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#### THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 22, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: JAY FRENCH

FROM:

BARRY ROTH

The decision that Phil Buchen was referring to was in the consolidated cases of Apton, et al. v. Wilson, et al. and <u>Kuhn, et al. v. Wilson, et al.</u> These cases in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia are civil actions stemming from the May Day demonstrations. Phil Buchen was served with a subpoena <u>duces tecum</u> for various tapes and documents of the Nixon Administration which Justice sought to quash, primarily on the basis of a lack of relevancy and burdensome nature. Justice was joined by attorneys for former President Nixon who raised the presumptive privilege referred to by the Supreme Court in <u>U. S. v. Nixon</u>.

Judge Pratt, ruling orally from the bench, held that the materials in question were neither relevant to the main portions of the plaintiffs' case, nor had the plaintiffs met the heavy burden required of them to overcome the presumption of privilege. More importantly, Judge Pratt took issue with Judge Richey's ruling (now stayed) in <u>Nixon v. Sampson, et al.</u>, in holding that a former President can maintain this privilege after leaving office. Finally, Judge Pratt held that the discovery requested was overly burdensome for the government. While plaintiffs have indicated a desire to have Judge Pratt certify this question for interlocutory appeal, Justice feels that he is not likely to grant such a request. As the question of privilege is not the sole grounds for Judge Pratt's decision, there is no controlling question of law that would justify such an appeal.

The government and Nixon today filed a proposed order that would implement Judge Pratt's oral ruling. It is expected that Judge Pratt will issue an order encompassing whatever written opinion he intends to make no earlier than next Tuesday.

The significance of this decision is, of course, that this is the first time it has been held that a former President can claim executive privilege after leaving office.

cc: Rod Hills Bill Casselman

# THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

March 25, 1975

Phil:

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I believe that the attached transcript will be of interest to your

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	ľ	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT		
	2	FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA		
 	3	ROGER S. KUHN,		
	4	Plaintiff, )		
	5	v. ) Civil Action No. 956-71		
	6	JERRY V. WILSON, et al,		
	7	Defendants.) and		
	9	WILLIAM H. APTON,		
	10	Plaintiff, ) v. ) Civil Action No. 798-72		
	11	JERRY V. WILSON, et al,		
	12	Defendants. )		
•	13	Washington, D.C.		
	14	Thursday, March 20, 1975		
	15	The above-entitled matter came on for motion to		
i <sup>.</sup>	16	quash in open court before THE HONORABLE JOHN H. PRATT,		
	17	United States District Judge, commencing at 9:30 a.m.		
· · · ·	18	APPEARANCES:		
	19 20	ELLIOTT C. LICHTMAN, ESQ., appearing on behalf of the plaintiffs.		
	21	DENNIS G. LINDER, ESQ., appearing on behalf of the federal defendants.		
	22	RAYMOND G. LARROCA, ESQ., appearing on behalf of Richard M. Nixon.		
	23	RICHARD L. MATTSON		
	24	Official Court Reporter Room 6800, U. S. Court House		
	25.	Washington, D.C. 20001		
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(Whereupon, after hearing oral argument, the
Court rendered the following oral opinion:)

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THE COURT: Well, we are going to grant the motions to quash the subpoena, and we would do so on the following grounds:

First, we would hold, despite what Judge Richey has held in his consolidated civil cases, the presidential privilege of confidentiality, which is a part of executive privilege, continues after the incumbent has left office, and can properly be asserted, and has been asserted in this case.

Second, that the presidential privilege of
confidentiality which was recognized in U.S. v. Nixon is
qualified and does not operate where there is a demonstrated
showing of a particularized need in a criminal case. We
don't have a situation such as that here.

18 Third, entirely aside and a part from the question 19 of the existence of such a privilege, and who may assert 20 it, particularly a past president, it seems to me that 21 very definitely the information that is requested in these 22 subpoenas does not go to the heart of the plaintiffs' case; that it is of peripheral relevance at best. The motivations  $\mathbf{23}$ that are challenged in this particular case are motivations 24 25 of certain defendants who have been deposed, and while there

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1 might be some justification for release of this information 2 if Mr. Nixon himself was a defendant, he is not even a 3 defendant in these cases.

And, furthermore, the defendant has made a
demonstration that to obtain this information of very
dubious relevance would impose on the Government a very
oppresive and burdensome task.

8 I would distinguish Carey v. Hume, where Brit
9 Hume was the sole repository of certain information.

And even applying a balancing test of Branzburg
v. Hayes, or of Carey v. Hume, it seems to me the plaintiffs,
who have a very heavy burden in this case, haven't reached
that burden.

For all of the foregoing reasons, as I indicated before, I will grant the motion to quash and suggest, Mr. Linder, that you and Mr. Larroca get together on a formal order and you can send a copy to Mr. Lichtman.

### CERTIFICATE

I, RICHARD L. MATTSON, Official Court Reporter, do hereby certify that the foregoing transcript is a complete and accurate transcript of the proceedings. For contained therein.

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
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WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Cy for you





## UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

March 27, 1975

Address Reply to the Division Indicated and Refer to Initials and Number

> DGL:dav 145-12-1552 145-12-1721

> > Philip W. Buchen, Esquire Counsel to the President The White House 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, D. C. 20500

> > > Re: Roger Kuhn, et al. v. Wilson, et al., (USDC D.C.) Civil Action No. 956-71 William Apton, et al. v. Wilson, et al. (USDC D.C.) Civil Action No. 798-72

Dear Mr. Buchen:

As we informed you last week, Judge Pratt on March 20, 1975 orally granted the Motions to Quash filed in response to the subpoena served upon you by plaintiffs in these actions.

Enclosed for your information is a copy of the formal Orders entered by the District Court on March 26, 1975, granting the Motions to Quash and denying the plaintiffs' motion to certify the privilege issue to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).

Yours very truly,

Dennis G. Linder

Attorney Office of Special Litigation Counsel Civil Division

Enclosure





Telephone: (202) 739-3487 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

#### FOR THE

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

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WILLIAM H. APTON, et al., )	11-0. D.S.
Plaintiffs, )	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
y and a V	CIVIL ACTION NO.
JERRY V. WILSON, et al.,	798-72
Defendants. )	FILED
RUGER S. KUHN, et al.,	MAR 2 6 1975
Plaintiffs,	JAMES F. DAVEY, CLERK
pidinti. v.	CIVIL ACTION NO.
JERRY V. WILSON, et al.,	956-71
) Defendants. )	
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ORDER

LAF CLORATERA WA

This matter is before the Court on the Motion to Quash or, in the Alternative, For a Protective Order filed by Philip W. Buchen, Counsel to President Gerald R. Ford, and the Motion to Quash and Formal Claim of Presidential Privilege filed by former President Richard M. Nixon, in response to the plaintiffs' subpoena <u>duces tecum</u> served upon Philip W. Buchen on February 11, 1975. The Court, having heard oral argument on March 20, 1975, and having considered the Motions, Opposition, and Points and Authorities of the parties, and being fully advised in the premises, finds as follows:

1. The Presidential Privilege of Confidentiality, which is a part of the executive privilege, continues after a President has left office, can be properly asserted by such a former President, and has been so asserted by former President Nixon in this action.

2. The Presidential Privilege of Confidentiality recognized in <u>United States v. Nixon</u>, <u>U.S.</u>, 93 Sup. Ct. 3090 (1974) is a qualified privilege which may be overcome by a demonstrated showing of a particularized need in a criminal case. This situation does not exist in the

instant case, which is civil in nature. Intrody segments and grant from the grande and fait in (1) and (2) above 3., the information requested by the plaintiffs'

subpoena <u>duces tecum</u> does not go to the heart of the plaintiffs' case, and is of peripheral relevance at best. The motivations challenged in these actions are motivations of the federal defendants, who have been deposed by plaintiffs. Furthermore Philip W. Buchen, Counsel to President Gerald R. Ford, has demonstrated that to obtain this information of very dubious relevance would impose on the Government a very oppressive and burdensome task.

The Court distinguishes <u>Carey</u> v. <u>Hume</u>, 492 F.2d 631 (CADC 1974), where Britt Hume, a party to the action, was the sole repository of certain information. Further, even applying a balancing test as in <u>Branzburg</u> v. <u>Hayes</u>, 408 U.S. 665, 710 (1972) or of <u>Carey</u> v. <u>Hume</u>, <u>supra</u>, it appears to the Court that plaintiffs, who have a very heavy burden in this case, have not carried that burden.

Therefore, for the above-stated reasons, it is this day of March, 1975, hereby

ORDERED, that the Motion of Richard M. Nixon to Quash Subpoena Duces Tecum be and the same is hereby granted, and it is further

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ORDERED, that the Motion to Quash or in the Alternative for a Protective Order of Philip W. Buchen be and the same is hereby granted, and it is further

ORDERED, that the subpoena <u>duces tecum</u> dated February 11, 1975, for the testimony of Philip W. Buchen and for the production of tapes, recordings, transcripts, and documents relating to certain conversations of former President Richard M. Nixon during his tenure in office be and the same is hereby quashed.

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UNITED JUDGE

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

WILLIAM H. APTON et al.,

Plaintiffs,

JERRY V. WILSON et al.,

Defendants.

Civil Action No. 798-72

ROGER S. KUHN et al.,

Plaintiffs,

FILED

JAMES F. DAVEY, CLERK

MAR 26 1975

Civil Action No. 956-71

JERRY V. WILSON et al.,

v.

Defendants.

# ORDER

Upon consideration of the motion of plaintiffs to certify to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit the privilege issue raised in the matter of the subpoena of the tape recordings of certain Presidential conversations, which matter was ruled upon in this Court's Order of March 26, 1975, and noting that the Court's order in granting the motion to quash was also based on the independent ground that the information sought was of dubious relevance at best and would impose a very oppressive and burdensome task on the Government, it is by the Court this 26th day of March, 1975,

ORDERED, that said motion be and is hereby denied for the reason that an appeal will not "materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation . . . " 28 U.S.C. §1292(b).

John н.

Junited States District Judge