

The original documents are located in Box 3, folder “Third Debate: Issue Papers – Foreign Policy” of the White House Special Files Unit Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

Copyright Notice

The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald Ford donated to the United States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections. Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.



Q: Mr. President, you recently stated that Governor Carter slandered the good name of the United States when he said that we have lost respect throughout the world. However, a recent overseas poll by the U. S. I. A. now reveals that respect for the United States among the people of Western Europe has sunk to its lowest point in 22 years. Don't you owe Mr. Carter an apology?

A: I did indeed state that Mr. Carter slandered the good name of the United States and I repeat that statement now.

Let me remind you what Mr. Carter said about his own country - speaking to all the world by satellite television: he not only said that we are "not strong any more", that we are not "respected any more" - listen to what else he says: he made the grave charge that we overthrew the elected government in Chile. He even said this was a "typical example" and there "may be many others".

He even charged that we "tried to start a new Viet Nam in Angola", - those were his words.

Mr. Carter not well informed

Rebel Middle East Southern Africa



A: (cont'd.)

These allegations against his own country are absolutely false and Mr. Carter knew they were false when he made them.

*Middle East
Southern Africa*

Tonight he will again be speaking to a world wide audience and I call upon him now to either prove those charges or to retract them here on this podium tonight.

* * * *

(The above might be a good place to end and let Carter worry about an instant reply. If there is a follow-up question or if the President would like to end on a more affirmative note, I suggest something like the following.)

* * * *

It would be easy for a President to win Gallup Polls in a foreign country if that's what he cares about: all he has to do is say yes to everything they ask for.

But the policies of this administration are determined by the best interests of the United States, both domestically and as the recognized leader of the free world. Our policies- our strength - our morality have maintained peace in a very

troubled world and peace will continue to be our objective regardless of any Gallup Polls in other countries.



ITEM: It is ironic that Carter made his derogatory remarks just before the United States made the first clean sweep in the 75 year history of the Nobel prizes: Chemistry, Physics, Medicine, Economics and Literature. I think this tells us more about the United States' position in the world than any opinion poll.



US PRESTIGE IN EUROPE

Q: Mr. President, what is your reaction to the USIA poll which it was reported yesterday shows US prestige in Western Europe at its lowest point in 22 years?

A: America's greatest international strength lies in our close ties of friendship and alliance with the nations of Western Europe. In the Atlantic Community, our solidarity is being more impressively shown than at any time in the past two decades. Our prestige is high. Our friendship has never been better.

I am not speaking from the basis of any one poll -- and I would note, first, my understanding that the evaluation of the poll you refer to has not even been completed and, second, that it was made available to the press -- as the reporter acknowledges -- for partisan political reasons. I could cite a German poll conducted last summer which stated that friendship with the United States was at the highest in the 18 years that the poll has been taken. So there are polls and polls.

The simple facts are Western Europe values American leadership. Western Europe respects America. Over the first two years of my Presidency, we have clearly demonstrated the capacity of the West to provide for the common defense and to deal with common problems, and over the next four years we will build on this progress. The most significant measure of our relations is the attitude of the European leaders with whom we must work,

Robson



and their unanimous public comments as they came here this year to help us celebrate our Bicentennial testify unmistakably to the closeness of our relations and the esteem in which the US is held.

There is trust, there is respect, there is confidence and there is optimism. This is reflected at all levels of our government-to-government dealings, and it is reflected in the friendship between the American and European peoples.

NOTE: Over the two years of your Presidency you have met with 124 foreign leaders (more than any other President over a comparable period), including 58 leaders of Western Europe.

FROM USIS, BONN 11630

July 9, 1976

Subject: Wickert Poll on Friendship with U.S.

67 per cent of the West German citizens polled during the past two weeks consider friendship between the FRG and the US as "most important," the Wickert Public Opinion Institute disclosed July 6. This marks highest response favoring US in the 18 years the Institute has been sampling German adult opinion on the subject.

Runners up:

France	17 per cent
Great Britain	13 per cent
USSR	3 per cent

Monsen:

Interested in success / not polls.

~~SECRET~~





Source: Hyde

R558R A4894)IWYDWDYDRYR
POPULARITY

WASHINGTON, OCT 20, REUTER - AMERICAN ""POPULARITY"" AMONG WESTERN EUROPEANS HAS FALLEN TO ITS LOWEST POINT IN 22 YEARS, ACCORDING TO POLLS TAKEN FOR THE UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY, OFFICIAL SOURCES SAID TODAY.

THE POLLS WERE TAKEN LAST SUMMER IN BRITAIN, FRANCE, ITALY AND WEST GERMANY AND WERE THE LATEST IN A SERIES CONDUCTED ROUGHLY EVERY THREE YEARS.

U.S.I.A. SOURCES SAID DATA WAS STILL BEING ANALYZED AND THEY COULD NOT RELEASE DETAILS OF THE RAW RESULTS.

BUT THE MAIN TREND, THEY SAID, WAS A SHIFT AMONG RESPONDENTS AWAY FROM A POSITIVE FEELING ABOUT THE UNITED STATES AND INTO A FEELING OF ""NO OPINION.""

IN THIS SENSE, U.S. ""POPULARITY"" ABROAD DECLINED. BUT THERE WAS NO COMPARABLE INCREASE IN ""BAD FEELING"" ABOUT THE U.S.

THE POLL, EVEN THOUGH THE INFORMATION IS PRELIMINARY, IS LIKELY TO BECOME AN ISSUE IN THE U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION, NOW IN ITS FINAL TWO WEEKS.

DEMOCRATIC CANDIDATE JIMMY CARTER HAS CLAIMED THAT AMERICAN PRESTIGE AROUND THE WORLD WAS AT AN ALL-TIME LOW. PRESIDENT FORD HAS DENIED THE ASSERTION AND ALLEGED HIS OPPONENT WAS ""SLANDERING"" THE GOOD NAME OF THE UNITED STATES.

MORE 2341

R559R A3006)LWYDWDYDIYC
POPULARITY 2 WASHINGTON

A SPOKESMAN FOR THE U.S.I.A., THE GOVERNMENT'S INFORMATION ARM ABROAD, DECLINED ANY OFFICIAL COMMENT BEYOND SAYING THAT THE RESULTS OF SIMILAR POLLS HAD BEEN PUBLISHED IN PREVIOUS YEARS.

BUT U.S.I.A. SOURCES SAID THIS YEAR'S POLL ALSO WOULD BE PUBLISHED AFTER ANALYSIS IS COMPLETED.

THEY SAID TWO SETS OF ANALYSTS HAD BEEN GIVEN THE RAW DATA BUT HAD COME TO SOMEWHAT DIFFERING VIEWS AND OFFICIALS WERE NOW TRYING TO RECONCILE THEM.

THE SOURCES SAID THE POLL WAS TAKEN LAST JULY AND AUGUST AS ""RIDERS"" TO SURVEYS BEING CONDUCTED BY U.S. POLLING ORGANIZATIONS ON OTHER TOPICS.

THEY SAID THERE WERE SIX QUESTIONS, SOME RELATING TO OPINION ABOUT THE UNITED STATES IN GENERAL AND OTHERS TO INTERNAL EVENTS IN AMERICA.

ALTHOUGH OVERALL FAVORABLE OPINION ABOUT THE UNITED STATES HAD DECLINED, EUROPEANS WERE GENERALLY AFFIRMATIVE WHEN ASKED IF THEY THOUGHT THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS WAS FUNCTIONING IN THE UNITED STATES AND IF THE COUNTRY COULD SOLVE ITS OWN PROBLEMS.

REUTER 2344

SOVIET EMIGRATION



Q: Mr. President, you have been accused of defaulting on important humanitarian issues, including the issue of Soviet emigration. Governor Carter has been active on this issue and has told us that only this week, he sent the following telegram to Vladimer Slepak:

"I have read with great concern about the treatment that you and some of your colleagues suffered recently. As you know, I have spoken out on this matter as Governor and during this campaign and have referred to your case by name. I want you to know of my deep personal interest in the treatment that you and your colleagues receive. Sincerely,
Jimmy Carter"

How do you answer this charge, Mr. President?

A: I am firmly convinced the best way to deal with this problem is through quiet efforts rather than a publicity campaign. Let's look at the record of Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union. In 1968 the rate was 400 a year. Through sustained but unpublicized efforts we were able to increase that rate to 35,000. However, once it became a major public issue and a subject of legislation linked to trade, emigration fell off to its current rate of about 12,000, which is still far above the 1968 level. Our quiet efforts have also been successful in securing the release of a number of special hardship cases, but to mention names could jeopardize the chances of any future efforts. I believe this is the way to deal with this problem. The kind of telegram you refer to may make good publicity, but it is not likely to be helpful in solving the problem and could be quite harmful.

10/17/76
7:00 pm

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN....

MORALITY AND MORALISM IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY



Americans are today in the throes of the quadrennial debate about our past, our present, and the future we hope to create. In a world where too many are dominated by oppressive regimes and intolerant ideologies, it is a dramatic demonstration of the strength of our democracy and the greatness of our nation. Whatever the outcome, Americans should take pride that we have once again experienced the reality of a free and democratic system which gives hope to those countless millions around the world who yearn for freedom.

It is also, let us be honest, a time of confusion and of exaggeration. Some tell us we are weak; others tell us we are strong. Some tell us that our prestige is declining; others assert

that our global influence for peace and progress has never been greater. Some tell us we are in retreat around the world; others tell us we have never been more respected, more successful abroad than we are today.

As Secretary of State I am, of course, detached from partisan debate, although I will admit that my sympathies and in my view, the truth, tend to lie with the "others" rather than the "some."

But no matter how strongly Americans may disagree on specific issues, the history of the post-war period has left no doubt about the nature of our global responsibility. Without America's commitment there can be no security. Without our dedication there can be no progress. Without our strength,

peoples throughout the world will live in fear. Without our faith, the world will live without hope.

All of us here are deeply concerned about the survival and security of Israel. But we also know that the fate of even our closest friends cannot be assured in a vacuum. Peace, and justice, security, and progress will not be securely won for America or Israel unless they are embedded in a peaceful, just, secure and progressive international order. The task of building such an order is the fundamental challenge of our time.

America's unique contribution to world affairs has been our conviction that while history is often cruel, fate can be shaped by human faith and courage. Our optimism has made us understand better than many more jaded civilizations

that all great achievements were a dream before they became a reality and that in this sense all that is creative is ultimately a moral affirmation -- the faith that dares in the absence of proof; the courage to go forward when results are uncertain.

No people has experienced more of man's exaltation than the Jewish people; few have suffered more from man's depravity. The Jewish people know that survival requires unending struggle. But they know as well that peace, if it is to be more than a prophet's dream, must rest on the conscience of mankind translated into concrete efforts by all peoples and all nations.

America, because of its own heritage, is perennially engaged in such a search of its conscience. What is the relationship between morality and foreign policy? How can America carry

forward its role as human example and champion of justice?

and

How do we secure our existence/that of our allies and friends

in a world in which power remains a crucial arbiter? How do

we reconcile ends and means, principle and survival?

These questions have been asked throughout our history and they are being posed again today. But we should beware of simple answers and easy slogans. There is no doubt that policy without moral purpose is like a ship without a rudder drifting aimlessly from crisis to crisis. A policy of pure calculation will be empty of vision and humanity. It will lack not only direction, but also roots and heart. This country has always had a sense of moral mission; Americans have always held the view that America stood for something above and beyond its material achievements.

But we must never forget that policy is the art of the possible; the science of the relative. We live in a world of 150 sovereign states, profound ideological differences and nuclear weapons. Our power is enormous, but it is still finite. A wise policy must transcend rhetoric. A truly moral policy must relate ends to means and commitments to capabilities. We must keep our eyes on distant horizons; we must also keep our feet planted firmly in reality. We must learn to distinguish morality from moralizing. An attempt to impose our values on all other societies will lead to either a restless interventionism beyond our resources and what our people will support or to a withdrawal from the world. We should never forget that the invocation of abstract principles has in our history led as frequently.

to abdication as to overextension. Both tendencies would be
disastrous to all prospects of international order.

Our challenge is to be true to both these impulses --
to live up to America's usual promise while fulfilling the
practical needs of world order. This challenge will/be
still
with us when the campaign rhetoric ends two short weeks hence;
indeed we will face it for as far ahead as we can see. How
we meet it will determine the peace and progress of America
and of the world.

With your permission, it is this subject that I would
like to discuss today.

American Ideals and American Foreign Policy

Because of our history and geography, foreign policy
has never been central to American life, as it has been for many

other countries. The history of our foreign policy has been an experience of learning and of exploring. The tension between impulse and experience has been a creative force but also an unresolved dilemma in our perception of foreign policy.

As the United States has grown into the role of world power, the morality of our actions abroad has been a recurrent subject of the debate -- before World War I, between the wars, in the 50's and 60's, and again now. The very issues we hear discussed today -- openness in negotiation, distaste for armaments and tyrants, fear of involvement, preference for humanitarian endeavors -- were the focus of equally heated debate in the 1920's when the affirmation of high moral principle caused us to opt for isolationism.



From its beginnings, Americans have always believed that this country had a moral significance that transcended its geographic, military or economic power. Unique among the nations of the world, America was created as a conscious act by men dedicated to a set of political and ethical principles they believed to be of universal applicability. Small wonder, then, that Santayana concluded, "Being an American is, of itself, almost a moral condition."

But this idealism has also been in constant tension with another deep-seated strain in our history and experience.

Since Tocqueville, it has been frequently observed that we are pragmatic people -- common-sensical, undogmatic, and undoctinaire -- a nation of practical energy, ingenuity and spirit. We have

made tolerance and compromise the basis of our domestic political life. While we have defined our basic principles -- justice, liberty, equality and progress -- in universal terms, domestically we have sought to enlarge opportunity and freedom rather than coerce a uniform standard of conduct.

America has been most effective internationally when we have combined our idealistic with our pragmatic tradition.

The Founding Fathers were idealists who launched a new experiment in human liberty. But they were also sophisticated men of the world; they understood the European balance of power and manipulated it brilliantly to secure their independence. For a century thereafter, we devoted our energies to the development of our continent, content to influence the world by moral example



alone. Shielded by two oceans and the British Navy, and blessed by a bountiful nature, we tended to believe our special situation was universally valid, even for nations whose narrower margin of survival meant that their range of choices was far more limited than our own. We disparaged power even as we grew strong; we tended to see our successes and the product not of fortunate circumstance but of virtue and purity of motive.

As our strength grew, we became uncomfortable with the uses and responsibilities of power and impatient with the requirements of day-to-day diplomacy. Our rise to the status of a great power was feared and resisted by many Americans who foresaw only a process of deepening involvement in a morally questionable world.

In the early decades of this century we sought to reconcile the tension between ideals and interests by confining ourselves to humanitarian efforts and resort to our belief in the preeminence of law. We pioneered relief programs; we championed free trade and openness to foreign investment. We attempted to legislate solutions to international conflicts -- we experimented with arbitration, conciliation, legal arrangements, neutrality legislation, collective security systems.

These efforts to banish the reality of power culminated in our involvement in two world wars.

While we had a clear security interest in a

Europe free from domination by any one power we clothed



it in assertions that we would go to battle for universal moral objectives -- "a war to end all wars" or the unconditional surrender of the aggressor.

Disillusionment set in as the outcome of both world wars necessarily fell short of expectations. A tide of isolationist sentiment rose, accompanied by heightened moral proclamations coupled with a lowered willingness to undertake concrete commitments. Many Americans began to conclude that foreign involvement served no purpose but to debase the New World into service to the Old. In both world wars, total victory and an impatience with the political requirements of peace only enhanced our sense of moral rectitude. We were poorly prepared for a world of

imperfect security, alliances of convenience, recurrent crises and the need for political structure to secure peace in a turbulent world.

We entered the decades after World War II, our first sustained period of peacetime world leadership, with a supreme self-assurance fortunately matched by overwhelming material superiority. And we faced an antagonist whose political system and actions on the world scene explicitly threatened, yet again, the very existence of our most cherished principles.

In a period of seemingly clear-cut, black-and-white divisions, we harbored few doubts about the validity of our cause. Fortunately, our preponderant power gave us a broad margin for error. We saw economic problems around

the world -- which we had solved successfully in our own country -- and sought to overwhelm them with the sheer weight of resources. We projected our domestic experience overseas and assumed that economic progress automatically led to political stability. And in the process without making a conscious decision to do so we set about trying to shape the world to our design.

The Complexities of the Contemporary World

We no longer live in so simple a world.

We remain the strongest nation and the largest single influence on international affairs. For thirty years, our leadership has sustained world peace, progress, and justice. Our leadership is no less needed today but it

must be redefined to meet changing conditions. Ours is no longer a world of American nuclear monopoly; rather it is a world of substantial nuclear equivalence. Ours is a world of proliferating centers of power and influence, and at the same time of economic interdependence and common global challenges.

Today, for the first time in the modern American experience, we can neither escape from the world nor dominate it. We can no longer rely exclusively on massive resources to solve our problems. Today like all other nations in history we must conduct diplomacy with subtlety, flexibility, maneuver, and imagination if we are to preserve and forward our national goals.

We can no longer always impose our own solutions; yet our action or inaction will influence events, often decisively. Our leadership remains essential if the world is to shape cooperative international relationships that bring mankind peace and progress and human justice.

We cannot banish power from international affairs, but we can use our own power wisely and firmly to deter aggression and encourage restraint. We can encourage the resolution of disputes through negotiation. We can help construct more equitable relations between developed and developing nations, and a wider community of interest among all nations.

These are worthy goals and they are achievable.

But they require a different kind of moral conviction than in a simpler past. They require the stamina to persevere amid complexity and endless exertion; the courage to hold fast to our goals while recognizing that at any one time they may remain but partially fulfilled.

The complexity of contemporary international affairs has led some to seek easier answers. We are told that our foreign policy is excessively concerned with power politics and too little concerned with human values.

Painfully negotiated gradual steps toward bold objectives are dismissed as inadequate because partial. The very processes of diplomacy, necessary to achieve any national objective, are disparaged as incompatible with democratic principles.

It is time to face the reality of our situation. It is well to remember that it was precisely such slogans as prestige and influence that a decade and a half ago tempted us into adventures that divided our country and undermined our international position. We should always keep in mind that it is only in the last few years that we have finally begun to bring our commitments into line with our capabilities. We must of course maintain our values and our principles; but we risk certain disaster unless we relate them to a concept of the national interest and international order based not on impulse but on a sense of purpose that can be maintained by our people with conviction and steadiness for decades.

Our choice is not between morality and pragmatism.

We cannot escape either and remain true to our national character or to the needs of peace and progress. Our cause should be just but it must prosper in a world of sovereign nations and competing wills. Neither the rhetoric of moral purity nor an obsession with power politics will produce the foreign policy worthy of our challenge -- or even for our survival.

The Morality of Ends

America -- and the community of nations --

today faces inescapable challenges:

- We must maintain a secure and just peace;
- We must create a cooperative and beneficial international order;
- We must defend the rights and the dignity of man.

Each of these challenges has both a moral and a practical dimension. Each involves important ends; but they are sometimes in conflict. When that is the case we face the real moral dilemma of foreign policy: the need to choose between valid ends and of relating ends to means. And we must then be mature enough to face the fact that when two conflicting objectives cannot be achieved simultaneously one or the other will suffer at least temporarily.

In an age when nuclear cataclysm threatens mankind's very survival, peace is the first and fundamental moral imperative.



Without it, nothing else we do or seek can ultimately have meaning. Let there be no mistake about it -- averting the danger of nuclear war, limiting the growth of destructive nuclear arsenals is a moral as well as political act.



In the nuclear age, traditional power politics, the struggle for marginal advantages, the politics of prestige and unilateral gains must yield to a sense of responsibility unparalleled in history. Balances based on constant tests of strength have always in history erupted into war. But in the nuclear age this is unacceptable. Every President, sooner or later, will conclude with President Eisenhower that, "There is no alternative to peace."

But peace, however crucial, cannot be our only goal. We must not seek it at any price for that would render us morally



defenseless and place the world at the mercy of the most
ruthless. Mankind must do more, as Tacitus said, than
"make a desert and call it peace."

In the search for peace we are thus continually called
upon to strike balances -- between strength and conciliation;
between partial and total settlements; between the need to defend
our values and our interests and the need to take into account
the views of others. And we must reflect this balance in our
public discourse. Barely four years ago many argued that
conciliation was the only valid route to peace; today policies of
conciliation are frequently denounced as unilateral concessions.
This again is too simple. There will be no stability in a world
whose obsession with peace leads to appeasement; but neither
will there be security in a world which competes only in mock

tough rhetoric and in the accumulation of arms. Strength is essential but its nature needs analysis and it should never be an end in itself. Our policy must be always ready for conciliation. We must never lose sight of the fact that we owe our people a satisfactory explanation for their sacrifices and that we should bequeath to future generations something more hopeful than a balance of terror.

The second moral imperative is global cooperation.

We now live in a world of more than 150 countries, each asserting sovereignty and claiming the right to fulfill its national goals. Clearly no nation can realize all its goals without impairing the hopes of others. Compromise and shared endeavors are inescapable. An age of growing interdependence produces the imperative of world community made all the more



urgent by the danger of polarization.

We live in an age of division, not merely between East and West but between the advanced industrial nations and the developing nations. Clearly a world in which a few nations constitute islands of wealth in a sea of poverty, disease and despair is morally intolerable and fundamentally insecure. But equally intolerable are the tactics of confrontation with which some of the developing nations have pursued their goals.

The challenge of world community cannot be met by obsessive protestations of guilt characteristic of some advanced nations nor by inadequate sacrifices by the industrial nations nor by the bloc politics of many of the developing countries. What is required is a serious dedication to a spirit of cooperation.

The objectives of the developing nations are clear:

they want economic development, a role in international

decisions that affect them, and an equitable share of

global economic benefits. The goals of the industrial

nations are equally clear: widening prosperity, an open

world system of trade and investments with expanding

markets for North and South; and reliable and equitable develop-

ment of the world's resources of food, energy, and raw

materials.

The goals of both sides can be achieved only if they are seen as complementary rather than antagonistic. The process of building a new era of international economic relationships will continue through the rest of this century.

It will require compromise and negotiation among diverse and contending interests. Above all it requires a moral

act: a willingness on the part of the rich to make the

relatively small sacrifices which can contribute to a sense

while there is still time for conciliation and of community now/before the world is inevitably split into

contending camps; a readiness on the part of the weak and

the poor to recognize the difference between rhetoric

and progress and a willingness to refrain from blackmail

or extortion. Only in this manner can we build



a stable and creative world which all nations -- new and old, weak and strong, rich and poor -- have a stake in preserving because they had a part in building it.

The third moral imperative is the nurturing of human values. Today the tools of modern technology are used not only for mankind's betterment, but to intimidate, terrorize, and control. It is the tragedy of our times that the very forces of change that have made ours the most productive century in the history of man have also served to subject millions the world over to a new dimension of intimidation and suffering.

Individual freedom of conscience and expression is the proudest heritage of our civilization. All we do in

the world -- in the search for peace, for greater political cooperation, for a fair and flourishing international economy -- must be rooted in fundamental liberties which permit the fullest expression of mankind's creativity. Technological progress without justice mocks humanity; national unity without freedom is the unity of regimentation; nationalism without a consciousness of human community -- including a shared concern for human rights -- can become an instrument of oppression and a force for evil. The United States, to be true to its values, has an obligation to stand for the defense of human rights.

But responsibility compels also a recognition of our limits. Our alliances and political relationships serve

regional and world security. If well conceived, they are not favors to other governments, but reflect a recognition of mutual and global interests. They should be withdrawn only when these interests change and not, as a general rule, as a punishment for acts with which we do not agree. In many countries, like South Korea, whatever the internal structure, the populations are unified in seeking our protection against outside aggression. In many countries, such as Greece, Portugal and Spain, our foreign policy relationships have proved to be no obstacle to the forces of change. And in many countries it is the process of American disengagement that has eroded their sense of security and created the perception that there is a need for

greater internal discipline, while at the same time
diminishing our ability to influence the domestic practices
we criticize.


There are no simple answers to this dilemma.

The painful experience of the last decade should have
taught us that we ought not exaggerate our capacity to
foresee, let alone to shape, social and political change in
other societies. Therefore let me restate the principles
that have guided our actions:

- Human rights are a legitimate international
concern and have been so defined in international
agreements for more than a generation.

-- The United States will stand up for human rights in appropriate international forums and in exchanges with other governments.

-- We will be mindful of the limits of our reach; we will be conscious of the difference between public postures that satisfy our self-esteem and policies that bring positive results.



We thus return to our central problem which affects each of the moral imperatives of our time -- peace, global community, and human dignity. In foreign policy, at any one time, only partial solutions are possible. If every nation of the world presses for the immediate implementation of all of its values, hopes and desires, eternal conflict is inevitable. If we insist that others accept all

our moral preferences are we then ready to use military force to assist those who do as we demand? And if we "punish" those who refuse our prescriptions by withholding support or assistance, what will we do if the isolation of this government tempts external pressures.

If we overextend our moral claims and back them up we will have maneuvered ourselves into the role of the world's policeman -- a role which the American people rejected in a decade of turmoil. But if we fail to back up these claims we will lose relevance and credibility.

We will be conducting a policy of self-gratification without effectiveness.

Ladies and Gentlemen: it is essential to recognize

inevitable and inescapable tension between our moral
aims -- which of necessity are stated in universal terms --
and the constant necessity for choice that is imposed on the
policymaker by competing goals and finite resources.

The making and implementing of foreign policy is,
like life, a constant effort to strike the right balance
between the best we want and the best we can have -- between
the ends we seek and the means we adopt.

The Morality of Means

The task of statesmen is to find that balance:
to strive with all his heart and mind toward the values
America seeks; even when individual measures must fall short

of the final goal. The moral aspect of foreign policy thus involves not only a challenge of ends but of means as well.

Statesmen must understand that there are certain experiments that cannot be tried -- not because the goals are undesirable but because the consequences of failure would be so severe that not even the most elevated goal can justify the risk.

The Middle East is a vivid example. No people yearn for comprehensive peace more than the people of Israel whose existence has not been recognized by any of its neighbors throughout its history. There are those who argue that in the aftermath of the 1973 war the entire complex of Arab-Israeli issues -- borders, peace obligations, refugees -- should all have been approached simultaneously at one large scale conference. But at the time such a course would probably have proved disastrous: the United States had no diplomatic relations with

several key Arab countries; the Soviet Union was in effect the lawyer for Arab causes; an oil embargo still prevailed; and hostility between the Arab states and Israel remained at the flash point. The chances for success of a comprehensive approach were slight; the penalties for failure were far-reaching. -- a continuation of the oil embargo, a continued freeze in US relations with the Arab world, corresponding growth of Soviet influence and the likelihood of a resumption of the Middle East war in difficult circumstances.

We chose to proceed step-by-step on issues where room for agreement seemed to exist. We sought to establish a new relationship in the Arab world, to reduce the Soviet capacity for exploiting tensions and to build confidence of the parties



directly involved so that comprehensive solutions would
someday be possible. We approached peace in stages but with
the intention of ultimately merging these steps into an overall
solution.

In the space of eighteen months three agreements were
reached -- two between Egypt and Israel and one between Syria
and Israel. As a result, the possibilities of achieving a compre-
hensive peace are greater today than they have ever been before.

Deep suspicions remain but the first important steps have
been taken. The beginnings of mutual trust -- never before in
evidence -- are emerging. Some Arab states are for the first
time openly speaking of peace and ending a generation of conflict.
The nations of the Middle East are now in a position to negotiate
among themselves with confidence that the scope of outside

pressures has been substantially reduced. The step-by-step approach has thus brought us to a point where comprehensive approaches are the logical next step. The decision before us now is not whether but how the next phase of negotiations should be launched. And we will engage in it -- together with our Israeli friends -- with new hope and confidence.

Another issue involving means that deserves the creative attention of the American people is the potential tension between the democratic process and the process of diplomacy.

A great deal is being said about openness and secrecy in the conduct of our foreign affairs. It is an important issue; it is in fact critical both for the future of our democracy and our foreign policy. It deserves more careful examination

than it has received.

The American people must know the direction their foreign policy is taking; they must understand their government's purposes; they must know that its decisions reflect their values.

Our Constitution demands it; our commitment to government of and by the people compels it. And despite what you may hear in some quarters, I am deeply committed to an open foreign policy.

I have personally testified formally before Congressional committees in the past three years more than eighty times; I have met

informally with members of Congress over 100 times; I have given more than fifty public speeches in thirty cities across the country;

I have held nearly 100 press conferences since coming to office.

Senior State Department officials, since I have been Secretary of State, have visited more than 30 cities to explain and solicit

public views about our foreign policy. I am proud of that record.

But on the other hand, it is important to be clear about the nature of openness. Modern government is highly complex; it must deal daily with a wide range of extremely technical issues. Some of them -- especially these dealing with modern weaponry -- require long study. To contend that all decisions -- especially when they deal with subjects of great sensitivity -- can be publicly arrived at is an absurdity. The public can be misled by a flood of partial or irrelevant information as effectively as by the withholding of relevant information. Moreover if all ideas, however inadvertently advanced, became the subjects of public debate, minute examination by the media, and the object of political attack, the whole process of decision making will be corrupted and the

free exchange of opinion so essential to effective and creative Presidential decisions will dry up. Caution and inflexibility will reign. There will be a dearth of new initiatives and independent views.

The impact of excessive concern with "secrecy" on the process of negotiations can be equally pernicious. There is no question that the Congress and the public must be told the aims of any important negotiation before it is undertaken. The final results of a negotiation -- the costs involved, including all the national commitments promised -- must be made known to the people and submitted to their representatives for approval or ratification. But selective or partial revelations during the course of an ongoing diplomatic process will only serve to distort the over-all picture and thwart progress.

It has often been the case in the history of democracy

that governments may be more interested in compromise than their publics. Publicly expressed pressures often represent special interests, bureaucratic or private. It is difficult enough for a government to make concessions in the context of a balanced agreement; it is even harder if concessions are disclosed before the reciprocal concessions from the other side are available. In such conditions, leaks of information are almost always tendentious, and weapons in a bureaucratic battle. Public disclosure can become a weapon to destroy negotiating flexibility and undermine the possibilities of compromise.

This is not a call for secrecy, it is a call for responsibility. Unwarranted secrecy is intolerable; mechanical doctrinaire openness is self-defeating and stultifying. The

American people and their government must find this balance together with mutual confidence and a consciousness that we are engaged in a common enterprise some of whose aspects require the same degree of confidentiality extended to any lawyer or doctor on the performance of his trust -- the ability to achieve an agreed end by the most appropriate proper means.

Finally there is our commitment to human freedom.

There is perhaps no more difficult, no more painful issue about means than this.

We have a moral as well as a practical obligation to vindicate our values and combat injustice. Those who speak out for freedom and expose the transgressions of repressive regimes do so in the best American tradition.

They can have -- and on occasion have had -- a dramatic and heartening impact. But there can also be times when rhetoric becomes a substitute for action, or tragically drives those it seeks to influence into even greater acts of repression.

This Administration has believed that quiet diplomacy is generally the best way to further the cause of human rights. Our objective has been results, not publicity. We were concerned that when such sensitive issues are



turned into tests of strength between governments the concern for national prestige can defeat the most worthy goals. And we have generally opposed attempts to deal with sensitive human rights issues through legislation -- not because of the moral view expressed, which we share, but because it usually lacks the flexibility necessary to accomplish what it seeks, and because it is almost always too challenging to the government whose actions it seeks to change.

By using the tactics of quiet diplomacy this Administration has brought about the release or parole of hundreds of prisoners throughout the world, and mitigated repressive conditions in numerous countries. We have

not often, in keeping with our insistence on quiet diplomacy, publicized these successes.

The most striking example of the two contrasting approaches to the issues of human rights is the case of Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union. The number of emigrant Soviet Jews who were permitted to emigrate in 1968 was 400; in 1973 that number had risen to 35,000.

The reason for this quantum leap lies in our persistent but private approaches to the Soviet Government and the parallel overall improvement in U.S. -Soviet relations.

Hundreds of hardship cases were dealt with in quiet personal discussions by the President or his senior officials. No

public announcement or confrontation ever took place. But when results were sought by confrontation and legislation -- progress was reversed. Today Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union has dropped to some 10,000 a year. I

stress this not to score debating points against men whose dedication to Jewish emigration is unquestioned. Rather it is to stress that moral ends require the selection of appropriate means and that this cannot always be deduced from public declarations.

Conclusion

I have discussed the dilemmas of moral choice not to counsel resignation but as a message of hope. Fond as we are of self-flagellation especially in years divisible by four, Americans can take pride in the moral

achievements of their foreign policy in recent years:

- We have ended the war we found and preserved the peace;
- We have restructured and strengthened our partnerships with the industrial democracies and our sister republics in this hemisphere;
- We have opened new relationships with adversaries;
- We have begun to curb the race in nuclear arms;
- We have helped to sow the seeds of peace in the Middle East and begun the process of conciliation in Africa;

- We have put forth a comprehensive agenda for cooperation between the industrial and developing worlds;
- We have worked with others on new global challenges that transcend boundaries and ideologies;
- We have defended our values and interests around the globe while preserving the peace

But our agenda will inevitably remain unfinished.

Great opportunities lie before us:

- We have an early opportunity to place a ceiling on strategic nuclear arsenals and move on from there to reduce them.

- We have the possibility of major progress towards peace in the Middle East.
- We can help the peoples of Africa reach for conciliation, human justice, and development rather than violence and hatred.
- We can build on the promising foundations of the new relationship with the People's Republic of China.
- We can see to it that the atom is used for mankind's benefit not its destruction.
- The industrial democracies can usher in a new and dynamic period of creativity based on equality and mutual respect.



-- The developing countries can become true partners in the international community.

-- All countries can work together to fashion a global community both on land and in the vast domains of the oceans.

In pursuing these goals, the question is not whether our values should affect our foreign policy, but how.

We must have the courage to face complexity and the inner conviction to deal with ambiguity; we must be prepared to look behind easy slogans and recognize that great goals can only be reached by patience, and often only in gradual stages.

A world of turmoil and danger cries out for structure and leadership. The opportunities that we

face as a nation to help shape a more just international order depend more than ever on a steady, resolute, and self-assured America. This requires confidence -- the leaders' confidence in their values, the public's confidence in its government, and the nation's collective confidence in the worth of its objectives. It is time to remind ourselves that while we may disagree about means, as Americans we all have the same ultimate objective -- peace, prosperity, and justice in our country and in the world.

We remain the only force capable of protecting and furthering the process of liberating the human race from the tyranny it has all too often imposed upon itself. For the weak such responsibility would be a burden beyond

bearing. But America is a nation born in idealism, reared in the knowledge that a frontier was something to be challenged and crossed, and matured in the knowledge that the ideals that had so set us apart from others implied an obligation that we made untiring efforts to implement them.

Many years ago Abraham Lincoln proclaimed that no nation could long endure "half slave and half free," and touched the conscience of a nation. Today people the world over cry out for liberty, and look with hope and longing to America, for we have touched the conscience of all mankind. If we hold to our ideals, if we persevere in the day-to-day task of building a better world, there will come a time when the generations that come after us will be able to say that no man is a slave and no man a master.

SALT



Q: Last winter (January, February) SALT seemed to be moving ahead at the time of Secretary Kissinger's visit to Moscow. And then, suddenly, you abolished the word "detente," and SALT became stalled. Wasn't this simply a political decision of your during the campaign against Reagan?

A: I think it is important first that we put this whole thing into perspective and understand the nature of the problem.

The first and overwhelming factor is that the United States and the Soviet Union each have the capability of destroying the world. This is the first time in human history that such a situation has existed and it not only makes US-Soviet relations unique but places an awesome responsibility on them.

It is also important to understand that while we have a vital interest in the reduction of tensions and improvement of relations with the Soviet Union, we are not prepared to follow a "peace at any price" philosophy. In the end, a more stable, more peaceful world can result only from US strength and certain knowledge on the part of the Soviet Union that we will respond if challenged. It is true that something happened to US-Soviet relations early this year. What happened was that the Soviet Union intervened massively with military equipment and Cuban troops in Angola. I warned them publicly and also sent Secretary Kissinger to Moscow in January in part

Neither approach



to convey directly and in private the depth of our concerns.

The cooling of US-Soviet relations was directly related to their intervention in Angola. They cannot be allowed to get the impression that adventures of this sort are without cost.

On SALT itself, Mr. Carter says we have made no progress. That simply is another demonstration that he does not know what he is talking about. We made a fundamental breakthrough at Vladivostok -- achieving an agreement on equality in numbers, at a level which required Soviet reduction. Since then we have continued our work and we are about 90 percent of the way to the achievement of a new SALT agreement. This is not the place to get into the incredibly complex details of such an agreement but there are basically only two issues left -- backfire bomber and cruise missiles. They are difficult issues in that they are both weapon systems that do not fall neatly into any particular category. But we have made progress on them.

ARAB BOYCOTT



Q: Mr. President, Governor Carter has said that if he is elected he will put an end to Arab boycott practices. Would you comment.

A: The basic problem here is the bitter antagonism between the Arab countries and Israel. Unless we attack that problem and try to solve it, it is misleading to the American people to think that the boycott will simply be ended because we say it should be. The answer to the problem of the Arab boycott is to get a lasting peace in the Middle East. That is the objective we have pursued over the last two years and we now may have favorable prospects in the period ahead.

It is important to understand that any discrimination by American trading firms on the basis of race, religion, or national origin has been totally and completely ended by my actions last November. The boycott itself was established by the Arab governments; only they can end it. What the U.S. Government can do is to take action to deal with its effects. The actions we have taken, including my recent decision to make public reports of boycott activity, will go a long way toward inhibiting participation and reducing its effect, so the answer must be sought in a comprehensive peace settlement. I am sure Governor Carter knows this and any other approach is simply another impossible promise.



GRAIN DEAL WITH ISRAEL

Q: Mr. President, did the State Department inform Israel that it would not be possible to sign a long-term grain agreement with them? If so, why?

A: There have been ongoing discussions with the Israeli Government on US supply of agricultural commodities to that country. With respect to the agreement you refer to, any problems are purely technical. The issue is not whether or not we will provide sufficient grain and other agricultural commodities to Israel. Of course the United States will provide Israel all the grain Israel requires to meet her needs.

We anticipate shipments to Israel of approximately 2 million metric tons of grain products in 1977.

	<u>1977</u> (thousands of metric tons)
Wheat	450-500
Sorghum	700
Corn	300
Soybean	400
Soybean Oil	<u>Up to 10</u>
	1,900,000

COMPUTER SALE TO THE PRC



Q: According to Aviation Week Magazine, Control Data Corporation is negotiating the sale of highly advanced computers to the PRC. This sale is reported to be favored by the State Department but opposed by DOD and ERDA. Can you confirm that report?

A: A number of American companies have been discussing the sale of oil exploration equipment, including computers for the processing of seismic data, with the PRC. It would be inappropriate to comment on the details of any specific license application. Businesses provide such information to the government in confidence. Any export license application will be handled in accordance with the provisions of the Export Administration regulations, as continued in force by Executive Order. Under these laws and regulations, such proposed exports are subject to extensive inter-agency review designed to assure that no exports occur which would be detrimental to the national security of the US. The views of all the agencies affected, including the Department of Defense, ERDA as well as State are reflected in this review.

NAMIBIA IN SECURITY COUNCIL

Q: Why did the U. S. veto the resolution on Namibia in the UN Security Council on October 19?

A: As Governor Scranton said in his explanation of the American vote, the U. S. concern with the Namibia problem has been demonstrated dramatically by our continuing efforts to assist the parties involved in finding a peaceful solution. Negotiations are currently actively under way. While the sensitive process of consultation is going on I did not believe it would serve a useful purpose for the Security Council to take new initiatives on the Namibian question. After many years of frustration in trying to bring about independence for Namibia, the prospect for results exists now for the first time. The proposed resolution risked upsetting the progress already made.

It is important to note however that the U. S. has continued to enforce its own arms embargo towards South Africa since 1962, a year before the UN Security Council called for a voluntary embargo.

[The Security Council vote was 10 in favor; 3 opposed (U. S. , U. K. and France) and 2 abstentions (Italy and Japan). The three opposing votes are all vetos since they were all by permanent members of the UN Security Council.]

Strategic Stockpile Policy

Q: Senator Proxmire has accused the administration of wasting the taxpayers' money on a new strategic stockpile policy. What is the basis for our new policy, and have we consulted with the Congress in making these changes?

A: Our strategic materials stockpile provides an important source of critical materials needed in the production of military equipment and other key items in a wartime economy. Because of U.S. dependence upon overseas suppliers for many new materials, wartime availability can be curtailed or cut off completely. Even though foreign suppliers may be friendly nations, it may be impossible to move materials to the U.S.

during actual hostilities.

(strongly supported by other other Congressmen on cognizant committees,
The President's revised stockpile policy/has included a

comprehensive review of the basic materials needed in the construction of today's complex military weaponry and those materials needed to insure the continued health of the civilian economy during wartime. Our new stockpile goals are based upon a complex analysis of industry requirements, processing plant capabilities, reliability of foreign supply, and degree of substitutability by other materials. Because these many variables can change, the President has directed that stockpile purchases and sales be reviewed annually, and that a comprehensive policy review be conducted every four years. In conducting this past year's interagency stockpile study, the administration has consulted closely with the appropriate Congressional committees (including Senator Proxmire's).

[FYI: General Leslie Bray, Federal Preparedness Agency Director, will testify before Proxmire next month on the stockpile. This session has been planned for some time.]

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 19, 1976

Mr. President:

Attached is the transcript you requested of the press conference Henry gave in Boston on Friday, October 15.



Brent Scowcroft

PRESS DEPARTMENT OF STATE



THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN....

OCTOBER 15, 1976

NO. 518

PC 116


PRESS CONFERENCE
BY THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE

HARVARD UNIVERSITY
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS

OCTOBER 15, 1976



For further information contact:



PROF. FAIRBANK: Ladies and gentlemen, I am John Fairbank, representing Harvard University.

Harvard has called this press conference and is extremely glad that Secretary Kissinger is able to come here today, because we have an interest in East Asia that we think is absolutely essential to develop in the public interest. The Secretary is helping us in this way at our request. We appreciate it very much. I hope each of you will identify your paper as you ask questions.

Q Mr. Secretary, what is this Administration doing at this moment to secure a final accounting of American servicemen missing in action in Southeast Asia, and also a comment from you on the cooperation of the present government in Viet-Nam on this matter?

A (Secretary Kissinger) We have made it clear to the Government of Viet-Nam that progress towards normalization and progress towards better relations with the United States absolutely depends on an accounting for the missing in action. We are prepared to discuss this with the Vietnamese. We've had diplomatic exchanges in Paris,

and we expect to start some discussions with them in the near future on that subject.

Now, so far, the Vietnamese Government has not been particularly cooperative. They have been feeding out just a few names to influence particular decisions, but we think that as a question of principle we cannot let the Vietnamese Government blackmail American families with an anguish that has been going on for years, in order to do something that they should have done under the Armistice Agreement to begin with.

So we hope that in the future that we will get a complete accounting for the Missing in Action and that will then permit progress towards normalization.

Q Just a follow up on that: Is this Administration prepared to veto the entrance of the Government of Viet Nam into the United Nations until this matter is resolved?

A. Well, we have vetoed it before. We have made it clear that we would veto it before, and the President has stated that this is a precondition.

Q Mr. Secretary, how is the State Department responding to Fidel Castro's

statement that his country is cancelling the 1973 Sky-jacking Agreement with the United States?

A First, in my speech to the United Nations I condemned terrorism as an instrument of national policy pursued by any nation, for whatever cause. The United States is not engaged in any activity of this kind, and the charge by Fidel Castro that the United States or its government, or any agency of the government had anything to do with the explosion of that airliner is totally false.

Secondly, we think that it is an act of complete irresponsibility to encourage hijacking at this moment at a time when the -- when one of the biggest of human problems is the taking of hostages that cannot possibly influence political decisions or foreign policy decisions.

And we have stated today, and I repeat again, that we will hold the Cuban Government accountable for any actions that result from their decision.

Q Mr. Kissinger, The Democratic Presidential nominee, Jimmy Carter, says that when it comes to foreign policy that you, in fact, are the President of the United States; in that particular area that you really have the responsibility that President Ford apparently has very little input in foreign policy

matters. Could you respond to that?

A I will respond to that question.

But could I ask you to _____ -- in your other questions to leave them out of the partisan areas. You can mention criticisms and ask me to comment on criticisms but don't get me into specific references to personalities.

In this particular case I think I would have to say that this shows that Mr. Carter has more experience as a Governor than at the Federal level.

There is no such thing -- Dean Acheson used to say that there can be a strong President and a strong Secretary of State as long as the Secretary of State knows who is President.

The final decisions are always made by the President. I see the President three or four times a week. I am on the telephone with him constantly.

There is no major decision that is taken which is not made by the President.

In the day to day conduct of foreign policy every President has to delegate certain tactical decisions to somebody -- to his Security Advisor, to his Secretary of State -- and that, too, has happened with every

President in the post-war period. President Ford and I have had a very close working relationship and it is in the nature of such a relationship that the points of view of the two partners merge.

But it is always clear who is the senior partner and who is the junior partner.

Q Mr. Secretary, isn't it true that in a sense when President Ford admittedly made a blunder during the second debate with Jimmy Carter on the Eastern European situation, that that indicated that he was not on top of the situation -- that he wasn't aware fully of certain foreign policy issues?

A No. That indicated that under the pressure of a debate he did not make a point as felicitously as he might have made it -- as he has since admitted.

Nobody who knows his record could believe that on this particular issue he did not know exactly what the facts were. He had one thing in mind and he expressed it in a manner that created the wrong impression and he has stated that publicly and has clarified it.

But there was no misapprehension in his mind as to the presence of Soviet divisions in Eastern Europe

And we have been negotiating for years to reduce the number of those divisions; and he has personally visited three East European countries.

Q Mr. President,

A I appreciate the promotion but -- [Laughter.] there's a constitutional provision against it --

Q Mr. Secretary, what was your reaction to Carter's remarks on the Panama Canal, and has that affected the negotiations in any way?

A Could you leave names out of these questions? [Laughter.]

It has not affected the negotiations which are just on the verge of resuming.

We have stated repeatedly that with respect to the Panama Canal it is not an issue between the United States and Panama. It is an issue of the United States position with respect to the Western Hemisphere and ultimately with respect to all of the new nations in the world.

If there is a consensus in the Western Hemisphere on any point, it is that the existing arrangements in Panama are to be changed. And if the United States

relies simply on the physical assertion of its power -- which we have, and of course we are stronger than Panama -- then we are going to mortgage the possibilities of a more creative relationship in the Western Hemisphere.

So therefore, the problem is whether we can assure access through the Canal -- free and unimpeded access through the Canal -- by arrangements different from those that now exist.

This is the essence of the negotiation and I do not think it helps to make extreme statements in this regard.

Any agreement that we make -- first of all, there's no doubt -- not one line of an agreement exists at this moment. Once a concept of an agreement is agreed to, it will be discussed with the Congress. Once the Treaty exists, it will have to be approved by two thirds of the Senate.

So there is plenty of opportunity for a full debate and it will take an overwhelming majority to pass it. And we believe that the negotiations are in the

national interest and I believe that any President will come to the same conclusion that every President has come to since 1964, namely that these negotiations should be continued and that all possibilities should be explored.

Q Mr. Secretary, could you tell us a little bit about the Southeast Asia Conference and why it is important for you to be meeting with businessmen? Will you give us a little bit of your concept of the role of multinationals in East Asia?

A Well, first of all, I am meeting with this Conference primarily because my friend John Fairbank has asked me to meet with it. And I did not call the Conference nor did I have anything to do with the membership of the Conference.

As I understood it, Harvard is calling a conference of Americans with interests in Asia and attempts to bring that group together with faculty members that have been studying the problems of Asia.

Now I believe that this is an excellent idea. I think that Americans who are active in Asia ought to understand the cultural, political and economic conditions of the area. And I believe that professors

who are studying the area can benefit from some of the practical experiences which some of these corporations and others who are interested in the area have. I have always believed that one of the problems in our society is to bring together those who have an opportunity to reflect about the problems with those who have to be active in the area.

So I have welcomed this opportunity and, as you know, I am speaking OFF THE RECORD. I am not using it to make any public pronouncement. I am doing it to help my former colleagues at Harvard and my old institution to engage in a worthwhile program.

Q Mr. Secretary, could you please tell us if you or President Ford have plans for visiting the new Chinese leader at any time in the near future? And could you also give us your assessment of the kind of relations we are likely to have with the new government?

A There are no plans now for either President Ford or myself to visit China, because while we have no doubt about the election, there is a certain decorum about making plans -- (Laughter) until the results are clear.



It has been more or less an annual event that the Secretary of State would visit China at some point during the year -- and that could happen, although no plans exist now.

There are no plans whatever for the President to visit China. And there is something to be said for perhaps having a return visit at some point, or to meet at some other place.

But this, I think, has to be decided after the election.

As for the impact of changes in leadership on policy, the long term policy of any country, and especially of a country that moves with the care and thoughtfulness of the Peoples Republic of China doesn't depend so much on personalities as on a perception of their interests and of their values.

I think that the basic factors that brought the United States and China into contact with each other are still operating and are likely to continue.

Of course personalities affect the style of diplomacy and may affect how certain things are carried out,

but I do not expect a fundamental change in the relationship and it is too early for us to tell what differences of style might emerge.

Q: Mr. Secretary, in reference to South Africa, why do you refuse so far to meet with key African liberation organizations, particularly the African National Congress and the Pan African Congress? And why do you schedule meetings excluding these legitimate organizations, spokespersons for the African people in Namibia, Zimbabwe, and South Africa?

A Let's separate the liberation movements in Rhodesia - Zimbabwe -- from those in Namibia, for a moment.

When I visited Africa in April, I met with the Presidents of the so-called "front line states". They all felt at the time that the experience of Angola should not be repeated. That is to say, they did not want any of the outside powers to back one particular liberation movement and thereby get a fight started among the liberation movements.

I then agreed with President Nyerere and President Kaunda and President Khama that the United States would not get in touch directly with the liberation movements

in order to permit the African problems to be dealt with by Africans.

And we agreed to deal with these liberation movements through the front line Presidents, provided that all other countries did the same.

They have seen to it that these liberation movements would not become the plaything of great power rivalry and it is not failure to recognize these movements -- it is, rather, our attempt to insulate the problem from superpower rivalry.

Now that they are going to Geneva, we will of course deal with them and our whole policy has been to put these liberation movements into a position where they could negotiate directly for the future of their own country.

With respect to the liberation movement in Namibia, which is to say SWAPO. I have met with Nujomo and my representatives have met with Nujomo.

In that case, we do not have the special conditions of many movements, since as one movement he deals also with Communist countries. And we deal with him and we have recognized him as an important factor -- as a key

factor in the negotiations. In fact we are just now waiting for him to come back to New York from Africa, before I have another meeting with him.

With respect to -- again to the Rhodesian movements-- I want to repeat, we recognize them. We accept them. We do not want to choose among them. That is to say, we want the African presidents and the leaders, themselves, to determine their own relationships but we will recognize them and we support them.

Q Well is it not a fact that the State Department has had a preference for Joshua Nkomo in Zimbabwe?

A That is not a fact.

Q That is not a fact.

A No. Nkomo was recognized by all of the movements as the chief negotiator at the last negotiation, in February, which broke down.

At this moment, we are meticulously staying away from indicating any preference; and when Mr. Schauffele visited Salisbury he was in touch with Muzorewa as well as with Nkomo, as well as with representatives of Mugabe.

Q Mr. Kissinger, on the hijacking question do you feel at this point that these incidents of skyjacking will increase?

And also what can the United States do about it now that Castro has cancelled the arrangement?

A I don't want to speculate what exactly Castro intends to do with this arrangement, and what it means with respect to his actual performance.

Theoretically he could carry out the same obligations, which is to say to return the skyjackers without having the formal obligation to do so.

If he, however, deliberately encourages skyjackings to Cuba, it would be an act of extraordinary irresponsibility, because I think whatever the disputes between countries may be, no country should use the suffering of innocent people who, I repeat, have absolutely no possibility of affecting events for the sort of rivalry that now exists.

Q What can the United States do about that?

A Well, I said we will hold them accountable.

What we will do we will have to study.

Q Dr. Kissinger, because you are returning to help Harvard for the East Asian Conference, would you give any thought to returning to Harvard in any capacity after you leave office?

A Well, this won't be a problem before 1981, so we will have many opportunities to discuss this. (Laughter.)

Q Dr. Kissinger, last night the President said that Jimmy Carter had slandered the name of the United States when he criticized American foreign policy under yourself in the Ford Administration. How far can a Democratic candidate go in his criticism before the President has to go run and hide behind the American flag to defend against it.

A Well, I consider the office of the Secretary of State essentially a non-partisan office; and I think the candidates have to determine for themselves how far they should go and what they can say.

Q Mr. Secretary, in your answers you gave before about staying on until 1981 --

A That was a joke. (Laughter.) That was to



demoralize my staff.

Q Does that mean you are prepared to stay with President Ford if he is re-elected?

A No. I've said repeatedly that eight years is a long time -- especially eight years as turbulent as these have been -- that I did not want to state before the election was over what I would do before the President has talked to me, but that on the whole I thought that eight years is a long time. So I have not made my final decision. I want to wait until the President has talked to me.

Q Mr. Kissinger, aren't you in fact saying you'd prefer to leave, although you will serve at his request if he's re-elected?

A I haven't really stated what I will do because I want to look at it under the conditions that then exist, and I owe the President the opportunity to discuss it with me.

Q Is there any other job you prefer to take?

A No.

Q Mr. Secretary, I'd like to ask you:

Is it true that -- is it possible that recent arms sales by the United States to Israel were motivated by political considerations before the election?

A Well, I think the President has answered this yesterday. These items have been before the Administration for several months. They come up for an almost monthly review. And the President decided to act because he thought, as he pointed out yesterday, that it was in the best interests of the United States.

Q Mr. Secretary, I'd like to follow up on Mr. Krimer's question of before, since you said your answer to that was a joke. Taking for granted that you will at some point leave the State Department, would you at that point consider returning to Harvard? And, if so, have you at any time discussed that possibility with any member of the Harvard administration?

A I haven't discussed it with any member of the Harvard administration, and I have really not given any systematic thought to what I'm going to do when I leave this position. I have taken the view that after I've announced my resignation, or after the voters announce my resignation for me (laughter), I can then make the decision on what I might want to do. But I think it's inappropriate for somebody in my office to discuss his future with anybody until he's resigned.

Q Mr. Kissinger, I understand the United States is investigating the cause of the crash of the Cuban plane off Barbados.

A Yes.

Q Can you tell me who is doing the investigating, what the investigation has learned so far?

A To the best of my information, we have asked the CIA to check into it. I don't know whether the FBI is making a formal investigation of it. We have offered the governments concerned any assistance that they might request since it did not occur on American soil. But I can state categorically that no official of the United States Government -- nobody paid by the American Government, nobody in contact with the American Government -- has had anything to do with this crash of the airliner. We consider actions like this totally reprehensible.

Q Mr. Secretary, speaking of the CIA, the CIA has been accused by some Southeast Asia observers of more or less manipulating the recent military takeover in Thailand. Now, have the United States interests gone so far as to try to emulate the type of military dictatorship



that was set up in Chile? Are we talking about that topic?

A "Emulate," you mean? We have had absolutely nothing to do with the upheaval in Thailand, and therefore there's no point comparing it with Chile. We had absolutely nothing to do with it. We didn't know about it beforehand.

Q Is Chile still an issue?

A That depends with whom.

Q With the United States, with the recent car blow-up in Washington, D. C.?

A Well, we of course totally condemn the murder of former Ambassador Letelier, whom I knew personally and respected, even when we had our differences. We have seen no evidence yet as to who was behind this assassination. But whoever was behind it, it is an absolutely outrageous act.

We also had nothing to do -- as the Church Committee said -- with the overthrow of the Chilean Government. We had nothing to do with the military junta that overthrew it.

Q Despite some of the evidence to the

contrary?

A The Church Committee made clear that we had nothing to do with the military junta. What we were attempting to do was to strengthen the democratic parties, who in turn had nothing to do with the overthrow, for the 1976 election. That was a different matter.

Q Can we say without a doubt that the United States had nothing to do with the recent bombing in Washington, D. C.?

A You mean of Letelier?

Q Exactly.

A Absolutely.

Q Thank you.

Q You mentioned earlier that you're going to consider your fate following the election, and perhaps that fate might be decided by the voters. How much of an impact do you, yourself, feel your performance during the last eight years will have on this election?

A Well, foreign policy is inevitably an issue in any election, and that's inevitable. These have been eight turbulent years. I believe that they were the period in which we had to make the change from a belief

in American omnipotence, in which we could overwhelm every problem with our power, to a period in which we have to conduct foreign policy the way other nations have had to conduct it throughout history -- with a consciousness of a national purpose, a choice of means -- where we have had to establish new relationships with old allies, open new relationships with old adversaries, liquidate vestiges of a war which we found, and deal simultaneously with a revolution that is represented by these new nations.

I don't want to judge myself how effectively all of this has been done, and I don't frankly believe that candidates are in the best position to judge that either -- although, obviously, they must make their cases.

We will leave to history what the ultimate assessment is. But without doubt, an eight-year record in foreign policy will be subject to discussion.

Q Will you be an asset to Gerald Ford on Election Day or a liability?

A I don't go into the public opinion or polling business, and I can't judge it. My obligation is, under the direction of the President, to conduct foreign



policy and to advise the President as to what I believe to be in the best interests of the United States and world peace.

Now, I understand that most polls show that I have an adequate public support, but this is not the ultimate test of a Secretary of State.

Q Secretary Kissinger, do you think that at some point the United States should or might sell arms to China -- provide any kind of defense equipment to China?

A We have never had any request for the sale of arms to China. We have never had any discussions with China about the sale of arms. We believe that the territorial integrity and sovereignty of China is very important to the world equilibrium, and we would consider it a grave matter if this were threatened by an outside power. But we have never had any defense discussions with China. I don't foresee any, but I do have to state our general view that it would not be taken lightly if there were a massive assault on China.

Q Is it correct, as former Secretary Schlesinger has said, that the State Department withheld invitations for him to visit China?

A I don't believe that Secretary Schlesinger said this, and the only formal invitation to Secretary Schlesinger that was issued happened to coincide with his departure from the Government so that the problem of withholding it did not arise.

Q He said that two invitations were extended previously.

A Well, with respect to the first -- I don't think he said it. I think a member of his party must have misunderstood; there was no formal invitation the year before.

Q Mr. Secretary, if this' does turn out to be your last year in office, could you look back and think about what might be the major disappointment and major accomplishment during your period as Secretary of State?

A You know, when you are in this sort of a position, you perform almost like an athlete, in the sense of reacting to the series of situations that develop very rapidly. I would think that I would be much more reflective about it after I'm out of office than while I'm in office. I would think that the major accomplishment would be the attempt to shift American foreign policy from a perception that we could do everything **simultaneously**

to an attempt to relate our commitments to our means and our purposes and to our possibilities.

This involved recasting our relationships with allies, developing new relationships with adversaries, and beginning new approaches to the new countries.

The disappointment has been that in the period after 1973, the Executive authority of the United States was so weakened by a series of crises that many of the building blocks that were in place in 1973 could not be used as rapidly as I would have hoped, and that perhaps more energy had to be spent on preserving what existed than on building what might have been possible.

I could list specific things that were disappointing -- as you would expect in an eight-year period -- but if you want it on a general plane, these would be what I consider the accomplishments and what I consider the sadnesses.

Q More specifically, Mr. Kissinger, are you disappointed that the United States did not establish full diplomatic relations with mainland China before Mao Tse-tung's death and that perhaps now this period is going to be a longer period because of the transition that mainland China is going through?



A I think that the process of normalization is one to which we're committed and which we intend to carry out. I don't think it is tied, nor has it ever been tied by the Chinese, to a personality or to a specific leader. And I believe that that process can continue.

Q When will it be completed, or what's holding it up now?

A Well, what has held it up is to discuss the modalities about the future of Taiwan, which will have to be discussed with the new leadership.

Q Mr. Secretary --

PROF. FAIRBANK: We have a half hour.

Is there a last question or two?

Q This is the last, bringing you back to something else, Mr. Secretary -- if you don't mind.

A One more.

Q I'll give a scenario to you. Suppose that you do get your walking papers from the electorate in November. You say you don't know what job you're going to take. But most of us, I think, would concede in all probability you will receive an offer to write your memoirs or write a book on your eight years.

On balance, given equal office space and background, would you rather write that on the banks of the Potomac or the banks of the Charles? (Laughter.)

A Almost certainly not on the banks of the Potomac. (Laughter.) Where else, I don't know, but almost certainly not on the banks of the Potomac.

Q Mr. Secretary,--

A You'll get the last question. Go ahead. You ask a question and let this lady speak.

No -- you go ahead. You ask your question first.

Q O.K. Recently I have read that Mexico was going to Communism, quoting from one declaration of one of the Senators of the United States.

What is your point of view about that? Do you think Mexico is really going to the Communists?

A Absolutely not. I know Mexico a little. I know its leaders very well. I know its incumbent President well. I know the President-elect well.

Of course, Mexico is given to heroic rhetoric, which may not always be literally understood in the United States (laughter) -- but Mexico is not going towards Communism, and I know no leader in Mexico who has any Communist biases, though, of course, the Mexican revolution produces a certain sympathy for Third World causes

and inevitably when a country has as powerful a neighbor as the United States, there are going to be many points of friction. But the fact is we usually solve our points of friction. And we have repeatedly rejected this accusation that has been made by several Congressmen and Senators.

Q Thank you.

A Now this lady has the last question.

Q A few minutes ago you said that public opinion polls are not the ultimate test for a Secretary of State.

A Of a Secretary of State.

Q Yes. If they are not, what is the ultimate test?

A I think the ultimate test of a Secretary of State -- the obligation of a Secretary of State is to give his best judgment to the President as to what is in the national interest. And if he is responsible, he'll understand that the national interest cannot be separated from the world interest. The President then has to make the political decision as to how this judgment can be carried out within the American political context. It's the President who has to make that decision.

I don't think a Secretary of State should take his own public opinion polls as to his own popularity. The Secretary of State ought to be expendable and usually is expended (laughter), but he should not worry about his own popularity primarily. He should advise the President. Then the President has to make the judgment. And eventually he'll be judged by history and whether he's left the world somewhat more peaceful and perhaps more progressive than he found it.

A Thank you very much.

PROF. FAIRBANK: Thank you.

* * * * *