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NEWS RELEASE

OFFICE OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PUBLIC AFFAIRS)

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IMMEDIATE RELEASE

STATEMENT OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DONALD H. RUMSFELD

The House Armed Services Committee yesterday (September 28) killed the President's \$1.6 billion shipbuilding request, virtually eliminating the possibility of action on this urgently needed program this year.

The American people have been poorly served by this damaging and short-sighted action.

Last January in submitting the national defense budget, President Ford requested \$6.3 billion for shipbuilding in FY 77. That request provided for 16 new ships. He included a cautionary statement that an increase might be requested when a review -- then underway in the National Security Council -- of the nation's maritime strategy and naval requirements was complete. In May, with significant results of the study in hand, the President requested an additional \$1.2 billion for five additional ships and long lead funding for a sixth ship. These six ships would have added systems and capabilities clearly needed to maintain freedom of the seas in the decades immediately ahead.

That supplemental request was, in effect, rejected yesterday. Although the Seapower Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee strongly supported the building of the Strike Cruiser, the Aegis destroyer and four additional frigates, the House Committee rejected it on a close, split vote. Under the budget ceiling imposed by the Second Concurrent Resolution, there was room for an expanded shipbuilding program.

The real loss as a result of the dilatory handling of a vital national security budget request will be in America's confidence in the capability of our Navy to maintain freedom of the seas ... freedom upon which the nation's economy and security have always depended, and will continue to depend.

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Further, the Congress has acted unwisely in its failure to pass a variety of cost saving initiatives that would have saved the government hundreds of millions of dollars in 1977 alone and billions of dollars over the next ten years in civilian manpower, reduced training costs, and other operational efficiencies.

Finally, the Congress failed to take action on bills which would have authorized additional sales of excess quantities of stockpile materials, such as industrial diamonds, silver, tin and antimony, which are beyond our national security requirements. The Administration reviewed the national strategic stockpile requirements and determined that it would be in the national interest to sell certain quantities of such excess commodities, without adversely affecting the markets. The receipts, totaling about \$746 million, then would have been available to offset national defense expenditures in the President's FY 77 budget request.

The President's budget for FY 1977 included these economies and others. The need was clear. The failure of the Congress to approve these efficiencies means that roughly \$1.4 billion needed for essential defense programs will not be available.

Had the Congress passed these restraints, the savings could have paid for the major portion of the urgently needed shipbuilding program as proposed by the President.

- E N D -

Remarks by
Secretary of Defense THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN....
Donald H. Rumsfeld
to Illinois Associated Press Broadcasters
Lake Bloomington, Illinois
Saturday, September 11, 1976

This morning in Peoria I spoke with the Chamber of Commerce and I plan to go back to Washington this afternoon. Let me just say three or four, five things real quickly.

First, we're at "peace," And that's important. We tend to forget it.

The second point I would make, again an obvious point, but one worth mentioning, is that we cherish freedom; that freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, freedom of religion and our free political institutions are what we are about. Unfortunately, they're not the norm in the world. They're not universal, indeed we're in the minority, and the percentage of people who subscribe to our convictions with respect to freedom are fewer today than in previous years. The world is not a perfectly warm and friendly place for those who do believe in freedom.

A third point: we've always subscribed to the idea that we should be independent, and believed in self-determination for ourselves and for others. We know that -- while we believe in self-determination, there are others in the world who do not.

A fourth point -- to bring it down more specifically to the Defense establishment -- our Armed Forces today are, in fact, capable of performing their assigned missions. Our forces today are, in fact, capable of performing their assigned missions. That's not unrelated to the fact that we're at peace. Indeed it's very directly connected. Throughout history some nations have allowed themselves to become weak because they were at peace, because there was reasonable stability. They soon found that weakness was in fact provocative, enticing others into adventures they otherwise would have avoided. The fact that our Armed Forces can perform their assigned missions today has contributed and is contributing to the fact that we are at peace.

More importantly -- or at least equally important -- are the trends which have been adverse to the United States for the past ten to fifteen years. Whether you measure level of effort in dollars or rubles; whether you measure percentages of GNP; whether you measure production rates or the numbers of weapons, ships, guns, planes, tanks, etc.; whether you measure the expansion of an institutional capability to produce additional weapons of increasing sophistication -- regardless of which measure you select, reasonable people know that the trends have been adverse to the United States.

If those trends are allowed to continue, the United States will, in fact, move into a position of inferiority. The effect of that however would be to inject a fundamental instability into the world and, in my judgment, jeopardize peace and stability. It would have an effect exactly opposite of what those of us in this country would wish.

The President of the United States made a judgment that such a development was unacceptable and has proposed measures to the Congress of the United States that will act to reverse the trends.

Some people ask me, "How we got where we are? How did it happen that this country, which was in a position of overwhelming military superiority in the post World War II period, could allow itself to slide to a position of approximate rough equivalence today and set itself on a path of the adverse trends?"

The answer is that free people, during time of peace and relative stability, have tended to relax and think, "Well, nothing bad can happen, it's relatively pleasant, we don't have to worry about things." They later found, to their great loss, that that wasn't the case at all.



Also, some people have found it fashionable to say, "I'm for a strong national defense, but . . ." It's right after the "but" that you have to be careful. For example, some will say, "I'm for a strong national defense but we're at peace and there's no great, immediate threat and why should we be concerned?" The implication being that we should ignore history.

Others will say, "I'm for a strong national defense but there's all that waste in the Pentagon." The implication being that because there is some waste in the Pentagon -- and indeed there is -- that we should cut the budget. Through some magic, ^{they say,} there's an inexhaustible mother lode of billions of dollars that are going to enable the American people to have a strong national defense at no additional cost to the taxpayer. This is utter nonsense. There's no free lunch. It happens there is some inefficiency in the Pentagon in part because human beings work there and all humans are fallible. It also happens that there's less inefficiency in the Department of Defense than in other departments of government. If one looks at cost overruns--and they are of terrible concern to me--those in the military establishment are less than the cost overruns on the John Hancock Building, or the Bay Area Transit in San Francisco, or the Washington Metro, or the Federal Housing Administration, or in the private sector, or other government agencies.

Are we ever going to eliminate all waste and inefficiency in the Department of Defense? I'd like to be able to do it. We're working like the dickens to try to do it, but it's not going to happen. The implication that we can do what Congress has done for the last 10 years -- \$48 billion in cuts in the last 10 years; \$3 billion in the last six years; \$7 billion last year alone -- the idea that we can continue going down that path, and through some magic wand we're still going to provide for our national defense, is a disservice to the American people. It's just not so.

Some people say, "I'm for a strong national defense but we can't afford it." That's just plain baloney. We're spending a smaller percentage of our gross national product, a smaller percentage of our labor force, a smaller percentage of our federal budget, a smaller percentage of net public spending than at any time before the Korean War or Pearl Harbor, depending on which statistic you look at. Now, that's a fact. In any case, the simple fact is that this country can clearly afford that which is necessary to provide for peace and stability in the world.

With that I'll stop and I'll be happy to answer questions.

Q: How would you characterize the defense posture of Jimmy Carter?

A: Carefully. This is in view of the President's request that I not get involved in the political campaign. He indicated that he felt

that State and Defense and Justice ought not to be engaged in the partisan part of the campaign.

But to look at the matters, I really don't know what his views are on Defense. I've had the impression that they have varied from month. Earlier this year, he was talking about \$15 billion in cuts from the Defense Budget. More recently he was talking about \$7 to \$8 billion in cuts and most recently \$5 to \$7 billion of cuts from the Defense Budget. I don't know which one he believes, but in any case the net effect is that he would certainly fit in that category of those who continuously want to cut the Defense Budget and who in fact have brought us to the point of these dangerous adverse trends.

As a matter of fact, we can't have it both ways. He says we can go ahead and cut back of defense, whether it's \$5, \$7, \$8, \$15 billion -- take your pick -- and it's not going to hurt us. He believes there's a magic way of doing it without any pain, without any costs. There just isn't. There just plain isn't.

There have been various specific proposals he's suggested. One is a vague rumination about the Defense Department doing things that civilian agencies ought to be doing. The implication being that's where he'd cut the Defense Budget. If you keep the program but just transfer it, the move might make some of his anti-Defense people happy that he's reduced the Defense Budget, but he hasn't changed anything from the standpoint of the taxpayer. He is only continuing a function in a different place.

The other thing I've seen reference to involves saving the taxpayers money by bringing troops home ^{from} overseas. On the one hand he wants to have a good relationship with our allies and on the other hand he wants to bring troops home from overseas. This is kind of a contradiction. But the implication that there is any saving to be realized there is wrong. There isn't any saving. After you bring troops home from overseas, they still cost money here. It's not like you're not going to stop paying them, or housing them, or providing medical care for them.

If he wants to bring them home and put them out of the Service, then he's suggesting we should go below the 2.1 million force level. This is the lowest level of men and women in the Armed Forces since the Korean War. I hope he is not saying that. We should in fact continue the slide from 3.5 million of a few years ago to 2.1 million today and continue cutting more and more people out of the Army, Navy and Air Force. He hasn't proposed that, but only by lowering the total number of troops can you save any money from withdrawing troops from Europe or Asia.



Q: What have been your major accomplishments as Secretary of Defense?

A: I'll have to put on my modesty hat now. I've been Secretary of Defense for ten months. When the history of this first year is written and people look back three or four years from now I would submit that they will point and say, "Interestingly, in our Bicentennial Year the American people convinced their representatives in Washington to provide for the first time in five to ten years real increases in Defense spending." 1976 will prove to be the year that we've turned the corner and stopped sliding down that slope.

The American people are not stupid, they're not going to allow their Congressmen and Senators to continue to allow this country to slide down that slope to a position of inferiority. It's unacceptable to the American people. It ought to be unacceptable to the Congress.

Q: Can you talk about Congressional actions and waste in the Pentagon?

A: WE 've reduced troops over the last ten years from 1968, the Vietnam War high, of 3.5 million down to 2.1 million. Obviously, with that kind of reduction you need to adjust your base structure. The Congress has been inhibiting us from doing this. So there are savings that can be achieved, but in many instances they require legislative action and the Congress has so far resisted them.

A second point on waste. There are always areas that can be improved. We've been doing it. We've been reducing the numbers of generals and admirals, we've been improving the support to combat ratio. We've been improving the teacher-to-student ratio with respect to education.

But, when you look at the last ten years it's basically been the approach Mr. Carter's now taking: "I'm for a strong national defense, but you can save this money over here. You can have a strong national defense, but it's not going to cost anything."

That's really not being straightforward with the American people. The truth of the matter is there's waste in everything; there's waste in the civilian side, in business, in labor, in the press, and your offices just as there is in the Pentagon.

Still, are we going to cut down on waste? Yes. Do I think we can improve it? Yes. Do I think we're going to be able to find some inexhaustible motherlode of billions of dollars that will enable us to have a strong national defense at no cost to the taxpayers? Of course not. And anyone who tells you they can do it is plain not giving it to you straight.

Q: Could you elaborate briefly on the contribution the presence of American troops in South Korea makes on national security? This is something of an issue in the campaign.

A: It's an important question because , as I understand it, Mr. Carter has proposed to cut troops overseas in order to save money. Now, in point of fact, it wouldn't save any money, as I've already explained.

The way you would save money would be to bring them home from overseas and put them out of the military. Now, I've ^{not} detected that he's suggesting that. If he is suggesting that, that means that we should go below the 2.1 million in our armed forces that we have today, which is the lowest level since before the Korean War.

It's interesting to me that if you look at what's happened in recent history, every time there's been a Democratic Administration, the number of troops overseas has gone up, principally because we've been in a war. Every time there's been a Republican Administration, the number of troops overseas has gone down. It's just a fact. From 1960 to 1969, the troops overseas went from 700,000 overseas to 1.2 million. Since 1969 they've been reduced down to 434,000 today.

The number of U.S. troops in Korea has been reduced over a period of years, as you know. The situation there has been stable, for more than two decades. While there has been an absence of war, the situation there is not safe. Obviously there's continuing pressure and threats of aggression from North Korea that are repeated weekly. As recently as two weeks ago, of course, two Americans were killed there.

Our goal is peace and stability. To inject ^{the} stability there by prematurely or abruptly withdrawing troops is not wise. We've been successful in Europe since World War II. As a nation we've been successful in Northeast Asia, since the Korean War, in having peace, in having stability and in effectively deterring aggression.

There are always people who look for ways to get something for nothing. I find in life you tend not to get something for nothing. The free lunch went out in Chicago about 1930, as I recall.



MEMORANDUM

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

Mr. President —

As we discussed

Monday —

D. R.



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

September 9, 1976

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

SUBJECT: Separate Roads to Communism

In light of Euro-Communism now, it is interesting to look back at the statements of Communist leaders in Eastern Europe after World War II. Such statements are filled with protestations about independence from the Soviet Union and the Party's adherence to the principles of democracy, independence, and sovereignty. The parallel with claims from Italian (and even French) Communist leaders today is striking.

Below are examples of such statements made in the late 1940s. I have many more, if you are interested in using such material either in a speech, private talks with NATO PermReps, or whatever.

Bulgaria. "It is not true that the Communists want to have a single party government...This [coalition government] will not be a Soviet power, but there will be...a regime of the people's democratic forces, construction and development of our country, and the guaranteeing of our national independence and our state sovereignty."

-- November 1945, Bulgaria's Communist hero and former Secretary General of the Comintern, Georgi Dimitrov.

Czechoslovakia. "The Communist Party seeks to attain socialism, but we are of the opinion that the Soviet system is not the only road to socialism... I believe that not only are we capable of attaining socialism by a route different from that of the Soviet example, but that we have already embarked in that direction...We seek at present to make certain that our new democratic parliamentary methods, comprising the system called people's democracy, be expressed in constitutional law. If you want the view of the Communists, I can only say that they will be the strictest guardians of the new constitution."

-- January 1947, Chairman of the Czechoslovak Communist Party and Premier of the Czechoslovak Republic, Klement Gottwald.

East Germany. "We take the view that the method of imposing the Soviet system on Germany would be wrong, since this method does not correspond to present day conditions of development in Germany. We take the view rather that the overriding interests of the German people in their present-day situation prescribe a different method for Germany, namely the method of establishing a democratic anti-Fascist regime, a parliamentary democratic republic with full democratic rights and liberties for the people."

-- June 1945, "Inaugural Proclamation" of E. German Communist Party.



Hungary. "The Communist Party does not approve of the idea of a one-party system. Let the other parties operate and organize as well...There are certain Communists who, casting their eyes to the Soviet Union, think that the issue in Hungary is to develop socialism. This is not the standpoint of the Hungarian Communist Party. Our conviction is that, with united force, we have to create an independence, democratic, and people's Hungary."

-- November 1944, later Hungarian Party First Secretary Erno Gero.

Poland. "We completely reject the accusation made against us by the reactionaries that we will impose a one-party system. We do not want a one-party system, and we are not moving toward it." "In Poland there is a division of functions, and state power is based on parliamentary democracy. The dictatorship of the proletariat or of a single party is not essential. Poland can proceed and is proceeding along her own path."

-- December 1945 and January 1946, Party Leader Wladyslaw Gomulka.

Ken

Kenneth L. Adelman
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN . . .

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 29, 1976

Mr. President:

Attached is the transcript of Secretary Rumsfeld's press conference which we discussed this morning.

I have underlined some of the more significant passages and added paper clips by those you may find most interesting.

You will note on pages 8-9 that the press reacted rather sharply to the statement that missile deployment was higher than we expected and that they largely succeeded in getting a retraction of that statement.


Brent

NEWS CONFERENCE
BY
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DONALD RUMSFELD
AT THE PENTAGON
MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 27, 1976

For a number of weeks there have been questions by members of the press asking us to provide an update on Soviet ballistic missile programs and particularly MIRV programs with respect to events that have taken place and I guess since the Defense Report for all practical purposes. I indicated that I'd try to do that. I am available to do that today if that is your desire. Before I do, I might make a couple of other comments.

First with respect to the shipbuilding program, as you know the Bennett Seapower Subcommittee unanimously reported out a major portion of what the President requested, a \$1.1 billion program involving four additional frigates, strike cruiser and the aegis destroyer. Needless to say, President Ford and I and the United States Navy are hopeful that when that issue comes up tomorrow -- and it's scheduled for consideration of the full House Armed Services Committee tomorrow, I am told -- that the Committee will support that because we are convinced that the United States Navy does need modernization and that this is certainly a sensible approach towards modernizing our Navy this year. And it's needed.

The second is the subject of the main battle tank. As you know, there's been testimony over the last month on the subject. I was down in Norfolk the day I was asked to testify, volunteered to testify later in the week, but the hearings were closed and there is a possibility at least there will be some consideration of that during this final week of the Congress. I'd like to just make several points about it. We've been working with the committee; there have been a great many witnesses up there. Our goal obviously is to have a main battle tank promptly, and certainly as the bids come in, anything that will affect in a significant way cost, schedule, capability of the tank certainly would become a very important part of the decision-making process.

There has been a lot of talk about a possible six-month delay. A year's delay, possibly up to two years' delay. And lest there be any doubt, that clearly is not our intention in the Defense Department. Our goal is to get moving with the program and to have a good tank.

The report of the two-man panel of course raised a number of questions. The report indicates, I believe, some misunderstandings as to some of the actions taken, the objective of the actions, the potential effect of the actions. In short, what we've done is this. We've deferred making source selection by up to 120 days. We intend to make the source selection between Chrysler and General Motors and to decide upon the configuration of the XM-1 tank not later than 17 November.

MORE



Design decisions could affect costs, schedule and capability. That could happen anyway, but in any event, we won't know to what extent, if at all, until the information is in and we've had a chance to evaluate it between now and November 17. The approach was designed to obtain proposals from the contractors while in a competitive environment, focusing on the same basic tank and developing configuration options which would not otherwise have been available. Or, if they were to be available, they would have had to have been made available in a non-competitive environment. So the whole purpose of our decision of withholding the source selection was to get the additional configuration options in a competitive environment. As you know, the background was that on July 20, the Secretary of the Army presented to Secretary Clements and the members of the DSARC the Army's recommendations that the contractor be selected then, and as desired, request bids for quotations on a sole source, non-competitive basis for various possible configurations of the tank. In contrast, the recommendation made by Secretary Clements and the members of the DSARC must have the Army continue both contractors for a short period of time, solicit quotations in a competitive environment for the configuration alternatives of interest, quotations which I understand Mr. Clements had anticipated would be available on July 20 but which were not.

In considering the differing views, I concurred with the unanimous recommendations of Mr. Clements and the members of the DSARC. The two-man panel heard testimony on the potential for increases in the costs of the tank program. Unfortunately the line of questioning tended to drive towards a single large cost figure rather than towards an analysis of how costs might change with the various options; and the fact of the matter is, I've indicated earlier is, that we really can't know, if at all, cost of the XM program might change until that information is available.

The only thing I'd say is that we believe that we've taken the step of withholding source selection in the XM program for sound reasons to get competitive rather than sole source bids. Our actions we feel are prudent and consistent and I certainly for one are proud of the progress that we're making on the new tank and feel that any attempt to redirect this effort could be detrimental to our goal of having a main battle tank program soon. That is all I have to say on the tank.

I guess, Jim (James P. Wade, Director of Department of Defense SALT Task Force), do you want to put up that first one there and we can talk about the strategic systems.

Jim (James Wade) and I have prepared a statement here which talks about the ballistic missile program and MIRV programs. We tried to put down some of the things that are taking place and include those which have occurred since the Defense Report.

The first point I make there is that the Soviet Union today is clearly militarily stronger and busier than in any other period of its history. They devote more resources to defense than any other nation in the world.

MORE

The Soviets continue to press ahead with aggressive development programs, for both land-based ballistic missiles (ICBMs and IRBMs) and SLBM systems. The scope of these programs is unprecedented, either in the Soviet Union or in the U.S. While recent developments were not unexpected, they nevertheless reinforce one's concern about the purposes behind their energetic activities.

We continue to expect that the Soviets will eventually deploy close to the 1320 MIRVed missiles permitted under the Vladivostok understanding, assuming a SALT II agreement is reached.

We remain uncertain, however, as to the eventual mix the Soviets will select between MIRVed ICBMs and MIRVed SLBMs.

To the best of our knowledge no MIRVed SLBMs have been deployed to date, but they are expected to begin deployment over the next few years. Soviet efforts continue to be concentrated on the MIRVing of their ICBM force.

The first chart here it simply shows on the left the U.S. land-based ICBMs and on the right the Soviet Union's land-based ICBMs, indicating in the second row, I believe, maximum number of warheads (Let me see what that says, I can't see it from here.) The bottom line shows the number of potential MIRVed warheads. The next to the bottom line shows the model number of that particular missile.

Since I last commented here on this subject, the Soviets have continued to deploy three new ICBMs -- the SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19 -- all of which have been tested with MIRVs.

Testing is thought to be near completion on a fourth ICBM, the smaller SS-X-16, and a companion missile to the 16, the SS-X-20, which is not an ICBM, which I'll get to in a moment.

The SS-X-20 is a two-stage derivative the SS-X-16 which is believed to have been designed to replace aging Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) systems (SS-4 and -5). We have no firm evidence, as I indicated the other day that the SS-X-20 has actually been deployed, nor do we have any firm evidence that the 16 has.

All five of these systems, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, have a post-boost vehicle which usually implies a MIRV capability, and all except the SS-X-16 have been tested with a MIRV payload.

The SS-17 is one of two new missiles designed to replace the older SS-11. It utilizes an advanced, two-stage, liquid-propellant booster and carries a four-reentry vehicle (RV) MIRV payload. The missile first entered the Soviet inventory in mid-1975 and, to date, approximately thirty missiles are operationally deployed in silos.

The SS-19 was also designed to replace the SS-11 and, like the SS-17: It is a two-stage liquid-propellant missile, and carries a six-RV MIRV payload. The SS-19 first entered the Soviet inventory in late 1974, and, at the present time, at least 100 of these missiles are believed to have been operationally deployed.

MORE

During the last year both the SS-17 and SS-19 have also been tested with single RVs.

The SS-18 is a two-stage, liquid propellant missile which is designed to replace the SS-9 heavy ICBM. It has been tested with both single RV and MIRVed payloads since the beginning of the program. Approximately forty SS-18s have been deployed since it first became operational in late 1974. It is believed that these missiles are of the single RV version, which completed flight testing first, and that deployment of the MIRVed version, with eight RVs, will begin in the near future. Over three hundred SS-18s are expected to be deployed when this program is completed,

The SS-X-16 is a three-stage, solid propellant missile which is believed to have been designed as a replacement for the older SS-13 and possibly for use in a new land-mobile ICBM system. To date, it has been tested only with single RV payloads, but the missile does incorporate a post-boost vehicle, suggesting a possible MIRV role in the future. Although no evidence exists at this date that any SS-X-16 missiles have been operationally deployed, they could be deployed at any time, either in silos or on mobile launchers.

The SS-X-20 uses the first two stages of the SS-X-16, has a post-boost vehicle, and has been tested with three MIRVs. This missile is believed to have been designed as a replacement for the SS-4 and SS-5 IRBM systems. To date, it has been observed to have been tested only to IRBM ranges. Although no evidence exists at this date that any SS-X-20 missiles have been operationally deployed, initial deployment on mobile launchers is expected at any time.

As far as the SLBM programs, again the bottom line shows the number of warheads, the next to bottom line the MOD number.

In addition to the land-based ballistic missile programs, two new SLBMs are currently under development as probable follow-on's to the SS-N-6 and SS-N-8 missiles presently deployed. Both are in the flight test stage of a development program which is expected to last at least another year.

The missile we have designated the SS-NX-17 is the first Soviet solid propellant SLBM. Although it utilizes a post-boost vehicle, it has so far been observed with only a single reentry vehicle. The presence of the post-boost vehicle, however, could allow it to carry a MIRV package. This missile is believed to be a follow-on replacement for the SS-N-6 in a modified YANKEE-class nuclear-powered submarine.

The SS-NX-18 is being developed as a follow-on to the 4200 nm range SS-N-8 SLBM and will probably be deployed on a variant of the DELTA-class ballistic missile submarine. The SS-NX-18 is a liquid propellant missile and is the first Soviet SLBM to be MIRVed. We believe that this missile may be capable of carrying as many as three reentry vehicles.

Since the SS-NX-17 and SS-NX-18 are both in the early phases of the flight test program, we do not expect either system to be deployed operationally for several years.

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In short, over the past fifteen years, the Soviets have concentrated primarily on quantitative improvements to their strategic missile forces; They now have more than 1500 ICBMs and more than 800 SLBMs operationally deployed.

Having surpassed the U.S. in both of those two categories -- obviously not with respect to our strategic bomber capability -- the Soviets turned their efforts to qualitative improvements.

The new ICBMs, currently being deployed, have substantially greater throw-weight and are significantly more accurate than their predecessors.

Current trends indicate that, by the early 1980's, all of most of the Soviet's existing ICBMs could be replaced with the new generation of missiles.

The SLBMs, which are still in the test phase, are believed to have substantially improved accuracy, better range capability, and better payload flexibility than existing Soviet SLCMs. It is estimated that all or most of the current generation SLBMs could be replaced by the late 1980's.

In short, the Soviets appear to be on a steady building program which could carry them toward a capability in excess of that needed merely to deter nuclear war.

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Is there one more chart, oh, you've got it up. That's kind of a summary description. (I don't know that those were passed out, were they?

A: Yes.) I guess the only thing that was not passed out is this little gouge that I made myself which is that the 18 is intended to replace the 9; the 17 and 18 to replace 11 in large part; the 16 to replace the 13, and the 20 to replace or augment the 4s and the 5s.

Q: Do you know why they're using so many SS-18s with a single warhead?

A: Well, I think that what the Soviet Union will have to do is what others would have to do as to make judgments when they look at their total capability as it evolves over a period of time, to make judgments as to whether its to their advantage with respect to their targeting and their total capabilities to have a system MIRVed or with a single RV. It seems to me that that's kind of out in the future as to how that will evolve.

Q: Surely the Soviet Union was aware what they were doing when they put a single RV on SS-18s, about 25 to 30 megatons. What would be the purpose of 40 of those missiles?

A: Let me see if this is a response to it. It seems to me that a decision to do that is a decision to develop a capability that will thereby evolve from that and that clearly is a substantial capability to deal with certain types of targets.

Q: What kind of targets would those be?

A: If you use a single RV?

Q: Yes.

A: They'd be targets that you want them to destroy and you needed a good capability to do it.

Q: (Inaudible)

A: To a lesser extent.

Q: How do we know, do we have a technique of knowing without getting inside a missile that it's single as opposed to a MIRV?

A: I guess the correct answer is through national technical means. The United States can make judgments as to whether a system has been tested in a MIRVed as well as a single RV mode.

Q: We're talking about deployment, though, not just testing. Is this a foolproof technique that would hold up under SALT? Have we confirmed whether its our MIRV or a single RV?

A: I don't want to get into the specifics of our national technical means, but the answer is yes, we do have the ability to make those kinds of judgments as to -- pardon me?

VOICE: May I answer that? One point is that the flight test program with the SS 18 with the single RV commenced much earlier than the program with multiple RV's, and therefore we have seen that flight test development program basically be completed, so we expect initial deployment to be with single RV's.

Now, if we say multiple RV's deployment is commencing now, we still in the out years have a difficulty in being able to distinguish one versus the other as far as international means are concerned. And this gives us a concern as far as SALT is concerned.

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Q: We're talking about 40 missiles, how do we know with any certainty that they're just single RV's?

VOICE: Well, as I said before, the developmental program with the single RV's is basically completed, so we expect, as we said, that this initial deployment of the single RV's. Follow on MIRV deployment is now commencing now.

Q: I'm still talking about these 40 missiles. They've also tested them with MIRVed warheads.

VOICE: That's right.

Q: Well is that completed, not completed?

MR. RUMSFELD: I think what Jim is saying is if you take the time sequence, that the single RV testing preceded by a substantial period of time the MIRV testing, and that that is the reason why the conclusion on our part is that the forty that are deployed, are single.

Q: Mr. Secretary, what does this mean in the way of a threat to the United States?

A: Well, from a factual standpoint it means what it says, that these various systems, in the numbers set forth, and the throw weights that are involved, and the numbers of RV's that are involved, and the accuracies that are involved, constitute the Soviet Union's strategic nuclear capability. And that what that means is not a function only of what they have, but it is a function also of what we do and what our behavior is in the United States. The goal, obviously, is to see that the strategic nuclear deterrent is healthy, that the deterrent is in effect, functioning, and so as you see this kind of development program sequentially from really quantitative focus and attention over a period of years, to qualitative attention and focus more recently, it means that the United States has to see that our behavior pattern is such that that strategic nuclear deterrent stays in balance.

And the programs that we have put forward to the Congress -- as I recall the date was in 1974 -- with respect to prospective modernization of our SLBM force, more recently with prospective modernization of our manned bomber force, the proposals for a follow on to the B-52 and prospectively with respect to some modernization of our land-based ICBM force, that it is important for the United States to continuously assess and evaluate that balance, see that the deterrent that we have is healthy and effective.

Q: Mr. Secretary, does it matter that the SS-16 has not been tested with more than a single RV since the SSX20 has? Isn't testing for the SSX20 essentially testing for the SS-16?

A: It is a fact. It does not necessarily have a great deal of meaning. You're right. In other words the fact that the 16 has a post boost vehicle, the fact that the 20 has been tested in the MIRV manner, does suggest that the 16 could be, but it hasn't been.

Q: What I'm trying to lead up to is the possibility that the SSX20 becomes a convertible item that could give you an ICBM capability. I don't know how long it takes to turn one of these things around, but that it's a potential vehicle for cheating or for giving you an instant capability, if you ever get in trouble.

A: Well, obviously one has to look at systems apart from those systems that are specifically described as intercontinental in capability. One has

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to look at other systems and ask that question, is it possible for there to be a utilization in a variety of different ways that would in fact place them in a category of ICBM capability.

At the present time the SSX20 has not been tested to intercontinental ranges. We do categorize it, as I said, as an IRBM. But that's true with a number of things, what you're asking, and I don't know that I could answer it conclusively except to say obviously we're attentive to that.

Q: The 20 is not a potential instant 16 in any kind of crisis situation, or overnight 16?

A: I guess I'm comfortable with my answer. That's something that we have to be attentive to and assure ourselves on. As we proceed with the SALT negotiations that deals with the subjects of intercontinental systems, one does have to look at those systems that are off the edge of that definition, as we're doing with respect to several systems that have been widely debated in the press. Obviously the 20 is another that needs to be addressed.

Q: Mr. Secretary, is there anything different in what you went through today than what you went through in your posture statement in January, and if so where is the difference and what should we do about it?

A: Well, I apologize. I did not go back to my posture statement and analyze the specific events that have occurred since, and I was afraid you'd ask the question. Let me put it this way. What I've presented today is not in any way inconsistent with the posture statement. It is rather a projection of events that the posture statement either said had occurred or would occur, but in no case is anything I've presented today contrary to any of the prognostications that were in the posture statement. The major differences in terms of events that have occurred, as I recall, are in the SLBM area, since the January day. Do you want to cite any specifics that were not anticipated or were not speculated about in the posture statement?

Q: The point is, sir, is that you have voiced concern about the latent projection in the future of these programs, and what we're saying is consistent with what you said in the posture statement.

Q: What are the surprises?

Q: Are there any surprises since January?

VOICE: Not any major surprises. We see a slightly higher deployment rate of these new missile systems than perhaps we expected since January. That pertains to concern -- I believe the Secretary said, we questioned the programmatic direction of what the Soviets are up to.

Q: Our original query, and it's been repeated here several times was, to get the June 30th rundown of the ICBM's and other missiles, the SLBMs, compared with your forecast in January of where we will be in June, or where the Russians would be in June. We don't have that. Essentially we can compare it either in warheads or in individual missiles.

MR. RUMSFELD: Oh, sure you do. You've got the posture statement and we have this written document plus the copies of these --

Q: As of the 30th of

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A: I don;t think anything's changed in the last month, but it's basically as of a month ago or right about now.

Q: Mr. Secretary, are the rates higher than you expected? At this rate it would take them 20 years to reach the level we now have. You're deploying MIRV missiles at the rate of 60 a year.

Q: That's the point I want to get to.

Q: They're two years now, into their deployment and they've only deployed 130 MIRVed missiles. It'd take them 20 years to reach more than 1000. We're talking about the early eighties before they get even.

VOICE: Well, the statement said here (inaudible) the total missile force in the Soviet Union will be turned over.

Q: But you've got 100 SS-19's deployed, it would take you 10 to 11 years to replace all the SS-11's. You've only got 40 SS-18's, apparently they are to replace, you said, about three or 400 of those. It would take you about 10 years. Fifteen months ago the former Defense Secretary Schlesinger said that the Soviets were expected to deploy about 200 to 220 ICBM's a year. And 15 months ago he had almost 100 missiles deployed. I don't see that we've deployed over 100 for instance in the last year.

VOICE: I think the major point here is their MIRV development programs have now been completed and we see the start up of the MIRV deployments. As the statement indicated, we expect by late 1979-1980 time period, that this total new generation missile force can be turned over, as far as the ICBMs are concerned. We see now the SLBM force as far as the follow on to the Yankee Six and the Delta Eight. We expect that that program can be turned around by the mid-1980s. We are now seeing the turn on the Soviet and MIRV deployments.

A: Well, as you go through a development program and complete your testing and start your deployments, you're not going to deploy all of them instantaneously but you obviously are going to be deploying once that work's done at a more rapid rate, obviously than you did did previously.

Q: 130 missiles in two years is not a crash program by any means. When had you expected it, was it higher than you had expected?

A: As I say I didn't say it was higher than I'd expected. Jim did.

VOICE: I thought it was slightly higher than that expected six months ago, but just slightly higher. Again, I think the key point is we're saying 1979, 1980 that we see the Soviet full deployment in these new missiles be in the field. Again, that's three years from now, that's not 10 years.

A: The point I was making in my statement is that the Defense Posture Statement indicated that there had been effort quantitatively over a period of time, and that the focus the Soviets was on qualitative improvement; that they did have a variety, as you saw from the first chart, of new missiles coming along, the 16, 17, 18 and 19, and that as those testing programs were completed they would be modernizing their forces. The fact is they now are modernizing their forces, and it strikes me it would not be a prudent estimate

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to do as one questioner did and multiply the number deployed in the initial time frame by years and speculate that the modernization would not be completed for a decade. As Jim suggests, we anticipate that the modernization. . .

Q: When do you expect that they will equal us in MIRV missiles?

A: Well, if Jim is correct, as I suspect he is, when he indicates that in the early eighties the bulk of this modernization program would be completed, that they would be very likely moving up towards the 1320 in that time frame. I wouldn't want to pick a specific year, but that's assuming the 1320 that was discussed at Vladivostok gets pounded down into an agreement.

Q: Mr. Secretary, you indicate the first 40 SS-18s are single warheads. Does that mean you're ready to change the counting rules under SALT II. count some 18s or 19s as single warheads and some as MIRV's?

A: No, definitely we have no intention of changing that carrying rule has been discussed.

Q: So you would keep the. . . .

A: Count it as a MIRV.

Q: You would count 40 that you believe to be single warheads as MIRVS, if SALT II. . . .

A: At the point where you've fit within that rule and your testing program, yes.

Q: Mr. Secretary, I'd like to ask you to complete a thought that has left us dangling at the end of your formal statement. You say it appears the Soviets are building toward a capability in excess of that needed merely to deter nuclear war. What sort of capability do you think the Soviets are building toward?

A: Well, it seems to me that a reasonable person can look at the effort that the Soviet Union has applied and the product of that effort and conclude that they're clearly striving to not be on the losing side in the event those weapons are used. That, I think, is clear from the numbers and the types and the improvements, as well as their civil defense activities. That is to say, put a slightly different way that they appear, I think, to people who observe this, to be interesting themselves in seeing that -- obviously that they have the deterrent that they need, but also that in the event there is an exchange that they're not on the losing side.

Q: Are you saying they're working for a war-winning capability?

A: Well, you know, you start getting into those code words and all of that. I guess people have to make their own judgments on that. I think I can state, assert what I've asserted here very comfortably, that the pattern of, as I've described, suggests that they're undertaking programs that reflect a concern on their part as to which side would prevail at the end of a conflict, using these weapons.

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Q: Is that different from the U.S. policy in missile forces?

A: I think that our emphasis, if one looks at our numbers and our capabilities and our relative inattention to things like civil defense, it could be more precisely characterized as being determined to see that we have a strong, healthy, strategic nuclear deterrent.

Q: Anything that you see --

A: Just a minute. Jim, do you want to amplify on that at all? It's obviously a question that's an important question and people can have somewhat different ways of saying it. As a person I've always tended to walk away from hot bottom phrases and words and try to describe things in, oh, words that can be heard and read to mean what I want them to mean, rather than adding a whole lot of meanings that people have in their heads from previous debates and discussions on the subject.

Voice: I'd make one comment here. The capacity of the U.S. programs have been aimed at preventing a war from occurring; namely, the maintenance of peace, and thus our purpose has been on preventing a war from occurring, and as far as that part of the deterrent equation, talks about war fighting or war fighting capabilities, we have tended to try to minimize them. We focus our attention on preventing a war from going on. The Soviets in the past, particularly with the capabilities of these new systems, they're emphasizing to a great extent the capability of their missile forces to attack more military targets than perhaps we believe necessary as far as mutual deterrence is concerned.

Our attention on civil defense is certainly consistent to that, and therefore it just brings to our mind the question that generally the Soviets consistent with out objective as far as preventing war is concerned, or do they have something else in mind with these resources. That question is still in mind.

Q: How do you feel about that, Mr. Rumsfeld? Do you have any fears? One of the concerns that you're mentioning, that in the first sentence you say they nevertheless reinforce one's concern about the purposes behind their energetic activities. Could there be an offense purpose behind this?

A: Well, as you know, ever since I've been in this post I've tried to avoid pretending that I could climb in each of the Soviet individuals who could conceivably contribute to decisions in this area and pretend that I could determine intent, let alone intent over a sustained period of time.

What I have to do is look at capabilities. I've tried to describe them, here in an unclassified version, to the extent that's possible, and my concern, and my interest, obviously, is seeing that the United States of America, in the face of these quantitative and qualitative improvements, makes no mistake about what we have to do as a country to see that that deterrent is healthy and strong. It's the interaction of what they're doing and what we're doing that will determine what that strategic nuclear deterrent will in fact be one, two, three, four, five years from now in the period that Dr. Wade is discussing in the early 1980s.

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And it strikes me that our program that is before the Congress is a sensible program and a sound program, and to the extent that there is a proper response to the proposals that the President of the United States has put forward, obviously, any concern I might have as a future problem is lessened.

Q: Mr. Secretary, once this entire Soviet deployment pattern is complete, will these missiles be as good as the existing missiles not employed by the United States, and if not, what do you intend to do to balance the trends?

A: I could answer that, but it wouldn't give a sufficiently balanced response to your question because I think when one talks about the strategic nuclear balance or deterrent they have to look at more than just the missiles. Because our capability includes a very healthy strategic bomber force. Therefore, in evaluating the balance, or the deterrent, we can't simply look at SLBMs, theirs against ours, or ICBM ours against theirs, we have to add in our strategic bomber capability and some other factors, as you of course well know, so that we know what that balance will be.

My concern is to see that the strategic nuclear triad progresses and is modernized at a rate that in fact at the time they have completed modernization of their strategic nuclear capability, that that deterrent is healthy and strong.

So the answer to your question is obviously at that point where they've completed their modernization, assuming we did nothing, and if you exclude our bomber capability, they would, as I indicated, be ahead in ICBMs and SLBMs. But that is not enough of an answer.

Q: Can I follow that? Is a single, say MIRV SX-17 as good as a single Minuteman III in terms of --

A: I see what you're asking.

Q: -- in terms of accuracy and capabilities, that kind of thing?

A: In the first place, I don't believe it's an accurate way to achieve a net assessment to take one missile against one missile, because that isn't the way the potential exchanges is evaluated. But you can look at different missiles and in the earlier chart and you can see how many RV's they have, and we know what their progress is with respect to accuracy relative to ours, and you can come up with answers, missile for missile, but I don't know once you have that answer on a specific missile against another specific missile that you have very much.

Q: Well, are you confident, for example, that the accuracy figures that you are able to determine can give the Soviets confidence that they can in fact attempt to attack military targets?

A: If I were to try to set forth how I would describe their accuracies, I would say, (a) they're behind where we are in accuracy; (b) they obviously are attentive to the importance of accuracy, and the intelligence community, needless to say, interests itself in their progress with respect to accuracy improvement, and that the estimate is that in the late seventies, early eighties, they will be achieving improvements in their accuracies something like the improvements we've been achieving in our accuracies some years past.

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When the intelligence community does this, they obviously come up with high estimates, low estimates and bust estimates. So it's a range.

The kinds of improvements that we've experienced which have worked to our advantage we anticipate from the information we have, they will be experiencing something approximating those in the early 1980s.

Q: They'll be catching up with us in the early 1980s, is that --

A: I wouldn't want to --

Q: -- while we move further ahead.

A: Well, Jim, expand on this if you want to, but the kinds of improvements that we've had are likely to be -- something approximating that we're likely to see the Soviets have. We're not likely to achieve the kind of major improvements we had previously during the coming period, if that's what you're asking. Nor are they likely to achieve them.

Q: They're going to (inaudible)

A: Oh, now wait a minute. Oh my. Oh, my.

Q: Mr. Secretary, as Secretary of Defense -- all right.

A: I'm sorry, but let me really underline and emphasize this because what we're dealing with here is an important subject and communications is not always perfect between human beings. When one looks at this I caution everybody about taking a single statistic or a single trend or a single system. We have to look at accuracy, we have to look at throw-weight, we have to look at the numbers of weapons, we have to look at various other things that together comprise a total strategic nuclear capability. And to extract one, like accuracy, or RVs or throw weight or something else, and suggest that the balance turns on that, isn't accurate. We have to be concerned about significant asymmetries with respect to any of them, obviously. But it's the total capability that one assesses.

Q: Mr. Secretary, as Secretary of Defense, does this tenor or general profile of the Soviet effort, namely as you put it, not to be on the losing side, make sense, or is it just a waste of money? If it makes sense, should we do likewise, like embark on a big, new civil defense program? Or, if it's just a waste of money are we comfortable where we stand and therefore there's nothing to worry about?

A: You mean does it make sense from our standpoint?

Q: Yes, in other words, does it make sense to you for the Soviets to pursue getting on the winning side of the nuclear exchange and therefore if to you it does make sense we have to do even more than we are doing, namely perhaps beef up our nuclear force or our ICBM protection, or is it just a losing game we're on and as far as you're concerned, we're doing fine and they're wasting their money?

A: Well, it's clearly not the latter and let me see if I can refine a little bit of what you suggested with respect to the former. What the Soviets are doing is a fact, it's a reality. That is to say, they've gone from where they were to where they are now and prospectively we anticipate where they're going as we've suggested. We have to deal with that, that is to say, they're going to have "X" numbers of SLBMs, ICBMs, and other strategic nuclear systems.

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We have to look at that, we have to then go through the process of making an assessment as to what that interaction with our capabilities would be. To the extent that asymmetries look like they're occurring in a significant way we have to see that we're developing our force so that that strategic nuclear balance is healthy.

And that means that what we do between now and then is important. Now, you're asking could we just ignore what they're doing, and the answer is clearly no, we can't ignore what they're doing.

Q: What I'm asking, I think, by telescope of this, should we try and build a force to win a nuclear war?

A: It seems to me what we should try to do is to see that the strategic nuclear deterrent stays healthy, and that we achieve the kinds of force modernizations which will be necessary in the period between now and mid-eighties, so that in fact there is an acceptable strategic nuclear balance. That is why the proposals are before the Congress with respect to the SLBM force, and the bomber force; it's why we have been doing various research and development with respect to the ICBM force.

Q: Secretary Reed said we should begin full scale engineering development of a new land base missile in 1978. In light of your remarks today, do you support that, will you recommend that to the President?

A: As I've testified repeatedly, we have to see that each of the elements of our strategic nuclear triad is modernized as we proceed through time, and it's clear that as the Soviet accuracies improve it does affect the survivability of our land based ICBM forces. And that means that we have to, obviously in the period ahead, without getting into what month or what year recommendations will be made, or who will make them to whom, we have to see that that force is modernized. And that's why we've been doing research and development in that connection.

Q: Have you seen anything since your Posture Statement in January in the pace of Soviet development, of the nature of Soviet development, which would impel you to accelerate your various programs which have been before the Congress for some time, as well as the situation in SALT?

A: If I had to characterize it I would say that the Soviet Union's progress with respect to their strategic nuclear capability has been reasonably consistent with what we forecast in January.

Number two, that obviously as we go through the fiscal '78 budget process which we're now doing, we have additional information that was not available when we went through the fiscal '77 budget process. And therefore our proposals for fiscal '78 will reflect what is. There has not been anything that has been sufficiently different from that which was anticipated in the strategic nuclear area that it called for us to go into the Congress with a supplemental mid-year, with the single exception in the strategic nuclear area of the decision with respect to keeping open the Minuteman III line. And that was not so much related to the rate of progress of the Soviet strategic nuclear modernization program, but rather it was connected with

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the fact that the SALT II agreement had not been completed and the Minuteman III line was our only land based ICBM line, and we did not want to allow that capability to erode during a period when SALT was still being negotiated.

In answer to the second part of your question, no, there's been nothing that has taken place with respect to SALT that has been of a overriding nature that has led us to go in with a supplemental either, other than the Minuteman III line which I've described. Yes.

Q: You referred earlier to the gray areas in SALT talks, you alluded to backfire and cruise missiles, you then said that the SS 20 is a problem which needs to be addressed. Does that mean that you figure that the SS 20 now needs to be added as consideration of the SALT II talks?

A: No, no, our intelligence community figures on that, as I just indicated, still indicated that that's not been tested in ICBM mode. It has been tested in IRBM mode.

So it's not something that, given what we know of it at the present time, would fit formally in a SALT negotiation.

If in SALT you're dealing with systems that are agreed to be of an ICBM capability, intercontinental capability, we know that just outside that there are systems that are not of an intercontinental capability. In negotiating those things you negotiate in SALT, one does it without blinders on, that is to say one negotiates those things that have an intercontinental capability with an awareness of those things that do not have an intercontinental capability but are just short of that.

That doesn't mean they become part of the negotiation, but they are obviously are part of your peripheral vision as you proceed. And in some cases those systems can be sufficiently close in capability that you have to be fairly sensitive to them in your peripheral vision.

Because looking at a mix of capabilities, they in fact, such as the SS 20, it in fact exists, and as it's deployed provides certain capabilities.

Q: Well, what's the Pentagon's official position on the backfire bomber, is it strategic or is it - in a grey area?

A: We've not changed our intelligence understanding on that, and our judgment is what it has been. At the present time --

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Q: (Inaudible) 3,000 miles and just this past week one of your leaders here in the building said 5,000 miles.

A: We have not changed our agreed intelligence position that the backfire bomber operated in certain modes does in fact have an intercontinental capability. That's exactly what it's been. That's what I've testified to, that's what everyone's testified to. The Soviets don't agree with that, you understand, okay.

Q: Do you share Dr. Ikle's point of view that in future SALT considerations one should allow for what you call the peripheral vision of these systems, in other words, the total strategic capability of both countries, equal security as a standard be brought into play, or are you satisfied with the present, limited areas that are being pursued? Ikle in his report and in a recent speech indicated that from an accurate point of view, it would be desirable to broaden the scope of SALT to include regional missiles.

A: I guess I haven't read everything Fred said on it, so let me describe what I think, rather than answering whether I agree with some sentence in a speech he made. My view is that those who suggest that you can't do anything until you can do everything are counseling, of course, which means that nothing will get done. Conversely, to suggest that you can proceed doing some things and ignore those things that are just off to the side is obviously foolhardy. And I don't know that there's any disagreement between Fred or me or anyone else in the administration. The fact of the matter is that one has to recognize that there are certain systems that both of us can agree are intercontinental. There may be some that we don't agree, one thinks is and the other doesn't, or vice versa. And there may be some systems that both of us agree are not of an intercontinental range, but that cannot be ignored, at least in the minds of the respective parties as they're negotiating their intercontinental systems. Now, I guess rephrasing your question, do I think the Grey area are important and ought not to be ignored certainly, but I think everyone does. I don't know if any disagreement with respect to that.

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Q: Mr. Secretary, is the Pentagon going to help in any way in preparing the President for the debate that's coming up? Are you going to be doing anything special, what's the plan, are you going to help him bone up for this?

A: I really don't know; we've not been asked to participate in any way. I meet with him several times a week and we talk about defense issues, but that's been going on for years, apart from the fact that there was a debate. So I don't anticipate anything.

We supply the State and NSC and other interested parties with our consultation and contribution with respect to questions and answers for Presidential press conferences, just like State gives us how they're dealing with State issues and we tell them how we're dealing with Defense issues. I've not been asked to do anything particular.

As a member of the Defense Appropriations Committee for so many years, he's so knowledgeable about these issues, and as I've indicated previously with respect to the budget last year, he's so deeply involved in what we're doing that I would question that his preparation would have to be very extensive from the Defense part.

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Q: From the Defense Department's point of view, from the Administration's point of view, what would you want the message to be that night on Defense?

A: Obviously, exactly what I've been saying. Would you like a few comments on the trends? No, you wouldn't.

Q: What do you think the American people should learn from that?

A: I think the important thing, regardless of where the subject of defense is discussed or debated, whether by Presidents, Senators, Congressmen, Governors, Citizens, that the truth is what's important, and the truth is that the United States of America is living in a world that is not perfectly friendly; that we are a nation that for good or ill can't look for someone else to take care of us and do the job for us, we have to do it ourselves.

That weakness historically tends to prove to be provocative and create instabilities and wars and conflicts, and that strength on our part will contribute to peace and stability in the world, and that we can't have it on the cheap and that people who run around saying we can, through some magic wand, have strong national defense and not have it cost very much, just plain aren't giving it to people straight.

Q: Mr. Secretary, for your planning -- can I ask you if you're planning purposes realistically. I know the President has said that if you can get a good SALT deal he will go through whether there's been an election or not. But as you. . .

A: He's felt that way all along.

Q: But looking at the Soviets, given that it's so late in the year, do you think the Soviets have simply decided to wait until after the election?

A: Goodness, the President's answered this question, the Secretary of State's answered it, I don't know that there's anything I can contribute on the subject. I just don't know. The President's position has been that he favors a SALT II Agreement, one that is consistent with our national security interests. He has been working for it, he intends to keep working for it. To what extent the events of the next six weeks affect that, I suppose you're as good a judge as I am.

Q: Do you think there's a good chance of getting a new SALT Agreement before the interim pact expires in October of '77?

A: Well, you know, obviously that's our goal. Our goal is to face the reality that the interim agreement expires October '77 and that we would like to achieve an agreement, a SALT II Agreement, that would be consistent with our national security interests.

When you're dealing with a country such as the Soviet Union that has interests that differ from ours, I think the important thing is to decide what you want to negotiate, try to negotiate it, and don't prejudge whether or not it's possible, because it's really up to them whether or not it's possible. I don't know whether or not it's possible.

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Q: Mr. Secretary, you said you're concerned about Soviets building toward a capability in excess of that needed to deter nuclear war. If you get SALT II Agreement with the limits agreed to at Vladivostok, will that concern disappear, will it be gone?

A: If you've got a SALT II Agreement with the limits agreed to at Vladivostok, you would have just that, you would have a SALT II Agreement at 2400 1320 with freedom of mix and certain other rules. To the extent that within those agreed SALT II arrangements one side proceeded to improve and strengthen and modernize and develop and the other didn't, obviously that would not in and of itself provide a balance. The purpose of SALT is not to solve very problem in the strategic nuclear arms race. There are some elements of the problem that lend themselves to arms control solutions, there are other elements of the equation that require a behavior pattern on our part within that SALT II Agreement, hypothetically, that assures that that balance is there. And obviously, to take one example, our proposals for modernization of the strategic bomber force would continue quite apart from any agreement with respect to SALT II. Were we to do anything else we would be sitting with a situation where the B-52 ages and pretty soon goes out of business. So even though you've got a SALT II Agreement you're going to have to keep the capabilities within these levels that assure an adequate deterrent. One last question.

Q: On land warfare, you said in your letter to the XM panel that the first two years production of the XM-1 would be with the 105 cannon rather than the 120. Would it be with the modified turret that would allow the retrofitting with the 120?

A: The precise configuration, those kinds of decisions would be made after the companies come in and provide the cost data and schedule data and capability data with respect to the various options that are contained within the parameters of those proposals, or requests for proposals. The intention would be to obviously avoid things that would adversely affect either cost, schedule, or capability. With respect to specifically the gun, for example, there is no one I know who has any intention of putting a 120 millimeter gun on any tank until it's been tested and certified. And knowing when that would be is something that would require a ball to speculate through, because we won't know that until it's actually been achieved.

Thank you, very much.

Q: Thank you.

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