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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN....

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

September 16, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: WILLIAM E. TIMMONS *WET*FROM: MAX L. FRIEDERSDORF *M.F.*

SUBJECT: Congressional Trip to The Peoples Republic of China

The Congressional trip to China (August 31 to September 14, 1974) came off without major incident.

The Fulbright group was well received; kept a rigorous and carefully planned schedule, meeting with diverse groups of PRC citizens and leaders.

The delegation spent time in Peking; Ta-Chai (a model agricultural commune in central China); Chang-Sha (a large commercial center in central China near Chairman Mao's birthplace); Hang-Chou (the East Coast resort city); and Shanghai.

Several important themes came through during discussions with PRC leaders in Peking and Shanghai:

1. The PRC desires to continue efforts to normalize relations with the U.S. under your new leadership.
2. While stating the U.S. tends to overestimate Soviet military capability, the speed of USSR strategic weapons has been astonishing. The Soviet has not been saying much, but doing a lot. If the U.S. doubts this, ask yourself what the Soviet strength was 20 years ago in the Mediterranean, Middle East, Persian Gulf, Indian Ocean and the Pacific. We think the U.S. should maintain vigilance against the Polar Bear.
3. We are more at ease with the U.S. than the Soviet Union "for the foreseeable future."
4. Since World War II, U.S. has been well fed. The body of the U.S. has been well-maintained; there is much fat within the body of the U.S. Every advance of the Soviet strips a layer of fat off the U.S.
5. Soviet intentions are primarily directed toward Western Europe and the U.S., rather than China as Soviets pretend.

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By , NARA, Box 113102



6. The one million Soviet troops stationed along the Sino-Soviet border are not sufficient for a Soviet invasion of China. They would need two million troops to invade China and they can't spare them from Europe until they have control there.
7. Deep tunnels are being dug in rural and urban centers for civil defense against any Soviet nuclear attack. (An underground Chinese Great Wall.)
8. No diplomatic recognition with the U.S. is possible until resolution of the Taiwan Question. (The Chinese desire U.S. cutting of ties with Taiwan, of course.)
9. Chinese leaders do not believe in "detente" or a "generation of peace." They say they have had too much experience with wars. Wars have not stopped since World War II. Recently there has been war in the Middle East and Cyprus.
10. They do not expect nuclear war, however, because "the people won't permit it." They do expect more conventional conflicts.
11. Criticism of the Soviets was frequent and vitriolic. The Soviets are bullying people too much, and the young people of China are full of anger toward the Soviet imperialist revisionists, we were told.
12. Whether the Soviets come by land, sea, or air, they will find China not easy to deal with. China has vast territory and great population, and we are ready at all times to take up weapons, the leaders boast.
13. Great disdain for the U.N. was expressed to repeated questions by Fulbright. "The U.N. is good for speeches, but what wars did the U.N. ever stop?" the Chinese responded to the Senator.
14. Arguments and questions between nations are inevitable. But China will not speak foul words against countries truly friendly to China; we hope the U.S. will criticize us when we are wrong.
15. Their attitude toward trade is one of "self reliance" but they want help in technology. They pointedly stated that their "self reliance" had enabled China to maintain stable prices, currency and financial balance.
16. All nations should withdraw all troops on foreign soil, however, Russia won't withdraw from Eastern Europe. So, as a practical matter, U.S. presence in Europe is a stabilizing force.
17. Chinese participation in the Vietnam War was characterized as restrained. They stated the "affairs of Vietnam will be settled by Vietnam."
18. The Chinese leaders recalled several times your visit to China and they feel a continuity of U.S. policy toward them.



19. Younger leaders in China have same attitude of friendliness toward the U.S. and will continue this policy after Mao and Chou are gone.

These expressions were voiced by Vice Premier Teng (reportedly one of two Vice Premiers running the country in Chou's absence), and Chaiao Kuan-hua, top ranking Vice Minister in the Foreign Ministry during three extended interviews in Peking.

The only minor flap of the trip occurred early during our stay in Peking when Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping announced the delegation would be unable to meet with Premier Chou En-lai because he was hospitalized and his condition had worsened.

This got in the press, several delegation members received calls from the United States, and the Chinese within several days announced to another foreign group that Chou was improved. I suspect the earlier medical report was given us to spare the delegation's feelings about not meeting Chou.

Senator Humphrey proved to be the most effective representative of our group. He was forceful in presenting American foreign policy.

Representative Frelinghuysen was also effective in our briefing sessions.

Chairman Fulbright handled his role as delegation leader in exemplary fashion, but his tone was apologetic and somewhat deprecating toward American views and actions during meetings with Chinese leaders.

We received word of your pardon of former President Nixon by short-wave radio via a Phillipine Voice of American relay deep in rural, central China.

Senator Humphrey's reaction was immediate and positive, as was Senator Fulbright. Only Representative Jordan (D-Tex), a Member of the Judiciary Committee, was critical.

It became apparent during the trip that you have a strong foreign policy and national security supporter in Senator Humphrey. I would recommend that you and Dr. Kissinger encourage the Senator.

I think the delegation represented yourself, Congress and the American people in a manner conducive to better relations with the PRC.

Richard Solomon, of the NSC, who has made five trips to China, and accompanied the Magnuson group last year, acted as our interpreter. He expressed the belief that the impact of this group (Fulbright) was much improved over a year ago when there were serious problems.

In general, I believe the Fulbright group was much impressed by many of the PRC achievements, particularly in agriculture. However,

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the delegation's reaction to pronouncements by Chinese leaders ranged from doubtful to skeptical and highly critical.

There was a general feeling among our group that the trip was another step in the long road to normal bi-lateral relations with the Chinese.



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