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FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

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April 11, 1975

Office of the White House Press Secretary

THE WHITE HOUSE

TEXT OF LETTERS FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE

April 11, 1975

Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:)

I hereby transmit draft legislation to carry out the recommendations made in my April 10, 1975 address to the Congress with respect to Indochina.

The enclosed draft bills authorize additional military, economic, and humanitarian assistance for South Vietnam, and also clarify the availability of funds for the use of the Armed Forces of the United States for humanitarian evacuation in Indochina, should this become necessary.

I urge the immediate consideration and enactment of these measures.

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Sincerely,

GERALD R. FORD

A BILL

To authorize additional military assistance for South Vietnam, and for other purposes.

1	Be it enacted by the Senate and the
2	House of Representatives of the United States
.3	of America in Congress assembled, That para-
4 '	graph (1) of section 401(a) and subsection
5	(b) of Public Law 89-367, approved March 15,
6	1966 (80 Stat. 37), as amended, are amended by
7	striking out "\$1,000,000,000" each place it
8	appears and inserting in lieu thereof
9	"\$1,422,000,000".

To authorize additional economic assistance for

South Vietnam, and for other purposes.

. 1. Be it enacted by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States of 2 America in Congress assembled, That in addition 3 to amounts otherwise authorized for such purposes, there is authorized to be appropriated to the 5 President not to exceed \$73,000,000 to carry out 6 the purposes of part V of the Foreign Assistance 7 Act of 1961, as amended, for South Vietnam for 3 the fiscal year 1975. Funds made available for 9 economic and humanitarian assistance for Indo-10 china shall be available after the date of 11 enactment of this Act for obligation without 12 regard to the limitations contained in sections 13 36 and 38 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, 14 . Public Law-93-559, approved December 30, 1974 (88 15 Stat. 1795). 16To clarify restrictions on the availability of funds

for the use of United States Armed Forces in Indochina, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and the House 7 of Representatives of the United States of 2 .3 America in Congress assembled, That nothing 4 contained in section 839 of Public Law 93-437. section 741 of Public Law 93-238, section 30 of 5 Public Law 93-189, section 806 of Public Law 93-155. 6 section 13 of Public Law 93-126, section 108 of 7 Public Law 93-52, section_307 of Public Law 93-50, 8 or any other comparable provision of law shall be 0 10 construed as limiting the availability of funds for the use of the Armed Forces of the United 11 States to aid, assist, and carry out humanitarian 12 evacuation, if ordered by the President. 13

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

APRIL 10, 1975

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY

THE WHITE HOUSE

ADDRESS BY THE PRESIDENT TO THE JOINT SESSION OF CONGRESS

THE HOUSE CHAMBER

9:04 P.M. EDT

Mr. Speaker, Mr. President, distinguished guests, my very good friends in the Congress, and fellow Americans:

I stand before you tonight after many agonizing hours in very solemn prayers for guidance by the Almighty. In my report on the State of the Union in January, I concentrated on two subjects, which were uppermost in the minds of the American people -- urgent actions for the recovery of our economy, and a comprehensive program to make the United States independent of foreign sources of energy.

I thank the Congress for the action that it has taken thus far in my response for economic recommendations. I look forward to early approval of a national energy program to meet our country's long-range and emergency needs in the field of energy.

Tonight it is my purpose to review our relations with the rest of the world in the spirit of candor and consultation, which I have sought to maintain with my former colleagues and with our countrymen from the time that I took office.

It is the first priority of my Presidency to sustain and strengthen the mutual trust and respect which must exist among Americans and their government if we are to deal successfully with the challenges confronting us both at home and abroad.

The leadership of the United States of America since the end of World War II has sustained and advanced the security, well being and freedom of millions of human beings besides ourselves.

Despite some setbacks, despite some mistakes, the United States has made peace a real prospect for us and for all nations. I know firsthand that the Congress has been a partner in the development and in the support of American foreign policy, which five Presidents before me have carried forward with changes of course, but not of destination.

The course which our country chooses in the world today has never been of greater significance for ourselves as a Nation and for all mankind. We build from a solid foundation. Our alliances with great industrial democracies in Europe, North America and Japan remain strong with a greater degree of consultation and equity than everybefore.

With the Soviet Union we have moved across a broad front toward a more stable, if still competitive, relationship. We have begun to control the spiral of strategic nuclear armaments. After two decades of mutual estrangement, we have achieved a historic opening with the People's Republic of China.

In the best American tradition, we have committed, often with striking success, our influence and good offices to help contain conflicts and settle disputes in many, many regions of the world.

We have, for example, helped the parties of the Middle East take the first steps toward living with one another in peace. We have opened a new dialogue with Latin America, looking toward a healthier hemispheric partnership.

We are developing closer relations with the nations of Africa. We have exercised international leadership on the great new issues of our interdependent world, such as energy, food, environment and the law of the sea.

The American people can be proud of what their Nation has achieved and helped others to accomplish, but we have from time to time suffered setbacks and disappointments in foreign policy. Some were events over which we had no control. Some were difficulties we imposed upon ourselves.

We live in a time of testing and of a time of change. Our world, a world of economic uncertainty, political unrest and threats to the peace, does not allow us the luxury of abdication or domestic discord.

I recall quite vividly the words of President Truman to the Congress when the United States faced a far greater challenge at the end of the Second World War.

If I might quote: "If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world, and we shall surely endanger the welfare of this Nation."

President Truman's resolution must guide us today. Our purpose is not to point the finger of blame, but to build upon our many successes, to repair damage where we find it, to recover our balance, to move ahead as a united people.

Tonight is a time for straight talk among friends, about where we stand and where we are going.

A vast human tragedy has befallen our friends in Vietnam and Cambodia. Tonight I shall not talk only about obligations arising from legal documents. Who can forget the enormous sacrifices of blood, dedication and treasure that we made in Vietnam?

Under five Presidents and 12 Congresses, the United States was engaged in Indochina. Millions of Americans served, thousands died, and many more were wounded, imprisoned or lost.

Over \$150 billion have been appropriated for that war by the Congress of the United States. And after years of effort, we negotiated under the most difficult circumstances a settlement, which made it possible for us to remove our military forces and bring home with pride our American prisoners.

MORE

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This settlement, if its terms had been adhered to, would have permitted our South Vietnamese ally, with our material and moral support, to maintain its security and rebuild after two decades of war.

The chances for an enduring peace after the last American fighting man left Vietnam in 1973, rested on two publicly stated premises. First, that if necessary, the United States would help sustain the terms of the Paris accords it signed two years ago. Second, that the United States would provide adequate economic and military assistance to South Vietnam.

Let us refresh our memories for just a moment. The universal consensus in the United States, at that time, late 1972, was that if we could end our own involvement and obtain the release of our prisoners, we would provide adequate material support to South Vietnam.

The North Vietnamese, from the moment they signed the Paris accords, systematically violated the case-fire and other provisions of that agreement. Flagrantly disregarding the ban on the infiltration of troops, the North Vietnamese illegally introduced over 350,000 men into the South. In direct violation of the agreement, they sent in the most modern equipment in massive amounts. Meanwhile, they continued to receive large quantities of supplies and arms from their friends.

In the face of this situation, the United States -torn as it was by the emotions of a decade of war -- was unable to respond. We deprived ourselves by law of the ability to enforce the agreement thus giving North Vietnam assurance that it could violate that agreement with impunity.

Next, we reduced our economic and arms aid to South Vietnam. Finally, we signaled our increasing reluctance to give any support to that nation struggling for its survival.

Encouraged by these developments, the North Vietnamese, in recent months, began sending even their reserve divisions into South Vietnam. Some 20 divisions, virtually their entire army, are now in South Vietnam.

The government of South Vietnam, uncertain of further American assistance, hastily ordered a strategic withdrawal to more defensible positions. The extremely difficult maneuver, decided upon without consultations, was poorly executed, hampered by floods of refugees and thus led to panic. The results are painfully obvious and profoundly moving.

MORE

In my first public comment on this tragic development, I called for a new sense of national unity and purpose. I said I would not engage in recriminations or attempts to assess the blame.

I reiterate that tonight. In the same spirit, I welcome the statement of the distinguished Majority Leader of the United States Senate, earlier this week, and I quote, "It is time for the Congress and the President to work together in the area of foreign as well as domestic policy."

So, let us start afresh.

I am here to work with the Congress. In the conduct of foreign affairs, Presidential initiative and the ability to act swiftly in emergencies are essential to our national interests.

With respect to North Vietnam, I call upon Hanoi, and ask the Congress to join with me in this call, to cease military operations immediately and to honor the terms of the Paris agreement.

The United States is urgently requesting the signatories of the Paris Conference to meet their obligations to use their influence to halt the fighting and to enforce the 1973 accords.

Diplomatic notes to this effect have been sent to all members of the Paris Conference, including the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China.

The situation in South Vietnam and Cambodia has reached a critical phase requiring immediate and positive decisions by this government. The options before us are few and the time is very short.

On the one hand, the United States could do nothing more. Let the government of South Vietnam save itself and what is left of its territory, if it can. Let those South Vietnamese civilians who have worked with us for a decade or more save their lives and their families, if they can.

In short, shut our eyes and wash our hands of the whole affair, if we can.

There are two narrow options: First, stick with my January request that Congress appropriate \$300 million for military assistance for South Vietnam and seek additional funds for economic and humanitarian purposes, or increase my request for both emergency military and humanitarian assistance to levels which, by best estimates, might enable the South Vietnamese to stem the onrushing aggression, to stabilize the military situation, permit the chance of a negotiated political settlement between the North and South Vietnamese and, if the very worst were to happen, at least allow the orderly evacuation of Americans and endangered South Vietnamese to places of safety.

Let me now state my considerations and my conclusions.

I have received a full report from General Weyand, who I sent to Vietnam to assess the situation. He advises that the current military situation is very critical, but that South Vietnam is continuing to defend itself with the resources available.

However, he feels that if there is to be any chance of success for their defense plan, South Vietnam needs urgently an additional \$722 million in very specific military supplies from the United States.

In my judgment, a stabilization of the military situation offers the best opportunity for a political solution.

I must, of course, as I think each of you would, consider the safety of nearly 6000 Americans who remain in South Vietnam and tens of thousands of South Vietnamese employees of the United States government, of news agencies, of contractors and businesses for many years whose lives, with their dependents, are in very grave peril.

There are tens of thousands of other South Vietnamese intellectuals, professors and teachers, editors and opinion leaders, who have supported the South Vietnamese cause and the alliance with the United States to whom we have a profound moral obligation.

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I am also mindful of our posture toward the rest of the world, and particularly of our future relations with the free nations of Asia. These nations must not think for a minute that the United States is pulling out on them or intends to abandon them to aggression.

I have, therefore, concluded that the national interests of the United States and the cause of world stability require that we continue to give both military and humanitarian assistance to the South Vietnamese.

Assistance to South Vietnam at this stage must be swift and adequate. Drift and indecision invite far deeper disaster. The sums I had requested before the major North Vietnamese offensive and the sudden South Vietnamese retreat are obviously inadequate.

Half-hearted action would be worse than none. We must act together and act decicisively.

I am, therefore, asking the Congress to appropriate without delay \$722 million for emergency military assistance, and an initial sum of \$250 million for economic and humanitarian aid for South Vietnam.

The situation in South Vietnam is changing very rapidly, and the need for emergency food, medicine and refugee relief is growing by the hour. I will work with the Congress in the days ahead to develop humanitarian assistance to meet these very pressing needs.

Fundamental decency requires that we do everything in our power to ease the misery and the pain of the monumental human crisis which has befallen the people of Vietnam. Millions have fled in the face of the Communist onslaught and are now homeless and are now destitute.

I hereby pledge in the name of the American people that the United States will make a maximum humanitarian effort to help care for and feed these hopeless victims.

Now I ask the Congress to clarify immediately its restrictions on the use of U.S. military forces in Southeast Asia for the limited purposes of protecting American lives by ensuring their evacuation, if this should be necessary.

I also ask prompt revision of the law to cover those Vietnamese to whom we have a very special obligation and whose lives may be endangered should the worst come to pass.

I hope that this authority will never have to be used, but if it is needed, there will be no time for a Congressional debate.

Because of the gravity of the situation, I ask the Congress to complete action on all of these measures not later than April 19.

In Cambodia, the situation is tragic. The United States and the Cambodian government have each made major efforts over a long period, and through many channels, to end that conflict, but because of their military successes, steady external support and their awareness of American legal restrictions, the Communist side has shown no interest in negotiation, compromise, or political solution.

And yet, for the past three months, the beleagured people of Phnom Penh have fought on, hoping against hope that the United States would not desert them, but instead provide the arms and ammunition they so badly needed.

I have received a moving letter from the new acting President of Cambodia, Saukham Khoy, and let me quote for you:

"Dear Mr. President," he wrote. "As the American Congress reconvenes to reconsider your urgent request for supplemental assistance for the Khmer Republic, I appeal to you to convey to the American legislators our plea not to deny these vital resources to us, if a nonmilitary solution is to emerge from this tragic five-year old conflict.

"To find a peaceful end to the conflict, we need time. I do not know how much time, but we all fully realize that the agony of the Khmer people cannot and must not go on much longer. However, for the immediate future, we need the rice to feed the hungry and the ammunition and the weapons to defend ourselves against those who want to impose their will by force.

"A denial by the American people of the means for us to carry on will leave us no alternative but inevitably abandoning our search for a solution, which will give our citizens some freedom of choice as to their future.

"For a number of years now, the Cambodian people have placed their trust in America. I cannot believe that this confidence was misplaced and that suddenly America will deny us the means which might give us a chance to find an acceptable solution to our conflict."

This letter speaks for itself. In January, I requested food and ammunition for the brave Cambodians, and I regret to say that as of this evening, it may be soon too late.

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Members of the Congress, my fellow Americans, this moment of tragedy for Indochina is a time of trial for us. It is a time for national resolve.

It has been said that the United States is overextended, that we have too many commitments too far from home, that we must re-examine what our truly vital interests are and shape our strategy to conform to them.

I find no fault with this as a theory, but in the real world, such a course must be pursued carefully and in close coordination with solid progress toward overall reduction in worldwide tensions.

We cannot, in the meantime, abandon our friends while our adversaries support and encourage theirs. We cannot dismantle our defenses, our diplomacy or our intelligence capability while others increase and strengthen theirs.

Let us put an end to self-inflicted wounds. Let us remember that our national unity is a most priceless asset. Let us deny our adversaries the satisfaction of using Vietnam to pit Americans against Americans.

At this moment, the United States must present to the world a united front. Above all, let's keep events in Southeast Asia in their proper perspective. The security and the progress of hundreds of millions of people everywhere depend importantly on us.

Let no potential adversary believe that our difficulties or our debates mean a slackening of our national will. We will stand by our friends, we will honor our commitments, and we will uphold our country's principles.

The American people know that our strength, our authority and our leadership have helped prevent a third world war for more than a generation. We will not shrink from this duty in the decades ahead.

Let me now review with you the basic elements of our foreign policy, speaking candidly about our strengths and our difficulties.

We must, first of all, face the fact that what has happened in Indochina has disquieted many of our friends, especially in Asia. We must deal with this situation promptly and firmly. To this end, I have already scheduled meetings with the leaders of Australia, New Zealand, Singapore and Indonesia, and I expect to meet with the leaders of other Asian countries, as well.

A key country in this respect is Japan. The warm welcome I received in Japan last November vividly symbolized for both our peoples the friendship and the solidarity of this extraordinary partnership.

I look forward, as I am sure all of you do, with very special pleasure to welcoming the Emperor when he visits the United States later this year.

We consider our security treaty with Japan the cornerstone of stability in the vast reaches of Asia and the Pacific. Our relations are crucial to our mutual well-being. Together, we are working energetically on the international multilateral agenda -- in trade, energy and food. We will continue the process of strengthening our friendship, mutual security and prosperity.

Also, of course, of fundamental importance is our mutual security relationship with the Republic of Korea which I reaffirmed on my recent visit. Our relations with Europe have 'never been stronger. There are no peoples with whom America's destiny has been more closely linked. There are no peoples whose friendship and cooperation are more needed for the future. For none of the members of the Atlantic community can be secure, none can prosper, none can advance unless we all do so together.

More than ever, these times demand our close collaboration in order to maintain the sure anchor or our common security in this time of international riptides; to work together on the promising negotiations with our potential adversaries; to pool our energies the great new economic challenge that faces us.

In addition to this traditional agenda, there are new problems involving energy, raw materials and the environment. The Atlantic nations face many and complex negotiations and decisions. It is time to take stock, to consult on our future, to affirm once again our cohesion and our common destiny.

I therefore expect to join with the other leaders of the Atlantic Alliance at a Western Summit in the very near future.

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Before this NATO Meeting, I earnestly ask Congress to weigh the broader considerations and consequences of its past actions on the complex Greek and Turkish dispute over Cyprus. Our foreign policy cannot be simply a collection of special economic or ethnic or ideological interests. There must be a deep concern for the overall design of our international actions.

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To achieve this design for peace and to assure that our individual acts have coherence, the Executive must have some flexibility in the conduct of foreign policy.

United States military assistance to an old and faithful ally, Turkey, has been out off by action of the Congress. This has imposed an embargo on military purchases by Turkey, extending evan to items already paid for -- an unprecedented act against a friend.

These moves, I know, were sincerely intended to influence Turkey in the Cyprus negotiations. I deeply share the concern of many citizens for the immense human suffering on Cyprus. I sympathize with the new democratic government in Greece. We are continuing our earnest efforts to find equitable solutions to the problems which exist between Greece and Turkey. But the results of the Congressional action has been to block progress towards reconciliation, thereby prolonging the suffering on Cyprus; to complicate our ability to promote successful negotiations; to increase the danger of a broader conflict.

Our longstanding relationship with Turkey is not simply a favor to Turkey. It is a clear and essential mutual interest. Turkey lies on the rim of the Soviet Union and at the gates of the Middle East. It is vital to the security of the eastern Mediterranean, the southern flank of Western Europe and the collective security of the Western Alliance.

Our U.S. military bases in Turkey are as critical to our own security as they are to the defense of NATO.

I therefore call upon the Congress to lift the American arms embargo against our Turkish ally by passing the bipartisan Mansfield-Scott bill now before the Senate. Only this will enable us to work with Greece and Turkey to resolve the differences between our allies.

I accept and I indeed welcome the bill's requirement for monthly reports to the Congress on progress toward a Cyprus settlement, but unless this is done with dispatch, forces may be set in motion within and between the two nations which could not be reversed.

At the same time, in order to strengthen the democratic government of Greece and to reaffirm our traditional ties with the people of Greece, we are actively discussing a program of economic and military assistance with them. We will shortly be submitting specific requests to the Congress in this regard.

A vital element of our foreign policy is our relationship with the developing countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. These countries must know that America is a true, that America is a concerned friend, reliable both in word and deed.

As evidence of this friendship, I urge the Congress to reconsider one provision of the 1974 Trade Act which has had an unfortunate and unintended impact on our relations with Latin America where we have such a long tie of friendship and cooperation.

Under this legislation, all members of OPEC were excluded from our generalized system of trade preferences. This, unfortunately, punished two South American friends -- Ecuador and Venezuela, as well as other OPEC nations, such as Nigeria and Indonesia, none of which participated in last year's oil embargo.

This exclusion has seriously complicated our new dialogue with our friends in this hemisphere.

I therefore endorse the amendments which have been introduced in the Congress to provide Executive authority to waive those restrictions on the Trade Act that are incompatible with our national interest.

The interests of America, as well as our allies, are vitally affected by what happens in the Middle East. So long as the state of tension continues, it threatens military crisis, the weakening of our alliances, the stability of the world economy and confrontation with a nuclear superpower. These are intolerable risks.

Because we are in the unique position of being able to deal with all the parties, we have, at their request, been engaged for the past year and a half in the peacemaking effort unparalleled in the history of the region.

Our policy has brought remarkable success on the road to peace. Last year, two major disengagement agreements were negotiated and implemented with our help. For the first time in 30 years, a process of negotiation on the basic political issues was begun and is continuing.

Unfortunately, the latest efforts to reach a further interim agreement between Israel and Egypt have been suspended. The issues dividing the parties are vital to them and not amenable to easy and to quick solutions.

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However, the United States will not be discouraged. The momentum toward peace that has been achieved over the last 18 months must, and will, be maintained.

The active role of the United States must, and will, be continued. The drift toward war must, and will, be prevented.

I pledge the United States to a major effort for peace in the Middle East, an effort which I know has the solid support of the American people and their Congress.

We are now examining how best to proceed. We have agreed in principle to reconvene the Geneva Conference. We are prepared as well to explore other forums.

The United States will move ahead on whatever course looks most promising, even towards an overall settlement or interim agreements should the parties themselves desire them. We will not accept stagnation or stalemate with all its attendant risks to peace and prosperity and to our relations in and outside of the region.

The national interest and national security require as well that we reduce the dangers of war. We shall strive to do so by continuing to improve our relations with potential adversaries.

The United States and the Soviet Union share an interest in lessening tensions and building a more stable relationship. During this process, we have never had any illusions. We know that we are dealing with a nation that reflects different principles and is our competitor in many parts of the globe.

Through a combination of firmness and flexibility, the United States, in recent years, laid the basis of a more reliable relationship, founded on futile interests and mutual restraint.

But we cannot expect the Soviet Union to show restraint in the face of the United States weakness or irresolution.

As long as I am President, America will maintain its strengths, its alliances and its principles as a prerequisite to a more peaceful planet. As long as I am President, we will not permit detente to become a license to fish in troubled waters. Detente must be -and I trust will be -- a two-way relationship.

Central to U.S.-Soviet relations today is the critical negotiation to control strategic nuclear weapons. We hope to turn the Vladivostok agreements into a final agreement this year at the time of General Secretary Brezhnev's visit to the United States.

Such an agreement would, for the first time, put a ceiling on the strategic arms race. It would mark a turning point in post-war history and would be a crucial step in lifting for mankind the threat of nuclear war.

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Our use of trade and economic sanctions as weapons to alter the internal conduct of other nations must also be seriously re-examined. However wellintentioned the goals, the fact is that some of our recent actions in the economic field have been selfdefeating, they are not achieving the objectives intended by the Congress and they have damaged our foreign policy.

The Trade Act of 1974 prohibits most favored nation treatment, credit and investment guarantees with the Soviet Union, so long as their emigration policies fail to meet our criteria.

The Soviet Union has, therefore, refused to put into effect the important 1972 trade agreement between our two countries. As a result, Western Europe and Japan have stepped into the breach.

Those countries have extended credits to the Soviet Union exceeding \$8 billion in the last six months. These are economic opportunities, jobs and business which could have gone to Americans. There should be no illusions about the nature of the Soviet system, but there should be no illusions about how to deal with it.

Our belief in the right of peoples of the world freely to emigrate has been well demonstrated. This legislation, however, not only harmed our relations with the Soviet Union, but seriously complicated the prospects of those seeking to emigrate.

The favorable trend, aided by quite diplomacy, by which emigration increased from 400 in 1968 to over 33,000 in 1973 has been seriously set back. Remedial legislation is urgently needed in our national interest.

With the People's Republic of China, we are firmly fixed on the course set forth in the Shanghai communique. Stability in Asia and the world require our constructive relations with one-fourth of the human race.

After two decades of mutual isolation and hostility, we have, in recent years, built a promising foundation. Deep differences in our philosophy and social systems will endure, but so should our mutual long-term interests and the goals to which our countries have jointly subscribed in Shanghai. I will visit China later this year to reaffirm these interests and to accelerate the improvement in our relations, and I was glad to welcome the distinguished Speaker and the distinguished Minority leader of the House back today from their constructive visit to the People's Republic of China.

Let me talk about new challenges. The issues I have discussed are the most pressing of the traditional agenda on foreign policy, but ahead of us also is a vast new agenda of issues in an interdependent world.

The United States -- with its economic power, its technology, its zest for new horizons -- is the acknowledged world leader in dealing with many of these challenges. If this is a moment of uncertainty in the world, it is even more a moment of rare opportunity.

We are summoned to meet one of man's most basic challenges -- hunger. At the World Food Conference last November in Rome, the United States outlined a comprehensive program to close the ominous gap between population growth and food production over the long term. Our technological skill and our enormous productive capacity are crucial to accomplishing this task.

The old order -- in trade, finance and raw materials -- is changing and American leadership is needed in the creation of new institutions and practices for worldwide prosperity and progress.

The world's oceans, with their immense resources and strategic importance, must become areas of cooperation rather than conflict. American policy is directed to that end.

Technology must be harnessed to the service of mankind while protecting the environment. This, too, is an arena for American leadership.

The interests and the aspirations of the developed and developing nations must be reconciled in a manner that is both realistic and humane. This is our goal in this new era.

One of the finest success stories in our foreign policy is our cooperative effort with other major energyconsuming nations. In little more than a year, together with our partners, we have created the International Energy Agency; we have negotiated an emergency sharing arrangement which helps to reduce the dangers of an embargo; we have launched major international conservation efforts; we have developed a massive program for the development of alternative sources of energy.

But the fate of all of these programs depends crucially on what we do at home. Every month that passes brings us closer to the day when we will be dependent on imported energy for 50 percent of our requirements. A new embargo under these conditions could have a devastating impact on jobs, industrial expansion, and inflation at home. Our economy cannot be left to the mercy of decisions over which we have no control.

I call upon the Congress to act affirmatively.

In a world where information is power, a vital element of our national security lies in our intelligence services. They are essential to our Nation's security in peace as in war. Americans can be grateful for the important, but largely unsung contributions and achievements of the intelligence services of this Nation.

It is entirely proper that this system be subject to Congressional review. But a sensationalized public debate over legitimate intelligence activities is a disservice to this Nation and a threat to our intelligence system.

It ties our hands while our potential enemies operate with secrecy, with skill and with vast resources. Any investigation must be conducted with maximum discretion and dispatch to avoid crippling a vital national institution.

Let me speak quite frankly to some in this Chamber and perhaps to some not in this Chamber. The Central Intelligence Agency has been of maximum importance to Presidents before me. The Central Intelligence Agency has been of maximum importance to me. The Central Intelligence Agency, and its associated intelligence organizations, could be of maximum importance to some of you in this audience who might be President at some later date.

I think it would be catastrophic for the Congress, or anyone else, to destroy the usefulness by dismantling, in effect, our intelligence systems upon which we rest so heavily.

Now, as Congress oversees intelligence activities it must, of course, organize itself to do so in a reasonable way. It has been traditional for the Executive to consult with the Congress through specially protected procedures that safeguard essential secrets, but recently, some of those procedures have been altered in a way that makes the protection of vital information very, very difficult.

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I will say to the leaders of the Congress, the House and the Senate, that I will work with them to devise procedures which will meet the needs of the Congress for review of intelligence agency activities and the needs of the Nation for an effective intelligence service.

Underlying any successful foreign policy is the strength and the credibility of our defense posture. We are strong and we are ready and we intend to remain so.

Improvement of relations with adversaries does not mean any relaxation of our national vigilance. On the contrary, it is the firm maintenance of both strength and vigilance that makes possible steady progress toward a safer and a more peaceful world.

The national security budget that I have submitted is the minimum the United States needs in this critical hour. The Congress should review it carefully, and I know it will. But it is my considered judgment that any significant reduction or revision would endanger our national security and thus jeopardize the peace.

Let no ally doubt our determination to maintain a defense second to none, and let no adversary be tempted to test our readiness or our resolve.

History is testing us today. We cannot afford indecision, disunity or disarray in the conduct of our foreign affairs. You and I can resolve here and now that this Nation shall move ahead with wisdom, with assurance and with national unity.

The world looks to us for the vigor and for the vision that we have demonstrated so often in the past in great moments of our history.

I see a confident America, secure in its strengths and values -- and determined to maintain both.

I see a conciliatory America, extending its hand to allies and adversaries alike, forming bonds of cooperation to deal with the vast problems facing us all.

I see a compassionate America, its heart reaching out to orphans, to refugees, and to our fellow human beings afflicted by war, by tyranny and by hunger.

As President, entrusted by the Constitution with primary responsibility for the conduct of our foreign affairs, I renew the plege I made last August: to work cooperatively with the Congress.

I ask that the Congress help to keep America's word good throughout the world. We are one Nation, one government, and we must have one foreign policy.

In an hour far darker than this, Abraham Lincoln told his fellow citizens, and I quote: "We cannot escape history. We of this Congress and this Administration will be remembered in spite of ourselves. No personal significance or insignificance can spare one or another of us."

We who are entrusted by the people with the great decisions that fashion their future can escape neither responsibilities nor our consciences.

By what we do now, the world will know our courage, our constancy and our compassion.

The spirit of America is good and the heart of America is strong. Let us be proud of what we have done and confident of what we can do.

And may God ever guide us to do what is right.

Thank you.

END

(AT 10:05 P.M. EDT)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 10, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

FROM:

Rod Hills

SUBJECT:

Discussion points on war risk insurance granted PanAm for flights to, from and over Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos.

Because of the increasing war risks in the Vietnam area, PanAm's commercial carrier (Lloyd's) notified PanAm approximately ten days ago that its premium rates would increase dramatically and would be cancelled at 12:01 a.m. April 11th.

PanAm notified the President by letter of April 7 that it could not fly into Saigon without war risk coverage and asked the President to authorize the Secretary of Transportation to grant Title XIII coverage.

The Secretary of Transportation found as required by Title XIII, that PanAm could not secure insurance adequate for flights into and out of Vietnam on reasonable terms and requested the President's approval to grant Title XIII coverage.

In fact, the Secretary quite some time ago had delegated such authority in the Department of Transportation to the Federal Aviation Administrator so that the statutory certification of the Secretary of Transportation was in fact made by that official.

The Federal Aviation Administrator also pursuant to specific delegation makes the determination of the premium to be paid by PanAm for such coverage. By long-standing practice that premium is set at about the rate charged for such war risk coverage to other carriers flying obviously to other spots. The premium to be set for this coverage is slightly above that which PanAm was paying prior to the increase in war activities around Saigon. PanAm wrote the President also to point out that the Department of Transportation under Title XIII could not give the complete coverage previously given by PanAm's commercial insurance program and that PanAm therefore would need a broader indemnification from the government than the Department of Transportation could give. After consultation between the Secretaries of State, Transportation and Defense, and the National Security Council, it was determined to be in the national interest to maintain scheduled air service into Saigon. In response the Department of Defense has granted the additional indemnification that PanAm required for such continued service.


By reason of the above facts, PanAm will be insured as of 12:01 a.m. for essentially the same risks that were previously covered by a commercial carrier and PanAm will pay a premium slightly in excess of what it was paying prior to the recent increase in war activities.

The Department of Defense regularly provides complete war risk coverage for chartered aircraft operating in and out of war risk areas for the evacuation of refugees and for other humanitarian purposes.

It was determined by the above governmental officials that the cancellation of scheduled air service by PanAm into Saigon would severely hinder the departure of American citizens and would place additional demands for U. S. military help in removing civilians.

Attached are copies of the documents considered by the President in approving the Title XIII coverage. It should be emphasized that Presidential approval as required by statute was directly solely to the Title XIII coverage of the Department of Transportation and was not required for the broader indemnity granted by the Department of Defense.

Attachments



XXXXXXXX

MILITARY AIRLIFT COMMAND SCOTT AIR FORCE BASE, ILLINOIS

LEGAL FEES AND EXPENSES PAREN INCURRED BY THE CONTRACTOR IN THE DEFENSE IN DISCHARGE OF CLAINS OF OTHERS RESPECTING PROPERTY OR RESPECTING DEATH MA DISEASE CMA DISABILITY CMA INJURY CMA OR IMPAIRMENTS OF RIGHTS OF PERSONS CMA INCLUDING EMPLOYEES OF THE CONTRACTOR CMA ARISING OUT OF OR IN NY MANNER CONNECTED WITH THE OPERATION OF ANY AIRCRAFT IN THE PERFORMANCE IF SERVICES REFERRED TO IN ONE ABOVE STP THE INDEMNITIES PROVIDED FOR ABOVE N THIS PARAGRAPH SHALL BE APPLICABLE WHETHER OR NOT THE LOSS IS CAUSED Y ANY ACT OF NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE CONTRACTOR CMA ITS OFFICERS MA AGENTS OR EMPLOYEES IN CONNECTION WITH SUCH OPERATION OF SUCH AIRCRAFT ND

PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS, INC.

JAMES J. RICE STAFF VICE PRESIDENT-MILITARY TRAFFIC

The Friday States of a THE TRUE AND THE ETTERS OF A DECEMBER ONLY WILLIS GRAETEN SE MERCATED BY EROSSING OUR THE WORD LAND MESSAGE WILL AT WITH 18 1 1.1.22.22 DATE April 04 1975 PRICE.TY. HEADQUARTERS MILITARY AIRLIFT COMMAND SCOTT AIR FORCE EASE, ILLINOIS XXXXXXX

ATTENTION: ARTHUR W. PURKEL, AIRFORCE CONTRACTING

(cont'd)

OFFICE? YR TEL APRIL 3, 1975 CONCERNING INDEMNIFICATION AND INSURANCE PROVISIONS BE APPLICABLE TO MAC CONTRACT CARRIERS' PARTICIPATION IN VIETNAM EVACUATI URAM CMA IN VIEW OF TOTAL INABILITY TO PROCURE LIABILITY INSURANCE CHA TRICTED COVERAGE UNDER TITLE XIII INSURANCE AND EXCESSIVE COSTS FOR MERCIAL HULL AND WAR RISK INSURANCE CMA PAN AM MUST INSIST UPON OBTAINING INDEMNITY ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES AND FULLY ENFORCEABLE BEFORE WE CAN STDER PARTICIPATION IN SUCH PROGRAM COLON QTE THE GOVERNMENT HEREBY IMNIFIES THE CONTRACTOR AGAINST AND SHALL HOLD IT HARMLESS FROM VE/ ANY TOTAL LOSS PAREN WHICH SHALL INCLUDE DAMAGE RENDERING REPAIR BACTICAL OR UNECONOMICAL PAREN OF ANY AIRCRAFT OF THE CONTRACTOR ENCAGED PERATION TO OR FROM VIETNAM CMA INCLUDING ANY PERIOD WHEN SUCH AIRCRAFT BE ON THE GROUND IN VIETNAM CMA IN AN AMOUNT EQUAL TO THAT FOR WHICH THE RACTOR OTHERWISE INSURES SUCH AIRCRAFT WHILE NOT ENGAGED IN SUCH OPERATE AND FOR DAMAGE TO SUCH AIRCRAFT NOT AMOUNTING TO TOTAL LOSS THEREOF IN MOUNT EQUAL TO THE COST TO THE CONTRACTOR OF REPAIRING SUCH DAMAGE AND ORING SUCH AIRCRAFT TO AIRWORTHY CONDITION CMA BUT NOT MORE THAN THE INT WHICH WOULD BE APPLICABLE TO TOTAL LOSS THEREOF CMA AND IO/ ALL LOSSES OR DESTRUCTION OF OR DAMAGE TO ANY OF THE CONTRACTORS PERTY PAREN OTHER THAN AIRCRAFT PAREN CNA USED IN THE PERFORMANCE OF ICES REFERRED TO IN ONE ABOVE CMA AND ALL LOSSES AND EXPENSES PAREN



THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20590

April 10, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Title XIII - WAR RISK INSURANCE, provides that the Secretary of Transportation, with the approval of the President, and after such consultation with interested agencies of the Government as the President may require, may provide insurance against loss or damage arising out of war risks in the manner and to the extent provided in Title XIII, whenever it is determined by the Secretary of Transportation that such insurance adequate for the needs of the air commerce of the United States cannot be obtained on reasonable terms and conditions from companies authorized to do an insurance business in a State of the United States.

The Department of Transportation has consulted with the Departments of State, Defense and Justice.

Investigation of the availability of such war risk insurance has been made and it is my finding that such aviation war risk insurance adequate for the needs of the air commerce of the United States cannot be obtained on reasonable terms and conditions.


Therefore, in order that the aviation war risk program may be placed in effect, your approval is requested.

William T. Coleman, Jr. Secretary of Transportation

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

OFFIN ANT

William T. Seawell Chairman of the Board



The President of The United States of America The White House Washington, D. C. 20500

Mr. President:

We are, of course, anxious to cooperate in the movement of refugees, orphans and American personnel from Vietnam under a program which we understand is being developed by the U. S. Government, and to endeavor to continue our scheduled and charter services to Vietnam. However, there are problems which we have not been able to solve through our own efforts.

We have been advised by our insurance underwriters that they are terminating, effective 12:01 AM EST on April 11, 1975, our third party liability War Risk coverage with respect to operations to, from and over Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. We are seeking to reinstate this coverage but have not been successful to date. Under the terms of our existing indenture and mortgage with our creditors, we cannot operate any air craft into any recognized area of hostilities unless fully covered by war risk insurance or a United States Government contractural indemnity. Further the premiums on our aircraft overed under our War Risk hull insurance have been quoted at 25¢ per \$100 of aircraft insured value per trip on any additional flights into Vietnam and this coverage is subject to revised rating or cancellation at any time. This amounts to a premium of approximately \$12,500 for a 707 aircraft, and \$62,500 for a 747 aircraft, per trip.

We have sought coverage under Title XIII of the Federal Aviation Act, but have found, however, that such coverage is restricted and does not cover all the risks which are insured by our commercial insurance program such as:

- a. Riots and civil commotion
- b. Sabotage and malicious acts or other acts intended to cause loss or damage
- c. Hijacking, any unlawful seizure, diversion or exercise of control of the aircraft
- d. . The detonation of an explosive
- e. The exercise of military power by a foreign government

The President of The United States of America

Enclosure -

Therefore, due to lack of insurance coverage and prohibitive costs, if Pan Am is to participate in such a program we must secure compensation for additional costs for insurance over the costs in effect prior to March 31, 1975 or a fully enforceable indemnity and hold harmless agreement by the U. S. Government applicable to all aircraft hulls, third party and crew liability involved in such operation. Such indemnity and hold harmless provisions are described in our wire dated April 4, 1975 to the Military Airlift Command, a copy of which is enclosed herewith. If such coverage cannot be obtained by 12:01 AM EST on April 11, 1975, the time of termination of our war risk liability insurance as referred to above, we will not only be denied the opportunity to expand our operations to and from Vietnam but will be forced to suspend all scheduled and charter service to Vietnam.-

2

We would appreciate your good offices in developing such a United States Government indemnification program.

. :

Respectfully yours,

William T. Scawell

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10111111212121 21 1034

Copies of this letter have also been sent to the following persons:

Attorney General of the United States

Secretary of Defense

Secretary of State

Secretary of Transportation

Acting Chairman, Civil Aeronautics Board

4. 4.

Acting Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 10, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

RODERICK M. HILLS R.H.

SUBJECT:

FROM:

War Risk Insurance for PanAm Flights to Southeast Asia

PanAm's President has notified you by letter of April 7, 1975 (see Tab A) that it must terminate its scheduled operations to, from and over Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos because its insurance underwriters are terminating its third party liability War Risk Coverage as of 12:01 a.m., April 11. The Secretary of State has determined that it is essential to continue these flights, and that they continue to be scheduled rather than charter flights.

Under Title XIII of the Federal Aviation Act, the Secretary of Transportation with the approval of the President may provide such insurance against loss or damages arising out of War Risk, if it is determined by the Secretary of Transportation that the carrier cannot obtain such insurance on reasonable terms or conditions from private carriers that is adequate for the air commerce of the United States. The Secretary of Transportation has consulted with the Departments of State, Defense, and Justice and finds that PanAm cannot obtain such insurance on reasonable terms and conditions, and that such insurance is important to adequate air commerce of the United States (see Tab B).

It is apparent, therefore, that the PanAm flights will terminate unless you approve the proposal of Secretary Coleman to provide War Risk Insurance Coverage to PanAm for so long as it conducts scheduled operations to, from and over Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. Transportation will set a premium for this insurance at a price they believe to be reasonable. Your approval of the Secretary's proposal is supported by the Departments of State, Defense and Justice and by the National Security Council.

In granting this approval, you should know that the insurance to be provided under Title XIII is limited to so-called "hull insurance" which does not cover all the risks now insured by PanAm's commercial insurance program. Such excess insurance would be provided to PanAm by the Department of Defense under authority which they have regularly exercised, which does not require your approval, and which is presently being utilized to provide insurance coverage for presently operating charter services provided to Vietnam. A description of the DOD indemnification is attached (Tab C). State has notified Defense that it will take responsibility for seeking whatever additional appropriations may be necessary for this excess insurance. After discussions with the above Departments and the NSC, we recommend the Secretary's request be granted.

APPROVE

DISAPPROVE

Attachments

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

April 11, 1975

Office of the White House Press Secretary

THE WHITE HOUSE

TEXT OF LETTERS FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE

April 11, 1975

Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:)

I hereby transmit draft legislation to carry out the recommendations made in my April 10, 1975 address to the Congress with respect to Indochina.

The enclosed draft bills authorize additional military, economic, and humanitarian assistance for South Vietnam, and also clarify the availability of funds for the use of the Armed Forces of the United States for humanitarian evacuation in Indochina, should this become necessary.

I urge the immediate consideration and enactment of these measures.


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Sincerely,

GERALD R. FORD



A BILL

To authorize additional military assistance for.

South Vietnam, and for other purposes.

1	Be it enacted by the Senate and the
2	House of Representatives of the United States
3	of America in Congress assembled, That para-
4 '	graph (1) of section 401(a) and subsection
5	(b) of Public Law 89-367, approved March 15,
6	1966 (80 Stat. 37), as amended, are amended by
7	striking out "\$1,000,000,000" each place it
8	appears and inserting in lieu thereof
9	"\$1,422,000,000".

1,000,000,000 -700,000,000 -700,000,000 -700,000 +.422,000,000

A BILL

To clarify restrictions on the availability of funds for the use of United States Armed Forces in Indochina, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and the House 1 , of Representatives of the United States of 2 3 America in Congress assembled, That nothing contained in section 839 of Public Law 93-437. 4 section 741 of Public Law 93-238, section 30 of 5 Public Law 93-189, section 806 of Public Law 93-155. 6 section 13 of Public Law 93-126, section 108 of 7 Public Law 93-52, section-307 of Public Law 93-50, 8 or any other comparable provision of law shall be 9 construed as limiting the availability of funds 10 for the use of the Armed Forces of the United 11 States to aid, assist, and carry out humanitarian 12 evacuation, if ordered by the President. 13

To authorize additional economic assistance for

South Vietnam, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and the House 1. 2 of Representatives of the United States of 3 America in Congress assembled, That in addition to amounts otherwise authorized for such purposes, 4 there is authorized to be appropriated to the 5 President not to exceed \$73,000,000 to carry out 6 7 the purposes of part V of the Foreign Assistance 3 Act of 1961, as amended, for South Vietnam for the fiscal year 1975. Funds made available for-9 economic and humanitarian assistance for-Indo-10 11 china shall be available after the date of enactment of this Act for obligation without 12 regard to the limitations contained in sections - 13 36 and 38 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, 14 15 Public Law 93-559, approved December 30, 1974 (88 16-Stat. 1795).

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 12, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR:

JOHN O. MARSH

THRU:

FROM:

SUBJECT:

MAX L. FRIEDERSDORF

VERN LOEN VL

Calls to Members (Phnom Penh Evacuation)

Here are our reports on the telephone calls we made last night in regard to the Phnom Penh evacuation.

1 .

Attachments

JOHN MC FALL

Date:

Time:

Place:

Contact:

Comment:

April 11, 1975

8:15 p.m.

At home locally

Vern Loen spoke with Member personally

Very little reaction to notice of Phnon Penh evacuation. Immediately moved into a lengthy discussion on tactics for getting some military aid into South Vietnam in keeping with the President's request.

Pointed out that the Speaker, Senator Mansfield and the rest of the Democratic Leadership will meet on Monday morning to discuss strategy. McFall will be absent at that time.

Feels the most we can get is the \$300 M already authorized. Says Mahon does not want to move without an authorization for fear of Caucus reaction. Says a Floor amendment for the \$300 M should be offered to a supplemental authorization bill coming up Tuesday, April 15. Jack Kemp has expressed interest in such a tactic in the past.

Wants to know how serious the Administration is about its request for \$722 M in military aid. Hoped Jack Marsh would call him at his office on Saturday morning, April 12. If really serious for the full amount, it would require activating George Meany. Feels there should be a Floor vote on this issue.

BOB WILSON

Date:

April 11, 1975

Time:

Place:

8:12 p.m.

Ford's Theater

Contact:

Comment:

Vern Loen spoke with Member personally

Glum news - not unexpected. Appreciate your notifying me in advance. (No questions).

WILLIAM BROOMFIELD

0

Date:	April 11, 1975
Time:	8:43 p.m.
Place:	At home, Washington, D. C.
Contact:	Charles Leppert spoke with Member personally
Comment:	No Comment. "It's ok."

BOB MICHEL

Date:

Time:

Place:

Contact:

Comments:

April 11, 1975

10:18 p.m.

At home, Washington, D.C.

Charles Leppert spoke with Member personally

Did you say they were going to use helicopters? Yes. How many people are we talking about, at the last count I heard it was around 400? Approximately 150 Americans and 450 Cambodians and third country nationals. When is this going to take place, in the next day or so? It is expected to be within a few hours. If you have anything further, I'll be in the office tomorrow morning, so give me a call.

DR. THOMAS MORGAN

Date:	April 11, 1975
Time:	8:30 p.m.
Place:	Fredericktown, Pennsylvania
Contact:	Not available. White House Operator left word to call back.

Comments:

None

TIP O'NEILL

Date:	April 11, 1975
Time:	8:19 p.m.
Place:	Mass.
Contact:	Doug Bennett spoke with Member personally
Comment:	Only Americans to be evacuated? No. Thought there were only 50 Americans, Henry told us that the other day. He was probably referring to the Embassy staff but there will be other U.S. nationals, therefore, more Americans (Doug told him). There were no other questions and he thanked Doug.

MEL PRICE

Date:	April 11, 1975
Time:	8:05 p.m.
Place:	Chicago, Ill.
Contact:	Doug Bennett spoke with Member personally
Comment:	I expected this - fine - thank you. (he had no questions)

TIP O'NEILL

Date:

Time:

April 11, 1975

8:19 p.m.

Mass.

Place:

Contact:

Comment:

Only Americans to be evacuated? No. Thought there were only 50 Americans, Henry told us that the other day. He was probably referring to the Embassy staff but there will be other U.S. nationals, therefore,

Q

Doug Bennett spoke with Member personally

more Americans (Doug told him). There were no other questions and he thanked Doug.

CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP CONTACTS--PHNOM PENH EVACUATION 4/3/75

HOUSE

Albert - Max Rhodes - Max O'Neill Michel - CL Price Wilson - Morgan Broomfield - CL McFall - Utro Time of Call Lucations Reached Comments

> cabled in Equpt last week

Tip O'Neill

SENATE

Eastland Mansfield Scott, H. Griffin Byrd, R. Stennis Thurmond Sparkman Case Time - 8:19 Place - Mass. Comments - Only Americans? Thought there? were only 50 there. Henry touch US that the other day. Doug's response includes Enloasey staff and other U.S. nationals. therefore, more Americans. NO other questions thanked we.

Price

Time - 8:05 Place - Chicago Comments - 1 expected this - Fine - thank you.

SECRET

Charles and the second se

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4 (b) White House Guide Lines, Feb. 24, 1983 By WARS, Date 4/27/84 Union I

- Jan Inter

You will recall that last Thursday I advised you that the President had authorized the United States Ambassador in Phnom Penh to begin the evacuation of the American staff there. It will be necessary to undertake the final phase shortly, and it is planned that this phase of the evacuation will employ the use of helicopter airlift and U. S. Marine security forces, the latter being necessary to assure security for the landing zones. Tactical air cover has also been authorized.

As a part of this evacuation, there will be included with the U. S. Embassy staff other American nationals, and to the extent airlift capabilities will permit, Cambodians and third country nationals who have been associated with us.

Press inquintes -Prease do not confirm or deny before midnight.

> DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4 (b) White House Guide Lines, Feb. 24, 1983 By Dato NARS, Date <u>4/27/84</u>

C 12 OF 15 COPIES Department of State N00859 SCONET STATES OF PAGE 01 STATE 075750 82 DRIGIN NODS-30 INFO DCT-01 /001 R DRAFTED BY H:KBJENKINS:RMS APPROVED BY A - KEMPTUN JENKINS M-MR. EAGLEBURGER (SUBS) L-HR, LEIGH EA=HR. HABIB DUD-MR.FRYKLUND HH-MR , HULTHIUS NSC-GEN. SCONCROFT S/S - MR. DKT 12 101540 D 032158Z APR 75 ZFF4 FH SECSIATE WASHUC TO AMENBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE AMCONSUL JERUSALEM NIACT IMMEDIATE SER STATE 075750 NODIS E.O. 11652: GDS TAGS: PFOR, OREP (O'NEILL, THOMAS; PRICE, MELVIN) SUBJECT: CAMBODIA FOR THE ANBASSADOR 1. PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM JOHN MARSH, . WHITE HUUSE, TO CONGRESSMEN THOMAS UN NEILL AND MELVIN PRICE ASAP: 2. BEGIN MESSAGE; THE PRESIDENT HAS AUTHORIZED OUR AMBASSADOR IN PHNON PENH TO BEGIN EVACUATION OF THE AMERI-CAN STAFF UNDER OUR ESTABLISHED EVACUATION PLANS, PHASE ONE WILL DEGIN IMPEDIATELY AND WILL REDUCE DOWN TO A DARE CEPLET DA10. 4/27/84

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETAR

Department of State

PAGE 02 STATE 075750

MINIMUM ESSENTIAL STAFF THOSE AMERIGANS REMAINING. IT WILL UTILIZE FIXED-WING AIRCRAFT AND THE CIVILIAN AIR-PORT, MOST US CITIZENS, SOME THIRD-COUNTRY NATIONALS, AND SOME KHMER WILL BE LIFTED OUT UNDER PHASE ONE.

SI-CULT

3. SHOULD IT BECOME ESSENTIAL-BECAUSE OF SECURITY DEVELOP-MENTS IN PHNOM PENH-TO REMOVE THE REMAINING MINIMUM STAFF, THIS WILL BE DONE. YOU SHOULD BE AWARE THAT THIS FINAL STEP COULD REQUIRE, IN EXTREME CIRCUMSTANCES, THE USE OF HELICUPTERS AND LIMITED NUMBER OF MARINE SECURITY FORCES TO SECURE LANDING ZONES.

4. IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THIS INFORMATION BE HELD IN STRICTEST CONFIDENCE TO PREVENT ANY PUBLICITY THAT COULD JEOPARDIZE THE LIVES OF THE REMAINING AMERICANS IN PHNOM PENH. END MESSAGE.

5. PLEASE CONFIRM WHEN MESSAGE HAS BEEN DELIVERED. KISSINGER

bill itt.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 12, 1975

Dear Mr. Speaker

As you and other members of Congress were advised, in view of circumstances in Cambodia, the United States had certain contingency plans to utilize United States Armed Forces to assure the safe evacuation of U. S. Nationals from that country. On Friday, 11 April 1975, the Khmer Communists forces had ruptured Government of the Khmer Republic (GKR) defensive lines to the north, northwest and east of Phnom Penh and were within mortar range of Pochentong Airfield and the outskirts of Phnom Penh. In view of this deteriorating military situation, and on the recommendations of the American Ambassador there, I ordered U. S. military forces to proceed with the planned evacuation out of consideration for the safety of U. S. citizens.

In accordance with my desire that the Congress be fully informed on this matter, and taking note of Section 4 of the War Powers Resolution (P.L. 93-148), I wish to report to you that the first elements of the U. S. forces entered Cambodian airspace at 8:34 P.M. EDT on 11 April. Military forces included 350 ground combat troops of the U. S. Marines, 36 helicopters, and supporting tactical air and command and control elements. The Marines were deployed from helicopters to assure the security of helicopter landing zone within the city of Phnom Penh. The first helicopter landed at approximately 10:00 P.M. EDT 11 April 1975, and the last evacuees and ground security force Marines departed the Cambodian landing zone at approximately 12:20 A.M. on 12 April 1975. The last elements of the force to leave received hostile recoilless rifle fire. There was no firing by U. S. forces at any time during the operation. No U. S. Armed Forces personnel were killed, wounded or missing, and there were no casualties among the American evacuees.

Although these forces were equipped for combat within the meaning of Section 4(a)(2) of Public Law 93-148, their mission was to effect the evacuation of U. S. Nationals. Present information indicates that a total of 82 U. S. citizens were evacuated and that the task force was also able to accommodate 35 third country nationals and 159 Cambodians including employees of the U. S. Government.

The operation was ordered and conducted pursuant to the President's Constitutional executive power and authority as Commander-in-Chief of U. S. Armed Forces.

I am sure you share with me my pride in the Armed Forces of the United States and my thankfulness that the operation was conducted without incident.

Sincerely,

Henred A. Fred

The Honorable James O. Eastland President Pro Tempore of the Senate United States Senate Washington, D. C.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 17, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: LT. GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT

THRU:

MAX L. FRIEDERSDORF

FROM:

VERN LOEN

SUBJECT:

Republican Whip Check

House GOP Whip, Bob Michel, R-Ill., conducted a Republican Whip Check today on the following question:

"Would you vote for any military assistance to Vietnam?"

Responses were as follows:

62 N

14 Undecided

23 NR

It is worth noting that had this vote been taken early this week there probably would have been more like 100 No's. Time seems to be working in our favor as the Members learn more about the military situation and evacuation contingency. Thus, a delay over the weekend capped by Secretary Kissinger testifying before the House Appropriations Committee on Monday and movement on the Senate side should prove salutary.

There should be no problem with humanitarian assistance. The Morgan-Broomfield bill passed this afternoon by a vote of 18 to 7. Amendments offered by Hamilton-du Pont-Biester were also defeated 18 to 7.

⁴⁵ Y (many qualified)

TO:	MAX FRIEDERSDORF
FROM:	DOUG BENNETT
SUBJECT:	RVM Military Aid

BOB SIKES

He feels the best and fastest avenue is to pick up the unused authorization of \$300 M for military assistance. Mahon would prefer the authorizing committees to act first (getting him out of the middle). Mahon has called a full committee hearing for Monday afternoon with Kissinger testifying. Bob feels the tide is turning.

JOE WAGGONNER

Joe feels it is of utmost importance to get the issue to the Floor regardless of the committee from which it comes - Appropriations or Armed Services. The Democratic Caucus (Phil Burton through his brother John) will work hard to prevent military assistance. He is not sure the tide is turning because the situation in Vietnam is so fluid (the difficulties in Cambodia between yesterday and today, for example). Joe does feel some military assistance will be forthcoming but not to the extent of \$722M. Such military assistance will reflect the amount needed to get the Americans out. He said that it was very difficult for him to judge this one but stressed the importance of getting the issue to the Floor. Congress of the United States House of Representatives Washington, D.C. 20515 April 17, 1975

President Gerald R. Ford The White House Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

Many Members of Congress are extremely disturbed over the apparent lack of urgency in the evacuation of American nationals from Vietnam.

It is our intention only to do what is necessary to get the Administration to see to it that Ambassador Martin expedite the orderly removal of American nationals from Vietnam.

In the absence of any clear indication from you that you are taking firm action to insure that Ambassador Martin does expedite the orderly evacuation of American nationals from Vietnam, we intend to circulate the attached Resolution for signature tomorrow morning and to take action to bring it to the House floor for debate and vote.

We sincerely hope that you will take the steps that are appropriate to expedite the evacuation of American nationals from Vietnam.

Sincerely,

Burton John L Fimothy

Neal

Hal 1

Birkley, Bedell

Robert J Cornell

Herbert Harris, E.

This ist station for the class Likan John W. Jenrette, Jr. Gladys Noon Speilman Theodore M. Risenhoover SIX Arula Norman Y. Mineta Jim Lloyd 120/10 an alla Patricia_Schroeder Bob Carr ISA 149 -Les Aspin Anthony (Toby) Moffett White 4 our 10 Munin Edward Mezvinsky Abner /J. Mikva " Edward W. Pattison Christopher J. Dodd Hours Thomas J? Downey Andrew Maguire 57 Bella S. Abzdg list Robert W/ Edgar Sharley Chisholm a prucus Henry J. Nowak Max S. Bayers a sile (Alvin Baldus erry M. Paterson Marilyn Lloyd lland Javitua Leus Allan T. How Martha Keys ma Atan Tom Harkin George E. Miller (m Richer Gil Natingon 22. Henry A. Waxman James Weaver Neptin 7.14: Michael, T. Blouin David W. Evans A Mark W. Hannaford William M. Brodhead

94th Congress 1st Session

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

Whereas the safety of American nationals in Vietnam is of great concern to the American people,

- Whereas it is currently still possible to evacuate those American nationals from Vietnam without the involvement of American combat forces,
- Whereas reports from Vietnam indicate that Ambassador Graham Martin has not, and is still not, taking decisive action to expedite the evacuation of American nationals from Vietnam while it is still possible to do so without the involvement of American combat forces,
- Whereas Ambassador Martin is accountable to the President of the United States,
- Whereas the President of the United States is ultimately responsible for the safe evacuation of American nationals from Vietnam.

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That it is the sense of the Congress that --

The President should take immediate action to order Ambassador Martin to expedite the orderly evacuation of American nationals from Vietnam, and see that such prompt, orderly evacuation is accomplished.



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

the April 17, 1975

To: Vern Loen

FYI.

Les Janka

ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUE OF FURTHER AID TO SOUTH VIETNAM

By Rep. James M. Jeffords

April 14, 1975

The request by President Ford for additional military and humanitarian aid for South Vietnam raises three very important questions.

The first question is whether American aid is necessary to protect the lives of the 6,000 Americans who remain in Vietnam. The second is whether there is any possibility of political reforms in South Vietnam which would make it morally worthwhile for the United States to protect the government there any longer. The third is whether humanitarian aid would actually reach the suffering people for whom it is intended.

These are terribly difficult questions, and given the present military situation, there is little time to seek answers.

The issue of providing military aid to help save American lives in Vietnam was emphasized by President Ford in his address to the Congress the evening of April 10. The President, however failed to give the Congress the information needed to pass judgement, objectively, on that crucial matter.

I believe that if the President can demonstrate that a shortage of weapons and ammunition poses an immediate threat to American lives, then Congress will have a duty to respond by supplying minimal military aid on an interim, short-term, one-shot basis. This interim aid should continue for no longer than three months; hopefully long enough, if worse came to worst, for an orderly evacuation of Americans and endangered South Vietnamese friends. But, I emphasize again, the first step--making available reliable information--must come from the President, and I call upon him to do so immediately.

In response to the second question, of whether South Vietnam deserves our continued support, I reiterate the position which I have consistently stated in the past. I cannot possibly support a continued American effort to prop up a dictatorship such as the present Thieu regime. Over the long run, the only possible justification for continued military assistance would be a realistic chance that a measure of freedom and democracy could be established in Vietnam. President Thieu's resistance to political reforms, in violation of the 1973 Paris accords, is probably the chief reason for the agony and frustration felt by so many Americans regarding our continued assistance to South Vietnam.

The time has come for the U.S. to serve notice on President Thieu, in no uncertain terms, that we will not continue to prop up his dictatorship. I believe the only justification for aid beyond a short-term interim period would be a meaningful commitment by South Vietnam for political reforms and negotiations with the North. My personal feeling is that this could be accomplished only by the resignation of President Thieu, although it would probably be inappropriate for me to specifically call for his resignation. But we can no longer accept promises for future reforms. Unless there is immediate action by South Vietnam toward reform and negotiation, American military aid should be cut off completely, after the possible brief interim I have suggested.

In the minds of some, this position may possibly raise the question of "improper influence" upon a foreign government. In response, I can only say that Americans, after all these years of assistance to South Vietnam, have a right to know that any further aid will go to a government worthy of their support.

The third question is that of humanitarian aid. Like almost every other American, I want to do everything possible to supply food, medicine, and whatever other non-military supplies are needed to relieve the terrible suffering in Vietnam. The problem is that in the past, all evidence has indicated that our humanitarian aid has been diverted from its intended recipients, because of corruption in the Thieu government.

Therefore, I believe we should supply humanitarian aid, through a third party which would assure it reaches the people who so desperately need it. The United Nations would be a desirable intermediary; however, all indications are that the U.N. would refuse this role. The solution may be provided by another country, such as Indonesia, which is already playing a limited intermediary role in the Vietnam dispute. Introduction of a third party would allow us to significantly reduce the number of Americans remaining in Vietnam.

In summary, my position includes three steps. First, the Congress should provide limited military aid for no longer than three months, if--and only if--firm evidence is produced showing that such aid is needed to protect American lives. Second, notice should be served on South Vietnam that the government there will receive no further military assistance unless it takes firm, decisive, and tangible steps toward political reform and negotiation with the North. Third, humanitarian aid should be provided through a third party, with Indonesia appearing to be the most likely prospect.

These steps will not provide a happy, immediate solution to the tragic situation in Vietnam. Nothing will. But I believe they constitute the most rational Congressional response to President Ford's request.