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## WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1a. List	1. <u>Memo Janka to Friedersdorf, 9/18/75</u>  List of participants	Undated (ca. 9/18/75)	C(A)

## FILE LOCATION

Charles Leppert Files  
General Subject File  
Turkey - Military Aid (4)

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Department of State

EXECUTIVE  
FD-3-2/CO156  
CO156  
CM 2.8  
**TELEGRAM**

*August 1, 1975*

*TR 32-1*

UNCLASSIFIED: 7834

PAGE 01 STATE 181662

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ORIGIN SS-15

*Prime Minister DEMIREL,  
SULEYMAN*

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 SNM-02 NSC-05 H-02 SSO-00 NSCE-00

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DRAFTED BY TEXT REC'D FROM WHITE HOUSE

APPROVED BY S/S:LCJOHNSTONE

EUR:LBLAINGEN

S/NM:DERNST

WH:COL MACFARLANE

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS STATE 181662

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: MASS, TU

SUBJECT: LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT TO CONGRESSMAN RANGEL *Charles B*

FOR YOUR INFORMATION, THERE FOLLOWS THE CORRECTED TEXT  
OF A LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT TO CONGRESSMAN RANGEL  
WHICH WAS DELIVERED TODAY.

QUOTE:

JULY 31, 1975

DEAR CHARLEY:

IT HAS COME TO MY ATTENTION THAT MANY OF THE VOTES AGAINST  
THE BILL TO LIFT THE EMBARGO ON MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO  
TURKEY WERE BASED ON A MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE POLICIES  
OF MY ADMINISTRATION REGARDING THE THREAT TO THIS COUNTRY  
POSED BY FOREIGN PRODUCERS AND EXPORTERS OF OPIUM.

I WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT I HAVE HAD A THOROUGH CONVERSATION

AUG 25 1975

UNCLASSIFIED

CENTRAL FILES



Department of State

TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 STATE 181662

ON THE OPIUM SITUATION WITH PRIME MINISTER DEMIREL OF TURKEY EARLIER THIS WEEK. I EXPLAINED TO HIM THE HIGH PRIORITY WHICH I PLACE ON THIS PROBLEM. I KNOW THAT YOU WILL BE PLEASED AS I WAS TO HEAR HOW STRONGLY THE PRIME MINISTER BELIEVES IN THE MOST EFFECTIVE CONTROLS ON THE PRODUCTION OF OPIUM POPPIES.

I ALSO WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT MY CONCERN IN TURKEY IS THE SAME AS MY CONCERN IN EVERY NATION IN WHICH OPIUM POPPIES ARE GROWN. ALL NATIONS OF THE WORLD -- FRIEND AND ADVERSARY ALIKE -- MUST UNDERSTAND THAT AMERICA CONSIDERS THE ILLICIT EXPORT OF OPIUM TO THIS COUNTRY A THREAT TO OUR NATIONAL SECURITY. SECRETARY KISSINGER AND I INTEND TO MAKE SURE THAT THEY DO.

AS I MENTIONED TO YOU ON THE PHONE FROM HELSINKI THIS MORNING, I LOOK FORWARD TO DISCUSSING THIS FURTHER WITH YOU AND THE CONGRESS UPON MY RETURN.

SINCERELY, GERALD R. FORD.

THE HONORABLE CHARLES B. RANGLE  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
WASHINGTON, D.C. UNQUOTE. INGERSOLL

20515

32-T

Per Military assistance to Turkey

RECEIVED

AUG 11 1975

CENTRAL FILES

UNCLASSIFIED

August 4, 1975

*Susp.*  
*7 - Turkey*  
*Filt*

MEMORANDUM FOR:

LES JANKA

THRU:

JACK MARSH  
BILL KENDALL

FROM:

CHARLES LEPPERT, JR.

SUBJECT:

Scoville and Ikde Letter on the Utility  
of U. S. bases in Turkey

Max Friedersdorf asked that I obtain a copy of the Scoville letter on the marginal utility of our bases in Turkey and to have you prepare a rebuttal for circulation on the Hill.

Please note that also attached is the response of Mr. Fred C. Ikde.



COMMITTEES:  
JUDICIARY  
INTERIOR AND  
INSULAR AFFAIRS

Congress of the United States  
House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515

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
July 31, 1975

Dear Colleague:

Last week I circulated a letter from Dr. Herbert Scoville stating that the Turkish bases have only marginal utility in verifying past and future strategic arms limitation agreements. It seemed to me that Dr. Scoville's views had an important bearing on the claims by the Administration that the Turkish bases were essential for this purpose. Dr. Scoville is one of the foremost U.S. experts in the fields of strategic weaponry, arms control and scientific intelligence gathering, with more than twenty years of service in important posts in the Department of Defense, Central Intelligence Agency and Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

In connection with the Administration's efforts to obtain consideration of a revised compromise resolution on a partial lifting of the ban on arms shipments to Turkey, I received a phone call yesterday from Dr. Fred C. Ikle, Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Dr. Ikle called to say that he considered the bases very important for monitoring both present and future arms control agreements. I suggested to Dr. Ikle that he review Dr. Scoville's letter and give me his comments, and I offered to give his comments the same distribution that I had given to Dr. Scoville's letter. Both letters are attached, in order that Members may draw their own conclusions as to the adequacy of Dr. Ikle's response to the points made by Dr. Scoville.

Sincerely,

  
JOHN F. SEIBERLING, H.C.

JFS:jmb



Dear Congressman Seiberling:

I wish to follow up on your questions as to the importance of U.S. bases in Turkey for the verification of arms control agreements. In particular, you were interested in my reactions to the letter by Doctor Herbert Scoville, Jr. which you inserted in the Congressional Record of July 22, 1975.

In his letter, Dr. Scoville states that the bases in Turkey are not well located to monitor the SALT Interim Agreement and the ABT Treaty. While the sites in Turkey have made some contribution to monitoring the ABT Treaty, it would be shortsighted to consider the verifiability of only those limitations which were agreed to in the past. The Interim Agreement will expire in two years and the SALT II agreement now under negotiation will have additional limitations more difficult to monitor. Moreover, we must ensure that our verification capabilities will be adequate for further limitations and reductions to be negotiated after SALT II. If we permit our verification capabilities to contract, how can we expand the scope of future arms control limitations?

Many members of Congress expressed an interest in limiting cruise missiles. As far as we can anticipate, the verification of such limits will have to be based primarily on the observation of tests. For this purpose, bases in Turkey would play a crucial role; without them, any actual or likely potential test locations could not be monitored. It would take many years and considerable investment to develop alternate means of verification, if the gap could be closed at all.

We must also keep in mind that the Soviets may change the location of their test sites or the way in which they use them. This possibility lends added importance to the U.S. monitoring facilities in Turkey.

The suggestion has been made that the facilities in Turkey could be moved to another country. But this would forfeit Turkey's unique geographic location. Moreover, such a relocation would almost certainly entail new political vulnerabilities.

Classified data necessarily omitted from this letter would lend greater clarity and force to these conclusions. However, the importance of the Turkish bases for the monitoring of arms limitations agreements can be sufficiently appreciated, I think, from the considerations sketched here.

Please let me know if I can provide you with additional information.

Sincerely,

FRED C. IKLE, Director  
United States Arms Control and  
Disarmament Agency



July 20, 1975

Dear Congressman Seiberling:

This is in answer to your request for my views on the usefulness of our Turkish bases for verifying the SALT agreements. I understand that it has been argued that these bases are essential for ensuring that the Russians are not violating the SALT I ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement on Offensive Weapons and that they are also necessary if we are to verify any future agreements deriving from the Vladivostok Accords.

While there is no doubt that the Turkish bases provide useful information on certain aspects of the Soviet military complex, to say that they are essential for verifying past or future SALT agreements would appear to be such an exaggeration as to raise questions as to the sincerity of those making the statements.

First, with respect to the ABM Treaty, the bases would appear of marginal if any value. A glance at the globe will show their unsuitability for observations of the Soviet ABM Test Site at Sary Shagan, which is on Lake Balkash about 2,000 miles east of Turkey. That country is far less satisfactory for observing activities at the Test Site than would be bases in countries directly to the south. Turkey is not a good location for observing whether their radars are being tested in the ABM mode or their SAM missiles are being tested against incoming ballistic missiles. It has no value at all for verifying deployment of ABMs. While the Turkish bases are closer to the Russian ICBM, IRBM, or MRBM test launch areas, which are north of the Caspian Sea, information on such firings that might come from the Turkish bases is not of any great value in verifying the ABM Treaty.

The Turkish bases provide no information relative to the Interim Agreement on Offensive Weapons, since this agreement only freezes deployment of offensive missiles, not their development or testing. Information on deployment comes from observation satellites, not from surface observation posts. Thus, the Turkish bases have little if any value in verifying either of the SALT I Moscow Agreements.

It is harder to be so categorical relative to future agreements, since details on these are still unknown. However, looking at the Vladivostok Accords, it is doubtful whether the bases can be very important. As with the Interim Agreement, these bases have no relation to the ceiling on deployment of delivery vehicles.

They could be of some value relative to the ceiling on MIRVd missiles, since a factor here is what types of missiles have been tested with MIRVs. However, the key observation [point] to determine this is not at the launch end of the test range, but at the re-entry point which occurs on the Kamchatka Peninsula in the Pacific Ocean. Both of those areas are subject to observation from U.S. ships or land areas. It is these locations, not the Turkish bases, which have provided the information that the Secretary of Defense has used to announce Soviet MIRV tests. If observation of the launch areas were essential, then verification would be impossible, regardless of whether we had the Turkish bases, since there is nothing to prevent the Russians launching from one of their operational sites far from the Turkish bases. Finally, there are other land areas closer than Turkey for observing the current Soviet missile test launch area to the north of the Caspian Sea.

In sum, the Turkish bases have only marginal utility in verifying past or possible future SALT agreements. Other observation sites and satellites would appear much more useful. SALT cannot be reasonably used as a justification for making a decision on our Turkish aid program.

/s Herbert Scoville, Jr.  
Former Assistant Director of CIA for  
Scientific Intelligence and Deputy  
Director for Research

P. 2-75

Memo

To: Char. Dept


From: Max F.

Subject: Rep. Joe Stubby (R-Kans.)

Congressman Stubby is concerned about a letter Leberling is circulating concerning a statement by Mr. Herbert Seifield, a former CIA asst. Director, disputing the value of our intelligence work in Turkey.

Please get a copy of this letter & ask Janke to get draft rebuttal letter for Hill circulation.

Max F.



**August 11, 1975**

**MEMORANDUM FOR:**

**MAX L. FRIEDERSDORF**

**FROM:**

**CHARLES LEPPERT, JR.**

**SUBJECT:**

**Everett Bierman**

**Everett Bierman called concerning a letter written to you dated August 4 or 5 from Steve Ward of the House International Relations minority staff. The letter and attachments concerns the Turkish aid situation.**

**Bierman requests that you ignore the letter and do not respond to Ward. If it is necessary to respond Bierman suggests that you correspond with he or Broomfield.**

**cc: E. Frayer**



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

August 12, 1975

Charlie:

Yesterday your memo'd Max about the attached letter. Jane Greenleaf asked that we give you this copy -- showing the way in which it was handled.

Virginia



August 8, 1973

Dear Bill:

Max Friedersdorf is away from the office this week. However, I thought I should drop you a line to let you know that the August 5 letter to him from Steve Ward and the copies of your floor remarks concerning lifting the arms embargo has been marked for his attention as soon as he returns.

Although the President is fully aware of your valiant efforts to bring this issue to a vote on August 1, I shall make certain that he has an opportunity to read your excellent remarks.

With kindest regards,

Sincerely,

Charles Leppert, Jr.  
Special Assistant for  
Legislative Affairs

The Honorable William S. Broomfield  
House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515

bcc: w/incoming to John Marsh for appropriate handling.  
bcc: w/incoming to Max Friedersdorf - for your information

CL:EF:VO:vo



WILLIAM S. BROOMFIELD

19TH DISTRICT, MICHIGAN

DISTRICT OFFICE:

430 NORTH WOODWARD

BIRMINGHAM, MICHIGAN 48011

PHONE: 642-3800

Congress of the United States  
House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515

August 5, 1975

COMMITTEES:

INTERNATIONAL  
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SUBCOMMITTEES:

EX OFFICIO MEMBER OF

ALL SUBCOMMITTEES

SMALL BUSINESS

WASHINGTON ADDRESS:

SUITE 2435

RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING

PHONE: 202: 225-6135

Mr. Max L. Friedersdorf  
Assistant to the President  
for Legislative Affairs  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Friedersdorf:

Before leaving on recess, Bill Broomfield asked me to write you and enclose some of the clippings from the abortive "Round II" of the Turkish arms embargo debate last week. He suggested that you, and perhaps the President, might be particularly interested in "The Congressional Coup in Foreign Affairs," an issue about which Bill feels deeply and a theme he will return to after recess.

You will note that, in his opening remarks on August 1, Bill drove home the idea that the will of Congress on the arms embargo to Turkey was thwarted by a single member, that Congress was denied the opportunity to do what was right for the nation. In having the President's Helsinki address included in the Record, Mr. Broomfield also took the occasion to contrast the President's diplomatic efforts in Europe to Congress' rush to adjournment.

I know Bill sincerely believes that we almost turned the arms embargo issue around on Thursday night, that the votes for passage were there, and that it was only the willful abuse of the parliamentary system by

-Continued-



Mr. M. L. Friedersdorf

-2-


August 5, 1975

the Chairman of the Rules Committee that prevented favorable consideration prior to recess. We did, however, succeed in pinning the blame squarely on Mr. Madden and gave the opposition a very uncomfortable Friday morning. The extent of disillusionment at Madden's tactics is evident in the remarks of Congressman Sarasin (also enclosed) who was opposed to lifting the embargo, but even more opposed to Madden's maneuverings.

Although Bill was frustrated and disappointed about our inability to force this issue to a vote on August 1, he feels that we have laid the groundwork for favorable consideration soon after recess. Let us hope the status of the bases is not irretrievable by that time.

Please let me know if I can provide any further background or information regarding this matter.

Sincerely,



Stephen E. Ward  
Special Assistant to  
Honorable William S. Broomfield

SEW:ls

Enclosures

cc: Honorable William S. Broomfield



THE CONGRESSIONAL COUP IN  
FOREIGN AFFAIRS

HON. WILLIAM S. BROOMFIELD

OF MICHIGAN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, August 1, 1975

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Speaker, earlier this morning I expressed my profound disappointment at the inability or unwillingness of the House to act today on the question of the Turkish arms embargo. I continue to be dismayed at the fact that one man can stand in the way of our taking action on an issue important to our national security, that politics and parliamentary devices have become part of our foreign policy.

I offer these additional comments today not out of a sense of bitterness over battles lost last week or last night. Rather, I address the House in the hope that my colleagues will be prompted to think deeply about the rapidly emerging congressional role in foreign affairs and to determine how we can best exercise this influence responsibly and in the national interest.

The Turkish arms embargo was but a skirmish in the changing power relationship between Congress and the administration, a situation in which Congress is destined to become an increasingly important factor in the conduct of our foreign affairs. How shall we use this power?

We shall soon be called upon to pass judgment on a renegotiated Panama Canal treaty; we will have the last word on the size of the air defense system this country sells to Jordan; there will be opportunities to assess our standing in the United Nations and perhaps to take action that will either promote or destabilize the prospects for détente with the Soviet Union. These are merely the predictable items on our agenda; there will be others that will find their way to us through the inevitable interaction of forces we can neither foresee nor control.

We deal with the difficult questions of foreign affairs, issues on which a compelling argument can be made for or against. Most of our influence to date has been negative. We say to the administration, "You shall not ship arms to Turkey at the present time; you shall not grant MFN treatment to the Soviet Union until certain requirements are met; you shall not sell an air defense system, of the magnitude proposed, to the Government of Jordan."

But there is ample latitude for a positive, creative congressional role in foreign affairs. We have a real opportunity to help formulate the policy of this Nation on coming international issues of

vast significance: our attitude toward the emerging Third World, our policy on trade and commodities, future uses of ocean and space resources, the formation of a coherent food aid and energy policy are but some of the inevitable international issues of the eighties. Congress can—and should—play an important part in shaping our policy on each of these questions.

It remains to be seen whether our recent initiative, particularly in regard to Turkish arms embargo and the Jackson-Vanik amendment, will work to the advantage of our own national interests and serve the interests of those we seek to protect.

But there can be no doubt on two points: Congress has asserted, for better or worse, a degree of influence over the conduct of our foreign policy unprecedented since the post World War I era. With this additional power comes additional responsibility: an awesome, compelling requirement that we do what is right, not what is politic.

I have no inclination to deliver a learned discourse on the proper role of Congress in the conduct of our diplomacy. We can all agree, however, that Congress has an accepted oversight role in this field which, for most of the past decade, has been usurped by several Administrations. Today, with executive authority eroded by Vietnam and Watergate, with an Administration pledged to work with Congress, and with a Congress overwhelmingly controlled by the opposition, our role in foreign policy process has been vastly increased. One could make a strong argument that we have seen a congressional coup in foreign policy, that Congress has become preeminent on issues of its choosing and is in a position to dictate to the Administration how our relations with other nations shall be conducted. There is little likelihood that Congress will soon relinquish its newfound prerogatives in foreign affairs.

The obvious, and frequently noted, problem created by this situation is that the United States no longer has a single locus of foreign policy authority. We must negotiate internally before—or after—we negotiate with others. There may well be new restrictions on the use of executive agreements. Congress can, and has foreclosed foreign policy options. There is the ever-present risk that arrangements concluded in good faith and perhaps under considerable pressures with other governments will be abrogated by Congress for its own, possibly parochial, reasons. Some would argue that this is a good thing, the way it was intended to be. Others would suggest that it places American diplomacy at a serious disadvantage.

More disturbing, however, is that with an increased congressional role in foreign affairs, politics has inevitably become an ingredient in our diplomacy. All of us in this Chamber are political animals, Republicans or Democrats. We must stand for election every 2 years; we vie for control of the White House; as elected representatives of the people, we are understandably susceptible to pressure from back home. Despite our protestations, we know well the meaning of ethnic politics

However, we do not necessarily know all the complex, interlocking considerations that have gone into a foreign policy decision.

I would hope and assume that pressures or partisan political considerations do not play a determining role when we are called upon to judge issues important to our national security. But it is a fact that we are more vulnerable to these considerations than those who have traditionally been charged with the day-to-day conduct of our foreign affairs. The situation is particularly cumbersome when the White House is controlled by one party and Congress by another, when there is an adversary relationship between Capitol Hill and Pennsylvania Avenue.

It is questionable indeed whether 184 Democrats would have voted against relaxing the arms embargo to Turkey—or for that matter, that 103 Republicans would have voted in favor—if the proposal had emanated from a Democratic White House. An additional complication is that the administration and its spokesmen have increasing difficulty in “consulting” with a Congress where power is diffused, where 435 legislators are determined to have their say in formulating our foreign policy. With whom does the administration consult? The leadership, committee chairmen, and key Members are no longer sufficient.

In addressing its future role in the conduct of foreign relations, Congress must resolve a critical question: Are we prepared to acknowledge that the primary responsibility for foreign affairs is vested in the executive branch? If so, let us act accordingly and choose our issues carefully. We cannot conduct foreign policy by referendum. Let us respond, honestly and openly, to the problems inherent in the conduct of diplomacy, recognize there are no easy answers to difficult questions, and be aware of the pitfalls of a fragmented, contradictory foreign policy.

If we are not prepared to acknowledge executive preeminence in foreign affairs, if we seize on the path of confrontation, perhaps we would be well advised to elect from our number a Congressional Secretary of State who can negotiate with his counterpart in the executive branch. For it is clear that the United States can ill afford a situation in which we have a congressional and an executive foreign policy, frequently working at cross purposes to the detriment of our interests abroad.

I hesitate, at this particular time in our history, to stand before the House of Representatives and call for bipartisanship, a concept that has assumed some unfortunate connotations. In the worse sense bipartisanship has come to imply that the opposition in Congress will simply accede to, or rubberstamp, whatever the administration maintains is in the national interest. It was perhaps this attitude that led inevitably to the diminution of congressional influence in foreign affairs we are only now redressing.

But I think bipartisanship can mean something else, indeed it must mean something else, if we are to exercise our increased leverage over current and

future foreign policy issues with the sense of responsibility so clearly called for. We must define our role and we must stand prepared to account for our actions.

If the foreign policy of the United States is to prosper in the era of the congressional coup, bipartisanship will have to mean a sense of mutual restraint by both the Congress and the President. This and subsequent administrations have no alternative but to give due consideration to congressional sensibilities in the field of foreign affairs. An administration prepared to cross swords with Congress on a foreign policy issue had better be well armed with a very cogent rationale for its decisions. Despite the evidence of the past week, I continue to believe that Congress can be convinced that we can be backed off opposition to a policy if it can be demonstrated that it is soundly based and in the national interest. But we have served notice that our support cannot be taken for granted.

The bipartisanship of the seventies must be a dialog of the concerned, a sincere effort on the part of Congress and the administration to find areas in which we can work together, to resolve differences before we are forced to debate them on the floor of the House, to seek openly, with courage and good will, a measure of consensus on where this Nation is going and how we want to get there.

I hope my colleagues will give some thought to these considerations. The foreign policy issues we have debated to date are only the harbingers of issues to come. We will be assembled time and again to decide questions involving important American interests, very few of which will be amenable to easy, clearcut solutions.

There will be opportunities to assert ourselves, to score against the administration, and to win some votes back home. But more important, there will be opportunities to serve the interests of global peace and stability to the ultimate benefit of this and other nations. It is an opportunity we dare not neglect.



### THE REAL ISSUE ON THE TURKISH AID QUESTION

(Mr. SARASIN asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SARASIN. Mr. Speaker, I wish to respectfully disagree with the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. MITCHELL) and the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. BOLLEA). I think we must look at the real issue here.

I opposed the administration in its attempt to provide aid for Turkey, and I have no objection to the use of superior numbers in deciding various questions. After all, that is what we do here. We add up the numbers and decide the issues by our votes, and we come to an agreement or disagreement.

I have no objection either to the use of an objection to a unanimous-consent request, because, after all, that is a device that is designed to protect the minority, and it was properly used.

However, I think the issue here and the thing that we tend to forget is that we have witnessed the old-style political action where one Member of Congress, one chairman of a committee, sticks a bill in his pocket and walks away. That is what I thought we did away with in this great new reform Congress, but apparently we have not. I am disappointed that we did not hear one Member last night object to the fact that that was being done. I do not care what the issue is or how bad it is, that is what was done.

Where were the reformers? Where were the fresh new faces? This House sat quietly while it watched one Member, the chairman of the committee, stick a bill in his pocket and prevent discussion by the full House of Representatives.

Mr. Speaker, I do not think that is reform; that is hypocrisy, and I am disappointed with the actions of this body.

### CONGRESS SIDESTEPS THE CYPRUS ISSUE

(Mr. BROOMFIELD asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Speaker, we have an opportunity today to do what is right for America, not what is politic. We have an opportunity to reach a decision serving the national interest. Are we going to simply shrug our shoulders and walk away from it; are we going to allow a single individual from our number who refers, on the floor, to the people of Turkey as "cutthroat criminals," to deny us the chance to work our will? Or will we face up to our responsibilities to the Nation, allow the democratic process to prevail, and vote on the Turkish arms embargo before it is too late?

I would like to know how Members of Congress can embark this evening on trips around the world, or return to face their constituents, if we sidestep this question of vital national concern. Some may leave flushed with a sense of partisan victory on the arms embargo; others may feel that it can wait until

September. But, unless we have an opportunity to express our opinion today on the arms embargo, I think most of us will leave Washington dismayed at what we have wrought.

Mr. Speaker, we have the votes to pass S. 2230; all we need is the opportunity to take responsible action on behalf of the national interest.



at Helsinki. I believe a careful reading of the President's statement provides a useful analysis of our foreign policy objectives in Europe and serves to allay some of the doubts expressed previously about the purposes of the Helsinki Conference. There follows a complete text of the President's August 1 address.

ADDRESS BY PRESIDENT GERALD FORD

Mr. Chairman, my distinguished colleagues:

May I begin by expressing to the governments of Finland and Switzerland, which have been superb hosts for the several phases of this Conference, my gratitude and that of my associates for their efficiency and hospitality.

Particularly to you, President Kekkonen, I must convey to the people of the Republic of Finland, on behalf of the 214 million people of the United States of America, a reaffirmation of the long-standing affection and admiration which all my countrymen hold for your brave and beautiful land.

We are bound together by the most powerful of all ties, our fervent love for freedom and independence, which knows no homeland but the human heart. It is a sentiment as enduring as the granite rock on which this city stands and as moving as the music of Sibelius.

Our visit here, though short, has brought us a deeper appreciation of the pride, industry and friendliness which Americans always associate with the Finnish nation.

The nations assembled here have kept the general peace in Europe for 30 years. Yet there have been too many narrow escapes from major conflict. There remains, to this day, the urgent issue of how to construct a just and lasting peace for all peoples.

I have not come across the Atlantic to say what all of us already know—that nations now have the capacity to destroy civilization, and, therefore, all our foreign policies must have as their one supreme objective the prevention of a thermonuclear war. Nor have I come to dwell upon the hard realities of continuing ideological differences, political rivalries and military competition that persist among us.

I have come to Helsinki as spokesman for a nation whose vision has always been forward, whose people have always demanded that the future be brighter than the past, and whose united will and purpose at this hour is to work diligently to promote peace and progress not only for ourselves, but for all mankind.

I am simply here to say to my colleagues: We owe it to our children, to the children of all continents, not to miss any opportunity, not to muller for one minute, not to spare ourselves or allow others to shirk in the monumental task of building a better and a safer world.

The American people, like the people of Europe, know well that mere assertions of good will, passing changes in the political mood of governments, laudable declarations of principles, are not enough. But if we proceed with care, with commitment to real progress, there is now an opportunity to turn our people's hopes into realities.

In recent years, nations represented here have sought to ease potential conflicts. But much more remains to be done before we prematurely congratulate ourselves.

Military competition must be controlled. Political competition must be restrained. Crises must not be manipulated or exploited for unilateral advantages that could lead us again to the brink of war. The process of negotiation must be sustained, not at a snail's pace, but with demonstrated enthusiasm and visible progress.

Nowhere are the challenges and opportunities greater and more evident than in Europe. That is why this Conference brings us all together. Conflict in Europe shakes the world.

ADDRESS BY PRESIDENT GERALD FORD

HON. WILLIAM S. BROOMFIELD

OF MICHIGAN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, August 1, 1975

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Speaker, as we prepare to depart on recess, leaving important unfinished business behind, the President of the United States is in Helsinki, Finland, meeting with the leaders of Europe and working to render less likely the possibility of any future conflict on that continent.

The President today addressed the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. His eloquent remarks provide a compelling statement of what we hope to achieve through the treaty signed



Twice in this century we have paid dearly for this lesson; at other times, we have come perilously close to calamity. We dare not forget the tragedy and the terror of those times.

Peace is not a piece of paper. But lasting peace is at least possible today because we have learned from the experiences of the last 30 years that peace is a process requiring mutual restraint and practical arrangements.

This Conference is part of that process—a challenge, not a conclusion. We face unresolved problems of military security in Europe; we face them with very real differences in values and aims. But if we deal with them with careful preparation, if we focus on concrete issues, if we maintain forward movement, we have the right to expect real progress.

The era of confrontation that has divided Europe since the end of the Second World War may now be ending. There is a new perception and a shared perception of a change for the better, away from confrontation and toward new possibilities for secure and mutually beneficial cooperation. That is what we all have been saying here. I welcome and I share these hopes for the future.

The postwar policy of the United States has been consistently directed toward the rebuilding of Europe and the rebirth of Europe's historic identity. The nations of the West have worked together for peace and progress throughout Europe. From the start, we have taken the initiative by stating clear goals and areas for negotiation.

We have sought a structure of European relations, tempering rivalry with restraint, power with moderation, building upon the traditional bonds that link us with old friends and reaching out to forge new ties with former and potential adversaries.

In recent years, there have been some substantial achievements. We see the Four-Power agreement of Berlin of 1971 as the end of a perennial crisis that on at least three occasions brought the world to the brink of doom.

The agreements between the Federal Republic of Germany and the States of Eastern Europe and the related intra-German accords enable Central Europe and the world to breathe easier.

The start of East-West talks on mutual and balanced force reductions demonstrate a determination to deal with military security problems of the Continent. The 1972 treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union to limit anti-ballistic missiles and the interim agreement limiting strategic offensive arms were the first solid breakthroughs in what must be a continuing long-term process of limiting strategic nuclear arsenals.

I profoundly hope that this Conference will spur further practical and concrete results. It affords a welcome opportunity to widen the circle of those countries involved in easing tensions between East and West.

Participation in the work of detente and participation in the benefits of detente must be everybody's business—in Europe and elsewhere.

But detente can succeed only if everybody understands what detente actually is.

First, detente is an evolutionary process, not a static condition. Many formidable challenges yet remain.

Second, the success of detente, of the process of detente, depends on new behavior patterns that give life to all our solemn declarations. The goals we are stating today are the yardstick by which our performance will be measured.

The people of all Europe—and I assure you the people of North America—are thoroughly tired of having their hopes raised and then shattered by empty words and unfulfilled pledges. We had better say what

we mean, and mean what we say, or we will have the anger of our citizens to answer.

While we must not expect miracles, we can—and we do—expect steady progress that comes in steps, steps that are related to each other that link our actions with words in various areas of our relations.

Finally, there must be an acceptance of mutual obligation. Detente, as I have often said, must be a two-way street. Tensions cannot be eased by one side alone. Both sides must want detente and work to achieve it. Both sides must benefit from it.

Mr. Chairman, my colleagues, this extraordinary gathering in Helsinki proves that all our peoples share a concern for Europe's future and for a better and more peaceful world, but what else does it prove? How shall we assess the results?

Our delegations have worked long and hard to produce documents which restate noble and praiseworthy political principles. They spell out guidelines for national behavior, and international cooperation, but every signatory should know that if these are to be more than the latest chapter in a long and sorry volume of unfulfilled declarations, every party must be dedicated to making them come true.

These documents, which we will sign, represent another step—how long or short a step only time will tell—in the process of detente and reconciliation in Europe. Our peoples will be watching and measuring our progress.

They will ask how these noble sentiments are being translated into actions that bring about a more secure and just order in the daily lives of each of our nations and its citizens.

The documents produced here represent compromises, like all international negotiations, but these principles we have agreed upon are more than the lowest common denominator of governmental positions.

They affirm the most fundamental human rights: liberty of thought, conscience and faith, the exercise of civil and political rights, the rights of minorities.

They call for a freer flow of information, ideas and people, greater scope for the press, cultural and educational exchange, family reunification, the right to travel and to marriage between nationals of different States, and for the protection of the priceless heritage of our diverse cultures.

They offer wide areas for greater cooperation: trade, industrial production, science and technology, the environment, transportation, health, space and the oceans.

They reaffirm the basic principles of relations between States: nonintervention, sovereign equality, self-determination, territorial integrity, inviolability of frontiers and the possibility of change by peaceful means.

The United States gladly subscribes to this document because we subscribe to every one of these principles.

Almost 200 years ago, the United States of America was born as a free and independent Nation. The descendants of Europeans who proclaimed their independence in America expressed in that declaration a decent respect for the opinions of mankind and asserted not only that all men are created equal, but they are endowed with inalienable rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.

The founders of my country did not merely say that all Americans should have these rights, but all men everywhere should have these rights, and these principles have guided the United States of America throughout its two centuries of nationhood.

They have given hopes to millions in Europe and on every continent.

I have been asked why I am here today. I am here because I believe and my countrymen believe in the interdependence of Eu-

rope and North America, indeed in the interdependence of the entire family of man.

I am here because the leaders of 34 other Governments are here—the States of Europe and of our good neighbor, Canada, with whom we share an open border of 5,526 miles, along which there stand not a single armed soldier, and across which our two peoples have moved in friendship and mutual respect for 160 years.

I can say without fear of contradiction that there is not a single people represented here whose blood does not flow in the veins of Americans and whose culture and traditions have not enriched the heritage which we Americans prize so highly.

When two centuries ago the United States of America issued a declaration of high principles, the cynics and doubters of that day jeered and scoffed. Yet, 11 long years later our independence was won and the stability of our Republic was really achieved through the incorporation of the same principles in our Constitution.

But those principles, though they are still being perfected, remain the guiding lights of an American policy and the American people are still dedicated, as they were then, to a decent respect for the opinions of mankind and to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness for all peoples everywhere.

To our fellow participants in this Conference, my presence here symbolizes my country's vital interest in Europe's future. Our future is bound with yours. Our economic well being, as well as our security, is linked increasingly with yours.

The distance of geography is bridged by our common heritage and our common destiny. The United States, therefore, intends to participate fully in the affairs of Europe and in turning the results of this Conference into a living reality.

To America's allies: We in the West must vigorously pursue the course upon which we have embarked together, re-enforced by one another's strength and mutual confidence. Stability in Europe requires equilibrium in Europe. Therefore, I assure you that my country will continue to be a concerned and reliable partner.

Our partnership is far more than a matter of formal agreements. It is a reflection of beliefs, traditions and ties that are of deep significance to the American people. We are proud that these values are expressed in this document.

To the countries of the East: The United States considers that the principles on which this Conference has agreed are part of the great heritage of European civilization, which we all hold in trust for all mankind.

To my country, they are not clichés or empty phrases. We take this work and these words very seriously. We will spare no effort to ease tensions and to solve problems between us, but it is important that you recognize the deep devotion of the American people and their Government to human rights and fundamental freedoms, and thus to the pledges that this Conference has made regarding the freer movement of people, ideas, information.

In building a political relationship between East and West, we face many challenges.

Berlin has a special significance. It has been a flashpoint of confrontation in the past. It can provide an example of peaceful settlement in the future.

The United States regards it as a test of detente and of the principles of this Conference. We welcome the fact that, subject to Four Power rights and responsibilities, the results of CSCE apply to Berlin, as they do throughout Europe.

Military stability in Europe has kept the peace. While maintaining that stability, it is now time to reduce substantially the high levels of military forces on both sides. Nego-

tiations now underway in Vienna on mutual and balanced force reductions so far have not produced the results for which I had hoped.

The United States stands ready to demonstrate flexibility in moving these negotiations forward, if others will do the same. An agreement that enhances mutual security is feasible—and essential.

The United States also intends to pursue vigorously a further agreement on strategic arms limitations with the Soviet Union. This remains a priority of American policy.

General Secretary Brezhnev and I agreed last November in Vladivostok on the essentials of a new accord limiting strategic offensive weapons for the next ten years. We are moving forward in our bilateral discussions here in Helsinki.

The world faces an unprecedented danger in the spread of nuclear weapons technology. The nations of Europe share a great responsibility for an international solution to this problem. The benefits of peaceful nuclear energy are becoming more and more important. We must find ways to spread these benefits while safeguarding the world against the menace of weapons proliferation.

To the other nations of Europe represented at this Conference: We value the work you have done here to help bring all of Europe together. Your right to live in peace and independence is one of the major goals of our effort. Your continuing contribution will be indispensable.

To those nations not participating and to all the peoples of the world: The solemn obligation undertaken in these documents to promote fundamental rights, economic and social progress and well-being, applies ultimately to all peoples.

Can we truly speak of peace and security without addressing the spread of nuclear weapons in the world, or the creation of more sophisticated forms of warfare? Can peace be divisible between areas of tranquility and regions of conflict?

Can Europe truly flourish if we do not all address ourselves to the evil of hunger in countries less fortunate than we; to the new dimensions of economic and energy issues that underlie our own progress; to the dialogue between producers and consumers, between exporters and importers, between industrial countries and less developed ones; and can there be stability and progress in the absence of justice and fundamental freedoms?

Our people want a better future. Their expectations have been raised by the very real steps that have already been taken—in arms control, political negotiations and expansion of contacts and economic relations. Our presence here offers them further hope. We must not let them down.

If the Soviet Union and the United States can reach agreement so that our astronauts can fit together the most intricate scientific equipment, work together and shake hands 137 miles out in space, we as statesmen have an obligation to do as well on earth.

History will judge this Conference not by what we say here today, but what we do tomorrow; not by the promises we make, but by the promises we keep.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

# DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA REVENUE ACT OF 1975

HON. CHARLES C. DIGGS, JR.

OF MICHIGAN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, August 1, 1975

Mr. DIGGS. Mr. Speaker, the Council of the District of Columbia recently adopted and the Mayor signed, the Re-

venue Act of 1975, Council Act 1-34. Title VI of that legislation is set out in full below because of the interest in section 605, repealing the 1947 exemption of professional businesses from the unincorporated business tax.

A member of the House has introduced House Concurrent Resolution 370 disapproving Council Act 1-34. Under section 602(c)(1) of the D.C. Home Rule Act, Public Law 93-198, a council act takes effect unless within 30 legislative days of the Congress both Houses adopt a concurrent resolution disapproving the council act. If Congress follows the announced recess schedule, the 30 legislative days would end about October 28, 1975.

House Concurrent Resolution has been referred to the Subcommittee on Fiscal Affairs of the House District Committee. Subcommittee chairman is the gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. MAZZOLI).

## TITLE VI—AMENDMENTS TO DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA INCOME AND FRANCHISE TAX ACT OF 1947

SEC. 601. The District of Columbia Income and Franchise Tax Act of 1947 (D.C. Code, sec. 47-1501 et seq.) is amended as follows:

(1) Paragraph (u) of section 4 of title I of such Act (D.C. Code, sec. 47-1551c(u)) is amended to read as follows:

"(u) The term 'dependent' means a dependent as defined in section 152 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954."

(2) The last sentence of paragraph (v) of section 4 of title I of such Act (D.C. Code, sec. 47-1551c(v)) is amended to read as follows:

"The term 'head of a family' means an individual who is single, or if married, separated from husband or wife."

(3) The commencing phrase in section 1 of title II of such Act (D.C. Code, sec. 47-1554) is amended to read as follows:

"The following organization shall be exempt from taxation under this article, except to the extent that such organizations have unrelated business taxable income subject to tax under sections 511 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, in which event such organizations shall be subject to tax under this article on said unrelated business taxable income."

(4) Subsection (b) of section 2 of title III of such Act (D.C. Code, sec. 47-1557a) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new paragraph:

"(18) UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION—Payments received by an individual from the District of Columbia Unemployment Compensation Board or a similar State agency for those periods during which he is unemployed."

(5) Paragraph (16) (entitled "Real Estate Investments Trusts.") of section 6(a) of title III of such Act (D.C. Code, sec. 47-1557b(a)(16)), is renumbered as paragraph (17).

(6) Subsection (a) of section 3 of title III of such Act (D.C. Code, sec. 47-1557b(a)) is amended by adding at the end thereof a new paragraph as follows:

"(18) HOUSEHOLD AND DEPENDENT CARE SERVICES.—To the same extent that such amount is deductible under section 214 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, any amount expended by an individual for household and dependent care services necessary for gainful employment: Provided, however, That the requirement of section 214 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 that married couples must file a single return jointly, shall not be applicable."

(7) Paragraphs (a) and (b) of section 2 of Title V of such Act (D.C. Code, secs. 47-1564a(a) and 47-1564a(b)) are amended to read as follows:

"(a) RESIDENTS AND NONRESIDENTS.—Every nonresident of the District receiving income subject to tax under this article and every resident of the District, except fiduciaries, when—

"(1) his gross income for the taxable year, if single, or if married and not living with husband or wife, exceeds the personal exemptions authorized for the taxpayer as of July 1, 1975, by subsection (b) of section 151 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954; or

"(2) his gross income for the taxable year, if married and living with husband or wife, exceeds the combined amount of the personal exemptions authorized for the taxpayer and the spouse of the taxpayer as of July 1, 1975, by subsection (b) of section 151 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954; or

"(3) his gross sales or gross receipts from any trade or business other than an unincorporated business subject to tax under title VIII of this article, exceeds \$5,000, regardless of the amount of his gross income; or

"(4) the combined gross income for the taxable year of a husband and wife living together exceeds the combined amount of the personal exemptions authorized as of July 1, 1975, for the taxpayer and the spouse of the taxpayer by subsection (b) of section 151 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, or the combined gross sales or gross receipts from any trade or business, other than an unincorporated business subject to tax under title VIII of this article, exceeds \$5,000, regardless of the amount of their gross income.

"(b) FIDUCIARIES.—Every fiduciary (except a receiver appointed by authority of law in possession of only part of the property of an individual) for—

"(1) every individual if single, or if married and not living with husband or wife, for whom he acts having a gross income for the taxable year in excess of the amount of his personal exemption as authorized for the taxpayer as of July 1, 1975, by subsection (b) of section 151 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954;

"(2) every individual, if married and living with husband or wife, for whom he acts having a gross income for the taxable year in excess of their personal exemptions as authorized for the taxpayer as of July 1, 1975, by subsection (b) of section 151 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954;

"(3) every estate for which he acts, the gross income of which for the taxable year is in excess of its personal exemption, which is equivalent to the personal exemption authorized for an individual as of July 1, 1975, by subsection (b) of section 151 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954; or

"(4) every trust for which he acts, the gross income of which for the taxable year is \$100 or over."

(8) Section 2 of title VI of such Act (D.C. Code, sec. 47-1567a) is amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 2. Personal exemptions.—(a)(1) There shall be allowed to residents the same deductions for personal exemptions as are allowed as of July 1, 1975, under section 151 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.

"(2) A taxpayer who qualifies as head of a family shall be allowed a personal exemption in an amount which is twice the amount allowed the taxpayers as of July 1, 1975, by subsection (b) of section 151 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.

"(b) In the case of a return made for a fractional part of a taxable year, the personal exemptions shall be reduced to amounts which bear the same ratio to the full exemptions provided as the number of months in the period for which the return is made bears to twelve months."

(9) Subsection 4(b) of title VI of such Act (D.C. Code, sec. 47-1567(b)(1)) is amended to read as follows:

"(1) In applying such table the taxpayer's marital status on the last day of the taxable year shall control."

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, FRIDAY, AUGUST 29, 1975

# How Liberals Aided Israel's Foes

By EDWARD JAY EPSTEIN

The House of Representatives may have inadvertently altered the balance of power in the Middle East and critically diminished Israel's chances for survival when, in a fit of moral indignation inspired by a handful of Congressmen, it voted last

eastern flank of NATO, and that ultimately involves the security of Greece. Congressmen who voted to override these strategic considerations may have believed that détente has advanced to the point where nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union is improbable—and may therefore con-

to "protect" the sizable Turkish minority from the group of terrorists that assumed control of Cyprus in the coup.

Turkey had the right to intervene as it did under the 1960 "Treaty of Guarantee" in which Greece, Turkey and Great Britain all pledged the integrity of the constitu-

[Sept. 1975]

POINT PAPER ON TURKISH ARMS EMBARGO

1. Congress has made its point. The law has been upheld by imposing an unprecedented total arms embargo on a key ally. The question now is not one of undermining the law, but of the duration and efficacy of the penalty.
2. The embargo has not achieved its purpose of influencing Turkey: the embargo is now hurting the Cypriots and the United States more than Turkey, a proud ally whose domestic politics prevent concessions while the embargo exists. Thus, the Cyprus negotiations are stalemated as security in the region deteriorates.
3. Continuation of the embargo has seriously jeopardized US security interests in the Eastern Mediterranean:
  - Significant and unique electronic intelligence collection operations have been suspended.
  - Turkey will move more decisively against the US presence if the embargo is not lifted soon.
  - NATO's military posture and collective security has been undermined by weakening the armed forces of an ally which occupies a strategic position on the rim of the Soviet Union, the southern flank of Western Europe and at the gates of the Middle East.
4. The embargo has blocked progress toward a Cyprus settlement, has prolonged the suffering on Cyprus, has complicated the United States' ability to promote negotiations, and by hindering Greek-Turkish reconciliation, now harms Greece by increased tensions in the Aegean area.
5. Affirmative House action on S. 2230, permitting a limited lifting of the embargo, would help preserve US/NATO security interests, would make possible progress toward a Cyprus settlement, and prevent a further deterioration of the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean.

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[Sept. 1975?]

## RESTORATION OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO TURKEY

### FACT SHEET

1. United States military assistance to an old and faithful ally, Turkey, was cut off on February 5 by action of the Congress. This has imposed an embargo on military purchases by Turkey, extending even to items already paid for.
2. The total U.S. embargo on military assistance to Turkey has strained our relationship with this important NATO ally. The relationship of trust and confidence, built up over many years, has been seriously and adversely affected. Continuation of the embargo assures further irreversible deterioration that will seriously jeopardize our security interests throughout the Eastern Mediterranean area.
3. Following the failure of the House in late July to partially restore military assistance to Turkey, the Turkish Government suspended operations at our intelligence monitoring facilities on Turkish soil. While the Turks apparently decided at that time to hold off any further action against U.S. facilities for a few weeks more, clearly they can be expected to move decisively against our military presence if the embargo is not lifted shortly.
4. Our longstanding relationship with Turkey is not a favor to Turkey. It is a clear and essential mutual interest. Turkey lies on the rim of the Soviet Union and at the gates of the Middle East. It is vital to the security of the eastern Mediterranean, the southern flank of Western Europe and the collective security of the Western alliance.
5. With approximately half a million men under arms, including NATO's second largest land force (375,000 men), and a key strategic position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and the Middle East, Turkey makes a decisive contribution to the Western alliance. NATO military assessments indicate that a continuation of the U.S. ban on mutual aid to Turkey will seriously degrade the capability of all arms of the Turkish armed forces, and their reinforcement by NATO forces in time of tension. The U.S. ban therefore imposes a grave limitation on NATO's military posture in the Mediterranean area and the alliance as a whole. This point was clearly made by NATO Secretary General Luns during his recent visit to Washington.

6. The suspension of U.S. intelligence collection operations from Turkey has caused a significant loss of electronic intelligence on Soviet activities. The U.S. installations in Turkey provided information of great value on Soviet missile research and development activity, and on early indications and warnings of Soviet force readiness and movement in the area. We can replace this source only partially and only through significant investment in time and money. Our activities in Turkey fall into two general categories: first, Soviet weapon system development, and second, information on Soviet general purpose force development and activity in the southwestern USSR.

-- In the category of Soviet weapons systems development throughout the USSR, there has been a net loss of about 15% of the total information available to the United States. In this area we have experienced a total loss of information on some critically important weapon systems which is uniquely available from Turkey.

-- In the category of Soviet military forces in the southwest USSR, we have lost more than 50% of our surveillance capability which severely reduces our ability for timely understanding of military movements in that part of the world.

7. The aid cut-off by the Congress was intended to influence Turkey in the Cyprus negotiations. But the results of the Congressional action have been to block progress towards reconciliation, thereby prolonging the suffering on Cyprus; to complicate our ability to promote successful negotiations; to increase the danger of a broader conflict.
8. The present government in Ankara has made very plain in recent weeks, through both word and action, that they cannot move on the Cyprus issue while the arms embargo remains in effect. To do so would provide a politically exploitable issue within Turkey.
9. Our goal continues to be that of assisting the parties in the Cyprus crisis -- Greece, Turkey and Cyprus -- to reach a settlement that accommodates the interests of each -- and, in turn, contributes to the stability of the Mediterranean and the continuing strength of the Alliance. The attitudes of Greece and Turkey are of central importance and we cannot continue to alienate one of the major participants.

10. On July 31 the Senate passed S.2230 which would modify the arms ban to the extent of permitting us to deliver to Turkey items now in the sales pipeline.
11. If we are to preserve US/NATO security interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and achieve progress toward settlement of the Greek-Turkish dispute over Cyprus, the House must act affirmatively on the aid issue at the earliest possible date.
12. Without this legislation, progress toward a Cyprus settlement will be more difficult and the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean will almost certainly deteriorate. This will work against the interests of all -- Greece, Turkey and Cyprus, the United States and NATO.

[Sept. 1975?]

There have been some small hopeful signs since the last vote, although these have largely been overshadowed by other developments. On the positive side, there was some visible negotiating progress at the Cypriot intercommunal talks in Vienna July 28-30, resulting in agreement on a limited exchange of population between the two zones of Cyprus. Another positive development was the Turkish Government's announcement early last month that it was withdrawing to Turkey an elite military unit of 750 men, thus further reducing Turkish troop strength on Cyprus, which we now estimate at less than 30,000. Finally, we have received renewed assurances that Turkey desires a negotiated settlement to the Cyprus problem and that it recognizes that Turkish flexibility will be necessary to achieve it.

Turning to the other side of the ledger, there have been a number of developments since July which, in their totality, have undermined prospects for a Cyprus settlement, US security arrangements in the Eastern Mediterranean, and prospects for Turkish reconciliation with Greece. In my judgment a failure to ease the embargo will further exacerbate these adverse developments.

As regards Cyprus, despite our best efforts and those of UN Secretary General Waldheim, the intercommunal talks have been suspended. Among Turkish Cypriots, pressures for a declaration of complete independence for the Turkish zone are increasing. Up to now the Government of Turkey has resisted this pressure for an independent Turkish Cypriot state. It has noted, however, that fruitful negotiations toward a Cyprus settlement will be impossible so long as the arms embargo is in place.

US security interests have been severely affected since the last House vote. The day following the vote the Turkish Government asked us to suspend operations at US intelligence and navigation sites in Turkey. The intelligence loss to the US and NATO on Soviet force deployment and weapons research has been substantial. The Turks have also begun to place customs and other restrictions on US military personnel in Turkey.

As for Greek-Turkish relations, earlier this year these two countries agreed in principle to begin negotiations on their problems in the Aegean, including resource exploitation rights and control of the airspace. Although formal talks began late this summer, they are not proceeding rapidly. It is our impression that the pace has slowed noticeably since the last Turkish embargo vote here.

In summary, I believe that the embargo is simply not working constructively on any front. The Turkish Government has said that removing the embargo would enhance its negotiating flexibility on Cyprus. Similarly, the Turks have said that while they cannot conceive of a worthwhile US-Turkish security relationship so long as the ban is in place, its lifting would create an atmosphere conducive to reestablishing beneficial security ties. Under these circumstances it is in the interests of those who want a Cyprus settlement and who are concerned about US security interests to test these propositions. I find these compelling reasons for voting for the limited arms bill (S.2230) currently before the House.

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9. Our goal continues to be that of assisting the parties in the Cyprus crisis -- Greece, Turkey and Cyprus -- to reach a settlement that accommodates the interests of each -- and, in turn, contributes to the stability of the Mediterranean and the continuing strength of the Alliance. The attitudes of Greece and Turkey are of central importance and we cannot continue to alienate one of the major participants.

10. On July 31 the Senate passed S. 2230 which would modify the arms ban to the extent of permitting us to deliver to Turkey items now in the sales pipeline.
11. If we are to preserve US/NATO security interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and achieve progress toward settlement of the Greek-Turkish dispute over Cyprus, the House must act affirmatively on the aid issue at the earliest possible date.
12. Without this legislation, progress toward a Cyprus settlement will be more difficult and the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean will almost certainly deteriorate. This will work against the interests of all -- Greece, Turkey and Cyprus, the United States and NATO.

9/16/75

To: Mr. Goldberg H  
From: Mr. Gray

Of the thirty-seven (37) editorials on the issue of arms to Turkey which have come to our attention, twenty-two (22) have opposed the embargo on arms shipments, seven (7) have supported it, six (6) blame both Congress and Turkey for the present situation or call for compromise by both Turkey and the Congress, and two (2) have described the situation but have not taken a position.

A sample of editorial opinion on both sides is attached.

Sept 17      Richmond Grimes Dispatch  
                Favor Lifting Embargo  
Sept 18      Cincinnati Enquirer  
                Favor Lifting Embargo



FORT WORTH, TEXAS  
STAR-TELEGRAM

M - 94,188  
S - 227,297

JUL 11 1974

Editorials:

# Turkey Responds To House Ax Job

Moves over the weekend by the government at Ankara to take command of more than 20 U. S. installations on Turkish soil have all but wrecked our vital relations with that key nation—and have shaken the eastern rampart of NATO to its foundations.

It is an appalling fact for Americans that this latest mangling of Western peace interests abroad has come as the direct result of the clumsy foreign policy ax which the U. S. House of Representatives has been swinging at Turkey since last winter.

Last Thursday, in an action which President Ford said "can only do the most serious and irreparable damage to the vital national security interests of the United States," the House voted 223-203 against at least a partial resumption of arms sales to Turkey, sales that were summarily halted by similar House action last February.

It took less than 24 hours for the "serious and irreparable damage" to take shape, as Turkey announced that it was assuming control of the U. S. bases. Although the Ankara authorities stopped short of ordering outright evacuation of U. S. troops, the disruption of authority in operations at the installations was immediate and serious.

Apart from the damage to NATO's eastern flank—already weakened by Greece's earlier deci-

*the move of Turkey to send U.S.*  
installations is a crippling blow to this nation's vital intelligence network along the southern borders of the Soviet Union.

President Ford strongly urged members of the House of Representatives to support the bill that would have given a green light to move \$185 million in weapons which Turkey had contracted for before last Feb. 5, when the House passed an ill-advised, contract-defying embargo against the sales.

The president urged the congressmen to let the administration properly conduct the nation's foreign affairs—in this instance so that "normally excellent relations with Turkey" could be maintained—and to let the arms sales program be resumed.

Failure to do so, he warned, will have not only the adverse effects on NATO and our relations with Turkey, but also probably preclude a peaceful settlement of the Cyprus dispute between Turkey and Greece.

But in its apparently infinite desire to arrogate unto itself the conduct of foreign policy, the House once more axed the sales contract with Turkey, precipitating a new and totally unnecessary crisis for the White House and the State Department.

There was for us at least some gratification in noting that 19 House members from Texas voted to lift the embargo against Turkey, and



*Teague*

Front Page	Edit Page	Other Page
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NEW YORK, NEW YORK  
NEWS

M - 2,028,522

S - 2,794,716

JUL 26 1975

## IS THAT 'NO' FINAL?

By a slim margin of 17 votes, the House has rejected the proposal for a partial removal of the ban on arms shipments to Turkey in a dreadful exhibition of willful negativism and total irresponsibility.

The action further strained relations with Turkey, which cancelled our right to use bases on its soil.

And for what purpose? The Greek Cypriots, for whose cause the weapons boycott was enacted in the first place, certainly won't benefit. Ankara will now be less inclined than ever to modify its hard line on Cyprus, and the White House has been deprived of a tool that could have been used to pry out concessions.



Rep. Morgan

This episode demonstrates the evils of mischievous meddling by Congress in the con-

Front  
Page

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Page

Other  
Page

2

INDIANAPOLIS, IND.  
STAR

M - 224,630

S - 364,954

SEP 3 1975

## A Way Out For Congress

Greece has admitted that it seized millions of dollars' worth of United States ammunition earmarked for NATO when Turkey invaded Cyprus a year ago last July.

The admission will face Congress with a dilemma — and an opportunity — when it reconvenes

*Press Intelligence, Inc.*

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20001

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WASHINGTON, D.C.  
WALL STREET JOURNAL  
-EASTERN EDITION-  
JUL 5 1 1975  
M - 537,666

## A Security Disaster

Thanks to last week's House vote on the Turkish arms embargo, Turkey is taking control of the 20-odd American bases on its soil and suspending all of their activities not related to NATO. In effect, U.S. monitoring stations along Turkey's 2,000-mile border with the Soviet Union

Turkey did not start the Cyprus crisis. The late Greek junta set things off by sponsoring a coup led by terrorist fanatics bent on uniting the island with Greece. The 1960 treaty on the independence of Cyprus gave Turkey the right to prevent such en-  
cis. Furthermore, Congress has re-

Front Page	Editorial Page	Other Page
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DALLAS, TEXAS  
TIMES HERALD

E - 214,519

S - 257,936

JUL 29 1975

## Where loyalty lies

THE MAJORITY of members of the U. S. House played fast and loose with the security of their nation when they voted against lifting the ban on sale of arms to Turkey.

After all their high-flown oratory about "blackmail" and acting on principle, there is simply no other light that can be put on their decision.

The vote was fairly close, 222 to

As to principle, the Cyprus situation is so complex, so very nearly impervious to solution, that certainly we in this country should not set ourselves up as judges of who is right and who is wrong there. The fact of the matter is that had not the Greek Army sparked the Greek Cypriot uprising, there would likely have been no invasion of Cyprus by the Turks.

New York Times

## Turkish Arms 7/19/57

The narrow House vote against lifting the Congressional embargo on arms shipments to Turkey reflected the strong feeling that the prohibition against the use of American arms for non-defense purposes had been violated by Turkey in her invasion of Cyprus a year ago—as indeed it had. This principle is incorporated in all American arms sales agreements; and it is imperative that it be sustained.

However, the compromise agreement incorporated in the House bill, as amended, did recognize this principle by providing only a partial and temporary resumption of arms shipments in hopes of unfreezing the Cyprus negotiations. The need still remains to restore a more flexible policy that would enable American diplomacy

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*Press Intelligence, Inc.*

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20001

Front Page	Edi Page	Other Page
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ATLANTA, GEORGIA  
CONSTITUTION

M - 213,212

JUL 29 1975

## *Turkish Embargo*

It would be wonderful to be able to stand afar and take malicious glee in the spectacle of the U.S. House making a fool of itself -- to be able to slap our knee and crow: "Well, they really did it that time. And Boy, are they going to have to pay!"

Unfortunately, though, what they

strategic importance. Consider if you will:

Turkey has a common border with Russia and contributes to the defense of the Iranian oil fields. Greece does not. Turkey controls access of the Soviet Black Sea fleet to the Mediterranean. Greece does not. Greece has

8/16/75  
A14

WEDNESDAY.

# The Washington Post

AN INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPER

## *How to Break the Turkish Impasse*

WHEN THE ADMINISTRATION failed to induce Congress to loosen the Turkish arms embargo, Turkey responded, as it had threatened, by closing

The important but peripheral humanitarian deal announced in Vienna does not touch the unmitigated central refugee problem of the 200,000 other Greek

*Press Intelligence, Inc.*

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20001

Front  
Page

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Page

Other  
Page

10

KANSAS CITY, MO.  
TIMES

M - 334,249

JUL 26 1975

## The House Stands Fast on Turkey Arms Ban

A great many issues became intertwined in the question of whether the U.S. House ought to vote to rescind the ban on the sale of American arms to Turkey. Deep passions were involved as well as strategic interests and other matters of substantive merit. The White House engaged itself

The truth, as in so many complicated judgments, is that a reasonably credible case could be constructed on either side of most of these issues. Yes, the Turkish use of the American arms was illegal—but such illegalities have been winked at before, when it seemed in our overriding interest

# Editorial Opinion

the minneapolis star

6A

Tuesday, July 29, 1975

## The U.S.-Turkey mini-crisis

AS AN ALLY, Turkey leaves a great deal to be desired. The country has tested the patience of Congress more than once, with the result that congressmen are less inclined than the administration to "forgive and forget"

the use of American arms for non-defense purposes. Last February, Congress slapped a ban on arms shipments to Turkey, partly as punishment and partly to force the Ankara government to make concessions on the Cyprus is-

# 'Yes' to Turkish Arms

The issue of lifting the embargo on arms shipments to NATO-ally Turkey has engendered division and uncertainty in the two houses of Congress.

In May, the Senate passed by a vote of 41-40 a bill that would have permitted President Ford to resume military aid to Turkey, on the condition that progress be made toward peaceful resolution of the Greco-Turkish dispute over Cyprus. Again, in July, the Senate voted 47-46 to permit a partial lifting of the embargo.

However, the House of Representatives has so far refused all efforts to relax or lift the arms ban that Congress first put into effect last February. A move to ease the ban to the extent of allowing Turkey to receive arms it had purchased before the embargo failed by a 206-223 vote on July 24. And a Senate-passed bill to permit a conditional lifting of the embargo was not put to a vote before the August recess.

Confused as the congressional picture may be, there is little confusion as to the practical result of the House majority's uncompromising stand. The clear-cut result has been to damage severely American and Western defense preparedness against the possibility of Soviet aggression.

In retaliation for the House's July 24 vote, Turkey ordered an immediate halt to operations at 27 American military installations. Among those are some of the most sensitive defense bases the United States has anywhere in the world. Some are so highly secret that their names and locations have not even been given out.

From those critical outposts near Soviet borders, the U.S. can monitor by radar and radio Russian troops, ships and planes in the eastern Mediterranean, the Black Sea and Soviet Armenia. Those listening posts could provide the early warning of a missile attack,

or a conventional foray into, say, the Middle East, or intelligence about the development of new weapons that might mean the difference between life and death for free people. Because of the congressional snafu, however, the vital bases in Turkey are inoperative. And there are no substitutes for them; the role they perform is unique.

The proponents of the arms embargo purport to be acting out of high principle. They assert that Turkey broke the law by using American arms to invade Cyprus in July, 1974. They have a point, but they forget to add that it was a Greek-sponsored coup d'etat that appeared to threaten the Turkish Cypriot minority and motivated Ankara to act.

There are rights and wrongs on both sides of this passionately argued issue, but it ought to be possible to reconcile the needs of principle with the demands of pragmatism in this case. The Senate bill, after all, would require Turkish good faith in peacefully resolving the Cyprus situation as the price of renewed arms aid. Security could be protected and peace diplomacy advanced all together. And face could be saved all around.

Today, the process of reconsideration of this emotional issue will begin anew in the House when the International Relations Committee meets behind closed doors with Joseph Sisco, the State Department's Mideast specialist, to discuss the implications of the arms ban. The Senate bill still has not been sent by the Speaker of the House to committee, but presumably the House will have occasion to vote on it this fall. When that time comes, we urge all 10 Virginia congressmen to cast "aye" votes, in the best interests of their country.



Charlie

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

September 18, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: MAX FRIEDERSDORF

FROM: LES JANKA

SUBJECT: Agenda for LIG Meeting on Turkey  
(List of Participants attached)

Friday  
Roosevelt Rm.  
3:00

- A. Emphasize the importance the President attaches to this vote-- describe plans for leadership meetings next week.
- B. Describe your understanding of the Speaker's commitment on getting a rule and a vote on September 30.
- C. Ask State for assessment of ability of Brademas, Greek Lobby, et al to disrupt this plan.
- D. Ask State and DOD to present their latest sets of talking papers and fact sheets.
- E. Ask each agency for their assessment of vote count at this time.
- F. Go through list of House members to count votes and identify priority targets; assign targets to agencies.



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This form marks the file location of item number 19 as listed  
on the pink form (GSA form 7122, Withdrawal Sheet) at the front of the folder.

*Press Intelligence, Inc.*

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20001

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CINCINNATI, OHIO  
ENQUIRER

M - 189,462

S - 295,223

SEP 18 1975

## *Greece, Turkey And America*

ANY DAY NOW, Congress is due to take a second look at the embargo on arms for Turkey.

The hope must be that the issue will be analyzed this time on the basis of

remember—is that nothing would please the Soviet Union more than to see a perpetuation of the interfamily wrangling on NATO's Southern flank that began with Greece's attempt to destroy Cypriot independence and to assassinate the Cypriot president.

# VERA COE REPUBLICAN WHIP—ROBERT H. MICHEL

9/23/75

9/23/75  
4PM

Tally Sheet Will you support S.2230? (partial lifting of arms embargo on Turkey) 94th Congress

## Western and Plains (Talcott)

	Yes	No	Und.	N/R
<i>California</i>				
Bell	?			
Burgener				
Clausen <i>don't buy him</i>				X
✓ Clawson				
Goldwater				
Hinshaw				
Ketchum				
Lagomarsino (ARW)				
McCloskey				
✓ Moorhead				
* Rousselot				
Talcott				
Wiggins				
Wilson				
Pettis				
<i>Alaska</i>				
Young	?			
<i>Arizona</i>				
Conlan				
Rhodes				
Steiger				
<i>Colorado</i>				
Armstrong (ARW) OK				
Johnson				
<i>Idaho</i>				
Hansen				
Symms				
<i>New Mexico</i>				
Lujan				
<i>Washington</i>				
Pritchard				
<i>Kansas</i>				
Sebelius				
Shriver				
Skubitz				
Winn				
<i>Nebraska</i>				
McCollister				
Smith				
Thone (ARW)				
<i>North Dakota</i>				
Andrews				
<i>Oklahoma</i>				
Jarman				
<i>South Dakota</i>				
Abdnor				
* Pressler <i>no</i>				
Total	27	3	3	3

## Midwestern States (Myers)

	Yes	No	Und.	N/R
<i>Indiana</i>				
Hillis				
Myers				
<i>Iowa</i>				
Grassley				
<i>Michigan</i>				
Broomfield				
Brown				
Cederberg				
* Esch <i>OIT</i>				X
Hutchinson <i>OIT</i>				
Ruppe				
✓ Vander Jagt				
<i>Minnesota</i>				
Frenzel (ARW)				
Hagedorn				
Quie				
<i>Wisconsin</i>				
Kasten				
Steiger				
<i>Ohio</i>				
* Ashbrook		?		
Brown				
OK Clancy <i>send paper</i>				X
Devine				
Gradison				
Guyer				
Harsha				
Kindness				
Latta				
* Miller				
Mosher				
* Regula				X
Stanton				
Whalen				
Wylie				
<i>Illinois</i>				
Anderson				
* Crane <i>no</i>				
Derwinski <i>want him</i>				
Erlenborn				
Findley				
* Hyde <i>leaning no</i>				
Madigan				
McClory				
Michel				
* O'Brien <i>no vote</i>				
Railsback				
Total	31	2	5	3

Total pages 1 and 2

103 15 20 12

Note: (Previous record) 16 9 1  
\* - voted no on passage of S.846-7/24/75

# REPUBLICAN WHIP—ROBERT H. MICHEL

Tally Sheet *Turkey Aid*

94th Congress

## Border and Southern (Young)

	Yes	No	Und.	N/R
Maryland				
Gude				
Holt <i>no</i>				
* Bauman <i>OK?</i>				
Missouri				
Taylor (ARW)				
Kentucky				
Carter				
Snyder				
Tennessee				
Beard				
<i>Quillen</i> Duncan				
Quillen				
Florida				
* Bafalis <i>OK security</i>				
<i>mal@</i> Burke <i>comp. ngs. Turk</i>				
* Frey				
<i>Admin.</i> * Kelly <i>no earlier</i>				
Young				
North Carolina				
Broyhill <i>OK earlier</i>				
<i>mal@</i> Martin <i>looking for vote on Cyprus</i>				
South Carolina				
Spence				
Virginia				
Butler				
Daniel				
Robinson				
Wampler				
Whitehurst (ARW) <i>committed?</i>				
Alabama				
Buchanan				
Dickinson				
Edwards				
Arkansas				
Hammerschmidt				
Louisiana				
Moore				
Treen				
Mississippi				
Cochran				
Lott				
Texas				
Archer				
Collins				
* Steelman				
Total	23	7	3	1

## New England and Mid-Atlantic (McDade)

	Yes	No	Und.	N/R
Connecticut				
* McKinney				
* Sarasin				<i>possible</i>
Delaware				
* duPont				
Maine				
Cohen				
Emery				
Massachusetts				
* Conte (ARW)				
* Heckler				<i>possible</i>
New Hampshire				
Cleveland				
New Jersey				
Fenwick <i>chert</i>				
Forsythe <i>OK last time?</i>				
* Rinaldo				
Vermont				
Jeffords				
New York				
Conable				
Fish				
* Gilman				
* Hastings				
Horton				
Kemp				
Lent				
McEwen				
Mitchell (ARW)				
Peyser				
Walsh				
Wydler <i>Heck Ch.</i>				
Pennsylvania				
Biester				
* Coughlin <i>Turk contracts</i>				
Eshleman				
Goodling				
Heinz <i>chert on vote</i>				
Johnson (ARW)				
* McDade				
Myers				
Schneebeli				
Schulze				
Shuster				
Total	28	3	9	3

(Rev. Feb. 1975)

2

47-029-1 GPO

Note: (Previous record)

\* - voted no on passage of S.846 7/24/75

# VERA LOO REPUBLICAN WHIP—ROBERT H. MICHEL

9/23/75

9/23/75  
4PM

## Tally Sheet

Will you support S.2230? (partial lifting of arms embargo on Turkey) 94th Congress

Western and Plains (Talcott)					Midwestern States (Myers)				
	Yes	No	Und.	N/R		Yes	No	Und.	N/R
<i>California</i>					<i>Indiana</i>				
Bell	?				Hillis				
Burgener					Myers				
Clausen					<i>Iowa</i>				
*Clawson					Grassley				
Goldwater					<i>Michigan</i>				
Hinshaw					Broomfield				
Ketchum					Brown				
Lagomarsino (ARW)					Cederberg				
McCloskey					*Esch OIT				
Moorhead					Hutchinson OIT				
*Rousselot					Ruppe				
Talcott					Vander Jagt				
Wiggins					<i>Minnesota</i>				
Wilson					Frenzel (ARW)				
Pettis					Hagedorn				
<i>Alaska</i>					Quie				
Young	?				<i>Wisconsin</i>				
<i>Arizona</i>					Kasten				
Conlan					Steiger				
Rhodes					<i>Ohio</i>				
Steiger					*Ashbrook		?		
<i>Colorado</i>					Brown				
Armstrong (ARW)	?				*Clancy and byer				X
Johnson					Devine				
<i>Idaho</i>					Gradison				
Hansen					Guyer				
Symms					Harsha				
<i>New Mexico</i>					Kindness				
Lujan					Latta				
<i>Washington</i>					*Miller				
Pritchard					Mosher				
<i>Kansas</i>					*Regula				
Sebelius					Stanton				
Shriver					Whalen				
Skubitz					Wylie				
Winn					<i>Illinois</i>				
<i>Nebraska</i>					Anderson				
McCollister					*Crane				
Smith					Derwinski				
Thone (ARW)					Erlenborn				
<i>North Dakota</i>					Findley				
Andrews					*Hyde				
<i>Oklahoma</i>					Madigan				
Jarman					McClory				
<i>South Dakota</i>					Michel				
Abdnor					*O'Brien				
*Pressler					Railsback				
Total	27	3	3	3	Total	31	2	5	3
Total pages 1 and 2	101	15	20	10					

Note: (Previous record)

\* - voted no on passage of S.846<sup>1</sup>-7/24/75

# REPUBLICAN WHIP—ROBERT H. MICHEL

Tally Sheet *Turkey Aid*

94th Congress

Border and Southern (Young)					New England and Mid-Atlantic (McDade)				
	Yes	No	Und.	N/R		Yes	No	Und.	N/R
Maryland					Connecticut				
Gude					* McKinney				
Holt					* Sarasin				
* Bauman					Delaware				
Missouri					* duPont				
Taylor (ARW)					Maine				
Kentucky					Cohen				
Carter					Emery				
Snyder					Massachusetts				
Tennessee					* Conte (ARW)				
Beard					* Heckler				
Duncan					New Hampshire				
Quillen					Cleveland				
Florida					New Jersey				
* Bafalis					Fenwick				
* Burke					Forsythe				
* Frey					* Rinaldo				
* Kelly					Vermont				
Young					Jeffords				
North Carolina					New York				
Broyhill					Conable				
* Martin					Fish				
South Carolina					* Gilman				
Spence					* Hastings				
Virginia					Horton				
Butler					Kemp				
Daniel					Lent				
Robinson					McEwen				
Wampler					Mitchell (ARW)				
Whitehurst (ARW)					Peyser				
Alabama					Walsh				
Buchanan					Wydler				
Dickinson					Pennsylvania				
Edwards					Biester				
Arkansas					* Coughlin				
Hammerschmidt					Eshleman				
Louisiana					Goodling				
Moore					Heinz				
Treen					Johnson (ARW)				
Mississippi					* McDade				
Cochran					Myers				
Lott					Schneebeli				
Texas					Schulze				
Archer					Shuster				
Collins									
Steelman									
Total	23	7	3	1	Total	20	3	9	3

(Rev. Feb. 1975)

2

Note: (Previous record)

\* - voted no on passage of S.846 7/24/75



47-029-4 GPO

# Los Angeles Times

HARRISON GRAY OTIS, 1882-1917  
HARRY CHANDLER, 1917-1944  
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6—Part II

TUESDAY MORNING, SEPTEMBER 23, 1975

## Arms Embargo: a Proven Error

The House of Representatives will be extending the harm already done to American and NATO security interests if it fails to act soon to lift the embargo on U.S. arms shipments to Turkey.

good reason why that deadline cannot be met. The arms embargo has been thoroughly debated. All that has to be done before the House votes is to weigh the ban's actual results against its intended

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# Congress of the United States

## Committee on International Relations

House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515

October 1, 1975

MARIAN A. CZARNECKI  
CHIEF OF STAFF

Dear Colleague:

On Thursday, October 2, the House will again consider the issue of lifting the embargo on arms shipments to Turkey. Before that happens, we thought that we would try to elaborate on two issues being raised by those who favor continuing the embargo.

Their first argument deals with timing. They argue that House action now -- less than two weeks before the Senatorial elections in Turkey -- will be interpreted as an effort to influence the outcome of those elections, and as interference in Turkey's internal affairs.

This argument has no merit. The embargo has been a political issue in Turkey since the Congress first acted on it last September. It is a significant political issue -- but one which cuts across the whole political spectrum in Turkey. Both government and opposition parties condemn the embargo. All are advocating its prompt repeal. Therefore, none are likely to gain any advantage from a change in U.S. policy.

On the other hand, it is certain that if the embargo is not lifted or at least modified, U.S. and NATO interests will continue to suffer. The solution of the Cyprus problem will become even more difficult. U.S. intelligence-gathering losses may become permanent. There is every reason, therefore, for the House to act now, without further delay.

The second argument raised by the proponents of the embargo goes to the issue of principle. It insists that the rule of law be observed. It argues that Turkey -- having misused U.S.-furnished arms -- should be subjected to the penalties provided by law.

The problem here is that the embargo does not simply apply the law that was in effect last summer. The embargo went beyond that law and subjected Turkey to additional and unique sanctions. The bill which the House will consider Thursday -- S. 2230 -- is specifically intended to remove those additional sanctions and to leave the rest of the embargo intact until the Congress has an opportunity to review this issue again in the future.

This is a very important point which the advocates of the embargo consistently ignore. Our laws call for the suspension of further military


aid -- and of government-to-government sales and credits -- to countries which use U.S.-made arms for purposes other than those specified in law and in aid/sales agreements. The laws, however, were not intended to apply to the "pipeline" (goods already committed or purchased) or to commercial sales.

The bill, S. 2230, would lift those special sanctions by allowing delivery to Turkey of \$185 million in military items purchased by Turkey prior to the imposition of the embargo -- and by releasing commercial sales.

It seems to us that, considering the stalemate which has developed, and the events of the past few months, this is the minimum that the Congress should do in an effort to start some movement toward resolution of the Cyprus problem.

We believe that the security interests of our country, and the prospects for a just and enduring solution to the Cyprus problem, have been damaged by the events of the past year. And we agree with the President, the National Security Council, the American Legion, the Veterans of Foreign Wars, and a very large cross-section of the American public, that the time has come for the House to start correcting that situation.

With best wishes,



William S. Broomfield  
Ranking Minority Member

Sincerely yours,



Thomas E. Morgan  
Chairman



October 1, 1975

HON. THOMAS E. MORGAN  
CHAIRMAN  
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS  
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515  
(202) 225-5021

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

CHAIRMAN MORGAN'S STATEMENT ON TURKEY ARMS EMBARGO

"The proposal presented today by the supporters of the Turkey arms embargo is just another stalling tactic." Chairman Thomas E. Morgan said today:

"It does nothing to change the existing situation.

"We have gone up the hill on this issue at least eight times.

"Each time, the House has imposed conditions for lifting the embargo -- conditions which one or more of the parties to the Cyprus dispute was not willing to meet.

"As a result, we have reached a dead-end.

"We are in a deadlock which will not be broken by laying down new conditions.

"The House has to make a decision to fish or cut bait.

"If we want to help resolve the deadlock -- if we want to help the 180,000 refugees on Cyprus -- if we want to stop the erosion of U.S. security and NATO's strength, then we should be willing to take the first step by lifting a small part of the embargo.

"In this regard, the Veterans of Foreign Wars, the American Legion and several prominent newspapers, including the New York Times, the Washington Evening Star, the Pittsburgh Press and the Los Angeles Times, among others, have endorsed recommendations of the Committee on International Relations on a partial lifting of the embargo.

"The policy advocated by those opposing lifting the Turkey arms embargo has not achieved the desired objectives.

"The embargo has not worked. If anything, it has made things worse, particularly with respect to the plight of the refugees.

"In the interest of all concerned, I believe that we should not give in to any more stalling tactics -- and that the House should again have an opportunity to work its will on this issue."



# REPUBLICAN WHIP—ROBERT H. MICHEL

10/2 [1975]

Tally Sheet *Turkey Aid*

94th Congress

Western and Plains (Talcott)					Midwestern States (Myers)				
	Yes	No	Und.	N/R		Yes	No	Und.	N/R
<i>California</i>					<i>Indiana</i>				
Bell	/			X	Hillis	/			
Burgener	/				Myers	/			
Clausen	/				<i>Iowa</i>				
Clawson	/	/			Grassley	/			
Goldwater	/				<i>Michigan</i>				
Hinshaw	/				Broomfield	/			
Ketchum	/				Brown	/			
Lagomarsino (ARW)	/				Cederberg	/			
McCloskey	/				Esch <i>hedging</i>	/	/		
Moorhead	/	/		X	Hutchinson	/	/		/
Rousselot	/	/	X		Ruppe <i>dit</i>	/	/	/	/
Talcott	/				Vander Jagt	/			
Wiggins	/				<i>Minnesota</i>				
Wilson	/				Frenzel (ARW)	/			
<i>Pattis</i>	/				Hagedorn	/			
<i>Alaska</i>					Quie	/			
Young	/				<i>Wisconsin</i>				
<i>Arizona</i>					Kasten	/			
Conlan	/	/			Steiger	/			
Rhodes	/	/			<i>Ohio</i>				
Steiger	/	/			Ashbrook	/	/	/	
<i>Colorado</i>					Brown	/	/	X	
Armstrong (ARW)	/				Clancy	/	/	X	
Johnson	/			/	Devine	/	/		/
<i>Idaho</i>					Gradison	/			
Hansen	/				Guyer	/			
Symms	/				Harsha	/	/		
<i>New Mexico</i>					Kindness	/			
Lujan	/				Latta	/			
<i>Washington</i>					Miller	/			
Pritchard	/				Mosher	/	/	/	
<i>Kansas</i>					Regula	/			
Sebelius	/				Stanton	/			
Shriver	/				Whalen	/			
Skubitz	/				Wylie	/			
Winn	/				<i>Illinois</i>				
<i>Nebraska</i>					Anderson	/			
McCollister	/				Crane <i>clearing</i>	/			
Smith	/				Derwinski	/	/		
Thone (ARW)	/				Erlenborn	/			
<i>North Dakota</i>					Findley	/			
Andrews <i>w dB</i>	/				* Hyde <i>Sarkis amendment</i>	/	/	X	
<i>Oklahoma</i>					Madigan	/			
Jarman	/				McClory	/			
<i>South Dakota</i>					Michel	/			
Abdnor	/	/			O'Brien	/			
Pressler	/	/			Railsback	/			
Total	28	4	1	3	Total	31	3	4	3
Total pages 1 and 2	104	17	12	10					

28 2 1 1  
116



# REPUBLICAN WHIP—ROBERT H. MICHEL

## Tally Sheet

94th Congress

Border and Southern (Young)					New England and Mid-Atlantic (McDade)				
	Yes	No	Und.	N/R		Yes	No	Und.	N/R
<i>Maryland</i>					<i>Connecticut</i>				
Gude					McKinney				
Holt					Sarasin				
Bauman			X		<i>Delaware</i>				
<i>Missouri</i>					duPont				
Taylor (ARW)					<i>Maine</i>				
<i>Kentucky</i>					Cohen				
Carter					Emery				
Snyder possible					<i>Massachusetts</i>				
<i>Tennessee</i>					Conte (ARW)				
Beard					Heckler				
Duncan					<i>New Hampshire</i>				
Quillen					Cleveland				
<i>Florida</i>					<i>New Jersey</i>				
Bafalis					Fenwick				
Burke					Forsythe				
Frey					Rinaldo				
Kelly					<i>Vermont</i>				
Young					Jeffords				
<i>North Carolina</i>					<i>New York</i>				
Broyhill					Conable				
Martin					Fish				
<i>South Carolina</i>					Gilman				
Spence					Hastings				
<i>Virginia</i>					Horton				
Butler					Kemp				
Daniel					Lent				
Robinson					McEwen				
Wampler					Mitchell (ARW)				
Whitehurst (ARW)					Peyser				
<i>Alabama</i>					Walsh				
Buchanan					Wydler				
Dickinson					<i>Pennsylvania</i>				
Edwards					Biester				
<i>Arkansas</i>					Coughlin				
Hammerschmidt					Eshleman				
<i>Louisiana</i>					Goodling				
Moore					Heinz				
Treen					Johnson (ARW)				
<i>Mississippi</i>					McDade				
Cochran					Myers				
Lott					Schneebeli				
<i>Texas</i>					Schulze				
Archer					Shuster				
Collins									
Steelman									
Total	20	7	2	4	Total	25	5	5	



$$\begin{array}{r} 116 \\ 106 \\ \hline 222 \end{array}$$

# news

# Paul Simon

U.S. Congressman, 24th District Illinois

Immediate Release  
October 2, 1975

More Information: Terry Michael  
202/225-5201

SIMON EXPLAINS POSITION  
ON MILITARY AID FOR TURKEY

WASHINGTON, D.C.-- Congressman Paul Simon, D-Ill., prepared the following remarks on the Turkish military aid question for delivery on the House floor Thursday (10-2-75):

MR. SPEAKER: When we last voted, I supported the move to cut off aid to Turkey. I did it after careful evaluation, but I cast the vote with great uncertainty as to which alternative presented the right course.

I am confronted with that same dilemma today.

The two basic arguments used in debate on this question are these:

"Turkey is essential for the United States defense."

I have attended the briefing session with Secretary Schlesinger and have heard the discussion by others who are knowledgeable. My conclusion is that while there are defense pluses in a continuing close alliance with Turkey on the Soviet frontier, that should not be a dominant consideration.

"We would be abandoning principle if we provided assistance or tolerated military sales."

There is some truth to this argument. At the very least--acknowledging guilt on both sides--it is nevertheless true that we are modifying our standards if we approve the sales. Whether this will convince others that they can use our weapons for military aggression is one of the calculated risks we take if we accept the President's position.

(more)

If those two considerations were the only ones, my vote would be the same as it was a few weeks ago. There are other considerations, however, before Congress today:

First, we must somehow get the Cyprus issue off dead center, so that refugees can go home and so that peace can return to that troubled land. It now seems clear that a continuation of the present policy will not cause or permit movement by Turkey. By casting an affirmative vote, I am taking the risk that Turkey will understand this gesture of good faith and move toward a peaceful and humanitarian solution of that difficult situation. If my vote is followed by no movement on their part and a hardening of the existing lines, then my vote will have been a mistake. Turkey and Greece must follow the example of Israel and Egypt in reaching a workable accommodation.

A second consideration is that, since we last voted, a tenuous peace has been established in the Middle East between Egypt and Israel. It is the most hopeful sign for stability in that war-prone area that we have had in decades. If by rejecting assistance to Turkey we push that country into the arms of the forces of instability in the Middle East, we will have created trouble beyond the problems which exist between Greece and Turkey. The delicate balance of power in the Middle East should not shift, and Turkey has the capability of shifting it.

A third factor is the growing belief on my part that this is not an issue with which Congress can deal effectively. We must act on overall policy, but Congress does not have the flexibility to deal with rapidly changing events effectively. In part, my vote is a vote to place this matter in the executive branch with the belief that Congress can have appreciable influence on broad policy considerations. I do it with the plea that every effort be expended by the President and Secretary of State to bring justice and stability to Cyprus as rapidly as possible.

Whether my affirmative vote today is a proper one, history must judge. And the judgment of history rests to a great extent with the leaders of Turkey, who I hope will respond affirmatively to this gesture by the Congress of the United States.