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ATOMIC ENERGY  
COMMISSION

INTERVIEW NOTES

DIXY LEE RAY, Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission

1. Relationship between AEC and White House organization has been a distant one.
2. AEC has not been consulted on major domestic and foreign policies that affect AEC in its area of explicit statutory responsibility.
3. An effective mechanism for the development of domestic policy would be to structure the Domestic Council around important issues (i.e., inflation, energy, environment, employment, etc).
4. Top and middle management of OMB have influenced Agency decisions and have substantive program adjustments -- and they should be limited to supporting activities.
5. I am unprepared, at present, to suggest how any organizational change in NSC could take into account the special role of AEC in nuclear matters, but would like to go on record that it is a matter of grave concern to me.

UNITED STATES  
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20545

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

August 19, 1974

Honorable Rogers C. B. Morton  
Secretary of the Interior

Dear Rog:

Many thanks for the opportunity to comment on the issues raised in your letter of August 12. I am deeply grateful -- and impressed -- for this is the first time in the 18 months since I became Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission that my opinion on any issue of governmental policy has been sought.

In my experience, the relationship between AEC and the White House organization has been a somewhat distant one. This may be due, partly, to the 35 miles of geographic separation between the District and our headquarters at Germantown, partly to the highly technical nature of this Agency, and partly to the assignment of very explicit statutory responsibilities under the Atomic Energy Act. Whatever the reasons, AEC has not been consulted (except for staff input into various studies) on major domestic and foreign policies even though decisions made by the Commission and activities regulated by the Commission have widespread and important impact in both arenas. Recent examples of this influence include both foreign and domestic reactions to AEC's contracts for sale of uranium enrichment services, and the cooperative agreements for the exportation of nuclear power reactors to Egypt and Israel. The important role that AEC could and should play in both domestic and foreign policy considerations is illustrated by the partial list of Commission responsibilities that I have attached (1). I mention these facts only to illustrate how essential I believe it is for the Chairman of the AEC to be able to

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communicate directly with those of equivalent responsibility in the White House.

Domestic Council-AEC interaction.

The present system appears from our viewpoint to function mainly to create and perpetuate the following problems:

- 1) a situation whereby direct staff-to-staff communication serves as a means to circumvent top management and keep the bureaucracy in firm control.
- 2) a situation whereby policy decisions are apparently made by persons who have little technical knowledge or training and no responsibility for implementing the policies. Further, since such decisions appear to be made by "staff", no individual is identified and charged with accountability either to the Agency affected by the decisions or to the Congress.

Both of these situations aggravate the problem of "faceless government". Also, the natural tendency of a tenured staff to box in -- (or box out) -- the more temporary, presidentially appointed top management, is much enhanced.

Now, having been candid about what I believe to be some negative aspects of the present system, let me hasten to add that no organization for information flow will be free from problems. Perhaps a more effective mechanism for the development of domestic policy might be to structure the Domestic Council or similar body around a series of important issues, (i.e., inflation, energy, industrial development, environmental concerns, employment, etc.) each with a small standing membership from top management of those departments and agencies with statutory responsibilities in the chosen problem areas. Responsibility for each area could be assigned



as appropriate, with the Council functioning as a forum wherein both diverse viewpoints and collective judgments could be brought to bear on the domestic problems that cross over and transcend departmental boundaries. Such a Council should function to distill and test ideas and to weigh conflicting goals. It should be able to clarify the problems and evaluate the possible consequences of alternative Federal actions that in the normal course of events occur in different departments and agencies. In order to succeed such a Council would require strong leadership; staff functions should be restricted to administrative support.

OMB-AEC interaction.

Whereas domestic policies in important problem areas can benefit from enlightened debate among heads of agencies and departments, I believe that the construction of the Federal Budget is another matter. Quite properly this involves intense competition between agencies, and should be the subject of the toughest kind of bargaining between those responsible for developing the budget (OMB) and those responsible for carrying out the programs that derive from the policies. There is always a danger that the budget will drive the program rather than the reverse, and increasingly this has been the case in relations between OMB and AEC.

In the recent past, the top and middle management of OMB have intensified their efforts to influence agency decisions and to make substantive program judgments.

It seems to me that OMB's role in the development of domestic policy should be specifically limited to supporting activities. It should provide the major, but not exclusive, inputs in areas such as the estimated cost of the policies under consideration, comparative cost data regarding alternative approaches for achieving desired policy objectives, and historical or other directed studies of data pertinent or valuable to the development of fiscal policy. OMB probably should be

assigned a positive role in assuring the effective and economical implementation of domestic policy through its traditional responsibility of recommending to the President the appropriate allocation of resources to achieve the desired results of established policies. . . OMB could also perform an important role by monitoring expenditures and reporting currently on the implementation of the various policies in order to provide a basis for periodically evaluating the effectiveness of budgetary allocations and how well or poorly the objectives of the policies are being achieved with the funds available.

AEC-NSC interaction.

Despite very good staff relationships between AEC and the National Security Council, large problems involving AEC's statutory responsibility for export licenses for special nuclear materials, international and bilateral cooperative agreements, relations with the International Atomic Energy Agency, export or sharing of nuclear technology, cooperative research programs, non-proliferation and diversion of weapons grade materials, etc., remain unaddressed except for the cumbersome route of a NSSM.

In an effort to understand how the NSC system really works in practice, I recently requested and received from my staff the attached explanation (2). For the development of long-term policies and the presentation of options I have no doubt that the Under Secretaries Committee, Senior Review Group, Special Action Groups, etc., function very well, but for quick response to a pressing question there are problems. For example, the Commission must soon decide whether or not to send special instruments and enriched uranium to India for the operation of Tarapur reactors that supply electricity to the city of Bombay. Our decision should be taken in the context of U. S. policy toward India in view of the latter country's recent explosion of a nuclear device.

So far, our guidance on this question has been ambivalent. I am unprepared, at present, to suggest how any organizational change in the NSC could take into account the special role of AEC in nuclear matters, but would like to go on record that it is a matter of grave concern to me. Perhaps a quotation from a recent thought-provoking article on this subject best expresses my feeling:

"A balance whereby the President retains control of the thrust of policy while at the same time effective use of bureaucratic expertise is ensured has never been reached, and many would argue that it has not been approached.

The pitfalls are many, even when a President and his close advisers think they know what they want. An organizational arrangement may be so complex and so bound by procedural requirements that it becomes a paper mill rather than a means of developing and implementing intelligent and consistent policies, . . . . It may lead to over-centralization and excessive burdens on a small number of proximate policymakers while the rest of government is functionally underemployed, as under the Nixon-Kissinger National Security Council (NSC) system."

OBSTACLES TO REFORM IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS:  
THE CASE OF NSAM 341 by William I. Bacchus  
ORBIS, Volume XVIII, Spring 1974, Number 1

I know this response is too long but I hope the thoughts expressed may have some value in your very important task. Thanks again for the privilege of being invited to comment.

Sincerely,



Chairman

## ATTACHMENT (1)

### IMPORTANT AEC FUNCTIONS THAT IMPINGE ON DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICY

#### I. Statutory responsibilities in Domestic area

- . . . license and regulate nuclear power plants
- . . . set rules and standards for all nuclear industry
- . . . produce and sell enriched uranium for commercial use
- . . . control all special nuclear materials  
(together these amount to a multi-billion dollar segment of the domestic economy)
- . . . control, through licensing and regulation of all uses of radioactive materials and instruments in:
  - medicine
  - industry (e.g., non-destructive testing)
  - research (e.g., radioactive tracers, fundamental properties of matter)

#### II. Statutory responsibilities in Foreign area

##### A. National Security

- . . . development of nuclear warheads from concept through design, manufacture, and testing to delivery to DOD
- . . . responsibility for engineered security systems for nuclear weapons

ATTACHMENT (1)  
(Continued)

- 2 -

B. Atoms for Peace

- . . . export licenses for nuclear reactors, components, instruments, enriched uranium
- . . . liaison with IAEA
- . . . international and bilateral agreements
- . . . cooperation in research
- . . . training programs
- . . . export or sharing of nuclear technology and related research results



AUG 14 1974

NOTE TO CHAIRMAN RAY

SUBJECT: ROLE OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

In response to your request, a brief outline of the role and operation of the National Security Council (NSC) follows.

1. The NSC\* is the policy organization for the review, coordination and control of national security activities and foreign affairs and for the presentation of policy issues in these fields to the President for decision. Its role is to obtain a full presentation of the views of all governmental agencies concerned with a particular issue, to provide a clear statement of the issues, to present realistic options for dealing with them, to set forth the implications of each option for long-term objectives, and to ensure that a decision is implemented after it is made.
2. Policy issues are presented to the President either at a National Security Council meeting or by memorandum. The great majority of policy issues come through the Senior Review Group (Dr. Kissinger; Deputy Secretaries of State, Defense and Treasury; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Director of CIA and others as appropriate). This Group reviews studies which are prepared by various interdepartmental groups (depending upon the subject), chaired by Assistant Secretaries of State. The governmental agencies which have an interest in the issue participate in the preparation of the study and, as indicated above, are included in the Senior Review Group when it reviews the study.
3. The subjects for such studies are usually identified by the NSC staff or by one of the departments or agencies which sees a need to obtain a coordinated U.S. government policy. The AEC itself has on occasion suggested to the NSC the desirability of a study, e.g., on the supply of highly enriched uranium requested by Chairman Schlesinger. A request for a study is communicated to the interested

\* Statutory membership is President, Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness. Others attend meetings by invitation.

agencies by memorandum from the NSC and the study is given a National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) number. Work on a study is coordinated by the Department of State, but the most knowledgeable agency will frequently take the lead in preparing a draft, as the AEC has done many times.

4. Apart from the Senior Review Group, issues are also prepared for consideration by the Defense Program Review Committee (defense budget decisions and their relationship to domestic and foreign priorities) and by the Verification Panel (arms control issues and negotiations such as SALT and MBFR).
5. When a Presidential policy decision is made at a NSC meeting or on the basis of a memorandum, it is communicated to the interested agencies by a memorandum known as a National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM). The Under Secretaries Committee (chaired by the Deputy Secretary of State and including representatives at the Deputy Secretary level from Defense, CIA, Joint Chiefs and other agencies as appropriate, as well as Dr. Kissinger) is the basic instrument for ensuring effective and uniform execution of foreign policy decisions and under its guidance, memoranda are prepared setting forth detailed options, programs and recommendations to implement policy decisions.
6. A further organization, the Washington Special Actions Group, has responsibility for coordination in crisis situations. It is not a decision making body but rather ensures action by responsible agencies and anticipates future crises, reviews contingency plans prepared by interdepartmental groups and develops options for NSC consideration.
7. As the foregoing indicates, there is heavy reliance upon the Secretary of State for Presidential policy decisions under the NSC system, but the system is designed to draw upon the entire Executive Branch in securing the views of all agencies concerned with national security and foreign policy.



A.S. Friedman, Director  
Division of International  
Programs

## INTERVIEW NOTES

### RUSSELL TRAIN, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency

1. There should be open and direct communication on a regular basis between the President and Agency Heads.
2. There should be full, advance consultation on as bipartisan basis as possible, in the development of Presidential policy.
3. Agency Heads should be given maximum freedom in decision-making consonant with over all Presidential policy.



UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20460

August 13, 1974

THE ADMINISTRATOR

Dear Rog:

I have decided to set out some of my own thoughts on how to strengthen and make more effective the relationship of the President to agencies and to the Congress. I will not try to cover all aspects of the matter but simply to set out a few ideas from the perspective of my own experience over the past 25 years.

To summarize --

- (1) There should be open and direct communication on a regular basis between the President and agency heads.
- (2) There should be full, advance consultation with Congress, on as bipartisan a basis as possible, in the development of Presidential policy.
- (3) Agency heads should be given maximum freedom in decision-making consonant with overall Presidential policy. Neither OMB nor White House staff should become a barrier between the President and agency heads. In particular, OMB should avoid making policy decisions with major political implications. The key decisions must be made by the President.

These objectives cannot be assured by creating new institutions or changing old ones, although some new procedures could be helpful. Rather they must evolve as the result of the way the President in fact operates.

The need for direct communication on a reasonably regular basis between the President and agency heads is plain. It is the best and only way to assure clear policy direction from the top down within the Administration. It will help build teamwork, policy commitment at all levels, Administration credibility, and agency morale.

Discussions between the President and agency heads should have a clear policy focus. At the same time, agendas should not be too rigidly focused. The President should use his agency heads as antennae to extend his own awareness of public attitudes and issues. They should constitute an invaluable resource for him in this regard. If any do not, he should replace them.

Involving the Congress in policy development -- particularly legislative policy -- is equally important and probably more difficult. There are built-in constraints involving the separation of powers and the realities of the political system. At the same time, it is important that procedures be developed and utilized that do not constitute mere window-dressing and PR. There should be real and effective consultation prior to the formulation of an Administration position. Failure to do this has led again and again, in my own experience, to legislative ineffectualness on the part of the executive branch. For example, in the development of the water pollution legislation which ultimately became the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, the Administration's position was so narrow and rigid that it played no effective role in the legislative process, other than as sideline critic. As a result, we had no position from which to negotiate and were essentially ignored. The same situation is now developing in other areas.


I strongly recommend that the President officially and publicly direct his agency heads to meet bipartisanly with key committee leaders to get their views on key issues and to report these views back directly and personally to him. This is a process that could and should be institutionalized as a regular, on-going practice.

Major legislative and budgetary decisions should be made by the President and should, to the extent practical, involve direct communication between him and the affected agency head. I recommend that the prior practice of final appeal on budget decisions to the President by his agency heads be restored. The last such appeal process involving the President was in 1969 (to my knowledge). Recently, final appeals have not even gone to the Director of OMB but have been heard at the Deputy Director level. This practice downgrades the agency, eliminates an invaluable opportunity for the President to get a feel for the real guts of an agency's programs, and leads inevitably to the making of decisions with major political implications without the effective involvement of responsive political officials.

Obviously, while every agency head would like to elevate every decision to the President, I recognize that the President must not be overwhelmed with detail. At the same time, it is critically important that neither White House nor OMB staff become an iron barrier between the President and agency heads (or the Congress). I doubt that there is any way to guarantee this by formal procedures. The key has to be the determination and insistent effort of the President to involve himself in decision-making to the greatest extent practical. (By the way, please understand that my references to OMB are meant in the context of my own very high regard for the professionalism of OMB.)

I wish to raise one final point which inevitably has an element of self-interest. I recommend that major independent agency heads with responsibilities that cut widely across government functions attend Cabinet meetings as a matter of course. In this category, I would place EPA and FEA. In my own case, environmental concerns tend to have central relevance to energy, economic, agricultural, transportation, housing, public land, etc., issues. Yet I normally hear second or third hand of Cabinet discussion of environmental matters. By the same token, it is important that I, as head of EPA, have direct exposure to the development of economic and other policies without having to rely on the press or other indirect sources. Such a regular exposure provides an agency head with an opportunity to achieve a broader perspective in his decision-making and to strengthen his ability to articulate a well-balanced Administration position. I am confident that FEA would have a similar interest.

The above are some brief thoughts which I hope you and your associates will find helpful. In addition to the members of the President's transition committee, I am passing a copy of this letter on to Bryce Harlow and John Sawhill. If I can expand on or add to these preliminary ideas, please let me know.

Sincerely,  
  
Russell E. Train

Honorable Rogers C. B. Morton  
Secretary of the Interior  
Washington, D. C. 20240

cc: Honorable Donald Rumsfeld  
Honorable John O. Marsh, Jr.  
Honorable William Scranton

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION  
AGENCY

FEDERAL ENERGY  
ADMINISTRATION

## INTERVIEW NOTES

### JOHN C. SAWHILL--FEDERAL ENERGY ADMINISTRATION

1. Inflation and energy are two major problems facing the Administration.
2. Communication flow and policy direction should be clean and clear for economic and energy policy and other areas of government concerned.
3. Most important problems should be dealt with on a priority basis rather than divide the President's attention among all organizations of government.
4. Domestic Council and OMB attempt to reduce the President's span of control to a management level--both try to do same job--develop and interpret domestic policy matters going to and from the President.
5. In the case of energy, layering is complicated by Domestic Council, OMB and Committee on Energy and its Deputies Group. This inhibits communication.
6. A major emphasis in the Executive Branch should be on responsiveness to the President's policy directions.
7. Suggest fairly frequent one-to-one meetings between the President and Agency Heads.
8. One Cabinet member might be named to take the lead in each particular area and be primary spokesman. An alternative would be several Counsellors to the President in different areas. Important that President continue to deal with other agencies involved.
9. Would be easier to deal cooperatively with Congress since a leading spokesman on a particular subject would be identified. Agency Heads meet more frequently on a bipartisan basis with key committee members.
10. Recommend abolition of the Domestic Council and reducing the size of OMB and restricting its functions to the traditional legislative clearance and budget functions. Move OMB Director's office back to EOB.
11. Heads of major independent agencies (FEA, EPA) attend Cabinet meetings.

FEDERAL ENERGY ADMINISTRATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20461

August 22, 1974

OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR

Honorable Rogers C. B. Morton  
Secretary of the Interior  
Washington, D. C. 20242

Dear Rog:

In response to your request of August 12 on White House Organization, I offer the following thoughts for consideration by the Transition Team:

1. At present the two major problems facing the Administration are inflation and energy. Both impact upon each other and upon every phase of American life. The President must know about both of these problems, and there should be clear and simple lines of communication to facilitate information flow to him and his policy direction to the Executive Branch;
2. With time these two problems may become less troublesome while others may become relatively more so. Therefore, communication flow and policy direction should be clean and clear not only for economic and energy policy, but also for other areas of government concerned;
3. A potential difficulty could be with span of control. Therefore, some mechanism should be set up so that the most important problems can be dealt with on a priority basis rather than trying to divide the President's attention among all of the Cabinet members or all the organizations of government;
4. Your questions regarding the Domestic Council and the Office of Management and Budget point out some real and potential problems of communication. In a way both of these organizations attempt to reduce the President's span of control to a manageable level; however, in some ways both organizations try to do the same job--to develop and interpret domestic policy matters going to and from the President. The result may be excessive layering

changing channels on some issues, or in certain cases, a united front on one or the other side of a particular issue so that the policy is made and directed neither by the President nor by the Cabinet members or Heads of Agencies, but rather within the staffs of the Domestic Council or OMB;

5. In the case of energy, in addition to the Domestic Council and OMB, layering is further complicated by the existence of the Committee on Energy and its Deputies Group. This multiplicity of committees, councils and clearing agents serves more to inhibit communication than to expedite policy decisions and implementation;
6. A major emphasis in the Executive Branch should be on responsiveness to the President's policy directions. Excessive layering prevents such responsiveness as the separate bureaucracies build, each eager to respond for its own ends. Those ends, if they are those of the President and the Nation, need not be filtered. On the other hand, if those ends are not responsive to the President and the Nation, they can be counterproductive;
7. Since it is the President's publicly expressed policy to consult and cooperate with the Congress, much of the old structure and process will probably have to be changed.

With these thoughts in mind, I would suggest that there should be fairly frequent meetings between the President and Agency Heads. Such one-to-one meetings would, of course, reflect the policy priorities of the time, and not simply be regular meetings for their own sake. In addition, since many problems cut across agencies rather than fall within the full purview of a particular agency, it does seem that one Cabinet member might be named to take the lead in each particular area. For example, in the case of economic policy, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director of OMB, or the Secretary of Commerce might all justifiably receive consideration as the primary spokesman. In energy policy, the Secretary of Interior or

the Administrator of FEA or perhaps the Administrator of the new ERDA, might logically receive the designation. An alternative would be several Counsellors to the President in different areas (e.g., economics, energy and natural resources, etc.) -- each with very small staffs. Even with a lead spokesman or a Counsellor designated, however, it would be important that the President continue to deal with those other agencies involved so that Presidential decisions and policy direction would be based upon effective teamwork within the Executive Branch and the Administration as a whole.

Carrying this openness and teamwork approach further, it would be easier to deal effectively and cooperatively with the Congress since the leading spokesman on a particular subject would be identified, yet would not be the only person who could communicate on the President's programs with the Congress. If Agency Heads met more frequently on a bipartisan basis with key committee membership to get Congressional views on issues, this partnership concept would be greatly strengthened, and the fact that the same people who spoke to the Congressmen spoke directly to the President would facilitate progress.

To make such a process work, the Counsellor or lead agency spokesman for a priority problem would have to work virtually fulltime at the process. It would require close and frequent briefings, discussions and legislative negotiations with Congressional and Administration leaders.

I believe that any consideration of the roles of the Domestic Council and OMB should be done in light of this new process, and that these roles should be less policy-oriented. I would recommend abolition of the Domestic Council and reducing the size of OMB and restricting its functions to the traditional legislative clearance and budget functions. At the same time, the OMB should be depoliticized and the Director's office should be moved back to the EOB symbolizing that his first responsibility is to manage the agency rather than to serve as an "Assistant to the President."

As one further point, I agree with Russ Train's recommendation and rationale that the heads of major independent agencies (like FEA and EPA), whose responsibilities are large within the Government and the Nation, should attend Cabinet meetings.

I would be glad to discuss these ideas with you at greater length, and will, of course, provide further written elaboration later if you should so desire.

Sincerely,



John C. Sawhill  
Administrator

## INTERVIEW NOTES

### ARTHUR SAMPSON, Administrator, General Services Administration

1. Present decision making is confused and overburdened by too many layers of input and OMB has the greatest clout because of the budget.
2. OMB reorganization is the key -- the management part should be separated from the budget process.
3. Major decisions are made at relatively low levels in OMB and the Departments and there is a need for high-level discussions early in the budget cycle.
4. Recommend
  - a. Abolish the Domestic Council.
  - b. Reorganize OMB.
  - c. Utilize the budget process as the vehicle for the President to make domestic policy.
  - d. President's staff must be kept small to prevent second guessing OMB and/or Department Head.
  - e. OMB should participate with Department and Agency Heads in budget hearings before Congress.



UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20405

ADMINISTRATOR

CONFIDENTIAL

August 19, 1974

Honorable Rogers C. B. Morton  
Secretary  
Department of Interior  
Washington, D. C. 20240

Dear Rog:

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on GSA's relationship with the White House including OMB and the Domestic Council.

I have served as Administrator of GSA for two years. I have been with GSA for over five years. During that period GSA has had very limited input to the White House; particularly in the area of domestic policy. This is not unusual considering GSA's missions and programs.

The areas where we have had contact include:

1. Energy Conservation/Operation Independence
2. Federal Property Council
3. Accelerated Stockpile Disposal
4. Hurricane Agnes
5. Truckers Strike (1974)
6. Bicentennial
7. Construction Industry Stabilization Council

Despite the fact that our contact has been minimal, I do have some thoughts on the questions you included with your letter. I have observed how domestic policy has been formulated and I have, from time to time, discussed this matter with many of my associates.

Moreover, I have had experience in this area. I was the "Roy Ash" of Pennsylvania for three years. I served as Budget Secretary and Secretary of Administration under Governor Raymond P. Shafer. (I also served four years under Governor Scranton in a different capacity.)

In my opinion, the present decision-making process is confused and overburdened by too many layers of input. On any one issue today the President receives input from at least four primary sources:

1. His immediate staff.
2. The Domestic Council.
3. The Department or Agency.
4. OMB

All four sources vary in "clout" at any one time. All give their input in a different manner and at varying times. Ultimately, OMB has the greatest clout because "there must be a budget."

My recommendations are as follows:

1. Abolish the Domestic Council
2. Reorganize OMB
3. Utilize the budget process as the vehicle for the President to make domestic policy (this will cover 95% of the issues).
4. The President's immediate staff must be kept very small to prevent them from developing the capability to "second guess" OMB and/or the Department Head.

The reorganization of OMB is the key to success under the system I propose. First, the "management" part of OMB needs to be separated from the budget process. Second, the budget part needs to be organized into four activities; planning, programming, budgeting, and evaluation of programs. Third, competence and knowledge of personnel must be upgraded (many experts presently in the Domestic Council could be integrated into OMB). Lastly, OMB must change its method of operation -- too often it seems that major decisions are made at relatively low levels in OMB and the Departments and Agencies. There is a definite need for high-level discussions early in the budget cycle.

Another change in method I recommend is for OMB to be more active and open with Congress. For example, OMB should participate with us in budget hearings before Congress. They should work with our staffs as we work with Congressional staffs.

Under the plan I recommend the system for establishing domestic policy is as follows:

- I. A "planning" session will be held with the President, OMB, and the Department and Agencies involved.
- II. From the planning session will come Presidential guidelines.
- III. Programs and budgets are then developed.
- IV. Non-budget issues and issues arising outside of the budget cycle will be "staffed out" thru OMB.

I have kept this short and simple purposely assuming you will request details if you need them.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'A. Sampson', with a long horizontal line extending to the right.

Arthur F. Sampson  
Administrator



UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20405

DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR

AUG 1 2 1974

Honorable Rogers C. B. Morton  
Secretary of the Interior  
Washington, D.C. 20240

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Related to our brief Saturday exchange at the Hoover Centennial, I am forwarding a few thoughts with respect to the machinery of Government which I believe merit the attention of your transition team and President Ford.

Many of the reforms in this area undertaken during the past five years were sound, long overdue, and are efforts in which we should take pride. Some of them should be strengthened, rather than falling to neglect in the aftermath of Watergate. The report of the National Academy of Public Administration to the Ervin Committee, for example, specifically praised:

- . Formation of standard regions with common headquarters for many domestic agencies.
- . Establishment of regional councils.
- . Decentralization.
- . General revenue sharing.
- . Grant consolidation and simplification.
- . Formation of the Domestic Council
- . Effort to consolidate activities through departmental reorganization.
- . Formation of a Federal executive service.
- . Management by objectives.

At the same time, it is clear that corrective actions should be taken quickly in other areas. It is my view, however, that these corrective actions can and should strengthen, rather than weaken, the Presidency. These comments are also based upon the premise that if in fact there is now a Congressional-Executive imbalance, the Congress should concentrate on increasing its own effectiveness, just as it is now attempting to do through budget reform, rather than Congressional action which seeks equalization by weakening the Presidency.

Modern society has dynamic characteristics, with social and economic needs which often require action to be set in motion quickly. The nuclear era clearly requires a continued capacity to act very rapidly in the international arena. The need for greater sensitivity to the necessity of adequate Congressional consultation in no way lessens the importance of a quick reaction capability. If the Chief Executive becomes too weakened by steps taken to prevent another Watergate, the consequences could be catastrophic for the nation in time of future crises.

The following corrective steps will not weaken the Presidency. Some are underway.

1. Rebuilding Departmental Capability and Accountability. The usurpation of departmental powers by the White House staff and the Executive Office of the President has been eased in recent months, but the policy of strong departmental responsibility and management should be more clearly articulated and carried forward.

- . No staff order should be issued to departments from staff of the Executive Office of the President except those given in the name of the President and based on the President's expressed wishes.
- . Departmental shortcomings should be met by requiring departmental corrective action rather than the White House or OMB staff sharing or usurping the activity.
- . Consolidation of related functions through departmental reorganization should lessen the problem of fragmented operational activities floating up to the Executive Office of the President, although it may now be very difficult to generate congressional interest for another try for reorganization, especially with Holifield no longer in the House.
- . Congress is already limiting the size of the White House staff, a condition which should be maintained by the President.

2. Domestic Council. The establishment of a Domestic Council (DC) to somewhat parallel in domestic affairs the National Security Council activities in international affairs was sound, but the Academy and others believe that the Domestic Council generally has not operated as intended. I agree.

The Council was designed to replace the haphazard and uncoordinated means by which domestic policy has been formulated in the past. Within the framework of the Presidentially approved Ash Council recommendations, I made important commitments on behalf of this Administration before a skeptical Chet Holifield which have been violated. I feel a strong personal responsibility--and I believe there is an important Administration responsibility--to make good on what we promised Congress. More specifically:

- . The broad DC leadership should come from the President, not from the White House or DC staff.
- . Within this broad Presidential policy framework, the departmental and agency heads should steer the DC work. This should be handled as originally intended through Council members whose agencies have a role in the subject matter. These DC subgroups should be chaired by the head of the agency most heavily involved. DC staff should serve as secretariat, maintain an institutional memory, arrange for operational analyses, and coordinate the work of the various DC efforts to minimize major gaps and overlaps. The OMB has an important role of providing managerial and budget analysis in the deliberations of both the DC and NSC.
- . The DC operations should avoid any reemergence of the short-lived counselor concept in which one department head was subordinated to another in a manner fundamentally different from the DC committee concept in which no department head loses his access to the President or is placed in a subordinate role.
- . Clearer accountability to the Congress and to the public is needed.

3. Campaign Activities of Staff. Clearly the White House staff became too heavily enmeshed in the operational aspects of the 1972 campaign, in contrast to their more appropriate role of advising the President with respect to national policies and issues related to the campaign. The 1972 approach resulted in triple damage:

- . Contributing to the unprecedented concentration of power in certain of the White House staff.
- . Weakening of the Republican Party.
- . The undercutting of Congressional and gubernatorial candidates.

In preparing for the elections of 1976, clear instructions should be issued to the White House staff to prevent recurrence of the three problems noted which arose during the 1972 campaign.

4. Departmental Appointments. The White House should not impose appointments on departmental heads, or hold up departmental appointments as leverage for the removal of individuals in whom the department head has full confidence. Although White House consultation and advice has a legitimate role, which is particularly obvious with respect to those who are appointed by the President, the voice of the department head is also very important since he should be held accountable for the performance of his department.

I would also suggest a wariness with respect to political appointees who are too heavily indebted to sponsors outside the Government. The loyalty of these appointees to their sponsor is too often greater than their loyalty to the department head or the President. This causes problems both in how they perform and in the ability to replace them should that become necessary.

5. Briefing of New Appointees. One of the tragedies of Watergate is the ruined careers of bright young men suddenly placed in key positions with no background in, or understanding of, Government. Those from the private sector who were brought directly into key policy positions in the Executive Office of the President or in departments must be provided with some exposure to the nature of Government and the responsibilities to citizens of this nation we assume upon entering public service.

Enclosed is a letter on the subject which I forwarded to the Academy last January concerning briefings and discussions which would stress a partnership relationship between the executive and legislative branches, the significance of public accountability, the emphasis on responsiveness to the needs of the public, and the significance of the career service. A copy of a similar letter to Bob Hampton is also enclosed.

Although the suggestion was adopted by the Academy, most members have little hope of this step taking place until after the 1976 election. It would be my hope, however, that such a course might be initiated by President Ford.

6. Regional Office Management. I would urge that the heads of regional offices be selected with professional competence and demonstrated executive leadership as the primary criteria. Clearly, they must also be in sympathy with the philosophy of both the President and the department head. But in a given state or community, nothing reflects so quickly upon a President as either the lack of performance by a field unit or the susceptibility to corrupt or questionable practices on the part of the top field offices in that area.

Good management is also good politics nine times out of ten. Conversely, poor management results eventually in a negative political impact, especially out in the field where the evidence of poor program management is particularly apparent to the voters.

I would also make the suggestion that there are far better ways in which to help political allies than by straining or breaking the integrity of the contract award process. Too often this is not well understood.

Further, the awarding or denial of grants on the basis of "friends or enemies" also degrades the public respect for Government and literally results in mass discrimination against the people of a particular state or community which lost out because of favoritism. In many instances the criteria for selection are so subjective that the fairness of a grant award is subject to honest disagreement. But there needs to be stressed the philosophy of fairness in the award process to the extent humanly possible.

Further movement toward grant simplification and consolidation will help lessen the susceptibility of grants to manipulation.

7. Congressional--Executive Cooperation. Perhaps the most obvious step needed--and one of the most urgent-- is an approach to Congress in which the Congress is regarded as an equal partner rather than an enemy or simply an unfortunate impediment to executive action. Since the President is totally committed to this change, and since he and you and others of his advisors are far more expert in this important undertaking than I, this matter will not be developed further except for two points:

- . Merely stating President Ford's policy is one of cooperation is not enough. The departments at all levels have to understand its importance, and many need to be shown how to better work with Congress. Lack of early consultation, failure to keep committees and Congressmen informed, misleading information, and personal invective, are several of the problems that have become deeply ingrained habits in some quarters.
- . We need to give more thought to the legislative intent of Congress, rather than searching for technical loopholes through which to end run laws we do not support, in virtual defiance of the constitutional process. Defiance of Congressional action invites imposition of legislative restrictions on the Executive Branch.

8. Career Service. Another important type of partnership not well understood by the White House during the past 5-1/2 years is that involving the political leadership and the career service.

Most of the career service will respond with enthusiasm to President Ford's leadership if several things occur:


- . Departmental and agency political leadership, together with Schedule C assistants, need to treat careerists with respect and to recognize the importance of maintaining the integrity of the career service.
- . The political leadership must do more to help the careerists better understand the rationale behind policy decisions and actions, and what is expected of them.
- . Careerists (and also political appointees) must be able to present their frank views concerning a proposed action, including their reservations or opposition, without their comments being interpreted as disloyalty to the President.
- . On the other hand, the career service needs to understand that, once their views have been considered and a legal course of action is determined, they have a responsibility to devote their best efforts to prompt execution.

9. Interagency Mechanisms. Most interagency mechanisms, except some highly technical interagency committees, do not work well. Yet so many of our Governmental activities interrelate that some interagency machinery is necessary:

- . The Domestic Council and National Security Council have already been mentioned.
- . In first proposing the Under Secretary's Group, I had in mind their focusing on how best to implement those Presidential and Congressional programs which involve a number of departments and agencies. Regional council oversight was intended as simply a first phase. Unfortunately, until very recently, the Under Secretary's Group has not gone much beyond this very limited scope. The recent Camp David session was very good, but seems to having limited followup. This mechanism needs to have far broader sights. As the Domestic Council has the potential for providing important coordination in policy development, the Under Secretary's Group should play an important role in coordinating program execution.
- . Noncabinet agency heads tend to occupy a no man's land, not fitting into either the Under Secretary's Group or the Cabinet. Perhaps a properly constituted Domestic Council will assist in their having more direct exposure to Presidential perspectives and policies, although additional steps probably need to be considered.
- . We have retrogressed in utilization of the assistant secretaries for administration as a means of relaying Presidential attitudes to over two million Federal employees, a formidable task. Since the assistant secretaries for administration in their daily work come into far greater contact with large numbers of career employees than do others in the front office of a department, they have the capacity to play a special role in conveying Presidential thinking to the many thousands of lower level men and women upon whom any administration must depend to carry out its goals and objectives. This role needs to be rediscovered, and the rate of turnover reduced.

The above items represent candidates for consideration in improving the machinery of Government in several key areas. Clearly, the list could be expanded considerably.

Sincerely,

  
Dwight A. Ink

Enclosures

GENERAL SERVICES  
ADMINISTRATION



## INTERVIEW NOTES

ROY ASH, Director, Office of Management and Budget

1. President should work directly with Cabinet officers whenever possible.
2. There should be a deliberate redundancy built in to the organization so there is no sole source of information.
3. The overlap should exist in the following manner in three substantive areas:
  - a. International
  - b. Economic
  - c. Social (Domestic)

Then there are three cross cuts that are processive:

- a. Servicing of the President -- i.e. PR, General Counsel, etc.
- b. Legislation -- Relationship with Congress
- c. Operations -- Machinery of Government

The above six individuals would all work together--each with his General area of responsibility and in this manner the President receives the benefit of interaction.

4. The Social (Domestic) Area should be doctrinal on a high order--conceptualized in a manner such as Rockefeller's "Critical Choices".
5. Timmons office needs strengthening and OMB's legislative response has been poor.
6. There has not been a close relationship between the White House and the Departments in legislative action.
7. It is essential to have a good PR individual serving the President.
8. The three elements should be brought together under one Head.
  - a. CLAWSON OPERATION was affirmative PR events.
  - b. ZIEGLER--Press responsiveness
  - c. BAROODY--Affirmative Action with Groups

9. ECONOMIC

COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS

- a. Should be sterile politically.
- b. Deal with fact figures and forecasting.
- c. Must be intergrated.
- d. Deal with issues such as coal, steel policy, but not into controls.
- e. Not operational.

COUNCIL ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY --International policy serves where international and domestic economics cross.

TREASURY -- Pure economics--taxes and managing the debt.

10. Presidents staff secretariat is the most important function. It is the system by which he gets involved in everything. Keeps everyone closely tied.
11. Haig gets more into substance than Haldeman. Haldeman was more like a switchboard.
12. President should devote one hour per month with each Cabinet member and once every six months with key Department people on Presidential Objectives-- in this manner he would be managing 2 million people.
13. Don't put a lot of people between the President and the Departments.
14. President does not have room for any new initiatives (not to spend money).

What are the options?

- a. Hold down outlays without legislation--i.e. 40 thousand layoff
- b. Controllable Programs--5 percent of Federal Budget Controllable, i.e., school lunch program etc.
- c. Cut back social security.

Legislate all by proportionate amounts. All of this would not effect inflation rate. (1/20th of 1%)

Above could be good because:

- a. Psychology
- b. Everything saved in 1975--is a lower base for 1976, 1978, and 1980.
- c. 1 percent change in direction, 100 miles down the road would have a significant effect.

15. Whatever changes are made--make them soon.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 20, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SECRETARY ROGERS C. B. MORTON

FROM:

ROA L. ASH

Over the years, I have researched the thinking of the last 50 years on the operations of the President's office and added my own thoughts in light of today's scale and scope of the job.

The President has many jobs; he must do them all. The attached statement by President Truman shows one perception of the enormous task of a President.

Accomplishing these jobs requires the maximum amount of delegation, but also requires that the President not abrogate his responsibilities. To delegate effectively requires that the President:

1. Determine what be delegated and to whom.
2. Imprint his values, policies, goals and priorities on the work delegated.
3. Be provided information as to the performance under, and results of, delegated authority.
4. Have an orderly system by which matters needing Presidential decision or action come before him complete, balanced and timely.
5. Have a means for interceding selectively into those matters where he desires or should, and
6. Provide for the coordination and resolution of matters that cut across authorities delegated to two or more subordinates.

In today's government he can't do all this personally, so he needs considerable staff assistance - not to usurp the primary work delegated to others, but to assist him in effective delegation to others.

In my own view, the President needs a combination of substantive and

process assistance. That is, a limited number of personnel qualified in the main substantive areas of government, and others assuring the delegated processes operate as intended.

Personnel serving the President in this staff capacity must have only the President as their constituent, and be freed from any bureaucratic or public constituency.

Further, it is my own view that, because of the importance of every Presidential decision, the fact that most decisions at the highest level are "trade off" ones spanning many interests, and ones that often require highly subjective judgments, the structure of the President's staff should contain considerable redundancy. That is, mutually exclusive "territorial jurisdiction" deprives him of the full interaction of his staff, let alone the direct thinking he will get from his line executives.

To meet the criteria for effective delegation, to deal both with substance and process, and to assure redundancy, my own perception of a President's staff structure can best be described as a matrix:

	Substantive	International	Economic	Social (Domestic)
Process				
Presidency				
Legislation				
Operations				

The substantive "coordinators" would be:

- The NSC
- The coordinator for Economic Policy
- The Domestic Council

In each case, their work should concentrate on highest order policy from a Presidential perspective and should avoid duplicating or managing departmental work.

The process staff assistance would be:

1. The President's Chief of Staff, concerned with serving the President and the President's office directly - communications into and out of that office both with the public and the rest of the Executive Branch; personnel; the staff secretary; scheduling; the President's counsel; White House operations, etc.
2. The legislative liaison function
3. OMB

This is not the conventional way to show organizational arrangements, but it is my own belief that it better expresses the nature of the President's staff needs. The six people who would head these six functions would be, in effect, a cohesive President's office, with individual responsibilities of course, but working intimately together and with the President to assure complete and rounded staff assistance.

An alternative, depending on Presidential style and interest, is to forego one, two, or all three of the substantive staff groups and work with the three process activities. (The reverse is totally unworkable). In this case the President would rely on, say, the Secretary of State for international policy staff assistance, and on a combination of department heads in each of the other areas. This would, of course, bring an additional work load into the President's office directly, which he may desire in some areas, and also require the process offices to carry out greater interdepartmental coordination, but it could be workable.

Finally, two points need to be made. The specific structure and its workings are secondary to the individuals involved, and could and should be modified to reflect how those individuals can serve the President best.

Second, this is only the staff structure to serve the President in his role, not to do all the Government's work. That work must be done by the line executives to whom the President delegates authority (or who have it by statute). The President's role, to "take care . . ." needs this staff assistance so that he may do his job fully and well.

Attachment

# For the Jobs a President

By Harry S. Truman

The presidency of the United States is one of the most unusual, most important and least understood constitutional offices in the history of the world.

The first three articles of the Constitution outline the three branches of the government of this great republic. Article I sets up the legislative branch and gives that branch certain powers and duties. Article II sets up the executive branch and gives the executive certain powers and duties. Article III sets up the courts, creates a chief justice of the United States and gives certain powers and duties to the courts.

The founding fathers outlined the presidency in Article II of the Constitution, but they left a good many details vague. The office of the chief executive has grown with the progress of our republic. It has given our nation a means of meeting our greatest emergencies. And today it is one of the most important factors in determining whether we provide leadership for the free world.

NOW, IF YOU TAKE the powers of the president as enumerated in Article II of the Constitution, and the duties that have been given to the president by the growth and development of our institutions, and add them up, you will conclude that the president has the most difficult job in history.

It is also the most honorable and powerful office in the history of the world, and one of which every American should be proud—because the president is given his position by the voice of the people, and no emperor, king or dictator in history ever rose to a position of such power and influence as this chosen spokesman of a free electorate.

The president's job is really five or six jobs.

Now I want you to bear one thing in mind. As a former president of the United States, my sympathies are with the man who has to hold down these jobs. I may not agree with him politically, and I reserve the right to say whether he is doing his work well or badly, but he still has my sympathy, because I know exactly what he is up against.

ONE OF THE FIRST of these jobs—and this one is enumerated in Article II of the Constitution—is to take care that the laws are faithfully executed. This means the supervision of the work of the entire executive branch—not only to enforce criminal laws through the Department of Justice, but to carry out all legislation, whether it applies to national defense, to public lands, to postal rates, to immigration, to rural electrification, or to any other subject.

Such a job of supervision is a staggering one. No matter how much help the President may have, and no matter how well organized the executive branch may be, he has to work to keep a firm grip on the policies of all executive agencies.

For, make no mistake about it, the president has the ultimate responsibility for the conduct of the entire executive branch of the government. That is what the Constitution says, and that is what it means.

While the president can and must delegate certain of his executive functions, he cannot dodge the ultimate responsibility. In all the executive branch he is the only elected official, and he alone is responsible to the people. The members of his cabinet, his staff, and his other executive officers owe their appointments to him, and their con-

tinuance in office depends on his will, and his will alone.

Congress can't make him keep them. If they are not responsive to his wishes, he can and ought to fire them.

IT IS NOT A HAPPY experience, but I had to fire several people in my time. If you have a heart and a grain of sympathy in your make-up, it is hard to do—but it must be done.

This is very different from the so-called "cabinet" system of government, where the principal executive officers are elected officials, and the prime minister or premier is the spokesman for the group. That system is government by a group or a committee, and the chief executive is a sort of committee chairman. It is not the American system.

The American president is not a chairman of the board, because his board or cabinet owes its existence to him. He can never hide behind their skirts, or escape responsibility because they refuse to back him up or refuse to go along with him. He always has the majority vote in the cabinet. If they do not carry out his policies, they must resign or be fired.

This does not mean that a member of the president's cabinet cannot disagree with him in cabinet meetings. But when the president decides, his decision must be followed and carried out.

THE NEXT JOB of the president—and this is also enumerated in the Constitution—is to be commander in chief of the armed forces.

He appoints and commissions officers in the Army, Navy and Air Force. He has complete authority over the armed forces of the United States. He can place generals in command, and when it is necessary he can take them out. And sometimes that is necessary. This is a very great responsibility, and one that has to be considered very, very carefully.

The third job I would like to think about is the president's role in foreign affairs. He is the foreign policy maker of the nation.

The Constitution says he shall appoint ambassadors with the advice and consent of the Senate and receive ambassadors and ministers from foreign governments. Few of us fully appreciate what this means.

Our ambassadors are the personal agents of the president—his eyes and ears abroad. The ambassadors of other countries cannot operate here unless they are approved by the president.

To put it another way, the president "recognizes" foreign countries, diplomatically, and this is a great power and responsibility.

The president is our foreign policy maker, also, because he negotiates treaties. The Constitution says he shall have power to "make treaties" by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

IN THE DAYS WHEN the Constitution was young, George Washington tried to carry out this provision by going personally to the Senate with a proposed treaty and getting their advice and consent during his negotiations. The Senate said they couldn't act on things that way—they said they would have to appoint a committee and have them report back, and they couldn't work properly with the president sitting there.

At this, George got indignant and left in a huff. So ever since, the president has negotiated the treaty first, and then submitted it to the Senate for approval. But he can make executive agreements with foreign countries and send special representatives without consulting anybody. Strong presidents have always done these things.



One of the by-products of the president's job as our foreign policy maker is that any utterance he makes on foreign affairs will be heard around the globe almost as soon as he makes it.

The president has to be exceedingly careful about what he says. Whatever he says has both foreign and domestic repercussions, even if he only cusses out an unfair music critic.

The foreign policy job of the president is enough for one man, without the other two jobs I have described, the executive job and the command of the armed forces. But there is more to come—much more.

TURNING AGAIN to the Constitution, there is the president's legislative job. The Constitution says that he shall from time to time give Congress information on the state of the union and recommend measures for their consideration. And of course he must approve the laws before they can become effective, unless Congress can muster a two-thirds vote over his veto.

The Constitution has written the president in as a vital and necessary party of the legislative process, and he is not supposed to stand back and be a "yes man" for Congress. He must fight for his legislation program. If he doesn't, he's a weak executive.

The function of recommending legislation is now broken down into several distinct tasks. In the first place there is the budget.

The Congress has the purse strings all right; no revenue can be collected and no money can be spent unless the Congress says so.

All tax bills have to originate in the House. All appropriation bills, by courtesy, originate in the House. They don't have to; when I was in the Senate, we claimed we had the right to originate appropriation bills, but we never exercised it.

BUT EVEN THOUGH Congress has the purse strings, the president is responsible for spending the money appropriated, and he has to tell Congress how much the executive branch needs. This is the budget—and it goes to Congress every year in January, and the prosperity and welfare of the nation depend, in

# ent Must Do



ple in the nation, regardless of party, and he must always think of the welfare of the nation as a whole.

As I have said time and time again, the president is the only lobbyist in Washington who looks after the interests of about 150 million people. The other 15 million are able to hire people to go to Washington to present their claims to Congress on any subject they choose.

That is lobbying, and it is a perfectly legitimate function, and an exercise of the right of petition. But there are 150 million people who don't have any lobbyists.

It is the business of the president to find out what is good for those 150 million people, and to act as the principal lobbyist in the nation for their welfare and benefit. When a president does that, he is a good president.

**THE PRESIDENT CANNOT** carry out his legislative job and his political leadership without a lot of opposition. The Constitution makes the executive and the legislative separate and independent branches of the government, and as a result there is a certain amount of conflict built into the Constitution.

The separation of powers was not devised to promote efficiency in government; it was devised to prevent absolutism or dictatorship. It was devised to prevent executive dictatorship and congressional dictatorship. So a certain degree of struggle between the president and the Congress is natural, and a good thing.

It is the duty of the president to see that the constitutional powers of the presidency are not infringed. Some elements in Congress are always trying to legislate him out of office, and make themselves an English legislative government, which is not what the Constitution provides at all.

Now I come to the sixth job of the president. The president is the social head of the nation.

~~A great many of the stuffed-shirt people like this very much. They think it is the finest thing in the world to be able to meet counts, princes, kings and queens and other dignitaries of foreign countries. Of course, when distinguished guests of that kind come to the United States, the president is their host, and he is always a courteous host, and that is a vital part of our international relationships.~~

The president gives five or six state dinners each year at the White House and holds several large receptions, and if you think its a lot of fun to shake hands with 2,700 people, whose names you can't even ~~understand when they are pronounced~~, I wish you could try it sometime.

He holds diplomatic receptions, receptions for Congress, receptions for the Supreme Court, and various other receptions; and I want to say to you that the wife of the president has a tremendous burden.

**I HAVE ENUMERATED** for you the six full-time jobs that one man has to fulfill, and there isn't any way in the world, under the Constitution of the United States, for him to get out of any one of them.

He must do them. He must do them, or they aren't done; and when they aren't done, it is just too bad for the country.

*Harry S. Truman, the 33rd president of the United States, expressed these views in an address to a forum of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Harvard Law School in Cambridge, Mass., in the fall of 1956. His remarks were condensed, with his permission, and published in this newspaper that winter.*

the House or Senate because that body won't act.

**THEN THERE IS** the veto power. I vetoed, I think, more bills than any president except Grover Cleveland and Franklin D. Roosevelt. You will find that a president's administration is characterized as much by his vetoes of bad legislation as it is by the legislation he recommends and approves. I take a lot of satisfaction in some of my veto messages.

**NOW COMES THE FIFTH JOB** of the president, and this is the job I got the most kick out of. The president is the head of his political party.

You won't find this job mentioned in the Constitution. Political party leadership was the last thing the Constitution contemplated. The founding fathers did not intend the election of the president to be mixed up in the hurly-burly of party politics. But our two-party system, as it developed, changed all that.

The electoral college became a formality, and the president came to be elected by the whole people. As a result, the president emerged as the man who had led his party to political victory, and who was expected to set its policies for the future.

**THROUGH HIS POLICIES** and actions, the president must try to convince the people that his party can run the national government better than the opposition. But at the same time, he must never forget that he is responsible to all the peo-

great measure, on what is in it.

A president must be familiar with the income and expenses of the government of the United States, not in a vague, general way, but in detail. He has experts — the Bureau of the Budget (now the Office of Management and Budget) — who keep him informed, but it is still necessary for the president to know what the national budget provides and why. It is a difficult subject, and it requires much work and mental application.

In addition to the budget message, the president sends to Congress an annual message on the state of the union, recommending in broad terms the legislation he thinks necessary to keep the country running. Then there is the president's economic report required by the Employment Act of 1946 — a very good law passed by a Democratic Congress — in which the president sets forth what the economic situation of the country is likely to be, and the policies which should be followed to create full employment and to make business prosper.

This fourth job of the president — the legislative job — does not stop with these three messages. There are special messages he sometimes sends to Congress, and then there is the whole job of getting the program through Congress.

Usually this can best be done by working with the congressional leaders; but there are times when the president has to go before the country on radio or television and tell the people what he is trying to do — and put a firecracker under