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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. Chart	Helicopter Lift Capability (1 p.)	Undated	A 2
2. Chart	Aircraft Embarked on the USS America (1 p.)	Undated	A
3. Chart	Potential Evacuation Population (1 p.)	6/12/76	A <i>opened 6/30/00</i>
4. Map	Eastern Mediterranean (1 p.)	6/16/76	A <i>KBH</i>
5. Chart	Non-Combatant Evacuation from Lebanon (1 p.)	6/16/76	A
6. Schedule	Evacuation Schedule (2 pp.) <i>Serialized KBH 6/30/00</i>	6/17-21/76	A

FILE LOCATION

Cheney Files
 General Subject File
 Lebanon Evacuation

Box 9

RESTRICTION CODES

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 (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
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WHM, 5/28/75

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~ (GDS)

MEETING OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

LEBANON

Wednesday, April 7, 1976

2:30 p.m.

The Cabinet Room

From: Brent Scowcroft

I. PURPOSE

To review the current situation in Lebanon and its potential impact upon broader United States interests in the Middle East: a possible renewal of major Arab-Israeli hostilities should Syrian and Israeli troops both enter Lebanon; a possible reversal of the moderate Arab trend we have successfully fostered over the past two years should Syrian efforts in Lebanon fail; and possible strongly negative Arab reactions against the United States should our current efforts fail to bring a political solution.

II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS & PRESS ARRANGEMENTS

A. Background: In early March, Syria, acting at the request of Lebanese President Frangie, sent into Lebanon units of the Palestine Liberation Army in an effort to stop the fighting by Lebanese left-wing forces, (led by Kemal Jumblatt and other lesser leaders) supported by the PLO and rejectionist Palestinians. These forces were refusing to accept the ceasefire and political agreement reached with Syrian help on January 22, and were demanding the immediate resignation of President Frangie. Within a week, it was

Subject to GDS of EO 11652
Automatically Downgraded at Two
Year Intervals and Declassified on
December 31, 1984

~~SECRET~~ (GDS)

079 6/27/85



only the resistance of the PLA and Saiqa--a Palestinian organization loyal to Syria--which prevented the Presidential Palace from being occupied and Frangie overthrown by force.

At this point, Syria asked our advice on deploying regular Syrian army units to separate the combatants and bring about an orderly transfer of power from President Frangie to a new government. We strongly advised Syria against any direct intervention and urged other governments, including Jordan and Saudi Arabia, to warn the Syrians against such a move. We immediately asked Israel what its response would be to a Syrian intervention and urged them to remain calm while the situation was being clarified. Israel replied that it would move into South Lebanon if Syrian regulars intervened. In the face of our negative reactions, Syria turned to a renewed major effort to bring about a cease-fire and legal governmental succession by political means, while reinforcing somewhat its irregular military presence in the form of Saiqa and PLA units incorporating some regular troops. This has included closing the Syrian border and key Lebanese ports and airfields to arms supply for leftist forces. Israel has not indicated any intention of moving into Lebanon, despite its awareness of a sizeable irregular Syrian presence.

To reinforce our serious concern at the continued fighting and our support for an orderly political solution, we sent Dean Brown to take charge of our Embassy in Beirut, to analyze the situation at first hand and to consult with the various Lebanese parties. Units of the Sixth Fleet were moved closer to Lebanon to be available should the evacuation of American citizens appear necessary, as well as to show our serious concern. Our efforts, together with those of Syria, have produced a ten-day ceasefire during which the Lebanese hope to agree upon the succession to President Frangie. The Lebanese Parliament may meet on April 8 to tackle this problem. If it fails, the ceasefire is most unlikely to hold past April 12.

Should the ceasefire break down again, we could be faced with any of several extremely difficult scenarios: 1) tacitly accepting intervention by Syrian regular army units (probably at least a division) and making every possible effort to prevent an Israeli counter-intervention in South Lebanon; 2) making every effort to prevent further Syrian action with the likelihood that this would not only mean more bloody fighting and eventual leftist domination in Lebanon, but could very well mean the collapse of the moderate Syrian regime of Hafez Asad and its replacement by radical elements; or 3) witnessing military intervention by both Israel and Syria with the likelihood that this would produce a closing of Arab ranks and renewed Arab-Israeli hostilities on a major scale. The first choice could offer hope of protecting our substantial investment in the peace process and better bilateral relations with the Arab states but it would be the toughest for us to carry out successfully, given the very strong Israeli hatred and distrust of Syria, and would be hard to explain in this country. The second choice could spell the end of present hopes for the peace process, and would over time be seriously damaging to our relations with such key Arab states as Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia who would tend to see us as having exposed to them a rising tide of Arab radicalism. The third choice could produce a much more rapid negative Arab reaction against the United States as well as killing hopes for the peace process. It could also produce full-scale hostilities, with all that implies for the US-Soviet relationship in the Middle East, and another oil embargo.

Our objective is to generate an array of moderate Lebanese forces which, together with our support and that of the Syrians and other moderate Arabs, can move the political process ahead through the Presidential succession to needed reforms in the social, economic and political fields.

In parallel with our diplomatic efforts, we have undertaken an urgent review of our contingency planning in the event there should be another eruption of major hostilities in Lebanon or on an even broader scale. Existing plans

in the following fields have been reviewed and are being updated: political/diplomatic contingencies; military readiness of United States units for either evacuation of United States citizens or to meet foreign threats; economic contingencies (oil and financial); and improved intelligence collection and dissemination.

- B. Participants: List at Tab A
- C. Press Arrangements: The meeting but not the subject will be announced. White House photo only.

III. TALKING POINTS

1. I have been following developments in Lebanon very closely. We have been in close touch with all other governments in the area--particularly Israel and Syria--and other interested powers to try to prevent outside intervention, stop the fighting and see what can be done to move toward a satisfactory political outcome.
2. The situation is extremely dangerous since failure to end the fighting and find a moderate political solution could confront us either with an early renewal of Arab-Israeli hostilities or a serious setback for the peace process and the forces of Arab moderation in which we have invested so much.
3. We have sent Dean Brown to survey the situation first hand and be available to the various parties. He has already met with a wide spectrum of key Lebanese leaders. We have also moved some units of the Sixth Fleet to where they would be in position to evacuate American citizens should that become necessary and to demonstrate our concern.
4. We consider President Asad's behaviour in the Lebanese situation to be moderate and responsible and we are working closely with him.
5. Henry, will you discuss this situation in more detail?

6. [At the conclusion of the meeting] I want us all to work closely together in this dangerous period. I would like the WSAG to remain abreast of the situation. We must make every effort to help the parties directly concerned find a peaceful, moderate solution.



NR 98-9, #6 DOD Mr. 3/17/00

By KBH, NARA, Date 6/27/00

SECRET

EVACUATION SCHEDULE FOR FLUID DRIVE

DATE
(Wash./Beirut)

TIME
(Wash./Beirut)

June

Send a message to American Embassy Beirut announcing the evacuation decision and providing detailed evacuation guidance. Information copies of the same message should be sent to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Using [REDACTED]

Alert [REDACTED]

June

Meet with [REDACTED]

Arrange for [REDACTED]

Despatch [REDACTED]

98-11-0068 2749

(6)

SECRET

-2-

EVACUATION SCHEDULE FOR FLUID DRIVE (cont'd)

DATE
(Wash./Beirut) TIME
(Wash./Beirut)

June

Also using

Release press guidance in the U.S. and to wire services for worldwide distribution announcing our decision to evacuate and the reasons behind decision.

June

Task Force leaves station

June

Launch

June

arrives at U.S. Embassy.

Broadcast on an hourly basis for six hours instructions to anyone left behind in evacuation

June

Evacuees arrive at safehaven.

R. 6/10/76 Lebanon -

HAK, VP, Bush, Scowcroft, Clements, Chy -

Emb + staffs apparently dead -

Relate

P. - send commercial vessel close to Beirut - possible emergency evacuation
also send military forces - Dunderland -
to 12 hrs. away from 24 hrs. away -
gradual


HAK notify soviet of movements -
Send Dean Brown out

Press statement
Q + A's

send Brown to Lebanon

get Arabs to make strong statement condemning
the activity -





A

5:30 p.m., Thursday, June 17, 1976

Meeting with the President, re Lebanon
Evacuation

Oval Office

A handwritten signature, appearing to be "Saw", is enclosed within a hand-drawn oval. The signature is written in a cursive, fluid style.

Mr. Cheney

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~ (GDS)

MEETING ON LEBANON SITUATION

Thursday, June 17, 1976

5:30 p. m.

The Cabinet Room

From: Brent Scowcroft 

I. PURPOSE

To review the current situation in Lebanon and to determine the need for an evacuation of American citizens, including the options for conducting an evacuation.

II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS & PRESS ARRANGEMENTS

- A. Background: The general security situation in Lebanon and particularly in Beirut, remains much the same as yesterday. Sporadic fighting between Syrian and leftist/Moslem forces has continued through the day, but the Syrian blockade of Beirut has been partially lifted to permit some gasoline and foodstuffs to enter the city and there are reports that Beirut Airport might reopen in a day or two. The American Embassy in Beirut reports, moreover, that the shock of Ambassador Meloy's and Robert Waring's murder may in fact have helped the security situation in the short run.

Nevertheless, there is no definitive break in the political situation sufficient to permit optimism that a country-wide improvement will occur shortly, and if the present political maneuvering between Lebanese factions, the Palestinians, Arab League members and Syria leads to another deadlock, it is very possible that fighting will resume on a broad-scale, further imperiling the lives of Americans, particularly in the capital city.

In addition to this possibility, there are other factors which will further reduce the incentives for members of the American community to stay. These include the strong possibility

~~SECRET~~ (GDS)

DAO 6/27/85



that Ambassador Meloy was specifically targeted for execution by a Lebanese or Palestinian splinter group, and that killings of other Americans may occur; and the evacuation of members of other foreign communities from Beirut, particularly the French, UN and British (HMG announced this morning that British subjects should depart Beirut, and the British Embassy is arranging for the departure of a convoy of evacuees to drive overland to Damascus tomorrow). Under these circumstances, pressures for at least the partial evacuation from Beirut of remaining American citizens is high, and a basic decision on whether or not the US should announce an evacuation is now needed.

To a certain extent such a decision will depend on the current security situation in Beirut and the means available for the large-scale departure of Americans from the city. In essence, these break down into two general categories--evacuation by non-military means or the use of military assets to try to bring out those US citizens who wish to leave. Various possible options under each of these categories are described at Tab A. It is important that no option is risk-free and all involve one degree or another of hazard:

--All of the non-military options require the cooperation of one or more Lebanese or Palestinian groups, and in the case of overland evacuation to Damascus, of Syrian authorities. Even granted such cooperation, however, certain options could expose evacuees to hostile fire by one side or another or to individual snipers. It is also possible that an overland evacuation could stall at mid-point creating further complication.

--The various military options would to one degree or another provide US control over the evacuation operation. At the same time, they raise the strong risk of reactive fire from snipers or larger groups and of hostile reaction to those Americans who must remain within the country. Moreover any US military operation which saw Arabs killed by American weapons could have broad-scale implications for the United States in the Middle East.



Whatever the circumstance, there will be certain specific consequences of any decision, whether it is to evacuate or not. If the former, it will raise the perception that the US is reacting precipitously to Ambassador Meloy's murder. If, on the other hand, the US does not at least provide the means for Americans to leave Beirut if they so wish, as other nations have done for their communities, American lives could be later lost as a result.

Finally, there will be consequences flowing from the choice of non-military or military options if a decision to evacuate is made. The loss of civilian life in connection with a difficult overland convoy would be seen as the result of an error of decision in not using military protection. On the other hand, a decision to use US military capabilities which drew fire on civilian evacuees could be seen as one which was an overreaction which needlessly imperiled American lives.

- B. Participants: Secretary Kissinger, Mr. Clements, Director Bush, Mr. Marsh, Mr. Cheney, Brent Scowcroft, General Brown



LEBANON EVACUATION - OPTIONS

Options

These alternatives consist of:

I. OVERLAND:

A. Evacuation by road to Damascus. The French Embassy on Tuesday and the UN yesterday successfully evacuated a number of their personnel using a route that went south of Beirut, then in major part through Syrian-controlled Lebanese territory to Damascus. The British are planning a small convoy on this route tomorrow, Friday, which may contain some Americans and which will probably include the remains of Ambassador Meloy and Robert Waring. Depending on the success of this convoy, other British-sponsored convoys will be moved to Syria. Our Beirut Embassy is currently exploring the possibility of including Americans in a Saturday convoy with the British, but is relying on the British Embassy to negotiate safe passage.

-- This is considered generally safe and non-provocative; but if convoys are blocked or attacked, the evacuees are vulnerable; military support would have to come from the Sixth Fleet gunships or aircraft;

B. Overland Northward to Jounieh Bay, thence by sea. This route is short -- less than 15 miles to Jounieh port -- and is the one recommended by Syrian Chief of Staff Shihabi to Ambassador Murphy yesterday. Nevertheless, it involves crossing the Moslem/Christian lines and several very dangerous areas near the port, and could expose evacuees to hostile fire.

-- Our Beirut Embassy considers departure by this route very risky.

II. AIR/FIXEDWING

Use of Beirut Airport, when it reopens. Shihabi specifically warned against the use of Beirut Airport in view of the threat of SA-7 missiles against U.S. aircraft involved in evacuation aircraft. Nevertheless, our Beirut Embassy views the reopening of the airport to commercial aircraft during the next several days as a real possibility, probably

under some sort of joint Syrian-Palestinian or other multilateral arrangement, and believes that the threat of hostile fire on civilian flights is smaller than Shihabi stated. The Embassy further believes that some Americans might want to hold out until the airport reopens. The road to the airport is dangerous; waiting for it to reopen may be hazardous.

III. SEALIFT

Evacuation over the Beaches: either the Western part of Beirut (Bain Militaire) or Bain Jamal near the Embassy; for example, an LCU could carry up to 400 people; This option would assume a permissive environment, in view of the exposure of ships moving to and from Beirut to possible hostile fire from high-rise buildings and other locations in the near vicinity.

Of the above options, evacuation by road to Damascus appears to be the most practicable and least risky at this time. Preferably, it would be an international operation, involving British or other evacuees, and have UN or Red Cross cover. It would necessarily mean coordination with Lebanese Moslem leftist groups and Palestinians as well as Syrians, although contact with Palestinian organizations could be handled indirectly, through the British for example.

State and the Embassy tend to favor the road evacuation to Damascus option in the absence of better alternatives, each of the other options involving greater risk or practical problems (such as whether the Beirut Airport will in fact open at all during the next several weeks).

Our Beirut Embassy, which is in the best position to judge the local security situation, has stated that while it does not like this option, it judges the risks to be tolerable in the absence of viable alternatives.

IV. MILITARY OPTION (FLUID DRIVE)

General Brown will brief on the options for evacuation that involve possible hostilities. Basically the operation is: the landing of helicopters at the American University to bring out the American community.

The least exposure to risk, involves the lowest number of people engaged in the operation, and is, in effect, the lowest profile military option available.

-- Under optimum conditions, 1,000 could be evacuated in one hour; it invites harrassing fire, and firefights. If fighting occurs, then if Embassy remains, it will be under great risk.

NMCC

BRITISH EMBASSY

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY

AMERICAN EMBASSY


Port Area

RAS BEIRUT

LEBANON SITUATION

MEDITERRANEAN
SEA

BEIRUT
INTERNATIONAL
AIRPORT



DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12858 Sec. 3.8

MR 88-9, 174 Doc Hr. 3/1/85

KBR NAVA D-55 6/21/80

45
NMCC

EAST MED

BLACK SEA

Istanbul

Izmir

Athens

Mikonos

Musadasi

Kithira

Souda Bay

CRETE

Rhodes

ESTHER

KOELSCH (FRIGATE)

MCCLOY (FRIGATE)

MOINESTER (FRIGATE)

AMERICA (CARRIER)
YARNELL (CRUISER)
VDGE (FRIGATE)
CONNOLLE (FRIGATE)

Akrotiri

4 HH-53 (788)
3 HC-130 (538)

(173)

(269)

(148)

GUADALCANAL (AMPHIB)
RALEIGH (AMPHIB)
CHARLESTON (AMPHIB)
BARNSTABLE CTY (AMPHIB)
SPIEGEL GROVE (AMPHIB)
CONYNGHAM (DEST)

TOTAL 1916

Alexandria

Port Said

Suez

Aqaba

SOURCE: NCSC MOVREP
161200Z JUN 76

0 150 300
NM

40°
CONFIDENTIAL

20°

25°

30°

35°

45°

TF 61/62 SHIPBOARD CAPACITY FOR EVACUEES

	<u>NORMAL CONDITIONS</u>	<u>EMERGENCY CONDITIONS SHORT SEA TRIP</u>
USS GUADALCANAL (LPH - 7)	400	6,000
USS RALEIGH (LPD - 1)	200	1,600
USS CHARLESTON (LKA - 113)	60	300
USS SPIEGEL GROVE (LSD - 32)	100	600
USS BARNSTABLE COUNTY (LST - 1197)	140	700
TOTAL	<u>900</u>	<u>9,200</u>

EVACUEE NUMBERS ARE APPROXIMATE

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USS BARNSTABLE COUNTY (LST - 1197)	140	700
TOTAL	<u>900</u>	<u>9,200</u>

EVACUEE NUMBERS ARE APPROXIMATE

CONFIDENTIAL

AIRCRAFT EMBARKED ON THE USS AMERICA

VF-142	12 F-14A
VF-143	12 F-14A
VFP-63	3 RF-8G
VA-15	10 A-7E
VA-87	9 A-7E
VA-176	9 A-6E, 4 KA-6D
VAW-124	4 E-2C
VAQ-137	4 EA-6B
HS-15	8 SH-3H
	1 C-1A

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6

MR 98-9 #2 DOD Ltr. 3/17/00

By KSH NARA, Date 6/22/00

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

POTENTIAL EVACUATION POPULATION LEBANON

APPROXIMATE

		BEIRUT	N/LEBANON	S/LEBANON	BEKAA
DOD	18	18	0	0	0
DOD DEP	0	0	0	0	0
USG	35	35	0	0	0
USG DEP	0	0	0	0	0
US RESIDENTS	1575	1450	30	45	50
OTHER	700	700	0	0	0
THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALS	<u>4000</u>	<u>4000</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
TOTALS	6328	6203	30	45	50

SOURCE: AMEMB BEIRUT
121528Z JUN 76

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6

MR 98-9, #3 DOD Ltr. 7/17/00
By KBH NARA Date 6/29/02

~~SECRET~~

NMCC

NON-COMBATANT EVACUATION FROM LEBANON (FLUID DRIVE)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6

NR 98-9, #5 DOD (tr. 3/17/00)

By KBK, NARA, Date 6/27/00

RESPONSE CAPABILITIES

1. 6th FLEET	<u>FLAGSHIP</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	* <u>RESPONSE TIME</u>
TF 61/62	GUADALCANAL	AT SEA	21 HRS
TG 60.1	SARATOGA	AT SEA	79 HRS
TG 60.2	AMERICA	AT SEA	24 HRS

* RESPONSE TIME INDICATES ELAPSED TIME FROM NOTIFICATION TO ON STATION

2. MSC-CONTROLLED SHIPPING / US FLAG MERCHANTMEN
WITHIN 72 HRS - 0 / WITHIN 72 HRS - 9

3. MAC ASSETS WITHIN 12 HRS - 21 C-141, 5 C-5, 32 C-130E, 0 COMMERCIAL

SOURCE: NCSC/AFOC
161200Z JUN 76

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

COMBINED FORCE
HELICOPTER LIFT CAPABILITY

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>PASSENGERS PER AIRCRAFT</u>		<u>AIRCRAFT POSSESSED</u>
		<u>NORMAL</u>	<u>EMERGENCY</u>	
GUADALCANAL	CH-46D	21	23	10
	CH-53D	35	52	4
	UH-1N	13	13	2
AKROTIRI	HH-53	35	55	4

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6

MR 98-9, #1 DOD Ltr. 3/17/00

By KBH NARA, Date 6/27/00

SECRET

NAME	TYPE	DISTANCE FROM LEBANON	COULD ARRIVE	REMARKS
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MSC CONTROLLED SHIPPING

NONE

U.S. FLAG OTHER THAN MSC CONTROLLED

EXPORT DIPLOMAT ✓	DRY CARGO	ENR ISTANBUL	2 DAYS	20 KNOTS
LASH ITALIA ✓	LASH	1189 NM NAPLES	2-3 DAYS	22.5 KNOTS
EXPORT AIDE ✓	DRY CARGO	ENR SUEZ	1 DAY	18.5 KNOTS
ELIZABETH LYKES ✓	DRY CARGO	340 NM ALEXANDRIA	1 DAY	20 KNOTS
LOUISE LYKES ✓	DRY CARGO	340 NM ALEXANDRIA	1 DAY	20 KNOTS
LASH TURKIYE ✓	LASH	ENR IZMIR	2 DAYS	22.5 KNOTS
GREEN ISLAND ✓	LASH	ENR PORT SAID	1 DAY	22.0 KNOTS
SAM HOUSTON ✓	LASH	315 NM SUEZ	1-2 DAYS	22.0 KNOTS
JOHN PENN ✓	DRY CARGO	ENR PORT SAID	3 DAYS	20.0 KNOTS

NMCC EUROPEAN DESK

NMCC

BRITISH EMBASSY

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY

AMERICAN EMBASSY

Port Area

RAS BEIRUT

LEBANON SITUATION


MEDITERRANEAN
SEA

BEIRUT
INTERNATIONAL
AIRPORT

NAUTICAL MILES



KILOMETERS



Cyprus Option - boat opt

- 1.) Likelihood of drawing fire
 - 2.) Reaction - casualties on both sides
 - 3.) Have leave embassy in there
 - 4.) Arab opposition
 - 5.) Other nations will make public their opposition if we hit a snag.
- 6.) What if only a handful show up

We've waited this long - why not wait longer.

What set of circumstances requires such a high risk option -

Comparison w/ peaceful evacuation of French, British + UN personnel
Man on the scene - what does he think -

Why not road convoy - close to the coast allows quick reaction time to trouble -
Ferry to Cyprus



16 June 1976 10:00 a.m.

The State Department has released the following statement to the press:

We can confirm that our Ambassador in Beirut, Francis E. Meloy, Jr., and the Economic Counselor of the Embassy Robert O. Waring, have been missing since late Wednesday morning Beirut time June 16. The two men were travelling by car to make an appointment with President-elect Sarkis but failed to reach their destination. We are making every effort to locate the two men and are in touch with governments in the area. We have no further information to provide at this time.

