

**The original documents are located in Box 7, folder “Intelligence - Rockefeller Commission - General” of the Richard B. Cheney Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.**

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE  
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. Notes	<del>Cheney Notes re possible candidates for CIA commission (2 pp.)</del> <i>gen 18/24 7/00</i>	ca. 12/30/74	C
2. CIA to David Belin, 4/29/75			
2a. Memo	<del>Assistant to the Director, CIA to David Belin re loan of documents to the Rockefeller Commission (1 p.)</del> <i>Slip - 5/24/00 KBH</i>	4/29/75	A
2b. Memo	W.E. Colby to the Record <i>portions exempted 4/97 ut. RIF 3/16/12</i>	9/25/74	* C(A)
2c. Routing Slip	Routing slip with short memorandum (2 pp.) <i>portions exempted ut 4/97 del 7/11</i>	2/21/73	A
2d. Memo	Deputy Director for Plans to Director of Central Intelligence (5 pp.) <i>portions exempted ut 4/97</i>	2/21/73	A
2 e. Q&A	Questions and Answers (2 pp.) <i>portions exempted ut 4/97</i>	2/20/73	A
2f. Statement	Proposed Statement (2 pp.)	2/21/73	A
2g. Overview	Overview Statements (3 pp.)	2/20/73	A

FILE LOCATION

Cheney Files  
General Subject File  
Intelligence - Rockefeller Commission: General      Box 7

## RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.  
(B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.  
(C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

WHM, 5/31/85

Nedzi.

HAK - 4 who on group

P - 6 who on group

Requires narrow charter -

5-6 people on commission  
out of preliminary list of 8  
possible names -

go at 1<sup>st</sup> ques. - NY Times  
allegation + report -

Then if do good job -  
extend the length + the  
charter.



Griswold chm.

Keegan

Gen. Gunther

Day Miller

Scruton

Jaworski ✓

Harrison

Meany ✓

Staff Director

Robson or Dave Alshire

Mtgs. - Jan. 3

① HAK      ③ Schlinger

② Colby      ④ Kehn - -



Announce 4-5-6  
the panel + specifics -

---

Domestic Council -  
Wants Rocky + Robson -  
to get together -



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Morris Leibman, ~~att~~  
would like to  
serve on the  
CIA panel.

served:

1. Benedictson commit
2. Poverty commission
- 3.

DR.

List of names

Pres. ph. - 1-6 button ph. -  
study - easiest

Can Mark go on Hill  
clearance for OMB - yes  
Will b. calling.

Caulkins salary -  
\$37,500 ah Jerry. call Caulkins.



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Cong Sam Stratton

wants to serve

on CIA panel.

1



calls to panel members

My. next week - agency heads

talking pts -

letter - talking the

how he wants it done -  
potential ability to do it - but clarity

Referrals to Justice

Citizen's panel

Exec. order.

Pres. statement

cong. notification

group or panel

cong. coop. with new or  
existing committees

CIA Paul

Griewald - D.R.

McCloy - D.R.

Dillon

Friedly - Araska

Reagan - done

Semritzer

Back ups not approved

Connor

Rosa

Andrew Brimmer

DL -

Papage - FBI liaison w/ CIA

PFIAB domestic intelligence -

~~Refer~~ Angleton - referred

UPI to Papage news in N. Mexico -

Papage also worked w/ PFIAB

w/ Ash - guy who testified  
against HAK on wiretaps - etc.

PFIAB has to be cleared.

Arceada

Henry Friendly →

Absolutely brilliant - great  
public respect -

Senior judge - 2<sup>nd</sup> Circuit  
Court of Appeals - ~~B~~  
Would be terrific -

Can Arceada generate  
names.

Irwin Griswold - a fine man - still  
active - superior citizen - tough man -  
Not the easiest kind of man  
to get along with - good man -

---

Andrew Goodpaster -

Need protection from left -  
that's where the prob. will  
come from.

---

Lloyd Cutler - very good -  
viewed as a civil libertarian -



Walsh

Arceida - Staff Director

Rich Allen - Pol. Sci. - commin-  
worked at NSC - for HAK &  
then quit - didn't get on  
w/ HAK

Paul Volcher -

Cyrus Vance -

Thomas Gates - just retired from  
Noyes - Gates DOD  
under the

Gerard Smith - arms control guy

John Foster - DOD - R+D - now  
on PFIAB

Meyn

Cleveland

Segal

Nimmo

Martin

Woods

Wintell

Weber

C. Shultz

Kenit Gordon

Liebman - -

---

Lloyd Cutler Wash. lawyer -

Cutler - Pickering -  
recommended by Bucher

---

Arceida -

~~TOP SECRET EYES ONLY~~

**FLASH**

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~EYES ONLY~~  
CLASSIFICATION

FOR COMMCENTER USE ONLY

PRECEDENCE

FROM: DICK CHENEY  
TO: DONALD RUMSFELD

DEX \_\_\_\_\_

DAC 25

GPS \_\_\_\_\_

LDX \_\_\_\_\_

PAGES 2

TTY \_\_\_\_\_

CITE \_\_\_\_\_

INFO:

DTG: 242220Z

RELEASED BY: JP

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SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

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FORM 10 22 FEB 73


~~TOP SECRET EYES ONLY~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

December 24, 1974

TO: DONALD RUMSFELD

FROM: DICK CHENEY



~~TOP SECRET~~ -- EYES ONLY -- FLASH --

As requested.

~~TOP SECRET~~ -- EYES ONLY -- FLASH --

Determined to be an administrative marking  
Cancelled per E.O. 12356, Sec. 1.3 and  
Archivist's memo of March 16, 1983

By BA-D NARS date 5/31/85

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~ f

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON  
December 24, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
THROUGH: DON RUMSFELD  
FROM: JACK MARSH *JM*

The matter involving the Agency seems to have gathered momentum with increasing interest arising out of the resignation of Angleton.

Should results of the current investigation not quiet this sufficiently, you may wish to consider the following which I am sure others have suggested.

1. Selection of a Blue Ribbon Panel of individuals of reputation and who have knowledge of the security field. Their task would be to not only look at present compliants but make overall recommendations to improve effectiveness and suggest safeguards if needed.
2. The Panel might draw on detailed personnel from government with background in the fields of intelligence, law, and investigations to assist them in the effort.
3. Consideration might be given to having certain senior officials of your Administration serve on the Panel.
4. The Panel's efforts would take the initiative rather than finding ourselves whipsawed by prolonged Congressional hearings.
5. Candidates for Panel might include names such as:

Curtis Tarr	Bob Froehlke
John Byrnes	General Goodpaster
Arleigh Burke	Rill Rogers
Bill Scranton	Steve Ailes
Mathew Ridgeway	

Other possibilities would be educators and journalists.

6. Phil Areeda suggested to me a Commission approach, and from phone conversation with Buchen, I believe he would also be favorable.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

Classified to be an administrative mark  
called per E.O. 12356, Sec. 1.3 and  
Archivist's memo of March 16, 1983

NARS date 5/11/85

By *DM*

~~SECRET~~

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~~FLASH~~  
PRECEDENCE

~~TOP SECRET~~  
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CLASSIFICATION

FOR COMM CENTER USE ONLY

DICK CHENEY  
DONALD RUMSFELD

DEX \_\_\_\_\_  
DAC 25 GPS \_\_\_\_\_  
LDX \_\_\_\_\_ PAGES 2  
TTY \_\_\_\_\_ CITE \_\_\_\_\_

DTG: 24 2220 Z

RELEASED BY: JP

TOR: 2230 Z

ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS:

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
74 DEC 24 PM 5:32

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

December 24, 1974

TO: DONALD RUMSFELD

FROM: DICK CHENEY



~~TOP SECRET~~ -- EYES ONLY -- FLASH --

As requested.

~~TOP SECRET~~ -- EYES ONLY -- FLASH --

Determined to be an administrative marking  
Cancelled per E.O. 12356, Sec. 1.3 and  
Archivist's memo of March 16, 1983  
By DDO NARS date 5/31/85



~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 24, 1974

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12/26/74

Current concern about possible domestic intelligence operations of the CIA might warrant the appointment of a "Blue Ribbon Commission" to look into the matter.

Statutory Authority. Although statutory authority would be necessary if the Commission is to have subpoena powers, subpoenas would not seem necessary to obtain the relevant information because that information is presumably entirely in the possession of the Executive Branch. Assuming that the necessary funding is available in departmental or Presidential accounts, no legislation would be necessary to create a commission. (Where subpoena power was, in fact, conferred on recent study commissions, it was frequently done after the President had already created the Commission. This was true for the Warren Commission, for the Violence Commission of Milton Eisenhower, the National Advisory Committee on Civil Disorders chaired by Kerner, and the Katzenbach Commission on Law Enforcement.)

Purpose. The purposes of creating any such commission would be several: to obtain the facts, to generate public confidence with respect to agencies that must inevitably operate secretly, at least in part, to formulate organizational or statutory reforms necessary to prevent the reoccurrence of undesirable activities, and perhaps to forestall less desirable Congressional inquiries. Congressional inquiries, perhaps by several different committees

might well be less secure in safeguarding that data which ought not to be made public. The bi-partisan leadership in Congress might see the same advantages in a Blue Ribbon Commission.

Scope. The appropriate scope of the inquiry is determined in large measure by the scope of public concern. At the minimum, recent disclosures have reinforced public concern about the domestic activities of the CIA. Thus, the domestic surveillance of United States citizens by the CIA would be the minimum content of such an inquiry. It might be hard to exclude such surveillance undertaken by the FBI. The CIA's foreign surveillance activities affecting U. S. citizens might inevitably be covered. But perhaps ~~the~~ other CIA activities, exemplified by the recent disclosures concerning Chile, could be excluded as an altogether different problem.

Composition. In order to accomplish its purposes, the Commission would have to include members with the highest public reputation for intelligence and integrity. If the Commission is to be effective, it cannot be, in our intent or in public appearance, a "kept" body designed to whitewash the problem. People like Governor Scranton (if he would do it) or Milton Eisenhower (if still active enough) or James R. Killian (if still active enough) illustrate the kind of person needed for this task. We should be sure to include Democrats, although not people who served in the later Johnson years when these activities began. We should also include a person or

two from this Administration to make sure that the relevant agencies receive a fair hearing and, of course, the Commission would have to include members of Congress--perhaps one member each from the House and the Senate Foreign Relations, and Armed Services or Intelligence Committee. This would have to be worked out with the Congressional leadership and with the Chairmen of the relevant committees. It would be helpful if at least some of the private members had had previous national security responsibilities in the Federal Government. *Also note that the report should be made to the inquiry*

Timing: If such a Commission is to serve its purposes, it must be created very promptly. It is hard to decide upon its duration without knowing more about the underlying problem, but a report might perhaps be expected within three to twelve months of its commencement.

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Timing: If such a Commission is to serve its purposes, it must be created very promptly. It is hard to decide upon its duration without knowing more about the underlying problem, but a report might perhaps be expected within three to twelve months of its commencement.

Yes

No

[ca. 12/30/74]

Scranton  
Dillon

Reagan  
Dunther  
Meany  
Jaworski  
Driscoll  
Harriman

Ask Meany who he would recommend.

- Driscoll - not alert - old + tired
- Jaworski - wrong connotation - conflict w/ Sp. pros.
- Dunther - over the hill
- Meany - wouldn't have time - source him **(NO)**
- Reagan - too political - wait around good **[Buckley]**
- Harriman - physical **[Merritt]**

Freylinghagen

Keating (member or chair or staff Director)

~~Hot Lines:~~

Chips Chester - Senate Home Foreign Affairs -

?  
Mike Uhlman - Buckley, Huston - Ph.D.  
for Claremont - Pol. Sci. - lawyer  
~~for~~ 34.

Ron Dietrich -

Ken Damon -

→ Ed Zimmerman - Demo. Wash. lawyer -



Names - Marsh, Brubaker, Cheney

Charter - narrow - allegations plus  
Cobby report, status - not going  
on -

Timetable - 6 weeks

Executive Order - preamble.  
constituted  
powers.

Comm. name

Staff director

Statement -

Cog. Strategy -

~~476-4850~~

~~Tim  
Gayle~~

~~Dean Fisher of  
Time Mag.~~

~~Bill Barwood~~

~~21 Gov of Ind.~~

~~476-5431~~



Cerit. A.G. - for Anti-Trust -

by Cong. Howard Robison

by Steven Ciles -

no Dean Rusk -

by Bernice Segal

by Gen. Ridgeway

by " Taylor

No on Freylinghuysen -

Lyman Fennitzy

Maurie Liebman

~~Justice Powell~~

Cong. Sam Stratton



Dr. 12/30 - 8:00 P.M.

Done Reason - approved waiver - ICC

Done Tax status for passengers - At 1

Done Done SOTU - 1<sup>st</sup> full paragraph on p. 2 is checked "good"

Done Rorby wants summary of what's been decided on energy & economy - brief him - take Alan - also background - division papers - they set up

Done P. talked to Rorby about Robson - Fri. A.M. set up mtg. w - give him background fill & papers on Robson & introduce

Done Brennan - wait on letter until NSC responds -

Done Phou - eliminate hold button

Done Julius Election Commission - ask Cool yes or no with Hays agreement - Check at James Duffy if Holart Taylor says no - Hill Staffer -



Dave  
Warren

Margita White - OK for hire -  
gets commission after Milton solved.

Dave  
W512

Mtzp. - HAK, Schaeinger, Colby - Hebi -  
D.L. sit in on all 4.

Pres. should announce tomorrow  
that he will form a panel.

→ Abshire - chair PFIAB - he is  
director unless I get more

Scruton - ok  
Reagan - okayed  
Gen. Taylor - for Scruton } →  
Dillon -  
Asch -

→ ~~Mitley~~ → as chair Griswold

As to Griswold not competent - get  
specifics from Quenda

Keating backup for Reagan or Scruton  
Ridgway & Scruton - backup for Taylor  
Mearns - backup for Dillon & Asch.

Kon  
Da

Others possible for backup Brownell

Fitzhugh (OOO panel) Bubby  
Byrns - Lester

Robin  
Segal

Mr. Martin  
Harold Cleveland  
Mogrihan



June 1/2/76 Jim Brown - gets W.H. pass -

Cherry - too tall but - before  
they can anyone else at CIA  
let us know. ✓

Reagan turned down DOT

→ Call Holm about Rudy -

No on Zimmer -

S.



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 31, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Jack Marsh  
Dick Cheney

FROM: Phil Buchen *Phil*

Attached is draft of proposed Executive Order.

The critical portion is Section 2. Should U. S. "permanent residents" as well as "citizens" be specified? Should activities involving U. S. citizens in other countries be included? Should CIA employees and contacts be specifically excluded? Should a time period be specified for the activities to be investigated? Should the test be only conformity to the statutory limitations on the CIA or should it be broader, such as conformity to sound policies for the government's relations to its citizens? Should the Commission be required to make recommendations?

This draft has been reviewed by Stan Ebner of OMB, but it has not been reviewed by DOJ or any other concerned department or agency.

Attachment

EXECUTIVE ORDER \_\_\_\_\_

ESTABLISHING A COMMISSION ON CIA INTELLIGENCE  
ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES

By virtue of the authority vested in me as President under the Constitution and statutes of the United States, it is hereby ordered as follows:

SECTION 1. Establishment of the Commission. There is hereby established a Commission on CIA Intelligence Activities Within the United States (hereinafter referred to as the "Commission"), to be composed of a Chairman and four other members to be appointed by the President. The President may from time to time appoint additional members to the Commission and may designate additional officers thereof.

SECTION 2. Functions of the Commission. The Commission shall:

(a) Ascertain and evaluate the facts relating to intelligence activities conducted within the United States by the Central Intelligence Agency which may have impinged upon the privacy of citizens and permanent residents of the United States and have given rise to reasonable questions of compliance with the provisions of 50 U.S.C. 403.

(b) Ascertain and evaluate the means employed to stop continuance and to avoid recurrence of such activities; and

(c) Inquire into such other relevant matters as the President may request.

SECTION 3. Cooperation by Executive Departments and Agencies.

The Commission is authorized to request, at the direction of the Chairman from any executive department or agency any information and assistance deemed necessary to carry out its functions under this order. Each department or agency shall, to the extent permitted by law and within the limits of available funds, furnish information and assistance to the Commission.

SECTION 4. Compensation, Personnel, and Finance. (a) Members

of the Commission shall receive \$100 per day when engaged in the performance of official duties pursuant to this order, and shall be allowed travel expense and per diem in lieu of subsistence as authorized by law (5 U.S.C. 5703) for persons intermittently employed.

(b) The Commission shall have an Executive Director who shall be designated by the President and shall receive such compensation as may hereafter be specified. The Commission is authorized to appoint and fix the compensation of such other personnel as may be necessary to enable it to carry out its functions, and is authorized to obtain services in accordance with the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 3109.

(c) All necessary expenses incurred in connection with the work of the Commission shall be paid from the "Unanticipated Personnel Needs Fund of the President" or such other appropriated funds as may be available for the purposes of the Commission.

SECTION 5. Administrative Services. The General Services Administration shall provide administrative services for the Commission on a reimbursable basis.

SECTION 6. Report and Termination. The Commission shall present its final report to the President not later than \_\_\_\_\_ but may present interim reports prior to presenting its final report. It shall terminate within one month after presenting its final report.

THE WHITE HOUSE

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COMMISSION CHARTER QUESTIONS

## A Commission to inquire into

## (a) Those CIA operations

## 1) Within the U. S. concerning

- a) U. S. Citizens
- b) U. S. Residents (?)
- c) CIA employees and contacts (excluded?)

## ? 2) Outside the U. S. concerning —

- a) U. S. citizens only

## (b) Conducted

## 1) Now, and

## ? 2) Currently charged to have been conducted, or

## ? 3) Conducted within the past 10 (?) years

## (c) That raise reasonable questions concerning their consistency with

## 1) The statutory limitations on the CIA, and

## ? 2) Sound principle concerning government's relation to the citizenry under the Constitution, laws, custom, or developing notions of privacy.

(alternate)

-2-

(b) Ascertain and evaluate the means to stop continuance and to avoid recurrence of such activities; and

(c) Make recommendations for administrative or legislative clarification of the proper functions of the Central Intelligence Agency and their relationships to functions of other U.S. intelligence agencies with a view to avoiding a failure of intelligence efforts essential to the national security.

(d) Inquire into such other relevant matters as the President may request.

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2a

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SECTION 3. Cooperation by Executive Departments and Agencies.

The Commission is authorized to request, at the direction of the Chairman, from any executive department or agency any information and assistance deemed necessary to carry out its functions under this order. Each department or agency shall, to the extent permitted by law and within the limits of available funds, furnish information and assistance to the Commission.

SECTION 4. Compensation, Personnel, and Finance. (a) Members of the Commission shall receive \$100 per day when engaged in the performance of official duties pursuant to this order, and shall be allowed travel expenses and per diem in lieu of subsistence as authorized by law (5 U.S.C. 5703) for persons intermittently employed.

(b) The Commission shall have an Executive Director who shall be designated by the President and shall receive such compensation as may hereafter be specified. The Commission is authorized to appoint and fix the compensation of such other personnel as may be necessary to enable it to carry out its functions, and is authorized to obtain services in accordance with the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 3109.

(c) All necessary expenses incurred in connection with the work of the Commission shall be paid from the "Unanticipated Personnel Needs Fund of the President" or such other appropriated funds as may be available for the purposes of the Commission.

SECTION 5. Administrative Services. The General Services Administration shall provide administrative services for the Commission on a reimbursable basis.

SECTION 6. Report and Termination. The Commission shall present its final report to the President not later than \_\_\_\_\_ but may present interim reports prior to presenting its final report. It shall terminate within one month after presenting its final report.

THE WHITE HOUSE

---

COMMISSION CHARTER QUESTIONS

A Commission to inquire into

(a) Those CIA operations

1) Within the U.S. concerning

a) U. S. Citizens

b) U. S. Residents (?)

~~c)~~ CIA employees and contacts (excluded?)

? 2) Outside the U.S. concerning

a) U.S. citizens only

(b) Conducted

1) Now, and

? 2) Currently charged to have been conducted, or

? 3) Conducted within the past 10 (?) years

(c) That raise reasonable questions concerning their consistency with

1) The statutory limitations on the CIA, and

? 2) Sound principle concerning government's relation to the citizenry under the Constitution, laws, custom, or developing notions of privacy.

(alternate)

-2-

(b) Ascertain and evaluate the means to stop continuance and to avoid recurrence of such activities; and

(c) Make recommendations for administrative or legislative clarification of the proper functions of the Central Intelligence Agency and their relationships to functions of other U.S. intelligence agencies with a view to avoiding a failure of intelligence efforts essential to the national security.

(d) Inquire into such other relevant matters as the President may request.

SECTION 3. Cooperation by and with Executive Departments and Agencies.

The Commission is authorized to request, at the direction of the Chairman, from any executive department or agency any information and assistance deemed necessary to carry out its functions under this order. Each department or agency shall, to the extent permitted by law and within the limits of available funds, furnish information and assistance to the Commission. The Commission shall furnish to the Department of Justice any evidence found by the Commission which may relate to offenses under the statutes of the United States.

SECTION 4. Compensation, Personnel, and Finance. (a) Members of the Commission shall receive \$100 per day when engaged in the performance of official duties pursuant to this order, and shall be allowed travel expenses and per diem in lieu of subsistence as authorized by law (5 U.S.C. 5703) for persons intermittently employed.

(alternate)

2a

(b) The Commission shall have an Executive Director who shall be designated by the President and shall receive such compensation as may hereafter be specified. The Commission is authorized to appoint and fix the compensation of such other personnel as may be necessary to enable it to carry out its functions, and is authorized to obtain services in accordance with the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 3109.

THE NICK THIMMESCH COLUMN

RELEASE DATE: Saturday/Sunday, January 11/12, 1975

ROCKEFELLER WRONG MAN TO INVESTIGATE CIA

by Nick Thimmesch

WASHINGTON--Putting Vice President Nelson A.

Rockefeller in charge of the investigation of the CIA is the latest of President Gerald Ford's blunders, if indeed Mr. Ford is wholly responsible for this appointment.

For openers, Rockefeller is just too, too close to Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger to be objective about the allegations concerning the CIA and the possible role Kissinger had in any domestic surveillance activities by that agency.

Rockefeller and Kissinger have an association dating back to 1955. The two men have been through thick and thin. Indeed, as Kissinger's patron and employer, Rockefeller has a strong hold on the secretary of state.

According to the reports in The New York Times, the CIA carried on surveillance of some 10,000 U.S. citizens in the Sixties and Seventies, in an apparent violation of the law restricting CIA activity to areas outside the United States.

(MORE)



Page Two... NICK THIMMESCH ... January 11/12 ... United States.

In his official capacity as head of the National Security Council and as director of the Forty Committee, Kissinger obviously knows of any substantive activities by the CIA. So if there was any domestic spying, he surely would have known about it. Kissinger has denied any such knowledge.

Even assuming Kissinger's statement is accurate, it is still wrong for Rockefeller to head this investigation. Rockefeller himself has strong ties to the CIA as a longtime member of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. The makeup of the entire eight-member commission is likewise wrong because, almost to the man, these people have varying degrees of involvement with the CIA.

These Ford appointments are like General Motors appointing its own board to investigate its management. Indeed, whatever the state of Richard Nixon's reputation, the presidential commissions he appointed were independent and represented a spectrum of views. Several of those commissions filed reports which drove Nixon up the wall.

The Rockefeller commission breaks the precedent, and there is justification for criticism, in Congress and elsewhere, that it will very likely deliver a whitewash.

(Paragraph continues)

Page Three... NICK THIMMESCH ... January 11/12 ... whitewash. Rockefeller's defenders, while acknowledging his intimate relationship with Kissinger, hope that critics will wait for the verdict before making any such judgment.

It is unfortunate that Rockefeller and Kissinger vacationed together shortly after The Times story broke, thus causing speculation that the two men took breaks between swimming and golfing to develop a plan to deal with the explosive issue.

"Having that group, headed by Rockefeller," says Rep. Michael Harrington (D-Mass.), "do the investigating is allowing the foreign policy establishment to come to its own rescue. Its self-examination will have a predictable outcome. They will find themselves innocent. This is patently outrageous. It isn't even subtle. There's going to be plenty of trouble in Congress over this."

The issue of the credibility of New York Times correspondent Seymour Hersh's stories on the CIA is separate from the wisdom of appointing Rockefeller to head the commission. It is curious, however, that there is a concerted effort in some quarters in Washington to discredit Hersh.

(MORE)



Page Four... NICK THIMMESCH ... January 11/12 ... Hersh.

Over the years, many a gentleman of good breeding and fine education has graduated from CIA service and found his way into Washington's powerful establishment--the law and consultant firms, the upper reaches of the federal bureaucracy and journalism.

These well-placed, affluent professionals do feel an "old boy" loyalty and affinity to the CIA. They were greatly disturbed with James Schlesinger, now defense secretary, when he came to the CIA as director and announced that he was "no gentleman," and that he would dismantle the gentlemen's club.

Indeed, The Washington Post, which hammered and hammered and hammered so relentlessly at the Nixon Administration on Watergate that Watergate seemed to spill into the crossword puzzles and flower-club news, displays a curiously protective editorial attitude toward the CIA (to the consternation of some Post reporters).

The cozy feeling among some of the top people at The Post for the CIA might be traced to the former connections these people had with the agency and its officials.

Ah, that's life in Washington. Adam and Eve did not tryst at the Watergate.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

29 April 1975

Mr. David W. Belin  
Executive Director  
Commission on CIA Activities  
Within the United States

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 11/24/98, State Dept. Guidelines  
By KSH, NARA, Date 5/24/00

Dear Mr. Belin:

This material, requested by Mr. Gray for you, is provided to meet an urgent deadline and has not been subjected to usual Agency procedures governing release of Agency documents.

Accordingly, please consider it on loan and returnable. If you should require the material for Commission files, please let me know and we will arrange to provide it.

Faithfully yours,



E. H. Knoche  
Assistant to the Director

Attachment: a/s

P.S. As you know, Mr. Colby's memo of 25 September 1974 on Chile has been over-taken by subsequent events.

**SECRET**

Classified By <u>014359</u> Exempt from general declassification schedule of E.O. 11652 exemption schedule 53 (1), (2), (3) Automatically declassified on Date Impossible to Determine
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4  
Executive Registry  
74-4958

25 September 1974

74-0233

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: ITT/CIA/Chile Matter

The legality of certain of the matters surfaced in the memorandum to the Inspector General from Mr. Thomas C. Lawler dated 5 September 1974 has been studied by the offices of General Counsel and Legislative Counsel. To date, I have been advised by my General Counsel that the study has resulted in no finding that there is clear evidence of perjury or other crimes. Accordingly, I have decided not to refer any of the matters discussed in that memorandum to the Attorney General at this time. The study of these matters will continue and a final decision as to whether referral of any of these matters to the Attorney General is necessary will be made whenever clear evidence is available of any criminal conduct. I am also reserving decision at this time as to whether any of these matters require being brought to the attention of any of the congressional committees or OPIC.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3  
MR 00-024-R132  
CIA Letter 7/30/11  
By dal NARA Date 3/14/13 W. E. Colby  
Director

cc: IG ✓  
OLC  
OGC

UNCLASSIFIED

INTERNAL USE ONLY

EYES ONLY

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

### DUTYING AND RECORD SHEET

CT: (Optional)

C/WHD		EXTENSION	NO.
		DATE	
		21 February 1973	
Officer designation, room number, and 9)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED	
Mr. Broe IG	21 FEB 1973		
Mr. Maury OLC	21 FEB 1973		
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)			

#### MEMORANDUM FOR: DFC

The attached memo by Shackley (21 Feb 73) dwells on a question of CIA endorsing Helms' testimony although subordinate staff wouldn't show it to us. It so emphasizes the issue of whether CIA gave money — or vice versa — for political action in 1970, as distinguished from what we did our-

Also attached is an "overview" paper that reports 1970 activity to spill Allende's chance of election out, however, supporting either of the two non-"at" candidates. After the election CIA conducted actions "to prevent the accession of Allende," including providing weapons to instigate an uprising. Some in direct conflict to testimony TCL tells given before Congress. I think *Wally* *Wally* *Wally* can Warner has a copy and has been told that you a copy. He has not yet

revised TCL's showing it to \_\_\_\_\_ (DATE)  
26 Sept 72

DECLASSIFIED BY *SP* EXEMPTED FROM GDS

REF ID: A633

CIA ltr 7/20/11

del MARA Dec 3/16/13

*discuss per will get*

101 REPLACES FORM 10-101 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

**BY HAND**

SECRET/SENSITIVE

EYES ONLY



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~~USE ONLY~~  
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

7. (Optional)

C/WHD  [Redacted]	EXTENSION  [Redacted]	NO.		
		DATE 21 February 1973		
Officer designation, room number, and initials	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
Mr. Broe IG	21 FEB 1973		[Redacted]	
Mr. Maury OLC	21 FEB 1973		[Redacted]	
Mr. Houston OGC	21 FEB 1973		[Redacted]	
Mr. Colby	21 FEB 1973		[Redacted]	
DDP	21 Feb 73		[Redacted]	
DCI	22 FEB 1973		[Redacted]	
C/WHD				discuss with DCI

**BY HAND**

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

~~EYES ONLY~~



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21 FEB 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT: Proposed CIA Response to Request for Information Which Have Been Received From the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations

1. This memorandum contains action recommendations in paragraphs 4 and 5.

2. On 12 February 1973, in response to their request for a meeting, Mr. Maury, CIA Legislative Counsel, contacted Messrs Jerome Levinson and Jack Blum, staff members of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations. This resulted in Mr. Maury receiving five questions which the staff members wanted answered. The questions focus on the 1970 elections in Chile and the CIA and ITT role in these elections. Mr. Maury took note of the questions and told the staff members he was not familiar with the substantive issues which were involved in the inquiries. Mr. Maury did agree, however, to refer the questions to appropriate CIA officials for study. The staff members are, therefore, expecting a response. Attachment A, which is for information purposes only, lists the five questions and their correct answers.

3. It should be noted that in formulating the paragraph 4 recommendation, special note was taken of the 12 February statement by Mr. Levinson to Mr. Maury that he felt there were significant discrepancies between the 5 and 7 February 1973 testimony of Mr. Richard Helms, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the 1970 events in Chile and data which ITT had previously provided to the Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations. In this context Mr. Levinson made the point that these contradictions might require the Subcommittee to ask Mr. Helms to provide additional testimony at a later date, even if this meant Mr. Helms would have to return to Washington from Iran. The

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With PORTIONS EXEMPTED  
E.O. 12958 Sec. 1.5 (c)

MR 94-157, #50, CIA 11/10/96

By WT NARA, Date 1/8/98

1.5(c)  
1.5(d)(1)

CIA debriefing of Mr. Helms on 12 February did not identify any deviations in his testimony from the known facts. This debriefing, however, did not have the benefit of our being able to compare the transcript of Mr. Helms' testimony with his recollections of the salient points that were discussed with him by the Senate Committee. This was due to the fact that to date the staff members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee have refused to release a copy of Mr. Helms' testimony to either CIA or the Department of State.

4. The recommended CIA response to the staff members' questions is as follows:

"The testimony of Mr. Helms on 5 and 7 February 1973 before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee clearly established that CIA neither gave to nor received from ITT funds for use in Chile in 1970 for the support of political parties. In addition, Mr. Helms' testimony brought out the fact that there were no joint action programs established between CIA and ITT for implementation in the context of the 1970 political developments in Chile. CIA regards Mr. Helms' testimony on this topic to be accurate, thus no further elaboration is planned."

5. The Subcommittee staff members will undoubtedly find the paragraph 4 response less than satisfactory. It is to be anticipated, therefore, that they will refer the issue inherent in this answer to the Subcommittee in an attempt to set in motion action which would be designed to produce what they would regard as a more forthcoming reply from CIA. In the interim between forwarding the paragraph 4 answer to the Subcommittee staff members and their reaching agreement with the Subcommittee on how to proceed on the basis of this answer, it is recommended that CIA take the following actions:

a. The Legislative Counsel be authorized to sound out Senator Jackson on the prospects of CIA being able to obtain, either Senator Stennis or Senator Symington's assistance in arranging for the CIA Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee to consider the problems of how CIA sources and techniques could be protected before the Agency proceeds further with the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations. In this connection it should be noted that Senator Jackson has a proven record of

supporting CIA and in the past his advice on how CIA might handle a particular piece of Congressional business has been sound. In addition, Senator Jackson is discreet and can be counted on not to comment further on what he learns about CIA or ITT actions in Chile during 1970. It must be noted, however, that for the discussion with Senator Jackson to be meaningful and for his advice to be sound, CIA would have to give him a briefing on the nature of CIA's relations with ITT in 1970 during the Chilean election period. In short, a risk would be taken for sensitive information would be surfaced to a Senator with there being no guarantee he would be helpful. This is a risk which is worth taking, for the net gain from such action favors CIA if the desired results are obtained.

b. If Senator Jackson believes that it would be useful for the Agency to approach Senator Stennis or Senator Symington, then such an approach should be made. Perhaps Senator Jackson could pave the way for such a contact. In the discussion with either Senator Stennis or Symington, CIA should work toward the goal of having its testimony on events in Chile during 1970 shifted to the Senate Committee on CIA. Once that objective is achieved, the DCI could spell out in Executive Session to the Senate Committee on CIA that the Agency and ITT did not engage in joint action programs in Chile. The DCI would indicate, however, that CIA and ITT did exchange views on political and economic trends in Chile.

[REDACTED]

1.5(c)(d)  
1.6(d)(1)(6)

Having received such a briefing as a member of the Senate Committee on CIA, it is believed that Senator Stennis or Symington could be persuaded to work out with the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations an arrangement whereby the DCI could make a controlled presentation before the latter group. In such an appearance the DCI would want to make the critical point i. e., CIA neither received from nor gave to ITT funds for the support of political parties in Chile in 1970. See Attachment B for a proposed statement that would be used by the DCI in making a controlled appearance before the Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations.

c. As it is anticipated that even though Senators Stennis or Symington might arrange for a controlled appearance by the DCI

[REDACTED]

1.5(c)  
1.6(d)(1)

before the Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, it is possible that at the time of the DCI's appearance, some Senator might choose to violate the understanding. In such a case the DCI would have to fall back on Executive Privilege, and in so doing would have to avoid answering any questions that would compromise instructions which the Agency received from the President, Dr. Kissinger or the 40 Committee. Since it may be necessary to invoke Executive Privilege, we note that Presidential instructions state that this should be coordinated with Justice but in this instance the DCI should discuss this line of strategy with the White House first for basic policy guidance.

6. In considering the paragraph 4 and 5 recommendations, it should be noted that all of this involves unilateral action by CIA. This is due to the fact that while it would be desirable to have an agreed-upon interdepartmental coordination mechanism whereby CIA, the Department of State and the White House could jointly work out a governmental strategy for dealing with the various aspects of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee Hearings on Multinational Corporations, the simple realities indicate that it has not been possible to date to establish such an arrangement. CIA has worked with the Department of State to establish a coordinating group, but this effort has not been successful, primarily because the Department of State has not received the guidance it requested from the White House. In short, the lack of a coordinating mechanism forces CIA to respond to events on an ad hoc basis. In so doing CIA has to keep its options open so that flexibility can be preserved for as long as possible, pending resolution of the policy issue of how the hearings will be handled on an interdepartmental basis.

1.5(c)(4)  
1.6(c)(1)(C)

7.

In short,

we must protect intelligence sources and techniques whether we proceed to handle the Subcommittee Hearings on Multinational Corporations unilaterally or via an interdepartmental coordinating mechanism.

8. Attachment C provides an overview of CIA's involvement in the Chile electoral situation of 1970. This document is forwarded for information purposes only.



Chief  
Western Hemisphere Division

1.5(c)  
1.5(d)

Attachment:

- A - Questions and Answers
- B - Proposed Statement
- C - Overview

cc: DDCI

CONCUR:



Deputy Director for Plans

1.3(c)  
1.3(d)(1)

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1.3(c)  
1.3(d)

1.3(c)  
1.6(d)(1)

20 February 1973

1. QUESTION:

Who was the Station Chief in Chile during calendar year 1970?

ANSWER:

[REDACTED] was the CIA Station Chief in Chile from [REDACTED] to 12 November 1970.

1.3(c)  
1.6(d)(1)

During this period [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

1.5(c)  
1.6(d)(1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

2. QUESTION:

What was Mr. Broe's exact title during 1970 and what were his responsibilities?

ANSWER:

Mr. Broe was Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division with the responsibility for directing CIA's covert activities in Latin America to include the Caribbean area. Mr. Broe became the Inspector General of CIA on 1 February 1972.

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 1.5 (c)

MR 94-157#51; CIA letter 10/30/90

BY Wf NARA, Date 1/8/97

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

1.3(c)  
1.6(d)(1)

3. QUESTION: Will Mr. Broe and the Station Chief be available to the Subcommittee for questioning?

ANSWER: No.

4. QUESTION: If Mr. Broe and the Station Chief are not made available, will other CIA spokesmen be available to discuss the Agency's operations and involvements in Chile in 1970 and under what ground rules?

ANSWER: CIA is prepared to be helpful and to this extent the DCI would be prepared to work with the Subcommittee on a statement which CIA could make before the Committee and which would deal with the central issue of the 1970 political situation in Chile. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

1.5(c)  
1.6(d)(1)

5. QUESTION: [REDACTED]

ANSWER: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

1.5(c)  
1.6(d)(1)

21 February 1973

1.3(c)  
1.6(d)(1)

OPENING STATEMENT

Gentlemen,

In my view the basic questions which interest this group and which impact on CIA can be dealt with promptly by my commenting on what are perhaps a few of the key issues which are involved in this Hearing. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

1.5(c)  
1.6(d)(1)

CIA officers did, however, talk to ITT officials in the period July to October 1970 about political developments in Chile. This was in keeping with our long established policy of maintaining contact with knowledgeable businessmen, journalists or diplomats in order to discuss trends and developments in a particular area. It was in this frame of reference that ITT and CIA officials exchanged views on how things were going in Chile,

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

1.5(c)  
1.6(d)(1)

I should note in this context that CIA had no monopoly on United States Government contacts with ITT, either preceding or following Allende's election. Other government departments or agencies also talked to ITT

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 1.5 (c)

MR 94-157, #52; CIA letter 10/30/96

By WT, NARA, Date 1/8/99

[REDACTED]



representatives in this time frame, for such dialogues are part of the process of keeping abreast of what is going on in a country like Chile, when it is in a high state of political and economic flux.

Chile remains a topic of more than passing intelligence interest to the United States. As a result I am not at liberty to comment further on items dealing with Chile which affect intelligence techniques or personnel. I do hope, however, that my comments have been useful in terms of the basic issues being considered by this Committee.

Thank you.



20 February 1973

1.3(c)  
1.3(d)(1)

OVER VIEW STATEMENTS ON CIA INVOLVEMENT IN

CHILE IN 1970

1. [REDACTED]

1.5(c)(1)  
1.6(d)(1)

2. The primary CIA activity in Chile was to conduct spoiling operations against the candidacy of Salvador Allende in the 4 September 1970 elections without, however, supporting either of the two non-Marxist presidential candidates. This effort focused on a propaganda program to alert the Chilean people to the dangers of a Marxist regime under Allende. A total of \$425,000 was spent in this endeavor which was approved by the 40 Committee and was carried out in close coordination with Ambassador Korry in Chile and State Department officials in Washington.

3. A second Agency activity was conducted between 15 September 1970, after the popular plurality won by Allende, and before the election of Allende by the Congress on 24 October and his inauguration on 3 November. A total of \$153,000 was spent in this effort to prevent the accession of Allende to the presidency by attempting to induce various Chilean groups, notably the Christian Democratic Party, the Armed Forces and a number of independent

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MR 94-157, #53; CIA Ltr 10/30/96

By WJ NARA, Date 20 1/8/97

[REDACTED]

(b)  
(7)

organizations and individuals to use legislative or military means to thwart his investiture. At one point three submachine guns were provided to three military officers who planned to use them in instigating an uprising by the Armed Forces. This program was conducted at the request of President Nixon with the understanding that it was not to become known to the State Department or other members of the 40 Committee. It is believed that State Department officials are still unaware that this program was conducted by CIA. This is an important consideration which governs future actions,

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

1.5(c)(d)  
1.6(d)(1)(C)

[REDACTED]

4. [REDACTED]

E94-0538, Document No. 53  
"Overview Statements on CIA Involvement in Chile in 1970"  
Dated 20 February 1973

**Page 3**

**DENIED IN ITS ENTIRETY**  
UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12958  
SECTIONS 1.5(c) (d) and 1.6(d) (1) (6)