offered the United States a degree of cooperation and assured access to its oil which arouses the envy of all other industrialized countries. The Saudis do not propose, nor would we desire, privileged or discriminatory access to their oil, but they offer us -- and it is entirely proper that we should accept --

a unique relationship based upon assured oil supply, largescale investment of oil revenues in the United States, and primary reliance upon American technology for the development of Saudi Arabia. A Saudi-American association of this kind could also serve as an economic nucleus which would be highly beneficial to the rest of the world, including the developing countries. Also of great importance is the fact that almost all of Saudi Arabia's vast oil reserves are explored and extracted by a highly efficient American company with excellent relations with the Saudi Government. It is staffed primarily by Americans, is American in its orientation, and qualifies thereby as a solid asset to the national interest.

There are two basic problems with respect to our reliance on Arab oil: supply and price. The problems of supply -- which is to say, the threat of embargo -- is wholly a function of the Arab-Israel conflict. If that is resolved, there is no further threat of embargo. The problem of price is also related to the Arab-Israel conflict. A settlement could not be expected to result in an immediate, sizable price rollback, nor would it detach Saudi Arabia from OPEC. It would, however, eliminate the only outstanding issue between the United States and Saudi Arabia -- especially if provision were made for the restoration of East Jerusalem to one form or another of Arab sovereignty. Under these circumstances, Saudi Arabia works.

almost certainly draw closer to the United States and become more amenable to our influence, making the problem of oil prices far more susceptible of reasonable accommodation.

The settlement. Except from Israel herself, there is a virtual world consensus as to the main outlines of a Middle East settlement: an Israeli withdrawal to the borders of 1967 with insubstantial variations; a Palestinian state comprising the West Bank and Gaza, either separate or in association with Jordan as the Palestinians may choose; the permanent or indefinite demilitarization of the Golan Heights, of much or all of Sinai including Sharm el-Sheikh, and of much or all of the West Bank; the stationing in the demilitarized zones of UN forces which could not be removed except with the consent of both sides; and great power guarantees of the settlement, preferably under the aegis of the United Nations Security Council, supplemented if necessary by a solid and explicit American guarantee of Israel.

A settlement along these lines has been endorsed by the principal Arab parties and also by the Soviet Union. The Arab consensus for the acceptance of Israel has been repeatedly signaled by the Arab leaders. King Khalid put it this way: "The Arabs have learned to be moderate, reasonable. Gone are the days of Nasser's period when the Arabs threatened to exterminate the Israelis." No less significant is the Soviet declaration of willingness to guarantee Israel. As Foreign Minister Gromyko

put it at a dinner in Moscow on April 23, 1975, for Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam: "Israel may get, if it so wishes, the strictest guarantees with the participation -- under an appropriate agreement -- of the Soviet Union." As noted, the Arab consensus will not survive indefinitely if it brings no rewards; nor can we count on the Soviets to renew their offer to cooperate if we do not hold them to it now.

The settlement would not need to be implemented at once.

President Sadat and other Arab leaders indicate that they

would be prepared to have it implemented over a period of years,

step-by-step -- provided it were understood that such a

settlement, and nothing less, were the agreed objective.

A settlement of the kind described would redeem and reconcile the American interests at stake, and, I feel certain, is in the best interests of Israel as well. Israel will be secure only when she gains acceptance as a normal state in the Middle East, in which event she would almost certainly become the scientific and technological leader of the region. The Arabs offer that -- or a start toward that -- now, but it is far from certain that they will continue to offer it as they gain in military and technological capacity and the balance of power swings in their favor. In that eventuality, Israel will become less secure despite the retention of "defensible borders," and will of course be thrown into steadily greater dependence upon the United States.

As matters now stand, our commitment to Israel is open ended: we are providing the material means for an Israeli policy which is beyond our control -- a policy which, by all indications, is carrying both Israel and the United States toward a major new crisis. An American guarantee of an agreed settlement, on the other hand, would clarify an ambiguous commitment, bringing it clearly within the scope of our national interest, and at the same time provide Israel with the greatest possible security under the circumstances which exist in the area. As one thoughtful observer remarked: "The only secure borders are those which are accepted by one's neighbors."





By Geoffrey Moss for The Washington Post

## James W. Symington

# Toward an American Foreign Policy

In his farewell address George Washington cautioned his countrymen to beware of foreign entanglements, The Father of his Country had been a loyal British subject, having fought on the Indian frontier with General Braddock, His Americanization, like that of his associates, occurred by degrees as his mind and spirit became al-ienated by perceived injury and attracted by a corollary sense of patriotism to the emerging colonial cause. Were he to be allowed to visit with us today he would be hard put to fathom our network of alliances, trading arrangements, military aid programs and

Rep. Symington (D-Mo.) entered these remarks in the Congressional Record on Feb 5.

the intricacles of detente. Observing our grants, sales and loans to nearly every participant in the Middle East struggle, he might conclude our foreign policy bordered on the occult.

If he were to offer advice after being afforded such an overview, it seems to me it would be simply to bear in mind America's national interest in the formulation of foreign policy, so that it might be an American foreign policy with no prefixes denoting an infusion of extra-national bias or sentiment. He would have agr ed with Senator Henry Cabot Lodge Sr., who early in this century spoke of the need to cease being Anglo-Americans, German-Americans, Italian-Americans and Irish-Americans and become just Americans. This is harder than one might think. The melting pot melts slowly and Congress quite recurately reflects the condition of its content . . .

Reflecting overwhelming but imperfeetly informed public sentiment, dominant voices in the House and Senate recently prevailed on the administration to insist on a more liberal Jewish emigration policy on the part of the Soviet Union as a condition for increased trade. I supported the effort as The only one offered to express our proper concern for another popule. "at I would have thought a more attainable and more valuable quid pro quo would have been a firm guarantee of Soviet cooperation in sceuring a stable peace for Israel and her neighbors. That would have been in the best mterest of Israel, the United States and, in fact, a whole world clinging precariously to the hem of peace. For the Soviets that would have been an external not an internal initiative, thus properly negotiable.

Diplomacy is akin to the work of a potter's kiln. Congress can break but not make its products. There were aspects of the trade arrangement which I believe were questionable. A \$10 bilhun investment in Soviet energy production capacity with the hope of getting a steady supply of it seemed to merit close scrutiny. But if its benefits could stand that test it should not have been sacrificed to any condition other than one of the first magnitude. Compared to a great-power cooperative peace effort, the emigration flow is of a lower order of magnitude.

The Cyprus question provides another example of how Congress would lay its heavy hand on the iragile pen of diplomacy... The delicate task of reconciling the two contending NATO nations chiefly interested by bonds of blood, affinity, history and geography is ours as the principal NATO partner. The administration approaches the thicket most cautiously. We enter as if the thorns will recede at the sight of us. The problem appears simple to Congress. It is merely one of first principles: The provisions of the law are broken when one NATO power uses U.S. arms, not defensively but offensively, against another or a neutral. A

Tactor? Definitely. The principal factor? Reverse the players and see. Let us assume the Turkisk enclave produced a militant force which threatened the Greek sector, and Greek troops arrived first to defend, but then to attack and occupy the Turkish sector. Would the same impulse to curtail aid to Greece until the withdrawal of those troops be manitested with such firmness on the House floor, particularly if the President asked for time and patience? Candor compels a negative response to the hypothetical. What is it then that impels the Congress to take over the negotiations on Cyprus in this instance? The law only: No, the law buttressed by sentiment which evokes a sympathetic response from every minority which I to upon its respective kindred people overseas as an engangered

species.
And rican torer in policy lections bit Gulliver, bound and immobilized by myrtad threads of prejudice, favoring a chance assortment of nations and peoples whose own first concern is by no means for America. In the rush to resolve a delicate dispute on behalf of one favored contestant, the other's rightful claims to our gratitude or respect are muted and forgotten. Turkish excesses and the agonies of the Greek Cypriot community are well ventilated. But forgotten is the response of Turkey to our needs in Korea and the bravery of her soldiers there. Forgotten is the tangible bulwark Turkey poses by history and national character to Soviet expansion; forgotten, the strategic importance of her steadfastness; muted, the impact on her people of the mass execution of her civilian kinsmen on Cyprus. No, indeed, these concepts give way to the wry humor of what is fed in Greek restaurants to Congressmen who vote "wrong," reminiscent of the jokes that flourished in the wake of the six-day war in the Middle East and which bring no smiles now.

Similar impulses unite the Black Caucus on Rhodesia and South Africa, while Caesar Chavez suggests favored treatment to millions of illegal immigrants at the expense of his fellow citizens including 8 million unemployed. Are we so homesick for the problems of others that we care not for our own? There is irony in the fact that the technology of communication, nor-really a force for cohesion, has had a centrifugal effect on our attention span, leading us emotionally back to the entanglements Washington so feared. We live in a new and permanent era of interdependence. But the day-to-day reflection of our rightful concern for the rationality of our invgivement is better left to the executive than the legislative branch. The Congress plays its proper foreign policy role when it uses its principal power those of oversight, investigation and the purse, to encourage or discourage long-term courses of action . .

If the 535-member Congress thinks its collective wisdom is all that's necessary to break the Cyprus deadlock, it engages in a presumption commensurate with its size. In the further consideration of this and other matters that come before us, we would do well to remember not only our individual origins but the origins of the nation we serve. Its majesty and power were new understandings, not for venge-

#### THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 3, 1975

## ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR:

BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM:

JAMES E. CONNOR

SUBJECT:

The Middle East - An American Policy

The attached memorandum was returned in the President's outbox with the following notation:

"I have read"

cc: Don Rumsfeld

## Attachment:

Memorandum of June 27, 1975 to the President from J. W. Fulbright on the above subject.