



OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE: January 11, 1974

TIME: 3:00 p.m.

PLACE: OEOB Office

SUBJECT: Courtesy Call, Australian Deputy Prime Minister

PARTICIPANTS:

The Vice President
Maj Gen Dunn *DMC*

Lance Barnard, Deputy Prime Minister and
Defense Minister
Sir James Plimsoll, Australian Ambassador to the
United States
Sir Arthur Tange, Australian Secretary of Defense
Ambassador Marshall Green, Ambassador to Australia

After an exchange of pleasantries, the Prime Minister extended to the Vice President a most cordial invitation to visit Australia. A discussion of the differences between Congressional and Parliamentary procedures ensued.

The Prime Minister, with some feeling, emphasized his gratitude that the members of the Australian Parliament did not face elections as frequently as do the members of the House of Representatives.

The Prime Minister indicated that the talks on United States' bases in Australia had gone very well. Both the Prime Minister and he could be counted upon to defend their existence strongly. Both were well aware of the contribution of these bases to the

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E.O. 13526 () SEC 3.3
NSC Memo, 5/20/74, Other Dept. Guidelines
By *JA* NASA Date *4/17/11*



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stability of the area and accept their responsibility as leaders to bring those in Parliament, now opposing them, to a more reasonable position. The opponents are very much in the minority, in any event. (Although they are quite vocal.) Unrest among the Australian youth has largely disappeared, as seems to be the case in this country. He has been very much impressed by what he has seen and heard during his visit here and is most grateful for the opportunity to talk with so many leaders in the United States. He prizes good relations between our two countries very highly and is deeply aware of the importance of the ANZUS Treaty. Australians are very grateful and will always remember the contribution of the United States to Australia's security during World War II. Global problems of deep mutual concern remain. While the energy crisis has less impact on Australia than on many other nations, they are deeply concerned with its effect on Japan -- a very important trading partner -- and also on several developing countries in the Pacific.

The Prime Minister reiterated his appreciation for the many courtesies shown to him here, and the meeting concluded with a further exchange of pleasantries.

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 035852

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇBriefing Paper

TITLE US Defense Installations in Australia

CREATION DATE 01/1974

VOLUME 2 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 002301008

COLLECTION TITLE GERALD R. FORD VICE PRESIDENTIAL PAPERS

BOX NUMBER 65

FOLDER TITLE January 11, 1974 - Australian Deputy
Prime Minister Lance Barnard

DATE WITHDRAWN 11/18/2011

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST WHM

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REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇBiography

DESCRIPTION Concerning Australian official

CREATION DATE 01/1974

VOLUME 5 pages

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING PAPER

CONFIDENTIAL

Australian-American Political/Security Relationships
General Issues

Background:

Deterioration in Australian-American political and security relationships has been threatened by: (a) sharp policy shifts by the new Australian Labor Government, and (b) a Labor tendency to disregard the importance of SEATO and other regional security arrangements in arriving at a durable peace in Southeast Asia, as well as a broader detente throughout Asia; (c) a propensity to disregard the importance of military strength in "detente diplomacy"; (d) overly enthusiastic and premature endorsements of idealistic neutralist concepts in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean; (e) undue haste in establishing diplomatic relationships with North Viet-Nam; and (f) the ill-tempered and abusive public statements of some of the Labor Government's leftist ministers on our Indochina policies and operations.

Counterbalancing these trends, Prime Minister Whitlam has defended the importance of the "American Alliance," ANZUS, and US defense installations against leftist elements within his own party and Government. Further, he is strengthening Australia's always responsible role in Southeast Asian development. Australia's ties with Indonesia are closer than ever and supportive of our own objectives vis-a-vis the latter country. Australia continues to welcome US investment and trade. The Labor Government also cooperated closely with us in global trade and monetary affairs, has been particularly supportive of our efforts to encourage Japan to play a positive role in Asian development, and to find solutions to the perennial Korean problem. In general, basic Australian and American long-term objectives in Asia and the Pacific continue to coincide; differences that exist relate mainly to style and approach to problems in the area.

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WMM 10/24/00



Many of the problems we now have with the Labor Government are probably temporary and flow in some measure from that Government's inexperience. Whitlam and his Labor Government are gradually adjusting to the realities in international relations, and to the need for reciprocity in an alliance such as that which has developed over the years between Australia and the United States. Too, we should remember that many of Whitlam's less desirable initiatives flow from his need to contain the extreme left elements of his party and Government. Such actions often are designed to forestall more drastic measures which could threaten basic mutual interests, or core interests of the US, e.g., SEATO, and US defense installations in Australia.

US Position:

The US continues to attach great importance to the close relationships which have been traditional between our two countries and governments of whatever political persuasion. The reasons are multifold: healthy investment and trade relationships of importance to both Australia and the US; common traditions and values which lead to a commonality of interests and goals; the strategic location of Australia and the essential character of US defense installations on that continent; Australia's traditional and significant contributions to Southeast Asian security, stability, and development; and the value of the broad-based historical cooperation between our two countries over a wide-range of other regional as well as global issues and problems. We hope this relationship will continue, although we also recognize that Australia, given its expanding political and economic strength, and its own interests and concerns in the Southeast Asian region, may at times differ with us on the specifics of policy and courses of action. We hope that, when such differences exist, each Government will take into adequate consideration the concerns and interests of the other, and will exercise restraint in areas of real or potential conflict.

Talking Points:

We recommend that you initiate a discussion of bilateral, regional, and global issues. You might:



-- Note that, although the US and Australia may differ from time to time on specific issues, it is important that we keep in close and intimate touch, at all levels of government, in order to have a full understanding and appreciation of our respective viewpoints and concerns.

-- Comment that perhaps there has been a tendency in the past to regard the bonds joining Australia and America as being primarily in the defense field. This is a misconception. Our defense ties are important, and are related to global efforts to bring about a more secure world, detente, and arms limitations. But, mutual defense is only one part of our broad relationship. We enjoy a common heritage of language, of democracy, and of common law. Our professionals and our experts work continuously together in such areas as technology, urban planning, and the new challenges of environment and space. Our trade and investment patterns are important to both of us. We are interdependent economically and share a common cultural tradition, and common values which lead to shared interests and goals in the region and in the world.

-- State that, as long as we are clear about our shared basic objectives and common values, there is no reason why long-standing allies and friends need to have identical viewpoints and approaches on every international issue. We understand and appreciate that Australian and US perceptions of issues and problems may sometimes differ. But, if we are to retain intact our basic close relationship, we should each exercise restraint in pursuing courses which involve major conflicts of interest or policy.



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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING PAPER

CONFIDENTIAL

Profile of the Australian Labor Government

Background and Internal Political Situation

Australia has undergone a fundamental reorientation of both its internal and external policies since the election to office of Prime Minister Whitlam and his Labor Party in December of 1972 (the first Labor government in 23 years.) Whitlam's electoral victory was in part public reaction to the tired, often ineffectual, and always unimaginative former conservative government. But it was also very much a consequence of Australia's political and economic coming of age -- a new sense of national identity and maturity, coupled with an emergent feeling that Australia for too long had been tied to the apron strings first of Britain, and then the United States. Labor was generally seen by the Australian public as being more accurately reflective of these national trends and moods.

The new Labor Government, with the real handicap of having no leaders who had previously held national office, is still finding its way, and from time to time runs afoul of issues and obstacles that might have been avoided with more experience. The Australian Labor Party itself remains divided internally, with strong leftist influences extending into the Cabinet. The more moderate Whitlam's control of his own government is hampered by the fact that his ministers are chosen by parliamentary caucus, and often feel free to speak out in contradiction to government policy. Unfortunate and intemperate remarks by several leftist ministers have been a consequence of this general situation -- one largely beyond Whitlam's control. And Whitlam himself has shown a tendency to make ill-considered remarks from time to time. To Whitlam's advantage, the conservative opposition is even more divided, and is without a leadership that has attracted popular support.

An important test of Whitlam's leadership, and of his policies of importance to us, was the mid-1973 Labor Party conference where, with considerable skill, he outmaneuvered the left of his Party and forestalled policy decisions (which would have been binding on the Labor Government) that could have threatened US concerns with respect to SEATO, the Five Power Defense Arrangement, US defense installations in Australia, and even ANZUS.

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Whitlam 10/24/00



Foreign Affairs

In foreign policy, the Whitlam Government has tended to be moralistic and activist, although somewhat doctrinaire. In its first months in office, his government reversed the positions of previous Australian Governments by: endorsing proposals for neutralization of the Indian Ocean and South-east Asia; recognizing East Germany, the PRC, and North Vietnam; initiating steps for the withdrawal of Australian forces in Indochina; and taking major exception to our policies there.

On the other hand, Whitlam has publicly and lavishly praised the Nixon Doctrine, the President's efforts toward detente with the PRC and the Soviet Union, and his role in seeking an end to the Indochina war. Whitlam has also been emphatic in saying that differences over Vietnam have no relation to his Government's view of ANZUS, which remains for him the legal embodiment of common interests of the people of Australia, New Zealand, and the US, and thus beyond changes of administration in Washington, Wellington, or Canberra. He has also said that a successful foreign policy must balance commitments and capabilities. On this premise, he has listed as foremost among his Government's commitments the achievement of closer relations with Indonesia and the promotion of peace and prosperity in Southeast Asia.

He is deeply opposed to anything resembling containment or confrontation, and has no enthusiasm for the Five Power Defense Arrangements in support of Malaysia and Singapore, or for SEATO. However, he recognizes and accepts the importance to others of these commitments, and has stated that Australia will honor them and consult with the US and others with respect to how and when they might be modified, abandoned, or replaced without danger or disorder. He says "regional cooperation will be one of the keystones of Australia's foreign policy for the '70s. We shall be charting a new course with less emphasis on military pacts."

With all of its emphasis on regionalism, the new Australian Government has not lost sight of, or enthusiasm for, its relations with the US. The importance of our defense installations in Australia is accepted and defended by Whitlam, and the "American alliance" remains the cornerstone of Australia's defense and foreign policies. When they offer criticism, they do so (in their view) as a privileged old friend and ally -- from "within the family." In any future crisis, it is highly probable that the Australians would work responsibly with us as they unfailingly have in the past.





DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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January 7, 1974

CONFIDENTIALMEMORANDUM FOR MAJOR GENERAL JOHN M. DUNN
OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

Subject: Meeting with Australian Deputy Prime
Minister and Defense Minister Lance
Barnard: Friday, January 11th, 2:30 p.m.

The Vice President has agreed to see Australian
Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Lance Barnard
on Friday, January 11th, at 2:30 p.m.

Attached are briefing notes for the Vice President's
use, including a profile of Defense Minister Barnard,
a profile of the Australian Labor Government, and a
discussion of Australian-US political/security issues.

Barnard will be accompanied by the Australian
Ambassador here, Sir James Plimsoll, and Sir Arthur
Tange. Our Ambassador to Australia, Marshall Green,
will also attend.

Thomas R. Pickering
Thomas R. Pickering
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Notes for the Vice President

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WMM 10/24/00





DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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WHM 10/24/00



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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING PAPER

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NOTES FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Meeting with Australian Deputy Prime
Minister and Defense Minister Lance
Barnard: Friday, January 11, 2:30 p.m.

Lance Barnard is the number two man in an Australian Labor Government that came to office in late 1972, after twenty-three years in opposition. Under the leadership of Prime Minister Gough Whitlam, the Labor Government has taken a much more independent stance toward the US, abruptly ending Australian participation in Vietnam, recognizing the People's Republic of China, and strengthening ties with the third world. The Labor Government has, however, strongly reaffirmed its intent to maintain its security ties with the US under the ANZUS Pact. A briefing paper, "Profile of the Australian Labor Government," is attached.

From time to time, however, PM Whitlam and others of his ministers have made intemperate statements sharply critical of US policies in Southeast Asia. Barnard, however, has been most circumspect in this regard. He represents a friendly, stabilizing force in a Government still plagued by a degree of irresponsibility which is the probable result of a very long period out of power. In point of fact, Barnard is probably the best friend we have in the current Labor Government, and appropriate treatment of him could reinforce his will to help fight our battles in Canberra. Beyond this, Barnard is an intelligent, open-minded man who is quite serious about having our point of view on the many issues which concern our two governments at this time. Biographic information on Barnard is attached. We believe that Barnard's visit provides a singularly important opportunity to reverse present negative trends in our relations with Australia, trends which could do serious damage to our interests in that country.

Barnard comes to the US specifically to work out new understandings under which we operate a major naval communications station at North West Cape, in Australia. (A briefing paper on this, "US Defense Installations in Australia", is attached.) It is also his first visit to Washington since he assumed his present position, in 1972.

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WtM 10/24/00



Barnard's Objectives:

For domestic political reasons, Barnard will want to show that he and the Labor Government still retain close working relationships with the US, despite a somewhat more independent policy stance. He will be interested in seeing you in order to demonstrate the on-going nature of these relationships. Since he is Deputy Prime Minister, your seeing him will demonstrate for the Australian public that the US accepts Australia as an equal. We do not expect that he will raise any substantive foreign affairs issues with you.

US Objectives:

The primary US objective will be to resolve certain aspects of the North West Cape issue (already far advanced during preliminary consultations at the working level) and thus improve the prospect for US installations in Australia not becoming a major issue in Australian politics. We will also want to reaffirm with Barnard the fact that we strongly value our close ties with Australia. It would consequently be helpful to:

-- stress that we continue to attach great importance to our bilateral ties and to the ANZUS relationship;

-- acknowledge that the US does not expect Australia, or any other close ally, to maintain policies identical to ours on all issues;

-- state that we hope that if there should be sharp differences of opinion, these can be aired privately, and not be allowed to create the kind of public debate in either country that could erode our traditionally close relationship.

Attachments:

1. Profile of the Australian Labor Government
2. Profile of Lance Barnard
3. Australian-American Political/Security Issues
4. US Defense Installations in Australia



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING PAPER

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CONFIDENTIAL

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WITHDRAWAL ID 035854

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇBriefing Paper

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CREATION DATE 01/1974
VOLUME 2 pages

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DESCRIPTION Concerning Australian official

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VOLUME 5 pages

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W H M 1624/00



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