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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dick Cheney

*Very interesting.
Talk with me.*



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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

- 1) Carter is negotiating
for spot on TV. right
after big football game
just before election.
- 2) Mr. Ford / Pats.

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Jimmy Carter has the Democratic Party in a serious dilemma. If they nominate him, they are stuck with a candidate who lacks the experience and temperament to be President and one who is widely distrusted by leaders of the Democratic Party, with considerable justification.

If they fail to nominate him, after he has been so spectacularly successful in the primaries, the ripple throughout the south will cost them severely at the polls in November. It will be difficult to convince southerners that his regional origin did not cause them to gang up on him and snatch from him the nomination. Either outcome favors the immediate implementation of a strategy directed at Carter.

There are other reasons to begin now with an anti-Carter strategy. His momentum must be broken because he as the Democratic nominee would be very difficult for any Republican to beat. With a Southerner leading the ticket, southern states cannot be counted on to abandon their traditional party. This bloc of electoral votes combined with the northern industrial states, which tend to favor any Democrat, will leave very little left for the Republican nominee.

Moreover, a Carter Presidency would in the opinion of many Carter-watchers damage seriously the office. Barring a miraculous change in him, he can be counted on within three years to challenge Richard Nixon as one of the most unpopular



Presidents in American history. The office and the country can ill-afford another blow to the Presidency.

The system depends upon the adversaries of the candidate to make sure the people understand his weaknesses before they vote for him. It is up to Republicans to contribute to weeding our Carter if he is unqualified. As David Broder acknowledged in a recent column, the press has failed to convey to the American public the shortcomings of his qualifications.

A brief review of Carter's political career may be instructive. He returned to his hometown of Plains in the early fifties after a ten-year career in the Navy following graduation from the Naval Academy. He won narrowly a legally contested race for the State Senate in 1962 and served there until January, 1967. As a comparatively sophisticated senator from rural south Georgia, he captured more than his share of attention from the Atlanta media and was soon recognized as a man with political future.

As an unusually strong partisan in a state where party loyalty was on the wane after Senator Goldwater carried it in 1964 and the Johnson administration became increasingly unpopular, he considered a race against Bo Callaway for Congress, who was in his first and only term in the House of Representatives. Some who knew Carter detected a special



disdain for Callaway at the time. It may sound farfetched that a mature person would be motivated by such considerations, but the combination of Callaway's West Point background, strong Republican advocacy, and silk stocking status may have caused the competitive adrenalin to flow of the peanut farmer Democrat from the Naval Academy.

Developments in early 1966 caused Carter to enter the Governor's race. Callaway had decided to leave his apparently safe House seat in favor of the chance of becoming Georgia's first Republican Governor since Reconstruction. In addition, a major void was created on the Democratic side when former Governor Ernie Vandiver withdrew on a claim of ill-health.

There were several candidates in the race and Carter finished a strong third behind former Governor Ellis Arnall, who had the black vote, and Lester Maddox. Carter was a sensible alternative for moderate Democrats and geared his campaign accordingly. Maddox and Arnall gained positions in the run-off with less than 30 percent of the Democratic vote and Carter scored somewhere in the twenties coming very close to overtaking Maddox, as the second place finisher. Parenthetically, Maddox won the run-off and the Atlanta papers, which supported Arnall, claimed that Republican cross-overs, who thought that Maddox would be an easier target for Callaway, provided the margin of victory.



After losing in 1966, Carter commenced a four year campaign for Governor and the nature of his peanut warehouse business permitted him to become virtually a full-time candidate. From the beginning, he had an uphill battle against former Governor Carl Sanders, who served from 1963 to 1967 and who was prohibited by law from succeeding himself. As a result of his progressive record as Governor and his support for the Great Society, Sanders pre-empted the black/liberal vote in Georgia, which had given Hubert Humphrey about 28 percent of the 1968 total. This left for Carter, Georgia's largest voting bloc, which was the 41 percent that voted for Wallace in 1968. After running as a moderate in 1966, Carter was able to accomodate himself in order to reach these voters.

While Sanders pursued his \$100,000 a year plus law practice in Atlanta during 1967, 1968, and 1969, Carter was speaking in churches and to civic clubs and listening to the people. He told them what they wanted to hear and gained the support of leading spokesmen for segregation in Georgia, who probably disliked Sanders more than they favored Carter. He played to the emotions of people who distrust the Atlanta elite in the same manner that he plays to the emotions of people who distrust Washington today. His strategy paid off and his victory in 1970 was an upset.

It did not take long for the Wallace/Maddox element to discover he did not belong to them and he lost his base of support, becoming a very unpopular governor. He alienated



the state legislature and the consensus when he left office in 1974 was that he could not get elected sheriff in his home county.

He apparently decided he was worthy of a presidential race after being exposed to Jackson, Humphrey and McGovern in 1972, concluding if they could bat in the Presidential league, he could. He spent considerable time during his last two years in office plotting his strategy and he maneuvered himself into the chairmanship of the Democrats "Campaign 74 Committee." In this position, he began learning the ways of national politics. After leaving office in January, 1975, he became a full-time candidate for President and the rest is history.

If one asks why he has been able to succeed in this year's race, the answers are varied. A combination of factors have worked in his favor:

- (1) He has been totally dedicated to winning the Presidency while other candidates have had distractions like protecting a Senate seat and running a Senate Committee.
- (2) He has perceived better than other candidates that less than 10 percent of the total population selects the nominee of both parties; has identified that narrow segment of voters and has effectively gone after them maximizing his resources.



- (3) He was able to establish early respectability as a candidate by winning in New Hampshire and Florida. He accomplished this by pouring a disproportionate amount of time and resources into New Hampshire and he benefited in Florida because Florida was the time and the place for the National Democratic Party to rid itself of the Wallace nuisance, and he was the best man to accomplish it.
- (4) The caliber of the opposition was weak and he was able to survive the process of elimination. Humphrey was crippled and could not risk the primaries; Kennedy stayed out; Askew passed up the race and Brown may have moved too late leaving only Scoop Jackson, Mo Udall and Birch Bayh as credible candidates.
- (5) He has benefited from the anti-Washington mood and has been unburdened by the baggage of specific stands on specific issues. Governors and former Governors have historically fared better than Senators and House members in American Presidential sweepstakes up until the post World War II era when foreign policy became more important.



The strategy for defeating Carter must be aimed at forcing him to make a major mistake and to lose his composure. It is too bad the Eagleton affair was wasted on McGovern. Problems have to be created for him where he is forced to make choices and hopefully make the wrong choice if given enough opportunities.

The best hope for accomplishing this is through a well-organized, well-orchestrated attack strategy using a variety of spokesmen who are capable of making news followed by a creative negative issues advertising campaign in the fall if he is nominated.

This effort should be aimed at smoking him out on the issues and causing his ruthless, duplicitous character to surface from behind his smile. He should be closely tracked on the issues and challenged on a daily basis by someone knowledgeable in categories of issues.

An operational structure could be assembled along the following lines:

- (1) Establish a team with spokesmen assigning each of them to an issue. The make-up should include highly visible Senators and Cabinet Officers and might be as follows:

Goldwater/Tower - Defense and National Security

Simon - the Economy

Dole - Agriculture



Hills - Housing

Kleppe - Energy

Richardson - Social Programs

Griffin - Labor.

- (2) Establish a research capability that receives daily information on each Carter statement that would supplement news accounts.
- (3) Ask each spokesman to assign his press secretary or some other project officer to the task. This individual would also have a responsibility for tracking Carter's statements and for developing a complete catalogue of all of his positions on assigned issues.
- (4) Conduct daily meetings of the representatives of each spokesman where an attack on Carter is planned.
- (5) On a rotating basis, depending on events, issue a statement or conduct a press conference using a spokesman.

The purpose of this program should be to make sure the American people know Carter well because he would probably be rejected by the voters if they knew him better. If you conducted off-the-record interviews with people who have had considerable experience with him, including former colleagues



in the governors' conferences, members of the Georgia legislature, members of the Georgia Congressional Delegation and their staffs, certain words would bubble to the surface. These words include such epithets as phony, liar, hypocrite, lacks integrity, double crosser, two-faced, speaks from both sides of his mouth, and similar phrases.

If the people go to the polls without a thorough knowledge of a candidate's shortcomings, the people have been failed by the candidates opponents, just as a jury as well as a defendant is failed in a legal case when a lawyer makes an inadequate presentation. The President has the capability to put the mechanism in place to educate the public on Carter. In spite of the fact that he is no longer assured the Republican nomination, he should go ahead and order the execution of a negative Carter strategy as part of his duty as leader of the Republican Party.

To understand the objectives of a negative Carter project, you first need to understand Carter and the fact that there are two sides to him:

- (1) There is the Carter, who has Paul Warnke as a national security advisor and will cut \$7 billion from the defense budget and there is the Carter, who has Paul Nitze as his advisor and will add \$30 billion to the defense budget.



- (2) The Carter who spoke in Wisconsin in favor of repealing the right to work laws; the Carter who said in Georgia before a group of financial supporters a week later that he does not support repeal of right to work laws.
- (3) The Carter, who has built his campaign on a claim that he has streamlined the State Government in Georgia; the Carter, who presided over a state administration that increased its employees by 20 percent and increased state spending by 50 percent.
- (4) The Carter, who would simplify income tax forms and eliminate deductions including interest on mortgage payments; the Carter, who denies his plan to eliminate interest deductions.
- (5) The Carter, who ridiculed Lester Maddox in New Hampshire; the Carter, who praised him in 1970.
- (6) The Carter, who pledged to "end once and for all the threat Wallace represents to our country;" the Carter, who promised in 1970 to invite Wallace to Georgia to address the state legislature and is on-the-record a number of times praising him.



- (7) The Carter, who promised to support Wallace in 1972, if he would not offer a slate of delegates in Georgia; the Carter who made the nominating speech for Scoop Jackson in Miami after Wallace lived up to his end of the bargain.
- (8) The Carter, who claimed, after he was castigated by Wallace supporters for backing Jackson, that he was carrying out a wish of the late Senator Russell; the reality that anyone who knew Dick Russell knows that he would never have made that request.
- (9) There is the Carter, who said "Other than my father, Senator Russell made the greatest impact on my life. I never made a political decision without consulting him first. He kind of adopted me 19 years ago." There is the real Carter who never had a particularly close relationship with Dick Russell.
- (10) There is the Carter, who looked Bob Strauss in the eye and said he had no problem with him continuing as chairman through November; the Carter who, according to his former speechwriter, talked of canning Strauss.
- (11) The Carter, who asked Julian Bond to intercede with McGovern in behalf of him becoming McGovern's running-mate; the Carter who denied Bond's claim; and the Carter who later acknowledged it.



- 12
- (12) The Carter, who pledged his support to Reuben Askew to be Chairman of the Southern Governor's Conference; the Carter who went back on his pledge.
- (13) The Carter, who told environmentalists he supports strip mining legislation; the Carter who told coal operators that he doesn't.
- (14) The Carter, who told a reporter falsely that Senator Russell promised to vote for him in 1970; the Carter, who called Senator Russell to apologize and claim he never said it; the Carter, who told the reporter that he said it, but it was off-the-record.
- (15) The Carter, who said he opposed Richard Nixon since he lived in California in 1950; the Carter who profusely praised John Mitchell for his law and order campaign at a dinner in Atlanta in 1971.
- (16) The Carter, who talks of a need for honesty in government; the Carter, who met with Secretary Butz in behalf of the peanut industry in 1973.
- (17) The Carter, who talks of love; the Carter who sent a message recently to the Mayor of Atlanta to "kiss my ---."
- (18) The non-politician Carter, who is running against all the Washington politicians; the Carter who has been a full time candidate for public office for



six of the last ten years and in the Governor's office the other four, where he spent considerable time on politics.

Finally, there is the Carter, who tells the people he will never lie to them, but there is the string of evidence to the contrary that could be uncovered easily if adequately researched. This memorandum is simply the product of unverified recollections of a person who has closely observed him and known him for ten years.



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dick Cheney

Very interesting
article on Mrs. Carter.
Show it to Ron N.

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Jimmy Carter's Wife Speaks Softly, Shares His Ambitious Drive

She Sees Many Tasks for Her
If She Becomes First Lady;
Square Dances in Capital

By KAREN ELLIOTT HOUSE

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

SANDUSKY, Ohio — When Rosalynn Carter enters a room, men stand. They refer to her as a Georgia peach and tell her she will be the prettiest First Lady ever. Often, they give her roses.

Rosalynn holds the roses and smiles. Then, in her soft, Southern drawl, she tells the men and their wives about her husband, Jimmy Carter. She tells of growing up with Jimmy in tiny Plains, Ga., and of working and scrimping to build their peanut business. She says that they are dismayed at big government spending and that Jimmy is going to end that waste.

Then, speaking even more softly, she delivers a final pitch, laden with dramatic pauses. "I think Jimmy's going to be a great President. I'm here because we need your help."

Mrs. Carter has been making this quiet little speech with great effectiveness during 14 months of campaigning in 34 states. To thousands of voters she has appeared as a calm, sweet woman who talks in silky Southern tones of a hard-working and wholesome family. But beneath that exterior are qualities of toughness and calculating ambition that match her husband's, and they help explain Mr. Carter's phenomenal surge toward the Democratic nomination.

There even are signs that her little set speech is carefully tailored to fit different audiences. To a religious group, for example, she concludes by saying, "We need your prayers." And she seems to mention her support of the Equal Rights Amendment only when speaking to groups that are likely to share that support.

"She doesn't look it, but she's a tough woman in pursuit of her goal — putting Jimmy in the White House," says Hamilton Jordan, the Carter campaign manager. Another aide adds: "She's as ambitious to be First Lady as she is for him to be President."

For the Moment, a Breather

On the road, Rosalynn (pronounced ROSE-uh-lun) is a single-minded campaigner. In a typical day she will smile, make speeches and shake hands from 6 o'clock in the morning until 10 o'clock at night. Through the long primary season she rarely has seen her husband or her eight-year-old daughter, Amy, except on weekends back in Plains. (Now that his nomination seems assured, she plans almost no campaigning until after the Democratic convention.)

"I'm not doing this only for Jimmy," she said recently as she flew from one campaign stop to the next. "There are a lot of things I can do as First Lady."

She says, for example, that she and her husband have discussed the possibility that once he is President (neither of them seems to doubt that he will make it), she can travel around the country talking to ordinary Americans and relaying their views to President Carter. Mr. Carter adds that he believes she could effectively represent him abroad.

"She would be an excellent surrogate for me in foreign countries because she knows my stands on issues and she could listen to the people," he said in an interview the other day. (Mrs. Carter says she intends to begin brushing up on her Spanish as soon as she is settled in the White House.)

"I'm sure she will be more involved in his presidency than in being a traditional First Lady," Mr. Jordan says.

Mrs. Carter's Strategy

Since late 1972, when Mr. Carter began planning his run for the presidency, Mrs. Carter has been included in the strategy sessions. While key aides urged him to concentrate on a group of selected states, she argued that he should campaign hard in every primary state. He campaigned in 30 of the 31 primaries, and the strategy paid off.

There are other instances in which her advice was followed with success. He says, for example, that after his New Hampshire victory he was under some pressure to go for another quick victory in the Northeast by concentrating on the Massachusetts primary. She argued persuasively that he should stick to his original plan, concentrating on winning the Florida primary and knocking Alabama Gov. George Wallace out of the race. "She proved to be right," Mr. Carter says. "That was a major turning point of my race."

Campaign staff members say Mrs. Carter sometimes will intercede with her husband if other efforts to persuade him to do something have failed. For instance, Mr. Jordan called her this spring to urge that she persuade Jimmy Carter to apologize for his remark that the federal government shouldn't break up the "ethnic purity" of neighborhoods. Before she reached her husband, however, black Congressman Andrew Young, a Georgia Democrat, had obtained an apology.

"The staff comes to me," she acknowledges. "If I think they're right, I talk to

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Jimmy Carter's Wife Speaks Softly, Shares His Ambitious Drive

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Jimmy. That doesn't mean he does as I suggest."

She adds that she doesn't always do what he recommends. "No one has ever told me what to say," she says. "Sometimes, Jimmy and I have strong arguments." As First Lady, she adds, she would publicly express her attitudes on issues even if he didn't share her point of view.

So far, however, she has said very little about issues, and she doesn't believe that her husband should make his positions more specific. "People aren't looking for specifics," she says. "They are looking for character and experience."

Mrs. Carter seems to have a well-tuned instinct for what people are looking for. Last year, when Carter staff members decided to serve liquor at an Atlanta fund-raising affair, she overruled them. Booze, she feared, would offend the Baptists expected to attend.

When she speaks before elderly groups, Mrs. Carter always praises her husband's 78-year-old mother, who spent two years with the Peace Corps in India 10 years ago. "She's a wonderful woman," she says. "I wish you could meet her." (Carter staff members say the two women actually dislike each other. "One reason Rosalynn campaigns so hard," an aide says, "is to show Jimmy, she's as important to him as his mother.")

And at every stop, Mrs. Carter, 48 years old, emphasizes the family's rural background. "I've always worked," she says. After her father died when she was 13, she helped her mother sew bridal trousseaux and then worked in a beauty shop. At 18, she married Jimmy (whom she had known for years). Soon she had three sons to take care of while he was away with the U.S. Navy. Later, she was in charge of keeping the books at the family peanut warehouse in Plains.

She summarizes this personal history in speeches to buttress a favorite point: Americans are hardworking people who would love to sacrifice for their country if only they had a President with the vision to urge sacrifice. "I know we can solve our problems. I just know with Jimmy we can," she says earnestly.

As part of her just-folks campaign, she sometimes stays overnight in the homes of supporters. Each host gets a handwritten thank-you note and an invitation to spend a night in the White House. A major duty of the staff member who drives her around is to record the names of people who give her flowers, Bibles, perfume and photographs.

Being First Lady won't change her, Mrs. Carter says. "I intend to work." Besides jobs that she will undertake for her husband, Mrs. Carter says she will continue her efforts to improve mental-health care. Appalled at mental-health care in Georgia, she persuaded her husband to create a commission on mental health in 1971. He named her chairman; three years later the state had another 136 mental health centers. She says she also would like to work for more and better day care for children of working mothers.

The Carter White House will be informal, she promises. There will be square dancing and Southern food. However, she may abandon her wardrobe of dungarees, knit skirts and T-shirts for something more sophisticated. Major designers already are writing to offer their services, she says.


THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dick Cheney

Campaign suggestions.

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With Carter at Helm, the Ship of State May Toss a Bit

BY ROBERT S. BOYD
Chief of Our Washington Bureau

state Legislature. His stands



With Carter at Helm, the Ship of

BY ROBERT S. BOYD
Chief of Our Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — If Jimmy Carter is inaugurated as the 39th president of the United States next January, grab something solid and hang on. The country is likely to be for a rough but exciting time.

Behind the toothy Carter grin and soft Southern voice lurks a tough, stubborn, self-assured personality with a single-minded determination to get his own way.

As his mother once said: "Jimmy is like a beautiful cat with sharp steel claws."

It may seem awfully early to consider what kind of a president the former Georgia governor would be—especially when it's not even sure that he will win the Democratic nomination.

BUT JUDGING by his record, and his words and deeds as a candidate, a Carter administration seems certain to be filled with fire and controversy.

Within weeks of his taking office, the White House press corps probably would be screaming about attempts at news manipulation and deception.

Within months, Congress might be complaining about the return of the "imperial presidency" and the threat of one-man rule.

Recent efforts by Congress to regain some of the powers it has lost to the White House would be resisted, if not reversed.

By the end of his first year, the federal bureaucracy would feel the shocks of a shaking-up, by a Democratic president, that no Republican has yet achieved.

And all through his term, the so-called Washington "establishment"—the power-brokers, opinion-makers, influential lawyers, lobbyists for special interest groups and their allies in the committees of Congress and the agencies and departments downtown—would be battling to save their accumulated rights, privileges and ways of doing business.

At the center of this hurricane—assuming he wins next November—would be the stolid, strong-willed figure of Jimmy Carter, the first true outsider to run the government of the United States in this century.

Anyone who thinks Carter would be an easy-going, co-operative chief executive, ushering in an era of harmony and good feeling after the storms of recent years, had better move to New Zealand.

Carter makes it clear, in his speeches and answers to questions, that he means to be the boss. His record shows he is not one to share power gracefully.

ATLANTA attorney Charles Kirbo, one of Carter's early braintrusts, says: "He was

"My opponents said I had a hard time compromising. I guess I am subject to that criticism."

so gentle and friendly (when he ran for governor) that a lot of people got the idea he was going to be kind of easy to handle, and they could run the government. But they got the shock of their lives when they found out he was not only tough, but he was well informed about programs, statistics and the internal affairs of every department."

As a Democrat, Carter presumably would have smoother relations with the Democratic Congress than Presidents Nixon or Ford. He says he wants "a harmonious relationship" with Congress, but it's obvious that he wants it on his terms.

"Congress is incapable of leadership," he says over and over.

There is only one person who can set standards of morality . . . eliminate injustice . . . propose and carry out programs . . . provide for the national defense, maintain security and conduct foreign policy.

That person, says Carter, is the president, presumably leaving Congress little to do but approve his proposals and provide the money.

ASKED IF he would seek the counsel of congressional elders like Sen. Hubert Humphrey, Carter says, with barely concealed scorn, that he would listen to "a senior statesman like Mr. Humphrey," but would take "my ultimate advice from the people of this country."

When a politician says he is obeying the will of "the people", it usually means he is obeying his own will.

Even before he is nominated or elected, Carter wants to impose his will on congressional candidates.

For example, he says he will insist that Democrats commit themselves, at the national convention in July and during the fall campaign, to support his plan for a top-to-bottom reorganization of the federal government.

Noting that 85 percent of the lawmakers who will take their seats next January are up for election this year, Carter says: "I'll be running on the same ticket as many members of Congress . . . I want all of them to go on record — will you or won't you co-operate with the president to reorganize the executive branch of the government."

CARTER DENIES that he is demanding any kind of loyalty oath.

"If a congressman says no, that's all right with me," he

Viewpoint

says, "but I intend to pursue this and see that the federal government is completely reorganized."

If Carter gets the chance to carry out his promise to consolidate the 1,900 or so departments, agencies, commissions and whatnots that now make up the executive branch into 200 larger units, he is bound to have a tremendous fight on his hands.

Such a reorganization would break up the cozy alliances that have grown up among the bureaucracies, the congressional committees and the outside interest groups that deal with them.

Previous presidents have tried in vain to crack this jungle of special relationships. If

Carter succeeds, it will be at the cost of many scars and bruises. If he fails, he could be a frustrated and bitter man.

CARTER ALSO has his eye on another well-defended fortress — the array of privileges and preferences built into the nation's tax system.

Carter has pledged to carry out a sweeping tax reform, wiping out many of the so-called "loopholes," such as interest deductions for upper and middle-income home owners.

But every loophole has its dedicated defenders, both in Congress and among the taxpayers. They aren't going to shallow Carter's reforms without a titanic struggle.

The prospect for conflict is built into Carter's leadership style as well as his program.

As governor of Georgia, he frequently clashed with the

state Legislature. His stands may reflect credit on him, but they displayed a rigidity and reluctance to compromise that could be dangerous in the White House.

"My opponents said I had a hard time compromising," Carter admits. "I guess I am subject to that criticism."

"When I believe in something very deeply, I personally would rather fight for it than compromise. I hate to yield on something early. If the legislature opposed me, I would take my case to the people. The legislature was very recalcitrant at first, but later they joined in with me."

Carter may find 100 United States senators, and 435 congressmen even more recalcitrant at first, but later they will be more difficult to deal with the Georgia legislators.

FURTHERMORE, both as governor and as presidential candidate, Carter has tended to run a one-man show. He surrounds himself with bright young assistants who lack the independence and stature to tell him off.

He is also inclined to regard

State May Toss a Bit

criticism or a disagreement over policy as a personal attack on his character—and to respond in kind.

That kind of attitude can lead a president into difficul-

ties—even one as experienced in the ways of Washington as Lyndon Johnson or Richard Nixon.

In sum, if Jimmy Carter gets into the White House, he

would be, as he puts it, “a strong, independent and aggressive president.”

And nobody had better count on having a quiet time if he is there.

The first instance in history when political events in Europe were subordinated to the American electoral calendar was in the fall of 1940; when Stalin (who was then a neutral) insisted that the announcement as well as the event of Molotov's visit to Berlin be postponed until after the American Presidential election.

Earlier that same summer of 1940 events in Europe had had their effect on American politics: the isolationist wing of the Republican party (anti-British, pro-German) crumbled under the impact of Hitler's invasions of Denmark and Norway. Willkie -- internationalist and anti-German -- was nominated by a GOP convention which was meeting in Philadelphia during the very days of the French capitulation.

Today more than ever the play of domestic and international politics works both ways. Nixon certainly played world politics in 1972 with considerable skill and great impact. (Lou Harris in 1973 presented a persuasive analysis to show that it was world politics, and Nixon's role in them, which accounted for most of his popular support in 1972). Khrushchev bragged about how he tipped the 1960 Presidential election to Kennedy by letting it be known that he would not release captured American fliers at the request of the incumbent Eisenhower-Nixon administration. In the 1968 campaign, the Vietnamese Thieu, by dragging his feet on the peace talks that had been proposed by President Johnson, had a (marginal) effect on the (marginal) Presidential election of that November. As for 1976: Reagan's campaign owes much of its vitality to his exploitation of foreign and defense policy issues; and the Government of Greece seems to have decided to wait for January before signing a new DCA with Washington.

Looking at the calendar between now and inaugural day in January, then, there are two sets of important questions:

-- First, for foreign nations, the important questions will be specific versions of the larger question whether (a) to wait for the new administration, or (b) to try in active ways to take advantage of the fact of the campaign.



Active taking advantage could take one of two forms: either doing things which the US will not be able to stop because of the distraction of the campaign, or trying actively to influence the Presidential candidates to say certain things in the campaign.

-- Second, should the Ford Administration wait until January before trying to accomplish a given purpose, or should it move now in order to gain some campaign advantage for the President's re-election?

Here are the principal areas of concern or opportunity, as I see it.

- I. Cuba as an actor on the world stage.
- II. China.
- III. Turkey, Greece and US strategic interests in the Eastern Med.
- IV. The Middle East.
- V. The Soviet Union and Disarmament (SALT II).
- VI. OPEC: Another oil price increase?
- VII. Broader themes.
- VIII. Other.

I. Cuba:

If he does it quietly, Castro could probably consolidate his positions in Africa, in the Caribbean, and in Central and South America. Specifically: Jamaica, Guyana, Central America, Angola, and Mozambique. He will feel it is smart to avoid giving either Ford or Reagan any excuse to make an issue out of Castro over the next several months, in the hope that a Carter Administration would move to open up relations with Havana on a basis that would be advantageous to Castro. My own sense is that he will go ahead and consolidate his positions, while protecting possible prospects for rapprochement with a Carter regime.

Carter: I would be surprised if Carter were to make an issue of this, though of course it cannot be entirely ruled out. He is more likely to try to open a door for Castro: rapprochement if not Good Neighbor.

Reagan: I would be surprised if Reagan neglected to make an issue of Castro between now and early August.

Ford: I would think Ford (and the country) would benefit most from a line of relatively explicit criticisms of Castro's far-flung activities.



II. China:

Here it seems there is an inclination in Washington to wait for January. Still, that may not be easy, simply because Mao will probably die before then (he may already have died). Hua, the tough cop who is nominally in charge of China, may be flexing his muscles in the Taiwan Strait. The Soviets may have some sort of move toward rapprochement in mind for the immediate post-Mao period. The ground should be prepared with Peking, Taipei and Tokyo, and the White House should be ready to move promptly and effectively into the post-Mao era.

Meanwhile, the "China Lobby" has not been slumbering: they probably leaked to the press the fact of the US pullout from Quemoy and Matsu, and I expect they will attempt to force all the candidates (including the President) to make ever more precise statements about policy with regard to relations between Washington and Peking, together with ever more elaborate explanations of how the Taiwan question would be handled. The ROC will be behind efforts to make Ford inflexible, to make strong pro-ROC statements.

Carter: Carter can reasonably be expected to be fairly forthcoming with regard to the China question, or -- somewhat less likely -- to be precisely imprecise and indicate a preference to wait for January. He has already said he doesn't know how to handle the Taiwan problem.

Reagan: I would be surprised if Reagan did not seek, during July, to sound pro-Taipei, maybe even a little anti-Peking.

III. Turkey, Greece, etc.,:

Athens already seems to have decided to wait for January before signing the DCA with the United States, in hopes of getting a better deal. Members of Congress, of all political persuasions and denominations, want to wait until January or -- at the least -- until after the Republican Convention, before giving serious consideration to either the Greek or the Turkish DCA. This is because they don't want to have to approve the Turkish DCA without a green light from Athens (there are virtually no Turkish votes in America). Of course, such a delay will have adverse effects on the United States' strategic position in the Eastern Mediterranean. It is actually in the United States' interest to put our relations with Greece and Turkey on a solid footing once again, and to do so as expeditiously as possible.

The Turks don't want to wait for anything. They would like a DCA immediately.

Carter: My sense is that the Carter organization may try to appear pro-DCA for both Greece and Turkey, and at the same time severely critical of Ford and Kissinger for having failed to obtain a Cyprus settlement. Or possibly a set of 18-month "Interim Agreements" with Greece and Turkey to



protect our strategic interests now, while giving time for the US election to be settled and Cyprus to be resolved. Resolution of the Cyprus problem will be presented as the essential precondition to any new DCA with either Greece or Turkey. This is the Greek Lobby's position.

Comment: The Greeks in Athens -- instructed no doubt by the Greek Lobby -- also seem possessed by the notion that both the Greek and Turkish DCAs can be held as hostages to a Cyprus settlement that would be favorable to Athens, and that Washington can be pushed to deliver such a settlement.

The Ford Administration should consider going to the Interim Agreement play early. If not, then press both the Greeks and the Congress to move expeditiously on the Greek DCA, as well as the Turkish DCA. The administration should pound on US strategic interests, and be prepared to place the Congress in the position of thwarting foreign policy interests of the nation. The administration should also press the Greeks and the Turks to relinquish the hope that Washington will be able to solve the Cyprus problem for them. Washington should make its good offices available to assist the parties, but should pull back from its present posture of seeming to have more interest in solving the Cyprus problem in detail than do the parties themselves.

IV. The Middle East:

The Lebanon disaster and its ramifications have made the possibility of a major Arab-Israeli conflict practically nil. Certainly the Egyptians would see no purpose in damaging the Ford Administration by either starting or participating in a war against Israel. They could hardly expect to do better with Carter than they can with Ford and Kissinger.

Conditions are such in the Middle East that it will be difficult for any of the principal actors in that area to play American Presidential politics with much effect, although it now seems that the electoral calendar in combination with other factors has opened the door for a major Soviet deal on air defense for Amman. Israel is far from dissatisfied with the present situation in the Middle East and will clearly be inclined to wait for January unless, of course, she should begin to sense that some kind of Arab military operation against Israel was looming on the horizon.

For these reasons it will be difficult for Washington to do much except wait for January, although every opportunity should be sought to strengthen the Ford Administration's image as an effective power: peacekeeping, mediation, interlocutor, etc.

Carter: My guess is that Carter will be very cautious with regard to statements about the Middle East, except to the extent necessary to reassure the Jewish portion of the American electorate on his policy views on US-



Israel relations. Nevertheless, he will not shy away from opportunities to highlight the failures of step-by-step diplomacy and to blame that diplomacy for the present chaos.

Reagan: Ditto.

V. The Soviet Union:

I do not know whether the Soviet leadership has made any judgment as to its preference between Ford and Carter. If they should decide they want Ford to be President for the next four years, they could possibly move to an agreement on SALT II. Or the reverse: they could hold back if they decide they want Carter. Once they decide, if they decide, there's no doubt they will govern themselves accordingly. I do not wish to minimize the difficulties of writing a SALT II treaty that would be easily supportable both in Moscow and in Washington. Still, given the political motivation and the political will, it would be possible.

Carter: I would be surprised if Carter has not already been in touch with the Russians to reassure them as to the desirability of a Carter Presidency, and Carter policies, so as to prevent a pro-Ford decision in the Kremlin. And Senator Jackson (whether in coordination with Carter or not) is warning the administration against what he would call a bad deal.

Reagan: If Reagan should get wind of any Washington-Moscow movement on SALT II during July, he would surely make an issue of it immediately. He may try to make an issue of it anyway, without any evidence of Washington-Moscow long distance "footsie" during July.

VI. OPEC:

Could damage Ford if they wanted to by imposing another price hike between now and election day. The Ford Administration should be telling them not to do that. Any price rise would certainly be of benefit to Carter.

VII. Broader Themes:

In the broadest terms, the Presidential campaign this year may see the emergence of an issue between those who say, "We're number one and we can go it alone," and those who say, "We're divided and exhausted and must accommodate quickly to new world sentiments of social justice, human rights, national dignity and equitable redistribution of wealth." Each candidate's camp will attempt to portray the other as the representative of the worst in those two formulations:

-- The Carter camp will attempt to outline a Nixon-Ford-Kissinger foreign policy of Lone Rangerism, multinational corporationism, outmoded capitalism, balance of power manipulation and alienation from the roots of American liberality as well as from the sympathies and support of the majority of mankind.



-- At the same time, the Democrats may be vulnerable to charges that Carter would be too ready to serve as an evangelist (if not a world policeman) on behalf of egalitarianism, human rights, over-hasty reform of existing international institutions, and too much accommodation to foreign demands for more of the industrial world's wealth.

These brief paragraphs cannot begin to do justice to an extremely complex set of broader themes. They are only intended to highlight the probable emergence of an extremely important and, possibly, decisive set of ideas that are likely to be put into play in various ways over the next several months. Clearly, much careful thought and detailed wordsmithing needs to be done within the Ford camp, and soon, and not necessarily in a spirit of self-justification for every jot and tittle of declaratory policy over the past eight years.

VIII. Other Possible Items:

Panama has decided to wait until January, and Carter has been forced by Reagan to be relatively circumspect on the matter of the Canal. In handling Reagan, it will be necessary to be extremely careful and accommodating during the Republic platform drafting process in order to keep Reagan from making an issue with any substantial number of delegates. With regard to North Korea, it is theoretically possible that they could consider fomenting an incident between now and January, although they clearly are pursuing a policy designed to help themselves get into the UN and I think they will avoid incidents. With regard to the issue of Soviet emigration, the Jews in America are not likely to stir this up. Of course Reagan or Jackson could try to stir it up, but I would guess they would have minor success at it.



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TO: The President

FROM: MILDRED LEONARD

FOR: Information _____

Appropriate Handling _____

Attached is the paper you asked me to send to you this afternoon.



DATE: 8/12/76

16
encl
PAUL J. GILLETTE, Ph. D.

PSYCHOLOGIST

2362 VALLEJO STREET

SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94123

415/563-0546

mem
Jerry
Here's hoping it
proves useful to you

(Z&A)

Paul



Paul
Gillette

2362 VALLEJO STREET
SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94123
415/563-0546

MIZ LILLIAN, CRONKITE, THE JEFFERSONIAN, AND THOMAS WATSON

On the night that her son accepted the Democratic nomination for the presidency of the United States, Ms. Lillian Carter was being interviewed in the CBS-TV anchor booth by Walter Cronkite.

She spoke of how her son had always been a voracious reader, as were she and her late husband. She added that two of the publications she had found most inspiring and enlightening during her early years were The Jeffersonian and Watson's Magazine. She asked Cronkite if he knew about the publisher of Watson's, by name, Thomas Watson.

Cronkite said that the name rang a bell but he wasn't able at the moment to make a particular association with it. Ms. Lillian replied something to the effect that Watson was a great American, and the subject was changed.

The name rang a bell with me, too. During the early 1960's, while researching a book on the Ku Klux Klan (The Invisible Empire, published by Natlus, Inc., in New York, reprinted in paperback as Inside Ku Klux Klan by Pyramid Books, New York) I learned that Georgia Assemblyman--and later U. S. Senator--Thomas E. Watson was publisher of



MIZ LILLIAN 2

both The Jeffersonian and Watson's Magazine, both eventually outlawed as obscene by the U. S. Post Office.

Both publications specialized in vilifying blacks, Jews, and Catholics.

Blacks, Watson maintained, were literally beasts whose appetites for white women were insatiable. Jews were "moral cripples" with "an utter contempt for law and a ravenous appetite for the forbidden fruit--a lustful eagerness enhanced by the racial novelty of the girls of the uncircumcized."

Meanwhile, Catholic priests were "the wolves of Rome" who used the confessional to advance their own sexual interests. In the July, 1911, Jeffersonian Watkins wrote, "At the confessional, the priest finds out what girls and married women he can seduce [by listening to them recite their sins]. Having discovered the trail, he wouldn't be human if he did not take advantage of the opportunity."

In other issues, Watson commented: "No man can imagine a woman who could maintain her self-respect after being compelled to act as a sewer pipe for a bachelor priest's accumulation of garbage."

And: "Is there not one among them [the priests] to point out the absurdity of their wearing a garment emblematic of sexual intercourse?" [A reference to the priestly cassock,



MIZ LILLIAN 3

which Watson presumably linked with womanly dress.]

In the April, 1912, issue of Watson's Magazine, he offered the following contemplation, printed entirely in Italics: "Heavens above! Think of a Negro priest taking the vow of chastity and then being turned loose among women.... It is a thing to make one shudder."

I wondered how these and other quotes from Watson's writings inspired Miz Lillian. I thought it might prove instructive for Cronkite to pursue the matter on the air.

As a CBS partisan (I occasionally host the network's cultural affairs program, "Camera Three"), I also wanted to see my network get what obviously (to me) could be a very important scoop. So I rushed to my phone and, from San Francisco, where I live, dialed the CBS network news desk in New York, hoping I could get a message to Cronkite before Ms. Lillian left the anchor booth.

The network news desk switched me to the Convention Center news desk, which switched me to the assignment desk. With one eye on my TV screen (where Miz Lillian was still holding forth on her son's reading habits), I spilled out--for the third time in less than ten minutes--the story of Senator Thomas E. Watson and his campaigns against blacks, Catholics, and Jews.

The assignment editor said he'd get right on it,



MIZ LILLIAN 4


and I went back to my TV-viewing. Cronkite kept Miz Lillian in the anchor booth for the next 15 minutes, chatting about Jimmy Carter's boyhood, the "colored boy" who was his dear friend, and other nostalgia. My wife and I were confident good old Cronk was stalling her while subordinates checked the accuracy of my report.

Then Miz Lillian left the booth, and for the rest of the night no mention was made of Georgia's Senator Thomas E. Watson and his inspiring magazines.

I won't try to draw a moral from this story. Maybe my message never got to Cronkite. Or if it did, maybe he didn't deem it worth investigating. Or if it was investigated, maybe he didn't deem the Ku Klux Klan connections of Jimmy Carter's mother's favorite publisher newsworthy.

But if no one at CBS picked up on who Thomas E. Watson was and what he stood for, the network is really hurting for journalists. And if competing networks, who presumably were monitoring the CBS telecast, didn't pick up on it, the whole TV industry is hurting for journalists.

I'd still like to know what Miz Lillian found so inspiring about Watson's Magazine and The Jeffersonian. I have a hunch it would make a great story.




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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Paul Gillette is the author of 62 books and more than 1000 articles, short stories and translations that have appeared in *PLAYBOY*, *Esquire*, *McCall's* and other magazines. Among his better-known works are the novels, *Carmela*, nominated for the Pulitzer Prize in letters, and *Play Misty for Me*, also a motion picture. Holder of a Ph.D. in psychology, Dr. Gillette has also appeared as a CBS-TV interviewer, specializing in scientific subjects, and has made numerous guest appearances on national TV and radio shows. In addition, he directs for the theatre, films and television.



"Camera Three," Sunday, July 27, 11 A.M. "The Limits of Psychiatry"

Dr. Paul Gillette, Host; Dr. Gerald Klerman, Harvard University; Dr. Thomas S. Szasz, SUNY, Syracuse



Paul
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To:

Mr. Arthur Taylor
President
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Mr. Walter Cronkite
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Mr. Julian Goodman
President
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Mr. John Chancellor
NBC News
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Mr. Leonard H. Goldenson
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dick Cheney

a good analysis.





A Peanut in a Poke

By JUDE WANNISKI

The Democrats have done it. They've gone and nominated Jimmy Carter for President without any real idea of what kind of President he would be. Sure, we might find out before November which of those feet he has planted all over the ideological lot are his. But if the voters continue to find Mr. Carter's generalities less threatening than the specifics of his opponents, we might have to wait until after the inauguration to find out whether he breaks his eggs on the little end or the big end.

It's not so bad. We're a nation of gamblers, and as long as we have a system of government festooned with checks and balances, the risks the Democrats take in putting up a mystery man have much less to do with national survival than with the future course of the Democratic Party. Whether he'd move a little bit left or a little bit right, there's nothing to indicate that a President Carter would do terrible things to the country, and he could always be pitched out in four years if the electorate doesn't like the way he breaks his eggs.

The one thing we know for sure about this mystery man, after all, is that he is an extraordinary politician, which is a comforting thought. Not so much because he came out of nowhere to crush the cream of the Democratic Party: Fred Harris, Sargent Shriver, Morris Udall, Birch Bayh, etc., if not Jerry Brown. But to harmonize the wildly disparate elements of the Democratic Party—from the rednecks on one hand to the pointy-headed bureaucrats and limousine liberals on the other—is palpable evidence of political leadership even if it lasts only a week.

Watching for Weakness

There's no doubt that if this Georgia peanut farmer can keep this coalition docile and composed through early November he will deserve to win the presidency and will do so. His party is the majority party, and as long as it is united it is practically impossible for the GOP to win. If they are to retain the White House, the Republicans have to find the issues and arguments that can peel apart the Carter coalition, and as dull as this week's convection might appear on the television screens, it's being watched intently for signs of weakness, even hairline fractures in the coalition.

Will the Southern conservatives stick by Carter because he is a Southerner? Will the Northern liberals stay with him because they perceive a bleeding-hearted statist under his patina of Southern moderation? Will rural Democrats support him because he's one of them and will not, by gosh, favor the food consumer over the food producer? Will urban Democrats back him because they think he might be willing and able to pry money out of rural America to relieve the declining cities of the North?

Organized labor will be with him at the top, because it yearns for a Democratic President, and for all his fuzziness, Mr. Carter has more or less signaled that if Labor can get its pet legislation passed in Congress, he'll sign it. But will Mr. Meany and his friends be able to deliver the rank and file? And what about all those folks who became Carter fans because, unlike Messrs. Bayh, Udall and Jackson, the peanut farmer kept his distance from Labor until he had the nomination sewn up?

Black Democrats will vote for Mr. Carter over the Republican nominee, as

will all other segments of the electorate that have a greater stake in income redistribution than in income growth. But will they vote in droves or in dribbles, excited by Mr. Carter or suspicious of him and his intentions, as at least many black leaders seem to be?

So far, Mr. Carter appears to have welded together this old Roosevelt coalition by his sheer lack of credibility. Conservatives in the party don't seem to believe

Jimmy Carter "will never tell you a lie," but a good part of his support is coming from people who don't exactly believe what he says.

him when he comes on like a liberal. And the party's liberals have been persuading themselves that he's just playing politics when he comes on like a conservative.

The vast numbers of Democratic conservatives, who chose Richard Nixon over George McGovern in 1972, watch Mr. Carter sign up for McGovernlike tax and spending proposals a la Humphrey-Hawkins, national health insurance, Pentagon cutbacks, etc., but assume his heart isn't in it and that he'll find a way to avoid them after inauguration.

They have every reason to feel this way. Mr. Carter is always fervid, but he is perfervid when he announces without prodding that he stands foursquare for a balanced budget, and says he believes "in the free enterprise system with a minimum of government regulation." He harangues against "the bloated bureaucracy," doesn't he? And he aims to create jobs in the private sector, opposing the idea of the government being the employer of last resort. And look, Republicans, he has repeatedly said he wants to end the double taxing of corporate income, a grand idea that gags the liberal establishment and is applauded by Ronald Reagan.

The liberals, though, have so far found a way of ignoring all this, or winking at it. Remember FDR? He was for a balanced budget in his 1932 campaign and turned around after his election. Jimmy's doing the Roosevelt bit, eh? With the budget \$60 billion in the red, Mr. Carter promises increased spending for education, health, the cities, revenue sharing, welfare, housing, transportation, Social Security, private sector jobs for the needy subsidized by the federal taxpayer, and solar energy. When anyone asks Mr. Carter how all this red ink adds up to a balanced budget and less government, as Lawrence Spivak did on Meet The Press last Sunday, Mr. Carter blandly assures us that he has an "econometric model" figuring it all out.

To the degree the liberals are still nervous about Mr. Carter's heart of hearts, and the awful possibility that he may turn out to be a little-egg President, there's always the consolation that Mr. Carter is undeniably an ambitious man of the first order, who "clearly wants not only to be a good President, but to be remembered as a great one, if elected," as Charles Mohr of The New York Times observed the other day. "That will probably require an activist, aggressive and innovative legislative program. Even if the rhetoric remains

careful and middle-of-the-road, the direction may be leftward." Of course, there are other views of what constitutes a great President than Mr. Mohr's. There are also those who will remember Mr. Carter as great only if he does not have an active, aggressive, innovative, leftward legislative program. Certainly not another Great Society, which established Lyndon Johnson as a great President? Didn't it?

The Religion Problem

For a while, the biggest problem the Eastern liberals had with Mr. Carter was his religion. They were beside themselves worrying about his fundamentalist belief in a Baptist God. But once they began to realize they'd have to take it or leave it, they worked out rationales to accept it. "Anyway," writes Eliot Fremont-Smith in The Village Voice, "if he's really been born again, he won't have to be palsy-walsy with Billy Graham, which is a relief." And once William V. Shannon of the Times pointed out that anyone who quotes Reinhold Niebuhr and Dylan Thomas can't be all bad, the liberals quieted down on "religiosity," taking Mr. Carter's evangelism with a grain of salt. If he had managed to quote, say, Norman Mailer in his acceptance speech last night, the intelligentsia might have granted him a plenary indulgence.

In the same way, the party's unilateral disarmers read between the lines of his foreign policy pronouncements and give Mr. Carter a hopeful seal of approval. The Georgian says he never would have used the Nixonian bargaining-chip strategy to get an arms agreement with the Russians. The liberals, who hated the strategy but loved the agreement, like what Mr. Carter says. But the Scoop Jackson wing reads the same Carter speeches and interviews, takes heart from his schooling under Admiral Rickover and his expressed desire to build up the Navy to counter the Russkies, plus the fact that Mr. Carter was not "right from the start" on Vietnam, and they too give him a tentative seal of approval. The hardliners simply don't believe Mr. Carter is as soft as he lets on.

As masterfully crafted as it is, the problem with this kind of coalition is that everyone can't be right, and the more credible Mr. Carter becomes, the more he must weaken some element of his unified support. His support is truly very broad and very shallow, which is a lot better than being very narrow and deep, and he'll try for as long as he can to paper over the internal contradictions of his coalition with his exquisitely vague rhetoric. But it's a long time between now and November.

Of course his Republican opponent will be trying to pick him apart. The best way may not be to charge him with lack of specificity but to take him at his word, and get Democratic conservatives really believing he's a liberal and Democratic liberals really believing he's a conservative. Mr. Carter may be so extraordinary a politician that he'll figure a way to finesse this kind of strategy. But if he can't, the Democrats might find themselves having the traditional intramural ideological brawl they avoided this week in New York City somewhere down the homestretch of the presidential campaign.

Mr. Wanniski is an associate editor of the Journal.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dick Cheney

Interesting.

Schweid.

Keep for info.

Should give to Brent

5.



ORIGINAL RETIRED TO
SPECIAL DOCUMENTS FILE

Ohio was a key state

How Carter won confidence of Jewish voters

By John Dillin

Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor

Atlanta

Jimmy Carter's top advisers were concerned. With Henry Jackson out of the presidential race, they had hoped to get a big portion of the Jewish vote. But the latest primary results were shocking.

In Maryland, Mr. Carter lost the Jewish vote to Gov. Edmund G. Brown Jr. by at least 4 to 1.

Michigan was just as bad. Rep. Morris K. Udall drubbed Mr. Carter among Jewish voters by as much as 5 to 1.

The all-important Ohio and New Jersey primaries were coming up. And the Jewish vote could make a difference in a tight race. In Ohio, Jewish voters comprised, for example, 7 percent of the Democratic electorate.

The Carter braintrust went to work. It pinpointed two reasons that Jewish voters were steering clear of this Southern Baptist who speaks so warmly of his religion.

First, Mr. Carter was still an unknown. He had been a Southern governor, and most Jews were in the North. There was no long-term Washington record for them to use as reference.

Secondly, Mr. Carter's description of himself as a "born again" Christian caused concern and puzzlement. Could it mean he would be anti-Jewish?

Three of Mr. Carter's eight top advisers are Jewish. With their help — and the help of others in the Atlanta Jewish community — the Carter team swung into action.

Letter drafted

A letter, carefully drafted to show Mr. Carter's concern for Jewish causes, was taken to an Israeli bond meeting, where the signature of 30 prominent Atlanta Jews were gathered in about two hours.

Some 15,000 copies of the letter were sent to Jewish voters in New Jersey, another 10,000 to Jewish voters in Ohio.

A packet of articles dealing with Mr. Carter's positions on the Middle East were sent along with the letters to every rabbi in the two primary states.

Leading Atlanta Jews, including rabbis and presidents of congregations, were recruited to call Jewish leaders in Ohio and New Jersey.

Mr. Carter himself went before a Jewish group in New Jersey to reiterate his unwaivering support for Israel.

In each case, Jews were assured that Carter support for Israel and other important Jewish causes has been a matter of record.

On April 1, he told an audience: "A lasting peace must be based on the absolute assurance of Israel's survival and security. I would never yield on that point."

He calls Israel's survival a "significant moral principle for the people of the United States. We share democracy in a time when few nations are free. We both enjoy a free press and freedom of expression."

Mr. Carter points out that the United States was the first nation to recognize Israel diplomatically — 12 minutes after the state was founded. Harry Truman was president then — and Mr. Truman was not only a Baptist, but he was also Mr. Carter's favorite president.

A Biblical prophecy

Carter aides explain, too, that their candidate feels deeply that the founding of Israel represents a fulfillment of Biblical

prophecy. His support goes beyond political expediency or philosophy — it is an expression of his religious beliefs, they say.

The letter that went to Jewish leaders noted:

"Governor Carter believes that the United States . . . should never attempt to force Israel to give up the Golan Heights to Syria; should never require Israel to return East Jerusalem and the Jewish and Christian holy places; should not recognize the PLO and other terrorist groups which refuse to recognize Israel's right to exist. . . ."

If the Arab nations impose another oil embargo, Mr. Carter would seek to deny them shipments of U.S. "food, weapons, spare parts for weapons, oil drilling rigs, or oil pipes."

The drive for the Jewish vote was a success. In the Ohio primary, for instance, Mr. Carter nearly caught Mr. Udall among Jewish voters, and he far outpaced Sen. Frank Church.

His Ohio triumph triggered endorsements that appear to have assured Mr. Carter the Democratic presidential nomination.

Argentine violence spreading

Underground civil war escalates, intensifies during last 3 months

By James Nelson Goodsell

Latin America correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor

A vicious underground civil war, wracking Argentina for the past seven years, has escalated and intensified since the military took power nearly three months ago.

Twice as many people have been killed in the struggle during this recent period as were killed in the first three months of the year. In all, there have been 500 victims since Jan. 1.

In recent days, the violence has spread, enveloping Bolivians, Chileans, and Uruguayans, as well as Argentinians. And right-wing terrorists are openly threatening Latin Americans living in Argentine exile.

Last weekend, for example, 25 exiles were forced from their hotels in Buenos Aires by gunmen who broke into their rooms and held them overnight. All were beaten and some tortured

during the incident — and were released after they had promised to leave Argentina.

United Nations officials in Argentina expressed concern this week a rightist campaign to intimidate an estimated 11,000 Latin American refugees in Argentina may be developing. They cite last weekend's incident, as well as the abduction and murder of two former Uruguayan legislators and former Bolivian President Juan José Torres González.

Meanwhile, there are a number of allegations of police and military repression being circulated. Amnesty International, a private international group looking at human-rights issues, has made some of the charges.

At the same time, in neighboring Uruguay, similar charges have been leveled against that country's police and military.

David Anable, Monitor UN correspondent, reports from New York the United States Congress has taken a hesitant, initial step to counter political repression in Latin America as a House appropriations committee voted to cut off all military assistance to Uruguay.



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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dick Cheney
info.



ORIGINAL RETIRED TO
SPECIAL DOCUMENTS FILE



AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY— TWO CANDIDATES

JIMMY CARTER:

By Dana Adams Schmidt

Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

What would it mean for American foreign policy if Jimmy Carter became president?

Governments around the world, and especially their diplomatic representatives in Washington, are asking this question with growing insistency.

Diplomats of many nationalities have in fact been beating a track to the Washington office of "Carter for President," directed by Peter Bourne. Several Soviet diplomats have even gone so far as to suggest that Mr. Carter might like to meet Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin, who might find ways to help the Democrat. Mr. Carter replied publicly that it was improper for the Russians to take such initiatives.

Here are some of the answers diplomats are getting by gleaning Carter speeches and interviews and consulting his growing battery of foreign policy experts headed by Zbigniew Brzezinski, a political science professor at Columbia University.

Mr. Carter would become not only the principal architect but the spokesman of his foreign policy. His secretary of state, unlike Henry Kissinger, would be thrust into the background.

He would introduce important changes, not in the main lines of U.S. policy, such as alliances or support of Israel, but in emphasis.

Approach denounced

For Mr. Carter, with his Christian fundamentalist background, moral content is paramount. He denounces the amoral quality of what he calls the Nixon-Kissinger "balance-of-power politics," conceived and executed, he says, in secrecy, and he maintains that foreign policy in his administration will originate with "the people" and their representatives in Congress, and will be put into operation openly and in pursuit of a "new world order." The "new world order" is emerging as a central Carter slogan.

Mr. Brzezinski interprets Carter's proposals in three steps:

1. First must be to develop the closest possible cooperation among the advanced countries and especially among the United States, Japan, and Europe.
2. If achieved, the U.S. would be more successful in the next stage of cooperating with poorer nations.
3. If both Steps 1 and 2 succeed, the U.S. will have no dif-

ficulty in establishing a new relationship with the Soviet Union.

But if the West is in disarray, as U.S. foreign policy is at present, Dr. Brzezinski says, or the U.S. is shaken by a "rich nation-poor nation" confrontation, then the U.S. will lack the strength to deal with the Soviet Union.

In so doing care must be taken not to ignore East Europe and China.

Nuclear viewpoint

And the proposals made by Mr. Carter in his UN speech May 13 dealing with control of nuclear proliferation are seen as steps in this direction. Professor Gardner and W. Averell Harriman, the veteran foreign-policy maker of three Democratic administrations, helped inspire and write this speech.

Some other main points of Mr. Carter's foreign policy are these:

- Constantly recurring in his statements are three words: "the people," "respect," and "morality." He would have U.S. foreign policies "as decent and compassionate as the American people." The U.S. should treat other peoples with "respect."

- He respects the objectives of "detente" but believes that because of Dr. Kissinger's tendency to personalize the conduct of foreign affairs, Washington has given too much and received too little. "The Russians have no more business in Angola that we have," he says. The U.S. can "win" Africa and the "third world" with respect, and with commodity agreements that will keep stable the prices of cocoa, coffee, tin, rubber, and other raw materials.

- Henry Jackson's amendment to a trade bill designed to force the Soviet Union to allow more Jews to emigrate was self-defeating because it offended Soviet pride. Yet the U.S. should "insist that the Soviet Union and other countries recognize the human rights of all citizens who live within their boundaries, whether they be blacks in Rhodesia, Asians in Uganda or Jews in the Soviet Union."

- There will be no more ambassadors who are "... ignorant, rich, major contributors to a president's campaign."

- The Pentagon is the "most wasteful, bloated bureaucracy in Washington." He attributes to secrecy and failure to consult "the people" such episodes as Vietnam, Cambodia, Chile, and Angola, as well as excesses of the CIA.

Mr. Carter's advisers disagree as to whether his early religious education concerning the Biblical promise to the

children of Israel, or whether electoral necessities explain his stand for the survival of Israel, with which he usually qualifies talk about concessions to Palestinian nationalism.

But he has conceded that a Palestinian nation will probably emerge on the West Bank, adding that Jordan might chip in some territory.

Adamant in condemning terrorist leaders, he insists that any steps toward recognition of a Palestinian nation be paralleled by Palestinian recognition of Israel.

In the Middle East settlement Israel should get guarantees not only from the U.S., as suggested by former Sen. J. W. Fulbright, but "from the NATO countries, the Soviet Union, and the countries of the area," he says.

Denying that the U.S. is weak or No. 2 (the contention of both Jackson and Reagan) Mr. Carter proposes to cut the Pentagon budget by 5 percent or \$6 billion to \$7 billion. Only the Navy would escape his cuts.

Canal treaty revision

He proposes to cede to Panama "part" of the sovereignty over the Canal Zone, including deletion of the words "in perpetuity" from the agreement, while retaining "effective control" of the waterway.

On nuclear weapons he would press on with efforts to achieve SALT 2, while adding a commitment to seek reduction of U.S. and all other stocks of nuclear weapons to zero.

When he was governor of Georgia, Mr. Carter traveled widely to promote the economic interests of his state, including trips to Latin America, Tokyo, and Europe.

In Washington he was introduced to the Brookings Institution by Prof. Henry Owens, its director, and Barry Bleichman, a senior fellow. Over a period of three years they have exposed him to many of the departments and experts of the institution.

The inner circle of advisers are: Dr. Brzezinski; Milton Katz, a Harvard political scientist; Richard Gardner, a law professor at Columbia University; and Cyrus Vance. Mr. Vance, who served as Robert S. McNamara's deputy secretary of defense, now is a member of the New York law firm of Simpson, Thacher, and Bartlett. Among insiders, he has been mentioned as a possible Carter secretary of state, while Professor Brzezinski is thought likely to become national security adviser, the post from which Dr. Kissinger moved on to Secretary of State.

Former Undersecretary of State George Ball is available for help, though he has been waiting to see if old friend Hubert H. Humphrey would make a move.

Attracting more and more attention as the primary campaign trail ends are the foreign policies of the three main candidates. President Ford's policies are well known and have been widely reported in this newspaper since Mr. Ford took office. Today the Monitor presents a look at the policies of Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan.

CANDIDATES' VIEWS



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RONALD REAGAN:

By Dana Adams Schmidt

Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

What would it mean for American foreign policy if Ronald Reagan became president?

The world—and especially Washington's diplomats—are asking this question with urgency. The conduct of American foreign policy has been aggravated, they suspect, by something like an indirect veto-power exercised by Mr. Reagan.

In response to the former California governor's anti-detente polemics, President Ford has officially expunged the word "detente" from his vocabulary and has postponed the signing of an agreement setting a 150-kiloton ceiling on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. And Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger finds himself the butt of Mr. Reagan's political thrusts.

It is believed the White House recently asked Dr. Kissinger to cancel two scheduled speeches in California to prevent Mr. Reagan from launching a fresh round of criticism.

Here are some things the diplomats are learning from Mr. Reagan's foreign-policy speeches, his foreign-policy advisors, and in particular from Peter Hannaford, the California public relations man who acts as the Reagan research and foreign-policy coordinator:

National Security

There is one subject that moves Mr. Reagan above all others — national security. Out of that grows his special concerns with defense, detente, and the Panama Canal.

He says the United States should be ready to fight for the canal: "We bought it, we paid for it, we built it, and we intend to keep it."

Mr. Hannaford recalls it was Mr. Reagan, who, in May of last year, began bringing up foreign-policy issues (and Panama in particular) in his newspaper column.

Mr. Reagan's thinking is said to be influenced by Donald Dozer, a University of California professor from whom he appears to have taken the line — stoutly countered by the State Department — the Panama Canal Zone is no different from Alaska or the territories carved out of the Louisiana Purchase.

Dr. Dozer says whatever guilt may fall to the United States for having manipulated the detachment of the Panama Republic from Colombia (then having negotiated the Panama Canal treaty giving the U.S. rights "as though sovereign") has long since been expiated by good U.S. man-

agement of the canal and the prosperity it has brought Panama.

He thinks it unlikely Latin Americans would wage guerrilla warfare for the canal, but says he has heard of a plan by which next November (when Panama's representative will take his turn as President of the United Nations Security Council) President Omar Torrijos Herrera and his entire cabinet would walk into the Canal Zone and declare it Panamanian sovereign territory.

Karl Bendetsen

Another on whom Mr. Reagan leans for advice on Panama is Karl Bendetsen, a former Deputy Secretary of the Army and a former Chairman of the Panama Canal Company.

On general defense topics, Mr. Reagan has drawn much of his thinking from the following people, who, however, are not committed to him as a candidate:

— James R. Schlesinger, former Secretary of Defense, who, according to Mr. Reagan, "was fired because he was trying to speak the truth, frankly and boldly, to his fellow citizens." Dr. Schlesinger feels strongly the U.S. is being overtaken by the Soviet Union in almost all military spheres.

— Lt. Gen. Daniel O. Graham, former Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, who resigned when Dr. Schlesinger was forced out of office.

— Paul R. Nitze, the former Assistant Secretary of Defense, who also takes a pessimistic view of recent trends in U.S. defense.

— In addition, Mr. Reagan has consulted some "think tanks" which do not like to have their names used. He has also drawn heavily on the Hoover Institute at Palo Alto, paralleling Jimmy Carter's use of the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C.

From these and other sources Mr. Reagan has concluded the U.S. has slipped to "No. 2" and that this must be remedied by an immediate increase in defense spending. Unlike the Ford administration — and even Dr. Schlesinger — which sees "equivalency" as the objective, Mr. Reagan wants to bring back U.S. military superiority of the 1950s and part of the 60s.

Although he has yet to deal in any detail with the subject of strategic arms limitation and nuclear weapons, Mr. Reagan expresses concern SALT II could curtail development of the American cruise missile in return for relatively insignificant restrictions on the Soviet Union's backfire bomber.

From the dangers of SALT II, Mr. Reagan shifts to the dangers of detente and the way in which he says Dr. Kissinger and President Ford at Helsinki last summer acknowledged Moscow's domination of the peoples of Eastern Europe to buy SALT concessions.

If detente meant anything, he argues, it would have prevented the Soviet intrusion in Angola — or would at least have resulted in the return of all the Americans missing-in-action from North Vietnam.

Having winked at the activities of the Greek Junta, and at the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, "the U.S. now is distrusted by both sides, and the southern flank of NATO is weakened," he says.

In Angola, Dr. Kissinger kept secret the needs of the anti-communists until the "eleventh-and-a-half hour," then blamed everyone for not supporting him, the former governor contends.

Here are some other points made by Mr. Reagan:

- He reports as fact remarks Dr. Kissinger has denied ever making that Dr. Kissinger sees his job as securing for the United States the "best available" terms as No. 2 in the world. Although Mr. Reagan does not say so, the quotes probably came from an advance text of a book called "On Watch," by retired Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, in which he repeats remarks purportedly made by Dr. Kissinger while driving to a football game.

- On China, he appears to have unique sources of information. He says (the Shanghai Communique signed in 1972 by the U.S. and China notwithstanding) China would probably tolerate the indefinitely prolonged presence of U.S. garrisons in Taiwan as well as Korea because China wants the U.S. to maintain its presence in the Pacific. This view is met with skepticism in the State Department.

- One of the few foreign-policy topics on which he has no substantial differences with the Administration or with Mr. Carter is the Middle East. He would seek peace while preserving Israel.

- On Africa, on the other hand, he has profound differences with both the Administration and with Mr. Carter. While endorsing the objective of "majority rule" in Rhodesia, he considers Dr. Kissinger's sudden pressure on the white minority unwise and likely to lead to needless bloodshed. He wants to continue imports of Rhodesian chrome because, he says, cutting it off would make the U.S. dependent on the Soviet Union. This view is flatly denied by the Ford administration.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 8, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: MAX FRIEDERSDORF *M. G.*

Congressman Bernie Sisk (D-Calif.) resigned yesterday from Jimmy Carter's Agricultural Committee in California, according to Hyde Murray.

Congressman Sisk issued a very strong blast at Carter and accused him of taking at least three different positions on Proposition 14, a state referendum issue in California this year pertaining to the rights of farm workers.

Proposition 14 is being pushed by Cesar Chaves, Senators Cranston and Tunney, and other liberals in California. It is being opposed by California farmers.

Before Sisk agreed to go on Carter's Agricultural Committee he was given a commitment by Carter to remain neutral on Proposition 14.

However, when Carter visited California he joined forces with Cranston and Tunney and endorsed Proposition 14, thus touching off the Sisk resignation and blast.

Hyde Murray said there were also press reports that Congressman Tom Foley (D-Wash.), Chairman of the House Agriculture Committee, and Congressman Bob Bergland (D-Minn.) have criticized Carter's flip flop.

Hyde believes that this episode has implications outside of California with respect to both Carter's credibility and also his relationship with the nationwide farm vote.

Hyde Murray thinks that this instance could be sighted in the debates as another example of Carter's wishy-washy positions on the issues and also presents the opportunity for the President to tell the farm voters that they can depend on what the President tells them and not expect him to constantly change positions depending on his audiences.



Hyde Murray is sending me specific details and clippings concerning Sisk's resignation.



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Carter - Defense Spending

\$15 billion cut

when & where

And other statements
on cuts etc.

Memo to
Mike Doval
10/1/76



PRIORITY
PRECEDENCE

UNCLAS
CLASSIFICATION

FOR COMMCENTER USE ONLY

FROM: JACK MARSH

TO: MIKE DUVAL

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 5, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR:

JACK MARSH

FROM:

MILT MITLER *MM*

*Def
to
Duval*
MM

Jack, attached are the Carter quotes reference the National Guard and Reserve. He made statements on the subject both on the 27th of July and on the 28th. There is some difference in the two statements.

I'll be available to Mike Duval, should he need me for further elaboration or information.

Attachment



PLAINS, GA - JULY 27, 1976

On the question of the Armed Forces Reserves, including State National Guard Units, Carter said, "Their readiness for combat is doubtful, their weaponry is poor and they are quite often shot through with politics.

"I don't believe you'll ever have a President who is politically strong enough to run over a governor or to run over governors and institute changes unilaterally from Washington".

"One of the things that is obvious to me is that the Reserve Forces, say in a state, quite often are shot through with politics - promotion procedures, quality of training; it is heavily protected by Governors and Adjutants General and other leaders in the National Guard from encroachment of influence from Washington".

"But," he emphasized, that, "he and his advisors agreed that a coordinated effort between Washington and the States must be made to improve the quality and the coordination of the military reserves".

When asked if that meant drastic changes, he replied, "I would guess that is true".

JULY 28, 1976

The Former Georgia Governor was more definite in another subject, saying, "The military Reserve Forces were inadequately trained and quite often are shot through with politics. He stated it would be a major objective of his Presidency to work with the governors to devise a plan to reform the Guard and the Reserves. This cooperative approach would circumvent their political opposition. Among the deficiencies of the Reserve Forces," he said, "were insufficient combat readiness because of training and equipment deficiencies and the lack of clearly defined responsibilities. He called for a much tighter inter-relationship, much greater sharing of responsibility with the active armed forces".

