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## NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE

## WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1a. Briefing Paper	<p>1. <u>Briefing Paper case file, ca. 7/9/75</u></p> <p>Background information and talking points on restoration of military aid to Turkey (5 pp.)  <i>portins exempted NSC 6444 12/7/92</i>  <i>KBH 1/27/93</i></p> <p><b>SANITIZED</b> 11/01</p>	Undated (ca. 7/9/75)	A

## FILE LOCATION

Charles Leppert Files  
 General Subject File  
 Turkey - Military Aid (1)

## RESTRICTION CODES

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WHM, 5/1/84

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Date: 2/12

TO:

Charlie

FROM: Robert K Wolthuis

For your information ✓

Please handle                     

Other



## SUSPENSION OF MAP AND FMS TO TURKEY

- Suspension effective at midnight 5 February 1975. DOD implementing message attached (Tab A).
- Cargo awaiting shipment from depots or manufacturer's facilities being held at such depots/facilities.
- State Department suspending export licenses for material not yet past U.S. ports on commercial bills of lading for account of Government of Turkey.
- Cargo en route ~~to port~~ under U.S. Government control (Government Bill of Lading) will not be delivered.
  - Cargo en route to port being returned to depot or stored under U.S. Government control.
  - Cargo at sea under U.S. Government control (i.e., on U.S. Government Bill of Lading) being returned to U.S. or delivered to non-Turkish port for storage under U.S. control. For example:
    - o Ship EXPORT BUYER scheduled to arrive Turkey 16 February with MAP cargo will return cargo to U.S.
    - o Ship ELIZABETH LYKES, scheduled to arrive Turkey 21 February also will return cargo to U.S.
    - o Ship MARGARET LYKES scheduled to depart U.S. 7 February with MAP cargo will not be loaded.
- Cargo at sea but not on U.S. Government Bill of Lading (e.g., commercial Bill of Lading for Government of Turkey account) is beyond U.S. control. Example:
  - Ship FIRAT (Turkish flag) departed U.S. on 3 February with cargo of vehicles, ammunition, and weapons (MAP and FMS).
- Value of ~~material frustrated~~ <sup>program suspended</sup> estimated at \$265 million (\$86 million MAP, \$179 million FMS).
- Movement of U.S. personnel to Turkey and Turkish personnel to U.S. on MAP or FMS activities halted.



[July 1975?]

## RESTORATION OF MILITARY AID TO TURKEY

### FACT SHEET

1. United States military assistance to an old and faithful ally, Turkey, was cut off on February 5 by action of the Congress. This has imposed an embargo on military purchases by Turkey, extending even to items already paid for.
2. Although the Senate's passage of the Mansfield-Scott Bill was an important first step toward reestablishing with Turkey our credibility as a trusted friend and ally, Turkish trust in the United States remains shaken. At Brussels, the President and Turkish Prime Minister discussed the military aid cut-off and other aspects of our relations. The Government of Turkey expressed bewilderment and disbelief over the military aid embargo -- citing it as totally contrary to our common interests and our historic ties.
3. Our longstanding relationship with Turkey is not a favor to Turkey. It is clear and essential mutual interest. Turkey lies on the rim of the Soviet Union and at the gates of the Middle East. It is vital to the security of the eastern Mediterranean, the southern flank of Western Europe and the collective security of the Western alliance.
4. With approximately half a million men under arms, including NATO's second largest land force (375,000 men), and a key strategic position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and the Middle East, Turkey makes a vital contribution to the Western alliance. NATO military authorities have stated that a continuation of the U.S. ban on mutual aid to Turkey will seriously degrade the capability of all branches of the Turkish armed forces, and their reinforcement by NATO forces in a time of tension. The U.S. ban therefore imposes a grave limitation on NATO's military posture in the southern region.
5. The aid cut-off by the Congress was intended to influence Turkey in the Cyprus negotiations. But the results of the Congressional action have been to block progress towards reconciliation, thereby prolonging the suffering on Cyprus; complicating our ability to promote successful negotiations; and increasing the danger of a broader conflict.
6. The Turkish aid cut-off has not forced concessions from the Turks. Instead, it has hardened their position in the Cyprus crisis; it has fueled Greek-Turkish tensions in the Aegean; and we now run the very real risk of serious damage to US-Turkish relations and NATO relations.

7. Our goal continues to assist the parties in the Cyprus crisis -- Greece, Turkey and Cyprus -- to reach a settlement which accommodates the interests of each -- and, in turn, contributes to the stability of the Mediterranean and the continuing strength of the Alliance. The attitudes of Greece and Turkey are of central importance and we cannot continue to alienate one of the major participants.
8. There is growing frustration and irritation in Turkey over this penalization of a trusted friend and ally by the United States. In this regard, the Turkish Government in mid-June set a 30-day deadline for resumption of aid or consultations on reductions of U.S. facilities on Turkish soil. Turkish moves against our installations would have an adverse impact on U.S. and NATO security interests in the Eastern Mediterranean, and would also further damage prospects for a Cyprus settlement.
9. House approval of legislation which restores a proper balance in our relationship with Turkey and which is fair and equitable to Turkey and to Greece will increase our flexibility in working with both sides on a solution to the Cyprus problem.
10. Without this legislation, progress toward settlement will not be made and the situation will almost certainly deteriorate. This will work against the interests of all -- Greece, Turkey and Cyprus, the United States and NATO.
11. To sum up, the need is for immediate legislation to restore to an important NATO ally access to U.S. sources of supply for spares, components, and other material compatible with previously supplied U.S. military equipment. Lifting the embargo will enable Turkey to fulfill its NATO role, will safeguard vital U.S. installations in Turkey, and will remove a substantial impediment to progress in the Cyprus negotiations.

[July 1975?]

RESTORATION OF AID TO TURKEY  
MANSFIELD-SCOTT BILL

FACT SHEET

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2. Although the Senate's passage of the Mansfield-Scott Bill was an important first step toward re-establishing with Turkey our credibility as a trusted friend and ally, Turkish trust in the United States remains shaken. At Brussels, the President and Turkish Prime Minister reviewed the military aid cut-off and other aspects of our relations. The Government of Turkey expressed bewilderment and disbelief over the military aid embargo -- citing it as totally contrary to US-Turkish ties.
3. Our longstanding relationship with Turkey is not a favor to Turkey. It is a clear and essential mutual interest. Turkey lies on the rim of the Soviet Union and at the gates of the Middle East. It is vital to the security of the eastern Mediterranean, the southern flank of Western Europe and the collective security of the Western alliance.
4. With approximately half a million men under arms, including NATO's second largest land force (375,000 men), and a key strategic position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and the Middle East, Turkey makes a decisive contribution to the Western alliance. NATO military authorities have stated that "a continuation of the U.S. ban on mutual aid to Turkey will seriously degrade the capability of all arms of the Turkish armed forces, and their reinforcement by NATO forces in a time of tension. The U.S. ban therefore imposes a grave limitation on NATO's military posture in the southern region."
5. The aid cut-off by the Congress was intended to influence Turkey in the Cyprus negotiations. But the results of the Congressional action has been to block progress towards reconciliation, thereby prolonging the suffering on Cyprus; to complicate our ability to promote successful negotiations; to increase the danger of a broader conflict.

6. The Turkish aid cut-off has not brought concessions from the Turks. Instead, it has hardened their position in the Greek-Cyprus-Turkish crisis; it has fueled Greek-Turkish tensions in the Aegean; and we now run the very real risk of serious damage to US-Turkish relations and NATO relations.
7. Our goal continues to be that of assisting the parties in the Cyprus crisis -- Greece, Turkey and Cyprus -- to reach a settlement that accommodates the interests of each -- and, in turn, contributes to the stability of the Mediterranean and the continuing strength of the Alliance. The attitudes of Greece and Turkey are of central importance and we cannot continue to alienate one of the major participants.
8. There is growing frustration and irritation in Turkey over this penalizing of a trusted friend and ally by the United States. So far, the new Demirel government has resisted domestic pressures to take retaliatory steps against the United States by cutting back facilities of great military importance to us unless we lift the military aid ban. Were these actions to occur, they would not only harm important U.S. and Alliance security interests but also further damage prospects for a Cyprus settlement.
9. Congressional approval of the Mansfield-Scott legislation will restore a proper relationship with Turkey. This in turn will increase our flexibility in working with both Greece and Turkey on a solution to the Cyprus problem.
10. Without this legislation, progress toward settlement will not be sustained and the situation will almost certainly deteriorate. This will work against the interests of all -- Greece, Turkey and Cyprus.

[July 1975?]

## THE EMBARGO ON TURKEY

Approval of H. R. 8454 is essential to the achievement of a Cyprus settlement and to the protection of vital NATO and U. S. national interests in the eastern Mediterranean area.

-- A continued embargo helps no one: it precludes a Cyprus settlement and hence a solution to the refugee problem; it weakens the NATO alliance; it threatens the U. S. with the loss of vital intelligence installations in Turkey; and as the current tension in the region persists, it hinders Greece's ability to build a stable democracy.

-- The issue is not a matter of upholding the law. The Administration stopped new shipments of arms to Turkey last fall; a total embargo for six months indicates that Turkish actions are not condoned. The law has been upheld: now we must consider the consequences of continued stalemate for U. S. security and foreign policy interests.

-- A worsening of U. S. - Turkish relations that would result from a continued embargo is contrary to U. S. interests. It will deal a heavy blow to the NATO alliance at a time when other major problems exist in the region--Portugal, Spain, and the Middle East.

-- The only way to settle the Cyprus problem is through negotiations. The Turks will not negotiate under the pressure of an embargo. The U. S. can help in these negotiations only if it has the necessary flexibility with all parties.

-- Lifting the embargo will remove a substantial impediment to progress in the Cyprus negotiations, enable Turkey to fulfill its NATO role, and safeguard vital U. S. installations in Turkey.

-- H. R. 8454 is a compromise. The Administration has stated its preference for a total lifting of the embargo; however this bill permits only the release of material in the pipeline which Turkey has already paid for and future commercial sales. Furthermore, Turkey would be expected to continue to observe the ceasefire, not to increase its troops on Cyprus, and not to introduce additional U. S. -provided equipment into Cyprus. In addition, the bill includes provisions for consultations with Greece regarding military and economic assistance to that country and provides for continuation of humanitarian aid to Cyprus refugees.

[July 1975?]

## RESTORATION OF MILITARY AID TO TURKEY

### FACT SHEET

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8. There is growing frustration and irritation in Turkey over this penalization of a trusted friend and ally by the United States. In this regard, the Turkish Government in mid-June set a 30-day deadline for resumption of aid or consultations on reductions of U.S. facilities on Turkish soil. Turkish moves against our installations would have an adverse impact on U.S. and NATO security interests in the Eastern Mediterranean, and would also further damage prospects for a Cyprus settlement.
9. House approval of legislation which restores a proper balance in our relationship with Turkey and which is fair and equitable to Turkey and to Greece will increase our flexibility in working with both sides on a solution to the Cyprus problem.
10. Without this legislation, progress toward settlement will not be made and the situation will almost certainly deteriorate. This will work against the interests of all -- Greece, Turkey and Cyprus, the United States and NATO.
11. To sum up, the need is for immediate legislation to restore to an important NATO ally access to U.S. sources of supply for spares, components, and other material compatible with previously supplied U.S. military equipment. Lifting the embargo will enable Turkey to fulfill its NATO role, will safeguard vital U.S. installations in Turkey, and will remove a substantial impediment to progress in the Cyprus negotiations.

[July 1975?]

VOTE ANALYSIS OF H.R. 4035,  
CONFERENCE REPORT ON H.R. 4035  
AND H.RES. 605 .

+ = For administration position by vote or by pairing  
x = Against administration position by vote or by pairing  
Members not listed were either for or against the administration  
position on all three votes

Name	H.R. 4035	Conf. Rep. 621/4035	H.Res. 605
Abdnor (R.-S.D.)	+	+	x
Andrews (N.C.) D.	x	+	x
Andrews (N.D.) R.	+	+	x
Bafalis (R-Fla.)	+	+	x
Bell (R-Calif.)	+	NV	+
Bevill (D.-Ala.)	x	x	+
Bowen (D-Miss.)	+	+	x
Brinkley (D-Ga.)	x	x	+
Brooks (D-Tex.)	x	+	+
Brown (Cal.) R.	+	x	+
Burke (Fla.) R.	x	+	x
Byron (D-Md.)	+	+	x
Chappell (D-Fla.)	+	x	+
Clancy (R-Ohio)	+	x	+
Clausen (Don-R-Cal.)	NV	+	NV
Cleveland (R-N.H.)	x	+	+
Coughlin (R-Pa.)	+	+	x
Davis (D-S.C.)	x	+	+
Dent (D-Pa.)	x	x	+
Derrick (D-S.C.)	x	x	+
Downing (D-Va.)	x	+	+
du Pont (R-Del.)	x	+	+
Fenwick (R-N.J.)	x	+	+
Fish (R-N.Y.)	x	+	+
Flynt (D-Ga.)	x	+	+

\_/ P = Paired



<u>Name</u>	<u>H.R. 4035</u>	<u>Conf. Rep. 621/4035</u>	<u>H.Res. 605</u>
Haley (D-Fla.)	+	+	x
Hinshaw (R-Cal.)	+	+	NV
Jenrette (D-S.C.)	NV	x	+
Krueger (D-Tex.)	+	+	x
Littor (D-Mo.)	x	+	x
Mann (D-S.C.)	x	x	+
Mathis (D-Ga.)	NV	+	+
Mosher (R-Ohio)	NV	+	+
Murtha (D-Pa.)	x	+	x
Myers (Ind.) R.	+	+	x
McKay (D-Utah)	x	+	x
Nichols (D-Ala.)	x (P)	x	+
Patman (D-Tex.)	NV	+	x
Pickle (D-Tex.)	+	+	x
Rees (D-Cal.)	x	+	+
Regula (R-Ohio)	+	+	x
Risenhoover (D-Okla.)	x (P)	+	+
Ruppe (R-Mich.)	+	x	+
Stephens (D-Ga.)	x	x	+
Taylor (Mo.) R.	+	+	x
Walsh (R-N.Y.)	x	+	x
Whitten (D-Miss.)	+	+	x
Wright (D-Tex.)	x	+	x
Wylie (R-Ohio)	NV	+	+



*Rayburn 080*  
*[July 1975]*

FBIS 33 (SEE 79) \*\*\*\*\*

TURKEY TO TAKE OVER JOINT DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS 26 JULY

TA251327 ANKARA DOMESTIC SERVICE IN TURKISH 1800 GMT 25 JUL 75 TA

(TEXT) THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS HAS DECIDED TO HALT, AS OF TOMORRE THE ACTIVITIES OF ALL JOINT DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS ESTABLISHED IN TURKEY UNDER THE AGREEMENTS GOVERNING JOINT DEFENSE COOPERATION BETWEEN TURKEY AND THE UNITED STATES. IT HAS BEEN ANNOUNCED THAT THESE INSTALLATIONS WILL BE PLACED COMPLETELY UNDER THE CONTROL AND SUPERVISION OF THE TURKISH ARMED FORCES. THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS MET AT 1300 TODAY. WHILE THE MEETING WAS STILL IN PROGRESS A STATEMENT WAS ISSUED WHICH SAID:

1. THE DEFENSE COOPERATION AGREEMENT OF 3 JULY 1969, WHICH GOVERNS JOINT DEFENSE COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND TURKEY, AND OTHER AGREEMENTS CONNECTED WITH IT HAVE LOST THEIR LEGAL VALIDITY.

2. IN VIEW OF THIS SITUATION, AS OF TOMORROW, THAT IS AS OF 26 JULY 1975, THE ACTIVITIES OF ALL JOINT DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS IN TURKEY, EXCLUDING THE INCIRLIK JOINT DEFENSE INSTALLATION RESERVED FOR NATO TASKS ALONE, WILL BE SUSPENDED.

3. ALL INSTALLATIONS WHOSE ACTIVITIES HAVE BEEN SUSPENDED WILL BE TURNED OVER TO THE FULL CONTROL AND SUPERVISION OF THE TURKISH ARMED FORCES.

5 JUL 1353Z PC/CAJ \*\*\*\*\*



[July 1975?]

## Committee on International Relations

On page 5, after line 17, add the following new section:

(e) In the case of any letter of offer to sell any defense article or defense service pursuant to the Foreign Military Sales Act or to furnish grant military assistance under the authority of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 for \$25,000,000 or more, the President shall submit to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a statement containing (1) a brief description of the defense article or defense service to be offered, (2) the dollar amount of the proposed sale or grant, (3) the United States armed force which is making the sale or grant, and (4) the date on which any letter of offer to sell is to be issued or grant is to be made. The letter of offer shall not be issued nor the grant made if the Congress, within twenty calendar days after receiving any such statement, adopts a concurrent resolution stating in effect that it objects to such proposed sale or grant.

[July 1975?]

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[July 1975]

## REBUTTAL TO ARGUMENTS AGAINST LIFTING EMBARGO

### A. The So-Called Compromise is no Compromise

The Administration has stated its preference for a total lifting of the embargo. H. R. 8454 permits only the release of material in the pipeline Turkey has already paid for and future commercial sales.

Furthermore, Turkey would be expected to continue to observe the ceasefire, not to increase its troops on Cyprus, and not to introduce additional U. S.-provided equipment into Cyprus. The Administration has made it clear to Turkish leaders that if the lifting of the embargo is not followed by constructive Turkish efforts to reach an acceptable negotiated solution, US-Turkish relations would be seriously affected.

### B. Approval of Arms Condone Violations of Conditions of U. S. Law and of Bilateral Agreements Between U. S. and Turkey

The imposition of a total embargo for six months makes it clear to Turkey and to all other countries that Turkish actions are not condoned.

A continuation of the total embargo, a major impediment to a negotiated solution on Cyprus, would represent a policy decision by Congress that Turkey's use of U. S. arms on Cyprus warrants such an extreme and prolonged response, irrespective of the consequences for US security and foreign policy interests.

### C. Approval of Arms Encourages Other Nations Buying or Receiving U. S. Arms to use Them Without Inhibition

The embargo on Turkey for more than six months serves as an uncontrovertible warning that use of U. S. arms without regard to agreements limiting such use will not be tolerated by the United States. The proposed bill does not imply that the U. S. would fail to insist upon observance of restrictions on the use of U. S. supplied arms. Any future violations of an agreement with the United States would remain subject to the provisions of existing law. The premise of the proposed legislation is that lifting of the suspension will occur only after it has become clear in a given case that U. S. interests and objectives are not served by a continuation of the suspension.

D. Approval of Arms Now Would Condone Aggression by Turkey

The Administration and Congress have made clear on many occasions their opposition to Turkish military intervention on Cyprus.

Resumption of arms deliveries to Turkey, conditioned as they would be by the provisions of H.R. 8454, would in no way amount to condoning Turkish action on Cyprus. The Turkish army, who uses US equipment almost exclusively, sent some US weapons to Cyprus. These weapons are still there, but the best way--perhaps the only way--to get them off the island is through a negotiated settlement. The arms embargo has had no positive influence on the Cyprus situation. The Turkish Government has made clear that so long as it remains subject to an arms embargo, which it views as a threat to its own security, it cannot be accommodating with respect to Cyprus.

E. Resumption of Arms Would Have a Very Damaging Impact in Greece

Just the opposite is true. The present lack of progress is not in the interest of any of the parties. We have no interest in making choices between Greece and Turkey. The United States needs a close security relationship with both, bilaterally and through NATO.

The proposed legislation requests the President to determine the most urgent needs of Greece for economic and military assistance and to make FY 1976 recommendations to the Congress. This is consistent with our policy of supporting the Greek government and the great importance we attach to our security relationship with Greece.

F. To the Argument that the Arms Embargo has not Worked Because the Administration Undercut its Effectiveness

The very contrary is the case. Although it opposed the embargo from the beginning because it would jeopardize US security interests in the eastern Mediterranean and would compromise U.S. efforts to urge the parties toward a Cyprus settlement, the Administration halted new shipments to Turkey last fall and consistently and persistently has made known to the Turkish Government our desire for a constructive approach toward the Cyprus negotiations.

The aid cut-off by the Congress was intended to influence Turkey in the Cyprus negotiations. But the results of the Congressional action have been to block progress towards reconciliation, thereby prolonging the suffering on Cyprus; to complicate our ability to promote successful negotiations; to increase the danger of a broader conflict. It has not brought concessions from the Turks. Instead, it has hardened their position in the Greek-Cyprus-Turkish crisis; and we now run the very real risk of losing important U. S. capabilities in Turkey and serious damage to US-Turkish relations and NATO relations.

It is erroneous to say that the Turks showed no flexibility on Cyprus prior to February 1975. The Turks supported the Security Council and General Assembly Resolutions last fall. In the intercommunal talks in January and early February, the Turks put forward concrete proposals to reopen Nicosia Airport, share use of Famagusta Harbor with the Greek-Cypriots, and let several thousand refugees go back to their homes. These were rejected by the Greek-Cypriots who broke off the intercommunal talks on February 13.

G. Resumption of Arms Would be to Yield to Turkish Blackmail Threats on the U. S. Bases

There remains a strong basic mutuality of interests between the US and Turkey. But Turkey feels that this alliance mutuality is being eroded by a legislative embargo that cuts Turkey off completely from access to U. S. arms, in conflict with mutual security agreements between the U. S. and Turkey.

In no other allied country have we applied sanctions as severe as we have to Turkey. Our allies have provided essential facilities and we have provided military assistance where it was needed. Continuation of the embargo both jeopardizes vital bilateral ties with Turkey and erodes the NATO defenses in the area, since virtually all U. S. facilities in Turkey relate to our capacity to support NATO defense objectives in the area.

[July 1975?]

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[July 1975?]

THE SEVEN (7) VOTES IN THE U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

x - anti-administration vote  
o - pro-administration vote  
A - absence

→ leaning toward administration  
← leaning away

VOTE #1: Sept. 24 - Rosenthal-DuPont IV Amendment passed 307 to 90 prohibiting funds for military assistance to Turkey until the President certifies to Congress that a satisfactory agreement has been reached regarding military forces in Cyprus.

VOTE #2: Oct. 7 - House rejects the Conference Committee language by 291 to 69 and passes the Rosenthal Motion by voice vote.

VOTE #3: Oct. 11 - The House rejects the Mansfield Motion, SJ Res 247 by 187 to 171, which then brings on a Presidential veto. (The Congress had plans to recess for Elections on this date but had to return to Session the next week because of the Veto.)

VOTE #4: Oct. 15 - The House failed to override Presidential veto by vote of 223 to 135 (16 votes short) and new legislation required.

VOTE #5: Oct. 16 - House passes Rosenthal Compromise Amendment by 194 to 144 providing for cut-off military aid to Turkey if any U. S. equipment given to Turkey is shipped to Cyprus.

VOTE #6: Oct. 17 - The House failed to override the President's veto of Oct. 16, two vote short (161-83); then passed HJ Res 1167 by vote of 191-33, which the President signed into law. (Senate passed HJ Res 1167 by voice vote, same day)

VOTE #7: Dec. 11 - Rosenthal Amendment to provide for an immediate cut-off of military aid to Turkey unless the President certified to Congress that Turkey was in compliance with the Foreign Aid and Foreign Military Sales Acts and that substantial progress had been made toward a military settlement on Cyprus. Adopted 297-98.

Sept. 24

Oct. 7

Oct. 11

Oct. 15

Oct. 16

Oct. 17

Dec. 11

WH Breakfast  
July 9WH Breakfast  
July 17

Abdnor, James (S. Dak.)	VL	X	X	O	O	A	A	X	2 VL		
Abzug, Bella S. (N.Y.)		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		
Adams, Brock (Wash.)		X	A	X	X	X	X	X	st		
Addabbo, Joseph P. (N.Y.)	D	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	Do		
Albert, Carl (Okla.)											
Alexander, Bill (Ark.)		X	X	A	X	X	A	X	OK		
Ambro, Jerome A. (N.Y.)	NM								st		
Anderson, Glenn M. (Calif.)	S	X	X	A	X	X	A	X	OO		
Anderson, John B. (Ill.)		O	O	O	O	O	A	O	OO		
Andrews, Ike F. (N.C.)	S	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	←		
Andrews, Mark (N. Dak.)	SW	X	X	O	X	A	A	X			
Anunzio, Frank (Ill.)		X	X	X	X	X	X	X			
Archer, Bill (Tex.)	TL	X	A	O	O	O	O	X			
Armstrong, William L. (Colo.)	VL	A	A	X	X	X	A	A			
Ashbrook, John M. (Ohio)	VL SW	X	X	X	X	X	A	X	X		
Ashley, Thomas L. (Ohio) (CL)	SWH	X	X	O	X	X	X	X			
Aspin, Les (Wis.) L+	D	X	X	X	A	A	A	X	→		
AuCoin, Les (Oreg.)	VL	NM									
Badillo, Herman (N.Y.)	S	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			
Bafalis, L. A. (Ship) (Fla.)		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		
Baldus, Alvin (Wis.)	S	NM									
Barrett, William A. (Pa.) L-	S	X	X	X	X	X	X	A	←		
Baucus, Max (Mont.) DND	POD	NM									
Bauman, Robert E. (Md.) - CL	SW	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			
Beard, Edward P. (R.I.)		NM							X		
Beard, Robin L. (Tenn.)	D	O	X	O	O	O	A	O			
Bedell, Berkley (Iowa)	S	NM									
Bell, Alphonzo (Calif.)		O	A	O	A	O	O	O	O		
Benitez, Jaime <sup>1</sup> (P.R.)											
Bennett, Charles E. (Fla.)	D	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			
Bergland, Bob (Minn.)	VL	X	X	X	X	X	A	X			
Bevill, Tom (Ala.)	S	O	X	O	O	O	O	A			
Biaggi, Mario (N.Y.)	S	A	X	X	A	X	X	X			
Biester, Edward G., Jr. (Pa.)	S	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	OO		
Bingham, Jonathan B. (N.Y.)	S	X	O	O	X	A	A	X	OO		
Blanchard, James J. (Mich.)	S	NM									
Blouin, Michael T. (Iowa)	AF S	NM									
Boggs, Lindy (Mrs. Hale) (La.)	S	X	X	X	X	X	A	X			
Boland, Edward P. (Mass.) CL	WH	X	X	X	X	A	A	X			
Bolling, Richard (Mo.)	S	X	X	A	A	A	A	X			
Bonker, Don (Wash.)		NM							X		
Boyer, David R. (Miss.)	S	O	O	O	O	O	A	X			
Brademas, John (Ind.)		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		
Bresux, John B. (La.)	S	O	O	O	O	A	O	X			
Breckinridge, John (Ky.)	S	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			
Brinkley, Jack (Ga.) L-	D	X	X	O	X	X	X	X			
Broadhead, William M. (Mich.)		NM									
Brooks, Jack (Tex.)		A	X	X	X	A	A	X			
Brown, Wm. S. (Mich.)	S	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O		
Brown, Clarence J. (Ohio)	S	X	X	O	O	O	O	A			
Brown, Garon (Mich.)		X	A	O	X	O	A	X			

Sept. 21  
Oct. 7  
Oct. 1  
Oct. 1  
Oct. 1  
Oct. 1  
Dec. 11

WH Break  
July 9

Brown, George E. Jr. (Calif.)	S	X	X	A	X	A	A	X
Brownhill, James T. (N.C.)	S	X	X	O	O	O	A	X
Buchanan, John (Ala.)	S	X	X	O	O	X	X	O
Burgener, Clair W. (Calif.)	S	X	X	A	X	O	A	X
Burke, J. Herbert (Fla.)	W	X	X	A	A	A	A	X
Burke, James A. (Mass.)	S	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Burke, Yvonne Brathwaite (Calif.)	S	X	A	X	X	X	A	X
Burlison, Omar (Tex.)		O	O	O	O	O	O	O
Burlison, Bill D. (Mo.)	D	O	O	O	X	O	A	O
Burton, John L. (Calif.)		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Burton, Phillip (Calif.)	HAK	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Butler, M. Campbell (Va.)	D	X	X	O	A	O	O	O
Byron, Goodlee E. (Md.)	S	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Carney, Charles J. (Ohio)		X	X	X	X	A	A	X
Carr, Bob (Mich.)	D	N/M						
Carter, Tim Lee (Ky.)		O	A	O	O	O	A	O
Casew, Bob (Tex.)	S	X	X	X	X	O	O	X
Cederberg, Elford A. (Mich.)		O	O	O	O	O	O	O
Chappell, Bill, Jr. (Fla.)	D	X	X	O	O	O	O	A
Chisholm, Shirley (N.Y.)	S	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Clancy, Donald D. (Ohio)	TL (W)	X	X	X	X	A	A	X
Clausen, Don H. (Calif.)		X	X	O	X	X	A	X
Clawson, Del (Calif.)	S	X	A	A	X	O	A	X
Clay, William (Bill) (Mo.)	S	X	X	X	X	X	A	X
Cleveland, James C. (N.H.)	S	X	X	X	O	O	O	X
Cochran, Thad (Miss.)		X	X	O	O	O	A	X
Cohen, William S. (Maine)	S	X	A	A	X	O	O	O
Collins, Cardiss (Ill.)	S	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Collins, James M. (Tex.)	TL (W)	X	X	A	A	A	A	X
Conable, Barber B., Jr. (N.Y.)	S	O	A	A	A	A	A	A
Conlan, John B. (Ariz.)	VL (W)	X	X	X	A	A	A	X
Conte, Silvio O. (Mass.)	S	X	X	X	X	X	A	X
Convers, John, Jr. (Mich.)		X	A	X	A	X	X	X
Cornian, James C. (Calif.)		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Cornell, Robert J. (Wis.)	D	N/M						
Cotter, William R. (Conn.)		X	X	X	X	X	A	X
Coughlin, Lawrence (Pa.)	S	X	X	O	O	A	X	X
Crane, Philip M. (Ill.)	VL S	X	X	X	A	A	A	X
D'Amours, Norman E. (N.H.)	S	N/M						
Daniel, Dan (Va. W.C.)	+	D	X	X	O	O	X	O
Daniel, Robert W., Jr. (Va.)	+	D	X	A	A	X	A	X
Daniels, Dominick V. (N.J.)		X	A	X	X	X	X	X
Danielson, George E. (Calif.)		X	X	X	X	X	A	X
Davis, Mendel J. (S.C.)	-	D	X	X	X	X	X	X
de la Garza, E. (Tex.)	S	O	O	A	A	O	O	X
DeMaey, James J. (N.Y.)	S	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Dellums, Ronald V. (Calif.)	-	D	X	X	X	X	X	X
de Lugo, Ron <sup>2</sup> (V.I.)		N/M						
Dent, John H. (Pa.)		A	X	X	X	X	X	X
Derrick, Butler (S.C.)	UND	D	N/M					
✓ Derwinski, Edward J. (Ill.)	Ch. (W)	X	X	X	X	X	A	X

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Handwritten notes and symbols in the right margin, including arrows and the word "XOO".

Vertical text on the far right edge, including "WH Break" and "July 9".

		Sept. 24	Oct. 7	Oct. 11	Oct. 15	Oct. 16	Oct. 17	Dec. 11		WH Breakf	July 9	WH B: It
Devine, Samuel L. (Ohio)	S	O	X	O	O	O	A	O				
Dickinson, William I. (Ala.)	D	O	X	O	O	O	A	O				
Diggs, Charles C. Jr. (Miss.)		X	X	X	X	X	X	X				
Dingell, John D. (Mich.)		X	X	X	X	X	A	X				
Dodd, Christopher J. (Conn.)	S	N/M										
Downey, Thomas J. (N.Y.)	D	N/M										
Downing, Thomas N. (Va.)		X	X	X	X	O	X	X				
Drinan, Robert F. (Mass.)		X	X	X	X	X	X	X				
Duncan, John J. (Tenn.)	TL (W)	X	X	A	X	X	X	X				
Duncan, Robert (Ore.)	L+ D	N/M										
du Pont, Pierre S. (Del.)	S	X	X	X	X	X	X	X				
Early, Joseph D. (Mass.)	S	N/M										
Eckhardt, Bob (Tex.)	S	A	A	X	X	X	X	X				
Edgar, Robert W. (Pa.)	- AID	N/M										
Edwards, Don (Calif.)	S	X	X		X							
Edwards, Jack (Ala.)	+ D	X	X	A	X	A	A	X				
Eilberg, Joshua (Pa.)	S	X	X	A	X	X	X	X				
Emery, David F. (Maine)	UND D	N/M										
English, Glenn (Ga.)	TL (TL)	N/M										
Erlenborn, John N. (Ill.)		O	O	O	O	O	O	O				
Esch, Marvin L. (Mich.)	S	X	X	X	A	X	A	X				
Eshleman, Edwin D. (Pa.)		X	X	O	O	O	O	A				
Evans, David W. (Ind.)		N/M										
Evans, Frank E. (Colo.)	S	X	X	X	X	A	A	X				
Evins, Joe L. (Tenn.)	CL WH	O	O	O	O	A	A	X				
Fascell, Dante B. (Fla.)	S	X	X	X	X	X	X	X				
Fauntroy, Walter E. (D.C.)												
Fenwick, Millicent (N.J.)	S	N/M										
Findley, Paul (Ill.)		X	A	A	O	A	A	O				
Fish, Hamilton, Jr. (N.Y.)	S	X	X	X	X	X	X	X				
Fisher, Joseph L. (Va.)	S	N/M										
Fithian, Floyd J. (Ind.)	- D	N/M										
Flood, Daniel J. (Pa.)		X	X	X	X	A	X	X				
Florio, James J. (N.J.)	- D	N/M										
Flowers, Walter (Ala.)	S	O	X	A	X	X	X	X				
Flynt, John J., Jr. (Ga.)	D	X	X	X	X	X	A	X				
Foley, Thomas S. (Wash.)	S	X	X	X	X	X	A	X				
Ford, Harold E. (Tenn.)	S	N/M										
Ford, William D. (Mich.)	S	X	X	A	X	X	A	X				
Forsythe, Edwin B. (N.J.)	S	X	X	O	A	X	X	X				
Fountain, L. H. (N.C.)	UND AID	O	O	O	O	O	O	X				
Fraser, Donald M. (Minn.)	S	X	X	X	X	X	X	X				
Frenzel, Bill (Minn.)	S	X	X	O	O	X	X	X				
Frey, Louis, Jr. (Fla.)	CL (WH)	X	X	O	O	O	O	X				
Fulton, Richard H. (Tenn.)	S	O	X	X	X	A	A	X				
Fuqua, Don (Fla.)	CL WH	X	X	X	X	O	X	X				
Gaydos, Joseph M. (Pa.)		X	X	X	X	X	X	X				
Giaino, Robert N. (Conn.)	D	X	A	X	X	X	X	A				
Gibbons, Sam (Fla.)	TL (WH)	X	X	X	X	X	X	A				
Gilman, Benjamin A. (N.Y.)	S	X	X	A	X	X	X	X				
Gunn, Bo (Ga.)	UND D	X	X	X	X	X	X	X				

			Sept. 24	Oct. 7	Oct. 11	Oct. 15	Oct. 16	Oct. 17	Dec. 11	WH Break: July 9	WH Break: July 9
Goldwater, Barry M., Jr. (Calif.)	SW		X	X	A	X	A	X	O		
Gonzalez, Henry R. (Tex.)	TL	TL	A	X	X	X	O	X	X		
Goodling, William F. (Pa.)	VL	VL	O	O	O	O	O	O	X		
Gradison, Willis D., Jr. (Ohio)	WH	WH	N/M								
Grassley, Charles E. (Iowa)	VL	N/M									
Green, William J. (Pa.)	S		X	X	X	X	X	X	X		
Gude, Gilbert (Md.)	SW		X	X	X	X	X	X	X		
Guner, Tennessee (Ohio)	S		X	X	O	O	O	O	X		
Hagedorn, Tom (Minn.)	S		N/M								
Haley, James A. (Fla.)	CL	CL	X	X	X	O	X	X	X		
Hall, Tim L. (Ill.)			N/M								
Hamilton, Lee H. (Ind.)			O	O	O	O	O	O	O		
Hammerschmidt, John Paul (Pa.)	TL	TL	X	A	A	A	A	A	X		
Hanley, James M. (N.Y.)	S		X	X	X	X	X	A	X		
Hannaford, Mark W. (Calif.)	D		N/M								
Hansen, George (Idaho)	S		O	A		X					
Harkin, Tom (Iowa)	D		N/M								
Harrington, Michael (Mass.)	S		X	X	A	X	A	A	X		
Harris, Herbert E., II (Va.)			N/M								
Harsha, William H. (Ohio)	S		X	X	X	O	A	O	O		
Hastings, James F. (N.Y.)	S		X	O	O	A	A	A	O		
Hawkins, Augustus F. (Calif.)	S		A	X	X	X	A	A	X		
Hayes, Philip H. (Ind.)	MF		N/M								
Hays, Wayne L. (Ohio)			X	A	O	A	X	X	O		
Hébert, F. Edward (La.)	+	D	O	A	A	O	A	A	A		
Hechler, Ken (W. Va.)	S		X	X	X	X	X	X	X		
Heckler, Margaret M. (Mass.)	S		A	X	X	X	X	X	X		
Hefner, W. G. (Bill) (N.C.)	CL	WH	N/M								
Heinz, H. John, III (Pa.)	WS		X	X	O	O	X	X	A		
Helstoski, Henry (N.J.)	S		X	X	A	X	X	A	X		
Henderson, David N. (N.C.)	VL	WH	X	X	O	O	O	O	X		
Hicks, Floyd V. (Wash.)	+	D	X	X	X	X	X	A	X		
Hightower, Jack (Tex.)	TL	TL	N/M								
Hillis, Elwood (Ind.)	+	D	X	X	X	O	O	O	X		
Hinshaw, Andrew J. (Calif.)	L	D	X	A	O	O	O	A	X		
Holland, Kenneth L. (S.C.)	-	D	N/M								
Holt, Marjorie S. (Md.)	UND	VL	WH	X	X	X	X	X	X		
Holtzman, Elizabeth (N.Y.)	-		X	X	X	X	X	X	X		
Horton, Frank (N.Y.)	S		X	X	X	X	X	A	X		
Howard, James J. (N.J.)	S		X	X	X	X	X	A	A		
Howe, Allen T. (Utah)	BW	WH	N/M								
Hubbard, Carroll, Jr. (Ky.)	+	D	N/M								
Hughes, William J. (N.J.)	UND	D	N/M								
Hungate, William L. (Mo.)	2		X	X	X	X	X	X	X		
Hutchinson, Edward (Mich.)			O	X	O	O	O	O	O		
Hyde, Henry J. (Ill.)	VL	VL	N/M								
Ichord, Richard H. (Mo.)	D		O	O	O	O	O	A	O		

Sept. 24

Oct. 7

Oct. 11

Oct. 15

Oct. 16

Oct. 17

Dec. 11

WH Breakd  
July 9

WH Breakd

Johnson, Albert W. (Pa.)	S		X	X		O			
✓ Johnson, Harold T. (Calif.)	CL	CL	X	X		X			
Johnson, James P. (Jim) (Calif.)	VL	VL	A	A		A			
Jones, Ed (Tenn.)	S		X	X	O	O	O	O	X
Jones, James R. (Okla.)	TL		A	A	O	A	O	A	X
✓ Jones, Robert E. (Ala.)	CL	WH	X	X	O	X	O	X	X
✓ Jones, Walter B. (N.C.)	CL	WH	X	X	O	O	O	A	A
Jordan, Barbara (Tex.)	S		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Karth, Joseph E. (Minn.)			X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Kasten, Robert W., Jr. (Wis.)	S	NM							
Kastenmeier, Robert W. (Wis.)	S		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Kazen, Abraham, Jr. (Tex.)	UND	D	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Kelly, Richard (Fla.)	VL	WH	NM						
Kemp, Jack F. (N.Y.)		D	X	X	O	O	X	A	X
Ketchum, William M. (Calif.)			X	X	O	X	X	X	O
Keys, Martha (Kans.)	S	NM							
Kindness, Thomas N. (Ohio)	VL	VL	NM						
Koch, Edward I. (N.Y.)	S		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Krebs, John (Calif.)		NM							
Krueger, Robert (Bob) (Tex.)	D	NM							
LaFalce, John J. (N.Y.)		NM							
Lagomarsino, Robert J. (Calif.)	S		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Landrum, Phil M. (Ga.)	S		O	X	O	O	A	A	X
Latta, Delbert L. (Ohio)			X	X	O	O	O	A	O
Leggett, Robert L. (Calif.)	+	D	X	X	O	X	X	X	X
Lehman, William (Fla.)	S		A	X	X	A	X	X	X
Lent, Norman F. (N.Y.)	WS		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Levitas, Elliott H. (Ga.)	S	NM							
✓ Litton, Jerry (Mo.)	CL	WH	X	X	O	O	A	A	A
Lloyd, Jim (Calif.)	UND	D	NM						
Lloyd, Marilyn (Tenn.)	VL	WH	NM						
Long, Clarence D. (Md.)			X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Long, Gillis W. (La.)	TL	WH	X	X	X	A	A	A	X
Lott, Trent (Miss.)			O	O	O	A	O	O	O
Lujan, Manuel, Jr. (N. Mex.)	WS		X	A	X	X	X	X	X
McClorn, Robert (Ill.)	S		X	X	O	O	O	O	O
McCloskey, Paul N., Jr. (Calif.)			X	A	O	O	O	A	O
✓ McCollister, John Y. (Nebr.)	CL	(W)	X	X	X	X	A	A	X
✓ McCormack, Mike (Wash.)	CL	CL	X	X	X	X	X	A	X
McDule, Joseph M. (Pa.)	S		X	X	O	O	X	O	X
McDonald, Larry (Ga.)	+	D	NM						
McEwen, Robert C. (N.Y.)			O	O	O	O	O	O	X
McFall, John J. (Calif.)			O	O	O	X	O	X	O
McHugh, Matthew F. (N.Y.)	S	NM							
McKay, Gunn (Utah)	WH	(WH)	X	X	A	X	X	A	X
McKinnen, Stewart B. (Conn.)	WS		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Macdonald, Torbert H. (Miss.)			X	X	X	X	X	A	X
Madden, Ray J. (Ind.)			X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Madigan, Edward B. (Ill.)			O	O	O	O	O	A	O
Maguire, Andrew (N.J.)		NM							
Mahan, George H. (Tex.)	D		O	O	O	O	O	O	O

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Passman

Sept. 24

Oct. 7

Oct. 11

Oct. 15

Oct. 16

Oct. 17

Dec. 11

NAME	STATE	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945	1946	1947
Patman, Wright (Tex.)			X	X	A	A	X	A	X
Patten, Edward J. (N.J.)	S	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Patterson, Jerry M. (Calif.)	D	NM							
Pattison, Edward W. (N.Y.)	D	NM							
Pepper, Claude (Calif.)	S	X	A	X	X	X	X	X	X
Perkins, Carl D. (Ky.)	S	X	X	O	X	O	X	X	X
Peuser, Peter A. (N.Y.)	SW	X	X	A	X	X	A	X	
Pickle, J. J. (Tex.)	S	O	O	O	O	X	X	X	
Pike, Otis G. (N.Y.)	S	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Posge, W. R. (Tex.)		O	A	O	O	O	O	O	
Pressler, Larry S. (Dak.)	S	NM							
Prever, Richardson (N.C.)		X	A	O	X	O	O	O	
Price, Melvin (Ill.)	+	D	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Pritchard, Jack (Wash.)	S	X	A	A	X	X	O	X	
Quie, Albert H. (Maine)	S	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	
Quillen, James H. (Jimmy) (Tenn.)		X	X	O	O	O	A	O	
Railsback, Tom (Ill.)	S	O	X	O	X	O	A	X	
Randall, Wm. J. (Mo.)	D	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Rangel, Charles B. (N.Y.)	S	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Rees, Thomas M. (Calif.)	TL	NM	X	X	O	O	O	A	X
Regula, Ralph S. (Ohio)	SW	X	X	X	A	X	X	X	
Reuss, Henry S. (Wis.)	S	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Rhodes, John J. (Ariz.)		O	A	O	O	O	O	O	
Richmond, Frederick W. (N.Y.)		NM							
Riegle, Donald W., Jr. (Mich.)		A	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Rinaldo, Matthew J. (N.J.)	SW	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Risenhoover, Theodore M. (Tenn.)	D	NM							
(Okla.)									
Roberts, Ray (Tex.)	TL	TL	X	A		X			
Robinson, J. Kenneth (Va.)	D	X	X	O	O	O	O	X	
Rodino, Peter W., Jr. (N.J.)		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Roe, Robert A. (N.J.)		X	X	X	O	X	X	X	
Rogers, Paul G. (Fla.)	S	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Roncalio, Teno (Wyo.)	D	X	X	A	A	A	A	X	
Rooney, Fred B. (Pa.)	S	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Rose, Charles (N.C.)	S	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Rosenthal, Benjamin S. (N.Y.)		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Rostenkowski, Dan (Ill.)	TL	(WH)	X	X	X	X	X	A	X
Roush, J. Edward (Ind.)		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Rousselot, John H. (Calif.)	SW	X	X	O	A	A	A	X	
Roybal, Edward R. (Calif.)	S	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Runnels, Harold (N. Mex.)	SW	X	A	O	O	X	O	X	
Ruppe, Philip E. (Mich.)	S	O	O	O	A	A	A	O	
Russo, Martin A. (Ill.)		NM							
Ryan, Leo J. (Calif.)	S	O	O	O	O	A	A	O	
St Germain, Fernand J. (R.I.)		X	X	X	X	X	A	X	
Sertini, Jim (Nev.)	S	NM							
Sarasin, Ronald J. (Conn.)	SW	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Sarbanes, Paul S. (Md.)		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Satterfield, David E., III (Va.)	S	X	X	O	O	X	X	X	
(N.Y.)		NM							

		Sept. 24	Oct. 7	Oct. 11	Oct. 15	Oct. 16	Oct. 17	Dec. 11			
Schneebeli, Herman T. (Pa.)		O	O	O	O	O	A	O	0		V
Schroeder, Patricia (Calif.)	D	X	X	X	X	A	A	X			V
Schulze, Richard T. (Pa.)	D	NM									V
Sebelius, Keith G. (Kans.)		O	O	O	A	O	O	O			V
Seiberling, John F. (Ohio)	S	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	↑		V
Sharp, Philip R. (Ind.)	S	NM									V
Shipley, George E. (Ill.)	UND	D	X	X	X	X	A	X			V
Shriver, Garner E. (Kans.)		O	O	O	O	O	O	X	00		V
Shuster, Bud (Pa.)		X	O	O	O	O	O	O	00		V
Sikes, Robert L. F. (Fla.)	D	X	A	O	O	O	O	O	00		V
Simon, Paul (Ill.)	S	NM									V
✓ Sisk, B. F. (Calif.)	CL	WH	A	X	X	X	O	X	0	⑦	V
Skubitz, Joe (Kans.)		O	O	O	O	O	A	O	0		V
Slack, John M. (W. Va.)	S	X	O	X	X	O	O	X			V
Smith, Neal (Iowa)	S	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			V
Smith, Virginia (Nebr.)	VL	WH	NM						0	⑦	V
Snyder, Gene (Ky.)	WH	X	A	A	A	A	A	X			V
Solarz, Stephen J. (N.Y.)		NM									V
Spellman, Gladys Noon (Md.)	S	NM									V
Spence, Floyd (S.C.)	UND	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			V
Staggers, Harley O. (W. Va.)	S	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			V
✓ Stanton, J. William (Ohio)	CL	WH	O	X	O	O	O	X			V
Stanton, James V. (Ohio)	Haye	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			V
Stark, Fortney H. (Pete) (Calif.)		X	X	X	X	X	X	X			V
Steed, Tom (Okla.)		O	O	O	O	O	O	O	0		V
✓ Steelman, Alan (Tex.)	TL	W	X	A	A	X	A	A			V
Steiger, Sam (Ariz.)	S	X	X	O	O	A	A	X			V
✓ Steiger, William A. (Wis.)	SV	X	X	O	X	O	X	A	→		V
✓ Stephens, Robert G. Jr. (Ga.)	WH	X	X	A	X	X	A	X			V
Stokes, Louis (Ohio)		X	X	X	A	X	X	X			V
Stratton, Samuel S. (N.Y.)	+	D	X	A	O	X	O	A			V
Stuckey, W. S. (Bill), Jr. (Ga.)	S	X	A	A	X	X	A	X			V
Studds, Gerry E. (Mass.)	S	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			V
Sullivan, Leonor K. (Mrs. John B.) (Mo.)		X	X	X	X	X	X	X			V
Symington, James W. (Mo.)	S	X	A	X	X	X	X	X	0		V
Symms, Steven D. (Idaho)	VL	WH	O	A	A	O	A	O	0		V
Talcott, Burt L. (Calif.)	S	X	X	O	O	O	A	X	0		V
Taylor, Gene (Mo.)	TL	CL	X	A	O	O	A	O	X?		V
Taylor, Roy A. (N.C.)	CL	X	X	O	X	O	O	X			V
Tesgue, Olin E. (Tex.)	S	O	A	X	X	A	X	X			V
Thompson, Frank, Jr. (N.J.)	S	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			V
Thone, Charles (Nebr.)	VL	X	X	O	O	A	A	O			V
✓ Thornton, Ray (Ark.)	CL	WH	O	O	O	O	O	X			V
Traxler, Bob (Calif.)		X	X	X	X	X	A	X			V
Treen, David C. (Ga.)	D	O	O	O	O	X	A	O	X		V
Tsongas, Paul E. (Mass.)		NM									V
Udell, Morris K. (Ariz.)	S	X	X	X	A	O	A	X			V

WH Break  
July 9

7/17

		Sept. 24	Oct. 7	Oct. 11	Oct. 15	Oct. 16	Oct. 17	Dec. 11
Whitten, Jamie L. (Miss.)		O	O	O	O	O	O	X
Wiggins, Charles E. (Calif.)		O	O	O	O	O	A	O
Wilson, Bob (Calif.)	D	X	X	O	O	O	A	O
Wilson, Charles (Tex.)		O	O	O	O	O	A	X
Wilson, Charles H. (Calif.)	+ D	A	O	O	O	O	X	O
Winn, Larry, Jr. (Kans.)	S	O	O	O	O	A	A	O
Wirth, Timothy E. (Colo.)	LT DS	NH						
Wolff, Lester L. (N.Y.)		X	X	X	X	A	A	O
Won Pat, Antonio Borja * (Guam)								
Wright, Jim (Tex.)	TL	A	X	X	A	X	A	X
Wylder, John W. (N.Y.)	SW	X	X	X	A	X	A	X
Wylie, Chalmers P. (Ohio)	VL W	X	X	X	X	X	A	X
Yates, Sidney R. (Ill.)	S	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Yatron, Gus (Pa.)		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Young, Andrew (Ga.)	S	X	X	O	A	X	A	X
Young, O. W. Bill (Fla.)	S	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
Young, Don (Alaska)	SW	X	X	A	A	A	A	X
Young, John (Tex.)	S	X	X	X	X	O	X	X
Zablocki, Clement J. (Wis.)		O	O	O	X	O	O	O
Zeferetti, Leo C. (N.Y.)		NH						
Vander Jagt, Guy (Mich.)	S	X	X	O	X	O	A	A
Vander Veen, Richard F. (Mich.)		X	X	A	X	A	A	X
Vanik, Charles A. (Ohio)	S	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Vigorito, Joseph P. (Pa.)		A	X	X	X	A	A	X
Waggoner, Joe D., Jr. (La.)		X	X	O	O	O	A	X
Walsh, William F. (N.Y.)	VL WH	X	X	O	O	O	A	X
Wampler, William C. (Va.)	S	X	X	O	O	O	A	X
Waxman, Henry A. (Calif.)		NH						
Weaver, James (Oreg.)		NH						
Whalen, Charles W., Jr. (Ohio)	S	X	X	O	X	X	X	X
White, Richard C. (Tex.)	+ D	O	O	A	O	O	O	X
Whitehurst, G. William (Va.)	DW	X	A	A	X	A	A	X
Van Leerlin (Calif.)		X	X		X			

X

X

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[July 1975?]

DEMOCRATS - UNDECIDED

Taylor, Roy	Fisher
Downing	Shipley
Natcher	Brooks
Boggs	Smith, Neal
Long, Gillis	✓ McCormack
Montgomery	Price
Whitten	Ashley
✓ Fuqua	Dodd
Andrews, Ike	Carney
✓ Jones, Walter	Hechler, Ken
Casey	Staggers
Roberts	Mills
Teague	Bowen
Kazen	Roush
Patman	Sharp
Pickle	English
White	Baucus
Young, John	Howe
Bennett	Rees
Evans, Dave	Steed
Evans, Frank	Moorhead, Bill
Aspin	McHugh
Bergland	Nowak
Dingell	Vigorito
Harris	Johnson, Bizz
✓ Hefner	Perkins
Rooney	Eckhardt
Matsunaga	Jordan

REPUBLICANS - UNDECIDED

Harsha	Kindness	Esch
Mosher	Wylie	Crane
Archer	McKinney	Sarasin
Conte	Rinaldo	Fish
Coughlin	Heinz	Andrews, Mark
Heckler, Peggy		

REPUBLICAN - "NOs"

Holt  
Gude  
Beard  
Burke, Herb  
Martin, Jim  
Spence  
Whitehurst  
duPont  
Emery  
Peyser  
McDade  
Derwinski  
Clausen  
Clawson  
Hinshaw  
Rousselot  
Conlan  
Steiger, Sam  
Lujan  
Grassley  
Ashbrook  
Miller  
Regula  
O'Brien

[Only 1975?]

Republicans with Negative  
Voting Records on Turkey

Andrews, Mark  
Armstrong  
Ashbrook  
Bauman  
Burke, J. Herbert  
Clancy  
Clawson, Del  
Collins, James  
Conable  
Conlan  
Conte  
Coughlin  
Crane  
Daniel, Bob  
Derwinski -  
Duncan  
du Pont  
Edwards, Jack  
Esch  
Fish  
Goldwater  
Gude  
Hammerschmidt  
Heinz  
Holt  
Lent  
Lujan -  
McCollister  
McKinney  
Moorhead, Carlos  
Mosher  
Peyser  
Regula  
Rinaldo  
Rousselot  
Sarasin  
Snyder  
Spence  
Steelman  
Steiger, William  
Wydler  
Wylie  
Young, Don  
Whitehurst - ~~vice~~



[July 1975?]

## THE EMBARGO ON TURKEY

Approval of H. R. 8454 is essential to the achievement of a Cyprus settlement and to the protection of vital NATO and U. S. national interests in the eastern Mediterranean area.

-- A continued embargo helps no one: it precludes a Cyprus settlement and hence a solution to the refugee problem; it weakens the NATO alliance; it threatens the U. S. with the loss of vital intelligence installations in Turkey; and as the current tension in the region persists, it hinders Greece's ability to build a stable democracy.

-- The issue is not a matter of upholding the law. The Administration stopped new shipments of arms to Turkey last fall; a total embargo for six months indicates that Turkish actions are not condoned. The law has been upheld: now we must consider the consequences of continued stalemate for U. S. security and foreign policy interests.

-- A worsening of U. S. - Turkish relations that would result from a continued embargo is contrary to U. S. interests. It will deal a heavy blow to the NATO alliance at a time when other major problems exist in the region--Portugal, Spain, and the Middle East.

-- The only way to settle the Cyprus problem is through negotiations. The Turks will not negotiate under the pressure of an embargo. The U. S. can help in these negotiations only if it has the necessary flexibility with all parties.

-- Lifting the embargo will remove a substantial impediment to progress in the Cyprus negotiations, enable Turkey to fulfill its NATO role, and safeguard vital U. S. installations in Turkey.

-- H. R. 8454 is a compromise. The Administration has stated its preference for a total lifting of the embargo; however this bill permits only the release of material in the pipeline which Turkey has already paid for and future commercial sales. Furthermore, Turkey would be expected to continue to observe the ceasefire, not to increase its troops on Cyprus, and not to introduce additional U. S. -provided equipment into Cyprus. In addition, the bill includes provisions for consultations with Greece regarding military and economic assistance to that country and provides for continuation of humanitarian aid to Cyprus refugees.

UNCLASSIFIED

*The waiver is not a solution to the [July 1975] present impasse*

PRESIDENTIAL WAIVER AUTHORITY

Under Section 614(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended, the President has the authority to extend up to \$50 million in assistance under the Act, including military assistance, to any country in any fiscal year, without regard to other provisions of law, if he determines it to be important to the national security. However, the Foreign Military Sales Act, which governs government-to-government sales of military equipment, whether on a cash basis or through the extension of credits and guaranties, has no similar provision. The waiver authority also does not apply to restrictions on the issuance of export licenses in purely commercial transactions.

By itself the waiver is not a solution to the present impasse. It does not remove the "embargo" aspect from the present Congressional suspension of military assistance and sales to Turkey. The waiver would not remove the current prohibition against NATO allies and other friendly countries supplying Turkey with U.S. manufactured or designed equipment and parts. It would not allow release from the pipeline of cash and credit sales items contracted for prior to February 5. It also would not allow reconditioning in the United States and reexport to Turkey of major items of military equipment belonging to the Turkish armed forces.



[July 1975?]

## PRESIDENTIAL WAIVER AUTHORITY

The waiver is not the solution to the present impasse in our relations with Turkey.

-- It is exclusively an action of the executive branch, leaving the impression that the Congress remains hostile to Turkey.

-- It would not remove the embargo aspect from the present suspension of military assistance and sales to Turkey.

-- It would not remove the current prohibition against other NATO allies supplying Turkey with equipment and parts designed or manufactured in the U.S.

-- It would not release items which the Government of Turkey ordered and paid for before the embargo was imposed.

From the perspective of the Government of Turkey, these limitations make the waiver an inadequate basis on which to make policy shifts in ongoing negotiations.

From the U.S. perspective the most logical first steps in lifting the embargo are to release items already contracted for and to permit sales on commercial terms. The next steps are sales and credits under FMS. The waiver affects only grant assistance.

[ca. 7/9/75]

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

BACKGROUND INFORMATION AND TALKING POINTS ON  
RESTORATION OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO TURKEY

I. Background

Yesterday morning you met with 122 Congressmen at a White House breakfast to underscore the necessity of lifting the arms "embargo" against Turkey at an early date and to give your support to legislation which has been proposed.

Your purpose in this meeting with the leadership will be:

-- to urge maximum support for early favorably action in the House on the Turkish military aid issue both in the International Relations Committee and on the House floor.

The House leadership generally agrees that military assistance to Turkey should be resumed but that some sort of "face saving" alternative would have to be found to allow reversal of the present House position on this issue. Compromise legislation was worked out on July 8 by the House International Relations Committee, in coordination with Administration representatives, which would:

-- remove the suspension with respect to defense articles and services for which Turkey has already signed contracts;

-- lift the embargo on commercial sales to Turkey; and

-- remove the suspension on military sales, credits and guaranties for items which Turkey needs to fulfill her role in NATO.

In addition the bill provides for reports to Congress, urges the President to start discussions with Greece about her economic and military needs, and makes clear that no grant military aid would go to Turkey.

Chairman Morgan and Congressman Broomfield have agreed to hold hearings Thursday, July 10, in both the morning and afternoon, and are seeking to mark up the bill and report it out favorably on Friday, July 11.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE  
XGDS

DECLASSIFIED • E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.8  
With PORTIONS EXEMPTED  
E.O. 12958 Sec. 1.5 (c)

MR 01-44, # 32; CIA Ltr. 11/30/01

By dal NARA, Date 2/5/02

They will seek to move the bill to the floor early next week if at all possible.

Because the Turkish government in mid-June set a 30-day deadline for resumption of aid or consultations on reductions of U. S. facilities on Turkish soil, we need, as a minimum, favorable action by the International Relations Committee by mid-July, and by the full House soon thereafter. (Through diplomatic channels we have been urging continued restraint by the Turkish government).

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## II. Talking Points

### Legislative Action

1. I am pleased by the effort of the House International Relations Committee to work out an acceptable legislative proposal on the Turkish military aid issue.
2. I will give my full support to this compromise legislation which restores the proper balance in our relations with Turkey and which is fair and equitable not only to Turkey but also to Greece.
3. I emphasized this in a breakfast meeting with House members yesterday and in my letter to the Speaker.
4. We need your leadership and full support to move this legislation through the House as soon as possible.

### Need for Early House Action

1. U. S. national interests require immediate legislative action to lift the Turkish arms embargo.

2. The total U. S. embargo on grant assistance, credit and commercial sales of military equipment to Turkey -- so sweeping that even certain communist nations can purchase items now forbidden to Turkey -- is jeopardizing our security relationship with this important NATO ally. Continuation of the embargo risks further deterioration that could jeopardize our security interests throughout the Eastern Mediterranean area.
3. There is no way to relax restrictions on those portions of the embargo that affect Turkey most -- cash and credit sales -- without legislation.
4. As a result of the February 5 embargo, Turkey has now informed us that they may wish to begin negotiations in mid-July on the future of U. S. facilities.
5. At the same time, and as was pointed out at yesterday's breakfast, the Soviets are seeking to take full advantage, and have just announced new economic agreements with Turkey.

Importance of U. S. Facilities in Turkey

1. The facilities in question are vital to U. S. and Western defense.  
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3. ....  
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Turkish Measure to Control Opium Production

1. Prior to yesterday's breakfast meeting, several Congressmen expressed real concern over Turkey's resolve to control international drug traffic.
2. Since permitting the resumption of opium poppy cultivation (an important cash crop for Turkey) last year, the Turkish government has taken a number of positive measures to control illicit production of opium, including tight controls on poppy cultivation and opium production and increased surveillance and enforcement efforts.
3. While we cannot prejudge the results of the new Turkish controls, they appear to be substantial and relevant and all indications are that the Turks are determined to enforce controls effectively.

Overall Importance of Restoration of Military Aid

1. The downward spiral in US-Turkish relations that would result from a prolongation of the embargo is contrary to U.S. and Turkish interests. It will also deal a heavy blow to the NATO Alliance, at a time when other major, unsolved problems exist in the Mediterranean -- Portugal, Spain and the Middle East.
2. Turkey remains loyal to NATO. Moreover, with its strategic location and a half million men under arms, its importance to the Alliance should be obvious.
3. The arms embargo has not been an effective tool in bringing pressure on the Turks regarding a Cyprus settlement. The Turks insist that these two issues cannot be linked.
4. The fact remains that the only way to get what we all want, a just and broadly acceptably Cyprus settlement, is through negotiations. The U.S. can be helpful in moving the negotiations along only to the extent that we are able to maintain maximum flexibility with all the parties.

5. To sum up, the need is for immediate legislation to restore to an important NATO ally access to U.S. sources of supply for spares, components, and other material compatible with previously supplied U.S. military equipment. Lifting the embargo will enable Turkey to fulfill its NATO role, will safeguard vital U.S. installations in Turkey, and will remove a substantial impediment to progress in the Cyprus negotiations.

PRESIDENT'S TALKING POINTS

FOR

LEADERSHIP MEETING

1. Thank you for coming this morning. As you know, the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act expires on August 31. In order to get an extension, it has to be done within the next three weeks, before the Congressional recess in August.
2. A simple extension of the EPAA has been proposed which I am strongly opposed to without an acceptable decontrol plan being agreed upon simultaneously.
3. Our imports continue to grow, as does the percentage from insecure OPEC sources. Unless we provide increased supply incentives and cut energy demand, our vulnerability will grow unacceptably in the next few years.
4. I view decontrol as the single most important element in reaching energy independence.
5. There have been several decontrol plans proposed by the Congress. As you know, the House Commerce Committee Bill (H.R. 7014) contains a decontrol provision which I cannot accept as it represents a substantial rollback of prices and significant losses in oil production.
6. I plan to send up an administrative decontrol plan in the very near future. There are, of course, many alternatives to be considered which I'd like to discuss at this time and get your views on. Frank, will you please summarize where we stand and the options available.

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

JULY 9, 1975

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY

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THE WHITE HOUSE

STATEMENTS BY THE PRESIDENT,  
THOMAS E. MORGAN  
REPRESENTATIVE FROM THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA  
AND  
CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI  
REPRESENTATIVE FROM THE STATE OF WISCONSIN  
FOLLOWING THE BREAKFAST MEETING  
WITH CONGRESSMEN ON TURKISH AID

THE WEST DRIVEWAY

9:37 A.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: This morning we had an hour and a half breakfast, a working meeting with a number of the Members of the House Committee on International Relations; the Chairman, Doc Morgan; the Chairman of the subcommittee, Congressman Zablocki, and the ranking Republican on the full committee, concerning an effort to try and resolve the legislative problem of Turkish military aid.

The Administration, of course, has asked for a total removal of the ban, but we have worked with the Democratic Chairman and the other Members of the committee on a compromise that will be before the committee tomorrow.

I just want to thank Chairman Morgan and his associates on both sides of the aisle for taking the initiative in seeking what we believe is a fair and equitable solution.

QUESTION: What is the compromise, sir?

CONGRESSMAN MORGAN: The compromise -- we will start out tomorrow, hold hearings on the Mansfield-Scott resolution, and we hope to complete hearings tomorrow. We will have the Administration witnesses in the morning and, of course, the Greek witnesses in the afternoon in the open hearing.

On Friday, we hope to start the mark-up. We will start the mark-up using the Senate resolution and substitute the bill worked out by Mr. Zablocki and Congressman Fascell and Congressman Hamilton and Congressman Broomfield. We hope we can report that out sometime on Friday.

MORE

The substitute really opens up the pipeline on what Turkey has bought and paid for, plus it resumes the rights of Turkey to make cash sales in the military foreign sales program.

There is no grant military assistance plus a complete study for future military and economic aid, both to Greece and Turkey. There is a clause, some safety clauses in that that the President doesn't like. The President has to report to Congress every 60 days on the progress of the sales and the progress, of course, of settling the Cyprus dispute.

I think it is a fair compromise. I think we can sell it to the House. Those who supported the total embargo last December, when we appropriated the foreign aid bill, can vote for this and explain it to the Greek-American people of this country.

QUESTION: Congressman Morgan, will there be action in the House by the 1st of August?

CONGRESSMAN MORGAN: I hope to have action if we can move as rapidly as we can to get it out of the committee Friday or the early part of the next week and immediately apply for a rule.

QUESTION: How much money is involved? How much equipment? Is it millions of dollars in the pipeline?

THE PRESIDENT: I understand that there is approximately \$70 million of Turkish military purchases which they bought and paid for that are not delivered because of the embargo. Unfortunately, they have not only bought and paid for this equipment, but they are being charged storage in the warehouses in the United States.

The compromise that Dr. Morgan and the others have worked on would free those Turkish purchases, amounting to roughly \$70 million, and add to that the right of the Turkish Government to buy for cash additional military hardware.

QUESTION: How much?

THE PRESIDENT: That is, I think, limited by the overall limitation on foreign military sales.

CONGRESSMAN MORGAN: It would depend on how much military sales worldwide have been purchased. You couldn't determine the figure.

MORE

QUESTION: How is the Cyprus compromise coming along? I mean, is there any progress in the negotiations?

THE PRESIDENT: There is a meeting between Denktash and Clerides scheduled for July 24, and if there is action in the Congress, it will, I believe, greatly facilitate the negotiations between these two leaders of the Turkish and Greek Cypriots, so we are hoping that there can be action. If there is action in the Congress, then the prospects for movement are certainly improved tremendously.

QUESTION: Mr. President, there was a quote on one of the broadcasts this morning saying Congressman Brademas thought some of your meetings involved some arm twisting, like this meeting this morning. Have you been arm twisting on this subject?

THE PRESIDENT: No, I would say just the opposite. I should add that in the last two or three weeks, I and Secretary Kissinger have met with Congressman Brademas, Congressman Sarbanes and Congressman Rosenthal, plus Congressman Hamilton, Fascell, Zablocki, Broomfield and Whalen and maybe one or two others, in trying to get a dialogue started so that we could find the areas of agreement and the areas of compromise, and out of those meetings, I think, has come this compromise.

QUESTION: Mr. President, what does this compromise do to the problem of the law that says that our allies are not to use American weapons against their friends and allies?

CONGRESSMAN ZABLOCKI: The compromise very clearly states that any additional military aid that will be sold to Turkey may not be used for other purposes than NATO defense.

QUESTION: Didn't the law state that from the beginning, though?

CONGRESSMAN ZABLOCKI: The compromise does not deal with any matter that has taken place in the past. It is restating the law for future use.

QUESTION: How will that be policed?

THE PRESIDENT: We, of course, have U.S. military personnel in the various NATO countries, and they follow on the scene the end use of the equipment.

MORE

QUESTION: Mr. President, are we prepared to talk about renegotiating the bases in Turkey now?

THE PRESIDENT: That is another matter of major importance. Roughly 30 days ago the Turkish Government indicated to us formally that they wanted to begin talks for the termination of some of our U.S. bases in Turkey, and the deadline for that is July 17.

We again hope that there can be some action in the committee and hopefully on the floor of the House of Representatives prior to that date so that we can say to the Turks that progress is being made, and if there is progress, then we are in a better position to talk with them without any adverse developments as to those highly important military installations in Turkey.

QUESTION: Do you think Turkey will accept this, the compromise?

THE PRESIDENT: We think it is a good compromise, and we will do our utmost in the Executive Branch to convince the Turks that it is a solution that will lead to the settlement of the Cyprus problem and to the continuation of Turkey as a strong and effective partner in NATO, plus the good bilateral relations that Turkey and the United States have had in the past.

QUESTION: Mr. President, what can you tell us about the developments in the Helsinki Conference?

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you very much. (Laughter)

THE PRESS: Thank you, gentlemen.

END (AT 9:45 A.M. EDT)

July 16, 1975

A. The so-called compromise is no compromise.

1. Turkey gets arms but Turkey is required to do nothing with respect to the Turkish action which caused the cutoff--the use of American arms on Cyprus.
2. Opponents of arms to Turkey have consistently favored resumption of arms provided Turkey makes concessions on Cyprus, especially on the humanitarian problem of refugees.

B. Approval of arms condones violations of conditions of U.S. law and of bilateral agreements between U.S. and Turkey.

1. The rule of law must be upheld.
2. Congress is not meddling in the conduct of foreign policy when Congress insists that the laws of the land be enforced.

C. Approval of arms encourages other nations buying or receiving U.S. arms to use them without inhibition.


1. Example, the dangers of increased supplies of arms to the Persian Gulf States.
2. George Ball's warning of the "explosive" effect of a U.S. failure to insist on restrictions on use of U.S.-supplied arms.

D. Approval of arms now would condone aggression by Turkey.

1. Turkey continues to occupy Cyprus with U.S. arms.
2. The arms have already been cut off and for the U.S. now to resume arms without any remedial action on Cyprus by Turkey would only be to condone the Turkish action, despite what the State Department says.

E. Resumption of arms would have a very damaging impact in Greece.

1. It could threaten the new democracy there. George Ball says it would have a "catastrophic" impact in Athens with little hope of inducing constructive response in Ankara.
2. Could endanger both U.S. bases in Greece and a revived role for Greece in NATO.



F. To the argument that the arms embargo has not worked:

- 1. It has not been effectively tried, for Ford and Kissinger have undercut it both publicly and privately.
  - a. On February 16, eleven days after the ban went into effect, the Scott-Mansfield Administration bill was introduced.
  - b. Public statements of Ford, Kissinger and Macomber attacking Congress on its action and urging a reversal.
2. All these statements encouraged Turkey to believe that the Administration would reverse Congress and there was therefore no incentive for Turkey to make concessions on Cyprus.
3. Moreover, arms flowed to Turkey from July to February, but the Turks did nothing in the way of concessions on Cyprus.

G. Resumption of arms would be to yield to Turkish blackmail threats on the U.S. bases.

1. This despite Kissinger's statement in Atlanta that the U.S. would not yield to threats of blackmail
2. Proponents of the arms cutoff are strongly pro-NATO.
3. To yield to Turkey here would be to invite similar threats to U.S. bases by other countries.

H. The bill reported by the International Relations Committee is a bad bill: See attachment.



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Vern:

Les Jenka brought this by  
for you.

Vera



What S. 846, as amended, does re: U.S. arms for Turkey:

(1) Section 2 allows immediate shipment of \$185 million of arms sales to Turkey contracted for prior to February 5, 1975.

It is not known how much, if any, of the \$185 million represents cash payments.

(2) Section 2 also allows unlimited commercial sales by U.S. arms manufacturers to Turkey, by cash or credit.

(3) Both of the above categories of arms sales are allowed "notwithstanding any other provision of law." This means that Turkey could occupy all the Aegean islands or go to war with Greece, using the weapons specified above without violating any American law. Even the general provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act and the Foreign Military Sales Act prohibiting aggressive use of aid are suspended for the categories.

(4) Section 3 of the bill also automatically allows resumption this year of all sales by our government of military goods to Turkey by cash or by credit subsidized by American taxpayers, immediately upon enactment of the regular military assistance bill.

(5) The only arms for Turkey not authorized by this bill are in grant assistance. However, the President already has waiver authority to give Turkey up to \$50 million this fiscal year, more grant assistance than Turkey received in Fiscal Year 1974.



A.     The So-Called Compromise is no Compromise

The Administration has asked for a total removal of the arms embargo against Turkey. The compromise legislation, as amended:

- removes the suspension with respect to defense articles and services for which Turkey has already signed contracts; and
- lifts the embargo on commercial sales to Turkey.
- prevents future military sales on a cash or credit basis by the U.S. Government until the next Foreign Assistance Act is considered by the Congress, probably not until the end of this year.
- includes provisions for consultations with Greece for military and economic assistance in that country; and
- provides for continuation of humanitarian aid for Cyprus refugees.

In addition, the legislation requires periodic reports from the President on progress toward a Cyprus settlement.

The Committee bill maintains substantial restrictions. It represents much less than was requested, but is a responsible effort at compromise.

B. Approval of Arms Condone Violations of Conditions of U.S. Law and of Bilateral Agreements Between U.S. and Turkey

The Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) and Foreign Military Sales Act (FMSA) both state that military assistance to friendly countries will be provided "solely for internal security, for legitimate self-defense, and to permit the recipient country to participate in regional or collective arrangements or measures consistent with the Charter of the United Nations . . ." (FAA, Sec. 502; FMSA, Sec. 4). Neither act is cast in terms of specifying where the weapons may or may not be utilized.

Turkey considers its military action on Cyprus as consistent with the United Nations Charter and the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee under which Turkey, Greece, the United Kingdom, and Cyprus undertook to safeguard the independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus. Turkey has said that its actions on Cyprus were fully justified by the threat to the Turkish Cypriot community posed by the July 1974 coup d'etat against Archbishop Makarios and by subsequent events which in their view suggested the likelihood of union of the island with Greece, an unacceptable threat to Turkish security (and -- in their eyes -- a very real and grave threat to the lives of the Turkish Cypriot minority).

C. Approval of Arms Encourages Other Nations Buying or  
Receiving U.S. Arms to Use Them Without Inhibition

The proposed bill does not imply that the U. S. has failed, or would fail, to insist upon observance of restrictions on the use of U. S. supplied arms. Any violation of an agreement with the United States would remain subject to the provisions of existing law. That law establishes limited purposes for which arms can be provided, requires agreement by the recipient to use those arms only for those purposes, and establishes consequences for violation of that agreement.

D. Approval of Arms Now Would Condone Aggression by Turkey

As answered previously, the earlier Turkish actions on Cyprus are subject to various interpretations. The arms embargo has been in effect for six months and has had no constructive effect on the Cyprus situation. Passage of the bill before the House represents the only basis for further progress and for maintaining important U.S. security interests.

E. Resumption of Arms Would Have a Very Damaging Impact in Greece

The Administration intends to continue efforts with each of the parties to reach an agreed settlement on Cyprus. We have no interest in making choices between Greece and Turkey. The United States needs a close security relationship with both, bilaterally and through NATO. The present lack of progress is not in the interest of any of the parties.

The proposed legislation requests the President to determine the most urgent needs of Greece for economic and military assistance and to make FY 1976 recommendations to the Congress. This is consistent with our policy of supporting the Greek government and the great importance we attach to our security relationship with Greece.

F.      To the Argument that the Arms Embargo has not Worked

The aid cut-off by the Congress was intended to influence Turkey in the Cyprus negotiations. But the results of the Congressional action has been to block progress towards reconciliation, thereby prolonging the suffering on Cyprus; to complicate our ability to promote successful negotiations; to increase the danger of a broader conflict.

The Turkish aid cut-off has not brought concessions from the Turks. Instead, it has hardened their position in the Greek-Cyprus-Turkish crisis; it has fueled Greek-Turkish tensions in the Aegean; and we now run the very real risk of losing important U.S. capabilities in Turkey and serious damage to US-Turkish relations and NATO relations.

G. Resumption of Arms Would be to Yield to Turkish Blackmail  
Threats on the U. S. Bases

There remains a strong basic mutuality of interests between the US and Turkey. But Turkey feels that this alliance mutuality is being eroded by a legislative embargo that cuts Turkey off completely from access to U.S. arms, in a manner in conflict with mutual security agreements between the U. S. and Turkey.

Continuation of the embargo both jeopardizes vital bilateral ties with Turkey and erodes the NATO defenses in the area, since virtually all U. S. facilities in Turkey relate to our capacity to support NATO defense objectives in the area. Also, to the extent that the embargo limits U. S. effectiveness in contributing to a Cyprus settlement, the outlook for Greek-Turk relations remains clouded, thus weakening an important element of overall NATO defense arrangements.

In no other allied country have we applied sanctions as severe as we have to Turkey. Mutual security relationships require cooperation on both sides. Our allies have provided essential facilities and we have provided military assistance where it was needed. An ally is bound to feel that the U. S. has failed to uphold its end of the security relationship when essential assistance is cut off.

H. The bill reported by the International Relations Committee is a bad bill.

As stated in the response to Item A, the bill reported out is a genuine and fair compromise. Specific comments on the bill follow:

Criticism:

"(1) Section 2 allows immediate shipment of \$185 million of arms sales to Turkey contracted for prior to February 5, 1975.

"It is not known how much, if any, of the \$185 million represents cash payments."

Response:

Section 2 removes the ban against deliveries under existing FMS contracts. However, most of the items making up the total contract value of \$185 million are not yet manufactured and ready for delivery. Less than \$60 million, mostly F-4 aircraft bought in 1972 and fully paid for, could be shipped immediately. Turkey has paid over \$100 million toward the purchase of undelivered aircraft. These funds have been borrowed from the United States over the last three years and are being repaid with interest. In addition, Turkey has paid more than \$12 million as down payments on FMS cash purchases for which contracts have been signed and delivery has not been made.

Criticism:

"(2) Section 2 also allows unlimited commerical sales by U.S. arms manufacturers to Turkey, by cash or credit.

Response:

All but a few countries in the world can buy items from U.S. firms through direct commercial channels. The only U.S. Government involvement in such sales is the issuance of export control licenses. Any credit obtained by Turkey would be from private financial sources, not from the U.S. Government. The quantity of commerical purchases would be limited by need, price, and availability, and the nature of the items would be limited by established U.S. export control policies.

Criticism:

"(3) Both of the above categories of arms sales are allowed 'notwithstanding any other provision of law.' This means that Turkey could occupy all the Aegean island or go to war with Greece, using the weapons specified above without violating any American law. Even the general provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act and the Foreign Military Sales Act prohibiting aggressive use of aid are suspended for the categories."

Response:

The authorization to complete deliveries of previously contracted for items "notwithstanding any other provision of law" makes clear that existing statutes, particularly section 620(x) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, will not be an impediment to such delivery. Similar superseding language is routinely contained in other foreign assistance legislation. This notwithstanding clause relates only to delivery of goods contracted for under the Foreign Military Sales Act and subject to the provisions of that Act. It does not relieve Turkey from its obligations under the existing contracts and agreements which contain all of the conditions on use, transfer and security of U.S. furnished arms required by U.S. law and policy.

Criticism:

"(4) Section 3 of the bill also automatically allows resumption this year of all sales by our government of military goods to Turkey by cash or by credit subsidized by American taxpayers immediately upon enactment of the regular military assistance bill."

Response:

Cash sales are for value and are not subsidized. Credits may be considered subsidies, like any other form of foreign assistance. But the funds go entirely to U.S. business and the credits are repaid in full with interest. By conditioning the resumption of government sales to Turkey upon the enactment of subsequent legislation, the Committee bill provides a second opportunity for Congress to reevaluate the situation, and to further modify the legislation if appropriate, before section 3 takes effect. This is hardly automatic.

Criticism:

"(5) The only arms for Turkey not authorized by this bill are in grant assistance. However, the President already has waiver authority to give Turkey up to \$50 million this fiscal year, more grant assistance than Turkey received in Fiscal Year 1974. "

Response:

The President does have the authority under section 614(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act to authorize up to \$50 million in military assistance to Turkey. Exercise of that authority, and the resulting assistance, would be no substitute for the authority sought in the proposed legislation. For one thing, equipment now in the military assistance "pipeline" and which could be released by such a waiver would not satisfy Turkey's most pressing needs. Moreover, it would be obviously illogical to provide grant assistance while not first seeking authority for cash, credit and commercial sales. Lastly, the President has felt from the beginning, and continues to feel, that cooperation with the desires of Congress would be the surest route toward restoration on a firmer basis of the flexibility he needs so that the United States may play a meaningful role in the search for a resolution of the Cyprus problem while helping Turkey to fulfill its important responsibilities in a strong North Atlantic Alliance. The FY 1974 grant program for Turkey was \$63.3 million. During that period, deliveries of grant material and services were approximately \$52.8 million.