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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

April 2, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: JACK MARSH  
THRU: MAX FRIEDERSDORF  
FROM: CHARLES LEPPERT, JR. *CLJ*  
SUBJECT: Reaction of Member Contacts on  
Situation in Southeast Asia.

George Mahon Not in his district. American people are disturbed about the situation in South Vietnam. But there does not seem to be a change in the American people's sentiment that the South Vietnam Army will not fight. Americans do not feel they should stay in there until the end of the century. The U.S. has expended tens of billions of dollars to help these people defend themselves from the Communists. The fault lies not with the lack of American aid but the unwillingness of the South Vietnam army to fight. People here feel more military aid is money down the drain and eventually there will be a blood bath in South Vietnam. The patience of the American people has been worn down on this issue. President ought to avoid criticism of the Congress on this. The \$300 million requested for aid would not have changed the situation in South Vietnam or brought about sweetness and light there.

Al Cederberg His own assessment is that it's a sad situation but don't know what we can do about it. American people are sad about it but they are frankly disillusioned and do not know what to think about the situation there. Most people now are concerned about the South Vietnam Army and need an assessment of their abilities especially in light of the abandonment of equipment, etc. Looks as though Thieu's withdrawal was premature and ill-advised.

John McFall Feel strongly about aid to South Vietnam. People in California want people of South Vietnam to have a chance but Thieu made decision to withdraw and retreat leaving millions of people to die or be stranded with the Communists. President should take a stand and not run from the press on this issue. He cited John Murtha's talk with George Meany and support of AFL-CIO for aid. Feels President should talk to Meany. Questioned Phil Burton's position and stated "he's probably saying my people were right and we are winning."



Most Members of Congress are not aware of the offers made by South Vietnam government to bring about settlement. People now are asking if there is anything that can be done to help these people? Is it possible to help them now?

Feels President should talk to American people and tell them the status and situation in Southeast Asia and what's possible and not possible for us to do and why it's important for us to do anything. Always been the policy of the U.S. that if 20 million people want to fight for their freedom we as a nation could support them. My people in California want to help save these people. Joe Addabbo and a substantial group in the Congress want to help but don't know what will happen now under present circumstances.

Bob Michel            Reaction to Southeast Asia is mixed. American people are uncertain and unsettled about the situation there. They are looking to Congress for answers and asking if the U.S. is throwing in the sponge? On Cambodia he says yes but on South Vietnam it's different he says and would vote for more money and aid. But then raises the question that the South Vietnam Army not holding up so it looks like we can only provide humanitarian assistance. It's too hard to call. People want answers but the sentiment in Congress is no military aid. The way the army has folded up makes military aid unconscionable. He doesn't know specific military situation but it doesn't look like they can regroup to amount to any kind of offensive without some kind of leadership and discipline.

Sam Stratton        Strongly favors aid to Southeast Asia if it can be effective aid and not too late to be helpful. Catching Hell for taking that position but some people that listen are also in favor while most are against that position. Still feels this is a case where the U.S. should stick its neck out and make a real fight for aid for these people. Most in Congress against that position and the 75 freshmen are a real problem on this.

If President laid the facts on the line and stated the need to give these people a real chance to defend against the Communists and it would take X amount of dollars for ammo and equipment to do it then ask us to get on with it, I'd support the President - only problem is the recent situation of abandonment of equipment, etc. -- but we ought to go ahead and make a fight for aid to these people.

Ralph Preston        Not available - away on vacation.

Sam Devine            Called to ask if anything is being formulated on helping Vietnam refugees. Stated that he was anticipating a lot of calls in the next 48 hours on what the U. S. is doing to help the refugees to take them to Australia, or the West Coast. Who will make that decision and what department will carry it out? Told him that in any situation like this there are plans developed to get Americans out but nothing definite yet on that. Of course, President has ordered ships to assist in refugee evacuation. All these contingent plans are being updated according to the situation there.



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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 2, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR:

JACK MARSH

THRU:

MAX FRIEDERSDORF  
VERN LOEN

FROM:

CHARLES LEPPERT *CLP*

SUBJECT:

Rep. Don Clausen's SEATO proposal  
for Southeast Asia

I suggest that Rep. Don Clausen be provided with a definitive written response to his proposal for the establishment of a SEATO type organization for peace keeping in Southeast Asia.

Such a response should tell Clausen that his idea or concept is good or bad, can or cannot be implemented and what the alternatives are.

Clausen's discussions with Administration people in the past have always indicated he had a good idea but then nothing done. Let's get State and/or Defense to give him a definite answer.

cc: Bennett



MAR 29 1974

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

M

March 28, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR:

JACK MARSH

THRU:

MAX FRIEDERSDORF *RKW for Map*  
VERN LOEN *VL*

FROM:

CHARLES LEPPERT, JR. *CLJ*

SUBJECT:

Congressional Inquiries on Southeast  
Asia and the Marianas Islands

I have talked to both Rep. Clausen and Ketchum on the attached inquiries. Rep. Ketchum is satisfied with the explanation provided by Ambassador Haydn Williams on the political status negotiations concerning the Marianas Islands.

Rep. Don Clausen was not satisfied with the response to his suggestions concerning setting up a SEATO concept for keeping peace in Southeast Asia. Clausen contends that he has discussed this concept with people in the Executive Branch for months with no follow up. Clausen contends that the time of bilateral agreements in foreign policy has passed and there is a real need to establish institutional arrangements for peace-keeping in Southeast Asia. Clausen acknowledged the meeting with Dick Smyser and discussing the same concept but is frustrated by the lack of leadership and follow through by the Executive Branch.

bcc: Bennett  
Wolthuis

Charlie -

What do you suggest  
we do?  
jam



Chron

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 2, 1975

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FOR RELEASE AT 12 noon PDT  
3 pm EDT

APRIL 3, 1975

Office of the White House Press Secretary  
(San Diego, California)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

We are seeing a great human tragedy as untold numbers of Vietnamese flee the North Vietnamese onslaught. The United States has been doing and will continue to do its utmost to assist these people.

I have directed all available naval ships to stand off Indochina to do whatever is necessary to assist. We have appealed to the United Nations to use its moral influence to permit these innocent people to leave, and we call on North Vietnam to permit the movement of refugees to areas of their choice.

While I have been in California I have been spending many hours on the refugee problem and our humanitarian efforts. I have directed that money from a \$2 million special foreign aid children's fund be made available to fly 2,000 South Vietnamese orphans to the United States as soon as possible.

I have also directed American officials in Saigon to act immediately to cut red tape and bureaucratic obstacles preventing these children from coming to the United States.

I have directed that C-5A planes and other aircraft, especially equipped to care for these orphans during the flight, be sent to Saigon. I expect the flights to begin within the next 36 to 48 hours. These orphans will be flown to Travis Air Force Base and other bases on the West Coast and cared for there.

These 2,000 Vietnamese orphans are all in the process of being adopted by American families.

This is the least we can do, and we will do much, much more.

# # #

APRIL 5, 1975

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY  
(Palm Springs, California)

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
PRESS CONFERENCE  
OF  
HENRY A. KISSINGER  
SECRETARY OF STATE

THE INTERNATIONAL HOTEL

9:20 A.M. PDT

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Ladies and gentlemen, I just want to bring you up to date on the discussions that have been taking place.

The President, General Weyand and I met for about an hour and one half this morning. General Weyand gave us a report about the military situation in South Vietnam, as he sees it, and some of the options which he believes should be considered.

The President invited General Weyand to return this afternoon, and on that occasion he will bring along with him two intelligence experts, as well as the Defense Department expert who has been handling military supplies.

We will then go into the question of the political situation and the long-term supply situation in detail.

The President has also ordered an NSC meeting for probably Tuesday afternoon. It could slip until Wednesday morning, to permit General Weyand and his team to report to the entire NSC.

In the meantime, he has ordered that the NSC staff, in close cooperation with the other agencies, develop for their NSC meeting a statement of the various options before us.

These are the procedures that are going to be followed. I make these points in order to indicate that we are at the very early stages of considering the report of General Weyand. No decisions will be taken while the President is in Palm Springs.

Rather, we will use this opportunity for the fullest possible briefing of the President, and then the staffs in Washington are going to analyze the reports, prepare the options and then the entire NSC will consider the matter.

I might also point out that we are considering releasing the report of General Weyand, after the President has had an opportunity to study it with just some minor deletions by the middle of the week so the public can have the general appreciation. This is where we stand, and I will be glad to answer questions.

MORE

Q Mr. Secretary, considering the enormous amount of military equipment that has been lost in South Vietnam by the deterioration of the South Vietnamese Army, do you see any conceivable way that you can justify sending additional military equipment to South Vietnam until at least the South Vietnamese Army shows it can stand and hold its own territory?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The determination that has to be made is with respect to the military capacity of the South Vietnamese Army to defend the remaining territories. We have received another detailed analysis from General Weyand as to some estimates of what would be required to effect this.

The loss of territory in the North -- I think it is important to understand what the military situation was. In flagrant violation of Article 7 of the Paris accords, the North Vietnamese have introduced almost their entire army into South Vietnam so that there are 18 North Vietnamese divisions in South Vietnam at this moment leaving only two or three divisions in North Vietnam and this is in flagrant, total violation of solemn agreements which were endorsed by the international community.

That created an unbalanced military situation in the North in which whatever the South Vietnamese did it would be wrong. If they stood, they were going to be defeated piecemeal. If they retreated, they ran the risk of disintegration of the units that were retreating which is in fact what happened.

But one of the aspects of our examination is, of course, what the military situation is and what degree of American help can be significant.

Q Mr. Secretary, can the South Vietnamese Army defend the remaining territory and what are the requirements of their army now to defend that territory?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: As I pointed out, this is, of course, one of the issues that has to be looked at. There is a possibility for the South Vietnamese military forces to stabilize the situation. The next question is for what length of time and against what level of attack.

Then, there is also the moral question for the United States, whether when an ally with which it has been associated for ten years wishes to defend itself, whether it is the United States that should make the decision for it by withholding supplies, that it should no longer defend itself. These are all questions that are involved in the examination that is now going on.

MORE



Q Mr. Secretary, General Thieu seems to have adopted some of the Administration's language in explaining about why he retreated; namely, that the U.S. failed to supply him with aid. In fact, he said it would be an act of betrayal if we continued to fail to supply aid.

Now, how is that going to help your problems with the U.S. Congress?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think, Mr. Lisagor, that one of the most important things that all of us can do--the Administration, Congress, and if I may say so, the press as well-- is to recognize that we are facing a great human tragedy and that we don't try to gloat over arguments that may have been made or to try to pick on things that men, who obviously are in despair, now may be saying.

There are certain facts in the situation which may be difficult and unpleasant, but which are, nevertheless, true. It is a fact that the aid levels to Vietnam were cut by a third the first year and by another 50 percent the following year.

This coincided with a worldwide inflation, and a fourfold increase in fuel prices, so that a situation was created for a variety of reasons, in which almost all of the American military aid had to be given for ammunition and for fuel, very little for spare parts, and none for new equipment.

Even the ammunition had to be rationed, according to General Weyand, and so that individual guns could, for example, fire only two rounds a day. To what extent did such a situation contribute to the demoralization of the Army, and to what extent the certainty, as they were looking at the situation of constantly declining aid levels, produced a decision to withdraw, which in turn produced a panic, I think is fairly evident.

This is far from saying this was the intention of those who cut the aid, and I think it is safe to say that you can tell from the public statements that senior Administration officials made, that there was no expectation of a massive North Vietnamese attack this year.

So, there were a number of factors involved here, and I think there is some merit in what General Thieu is saying now. I think some of the adjectives he used are those of a desperate man who is in great anguish and I think it is also fair to say that the United States, for ten years, put in a great deal of its efforts and of its blood and of its treasure, and that, too, should weigh in the scale and that we made a very great effort through a long period of time. So, we have to evaluate it over an extended period of time.

MORE

Q Could I just follow that a moment? We keep talking about a massive North Vietnamese invasion and many of us have been led to believe that this was a case of withdrawal by General Thieu. The President commented on that in San Diego saying it was a poorly planned and unnecessary affair.

Would you be more precise about what happened?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: To the best of our understanding, what happened was the following: In December, the North Vietnamese plan was to continue an intensified version of the operations of last year. That is to say, to pick off outlying district towns and perhaps to attack one or two provincial capitals.

In January, for a variety of reasons, the North Vietnamese decided to make a larger attack and they concentrated on the province of Phuoc Long, in total violation of the Paris accords. When they succeeded in that operation without significant opposition from the South Vietnamese government, which felt itself overextended and without any military reaction or even military moves by the United States, they decided to make an all out attack this year.

From the middle of January on, a massive infiltration of North Vietnamese divisions started. President Thieu, at that point, was faced with a situation -- also President Thieu found out during the battle of Ban Me Thuot which followed the battle of Phuoc Long, of his fleet of C-130s, only six were flyable because of the absence of spare parts so that his strategic mobility had been substantially reduced.

As he saw the North Vietnamese build up, and as he saw the prospects of American aid, in any case declining, whatever the decision of the Congress would be -- I think it was a reasonable assumption that the level of aid would be declining -- he made the strategic decision of consolidating his forces this year, depriving the North Vietnamese of the momentum of this campaign season, use his supplies up in the battles next year, and hope for new appropriations in 1977. This was his strategic assessment.

MORE

In terms of a strategic assessment, it made a lot of sense. The trouble was that in executing it, it was not planned with sufficient care, with sufficient understanding of the logistic system of South Vietnam, and it was compounded by the fact that the South Vietnamese divisions have their dependents living with them so that when a South Vietnamese division moved, all of their dependents moved with them, which, in turn, triggered a mass exodus of refugees, immobilizing these armies and at some point along this retreat, that turned into a panic where the soldiers were trying to take care of their families.

So, the decision was triggered by a correct evaluation of his prospects, the prospects being that if he kept his units strung out, they would probably be defeated by this massive North Vietnamese invasion and to try to get to a more consolidated line, in executing what was probably a correct strategic decision, he, of course, brought about consequences with which we are familiar, which are tragic. I am just trying to explain our best understanding of what happened.

Q Mr. Secretary, the United States has spent about \$140 to \$150 billion in South Vietnam. What is it that makes the Administration think that \$300 million or even an amount somewhat larger than that would do any good? What is it that makes you think additional money is ever going to be able to make the South Vietnamese Army fight or solve the situation, when you spend \$140 to \$150 billion and you are in the situation you are in now?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: First of all, as I pointed out, this whole situation is going to be reviewed by the National Security Council on Tuesday, and I do not want to prejudge all of these decisions.

There is, however, also involved a question of the obligations a country has that for ten years has fought somewhere, which has encouraged millions of people to associate themselves with the United States, and whether it should then refuse to let them defend themselves if they want to defend themselves.

This is one argument on the military side. On the humanitarian side, I think it is important and decisive that the United States has an obligation to the hundreds of thousands who were closely associated with it and must make a maximum effort on the level of refugees and otherwise.

MORE

Q I am not talking about the humanitarian side, Mr. Secretary. I am asking, in effect, whether \$140 to \$150 billion is not as much moral obligation as the United States can undertake?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That is the decision that will have to be made by first the President and then the Congress.

Q Mr. Secretary, would you anticipate that the President would make these decisions in time to tell us about them in the so-called State of the World address Thursday?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have not had an opportunity to discuss with the President in great detail what he intends to say in this address. My impression is he will deal with the immediate foreign policy situation ~~that he feels~~ the United States is confronting, and I would think it is extremely probable that he would put before the Congress on that occasion at least some preliminary ideas of at least some immediate measures that in his judgment have to be taken.

Q Dr. Kissinger, the New York Times has a report from Paris this morning that the French government has initiated plans to implement the Paris peace accords and to reach a settlement on that basis. Also, that the French are going to be active in all of Vietnam in humanitarian and refugee work.

Do you have any comment on that? Have you been informed of this, and, what is the outlook of this taking place?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We would gratefully welcome any attempt by any nation, including France, to participate in the humanitarian effort. Secondly, we have attempted to encourage all of the signatories of the Paris accords to bring about their implementation and therefore, if France is attempting to bring about an implementation of the Paris accords, we would certainly look at their proposals with sympathy.

We have not received an official French proposal and, indeed, I was not aware of this particular report, but the United States strongly favors the implementation of the Paris accords, which have been grossly and outrageously violated by Hanoi, and it would support the efforts of any country that would attempt to bring about an implementation of those accords.

Helen?

MORE

Q Mr. Secretary, we have heard around here that this is not our war. We have also seen some pretty pessimistic reports from everywhere that the ball game is over. And also, you seem to neglect the area while you are concentrating on the Middle East. What do you have to say for that? Do you think Southeast Asia is still as viable as you thought it was two years ago?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: First of all, my trip to the Middle East to deal with the question that I was dealing with, other problems, had been scheduled for many months and when I left on the trip to the Middle East, we had a crisis in Cambodia, the nature of which was well understood and which really required a Congressional decision. It did not require decisions by the Administration.

We did not expect an imminent crisis in Vietnam, and you remember that the Secretary of Defense stated a view which, all of us shared, that the attacks this year would not be of a critical nature, so that the disintegration of the situation in the Northern half of Vietnam was quite unexpected to us in the sense that we were not told in advance of the decision to evacuate.

It really did not reach the proportions it has until after my return from the Middle East. There is no question that South Vietnam faces an extremely grave situation. There are 18 North Vietnamese divisions in South Vietnam in blatant violation of the Paris accords, and there is no agreement in history that is self-enforcing.

If the signatories of the agreement cannot enforce it, either by actions of their own or by aid to the aggrieved parties, then a difficult situation is inevitable.

Under the Paris accords, North Vietnam was not permitted to infiltrate or to add any additional forces to those it already had in South Vietnam. At that time, it had something like 80,000 to 100,000 people in South Vietnam. Today, it has closer to 400,000 in South Vietnam.

Under the Paris accords, North Vietnam was not permitted to introduce new equipment except through ICCS checkpoints and in replacement on a one-to-one basis for equipment that had been lost, damaged and destroyed.

The North Vietnamese never even permitted the establishment of these checkpoints and totally disregarded the agreement. This is what brought about the change in the military situation which was compounded by the fact that the South Vietnamese Army inventories were running down while the North Vietnamese inventories were increasing. This is the objective structure of what happened in the last two years.

MORE

Q Mr. Secretary, has the Administration any indication from the Democratic leadership of Congress that Congress will be any more receptive to providing more military aid now than they were before they went into recess?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: As you know, the Congress is in recess right now and I am confident that the President is going to be in touch with the Congressional leadership.

He has not had an opportunity, to the best of my knowledge, to be in touch with the Congressional leadership, but again, let me make one point: It is unavoidable that when one analyzes the causes of a situation, that it may be taken as a criticism of this or that group.

I think, in the history of Vietnam, there is enough criticism to go around. There have been mistakes made by the Executive Branch and there have been misjudgments made by the legislative.

I think the major requirement for the United States, recognizing that we will now have a difficult set of decision, and a difficult set of debates, is to come out of this with dignity and without adding to the bitterness and viciousness which has so drained us over the years.

We will try to do our best to contribute to this. Whether we will always succeed, I don't know.

Q Mr. Secretary, you said at your last press conference in some very strong language, that the problem was that this was now a question of what kind of people we are and whether or not we will destroy deliberately an ally.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That is right.

MORE

Q The scenario that you gave us today indicates that while that \$300 million would have been needed, there was a proper, comprehensible decision to make, yet it was poorly executed, and that is why we have the problem. Your scenario does not really seem to back up the question of laying the blame.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Wait just a minute. It is not just a question of \$300 million. It is a question that since 1973, the combination of declining aid levels, inflation and rising fuel prices has led to a constant attrition of the South Vietnamese Army.

It is not just a decision of this Congress to delay \$300 million. It is a process that has been going on for a period of two years.

The statement I made in the press conference, which was under slightly different military conditions, at least as they were then perceived in Washington, was in terms of those decisions, but nevertheless, it is a very important moral question for the United States, whether when people who, with its encouragement, have fought for many years, should in their hour of extremity be told by the United States that while they want to continue fighting that the United States would no longer help them defend themselves against an enemy who has never been told by its allies that there is a limit beyond which they won't support them.

I maintain that is a question that we ought to ask ourselves as a people. Regardless of the probable outcome of the war, I think it is a serious question. It is not meant necessarily as a criticism of anybody, and I really believe that at this moment, having paid so much in our national unity on this issue, we should conduct this debate, not with an attitude of who is going to pin the blame on whom, but with an attitude that we are facing a great tragedy in which there is involved something of American credibility, something of American honor, something of how we are perceived by other people in the world, on which serious people may have different questions but in which, for God's sake, we ought to stop talking as if one side had the monopoly of wisdom, morality and insight and that serious people trying to deal with this problem are trying to run a confidence game. This is all that I am trying to suggest.

Q Mr. Secretary, if I may continue, my question really was getting toward, are you personally convinced that if we had voted that extra \$300 million that was requested for the emergency supplemental, or if we had actually appropriated the full amount requested in the beginning -- \$1.4 billion -- that we would not have faced the situation we now face, either at this time or sometime down the road?

MORE

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I believe, personally, that it is not just the \$300 million. It is the \$300 million coming on top of a lot of other things. I believe that if it had not been for the moralities of Executive authority resulting from Watergate, if the aid levels had been appropriate over the years and if we had been freer to conduct foreign policy than was possible under these circumstances -- partly for reasons in which the Executive shares a responsibility -- I believe that certainly the difficulties we face this year could have been avoided for a number of years.

For how long, it is hard to say, but very often, if we look over the postwar period, a period of time gain gets a possibility of things developing. But I would add, moreover, that it would have made a lot of difference to us as a people, that if it happened, if it had more clearly happened as a result of actions, not so much under our control. But I would finally add, since you asked the question, and I did not volunteer this statement, that at some point in this discussion -- we now cannot avoid the discussion -- at some point in this discussion we ought to stop this inquiry and ask ourselves where we go from here.

Q Mr. Secretary, I have two questions. One is, you keep referring to the massive violations by the North Vietnamese, and in view of their record, I wonder why you thought at the time the agreements were negotiated, or at any other time, that they were going to abide by them?

We knew very early, as you said, they did not allow us to establish checkpoints.

My other question is, do you think there would be any benefit if the United States were able to provide some military aid now, through bombing or any other measure, to stem the tide of what is going on?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The first thing I think the people ought to remember is the kind of national debate that was going on in the United States in 1971 and 1972. I think it is indisputable that there was overwhelming consensus developing that the United States should end its participation in the war.

And you may remember that before I went on my last negotiation, the Democratic caucus had already voted to set a terminal date to our participation in the war. That is January, 1973.

Let me point out this did not affect the actual terms of the negotiations which were substantially agreed to before that. So, I am simply trying to reconstruct the national mood which was that the American military participation in the war had to be ended.

MORE



The major debate that then occurred was whether the United States should deliberately overthrow the government with which it was associated, and that we refused to do.

Now, that the North Vietnamese would press against the edges of the agreement was to be expected. What was not to be expected was, that partly through legislative action and partly through our internal divisions we would find ourselves in a position where a forceful diplomacy became extremely difficult, and this certainly accelerated the violations and made them substantially free.

So, we had no illusions that we were dealing with a country other than one that had violated every other agreement that it had made, but under the conditions in which the agreement was made of a strong period in American foreign policy, we believe that we would be able to exercise sufficient influence on the situation to keep the violations to manageable proportions, and also to obtain sufficient aid to permit the South Vietnamese to handle the problem.

So, those expectations, for reasons that no one could possibly predict at that time, were not fulfilled.

Q Mr. Secretary, a look at the future rather than the past. I have two questions. One, isn't it likely that if we provided the \$300 million at this point, the likelihood would be that it would only prolong the fighting, cost more lives, and end in the same result? Two, the President and General Weyand have said they think the situation is salvageable. I wonder what evidence you have to give any hope that it is salvageable?

MORE

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The President will study all the recommendations of General Weyand, plus the judgment of all of his senior advisers over the next days, and I think it is for the President then to make the judgment and to state it in his press conference.

I would like also to point out that even if this situation should finally wind up in some negotiation, it is not a matter of indifference whether it is done in such a way that permits the maximum extraction of refugees and of those whose very lives are at stake in the present situation.

So, there are very many levels of objectives that can be set. There is a point of view, which we will be examining, that the situation can be stabilized by a combination of the shortened lines, infusion of American aid, and other measures.

That point of view, together with other points of view, will be considered over the next few days, and the President will report his conclusions to the Congress on Thursday.

My point in appearing here is to tell you primarily what the status of our discussion is at this moment and at this moment the President has really done nothing but spend about 90 percent of his time listening and asking questions to the purely military aspect of General Weyand's report.

He will get a further discussion of that this afternoon, together with the intelligence appraisal, and then this whole matter will be submitted to the National Security Council, so I do not want to pre-empt his decisions.

Q Mr. Secretary, it would seem time is of the essence, and with the events happening as quickly as they are over there, isn't time being wasted with the President being out here? Isn't this whole policy-making process being delayed because of the distances between here and Washington?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I am not going to answer that question. Isn't time being wasted?

Q Isn't time being wasted in the policy-making decision with NSC being all back in Washington, you are here, General Weyand is here, the President is here. Couldn't it be done faster if everything was concentrated back there. It seems the middle of the week is awfully late for something so important.

MORE

SECRETARY KISSINGER: There are about \$175 million left in the pipeline in the current appropriations. We are expediting the shipment of that equipment to Vietnam. No matter what decision is made by the President, it could not take effect for a number of weeks.

Therefore, we believe in decisions of this importance, it is extremely crucial that there be a very careful and a very prayerful examination of all the choices before us, and there is no effective delay, no matter what decisions the President eventually decides.

Q Dr. Kissinger, could you answer the other part of that question about whether bombing is still an option and whether that would be of any assistance, help to the South Vietnamese?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: As you know, the introduction of American military forces in or over Vietnam is prohibited by specific legislation that was passed in July 1973, which was, I may say, another complicated factor in the enforcement of the agreement.

It is not so much a question of what we would have done. It is a question of what the other side knew we could not possibly do. Therefore, before any such action could be contemplated, the President would have to ask authority from the Congress to do that, and I do not anticipate that.

Q Mr. Secretary, one of the questions that is troubling many Americans and some people in this room, as you have already judged, is that what is happening in Vietnam today was foreseen by many people once the American troops withdrew.

My question is, why then must the Nation be asked to wear a hair shirt because of what has happened?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The problem is not whether the Nation must be made to wear a hair shirt. The President is trying, to the best of his abilities, to make clear what he takes to be the causes of that situation.

We will never know whether it would have happened if enforcement had been carried out more aggressively and aid had been given more substantially. He is simply trying to point out his analysis of what brought about the present situation. After all, the people who predicted this could have been wrong. Maybe they could have been right. We do not know now.

MORE

Q You do acknowledge that a great many people did predict it?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Oh, yes, and I am saying, of course, there were many people who made that argument, and that still does not change the question of whether the United States, having made all these investments, should not have carried out at least its moral obligations more fully.

Q Mr. Secretary, could you tell us what some of the options are that are being considered? We are not going to get a chance to talk to General Weyand, so we don't know what the suggestions are.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I really cannot properly go into it. Partly this is due to the fact that this morning General Weyand concentrated, I would say, exclusively on two things: His analysis of the reasons for the development of the military situation, and secondly, his analysis of the military prospects.

We have not yet covered the humanitarian problems, the evacuation problems of refugees, the possibilities that were alluded to of which we have no formal indication of restoration of the Paris accords.

So, all of these will have to be issues that will have to be examined in developing the options, but what we are planning is to go over that this afternoon, to sketch out some of the main options as we see them.

Then, the NSC staff, together with General Weyand, the Defense Department and the Central Intelligence Agency will pull them together into a more comprehensive option paper, which will then be put before the National Security Council on Tuesday or, at the latest, Wednesday morning.

Q Mr. Secretary, the President spoke in his press conference of solemn commitments we had made to South Vietnam. This, I am sure you are aware, has raised many questions of secret agreements or tacit understandings or that kind of thing.

First of all, what solemn commitments was the President referring to? Was he referring only to the one-for-one replacement, which, as I understand it, was not a commitment but an option, and if he was not referring to that, what was he talking about?

MORE

SECRETARY KISSINGER: As I have explained, I think, at a previous press conference, he was not talking of a legal commitment. He was talking of a moral commitment. I believe that the South Vietnamese had every reason to think that if they permitted American troops to withdraw and if they enabled us to retrieve our prisoners, that we would carry out what we had called the Vietnamization process in enabling them to defend themselves.

We did not give them any specific figures, and we did not give them any definite promises, except to indicate that obviously, having signed the Paris agreement, we would have an interest in its enforcement.

But, I believe that what the President was talking about was a moral obligation, not a legal commitment. He was talking about something growing out of a ten-year engagement of the United States ended by our withdrawal, not about secret clauses in particular documents.

There is no question that when we were negotiating the agreement we, ourselves, believed that the American debate had not concerned economic or military aid, and I think if you check the record, there was no debate on that subject at the time.

The American debate had concerned the question of whether enough Americans had died there and whether the South Vietnamese should not be able to defend themselves, and I believe, in all fairness, we all have to admit to ourselves, that we all believe that if the South Vietnamese would make the effort to defend themselves, there would be great receptivity in this country to help them do it as long as our prisoners could come back and Americans could stop dying there.

That was the assumption within which we were operating, and I think if you read the back files of newspapers and Congressional debates, that was the essence of our debate at the time.

Therefore, it was never put in the form of a legal commitment, and it is not that we are violating a legal commitment. It is the President's perception of the moral obligation growing out of the context of events.

I just want to say again, many of you have heard me brief on this subject now for six years, and I think none of you have ever heard me question the travail and concern of those who have opposed the war, and all we can ask is that those of you who have been critical, ought to keep in mind that there is a great human tragedy that those in the Administration are viewing, and they are trying to deal with it in the best interest of the United States and in the best interests of world peace.

Thank you.

END (AT 10:10 A.M. PDT)

**MEMORANDUM**

**ROBERT L. F. SIKES**


**MEMBER OF CONGRESS**

**1ST DISTRICT—FLORIDA**

**Doug:**

**The attached is for your information.**

**Regards.**

A large, stylized handwritten signature in dark ink, consisting of several loops and a long trailing stroke.

**Bob Sikes**



tortuous changes, none of which have established representative governments; and, there is no reason to believe that they ever will. Israel is, has been, and will continue to be the citadel of democracy in the Middle East. She is the only nation that has been truly and constantly an unswerving ally of the United States. Our own best interest is served by a continuation of a policy of complete support for the State of Israel.

(Mr. MILFORD asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

[Mr. MILFORD's remarks will appear hereinafter in the Extensions of Remarks.]

#### AMERICA CANNOT WITHDRAW FROM THE WORLD

(Mr. SIKES asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Speaker, the tragic events which have unfolded in Southeast Asia in recent weeks serve to emphasize the effects of American withdrawal from that part of the world. But American withdrawal is not confined to that part of the world. The sad truth is that whether from choice or not, America's prestige is confronted with grim prospect in many parts of the world. American diplomacy is showing greater weakness than at any time since the beginning of World War II. Despite the brilliant and tireless efforts of Secretary of State Kissinger, it could be said that we are being backed into a corner.

I welcomed the end of American combat participation in the war in Southeast Asia. It can be stated that we never should have been involved in conflict there. It is easy to say that now. More importantly, having become involved, we should have gone in to win in the American tradition. A timid State Department and our fair-weather friends in the United Nations talked us out of getting the job done and it could have been done within a very short time without serious consequences from other powers. After long and tragic years, we obtained an agreement for an end of conflict between the North Vietnamese and South Vietnamese and withdrew our forces. At the time U.S. troops were withdrawn, the Congress and the American people—and the people of the entire world—were told our physical presence in South Vietnam would be replaced with aid of another form, namely military and humanitarian help.

Now it seems Congress does not intend to live up to that commitment. The fact is that the sudden reverses in the military situation in Southeast Asia can be traced in part to the congressional decision of a year ago not to live up to our word.

As the situation worsens, we hear from all sides that we should not place blame in any quarter for the events now going on there. We are told that these tragic consequences would have happened even if we had lived up to our agreement. I

do not believe that, nor do I believe we can save our conscience by bringing out a few hundred orphans. That is a poor substitute for the loss of freedom for millions of people in one of the most productive areas in the world.

I do not believe there would have been a shortage of ammunition or gasoline today if we had provided these as we said we would. I do not believe parts for trucks and planes would have been in short supply if we had sent spare parts as we said we would. I do not believe the army of South Vietnam would be in its present state of confusion if that army had been given the means to fight a war instead of having been denied essential supplies which we had promised. I do not excuse them for panic or for abandoning weapons and aircraft. But we are not blameless in today's grim picture.

I do believe the communists have grown bold in the knowledge that America is backing away from its friends, and they now can attack at will and in confidence, believing that however much they may violate their truce agreement, this Congress will do nothing to help stem the advance of Hanoi's troops and their allies, the Khmer Rouge, in Southeast Asia. I know of no means whereby people enslaved by communism can be provided humanitarian assistance. There are those who say that we must isolate ourselves from what is happening in that part of the world so that the fighting will stop. The fighting has stopped for millions, but the killing did not stop. The fall of South Vietnam will signal the start of mass executions and reprisals aimed at those who chose to fight for freedom rather than succumb to Communist rule. These people staked their lives on our good word, and we failed them.

We can learn from the tragic story of the refugees. They are fleeing toward any sanctuary which will take them out of reach of communism. Refugees never flee toward Communist forces. They flee from communism.

There are those who base their objection to American assistance on the fact that they do not like the present governments of nations friendly to us in Southeast Asia. They neglect to state whether they will like Communist governments better in those countries. This is the only alternate that is in prospect.

The rest of the world is facing the facts of life about America and our efforts to withdraw from the rest of the world. This Congress must face the facts of life and death in Southeast Asia.

#### DEATH OF A WORLD LEADER

(Mr. SIKES asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Speaker, the death of President Chiang Kai-shek of the Republic of China marks the end of an era. This world leader was the last of the great statesmen of the World War II period. He fought by the side of Franklin Roosevelt and others who sought freedom for people the world over. Now all of them are gone.

This remarkable man never lived to see his dream of a free and united China come to pass. Instead, ironically, at the time of his death the Communists on the mainland of Asia are making even greater strides toward their goal of Communist domination throughout the area.

But President Chiang left behind a strong nation determined to remain independent and continue to provide a outstanding example of free enterprise which both worlds could well seek to imitate. The people of Formosa have been eminently successful and the level of prosperity which they enjoy is far superior to that of the Red Chinese.

After emerging successfully from World War II, Chiang and his people suffered the indignity of seeing their native land overrun by the Communists. He reestablished his government on Taiwan and there he continued to carry on the fight against communism.

For years he dreamed of reclaiming the Chinese mainland and reestablishing the government of free China. His was a dream that was not to come true in his lifetime, but the example he set as the leader of the Republic of China on Taiwan and around the world will insure that the legacy of Chiang Kai-shek will live on in the years ahead.

It was my honor to know this truly great man. I first met him in the dark days during the late 1940's when the Communists were beginning to close in on the free Chinese on the mainland. Anyone who has known this man will attest to his remarkable strength of character and his love of freedom. Equally as strong was his hatred for the Communists who had enslaved millions of Chinese. At his side, upholding him in his endeavors and providing in her own right an outstanding example of leadership and inspiration, was his beloved wife, Mei-ling.

Chiang was subjected to severe pressure to knuckle under to the Communists.

The Russians even forged letters to Chiang which purported to denounce the President and, attributed to his son, they came as a severe blow to the gentle heart of the great leader.

Over the years it has become known the letters were frauds, and today much of the leadership authority on Taiwan rests with that same son, Chiang Ching-kuo, who was at his father's bedside when he died Saturday.

At 87 years of age, the stout heart of the fabled leader succumbed to age. The wonder of it is that he remained with us so long. He had suffered heartbreak after heartbreak over the years. He saw his country ejected from the United Nations to be replaced by the Communists. He saw an American President drinking toasts to his enemies in Peking. And he heard almost constant report that Taiwan would be abandoned by the United States for the sake of expediency and détente with the Communists.

But he had great moments of triumph, as well. He had only to drive the streets and highways of Taiwan to see what freedom could accomplish. His was a nation of 15 million people where the standard of living was second only to Japan in the Far East. Unemployment



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 7, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: MAX FRIEDERSDORF

FROM:

VERN LOEN *VL*  
CHARLES LEPPERT  
DOUG BENNETT

SUBJECT:

Home District sentiment

AL QUIE - (R-Minn) - - -

Vietnam - Down the drain, along with Cambodia, Limit aid to humanitarian. No guilt feelings, blame it on Vietnamese army performance. Tremendous interest in rescuing Vietnamese children.

Tax Bill - Not one person in favor of tax cut; don't understand economics of it.

Farmers - Want farm bill; organizing to cut production 10% voluntarily in effort to drive up prices.

CARROLL HUBBARD - (D-Ky) - - - (President of Freshmen Democrats)

Vietnam - No further involvement except humanitarian assistance; dismay at South Vietnam army performance.

Tax Cut - Hope it is proper answer, fear it will just add to deficit.

Farmers - Tobacco farmers upset by Secretary Butz's plans to lift quotas.

Equal Rights Amendment - Getting much mail against it, urges Mrs. Ford to make no more comments in support.



Comments of Select Members with Respect to RVN,  
Cambodia and General Issues of Concern

DERWINSKI - On IPU trip - will return on Wednesday

WAGGONER - On NATO trip - will return on Tuesday

LEE HAMILTON - On IPU trip - will return on Wednesday

MURTHA - Unable to reach this afternoon

L. H. FOUNTAIN - On NATO trip in Germany - however, offered the following comments:

- (1) With respect to Southeast Asia, his staff reported to him that the general attitude of the public is that they couldn't care less. Resented the capture of South Vietnamese weapons and ammunition by North Vietnamese, while they're sorry for the tragedy. The sentiment is against any form of military aid but probable support for humanitarian aid.
- (2) With respect to Southeast Asia, he suggested that the President not place the blame on the Congress.
- (3) The domestic issue of greatest concern is the state of the economy.



J. WILLIAM STANTON (R-Ohio)

Vietnam - People expressed great deal of compassion for Vietnam orphans but no desire for the U. S. to provide military aid. People were shocked, surprised and bitterly disappointed at Thieu's remarks that the U. S. let the Vietnam people down by not providing more military assistance.

Economy - The number one issue on the minds of the people. They seemed to display hopeful optimism that the economy will get better. A lot of people expressed the opinion that the President could have vetoed the tax cut bill which was amazing in a sense. The people seem to be understanding that the battle is going to come down on government spending and the people are beginning to feel that there is a need to hold down government spending.

BOB MICHEL (R-Ill)

Vietnam - Cambodia - Reaction of the people is a mixed reaction. Those who have always opposed U. S. involvement in Vietnam now argue that not one more dime be spent by the U. S. for military aid or assistance in Indochina. Those people who were on the fence over U. S. involvement are now more confused than ever. These people feel there is no hope for Cambodia and feel that what the American people need is to be convinced that the South Vietnamese will fight and want to fight before more military aid is given. The hawks, the hard-liners and military people who have been involved argue that U. S. should go in or provide the assistance required. Michel responded to the question of whether the loss of American lives in Vietnam and Cambodia was in vain by stating that the American lives lost in Indochina were not lost in vain because at that point in time it was the United States policy to fight a war in Indochina and those Americans were carrying out the policy of their country in a patriotic manner.

Tell the President that the Democrats as they get ready to go into the '76 convention cannot malign Ford for Vietnam and Cambodia. The Democrats are not in a position to criticize Ford for what has happened in Vietnam and Cambodia. If the President is going to propose a change in our foreign policy, the timing for such a speech could not be better. If that change in policy involves Vietnam, then this decision must be President Ford's and if its to be a clean break with Vietnam then its Ford's clean break. But the President should point out in his speech that in today's open society, when dealing in foreign affairs we cannot say that up to this point we will not fight, but beyond this point we will fight. The President should make the point



to the American people that notwithstanding today's open society and all the public talk about foreign affairs, when dealing on the international scene, there are many things that by the nature of international relations must remain uncertain and can not be tied down to a degree of certainty. This President does not have to feel any sense of guilt over Vietnam and Cambodia during his stewardship because he is in an altogether new ballgame since Nixon and Watergate.

Economy - - Otherwise the main issues on the minds of the people are the economy, taxes, and other domestic issues.

But the people discussing the economy want to know if those people down in Washington, D. C., know where they are going. On the tax cut bill Michel was out front on his position against the tax cut but received compliments for taking the position he did. In the rural areas the people want to know what the President is going to do on the farm bill. Farmers are asking whether they should cut back on production. Is there going to be a good farm market? Michel responded that if the farmers voluntarily cut back on production that would be their choice rather than the federal government making that choice. Michel encouraged full production because of the investment in machinery and equipment and the effect on allied industries. Michel encourages the President to keep export farm markets open.

Unemployment - - No serious unemployment problem in his District.

JACK WYDLER - Returns to Washington, D. C. on Tuesday, 4-8-75.

JOHN ANDERSON - Returns to Washington, D. C. on Tuesday, 4-8-75.



April 9, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: MAX FRIEDERSDORF  
THROUGH: VERN LOEN  
FROM: CHARLES LEPPERT  
SUBJECT: Aid to South East Asia

On Tuesday, April 8, at 7:55 Spence Matthews, Administrative Assistant to Congressman Bill Chappell of Florida, called concerning a meeting of the Appropriations Committee in which aid to South East Asia was discussed. Matthews says that Rep. Chappell in committee stated that Congress must "paint or get off the ladder" with regard to aid to South East Asia. Chappell told the Chairman that he and others explained upon their return from Viet Nam that the real problem there is morale and that this "goddam country better do something about it." McFall then is alleged to have said, "Mr. Chairman, that's the same speech I made to you a few weeks ago." At this point Matthews indicated that Bob Sikes indicated support for the Chappell/McFall position. Matthews contends that Chappell, McFall and Sikes agree that there are sufficient votes to report some amount of aid out of the subcommittee.

Matthews says that Chappell does not want the President to be mealy mouthed about anything on Viet Nam in his speech to the Joint Session on Thursday night. Matthews says that Chappell believes that the President must have a good strong position on Viet Nam in that speech and come out strong for aid to South East Asia.

Matthews says that Chappell needs a two minute telephone conversation with the President sometime today to give him a first hand account of the discussion on this during the Appropriations meeting.



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Date: 4-9-75

TO: Doug Bennett

FROM: Robert K Wolthuis

For your information X

Please handle

Other



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

April 9, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: JACK MARSH  
THROUGH: MAX FRIEDERSDORF  
FROM: BOB WOLTHUIS *rw*

Attached is a concise summary of Congressional reaction to Viet Nam and Cambodia. It is broken down into four parts.

- I. Notifications to Leadership on Phnon Penh Evacuation.
- II. Congressional Leadership Reaction to Notification on Deploying U.S. Navy Off Coast of Viet Nam.
- III. Congressional Leadership Reaction to Presidential Message to President Pro Tem and Speaker to the House Concerning War Powers Matters.
- IV. General reactions on Viet Nam and Cambodia from a cross section of Congressional members.



CONGRESSIONAL REACTION TO EVENTS IN SOUTH VIET NAM  
AND CAMBODIA

I. Notifications to Leadership on Phnom Penh Evacuation

<u>Member</u>	<u>Date/Time</u>	<u>Comment</u>
Senator Mansfield	April 3	Little bit leary of use of marines. Ought to be plenty of time to get out.
Senator Thurmond	April 3	Hopes President does all he can to help save South Viet Nam and Cambodia.
Senator Sparkman	April 3	Certainly a mess. Appears to be a good plan.
Senator Eastland	April 3	Good. Why in the hell don't we drop a bomb on them.
Senator Robert Byrd	April 3	This is something that had to be done.
Senator Griffin	April 3	None
Senator Case	April 3	OK. Believes War Powers Act does not cover rescue operation.

House

Broomfield	April 3	President doing proper thing under the circumstances.
Michel	April 3	No more than we could expect.
Morgan	April 3	Doesn't sound very good. Thank you.
McFall	April 3	Kind of expected it.

Cabled

Albert	April 3	China
Rhodes	April 3	China
O'Neill	April 3	Egypt
Price	April 3	Egypt
Wilson	April 3	Egypt
H. Scott	April 3	Spain

II. Congressional Leadership Reaction to Notification on  
Deploying U.S. Navy off Coast of Viet Nam

<u>Member</u>	<u>Date/Time</u>	<u>Comment</u>
Eastland	March 29	Pleased President has done this.
Mansfield	March 29	Cabled in Mexico. No comment.
Robert Byrd	March 29	Thinks President is doing right thing.
Hugh Scott	March 29	Cabled in Europe. No comment.
Griffin	March 29	Cabled in Mexico. No comment.
Stennis	March 29	Very good move. We have an obligation.
Thurmond	March 29	Agrees with action.
Sparkman	March 29	Thinks this is a good move.
Case	March 29	Said ok
McClellan	March 29	Not available
Young	March 29	Fine
<u>House</u>		
Albert	March 29	Cabled to U.S. Mission in Peking.
Rhodes	March 29	Cabled to U.S. Mission in Peking.
O'Neill/John Anderson	Mar. 29	Cabled to U.S. Embassy, Athens.
McFall	March 29	Telephoned by Loen and he suggested that George Meany, as a result of McFall's discussion with Congressman Murtha, would support limited aid to Viet Nam with cutoff date. Recommended President call Meany.



<u>Member</u>	<u>Date/Time</u>	<u>Comment</u>
Morgan	March 29	Telephoned by Leppert. Saw no problem with President's action.
Broomfield	March 29	Due to father's funeral was not available.
Mel Price Bob Wilson	March 29	Cabled at U.S. Embassy, Athens
Mahon	March 29	Telephoned by Loen. Approved President's action.
Cederberg	March 29	Not available. AA was notified. No comment.
Michel	March 29	Not available. Message left with secretary.
Jack Edwards	March 29	Telephoned by Loen. No comment.

III. Congressional Leadership Reaction to Presidential Message to President Pro Tem and Speaker to the House Concerning War Powers Matters.

<u>Member</u>	<u>Date/Time</u>	<u>Comment</u>
Stennis	April 5	Mr. Cresswell was notified in lieu of Senator Stennis who was travelling in Miss.
Young	April 5	His AA, Mr. Sylvester, was notified. Senator Young was unavailable.
Thurmond	April 5	Approves the action and believes the President should have sent Armed Forces to South Viet Nam.
McClellan	April 5	Approves the action.
Sparkman	April 5	Approves the action.
H. Scott	April 5	Cabled in Europe.
Case	April 5	En route to Europe. No contact.

III. Congressional Leadership Reaction to Presidential Message to President Pro Tem and Speaker to the House Concerning War Powers Matters.

<u>Member</u>	<u>Date/Time</u>	<u>Comment</u>
Mansfield	April 5	OK. Appreciates being informed. Asked Kendall to inform the President he would call Dem. policy meeting on Mon., Apr. 7 to discuss IndoChina situation.
Griffin	April 5	No problem. Asked to be informed if there is any flack.
Bob Byrd	April 5	This is proper role for the President. Thinks President is handling terribly difficult situation very well.
<u>House</u>		
Michel	April 5	No comment.
Speaker Albert	April 5	Cabled in Peking.
McFall	April 5	Cabled in California and copy of President's message delivered to his AA.
Rhodes	April 5	Cabled in Peking.
O'Neill	April 5	Cabled in Tel Aviv.
Mahon	April 5	Contacted by Defense. No comment on action per se. Indicated he would soon make speech on floor regarding history of aid to Viet Nam. Indicated he felt withholding \$300 million would not have made much difference in outcome.
Jack Edwards	April 5	Not available.
Cederberg	April 5	No comment
Mel Price Bob Wilson	April 5	Cabled in Tel Aviv.

IV. General reactions on Viet Nam and Cambodia from a cross section of Congressional members.

Mar 28, 1975

James Buckley

Requests that the President make an urgent appeal to the American people on national television to support the upcoming military assistance legislation for the Republic of Vietnam and Cambodia; this would do more than any effort by individual Members of the Congress to provide the American people with the facts they need to support the aid requested.

April 2, 1975

Jennings Randolph

Asks that the President urge all countries to act immediately through the United Nations to lessen the massive problems connected with the movement of refugees, relief personnel and supplies in Indochina.

April 3, 1975

Warren Magnuson

Telegram -- Urges Presidential action to ensure that the American government does everything humanly possible to bring the Vietnamese orphans to the United States. States not only orphans whose adoption has been arranged but also many others who are homeless should be included.

April 4, 1975

Walter Mondale

Telegram - Urges that a special task force be appointed, using Presidential contingency funds, with responsibility of aiding Vietnamese children. Is confident that the Congress will cooperate fully in efforts to assist these innocent victims of the conflict.



Apr 7, 1975

Paul Fannin

Urges the United Nations to take all possible actions  
to relieve the suffering and misery of refugees  
in South Vietnam.

April 3, 1975

Joseph Fisher

Telegram -- Urges action with respect to waiving visa and evacuation procedures to enable relatives of South Vietnamese living in the United States to leave South Vietnam.

Robert Leggett

Cites news reports of private American ships and aircraft, under U.S. government contract, carrying Republic of Vietnam troops with weapons from Communist overrun areas. States such support service constitutes a violation of legal prohibitions against participation in Indochina hostilities and in his view the present Congress would consider such activities as an impeachable offense.

Edward Boland

Urges suspension of immigration procedures to expedite evacuation of Vietnamese orphans.

April 4, 1975

Andrew Maguire

Telegram - Urges immediate action to provide humanitarian assistance to Vietnamese refugees. Also, cooperative effort should be made with other nations to provide asylum.

Bella Abzug

"The human suffering and chaos in South Vietnam require prompt humanitarian and constructive action by the U.S. government, whose wrong policies and illegal military intervention for the past decade are largely responsible for the current tragic plight of the South Vietnamese." Calls for cessation of all military aid, and the United States make a demand for the resignation of President Thieu.

April 7, 1975

Gilbert Gude

Asks that arrangements be made to provide free medical care -- at Walter Reed and Bethesda Naval Hospital -- for the orphans coming into the area from Southeast Asia.

J. Kenneth Robinson

Urges the President to do everything possible to clear the Vietnam flights for which planes are now available, including the one sponsored in part by U.S. Jaycees.

Hamilton Fish

Is pleased that the Attorney General has taken action to admit the Vietnam orphans who are being adopted by our citizens; urges the President to direct the appropriate officials to establish a schedule of priorities for the removal of other refugees from Vietnam; once we have evacuated the American citizens and their dependents, feels that serious consideration should be given to others who have strong ties to the U.S.; says that the the Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship and International Law will hold hearings on April 9 on Migration and Refugee Assistance; hopes that refugee assistance will be a close cooperative effort.



April 2, 1975

SUBJECT:

Reaction of Member Contacts on  
Situation in Southeast Asia.

George Mahon Not in his district. American people are disturbed about the situation in South Vietnam. But there does not seem to be a change in the American people's sentiment that the South Vietnam Army will not fight. Americans do not feel they should stay in there until the end of the century. The U.S. has expended tens of billions of dollars to help these people defend themselves from the Communists. The fault lies not with the lack of American aid but the unwillingness of the South Vietnam army to fight. People here feel more military aid is money down the drain and eventually there will be a blood bath in South Vietnam. The patience of the American people has been worn down on this issue. President ought to avoid criticism of the Congress on this. The \$300 million requested for aid would not have changed the situation in South Vietnam or brought about sweetness and light there.

Al Cederberg His own assessment is that it's a sad situation but don't know what we can do about it. American people are sad about it but they are frankly disillusioned and do not know what to think about the situation there. Most people now are concerned about the South Vietnam Army and need an assessment of their abilities especially in light of the abandonment of equipment, etc. Looks as though Thieu's withdrawal was premature and ill-advised.

John McFall Feel strongly about aid to South Vietnam. People in California want people of South Vietnam to have a chance but Thieu made decision to withdraw and retreat leaving millions of people to die or be stranded with the Communists. President should take a stand and not run from the press on this issue. He cited John Murtha's talk with George Meany and support of AFL-CIO for aid. Feels President should talk to Meany. Questioned Phil Burton's position and stated "he's probably saying my people were right and we are winning."

April 2, 1975

John McFall (continued)

Most Members of Congress are not aware of the offers made by South Vietnam government to bring about settlement. People now are asking if there is anything that can be done to help these people? Is it possible to help them now?

Feels President should talk to American people and tell them the status and situation in Southeast Asia and what's possible and not possible for us to do and why it's important for us to do anything. Always been the policy of the U.S. that if 20 million people want to fight for their freedom we as a nation could support them. My people in California want to help save these people. Joe Addabbo and a substantial group in the Congress want to help but don't know what will happen now under present circumstances.

Bob Michel Reaction to Southeast Asia is mixed. American people are uncertain and unsettled about the situation there. They are looking to Congress for answers and asking if the U.S. is throwing in the sponge? On Cambodia he says yes but on South Vietnam it's different he says and would vote for more money and aid. But then raises the question that the South Vietnam Army not holding up so it looks like we can only provide humanitarian assistance. It's too hard to call. People want answers but the sentiment in Congress is no military aid. The way the army has folded up makes military aid unconscionable. He doesn't know specific military situation but it doesn't look like they can regroup to amount to any kind of offensive without some kind of leadership and discipline.

Sam Stratton Strongly favors aid to Southeast Asia if it can be effective aid and not too late to be helpful. Catching Hell for taking that position but some people that listen are also in favor while most are against that position. Still feels this is a case where the U.S. should stick its neck out and make a real fight for aid for these people. Most in Congress against that position and the 75 freshmen are a real problem on this.

If President laid the facts on the line and stated the need to give these people a real chance to defend against the Communists and it would take X amount of dollars for ammo and equipment to do it then ask us to get on with it, I'd support the President - only problem is the recent situation of abandonment of equipment, etc. -- but we ought to go ahead and make a fight for aid to these people.



April 2

Sam Devine Called to ask if anything is being formulated on helping Vietnam refugees. Stated that he was anticipating a lot of calls in the next 48 hours on what the U. S. is doing to help the refugees to take them to Australia, or the West Coast. Who will make that decision and what department will carry it out? Told him that in any situation like this there are plans developed to get Americans out but nothing definite yet on that. Of course, President has ordered ships to assist in refugee evacuation. All these contingent plans are being updated according to the situation there.



April 7, 1975

SUBJECT: Home District sentiment

AL QUIE - (R-Minn)

Vietnam - Down the drain, along with Cambodia, Limit aid to humanitarian. No guilt feelings, blame it on Vietnamese army performance. Tremendous interest in rescuing Vietnamese children.

CARROLL HUBBARD - (D-Ky) - - - (President of Freshmen Democrats)

Vietnam - No further involvement except humanitarian assistance; dismay at South Vietnam army performance.

L. H. FOUNTAIN - On NATO trip in Germany - however, offered the following comments:

(1) With respect to Southeast Asia, his staff reported to him that the general attitude of the public is that they couldn't care less. Resented the capture of South Vietnamese weapons and ammunition by North Vietnamese, while they're sorry for the tragedy. The sentiment is against any form of military aid but probable support for humanitarian aid.

(2) With respect to Southeast Asia, he suggested that the President not place the blame on the Congress.

J. WILLIAM STANTON (R-Ohio)

Vietnam - People expressed great deal of compassion for Vietnam orphans but no desire for the U. S. to provide military aid. People were shocked, surprised and bitterly disappointed at Thieu's remarks that the U. S. let the Vietnam people down by not providing more military assistance.

April 7, 1975

BOB MICHEL (R-III)

Vietnam - Cambodia - Reaction of the people is a mixed reaction. Those who have always opposed U. S. involvement in Vietnam now argue that not one more dime be spent by the U. S. for military aid or assistance in Indochina. Those people who were on the fence over U. S. involvement are now more confused than ever. These people feel there is no hope for Cambodia and feel that what the American people need is to be convinced that the South Vietnamese will fight and want to fight before more military aid is given. The hawks, the hard-liners and military people who have been involved argue that U. S. should go in or provide the assistance required. Michel responded to the question of whether the loss of American lives in Vietnam and Cambodia was in vain by stating that the American lives lost in Indochina were not lost in vain because at that point in time it was the United States policy to fight a war in Indochina and those Americans were carrying out the policy of their country in a patriotic manner.

Tell the President that the Democrats as they get ready to go into the '76 convention cannot malign Ford for Vietnam and Cambodia. The Democrats are not in a position to criticize Ford for what has happened in Vietnam and Cambodia. If the President is going to propose a change in our foreign policy, the timing for such a speech could not be better. If that change in policy involves Vietnam, then this decision must be President Ford's and if its to be a clean break with Vietnam then its Ford's clean break. But the President should point out in his speech that in today's open society, when dealing in foreign affairs we cannot say that up to this point we will not fight, but beyond this point we will fight. The President should make the point to the American people that notwithstanding today's open society and all the public talk about foreign affairs, when dealing on the international scene, there are many things that by the nature of international relations must remain uncertain and can not be tied down to a degree of certainty. This President does not have to feel any sense of guilt over Vietnam and Cambodia during his stewardship because he is in an altogether new ballgame since Nixon and Watergate.



April 2, 1975

SUBJECT:

Comments on Vietnam situation

Senator Griffin

(Not much comment) Feels he might need briefing on Saturday. I agree, if it can be arranged since he made speech on subject backing Administration last week. Seemed stunned by march of events.

Senator Mansfield

(He called to give me his vacation telephone number starting tomorrow.) Feels Congress will resist military aid money but give all needed for humanitarian relief. Mentioned loss of \$600 to \$1 billion in equipment. Told me aid package was scheduled to come up but issue now in grave doubt.

Senator Packwood

(A strong supporter of aid in the past) "We have given all we can, more than North Vietnam has received. We can't give them the will to fight." Working on orphan evacuation. For humanitarian aid.

Senator Case

This is human tragedy no one could have prevented. Stop trying to blame others (and Congress). President should take the high road.

Bill Simpson (Eastland)

Everyone heartsick and dismayed. "What can anybody do now?"



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 10, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

FROM: Rod Hills

SUBJECT: Discussion points on war risk insurance granted PanAm for flights to, from and over Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos.

Because of the increasing war risks in the Vietnam area, PanAm's commercial carrier (Lloyd's) notified PanAm approximately ten days ago that its premium rates would increase dramatically and would be cancelled at 12:01 a.m. April 11th.

PanAm notified the President by letter of April 7 that it could not fly into Saigon without war risk coverage and asked the President to authorize the Secretary of Transportation to grant Title XIII coverage.

The Secretary of Transportation found as required by Title XIII, that PanAm could not secure insurance adequate for flights into and out of Vietnam on reasonable terms and requested the President's approval to grant Title XIII coverage.

In fact, the Secretary quite some time ago had delegated such authority in the Department of Transportation to the Federal Aviation Administrator so that the statutory certification of the Secretary of Transportation was in fact made by that official.

The Federal Aviation Administrator also pursuant to specific delegation makes the determination of the premium to be paid by PanAm for such coverage. By long-standing practice that premium is set at about the rate charged for such war risk coverage to other carriers flying obviously to other spots. The premium to be set for this coverage is slightly above that which PanAm was paying prior to the increase in war activities around Saigon.



PanAm wrote the President also to point out that the Department of Transportation under Title XIII could not give the complete coverage previously given by PanAm's commercial insurance program and that PanAm therefore would need a broader indemnification from the government than the Department of Transportation could give. After consultation between the Secretaries of State, Transportation and Defense, and the National Security Council, it was determined to be in the national interest to maintain scheduled air service into Saigon. In response the Department of Defense has granted the additional indemnification that PanAm required for such continued service.


By reason of the above facts, PanAm will be insured as of 12:01 a.m. for essentially the same risks that were previously covered by a commercial carrier and PanAm will pay a premium slightly in excess of what it was paying prior to the recent increase in war activities.

The Department of Defense regularly provides complete war risk coverage for chartered aircraft operating in and out of war risk areas for the evacuation of refugees and for other humanitarian purposes.

It was determined by the above governmental officials that the cancellation of scheduled air service by PanAm into Saigon would severely hinder the departure of American citizens and would place additional demands for U. S. military help in removing civilians.

Attached are copies of the documents considered by the President in approving the Title XIII coverage. It should be emphasized that Presidential approval as required by statute was directly solely to the Title XIII coverage of the Department of Transportation and was not required for the broader indemnity granted by the Department of Defense.

Attachments



THE FOLLOWING IS A SUMMARY OF THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS MESSAGE

THIS MESSAGE WILL BE REPRODUCED AS A SUMMARY OF THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS MESSAGE BY CROSSING OUT THE WORDS IN THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE

PRIORITY \_\_\_\_\_

DATE April 04 1975

HEADQUARTERS  
MILITARY AIRLIFT COMMAND  
SCOTT AIR FORCE BASE, ILLINOIS

ATTENTION: ARTHUR W. PURKEL, AIRFORCE CONTRACTING  
OFFICER

XXXXXXX

YR TEL APRIL 3, 1975 CONCERNING INDEMNIFICATION AND INSURANCE PROVISIONS  
BE APPLICABLE TO MAC CONTRACT CARRIERS' PARTICIPATION IN VIETNAM EVACUATION  
GRAM CMA IN VIEW OF TOTAL INABILITY TO PROCURE LIABILITY INSURANCE CMA  
TRICTED COVERAGE UNDER TITLE XIII INSURANCE AND EXCESSIVE COSTS FOR  
MERCIAL HULL AND WAR RISK INSURANCE CMA PAN AM MUST INSIST UPON OBTAINING  
INDEMNITY ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES AND FULLY ENFORCEABLE BEFORE WE CAN  
SIDER PARTICIPATION IN SUCH PROGRAM COLON QTE THE GOVERNMENT HEREBY  
EMNIFIES THE CONTRACTOR AGAINST AND SHALL HOLD IT HARMLESS FROM  
NE/ ANY TOTAL LOSS PAREN WHICH SHALL INCLUDE DAMAGE RENDERING REPAIR  
RACTICAL OR UNECONOMICAL PAREN OF ANY AIRCRAFT OF THE CONTRACTOR ENGAGED  
OPERATION TO OR FROM VIETNAM CMA INCLUDING ANY PERIOD WHEN SUCH AIRCRAFT  
BE ON THE GROUND IN VIETNAM CMA IN AN AMOUNT EQUAL TO THAT FOR WHICH THE  
TRACTOR OTHERWISE INSURES SUCH AIRCRAFT WHILE NOT ENGAGED IN SUCH OPERATION  
AND FOR DAMAGE TO SUCH AIRCRAFT NOT AMOUNTING TO TOTAL LOSS THEREOF IN  
MOUNT EQUAL TO THE COST TO THE CONTRACTOR OF REPAIRING SUCH DAMAGE AND  
TORING SUCH AIRCRAFT TO AIRWORTHY CONDITION CMA BUT NOT MORE THAN THE  
MNT WHICH WOULD BE APPLICABLE TO TOTAL LOSS THEREOF CMA AND  
WO/ ALL LOSSES OR DESTRUCTION OF OR DAMAGE TO ANY OF THE CONTRACTORS  
PERTY PAREN OTHER THAN AIRCRAFT PAREN CMA USED IN THE PERFORMANCE OF  
VICES REFERRED TO IN ONE ABOVE CMA AND ALL LOSSES AND EXPENSES PAREN INCL

(cont'd)



THIS MESSAGE WILL BE SENT BY AIR MAIL UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED BY CROSSING OUT THE WORD

PRIORITY \_\_\_\_\_

DATE April 04 1975

PAGE TWO

HEADQUARTERS  
MILITARY AIRLIFT COMMAND  
SCOTT AIR FORCE BASE, ILLINOIS

XXXXXXXX

LEGAL FEES AND EXPENSES PAREN INCURRED BY THE CONTRACTOR IN THE DEFENSE  
OR DISCHARGE OF CLAIMS OF OTHERS RESPECTING PROPERTY OR RESPECTING DEATH  
CMA DISEASE CMA DISABILITY CMA INJURY CMA OR IMPAIRMENTS OF RIGHTS OF  
PERSONS CMA INCLUDING EMPLOYEES OF THE CONTRACTOR CMA ARISING OUT OF OR IN  
ANY MANNER CONNECTED WITH THE OPERATION OF ANY AIRCRAFT IN THE PERFORMANCE  
OF SERVICES REFERRED TO IN ONE ABOVE STP THE INDEMNITIES PROVIDED FOR ABOVE  
IN THIS PARAGRAPH SHALL BE APPLICABLE WHETHER OR NOT THE LOSS IS CAUSED  
BY ANY ACT OF NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE CONTRACTOR CMA ITS OFFICERS  
CMA AGENTS OR EMPLOYEES IN CONNECTION WITH SUCH OPERATION OF SUCH AIRCRAFT  
ND

PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS, INC.

JAMES J. RICE  
STAFF VICE PRESIDENT-  
MILITARY TRAFFIC





THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20590

April 10, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Title XIII - WAR RISK INSURANCE, provides that the Secretary of Transportation, with the approval of the President, and after such consultation with interested agencies of the Government as the President may require, may provide insurance against loss or damage arising out of war risks in the manner and to the extent provided in Title XIII, whenever it is determined by the Secretary of Transportation that such insurance adequate for the needs of the air commerce of the United States cannot be obtained on reasonable terms and conditions from companies authorized to do an insurance business in a State of the United States.

The Department of Transportation has consulted with the Departments of State, Defense and Justice.

Investigation of the availability of such war risk insurance has been made and it is my finding that such aviation war risk insurance adequate for the needs of the air commerce of the United States cannot be obtained on reasonable terms and conditions.

Therefore, in order that the aviation war risk program may be placed in effect, your approval is requested.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "William T. Coleman, Jr.", is written over the typed name.

William T. Coleman, Jr.  
Secretary of Transportation






OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10  
MAY 1962 EDITION  
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

William T. Seawell  
Chairman of the Board

April 7, 1975



The President of The United  
States of America  
The White House  
Washington, D. C. 20500

Mr. President:

We are, of course, anxious to cooperate in the movement of refugees, orphans and American personnel from Vietnam under a program which we understand is being developed by the U. S. Government, and to endeavor to continue our scheduled and charter services to Vietnam. However, there are problems which we have not been able to solve through our own efforts.

We have been advised by our insurance underwriters that they are terminating, effective 12:01 AM EST on April 11, 1975, our third party liability War Risk coverage with respect to operations to, from and over Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. We are seeking to reinstate this coverage but have not been successful to date. Under the terms of our existing indenture and mortgage with our creditors, we cannot operate any aircraft into any recognized area of hostilities unless fully covered by war risk insurance or a United States Government contractual indemnity. Further, the premiums on our aircraft covered under our War Risk hull insurance have been quoted at 25¢ per \$100 of aircraft insured value per trip on any additional flights into Vietnam and this coverage is subject to revised rating or cancellation at any time. This amounts to a premium of approximately \$12,500 for a 707 aircraft, and \$62,500 for a 747 aircraft, per trip.

We have sought coverage under Title XIII of the Federal Aviation Act, but have found, however, that such coverage is restricted and does not cover all the risks which are insured by our commercial insurance program such as:

- a. Riots and civil commotion
- b. Sabotage and malicious acts or other acts intended to cause loss or damage
- c. Hijacking, any unlawful seizure, diversion or exercise of control of the aircraft
- d. The detonation of an explosive
- e. The exercise of military power by a foreign government





April 7, 1975

Therefore, due to lack of insurance coverage and prohibitive costs, if Pan Am is to participate in such a program we must secure compensation for additional costs for insurance over the costs in effect prior to March 31, 1975 or a fully enforceable indemnity and hold harmless agreement by the U. S. Government applicable to all aircraft hulls, third party and crew liability involved in such operation. Such indemnity and hold harmless provisions are described in our wire dated April 4, 1975 to the Military Airlift Command, a copy of which is enclosed herewith. If such coverage cannot be obtained by 12:01 AM EST on April 11, 1975, the time of termination of our war risk liability insurance as referred to above, we will not only be denied the opportunity to expand our operations to and from Vietnam but will be forced to suspend all scheduled and charter service to Vietnam.

We would appreciate your good offices in developing such a United States Government indemnification program.

Respectfully yours,

William T. Seawell

Enclosure

OFFICE OF THE  
DEPUTY SECRETARY  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIATE

'75 APR 8 PM 3:23

U.S. DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION



Copies of this letter have also been sent to the following persons:

Attorney General of the United States

Secretary of Defense

Secretary of State

Secretary of Transportation

Acting Chairman, Civil Aeronautics Board

Acting Administrator of the Federal  
Aviation Administration



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 10, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

RODERICK M. HILLS

R.H.

SUBJECT:

War Risk Insurance for PanAm  
Flights to Southeast Asia

PanAm's President has notified you by letter of April 7, 1975 (see Tab A) that it must terminate its scheduled operations to, from and over Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos because its insurance underwriters are terminating its third party liability War Risk Coverage as of 12:01 a.m., April 11. The Secretary of State has determined that it is essential to continue these flights, and that they continue to be scheduled rather than charter flights.

Under Title XIII of the Federal Aviation Act, the Secretary of Transportation with the approval of the President may provide such insurance against loss or damages arising out of War Risk, if it is determined by the Secretary of Transportation that the carrier cannot obtain such insurance on reasonable terms or conditions from private carriers that is adequate for the air commerce of the United States. The Secretary of Transportation has consulted with the Departments of State, Defense, and Justice and finds that PanAm cannot obtain such insurance on reasonable terms and conditions, and that such insurance is important to adequate air commerce of the United States (see Tab B).

It is apparent, therefore, that the PanAm flights will terminate unless you approve the proposal of Secretary Coleman to provide War Risk Insurance Coverage to PanAm for so long as it conducts scheduled operations to, from and over Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. Transportation will set a premium for this insurance at a price they believe to be reasonable.



Your approval of the Secretary's proposal is supported by the Departments of State, Defense and Justice and by the National Security Council.

In granting this approval, you should know that the insurance to be provided under Title XIII is limited to so-called "hull insurance" which does not cover all the risks now insured by PanAm's commercial insurance program. Such excess insurance would be provided to PanAm by the Department of Defense under authority which they have regularly exercised, which does not require your approval, and which is presently being utilized to provide insurance coverage for presently operating charter services provided to Vietnam. A description of the DOD indemnification is attached (Tab C). State has notified Defense that it will take responsibility for seeking whatever additional appropriations may be necessary for this excess insurance. After discussions with the above Departments and the NSC, we recommend the Secretary's request be granted.

APPROVE \_\_\_\_\_

DISAPPROVE \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments







# Department of State

~~SECRET~~

NOD859

## TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 STATE 075750

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ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 /001 R

DRAFTED BY H:KBJENKINS:RMS  
 APPROVED BY H - KEMPTON JENKINS  
 M-MR.EAGLEBURGER (SUBS)  
 L-MR.LEIGH  
 EA-MR.HABIB  
 DOD-MR.FRYKLUND  
 WH-MR.WULTHIUS  
 NSC-GEN.SCONCROFT  
 S/S - MR. ORTIZ

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 TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE  
 AMCONSUL JERUSALEM NIACT IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ STATE 075750

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, OREP (O'NEILL, THOMAS; PRICE, MELVIN)

SUBJECT: CAMBODIA

FOR THE AMBASSADOR

1. PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM JOHN MARSH, WHITE HOUSE, TO CONGRESSMEN THOMAS O'NEILL AND MELVIN PRICE ASAP:
2. BEGIN MESSAGE; THE PRESIDENT HAS AUTHORIZED OUR AMBASSADOR IN PHNOM PENH TO BEGIN EVACUATION OF THE AMERICAN STAFF UNDER OUR ESTABLISHED EVACUATION PLANS. PHASE ONE WILL BEGIN IMMEDIATELY AND WILL REDUCE DOWN TO A BARE

~~SECRET~~

DAO, 4/27/89





# Department of State

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 STATE 075750

MINIMUM ESSENTIAL STAFF THOSE AMERICANS REMAINING. IT WILL UTILIZE FIXED-WING AIRCRAFT AND THE CIVILIAN AIRPORT. MOST US CITIZENS, SOME THIRD-COUNTRY NATIONALS, AND SOME KHMER WILL BE LIFTED OUT UNDER PHASE ONE.

3. SHOULD IT BECOME ESSENTIAL--BECAUSE OF SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS IN PHNOM PENH--TO REMOVE THE REMAINING MINIMUM STAFF, THIS WILL BE DONE. YOU SHOULD BE AWARE THAT THIS FINAL STEP COULD REQUIRE, IN EXTREME CIRCUMSTANCES, THE USE OF HELICOPTERS AND LIMITED NUMBER OF MARINE SECURITY FORCES TO SECURE LANDING ZONES.

4. IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THIS INFORMATION BE HELD IN STRICTEST CONFIDENCE TO PREVENT ANY PUBLICITY THAT COULD JEOPARDIZE THE LIVES OF THE REMAINING AMERICANS IN PHNOM PENH. END MESSAGE.

5. PLEASE CONFIRM WHEN MESSAGE HAS BEEN DELIVERED. KISSINGER

~~SECRET~~

