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
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
WASHINGTON

13 January 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA (by WG wickhow)

Attached is a paper which I believe will be helpful in considering this decision. It sets forth arguments pro and con for the options (pages 9-12), enumerates the concessions on both sides (pages 13-16), attempts to describe how each option would have to be defended, and discusses Congressional considerations which would be important in ratification (pages 18-21).

Attachment SALT Options Paper 7 Jan 76



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WORKING PAPERS

SALT OPTIONS PAPER

7 JANUARY 1976

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WORKING PAPERS

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OSD SALT OPTIONS PAPER

INTRODUCTION

- I. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
- II. SALT OPTIONS
 - A. Description of Options (I, II, III, IV and V (formerly Option G) see Attachment)
 - B. Pros and Cons (each Option)
 - C. US and Soviet Concessions
 - 1. Concessions Made at Vladivostok
 - 2. Concessions Made since Vladivostok
 - 3. Additional Concessions Required to Achieve Options
 - D. Negotiating Tactics

III. CONGRESSIONAL/POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

- A. Considerations on US Side
 - Congressional Reaction to the SALT Options
 Advocacy Statements for the Options
- B. Considerations on Soviet Side

IV. RELATIONSHIP WITH DETENTE

- A. Status of Detente
- B. Impact of SALT Options on Detente
- LONG-RANGE IMPLICATIONS IF NO AGREEMENT
- A. Political Implications
 - 1. To US

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- 2. To USSR
- B. Military Implications
 - 1. Soviet Reaction
 - 2. US Reaction
 - 3. Perceived Balance
 - 4. Strategic Stability

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
SALT OPTIONS PAPER

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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this paper is to assess the technical, military and political ramification of the five SALT options currently being considered by the Verification Panel Working Group and to assess the longterm implication if no agreement is obtained. Section I contains some observations on the current SALT debate. Section II contains a description of the five SALT options, a discussion of the pros and cons of each, the concessions required by both sides to reach an agreed position and a discussion of possible negotiating tactics that might be used to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion. Section III discusses the domestic political considerations on both sides that influence the acceptability of one option over another. Included in this section are hypothetical "advocacy" statements that might be prepared in support of each of the options. Section IV discusses the relationship between SALT and DETENTE including an assessment of how DETENTE might influence the acceptance or non-acceptance of a SALT agreement at this time and an assessment of how acceptance or nonacceptance of a SALT agreement might, in turn, affect DETENTE. Section V assesses the long-range implications, both military and political, that might result if no agreement can be reached at this time.



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-3-

SECTION I

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

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GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE CURRENT SALT DEBATE

^o A good agreement within the framework of the Vladivostok accords could set a valuable precedent of equality for future agreements that would limit strategic forces more tightly and might slow somewhat the expansion of Soviet strategic forces in the latter part of the next decade.


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- ^o However, even the best agreement possible will not prevent a major build-up in Soviet strategic forces over the next ten years and will not significantly reduce the need for a high level of US military spending.
- ° Failure to achieve agreement would not be disastrous, and need not even preclude continuing negotiations to attempt to reach agreement at a later date.
- Some of the options still being considered could compromise the principle that agreements must be verifiable, could jeopardize technological innovations that could be important for US security, and could even jeopardize the fundamental Vladivostok achievement of equality. Such agreements would be worse than no agreement at all.
- The most important consequences of any agreement are likely to be determined by the way it is presented to, and received by, the American public and Congress. Even a good agreement may foster harmful illusions about the real requirements of national security if its benefits are exaggerated.
- A key accomplishment to be achieved by the present SALT talks remains the Vladivostok principle of equality between the strategic forces of the superpowers. Although this equality is established at very high levels, it is a valuable precedent for future negotiations which could reduce the level of strategic forces.

Such an agreement would unquestionably be a positive accomplishment; however, its benefits would be modest and should not be exaggerated.

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SECTION II

SALT OPTIONS

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FIGURE 1 - OPTIONS SUMMARY

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BACKFIRE		NOT NUMERICALLY CON- STRAINED (COLLATERAL CONSTRAINTS)	NUMERICALLY CONSTRAINED IN SEPARATE LIMIT OF 300 COLLATERAL CONSTRAINTS)	COUNT IN AGGREGATE	
ALCMS ON HEAVY BOMBERS		BAN ABOVE 2000-2500 Km	BAN ABOVE 2000-2500 Km	BAN ABOVE 2500 Km	
	DEFER TO FOLLOW-ON* NEGOTIATIONS	300 H.B. WITH ALCMs ABOVE 600 Km	COUNT H.B. WITH ALCMs ABOVE 600 Km IN MIRV LIMIT	COUNT H.B. WITH ALCMs ABOVE 600 Km IN MIRV LIMIT	
ALCMS ON OTHER AIRCRAFT		BAN ABOVE 600 Km	BAN ABOVE 500 Km	BAN ABOVE 600 Km	
SLCMs ON SUBMARINES		BAN ABOVE 600 Km	BAN ABOVE 600 Km	BAN ABOVE 600 Km	
SLCMs ON SURFACE SHIPS		BAN ABOVE 2000-2500 Km	BAN ABOVE 2000-2500 Km	BAN ABOVE 2500 Km	
. /	↓ · · · ·		NUMERICAL LIMIT ON PLATFORMS		
LAND-BASED CRUISE MISSILES	BAN ABOVE 5500 Km	BAN ABOVE 2000-2500 Km	BAN ABOVE-2000-2500 Km	BAN ABOVE 2500 Km	

*THIS OPTION COULD INCLUDE AN INTERIM BAN ON CRUISE MISSILE TESTS ABOVE 2500 Km AND INTERIM CONSTRAINTS ON NUMBERS OF BACKFIRE AND CRUISE MISSILE PLATFORMS.

**REDUCTION OF THE AGGREGATE TO 2300 COULD BE CONSIDERED UNDER ANY OF THE OPTIONS BUT MAY BE OF PARTICULAR INTEREST IN OPTION II WHICH DOES NOT NUMERICALLY LIMIT BACKFIRE.

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(formerly Option G)

BASIC PROVISIONS

© U.S. CONCESSIONS

BACKFIRE NOT LIMITED IN SALT

LIMITS ON CRUISE MISSILES (SAME AS OPTION IV, FORMERLY OPTION E)

•• DEFINE CRUISE MISSILES AS "NUCLEAR-ARMED".

- •• BAN LAND, SEA AND AIR-LAUNCHED ABOVE 2500 Km RANGE.
- •• COUNT HEAVY BOMBERS WITH ALCMs OF RANGE ABOVE 600 Km IN 1320 MIRV LIMIT.
- •• BAN ALCMs OF RANGE ABOVE 600 Km FROM AIRCRAFT OTHER THAN HEAVY BOMBERS.
- •• BAN SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED SLCMs OF RANGE ABOVE 600 Km.

SOVIET CONCESSIONS

- FREEZE DEPLOYMENT OF "NEW" MLBMs (SS-18).
- AGREE TO OBJECTIVE OF PHASING-OUT MLBMs IN SALT THREE.

WOULD TAKE FIRST STEP TOWARD EQUALIZING MISSILE FORCE CAPABILITIES.

WOULD PAVE WAY FOR REDUCTIONS IN SALT THREE

II SALT OPTIONS

A. Description of Options (See Figure 1)

Option I. This option would defer reaching agreement on Backfire and air- and sea-launched cruise missiles to a follow-on negotiation. It would codify the Vladivostok understandings and those other issues which have been agreed to since Vladivostok, such as limits on missile size and limits on other systems such as ICCMs, seabed missiles, etc. The sides would agree to commence negotiations in early 1977 with the objective of realizing an agreement to go into effect by October 1977 which would resolve the Backfire, ALCM, and SLCM issues.

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There could be interim constraints on the deferred issues pending final agreement. For example, cruise missile tests could be limited to a range of 2500 km, and Backfire production could be limited to the current rate.

Option II. This option has no numerical limits on Backfire, but does contain collateral constraints on Backfire, including a ban on (1) upgrading the Backfire aircraft, (2) tankers for Backfire, (3) longrange ASMs on Backfire, and (4) basing and training for strategic missions. In addition, Backfire could be deployed only as a replacement for older medium bombers.

This option contains less restrictive but still significant constraints on cruise missiles. All cruise missiles of range above 2000-2500 km are banned, and cruise missiles of range above 600 km are banned on submarines and aircraft other than heavy bombers. SLCMs of below 2000-2500 km on surface ships are not limited, and ALCMs of range between 600 km and 2000-2500 km are permitted on 300 heavy bombers.

Option III. This option is more restrictive than Option II. It contains the limitations of Option II with the following additions and modifications:

In addition to the collateral constraints on Backfire, the number of Backfires is limited to 300 (a separate limit outside the 2400 aggregate).

Heavy bombers equipped with ALCMs of range above 600 km are included in the 1320 MIRV limit. (This is in lieu of the 300 sublimit on heavy bombers with ALCMs) There is a numerical limit (separate from the 2400 aggregate) on the number of surface ships equipped with SLCMs of range above 600 km.

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Option IV. This option counts Backfire in the 2400 aggregate. Land-, sea- and air-launched cruise missiles of range above 2500 km are banned. Heavy bombers equipped with ALCMs of range between 600 km and 2500 km are included in the 1320 MIRV limit. Cruise missiles of range above 600 km are banned on submarines and aircraft other than heavy bombers. SLCMs of range below 2500 km on surface ships are not limited.

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-9-

Option V (formerly Option G). This option would not count Backfire in the aggregate, adding a Soviet <u>quid</u>, namely, a limitation on "new" MLBMS (Modern Large Ballistic Missiles). Option V would allow Backfire to be deployed outside of the 2400 aggregate ceiling in SALT. Limits on Backfire <u>could</u> be considered in future negotiations associated with MBFR. (An alternative here would be to allow only 300 Backfire, similar to Option III). Limits on cruise missiles would be identical to Option IV. There would also be agreement that, as part of the SALT TWO agreement, deployment of "new" MLBMs, i.e., SS-18s, would be frozen at the current level (or as of 1 January 1976). Both sides would agree through the negotiating record that SALT THREE would have as one <u>objective</u> the total phase-out of all MLBMs. This understanding, if successfully negotiated, would result in the elimination of a major inequity in the current SALT agreement on offensive arms, namely zero MLBMs for the US and 308-326 MLBMs for the USSR.

B. Pros and Cons

Option I

Pros

- Would codify Vladivostok understandings as well as issues agreed since Vladivostok.
 - -- Codify principle of equal aggregates with freedom-to-mix.
 - -- Establish qualitative constraints on delivery systems with the MIRV sublimit and initial limits on missile size.
 - -- Formally define the offensive systems to be limited and establish when they are subject to the limits.
 - -- Maintain the momentum of the SALT process.

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- Would permit US maximum cruise missile flexibility, at least for next two years.
 - -- Retains negotiating leverage associated with cruise missile programs.
- Would obtain some degree of Soviet acknowledgement of Backfire as an appropriate topic for discussion in SALT.

Cons

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- Increases possibility of losing Congressional support for the long-range cruise missile program, having not been "legitimized" in the SALT TWO agreement as an important and agreed element in the "strategic balance."
- Allows Soviets to continue Backfire program (and initiate a long-range cruise missile program if they so choose) without restriction.
- Could be difficult to reach agreement on other issues, e.g., heavy missile definition and MIRV verification, without accepting limits on cruise missiles.
- Could provide Soviets with additional argument for inclusion of forward based systems (FBS) in SALT THREE.
- Could cast doubt on whether final comprehensive agreement is achievable, in view of failure to settle Backfire and cruise missile issues in more than one year's time since Vladivostok.

Option II

Pros

- Would allow a SALT TWO agreement to be formalized.
- US would retain options to deploy long-range cruise missiles on heavy bombers and surface ships for;
 - -- Bomber penetration

-- Surface ship theatre roles

 Would somewhat inhibit efficient use of Backfire for CONUS strike role

Cons

- Number of Backfires not limited. Counting older Bison, while allowing new Backfire to go free in the 2400 ceiling will be difficult to defend
- Backfire constraints do not preclude its use against CONUS

- Precludes US option for long-range submarine launched cruise missiles

-11-

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- -- 600 km range limit favors Soviets due to geography
- 2000 km upper range threshold would limit target coverage by

Option III

Pros

- Would allow a SALT TWO Agreement to be formalized.
- US would retain option to deploy long-range cruise missiles on heavy bombers without counting each ALCM.
- US would retain option to deploy long-range cruise missiles on surface ships.
- Would inhibit efficient use of Backfire for CONUS strike role, and also limit number of Backfire (and perhaps Soviet long-range cruise missiles on surface ships). Soviet agreement on collateral constraints on Backfire may be as difficult as achieving agreement to count Backfire in the aggregate.

Cons

- Increase effective aggregate limit to 2700 for Soviets.
- Backfire permitted outside 2400 aggregate; constraints do not preclude its use against CONUS.
- Impacts number of US ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with MIRVs if US deploys significant number of long-range ALCMs.
- Precludes US option for long-range submarine launched cruise missiles.
- 2000 km upper range threshold would somewhat limit target coverage by

Option IV

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Pros

- Backfire fully counted as central system within 2400 aggregate.

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- US would retain option to deploy long-range cruise missiles on heavy bombers without counting each missile.
- US would retain option to deploy long-range cruise missiles on surface ships.

Cons

- Impacts number of US ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with MIRVs if US deploys significant number of long-range ALCMs.
- Precludes US option for long-range submarine launched cruise missiles.
- Probably unacceptable to Soviets.

Option V (formerly Option G) Pros

- Option provides comparable concession from Soviets for allowing Backfire to be free of aggregate 2400 ceiling.
- Eliminates major inequity in the current SALT agreement on offensive arms, namely zero MLBMs for the US and 308-326 MLBMs for the USSR.
- Would be a major first step toward equalizing aggregate force capabilities.
- Would pave the way for reductions in SALT THREE.

Cons

- Allows Backfire outside of SALT, somewhat diminishing the achievement gained at Vladivostok, namely equal ceilings on central systems. However, principle of force equality is maintained.
- Control on Backfire probably would have to be achieved in follow-on MBFR negotiations.
- Probably non-negotiable at least over a relatively short negotiating period.

- C. US and Soviet Concessions
 - 1. Concessions Made at Vladivostok
 - o By US
 - Equal MIRV sublimit
 - Agreed to count air-to-surface ballistic missiles of range above 600 km on heavy bombers
 - Dropped missile throw-weight and bomber payload constraints
 - o By Soviets
 - Equal overall aggregate
 - Dropped FBS and demand for third country nuclear systems compensation
 - Dropped asymmetrical subceiling on SLBMs and SSBNs
 - Concessions Made <u>Since Vladivostok</u> (via Helsinki and September proposal)
 - o Concessions Offered by US
 - Concessions from position that cruise missiles not limited:
 - -- Sublimit (within 2400 aggregate) of 300 heavy bombers equipped with ALCMs of range between 600 km and 2500 km
 - -- ALCMs with range greater than 2500 km would be banned from heavy bombers
 - -- US SLCMs (+FB-111s) of range between 600 and 2000 km would be limited to 250-300 (outside 2400 aggregate)
 - -- SLCMs with range greater than 2000 km will be banned
 - -- ALCMs with range greater than 600 km would be banned from aircraft other than heavy bombers
 - -- Land-based ICCMs(range greater than 5500 km) will be banned
 - -- Seabed-based cruise missiles will be banned
 - Concession from position that Backfire is heavy bomber
 - -- Soviet Backfire bombers (+ long-range SLCMs) would be limited to 250-300 (outside 2400 aggregate)
 - o Concessions Offered by Soviets
 - Agreed to satisfy US MIRV verification concerns but details are yet to be worked out (tied to satisfying Soviet cruise missile concerns)
 - Agreed in principle to include a heavy missile definition but have not as agreed in detail
 - Concession from position that ALCMs with range greater than 600 km on heavy bombers count in 2400 aggregate: -- None.
 - Concession from position that SLCMs with range greater than 600 km will be banned: -- None.
 - Concessions from position that Backfire is not a "heavy bomber": -- None.
 - Agreement to include missiles as well as launchers in seabed-based cruise missile ban

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3. <u>Additional Concessions Required to Achieve Options</u> (Note: Lowering of range threshold on land-based cruise missiles is not included below as it is a secondary issue to this discussion. It should be considered a Soviet concession, since the US would be the side proposing it.)

o Option I

- By US

-- Backfire not to be included in agreement at present time

- By Soviets

- Certain cruise missiles not to be included in agreement at present time
- -- Backfire accepted as valid topic for discussion in SALT, but probably as part of Forward Based Systems
- o Option II

- By US

- -- Backfire not numerically constrained
- -- Reduction in maximum ALCM range with consequent significant degradation in target coverage, if upper range threshold is 2000 km
- -- Ban long-range SLCMs on submarines
- By Soviets

-- Collateral constraints on Backfire

- -- ALCMs with range up to 2000-2500 km on heavy bombers are not included in 2400 aggregate
- Long-range SLCMs on surface ships are allowed and not limited
- o Option III

- By US

- -- Count heavy bombers with ALCMs having range greater than 600 km in MIRV limit
- -- Reduction in maximum ALCM range with consequent significant degradation in target coverage, if upper range threshold is 2000 km
- range threshold is 2000 km -- Ban long-range SLCMs on submarines

-14-

- By Soviets
 - -- Numerical limit and collateral constraints on Backfire
 - -- Long-range ALCMs on heavy bombers are not included in 2400 aggregate

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- -- Long-range SLCMs on surface ships are allowed and only number of platforms is limited
- o Option IV
 - By US
 - -- Count heavy bombers with ALCMs with range greater than 600 km in MIRV limit
 - -- Ban long-range SLCMs on submarines
 - By Soviets
 - -- Backfire is considered heavy bomber
 - -- Long-range ALCMs on heavy bombers are not included in 2400 aggregate
 - -- Long-range SLCMs on surface ships are allowed and not limited
- o Option V (formerly Option G)
 - By US
 - -- Count heavy bombers with ALCMs with range greater than 600 km in MIRV limit
 - -- Ban long-range SLCMs on submarines
 - By Soviets
 - -- Freeze on deployment of MLBMs
 - -- Long-range ALCMs on heavy bombers are not included in the 2400 aggregate
 - -- Long-range SLCMs on surface ships are allowed and not deployed

D. Negotiating Tactics

There are two basic negotiating tactics that could be used in attempting to obtain a SALT TWO agreement with the Soviets. One, the "Give-and-Take" approach, is based on the philosophy that both sides must make positive contributions to the negotiating process. For instance, the

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
US may propose a solution to a particular problem or set of problems, in this case the Backfire and cruise missile problems, and explain the rationale for that proposal. The Soviets would then respond with a counterproposal and their accompanying rationales. If both sides are sincere about reaching an agreement and make positive attempts in their respective proposals to accommodate concerns of the other side, the process should ultimately result in a compromise solution which could be agreed to by both sides.

The second, or "moderate preemptive concession" approach is based on the thesis that it is necessary for one side to generate proposed solutions to the problems in question because the other side cannot easily put forward proposed solutions due to its bureaucratic organization The second side therefore serves only as a sounding board, accepting or rejecting the proposals, but not offering substantive, comparable alternative proposals. This approach can result in agreement only if and when the proposing side, in this case the US, through alterations to its original proposal, arrives at a position which can be accepted by the other side, the USSR.

Without the benefit of Soviet counterproposals, the US may not be fully aware of the real concerns that must be accommodated in order to conclude an agreement. Accordingly, it is necessary for the US to move in relatively small increments towards what is believed to be the Soviet position in order to prevent conceding more of the US position than is necessary. This negotiating tactic fosters the additional concern that the Soviets may intentionally hold out for more US concessions than they would be willing to accept so long as the US is willing to offer them.

Insofar as the Soviets have not offered a counter proposal to our proposal of 21 September 1975 and insofar as the US is basically committed to offer a new proposal in the coming weeks, it would seem appropriate that this new proposal contain as few additional concessions as possible and that it be used primarily to draw the Soviets into a give-and-take exchange which could lead to an equitable agreement. Of the five options considered in this paper, Option IV offers the strongest starting position, being a solid arms control proposal.

-16-



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SECTION III

CONGRESSIONAL/POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

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III. <u>CONGRESSIONAL/POLITICAL</u> CONSIDERATIONS

A. <u>Considerations on US Side</u>

Legally, a treaty can be ratified either by a 2/3 majority of a quorum of the Senate or by a Joint Resolution of Congress. As President Nixon did with the Interim Agreement in SALT ONE, President FORD would likely request a Joint Resolution of Congress to support his actions in SALT TWO.

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The more perplexing question currently facing the Administration in its endeavor to secure an equitable SALT TWO agreement with the Soviet Union is whether or not the Congress and the American people will find any realizable agreement acceptable. The heavy coverage recently given the SALT negotiations by the media, especially discussions of SALT ONE inadequacies and inequities, Soviet SALT ONE "violations," and Soviet violations of the spirit of detente in Angola, has created a vocal group of Arms Control "experts" on the right throughout Congress and the nation. Similarly, the high aggregate levels agreed to in Vladivostok together with the addition of cruise missiles to the controversy has caused the vocal left to claim there is insufficient arms control in SALT. These individuals seem poised and ready to strike out at any agreement. Unfortunately, the negotiations are so complex, and political points of view so different, that almost anyone could find debatable inequities and loopholes in any possible future agreement.

Since most Congressmen realize the potential negative impact on detente and the international situation of a failure to conclude a SALT TWO agreement, one would expect the Congress to finally approve any SALT TWO agreement which was supported by DoD and the JCS. Nevertheless, the Administration can still expect to find considerable opposition to any agreement. The fact that 1976 is an election year and some candidates appear ready to use SALT and detente as major campaign issues adds an additional dimension to Administration considerations regarding the acceptability of a particular agreement.

A good agreement within the present negotiating framework would be an accomplishment of some value and a net benefit to the security of the United States. However, efforts to oversell even a good agreement, or to exaggerate its modest accomplishments, could have consequences far graver than any of the actual provisions of an agreement by undermining efforts to consider seriously the military problems this nation faces. If the agreement is presented as the modest achievement which it is, and if care is used in explaining its limitations, these consequences may be avoided. In particular:

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Proponents should not resort to emphasizing how large Soviet forces would be or how much the US would have to spend in the absence of agreement. Such arguments create the impression that the Soviet strategic build-up which will take place within the agreement is not a cause for concern and suggest erroneously that the overall level of Soviet military effort has somehow been reduced.

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It should be made clear the United States was prepared to set much lower levels than the ones in the agreement, even though this means placing responsibility on the Russians for the high levels reached. Failure to make this clear, however, further strengthens the myth that our current levels of military spending are made necessary only by the greed of the Pentagon and not by any actual dangers.


The agreement should also not be defended with arguments that appeal to the notion of an arms race out of control. To the contrary, it should be emphasized that our expenditures on strategic arms over the last decade have been steadily decreasing, while those of the Soviet Union have been increasing.

Finally, the purpose of limits such as those on cruise missiles should be explained in quantitative terms, not as attempts to prevent innovations in military technology or to halt the "qualitative arms race." Such arguments encourage the belief that innovation is harmful, or at least unnecessary since we aleady have the ability "to destroy the Soviet Union ten times over." Instead, the opportunity should be taken to explain that this is not the purpose of our strategic forces, and that the purpose of such innovations as cruise missiles is not to achieve "overkill" but to reduce the indiscriminate destructiveness of nuclear forces and to reduce their vulnerability.

The problems of presenting a bad agreement are of course even greater. An agreement which fails to include Backfire, and therefore seems unequal, will be particularly divisive. It will split the Administration from the very allies it will later need to defend adequate levels of military spending. And because the opposition will be more vocal, the arguments in defense of the agreement will tend to become more extravagant.

A debate over whether the agreement is an equal one will have particularly unfortunate results. It will force the "administration" into the position of arguing that the differences in question are "phony," which is only a short step away from the argument that improvements in our forces are unnecessary. The implicit premise on which such an argument would rest is the premise of "overkill," that the only necessary objective our military forces is to be able to kill millions of Soviet civilians. This premise -- which not only is barbaric and discourages efforts to limit the destructiveness of warfare but also would undermine a credible military posture -- has been explicitly rejected by the Administration in other contexts. It would be unfortunate if it should be resurrected in order to defend an unequal SALT agreement.

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The potential Congressional political reaction to each of the five SALT options currently under active consideration is the subject of the following discussion.

Option I - Deferral. Concluding an agreement in 1976 based on the Vladivostok Accords, while deferring the more controversial Backfire and cruise missile issues to further negotiations, could be a very attractive alternative for the Administration. Political benefits would flow from reaching an agreement, holding a Summit meeting, and capping most of the strategic competition. The key element is a recognition that SALT is a step-by-step process, reaching agreement in steps on those elements that can be resolved by the two sides within a set time frame.

Some of the more liberal Congressmen, believing that cruise missiles are unimportant to US security, may still criticize the President for failing to reach an agreement which limited these new systems. Conservatives, on the other hand, might claim that failure to limit Backfire now will permit continued Soviet deployment and, hence, prejudice the final outcome of the negotiations.

Both arguments could be countered by stating that the present impasse must be removed but in an equitable manner and that both sides are working diligently to reach agreement on these complex issues. If the criticism from the left threatened ratification of the agreement, flight testing of cruise missiles at long ranges could be delayed until the issue was resolved. The possibility of losing Congressional support for continuation of the development of cruise missiles would increase. To stem the criticism from the right, we could go on record that the US will respond to lack of Backfire restraint by deploying 2500 km land-based cruise missiles or more F-111's in Europe.

Option II - Backfire Numerically Unconstrained. The ability of the Administration to sell an agreement in which the controversial Backfire bomber was left numerically unconstrained would depend heavily on whether experts outside the Government supported the contention that collateral constraints were sufficient to limit the strategic utility of this aircraft. If not, this agreement would draw considerable criticism and a high possibility would exist that it would not be ratified. It would be argued that this option is a fraud on the agreements reached at Vladivostok on equal ceilings.

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With so much publicity on the Backfire issue and failure of unilateral statements and ambiguous understandings in SALT ONE, the conservatives would have a considerable amount of ammunition for use against an agreement based on the provisions of Option II.

Option III - Backfire Numerically Constrained Outside the Aggregate. Like Option II, in order to successfully defend this type of an agreement, the Administration would have to convince the majority that this was a reasonable compromise and the best possible deal. It probably will be strongly attacked from all sides being as such, a compromise agreement. One would expect the arms control community to be critical of the large numbers of cruise missiles permitted, the possible expansion of the arms race into a new area, and the implicit raising of the aggregate level from 2400 to 2700. Despite the fact that long-range cruise missiles on surface ships would be permitted, there is a chance that the present SLCM program would be terminated or extensively reoriented (because of the constraints placed on the submarine-launched version); hence, conservatives could argue that the Soviets would get 300 Backfires and we nothing.

Option IV - Count Backfire in the Aggregate. From the standpoint of the Administration, this is the best possible outcome of the five options under consideration. With the strong backing which would come from the DoD, the Administration should have little difficulty getting this agreement ratified.

The Administration could expect some criticism from the left, because the agreement fails to strongly limit the deployment of cruise missiles. The different limits on SLCMs carried by submarines and surface ships may generate strong criticism from liberals who could be bothered by the verification problem and who would probably push to terminate the SLCM program. Regardless of the criticism, few of the critics would be willing to risk jeopardizing the agreement and a continuation of detente because of the cruise missile issue.

Option V (formerly Option G) - Backfire Outside SALT with Comparable Soviet Concession. From the standpoint of the Defense Department, this is an acceptable approach if agreement with the Soviets cannot be reached for inclusion of the Backfire in the SALT ceilings. Criticism could be made of the agreement allowing a major force element to go outside of SALT; however, the Soviet concession on MLBMs is a major and comparable quid, removing a basic inequity from the initial SALT agreement. 2. Advocacy Statement for The Options

Since an advocacy statement must defend the complete agreement including the Backfire and cruise missile provisions, there is necessarily a significant amount of duplication in writing such statements for the five options. Consequently, the elements of the statements are organized as follows:

TOP SECRET

-- a "stem" of three paragraphs addressing other parts of the agreement for Options I, II, III, IV, V;

-- a subsequent, second "stem" of two paragraphs for Options I, II, III addressing the fact that achieving an agreement supersedes specific principles, i.e., Backfire not in the 2400 aggregate;

-- one or two paragraphs for each option;

-- a concluding paragraph for all options (I, II, III, IV, V).

Main Stem for Options I, II, III, IV, V

The Agreement on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms is another important milestone in the efforts of the United States and the Soviet Union to enhance their national security by curbing the development and deployment of strategic offensive arms.

The preamble points to equality and equal security as basic principles of this agreement. In keeping with these principles, the agreement provides:

- -- equal rights to an aggregate number of 2400 strategic offensive arms;
- -- equal rights to an aggregate number of 1320 MIRV launchers;
- -- prohibitions on the development, testing and deployment of other strategic arms -- intercontinental cruise missiles, ballistic missile launchers on surface ships and missile launchers located in the territorial waters, inland seas and waterways;
- -- exclusion of all tactical nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons of allies;
- -- prohibition on additional ICBM silos and constraints on the size of ICBMs

-TOP SECRET

-- freedom to modernize and replace existing strategic offensive arms as well as to change the mix and capability of such arms.

-22-

We have further agreed to ban the development and testing of orbital weapons to enhance the viability of the Outer Space Treaty which banned the deployment of such weapons. Finally, we have agreed to continue negotiations with a view toward reducing the numbers of those strategic offensive arms limited by this agreement.

TOP SECRET

Second Stem for Options I, II, III

Both sides have agreed to maintain the momentum established in earlier agreements to limit strategic arms and not to let differing views on specific arms and limitations jeopardize either the process or those principles and provisions which can be agreed. The successful conclusion of negotiations which further limit strategic offensive arms reduces the future military uncertainties each side must face and should also reduce the pressure to undertake strategic initiatives for political purposes. Continuing to reach agreement offers the best way to maintain and enhance US security, while avoiding costs which would be required in the case of unknown and unconstrained Soviet force levels.

In formulating the provisions of the agreement there was considerable agreement on those central strategic systems which should be covered and on the nature of the limitations for these systems. There were differences as well, particularly in regard to cruise missiles and the Soviet Backfire bomber.

Option I. SALT continues to be, a cautious, step-by-step process. Both sides attach particular importance to concluding an agreement on those principles and limitations which were agreed. Because the military and political ramifications associated with both Backfire and cruise missiles are particularly complex and contentious, a decision was made to defer limitation on both. Since it was also agreed that neither system should ultimately go unlimited, each side undertakes an obligation to formulate an equitable agreement covering cruise missiles and Backfire to become effective by 1979. Specific developmental and deployment restraints have been agreed upon for this negotiating period.

Option II. While neither side could accept the fundamental position of the other with regard to these systems equitable limitations and restrictions were agreed. The Soviets accepted constraints on Backfire modernization, armament, basing, tanker support and training. All these are designed to prevent the Soviets from enhancing the Backfire's longrange capability while not restricting its performance in peripheral missions. In return, those lower cost systems of primary interest to the US, i.e., cruise missiles to complement, augment or replace manned aircraft, are retained, albeit in such a way as to limit strategic applications, to maintain present capabilities, rather than to create new threats. Option III. While neither side could accept the fundamental positions of the other with regard to these systems, certain equitable limitations were agreed. The Soviets agreed to limits on the deployment of Backfire and the United States agreed to limits on cruise missiles system, which were beyond the scope of the Vladivostok understandings. The numerical limit on Backfire and surface ships with long-range SLCMs outside the aggregate are designed to be compensating. The inclusion of the ALCM carriers in the MIRV launcher level reflects its similarity to the independent targeting capability of the MIRVed missile. The US has retained the right to deploy lower cost alternatives like the cruise missile to augment manned aircraft and, in certain missions, replace them.

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Option IV. Backfire and cruise missiles were particularly contentious issues in the negotiations and in a true spirit of compromise, equitable limits were reached. Backfire will be included in the 2400 aggregate level, and all heavy bombers with long-range ALCMs will be included in the 1320 MIRV total. In addition, cruise missiles over 600 km are banned on submarines and aircraft other than heavy bombers, while cruise missiles with up to 2500 km range would be permitted on surface ships. These limits on Backfire and cruise missiles are significant arms control measures in that they will cause both sides to dismantle existing systems if they wish to deploy new ones.

Option V. The Backfire and cruise missile issues were particularly difficult issues to resolve and were responsible for much of the delay in arriving at a SALT TWO agreement. Persistence in continuing the negotiations has paid off, however, by producing a compromise solution which accommodates the basic differences between the US and Soviet views and at the same time assures equitable limits on total strategic capability. Under this compromise solution the US has agreed to exclude Backfire in exchange for Soviet agreement to freeze deployment of their "heavy" ICBMs and establish as a SALT THREE objective phasing out of all "heavy" ICBMs. In addition, heavy bombers with longrange ALCMs will be included in the 1320 MIRV total and ALCMs with range over 600 km will be banned on other aircraft. SLCMs over 600 km on submarines and SLCMs over 2500 km on surface ships will also be banned.

-24-

<u>Concluding Comment for Options I, II, III, IV, and V (formerly Option G)</u>

The terms of this agreement will permit the United States to take the steps necessary to maintain a strategic posture which protects our vital interests and guarantees our continued security.

TOP SECRET

B. Considerations on the Soviet Side

Soviet SALT policy is most likely formulated on a consensus basis in a small group at the highest levels but it may also be influenced somwhat by Muscovite politics, i.e., Brezhnev's authority and his prospects at the upcoming Party Congress. There really are few hard facts available which illuminate the influences on SALT process in the Soviet Union to the outside world.

The Politburo is the decision-making body for SAL issues. It is composed of 15 full members with voting rights and seven candidate members with consultative rights. This is a Party organization, an oligarchial institution which since the mid-1960s has decided policy issues on the basis of collegiality and consensus. While some members represent institutions and interests which are directly related to national security policy, others do not. The key players on national security affairs are believed to be Secretary Brezhnev, President Podgorny, Premier Kosygin, Foreing Minister Gromyko, KGB Chairman Andropov and candidate member Ustinov who coordinates Soviet armament industry. Throughout the Soviet system there is an overlap of government and party structure. At the top, these structures coalesce completely in the Party and government leaders in the Politburo.

The policy orientation appears to be almost totally responsive to defense and heavy industry needs on top priority basis. The SAL negotiations are the first arms limitations talks in which the military have taken a direct and active role -- both on the policy level and in the actual negotiations with the US. In the Soviet view, it is apparent that arms control should be closely tied to the operational requirements of the Soviet Armed Forces. In this respect the military's present influence, prestige and role in policy making are unequalled in Soviet history.

The organization within the Politburo which is believed to formulate, arbitrate and make recommendations for the Politburo's final approach is the Defense Council. The top leadership of the Communist Party are directly involved in the Defense Council, along with the Ministry of Defense and Chief of Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces. Representatives of the defense industrial complex also regularly participate. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the KGB participates periodically. The basic mandate in the SALT context for the Defense Council appears to safeguard Soviet strategic force modernization against serious constraints in the SALT Accords. In terms of arms control, the Soviets do not in fact look at problems of stability the way we do, but simply want to minimize the US threat as much as they can. The close involvement of military leadership and officials of the defense industry in the SAL process is believed to give them a vested interest and responsibility in the SALT agreements. Should a SALT TWO agreement be negotiated in Geneva there is no reason to expect that it would not be ratified by the Soviet Union.

-26-

The Soviet Union may feel that it has met the US more than half way at Vladivostok by agreeing to equal aggregates without consideration of FBS and by promising to meet US requirements on MIRV counting rules. It probably views the US stance on cruise missiles and the inclusion of Backfire as contrary to what was agreed at Vladivostok.

However, Brezhnev may feel that an agreement is to the Soviet interest. He can argue, at least to his inner councils, that even in areas specifically covered by the agreement such as ICBMs, a major increase in strategic force capability is possible, and is to be expected, because the agreement does not limit the resources the Soviet Union can put into military forces. A new agreement only weakly constrains the way in which those resources can be spent.

Further, it should be recognized that SALT would prevent the Soviets from increasing their total of land-based and submarine-based ballistic missiles. However, at the high force levels the Soviet Union has already reached, it is much more effective to modernize the forces than merely to expand them. This modernization is not constrained by SALT.

The most significant modernization will be the replacement of their present single-warhead "light" missiles by missiles which are MIRVed and also much larger. Indeed, the principal replacement missile, the SS-19, will have a throw-weight three times larger than the missile it replaces (and is in fact a "heavy" missile according to the US unilateral explanatory statement of SALT ONE). This modernization can continue unconstrained by SALT limits throughout most of the ten-year agreement, doubling the "throw-weight" of the Soviet missile force and increasing the number of warheads several-fold. By the end of that period, MIRV limits will begin to place some constraints on this modernization, but there is every reason to expect further generations of ballistic missiles with still more warheads, greater accuracy, and (depending on the outcome of SALT TWO) possibly even greater throw-weight.

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In addition, major related areas of Soviet nuclear capability will be unconstrained by SALT:


-- The new Backfire bomber perhaps will not be (significantly) limited by SALT.

 Expansion and modernization of air defenses would be unconstrained by SALT. The effectiveness of the US bomber force which would be limited by the agreement could be reduced.

- Major expansion of attack submarines for anti-submarine warfare purposes could be possible as the Soviet Union turns their greatly expanded submarine construction facilities away from building additional ballistic missile submarines.
- -- Large-scale deployment of the SS-20 intermediate range ballistic missile, which will be a major threat to our allies, would be unconstrained by SALT.
- -- Their large cruise missile program, all based on cruise missiles of ranges less than 600 km, will be unaffected by SALT.

In addition, of course, SALT has no effect on Soviet Union's spending for conventional land, air and naval forces which make up the overwhelming bulk of military expenditures.

-27-



-TOP SECRET-

RELATIONSHIP WITH DETENTE

SECTION IV

-TOP SECRET-

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-28-

IV. RELATIONSHIP WITH DETENTE

A, <u>Status of Detente</u>

Of major concern to the outcome of the SAL negotiations are the US/USSR relationship and the domestic debates within the US and USSR regarding that relationship. The outcome of those debates will have an impact on the SAL negotiations, and vice versa.

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It is increasingly clear that "detente" does not mean that both sides agree on a common approach to international problems. Rather, detente between the US and USSR signifies an effort on the part of both countries to decrease the chances of nuclear war. In addition, however, the Soviet Union has entered into detente as a strategy for obtaining western agricultural, trade, technological, and investment assistance for its program of national development. Moreover, where the opportunity has presented itself, the Soviet Union has not hesitated to attempt to seize an opportunity for expanding its influence (as in Angola), to disrupt Western solidarity (as in Portugal), or to try to undercut political support for Western defense efforts (as in its attacks on US nuclear employment policy). The United States for its part shares the desire to lessen the chances of nuclear war. It also shares the desire to limit spending on arms -- provided that the limitations do not endanger our security. Also, the US has been willing to engage in agricultural, trade, technological, and investment assistance with the aim of involving the Soviet Union in the international system in such a way that it develops a greater stake in observing the rules of that system.

Several serious but not insoluble problems have cropped up during the period of detente, however. The following are the leading ones from the viewpoint of the US:

- The Soviet Union has continued impressive efforts at building its military capabilities over the past decade; overall, it has clearly established parity with the US. In fact, if the present trends continue, it appears that the Soviet Union could in certain areas obtain a position of military superiority over the US.

- Some observers contend that in SALT the US has ceded certain advantages to the Soviet Union without receiving adequate concessions in return.

- Charges have been made that the Soviet Union is violating several arms control agreements, specifically SALT and the Biological Weapons Convention, and has not lived up to its obligations under the CSCE accord, particularly with regard to the freer movement of people, ideas, and information between East and West.

-TOP SECRET-

-29-

Critics have charged that the US is giving agricultural, trade, technological and investment assistance to the Soviet Union without pressing for Soviet Union either to denounce its previously stated objectives of defeating capitalism or at least inducing it to cease its buildup of military capabilities.

- No one in the Administration has yet defined what is meant by involving the Soviet Union in the international system in such a way that it has a greater stake in abiding by the rules of that system; furthermore, no one has defined the rules of the system and the Soviet Union has never acknowledged that such is its understanding of the purpose of detente. The continued expansion of the Soviet involvement in Angola consequently has become a major test case of the respective US and USSR understandings of how "detente" is expected to influence superpower behavior.

With regard to Moscow's viewpoint, Soviet critics have charged that US critics are attempting to undermine detente, particularly those who accuse the Soviet Union of violating arms control agreements, the CSCE accords, and of expanding its role in Angola. Some also make the case that detente redounds to the advantage of the US. For example, the Soviet Union has not been a major actor in the Middle East negotiations, despite its enormous role as a supplier of arms to the region. Thus, the US has been able to influence the course of events such that US interests are protected.

It is within the context described above that the impact of detente on the SAL options, and vice versa, must be examined.

B. Impact of the Various Options on Detente

The major way in which any of the various options can affect detente is that the general consensus which emerges from the respective domestic debates on detente will impact on the willingness of each negotiating partner to enter into useful follow-on arms control agreements which represent a practical detente benefit. The fact that US leaders seem now to be facing heavy criticism that detente, despite goodfaith efforts on the part of the US, has failed to stem the Soviet military buildup or decrease its efforts at expansion indicates the significance of the criticism which will attach to the outcome of SALT TWO.

- Option I. This option may not hurt detente. It would mean that the outlook for detente would be influenced somewhat more by Soviet activities in areas around the world including strategic force developments and deployments and US responses to them but the rate of progress in follow-on SALT negotiations would still have an influence.

-30-

- Option II. Agreement on this option would not help the process of detente, and, in fact, may damage it. The loophole afforded by excluding Backfire from being limited numerically in SALT may be viewed as a fraud, and an additional indicator that detente is likewise a fraud.


- <u>Option III</u>. This option would probably be seen as the minimal acceptable agreement if US/USSR relations were to be seen as improving, rather than deteriorating or continuing to be in flux. Failure to ratify could result in a major set-back for detente.

- Option IV. Given the current state of domestic debate on detente within the US and USSR, this option would no doubt enhance detente over the longer term in that it would have resulted in a clear limitation of arms programs which would have been unconstrained had there been no detente.

- Option V (formerly Option G). Closer to Option IV, the effect should be positive. However, near-term control on (potentially unlimited numbers of) Backfires through a different arms control negotiations, e.g., MBFR follow-on, or an appropriate counter-response by the US to high levels of Backfires, would be necessary to allay allied concerns over the US approach to the Backfire issue.

- <u>No Agreement (Negotiations continue)</u>. As in the case of Option I, no agreement will result in detente being influenced somewhat more by events outside SALT, but on-going SALT negotiations would still have a major influence. Detente would be enhanced (and thus increase the chances of later SALT agreement) if US/USSR relations went well, such as would result from Soviet withdrawal from Angola for example.

-31-



-TOP SECRET -

SECTION V

LONG-RANGE IMPLICATIONS OF NO AGREEMENT

-TOP SECRET-

-32-

-TOP SECRET-

V. LONG-RANGE IMPLICATIONS OF NO SALT TWO AGREEMENT

A. Political Implications

1. To US

Failure to reach a SALT TWO agreement in 1976 is likely to have only a small impact on the American political scene <u>provided</u> negotiations continue and any action that either side takes to increase its bargaining leverage is reasonable and prudent.

The Administration may feel compelled to increase near-term spending on strategic programs, such as continued Minuteman III procurement and acceleration of the MX and cruise missile programs. Since most of the output of this action is in the outyears, it is unlikely that the Soviets will react in a manner greatly expanding the arms competition in 1976. The Administration's problem will come from the Congress, which will be reluctant to increase Defense spending.

Many liberals will be critical of the Administration for failing to reach a SALT agreement because of "minor" issues like cruise missiles. Conservatives should be generally supportive as the Administration takes the position that detente is a two-way street and we must have an equitable agreement. The middle-of-the-road should be basically unconcerned as long as detente doesn't collapse and Defense spending doesn't increase significantly.

The major risk associated with failure to conclude an agreement in 1976 centers on the potential long-term impact on detente. The attitude of the American people appears to be increasingly suspicious of detente and a break in its steady progress could provide the opportunity for the critics to stir the pot of discontentment. Should problems in other areas of the world, e.g., Angola, become more acute, the failure to conclude a new arms control agreement -- an important aspect of detente -- could be viewed as significant; however, it must be kept in mind that the military balance is critical to detente in that it must be maintained or else chances for detente and arms control benefits will be lost.

2. To USSR

It can be argued that, from the Soviet viewpoint, detente is a political tactic, a policy used to advance Soviet national interests. As a tactic it can be disregarded when it fails or accepted, as long as it continues to produce results; therefore, whether or not there is a SALT TWO agreement should have little real impact on the internal politics in the USSR. Brezhnev, though committed to a detente policy of which SALT plays an important role, could survive politically without an agreement.

-33-

B. Military Implications

1. Soviet Reaction

It is unclear exactly how the Soviets might respond to a breakdown or stalemate in the SALT negotiations or how much additional funding they might be willing to commit to further expansion/improvement of their strategic forces. For instance, if they wanted to continue the SALT negotiating process and avoid further erosion of US-Soviet detente they may elect to follow a relatively moderate response pattern as illustrated by

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This illustrative force projection assumes the Soviets, in response to a breakdown in SALT negotiations, would:

(1) accelerate and expand MIRV missile programs to obtain a deployment level of 1700 (vice 1320) by 1985;

(2) accelerate their mobile ICBM program to achieve a 1977 IOC and a deployment level of 180 (vice zero) by 1985;

(3) extend deployment of SLBMs to obtain a deploymentlevel of 1032 (vice 958);

(4) retain all heavy bombers, providing an inventory level of 140 (vice 90).

On the other hand, if the Soviets elected to implement a more drastic response without regard to its potential impact on detente, they could substantially increase the quantity and quality of weapons available to them by 1985. **Contract the second as summarized below**, illustrates the level of capability that might result from such an approach:

 (1) begin proliferation of ICBM silos to obtain a deployment level of 1570 (vice 1510) by 1985;

(2) accelerate and expand MIRV missile programs to obtain a deployment level of 2300 (vice 1320) by 1985;

(3) accelerate their mobile ICBM program to achieve a 1976 IOC and a deployment level of 300 (vice zero) by 1985;

(4) extend deployment of SLBMs to obtain a deployment level
of 1156 (vice 958);

(5) accelerate deployment of a follow-on heavy bomber to obtain a total bomber deployment less (Backfire) of 200 (vice 90) by 1985;

TOP SECRE

(6) increase deployment of new SAM launchers and air defense interceptors.

-34-

2. US Reaction

In response to a breakdown or stalemate in the SALT negotiations the US could either (1) implement a program of gradual growth of its strategic forces to parallel the "moderate" Soviet response or (2) initiate a more vigorous front-loaded program to match the more drastic Soviet response (i.e.,

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In both cases the major objective would be to encourage the Soviets to continue or resume serious negotiations by matching and/or nullifying Soviet actions.

Alternative 1, the "gradual growth" response, would take the approach of incorporating changes in our current program plan which would give notice to the Soviets that the US is determined to maintain a strong deterrent under any conditions and that a SALT agreement along the lines proposed by the US would be better than no agreement.

3. Perceived Balance

Current projections of US and Soviet force capabilities indicate that, with a SALT agreement along the lines of the Vladivostok accord, the Soviets could obtain a substantial superiority in throw-weight and EMT by 1985 while the US would probably retain a superiority in quantity of warheads deployed. Without a SALT agreement both sides could improve upon their projected capability. However, since the US does not currently have an active development program for a large ICBM it would take considerable time to develop and deploy a sufficient quantity of such missiles to overcome the Soviet advantages in throw-weight and EMT. The effect of such a response would have only a nominal effect on "perceived balance" in the pre-1985 time period. On the other hand, since the Soviets are at the peak of their ICBM/SLBM modernization program, it would be relatively easy for them to continue deployment of their MIRV missile so as to overcome the US RV advantage by the mid-1980s.

In the post-1985 period, it is difficult to assess how the perception of balance might change. It is conceivable that the measures of capability currently used to assess "perceived balance" may no longer be valid in the post-1985 period. For instance, measures of capability based on qualitative rather than quantitative measures or on ability to survive rather than ability to destroy may be recognized as being more representative measures. Furthermore, the perception of balance could be drastically affected by a major technological breakthrough (e.g., ASW capability, laser defenses, etc.) by one side or the other. In any case it would seem that "perceived balance" between the US and USSR is less dependent upon whether or not a SALT TWO agreement is concluded at this time than it is upon other factors, not the least of which is the willingness of the two sides to maintain a strong defense posture under whatever conditions or limitations that might exist. TOP SECRET-

-36-

4. Strategic Stability

The strategic relationship between the US and the USSR is currently believed to be relatively stable. The quantitative advantages of the USSR are believed to be more or less offset by the qualitative advantages of the US. However, as Soviet technology improves and their qualitative capability approaches that of the US, strategic stability may be substantially degraded even within the constraints of a Vladivostok-type SALT TWO Agreement. Figure 2 illustrates how two of the parameters commonly referred to in discussions of strategic stability have varied over the past 10 years and how they are expected to vary over the next 10 years if a SALT agreement is reached. This figure shows a significant

Failure to achieve a SALT TWO agreement at this time would have relatively little effect on either of these two measures of stability in the pre-1985 time period. Soviet proliferation of ICBMs and SLBMs and their continued deployment of MIRV weapons would have no effect on ICBM survivability and would add only slightly to the already large Soviet throw-weight advantage following an attack.

In the post-1985 period, however, the impact of no agreement could be more significant. If an acceptable agreement <u>could</u> be reached along the lines of the Vladivostok accord the US, by 1985, could be in a position to start deploying large land-mobile ICBMs (i.e. - M-X) which would both improve the survivability of the ICBM force and substantially reduce the Soviet post-attack advantage. Without the agreement, the Soviets would be free to deploy large quantities of MIRVed ICBMs to counter the US mobile systems, thus, making it more difficult and more costly to ensure a stable relationship.

On the other hand, any agreement is not necessarily better than no agreement at all. It should be recognized that, even within the constraints of the Vladivostok accord, it is possible to identify potential SALT agreements which would reduce rather than enhance the opportunity for strategic stability. If the Soviets are unwilling to accept an agreement which significantly constrains the deployment of "first-strike" weapons or if they insist on limiting systems which are basically oriented toward improving the survivability or penetrability of retaliatory weapons (e.g. - mobile ICBMs, bomber armaments, etc.) it may be better, over the long term, to have no agreement at all.

-37-

-TOP SECRET-

FIGURE 2 - MEASURES OF STRATEGIC STABILITY

(Assuming a Vladivostok-type SALT TWO Agreement)

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Impact of Backfire on SAL-Accountable Soviet Forces 1985

