

**The original documents are located in Box C20, folder “Presidential Handwriting, 5/9/1975 (1)” of the Presidential Handwriting File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.**

### **Copyright Notice**

The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald Ford donated to the United States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections. Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.


THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

May 9, 1975

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: JERRY H. JONES



The attached was returned in the President's outbox with the following notation:

-- Thanks.

cc: Don Rumsfeld

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*Sen. Snowcraft*

*Thanks*

# The Truman Doctrine Fades

By C. L. Sulzberger

ANKARA—I have been coming to Turkey for 36 years and never before found American governmental relations with this stubborn country at a lower ebb. The Turks are a courteous people and officials and friends are always personally polite and hospitable. But the glow has worn off from the era of the Truman Doctrine, Turkish military participation in the Korean war, and Ankara's enthusiastic embrace of NATO.

Apart from bitter public resentment at what is deemed a United States failure to understand Turkey's viewpoint on Cyprus—the issue which touched off the new and negative mood—two subsequent developments really enraged the Turks:

(1) A Congressional arms embargo on weapons or spare parts for this country until it satisfies the House of Representatives it is making concessions on Cyprus to obtain peace; (2) a House resolution proclaiming a day of national observation of Armenian massacres sixty years ago during World War I.

The arms embargo is regarded, to use the words of Foreign Minister Caglayangil, as "a hostile move" by one ally against another. There is no comprehension of the distinction between legislative and executive policies in Washington, and Turks bluntly regard the boycott as United States blackmail designed to weaken them. Consequently they are planning countermeasures to reduce or close several key U.S. military facilities here.

Official commemoration of the Armenian tragedy is even more emotionally viewed as a direct, deliberate insult. The Turks say there can be no other interpretation of such a decision six decades after the fact, deploring an event that occurred years before the Turkish Republic was proclaimed. They link the two Congressional decisions with the influence on Congress of the Greek-American lobby.

Both developments are now being studied by many people here, including some at influential levels, against a background of faltering United States leadership and a record of recent policy disasters in Southeast and Southwest Asia. There is growing suspicion that the firm rock of American reliability has turned out to be easily eroded mud.

Caglayangil talks of "suspicion in the Turkish public about the credibility of American commitments." And General Semih Sancar, Chief of the General Staff and in some respects the most important symbol of this traditionally military society, says: "The fact that measures restricting the combat power of the Turkish armed forces have come from a friend and ally leads us to serious doubts."

Turkey is almost wholly dependent on the United States for weapons. All its aircraft are American types and it is now having to build up its stocks with F-104 Starfighters purchased from Italy, because of the United States boycott. There is not yet a sign here of an alternative arms source—as, for example, Greece has found in France, and Iran has started

to develop in the Soviet Union.

The result of this deteriorating situation is Turkish reconsideration of its bilateral military arrangements with the U.S.A., and this has an unavoidable effect on NATO. Sancar reserves Turkey's right to disengage from joint U.S. defense commitments. The most likely major installations that would be affected are the American missile and intelligence stations at Karamursel, Sinop and Diyarbekir.

Moscow has been telling Ankara that these facilities have nothing to do with NATO as such but only the continental United States. Russia inquires provocatively: Is Turkey our enemy? Leading Turks argue it would be impossible to explain to public opinion why such bases, which bring added risk to Turkey, should be continued only to protect the homeland of a dubious ally.

The Government acknowledges that the reason for NATO's creation—fear of potential Soviet aggression—still exists but argues the alliance must adjust to new conditions. Among these are a growing belief that military installations arranged on a bilateral basis with the United States may have to be discontinued, leaving only those demonstrably within the NATO framework.

This is not a happy situation but the mood of determined obstinacy insisting that American ties may soon have to be thinned out is a growing mood. And one cannot say that the bleak outlook here is balanced by any brilliant United States successes in Greece, where a vast mob recently battered the United States Embassy.

There must be something seriously wrong with the way we present ourselves these days. It just isn't good enough to tell our friends abroad "Sorry about that; it really isn't policy, you know; only what Congress forces down our throats."

## FOREIGN AFFAIRS

*How can the  
Turks explain  
why some bases  
should stay open  
only to protect  
a dubious ally?*