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# U.S. Puts Off Sale Of Missiles to Jordan

Associated Press

Faced with congressional opposition, the Ford administration has deferred its proposed sale of 14 Hawk missile batteries to Jordan.

A number of legislators have criticized the proposed sale saying the number of batteries is excessive and would tip the balance of power in the Middle East.

numbers of missiles proposed.

THE FORMAL withdrawal came in a letter from Robert S. Ingersoll, acting secretary of state, who said the administration is prepared to extend the legal 20-day period as many as three times by withdrawing and then

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

June 20, 1975

*Barfield*

MEMORANDUM FOR: BRENT SCOWCROFT  
FROM: PHILIP BUCHEN *P.W.B.*

Attached are the following:

1. A letter to the President dated June 19, 1975, from Chairman Morgan of the House Committee on International Relations.
2. A copy of H. Res. 552 referred to in the letter.
3. Statement made by Representative Rosenthal before the House on June 18, 1975.

The deadline for the President to report his comments is Wednesday, June 25, 1975.

Attachments

cc: John Marsh (with enclosures)





THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Date 6-19-75

TO: Ph. 1 Buchen

FROM: VERN C. LOEN VL

Please Handle \_\_\_\_\_

For Your Information \_\_\_\_\_

Per Our Conversation ✓ 

Other: *Deadline for response  
next Wednesday, but  
sooner if possible. Ctr  
to President follows.*

THOMAS E. MORGAN, PA., CHAIRMAN

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# Congress of the United States

## Committee on International Relations

House of Representatives

Washington, D.C. 20515

June 19, 1975

MARIAN A. CZARNECKI  
CHIEF OF STAFF

The Honorable Gerald R. Ford  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500


Dear Mr. President:

I am writing to request your comments on a resolution of inquiry which was introduced in the House on June 18, 1975, and referred to the Committee on International Relations.

Enclosed are two copies of the Resolution, H. Res. 552, requesting the President to provide to the House of Representatives certain information relating to the sale of Hawk and Redeye missiles to Jordan.

As you know, the Committee must act on this resolution within seven (7) legislative days beginning today. We will appreciate receiving your comments as soon as possible, but no later than June 25, 1975.

Sincerely,



Chairman

TEM:rbj

Enclosures

cc: Honorable Henry A. Kissinger  
Secretary of State  
Department of State

Honorable James R. Schlesinger  
Secretary of Defense  
Department of Defense



94TH CONGRESS  
1ST SESSION

# H. RES. 552

## IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JUNE 18, 1975

Mr. ROSENTHAL submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on International Relations

## RESOLUTION

- 1     *Resolved*, That the President is requested to provide, not
- 2     later than ten days after the adoption of this resolution, to
- 3     the House of Representatives, the following information:
- 4         (1) How and when the sale to Jordan of the Hawk
- 5     missile system was initiated, including the date, nature, and
- 6     substance of the first approach of the Government of Jordan
- 7     to any agency of the United States.
- 8         (2) What military equipment, if any, in addition to
- 9     the Hawk missile system was sought by Jordan at or about
- 10    the time of this approach.
- 11         (3) Whether and when the request was referred to the
- 12    office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International



1 Security Affairs, and any recorded conclusions made by that  
2 office with respect to the significance, potential impact, and  
3 purpose of the proposed sale.

4 (4) Whether and when the request was referred to the  
5 Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs of the Department of  
6 State, and any recorded conclusions made by the Bureau  
7 with respect to the potential impact of the requested sale  
8 upon United States foreign policy in general, and with re-  
9 spect to the Middle East, in particular, including the potential  
10 impact of the requested sale on the balance of power in the  
11 Middle East, relations with Israel, the defense of Israel and  
12 Israeli-administered territory, relations between Jordan and  
13 the other Arab States, relations between Jordan and the  
14 Soviet Union, relations between Jordan and the Palestinians,  
15 the political stability of Jordan, including the maintenance in  
16 power of the Hussein regime, and the economic conditions in  
17 Jordan.

18 (5) Whether and when the request was referred to the  
19 systems project manager of a military service, and any re-  
20 corded conclusions of that manager with respect to the sale,  
21 including conclusions as to price, delivery date, and private  
22 industry production needs, together with any record of the  
23 factors and considerations that manager brought to bear in  
24 making those conclusions.

25 (6) Whether and when a price and advisability state-

1 ment was prepared by the systems project manager with  
2 respect to the requested sale, and the contents of that  
3 statement.

4 (7) Whether the statement referred to in paragraph  
5 (6) was presented to the Government of Jordan, and any  
6 reactions of that Government to the statement.

7 (8) The identity of any other person or persons in  
8 the executive branch, including the President, the Secre-  
9 taries of State and Defense, and any member or members  
10 of the Interagency Security Assistance Program Review  
11 Committee, who evaluated the request, when each such  
12 evaluation was made, and any recorded conclusions of each  
13 evaluating person as to the potential impact of the requested  
14 sale on the balance of power in the Middle East, relations  
15 with Israel, the defense of Israel and Israeli-administered  
16 territory, relations between Jordan and the Arab States,  
17 relations between Jordan and the Soviet Union, relations  
18 between Jordan and the Palestinians, the political stability  
19 of Jordan, including the maintenance in power of the Hussein  
20 regime, and the economic conditions in Jordan.

21 (9) The contents of any letter of offer prepared with  
22 respect to the requested sale, and whether such a letter of  
23 offer was presented to the Government of Jordan, together  
24 with any reactions of that Government to any such letter so  
25 presented.



(10) The details of any financing arrangements made by Jordan for such sale, including sources of funds, cash, and credit terms, and any other explicit or implicit conditions of financing.

(11) At what point, if any, the sale is to be referred to the Congress pursuant to the provisions of the Foreign Military Sales Act, as amended.

(12) The detailed substance of the communication (and its date) of the favorable disposition of the Government of the United States toward the requested sale, and whether any conditions were placed by the United States on the making public of the fact or substance of such communication.

(13) The date and substance of the first announcement by the United States Government of the sale, and the recorded conclusions, if any, of the executive branch as to the effect of such announcement on United States relations with Israel and Jordanian relations with the United States, the Soviet Union, other Arab States, and the Palestinians.

(14) A description of the function, purpose, mode of operation, and offensive and defensive capabilities of each of the principal components of the Hawk missile system.

(15) The identities of those nations to which the United States has furnished, or to which the United States has made

a commitment to furnish, directly or indirectly, each of the components referred to in paragraph (14).

(16) The relevant portions of all agreements, documents, letters, memorandums, and/or other written material in the possession of the executive branch which relate to all precautions being taken to insure that access to the Hawk missile system, and to technical information about its components, whether sold or given to Jordan, does not extend, directly or indirectly, beyond Jordanian personnel.

(17) The relevant portions of all agreements, documents, letters, memorandums, and/or other written material in the possession of the executive branch which relate to all precautions being taken to insure that neither the Hawk missile system nor any of its components falls under the command, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, of other than Jordanian personnel, including any steps which are being or which shall be taken to prevent the conclusion of agreements for joint military command between Jordan and any other country.

(18) The relevant portions of all agreements, documents, letters, memorandums, and/or other written material in the possession of the executive branch which relate to all contacts, in person or otherwise, between personnel of the executive branch, including employees of the State and



1 Defense Departments, and any representatives of private in-  
 2 dustry with respect, directly or indirectly, to the Hawk mis-  
 3 sile sale. "Representatives of private industry" includes, but  
 4 is not limited to, all Raytheon Company employees and  
 5 agents, all employees and agents of manufacturers of com-  
 6 ponents of the Hawk missile system, and all employees and  
 7 agents of any finance institution (including finance institu-  
 8 tions controlled or affiliated with any foreign government).

9 (19) The relevant portions of all agreements, docu-  
 10 ments, letters, memorandums, and/or other written material  
 11 in the possession of the executive branch which relate to all  
 12 sales commissions or fees related, in whole or in part, to the  
 13 Hawk missile system sale, payable by any entity involved  
 14 in the sale to any person.

15 (20) With respect to the Redeye antiaircraft missile  
 16 system, all of the information sought by this resolution with  
 17 respect to the Hawk missile system.

100-200000  
 100-200000  
 H. RES. 225

## RESOLUTION

Resolved, the President to provide to the  
 House of Representatives certain information  
 relating to the sale of Hawk and Redeye  
 missiles to Jordan.

By Mr. ROSENBERG

June 16, 1975

Reported to the Committee on International Relations



94TH CONGRESS  
1ST SESSION

## H. RES. 552

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### RESOLUTION

Requesting the President to provide to the House of Representatives certain information relating to the sale of Hawk and Redeye missiles to Jordan.

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By Mr. ROSENTHAL

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JUNE 18, 1975

Referred to the Committee on International Relations

tures of arms merchants and their shadowy agents.

Last year, Congress enacted into law a requirement that it be notified of any proposed military sale in excess of \$25 million. Congress then has a period of 20 calendar days in which to veto the sale by concurrent resolutions disapproving the sale. In theory, this provision opens each major sale to congressional review. In practice, little has been accomplished. First, the review is piecemeal; it gives Congress no ready capacity to assess the whole program, to see each sale in the perspective of total proposed sales to each country and each region. Second, the notification need come only at such time as a letter of offer is prepared. Typically the preparation of such letter is one of the last steps in the sale process, taking place only when the precise terms of the sale and the financing have been finalized. By such time, much effort has been expended by the United States and the proposed recipient in bargaining and planning; certain expectations have been engendered in the recipient State. Congress is understandably reluctant to upset the process at this late stage. Third, only Representatives and committee staff members are given access to the information about the proposed sale. Personal staff members, even those with clearance for top-secret documents, are unable to view the classified data. Finally, much of the information necessary to formulate a reasoned opinion as to the sale, for example, the financing terms, is typically not made available.

The history of the operation of the review process bears out the above criticisms. The Defense Department, pursuant to the terms of the Foreign Military Sales Act, has notified Congress of 26 proposed sales. None of them has been challenged. With respect to the Hawk sale, most of the terms have been finalized. Almost 1½ months ago, the fact of the proposed sale was announced. Clearly, Jordan has relied upon the sale in concluding the agreement with Syria for a joint military command. Yet, Congress has received no notification of the sale and, according to conversations my staff has had with officials of the State Department, no date for submission to Congress has been set.

All of the above abuses cry out for full disclosure and correction. Vital answers are needed. My resolution of inquiry solicits many of these answers with respect to the Hawk missile sale and with respect to a related sale to Jordan of the shoulder-fired Redeye antiaircraft missile. I have also introduced legislation addressing problems in the American arms sale program generally. Such legislation mandates advance congressional approval of U.S. arms sales by country and by major weapons systems and major defense services. These are the minimum steps which must be taken.

The text of the resolution of inquiry follows:

#### H. RES. 552

Resolution requesting the President to provide to the House of Representatives certain information relating to the sale of "Hawk" and "Redeye" Missiles to Jordan

*Resolved*, That the President is requested to provide, not later than 10 days after the adoption of this resolution, to the House of Representatives, the following information:

(1) How and when the sale to Jordan of the "Hawk" missile system was initiated, including the date, nature and substance of the first approach of the Government of Jordan to any agency of the United States.

(2) What military equipment, if any, in addition to the "Hawk" missile system was sought by Jordan at or about the time of this approach.

(3) Whether and when the request was referred to the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, and any recorded conclusions made by that office with respect to the significance, potential impact and purpose of the proposed sale.

(4) Whether and when the request was referred to the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs of the Department of State, and any recorded conclusions made by the Bureau with respect to the potential impact of the requested sale upon United States foreign policy in general, and with respect to the Middle East, in particular, including the potential impact of the requested sale on the balance of power in the Middle East, relations with Israel, the defense of Israel and Israeli-administered territory, relations between Jordan and the other Arab states, relations between Jordan and the Soviet Union, relations between Jordan and the Palestinians, the political stability of Jordan, including the maintenance in power of the Hussein regime, and the economic conditions in Jordan.

(5) Whether and when the request was referred to the Systems Project Manager of a military service, and any recorded conclusions of that Manager with respect to the sale, including conclusions as to price, delivery date, and private industry production needs, together with any record of the factors and considerations that Manager brought to bear in making those conclusions.

(6) Whether and when a Price and Availability Statement was prepared by the Systems Project Manager with respect to the requested sale, and the contents of that Statement.

(7) Whether the Statement referred to in paragraph (6) was presented to the Government of Jordan, and any reactions of that Government to the Statement.

(8) The identity of any other person or persons in the executive branch, including the President, the Secretaries of State and Defense, and any member or members of the Interagency Security Assistance Program Review Committee, who evaluated the request, when each such evaluation was made, and any recorded conclusions of each evaluating person as to the potential impact of the requested sale on the balance of power in the Middle East, relations with Israel, the defense of Israel and Israeli-administered territory, relations between Jordan and the Arab states, relations between Jordan and the Soviet Union, relations between Jordan and the Palestinians, the political stability of Jordan, including the maintenance in power of the Hussein regime, and the economic conditions in Jordan.

(9) The contents of any Letter of Offer prepared with respect to the requested sale, and whether such a Letter of Offer was pre-

sented to the Government of Jordan, together with any reactions of that Government to any such Letter so presented.

(10) The details of any financing arrangements made by Jordan for such sale, including sources of funds, cash and credit terms, and any other explicit or implicit conditions of financing.

(11) At what point, if any, the sale is to be referred to the Congress pursuant to the provisions of the Foreign Military Sales Act, as amended.

(12) The detailed substance of the communication (and its date) of the favorable disposition of the Government of the United States toward the requested sale, and whether any conditions were placed by the United States on the making public of the fact or substance of such communication.

(13) The date and substance of the first announcement by the United States Government of the sale, and the recorded conclusions, if any, of the executive branch as to the effect of such announcement on United States relations with Israel, and Jordanian relations with the United States, the Soviet Union, other Arab States and the Palestinians.

(14) A description of the function, purpose, mode of operation, and offensive and defensive capabilities of each of the principal components of the "Hawk" Missile System.

(15) The identities of those nations to which the United States has furnished, or to which the United States has made a commitment to furnish, directly or indirectly, each of the components referred to in paragraph (14).

(16) The relevant portions of all agreements, documents, letters, memoranda and/or other written material in the possession of the executive branch which relate to all precautions being taken to ensure that access to the "Hawk" missile system, and to technical information about its components, whether sold or given to Jordan, does not extend, directly or indirectly, beyond Jordanian personnel.

(17) The relevant portions of all agreements, documents, letters, memoranda and/or other written material in the possession of the executive branch which relate to all precautions being taken to ensure that neither the "Hawk" missile system nor any of its components falls under the command, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, of other than Jordanian personnel, including any steps which are being or which shall be taken to prevent the conclusion of agreements for joint military command between Jordan and any other country.

(18) The relevant portions of all agreements, documents, letters, memoranda and/or other written material in the possession of the executive branch which relate to all contacts, in person or otherwise, between personnel of the executive branch, including employees of the State and Defense Department, and any representatives of private industry with respect, directly or indirectly, to the "Hawk" missile sale. "Representatives of private industry" includes, but not limited to, all Raytheon Company employees and agents, all employees and agents of manufacturers of components of the "Hawk" missile system, and all employees and agents of any finance institutions (including finance institutions controlled or affiliated with any foreign government).

(19) The relevant portions of all agreements, documents, letters, memoranda and/or other written material in the possession of the executive branch which relate to all sales commissions or fees related, in whole or in part, to the "Hawk" missile system sale, pay-



amnesty and embarked on a series of mild liberal reforms. Today, almost seven years after the hopes of the Prague Spring were crushed, the Soviet-sponsored government of Comrade Husak has not yet established a new consensus and the Czech's "Kadar" certainly does not seem ready for a thaw.

# UNITED STATES-JORDAN HAWK MISSILE SALE: RESOLUTION OF INQUIRY

HON. BENJAMIN S. ROSENTHAL

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, June 18, 1975

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Mr. Speaker, I am today introducing a Resolution of Inquiry requiring the President to supply information to Congress regarding the proposed sale to Jordan of the Improved Hawk Missile System announced on May 5.

The sale to Jordan of this advanced ground-to-air missile system threatens to upset the delicate balance of military power in the Middle East. It has already contributed to the conclusion of an agreement between Jordan and Syria for a joint military command. Such an agreement was impossible as long as Jordan perceived itself as lacking an effective air cover.

Coming in the midst of a so-called reassessment of American policy in the Middle East, the announcement of the sale demonstrates the utter incoherence and inconsistency of our arms sale program in general and with regard to the Middle East, in particular, and encourages Arab resistance to any total peace agreement. The sale is further evidence of the mindless proliferation of American arms sales around the globe which presents the ghoulis spectacle of Americans selling death and destruction at a price of over \$7 billion annually to over 70 foreign countries. Almost 1 month after the announcement of the sale, Congress has not yet been given the details of the sale in arguable violation of the spirit if not the letter of the 1974 Foreign Military Sales Act Amendments.

The Hawk missile is a highly sophisticated weapon on par with the vaunted Soviet SA-6. It is the basic air defense missile system used by the U.S. Army and Marines, and by seven NATO countries. It can be speedily set up and fired from mobile carriers. The solid-propellant rocket, employing semiautomatic radar homing, is exceptionally effective at low altitudes, as well as at maximum tactical heights, to a range of 22 miles.

Jordan's acquisition of this modern antiaircraft missile system represents a qualitative change in the Middle East balance of power. Jordan refused to open up a third front along the Jordan River during the 1973 Yom Kippur War against Israel precisely because it lacked air cover. King Hussein was violently criticized thereafter in the Arab world for his refusal to widen the "Eastern Front."

Syria learned a painful lesson from its one-prong attack through the Golan Heights in 1973. Syria is believed to be

planning in any future war a multifront attack through Lebanon's Arqoub region and through the Yarmuk-Jordan Valley with Jordan's Arab Legion. This Syrian military option requires Jordan's involvement. Syria's President Assad employed both threats and blandishments to assuage Hussein's fears and enlist his participation. Jordan's lack of an air defense system was the primary obstacle. The acquisition of the Hawk removed this impediment. On June 12, Syria and Jordan announced that they would form a joint military and air command. Jordan has signified that it would enter any new Middle East war. Many analysts believe that none of this would be possible without Jordan's acquisition of the Hawk.

There are other potentially serious military consequences of the Hawk sale. The range of the Hawk permits the missile to be used to harass peaceful Israeli commercial and military air traffic. Moreover, mounted on mobile carriers, the Hawk can provide an effective umbrella in support of advancing, offensively deployed armed forces. Of equal importance, King Hussein has survived at least eight assassination attempts. His regime enjoys questionable political stability. A future leader of Jordan may be less able or willing than Hussein to refrain from using the Hawk system against Israel.

In addition to destabilizing the military balance, the sale of the Hawk may have a tragic effect on the political situation. It is a matter of debate whether this sale was the fulfillment of a prior commitment or a new agreement reached during King Hussein's recent visit to the United States. But coming as it does at a time when deliveries of the Lance missile to Israel have been suspended and talks between American and Israeli officials over the purchase of the F-15 fighter have been placed in abeyance, the sale of the Hawk system can only be interpreted by the Arab States as additional evidence of a shift in American policy deriving from the current reassessment. This encourages the Arab intransigence which was responsible for the breakdown of the second-stage talks between Egypt and Israel.

The Hawk sale symbolizes the chaotic and potentially disastrous nature of American arms sales. America has become the premier "merchant of death." In the year ended last June, American arms sales abroad more than doubled to \$8.5 billion. Annual sales at today's inflated prices can grow quickly to \$10 to \$12 billion, thus consolidating guns as a principal American export second only to butter, that is, agricultural products.

Some 70 countries have benefited from American largesse. Many of these countries are bitter rivals and the vision of wars fought entirely with American weapons is becoming increasingly real. Turkey and Greece, India and Pakistan, Israel and Jordan—each knows the horror of facing an enemy using the same American weapons it itself relies on. The next such conflict could break out in the Persian Gulf where the United States sold over \$5 billion in arms last year.

It is fatuous to argue that if the United States did not supply the needs of these countries, some rival would. There is little evidence that Jordan considered approaching any country other than the United States for its ground-to-air missile system. The closest American competitor in weapons vending, the Soviet Union, makes half as many sales as the United States.

As British weapons merchant Basil Zaharoff and other death peddlers of earlier eras well knew, each arms sale creates an ever-spiraling demand for additional arms sales. Fear begets fear and national budgets straining to find room for vitally needed social expenditures are consumed in the purchase of greater quantities of idle gunpowder and steel. The hands of those trained to use the weapons, that is, the military, is strengthened. Eventually military policy becomes identical to national policy. Any threat to national interests engenders the only possible response, resort to arms. With certain qualifications, this process describes the origin of the First World War and many conflicts since then. A critical ingredient of this deadly recipe is access to weapons. This is the ingredient the United States, and to a much lesser extent the Soviet Union, France, and the United Kingdom, provide.

The ability of the administration effectively to conclude the sale of the Hawk without congressional consultation points up another grave problem in the process of American arms sales. Popular scrutiny is almost completely lacking. The profit interests of the biggest multinational corporations may be served in secret at the expense of our real national policy and world peace.

The Hawk missile system is manufactured by Raytheon Co. Raytheon's principal Mideast marketing agent and a major figure behind the sale of the system to Jordan is Adnan Khashoggi. According to the Washington Post of June 7, 1975, Khashoggi is closely connected to the ruling family of Saudi Arabia and is the man who funnelled almost one-half million dollars in bribes to Saudia Arabian officials in the service of another major client, Northrop Corp. The Senate is probing a \$45 million "commission" paid by Northrop to Khashoggi for a new \$750 million sale of about 60 F-5E's to the Saudis.

Another reportedly key figure in Raytheon's sales team in the Middle East and Washington is Kermit Roosevelt, Grandson of President Theodore Roosevelt and former CIA and State Department official, Roosevelt also participated closely in Northrop's discredited dealings in Saudi Arabia. Roosevelt is a director of the Near East Foundation, a major Arabist organization.

Congress has a right and duty to know the exact role these men and others connected with Raytheon played in the Hawk missile sale. The record must disclose the nature of the dealings of Raytheon and its employees with the executive branch and Jordan. American foreign policy in the Middle East has too great an impact on world peace to be influenced by the greed-motivated pres-

able by any entity involved in the sale to any person.

(20) With respect to the "Redeye" anti-aircraft missile system, all of the information sought by this resolution with respect to the "Hawk" missile system.

# OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

HON. OLIN E. TEAGUE

OF TEXAS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, June 18, 1975

Mr. TEAGUE. Mr. Speaker, on Thursday, June 12, 1975, I initiated publication of a series of summaries of oversight activities scheduled for the 94th Congress, outlining the plan of the Committee on Science and Technology for discharging its responsibilities under the provisions of rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives.

This is the fifth in the series on this subject and involves planned activities in the area of the environment and the included under this category involve legislation and other matters relating to environmental research and development—including, but not limited to, EPA's research and development programs in air and water quality and solid waste disposal—the National Weather Service; the National Environmental Satellite Service; and the research and development activities of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration—jointly with the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee.

A summary of scheduled oversight activities in this area follows:

## THE ENVIRONMENT AND THE ATMOSPHERE OVERSIGHT PLAN

### SUMMARY

(1) Subject: Federal Environmental R. & D. Posture. Purpose: To review the nature and scope of Federal environmental R. & D. activities with emphasis on the adequacy of coordination among the 13 agencies engaged in environmental R. & D. Hearings: 6 days; April 22, 23, 24, 29, 30, and May 1 (Completed).

(2) Subject: Sulfate emissions and standards. Purpose: To review in detail the nature and scope of EPA's research program on the problems associated with sulfate emission, with particular reference to automobile catalytic converter. Hearings: 3 days; July 8, 9, and 10.

(3) Subject: NOAA organization and programs. Purpose: To make a general review of the organization and management of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and the details of its programs, including research on marine ecosystems, severe local storms, climate, upper atmosphere and space, weather modification, and atmospheric and oceanic modelling. Subcommittee visits to NOAA installations will be scheduled. Hearings: 6 days; July 15, 16, 17, 22, 23, and 24.

(4) Subject: Ocean Dumping. Purpose: To review the state of knowledge of the ecological effects of ocean dumping, and to inquire into the adequacy of research on this subject. Hearings: 3 days; first half, September.

(5) Subject: Health effects of low-level pollution. Purpose: To review the state of

knowledge of the health effects on humans and animals of low-level more-or-less constant exposure to various pollutants introduced into the ecosystem by man; to inquire into the nature and scope of research on this subject, and the adequacy of monitoring techniques. Hearings: 4 days; second half, September.

(6) Subject: Organization and management of EPA's Office of Research and Development. Purpose: To assess the effectiveness of the new organizational structure of EPA's Office of Research and Development which has recently been reorganized in response to criticism during the past year. Hearings: 3 days; first half, October.

(7) Subject: Ecological Research. Purpose: To assess the adequacy of EPA's ecological research program under the terms of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, e.g., acid rain, insecticide and herbicide run-off. Hearings: 3 days; second half, October.

### BILLS REFERRED

H.R. 7108. A bill to authorize appropriations for environmental research, development, and demonstration. Hearings: March 4, 5, 6, 13, 19, April 15, and May 15 (completed).

H.R. 3118. A bill to amend the Clean Air Act so as to assure that aerosol spray containers discharging chlorofluoromethane compounds in the ambient air will not impair the environmental ozone layer, to prevent any increased skin cancer risk, and otherwise to protect the public health and environment. (H.R. 4327, 4328, 5706 are identical bills) (Related bills also considered: H.R. 3916, 4652, 6097, and 6099). Hearings: May 20, 21, and 22 (Completed).

H.R. 35. A bill to amend the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 in order to encourage the establishment of, and to assist, State and regional environmental research centers. Hearings: 4 days; September or October.

H.R. 1027. A bill to authorize the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration to conduct research and development programs to increase knowledge of tornadoes; hurricanes, large thunderstorms, and other types of short-term weather phenomena, and to develop methods for predicting, detecting, and monitoring such atmospheric behavior. (H.R. 3859, 5449, and 6126 are similar bills). Hearings: 3 days; October or November.

H.R. 6011. A bill to provide for the recycling of used oil, and for other purposes. (H.R. 6377 is identical and H.R. 6012 is similar). Hearings: 3 days; October or November.

## SPARROWS ARE FALLING IN THE NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION

HON. ROBERT L. LEGGETT

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, June 18, 1975

Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Speaker, the motion of the gentleman from Maryland is obviously born of the frustration of attempting to understand precisely where all the sparrows are falling in the Federal bureaucracy. While I can appreciate the frustration the gentleman feels, I believe that his motion is badly misguided as an attempt to set things right.

I, too, have felt frustration, sitting as a member of an Oversight Committee, in seeing things happen that I wish were being done differently; however, I would caution the gentleman that if we get our-

selves entangled in trying to watch for sparrows falling in the National Science Foundation, we are going to be run down by elephants from elsewhere. The reason that we have an administration to begin with is to administer programs. If the Congress starts to undertake this function, what will be the point of having an administration at all? Incidentally, I wonder if the gentleman can tell us how many additional staff members his proposal would require, and how much it will cost to hire them? I also wonder if the gentleman can tell us how much additional delay will be necessary by the addition of this new bureaucratic step in the NSF grant procedure?

I would also caution Members that just because we may not understand the language of the scientific community, we should not assume that it is speaking gibberish. Dr. W. D. McElroy, chancellor of the University of California at San Diego, has informed me that, for example, the "celebrated Polish bisexual frog grant" could easily be related to fundamental genetic or population problems." Dr. McElroy also mentions that his own research as a biochemist involved the use of fireflies. While this no doubt could be made to sound very silly, his research has had major ramifications for such important areas as muscle and cell kinetics, cardiac dysfunctions, and bacterial aspects of sewage systems.

I believe that the National Science Foundation has done a creditable job in the dispersal of grant funds for basic research, and I believe that this motion would be detrimental to that work. For that reason, I urge Members to vote against the motion to instruct.

## DIALOG ON CHANGE: A RESPONSE

HON. CHARLES B. RANGEL

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, June 18, 1975

Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, our colleague, PAUL SIMON, raised some very thought-provoking questions in the first installment of his dialog on change. I have had an opportunity to reflect on these and would like to comment briefly on two of them.

### A. IMPROVING THE MEMBERS' EFFICIENCY

I would agree with our colleagues who say that the trial recess system, which the leadership devised at the beginning of this Congress, is a healthy reform. Too often many of us, for whatever reason, do not get home to the district as often as we should. Really, when one thinks about the model elected Federal official which our Founding Fathers envisioned, the Representative was one who articulated the needs of his constituencies as a result of constant communication with his district. If we are only home on weekends this severely impairs our ability to get a complete view of what the folks back home are thinking about the issues. We cannot effectively legislate without receiving the input of those for whom we are legislating. I personally applaud the



innovative recess approach as a means of making time spent both here in Washington and the district much more productive.

#### B. IMPROVING OUR JUDICIAL SYSTEM

One way in which the adjudicatory process could be speeded up would be by mandating that the trial process be a 24-hour occurrence. I find it quite antithetical to the concept of justice when at 5 p.m. the courts and judges close down for the day. What is the problem with having shifts so that courtrooms do not go vacant while the accused sits for days waiting to have his fate determined? Whether it be a guilty or innocent verdict, justice demands that there be a quick resolution to the issue. If we accept the theory that justice is indeed blind, we must make this change.

DR. CARL E. BOZZO, D.D.S.

HON. NORMAN Y. MINETA

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, June 18, 1975

Mr. MINETA. Mr. Speaker, I would like to call to the attention of this distinguished body, an individual who lives and works in my congressional district, and whose business, civic, and community achievements deserve special recognition.

Dr. Carl E. Bozzo, D.D.S., after leaving the Navy moved to the town of Gilroy in southern Santa Clara County in 1958. He made it his home and opened a dental practice which was immediately successful, and has remained so ever since. Dr. Bozzo's lucrative practice has enabled him to play a significant part in the progressive controlled growth of South Santa Clara County through a number of land development ventures.

He has been instrumental in bringing to South Santa Clara County an attractive, richly landscaped garden apartment community. This complex features heated swimming pools and a professionally supervised day-care center. Dr. Bozzo has also been involved in projects to establish a professional center, a townhouse complex, vineyards, farms, and a proposed theme-oriented entertainment complex.

Dr. Bozzo has been extremely active in civic and community affairs as well. He is a part director of Hope for the Retarded, a cofounder of the Santa Clara County Association for the Retarded, a part chairman of the Heart Fund Drive, on the board of directors of the San Jose Symphony, and the American Cancer Society, and a charter member and a cofounder of the Gilroy Jaycees. In 1974 Dr. Bozzo was named Citizen of the Decade by the Gilroy Chamber of Commerce.

Therefore, on the occasion of an awards banquet given in his honor by the Construction Council of Northern California and the Home Builders Institute of America on June 30, 1975. I urge you to join me in commending Dr. Carl Bozzo, who has done much to improve the overall quality of life for the people who live in southern Santa Clara County which is in the congressional district that I have the honor of representing.

#### UNITED STATES MUST MAINTAIN NAVAL SUPERIORITY

HON. BILL CHAPPELL, JR.

OF FLORIDA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, June 18, 1975

Mr. CHAPPELL. Mr. Speaker, the vital importance of a strong and viable national defense must be recognized as the greatest deterrent to war and essential if the world is to remain at peace. I, therefore, appeal to my colleagues to profoundly consider the dangerous implications of resigning this Nation to a national defense policy which guarantees our Navy's inferiority vis-a-vis the Soviets.

The United States emerged from World War II with the largest and most capable naval force the world has ever known and with undisputed supremacy across the oceans and seas of the world. At that time the British maintained the only other major oceangoing navy, and even this was of only moderate size compared with U.S. forces. The naval monopoly which the United States enjoyed, together with the historic concept of "freedom of the seas," enabled the United States to successfully adopt a "forward defense strategy" that complemented the economic bonds and other forms of interdependence which are fundamentally predicated on free use of the high seas.

In the past 25 years, the Soviet Navy has evolved from a force built and employed primarily to defend the Soviet littoral to a force clearly optimized to counter U.S. naval capabilities and our use of the seas. Since sea denial forces may be concentrated and employed selectively, the mission of denial is easier than that of control. This growing Soviet sea denial capability has tended to erode confidence in U.S. ability to deter aggression or influence events in distant corners of the world.

The Soviet Union is essentially a land power. She is not greatly dependent upon the use of the seas to maintain her economic or political integrity with her European allies. The Soviet's significant commitment of resources to increased naval capability cannot be explained solely in terms of a sea denial objective. This increased military capability has allowed the Soviet Union increasingly to become involved in international affairs and in attempts to exert greater influence in the international forum.

Conversely, the United States is—and always has been—critically dependent on unimpeded access to the oceans of the world. More than 70 percent of the U.S. trade is with overseas nations while almost all Soviet trade is with satellite or Western European nations. While all of the major allies of the Soviet Union are contiguous most of our important allies are overseas and the U.S. military support that really counts for these allies is that which can be projected across the oceans. The Western Alliance is an oceanic alliance, and without the freedom to fully utilize the sea the alliance is not viable.

The United States and many members of the Western Alliance are seapowers by necessity; they are dependent on the

sea and must possess naval strength to protect their vital interests. Having few interests of her own on the oceans of the World, the Soviet Union has built a Navy tailored to counter Western naval strength and to take advantage of the oceanic dependence of the West. U.S.-U.S.S.R. asymmetries with regard to alliance structure, dependence on maritime communications, history and geography, and naval missions dictate that we maintain a first-rate Navy. A strong Navy with the ability to concentrate naval forces goes a long way toward countering Soviet influence where our interests and objectives overlap. But if our Navy is clearly inferior to theirs, the Soviets can be expected forcefully and frequently to challenge our ability to utilize the seas in support of our national policy.

Today our Navy is charged with protecting national interests in both the Atlantic and the Pacific with combat forces comparable in numbers to our 1939 Navy. Our 1975 Navy is immensely more powerful in absolute terms, and its individual unit capabilities for protection of the sea lanes are almost beyond comparison with the 1939 Navy. But the opposition's capability has grown, too, and our forward deployment requirements in two oceans far exceed those of the old Asiatic Fleet.

The size of our naval force has been reduced from 976 ships in 1968 to its current level of about 500 ships. The present state of our reduced Navy is good; if our new construction programs are realized—and they must be if we are to remain a first-rate naval power—it will be even better.

A credible capability to utilize and protect sea lines of communications is fundamental to our national strategy and economic well-being. This capability is also essential to the credibility of our staying power during crisis situations. This fact has not been lost on our potential adversaries. To the degree that our sea lines can be interdicted, then to that same degree the cohesion of our alliances will be eroded. It is, therefore, vital that the United States maintain an ability to use the seas as necessary—in peace, in crisis, and in war. This task cannot be accomplished by a second-class seapower. The Soviets have succeeded in building an impressive maritime force capable of challenging our use of the seas. Although the free world has lost its monopoly at sea, it cannot afford to lose its superiority. To do so would invite disaster.

BISHOP, CALIF. UNION HIGH  
SCHOOL BAND EUROPE BOUND

HON. WILLIAM M. KETCHUM

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, June 18, 1975

Mr. KETCHUM. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to commend the efforts of an industrious group of young people within my district, and I ask that my colleagues join with me.

The Bishop, Calif., High School Band, unanimously designated as "official ambassadors of the city of Bishop" by the

**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL**

June 25, 1975

TO: PHIL BUCHEN

FYI. Your copy of the letter and  
questions and answers.

Les Janka



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

June 25, 1975

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In response to the request for information stated in H. Res. 552 in the House of Representatives, I am happy to provide information to the Committee to clarify the sale to Jordan of both the HAWK and REDEYE anti-aircraft missile systems. Answers to the specific questions posed in House Resolution 552 are attached.

Both sales were undertaken after the most careful consideration by appropriate agencies and officials of the Government and after carefully weighing all factors bearing on U. S. interests in the area and our relationship with Jordan. This particular transaction was not taken in isolation, but was considered in the overall perspective of past, current, and projected events throughout the Middle East, and the policies of other states toward the Middle East.

Our relationship with Jordan has for many years been mutually beneficial. Jordan has supported our broader goals in the Middle East, has encouraged moderation, and has contributed significantly to the peace of the region. The length of the boundary between Jordan and Israeli-administered territory on the West Bank and at Jordan's geographic location between Israel, Syria, Iraq and Saudi Arabia makes clear the importance of a moderate Jordan with close ties to the United States as a major contributing factor to regional stability and tranquility.

An essential element in the maintenance of such a relationship has been the ability of Jordan to protect itself from attack and the willingness of the United States to provide reasonable assistance in enabling it to maintain such an ability. For this reason we have collaborated closely in helping Jordan meet its legitimate defense needs since 1970, in the wake of Jordanian actions to repel outside attack, suppress Palestinian Fedayeen activity internally and generally establish security. Since that time, the U. S. Government has undertaken to replace combat losses and assist in the modernization of the Jordanian armed forces. There have been regular meetings at least once a year since 1970 between top level representatives of the U. S. and Jordanian military establishments. Congress has supported this policy by appropriating the following security assistance funds:



<u>Grant Materiel (millions)</u>		<u>FMS Credits</u>	
1970 - \$ .2	1973 - \$33.5	1970 - \$ 0	1973 - \$ 0
1971 - \$28.9	1974 - \$39.0	1971 - \$30	1974 - \$ 0
1972 - \$38.0	1975 - \$59.9	1972 - \$10	1975 - \$30

Jordan's need for an air defense capability and its supply by the United States have been the subject of discussion between the two countries since that time. The October 1973 war in the Middle East gave particular urgency to this question. Jordan, alone among its neighbors, has no viable air defense system and its interest in improving its air defense capabilities grew as a result of increasing quantities of sophisticated aircraft in the inventories of neighboring states and the offers to Jordan of air defense weaponry manufactured in the USSR and Western Europe. The U.S. supply of some type of air defense system for Jordan thus became a gauge of our relationship to that country and our support for its moderate policies during a period when it was increasingly under pressure and isolated from other Arab countries precisely because of its moderate stand.

Within this framework, in principle in February 1975, the Jordanian request was reviewed comprehensively within the U.S. Government during 1974, and in early 1975 the Defense Department conducted a study based on in-country review of Jordanian air defense requirements. The findings of the study team, together with comments by the Departments of State and Defense, and further specific requests by the Jordanians were reviewed by the President prior to reaching a decision in principle in February 1975, which was communicated to King Hussein of Jordan on April 29. Agreement was reached on a modest air defense system and training package, to be phased over a period of several years. The details of the agreement, including the Letter of Offer, are now being worked out.

In providing the Committee with information on these two arms sales we have done our best to be responsive to the requests contained in H.R. 552. As I am sure the Committee will recognize and appreciate, many of the questions seek information which is related to the security posture of a friendly country with which we have had a long and extensive military supply relationship. Unauthorized exposure of certain details might jeopardize the security of Jordan, as well as our close relationship with that country. Other questions seek information about a contracting process which is not yet complete. Still other questions touch on the nature of advice and recommendations provided to the President and are directly related to Executive Branch internal decision processes.

Nevertheless, we have made every effort within these constraints to provide the Committee with the information we believe adequate to an understanding of the purposes and policies underlying the President's decision to provide HAWK and REDEYE missiles to Jordan. Therefore, we believe H.R. 552 is unnecessary.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Max L. Friedersdorf". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name "Max" being particularly prominent.

Max L. Friedersdorf  
Assistant to the President

Attachments

The Honorable Thomas Morgan  
House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515



- (1) How and when the sale to Jordan of the HAWK and REDEYES missile system were initiated, including the date, nature, and substance of the first approach of the Government of Jordan to any agency of the United States?

- and -

- (2) What military equipment, if any, in addition to the HAWK and REDEYE missile systems were sought by Jordan at or about the time of this approach?


### Answer

The armed forces of Jordan have felt a need for an air defense system since the 1967 war. This need was clearly stated in 1970, at the time of the Syrian incursion into Jordan and was confirmed in the findings of the U.S. officials who conducted an analysis of Jordanian military needs at that time. However, at that point the degree of severity of the air threat, and the defensive capabilities of air defense missile systems were not fully recongnized. A higher priority and urgency was placed on ground equipment, such as tanks, and Jordan had tight budgetary restraints. For these reasons, Jordan did not press its request, although it had communicated to the USG its desire for air defense weapons, including HAWKS and REDEYES.

Subsequently, in March 1973, the United States was asked to reevaluate the military requirements for Jordan. Again the need for an air defense system was stated by the Jordanian military, understood by the U.S. analysts, but relegated to a lesser priority. Air defense was not included in subsequent arms transfers stemming from the early 1973 analysis.

The October 1973 Mideast war clearly demonstrated the vulnerability of Jordanian ground forces to air attack. As a result, Jordanian pressures to obtain air defense became intense. These concerns were clearly stated to the United States on many occasions by many representatives of the Jordanian Government.

The extensive arms request list which Jordan submitted in December 1973 included a mix of anti-tank weapons, armor, artillery, and aircraft and three types of air defense weapons in addition to the HAWK: the REDEYE missile, the CHAPARRAL missile, and the VULCAN anti-aircraft gun. This represented the point in time when very serious consideration began on providing air defense systems. At a conference held in 1974, the US and Jordanian representatives agreed to consider only a much reduced version of the December request as the basis for grant aid and FMS credit program to be funded in FY 1975. The resulting abbreviated list included no air defense weapons; however, Jordanian representatives indicated their continued interest in obtaining such equipment.





- (3) Whether and when the request was referred to the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, and any recorded conclusions made by that office with respect to the significance, potential impact, and purpose of the proposed sale.

Answer

The office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, as well as all other appropriate and concerned portions of the Executive have been involved in constant evaluation and analysis of all aspects of arms transactions with the Government of Jordan since the inception of our close military supply relationship in 1970. The analysis has been under constant review and modification to reflect the realities of the Middle East situation, and the objectives of United States foreign policy in the region. Conclusions and assessments from that office have been integrated into other studies and are reflected in the final decisions in the matter.



(4) Whether and when the request was referred to the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs of the Department of State, and any recorded conclusions made by the Bureau with respect to the potential impact of the requested sale upon United States foreign policy in general, and with respect to the Middle East, in particular, including the potential impact of the requested sale on the balance of power in the Middle East, relations with Israel, the defense of Israel and Israeli-administered territory, relations between Jordan and the other Arab States, relations between Jordan and the Soviet Union, relations between Jordan and the Palestinians, the political stability of Jordan, including the maintenance in power of the Hussein regime, and the economic conditions in Jordan.

Answer

The Department of State, including the Bureaus of Politico-Military Affairs and Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs considered thoroughly the potential impact of the Jordanian request upon United States foreign policy in general and with respect to the Middle East. The absence of even a nominal air defense system for Jordan had become, by late 1974, a matter of considerable importance to the Government of Jordan and its army, their attitudes toward the United States and the overall policy which Jordan would pursue in the future. Morale among the Jordanian Armed Forces had deteriorated as a result of their vulnerability to air attacks, yet a loyal, effective army is clearly an indispensable support for King Hussein and his policies. Neighboring countries such as Syria and Iraq had excellent air defense weapons supplied by the USSR, while Israel, Iran and Saudi Arabia had air defense weapons supplied by the United States.

At the Arab summit meeting in Rabat in November, 1974 subsidies were pledged for the purpose of Jordanian military purchases, thus removing a major obstacle to the acquisition of air defense weaponry. In the absence of a positive response from the United States on the supply of air defense weaponry, alternative sources of supply became real possibilities. Missiles manufactured by other countries were offered to Jordan. King Hussein and his advisors did not accept these offers, reiterating their preference for a continuing close military relationship with the United States. At the same time, the King also made clear the importance he attached to the early conclusion of a deal with the US for air defense weaponry.

The Department of State concluded in December 1974 that the dispatch of an air defense survey team to Jordan would be in the national interest of the United States, strengthening Hussein's internal position and reinforcing Jordan's policies of moderation at a time when Jordan was under heavy



political pressure from outside forces (including the PLO) and when the morale of its armed forces was suffering from the absence of any air defense. The sale of HAEK and REDEYE missiles, it was judged, would not alter the overwhelming military superiority which Israel enjoys vis-a-vis Jordan, but should contribute significantly to the confidence of the Jordanian military in their ability to deter attack on their country from any direction, thus helping to support a moderate and responsible government and maintain its close ties to the US. The President approved the State Department recommendation for the dispatch of the air defense survey team to Jordan.



(5) Whether and when the request was referred to the systems project manager of a military service, and any recorded conclusions of that manager with respect to the sale, including conclusions as to price, delivery date, and private industry production needs, together with any record of the factors and considerations that manager brought to bear in making those conclusions.

Because of its complexity, the Jordanian request for air defense weapons was evaluated on the technical level by a team of experts from the Services under the auspices of the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The team was required to conduct an analysis based on in-country examination of Jordan's air defense posture to assist in reaching decisions on appropriate US assistance to Jordan in this area. The team, representing all Service views, surveyed the Jordanian requirements, analyzed the nature and adequacy of air defenses in Jordan in February 1974, and outlined options for an air defense system. The team's report described the estimated price and availability of the pertinent US weapons, the military impact of each option on neighboring countries, and the requirements for training and follow-on maintenance. In developing this information the team maintained contacts and obtained requisite information from appropriate logistical agencies and systems managers within the military Services.



- (6) Whether and when a price and advisability statement was prepared by the systems project manager with respect to the requested sale, and the contents of that statement.

Answer

Price and availability data, and suitability of HAWK, REDEYE and other weapons systems were considered by appropriate Service representatives, including project managers. Some changes in price and availability have taken place since the original analysis.



(7) Whether the statement referred to in paragraph (6) was presented to the Government of Jordan, and any reactions of that Government to the statement?


Answer

During the regular conference between US and Jordanian military representatives held in early 1975, US official briefed representatives of the Jordanian Armed Forces on the findings of the air defense team. As a result of this discussion the Jordanians made some minor refinements in their proposed air defense package, and confirmed their desire to purchase HAWK, REDEYE and other air defense weapons.



(8) The identity of any other person or persons in the Executive Branch, including the President, the Secretaries of State and Defense, and any member or members of the Interagency Security Assistance Program Review Committee, who evaluated the request, when each such evaluation was made, and any recorded conclusions of each evaluating person as to the potential impact of the requested sale on the balance of power in the Middle East, relations with Israel, the defense of Israel and Israeli-administered territory, relations between Jordan and the Arab states, relations between Jordan and the Soviet Union, relations between Jordan and the Palestinians, the political stability of Jordan, including the maintenance in power of the Hussein regime, and the economic conditions in Jordan.

As noted in the reply to question number four, factors such as balance of power in the Middle East, relations with Israel, etc., were all considered as part of the process of reaching a final decision on the offer of air defense weaponry to Jordan. These factors were analyzed by the appropriate government agencies. The President made the final decision on the offer of air defense weapons to Jordan based on the comments and recommendations of his principal national security advisers.



(9) The contents of any letter of offer prepared with respect to the requested sale, and whether such a letter of offer was presented to the Government of Jordan, together with any reactions of that Government to any such letter so presented.

Answer

The Letter of Offer will consist of the standard legal Conditions which outline the liabilities and agreements between the purchaser and the United States Government pursuant to the Foreign Military Sales Act, as amended. The Letter of offer will also list major items together with all supporting equipment necessary for making the system operational by quantity, estimated price and delivery commitment time frame and technical information essential for complete understanding of the implementation phase of the case after acceptance. The Letter of Offer has not yet been completed and has not been presented to the Congress or the Government of Jordan. Therefore no reaction to its contents has been received.



(10) The details of any financing arrangements made by Jordan for such sale, including sources of funds, cash, and credit terms, and any other explicit or implicit conditions of financing.

The financial arrangement between the United States Government and the Government of Jordan will be entered on the Letter of Offer as a dependable undertaking in accordance with Chapter 2, section 22 of the Foreign Military Sales Act, as amended. Under these terms the Government of Jordan makes a firm commitment to pay the full cost of the contract and to make available all necessary funds in such amounts and at such times as demanded by the Department of Defense. Jordan has not requested and the USG has not offered either grant or credit assistance for the purchase of air defense weapons. The Administration understands that Jordan can expect assistance from friendly Arab governments in financing the HAWK and REDEYE purchases.



(11) At what point, if any, the sale is to be referred to the Congress pursuant to the provisions of the Foreign Military Sales Act, as amended.

The Letter of Offer is currently being staffed within the Executive Branch. It is anticipated that this staffing will be completed in time for the proposed Letter of Offer to be reported to Congress sometime late in July or early August.



(12) The detailed substance of the communication (and its date) of the favorable disposition of the Government of the United States toward the requested sale, and whether any conditions were placed by the United States on the making public of the fact or substance of such communication.

On April 15, the President approved the recommendation of the Department of State and Defense that the US agree, in principal, to sell the HAWK system, as well as other air defense weapons, to Jordan. Our Ambassador in Amman communicated this decision to King Hussein prior to his visit to Washington.

By the time of King Hussein's visit to Washington in April 1975, the Jordanians had submitted their final requirements to the Department of Defense. The President took the Jordanian assessment of its requirements into account in making the final decision to provide air defense equipment and training to Jordan, including the HAWK and REDEYE. This decision was communicated to King Hussein during his visit on April 29.

The USG placed no conditions upon making it public (see question 13).



(13) The date and substance of the first announcement by the United States Government of the sale, and the recorded conclusions, if any, of the executive branch as to the effect of such announcement on United States relations with Israel and Jordanian relations with the United States, the Soviet Union, other Arab States, and the Palestinians.

The air defense decision was not announced, since we do not as a matter of general policy announce decisions to proceed with preparation of a Letter of Offer. In early May the Department of State did respond to questions from the press about the sale of air defense weapons to Jordan by noting that, in the Department's view, the sale of such weapons would not upset the balance of power in the region.



(14) A description of the function, purpose, mode of operation, and offensive and defensive capabilities of each of the principal components of the HAWK and REDEYE missile systems.

Will be provided separately, on request, in classified form.



(15) The identities of those nations to which the United States has furnished, or to which the United States has made a commitment to furnish, directly or indirectly, each of the components referred to in paragraph (14).

The following countries have been provided with the HAWK Missile System: Israel, Greece, Iran, Korea, Taiwan, Japan, Kuwait, Spain (under Foreign Military Sales procedures); Saudi Arabia, Belgium, the Netherlands, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Sweden and Denmark (under commercial contract).

The United States has agreed to furnish the REDEYE system to the following countries besides Jordan: Israel, Australia, Sweden, Greece, Federal Republic of Germany and Denmark.



(16) The relevant portions of all agreements documents, letters, memorandums, and/or other written material in the possession of the executive branch which relate to all precautions being taken to insure that access to the Hawk missile system, and to technical information about its components, whether sold or given to Jordan, does not extend, directly or indirectly, beyond Jordanian personnel.

The proposed LOA for the HAWK missile system will contain a standard provision which carries out the intent of section 3(a) of the FMSA. This provision states that none of the defense articles, components, associated equipment, or technical information provided under the sales agreement can be transferred to any person, organization, or other government without the written consent of the USG.

Moreover, DOD carefully evaluates a potential recipient country's ability to maintain the security of US-supplied equipment, and the ability to provide such security is required before sales are made.



- (17) The relevant portions of all agreements, documents, letters, memorandums, and/or other written material in the possession of the executive branch which relate to all precautions being taken to insure that neither the HAWK missile system nor any of its components falls under the command, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, of other than Jordanian personnel, including any steps which are being or which shall be taken to prevent the conclusion of agreements for joint military command between Jordan and any other country.

The no-transfer provisions described in question (16) would prohibit Jordanian air defense equipment supplied by the US from coming under the command of other than Jordanian personnel. There is, of course, no way to ensure absolutely that Jordan will comply with US laws under all conditions. However, the Jordanian record of compliance has been excellent. At this moment we know of no plans for the establishment of a joint military command between Jordan and any other country, and our decision to provide air defense weapons to Jordan reduces that possibility.





- (18) The relevant portions of all agreements, documents, letters, memorandums, and/or other written material in the possession of the executive branch which relate to all contacts, in person or otherwise, between personnel of the executive branch, including employees of the State and Defense Departments, and any representatives of private industry with respect, directly or indirectly, to the HAWK missile sale. "Representatives of private industry" includes, but is not limited to, all Raytheon Company employees and agents, all employees and agents of manufacturers of components of the HAWK missile system, and all employees and agents of any finance institution (including finance institutions controlled or affiliated with any foreign government).

The Department of the Army has not entered into any agreement with Raytheon Company (the manufacturer of HAWK) relative to sale of the system to Jordan. Raytheon Company and other contractors have furnished proposals for hardware in support of this sale, and the data is included in the US Government's offer. Only upon acceptance of the Letter of Offer will the Department of the Army negotiate a contract with representatives of private industry. There has been no discussion with US financial institutions. As discussed earlier, the Letter of Offer, if accepted, will be signed by the Government of Jordan which will then be held committed to meeting the financial obligations of the contract. We do not anticipate USG involvement in Jordan's negotiations to secure funds to meet these obligations.

Since the supply of REDEYE missile system to Jordan would be from existing US Army assets, there would be no need for discussion with or transmission of documents to private industry.



(19) The relevant portions of all agreements, documents, letters, memorandums, and/or other written material in the possession of the executive branch which relate to all sales commissions or fees related, in whole or in part, to the HAWK missile system sale, payable by any entity involved in the sale to any person.

According to the Raytheon Company's proposal of June 9, 1975, it was stated that the company has agreements with representatives of Jordanian nationality to pay a fee of 2 percent of the contract price. This fee is included in the proposal as 2 percent of the "not to exceed" price. The names of person or persons acting as representatives on behalf of the Raytheon Company have not been furnished by the company. The question of whether these costs are properly allowable or will be disallowed will be resolved by the contracting officer during contract negotiations in accordance with applicable Armed Forces Procurement Regulations.

There are no fees involved in the REDEYE missile transaction.



(20) With respect to the REDEYE antiaircraft missile system, all of the information sought by this resolution with respect to the HAWK missile system.

Data on the REDEYE system has been answered in the preceding paragraphs with that pertaining to HAWK.

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