The original documents are located in Box 6, folder “Intelligence - Decision Book (1)” of the Richard B. Cheney Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

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MEMORANDUM TO: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: JACK MARSHALL
SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY DECISION BOOK

PURPOSE

This book presents the foreign intelligence issues which you must address. After nearly a year of headlines concerning past abuses by the Intelligence Community, you now have an historical opportunity to establish firm ground rules and make other changes to improve the Nation's foreign intelligence capability.

BACKGROUND

As indicated by the Index, this book attempts to deal with this complex issue comprehensively. It draws on the results of several interagency working groups, including the NSC/OMB organization and management study (which is attached).

The book is in decision format but contains no decision "blocks". Its main purpose as I explained orally, is to give you an overview of the situation as we see it at this time. However, I would point out it does not in my opinion yet adequately address all the issues that remain insofar as the intelligence community is concerned. For example there should be further development of matters relating to the NSA and to some extent the FBI. We are seeking your reaction to the issues presented and, after receiving them, we will prepare a final decision memorandum. Not all your senior advisors have reviewed this material, although all the relevant agencies did help in pulling it together. You can expect further inputs from some in the Intelligence community for your final decision memo.
The charts and text used in this book do not reflect your recent decision to fill the second deputy post at Defense, but this does not affect our analysis.

**ACTION REQUIRED**

Review this Decision Book. I recommend that you call a meeting of the NSC (including the Attorney General) soon after your return from Vail, to discuss this issue.

- Approve "expanded" NSC meeting
- Disapproved

**NEXT STEPS**

If you meet with us upon returning from Vail to present your views on these intelligence issues, we will then present another final decision memorandum (in under a week).

At that time, you may wish to meet again with an "expanded" NSC and, perhaps, separately with others such as the Joint Chiefs.

Once you make your substantive decisions on the foreign intelligence matter, we will prepare a "strategy" paper on the alternatives for presenting your positions to Congress and the public.
The purpose of this chapter is to assist you in developing goals and principles concerning the Intelligence Community. They will provide direction for the Community and serve as “guideposts” as you make your decisions on the issues which follow. This chapter focuses on:

- The need for charters to increase accountability which is necessary to restore public confidence in the Intelligence Community.
- The need to clarify the relationship between the Congress and the Executive.
- The need to clarify relationships within the Executive Branch.

A. INTRODUCTION

The focus of all investigations of the Intelligence Community (principally by the House and Senate Select Committees) has been on abuses, domestic and foreign. On the other hand, other recent studies have addressed the problem of improving the organization and management of the Community. Certain consumers of intelligence have focused on the need to improve product quality and to meet emerging needs in non-Defense areas, such as economic intelligence. And, finally, critics outside the Administration and Community leaders have recognized the need to improve protection of secrecy and, at the same time, to provide for wider dissemination of intelligence product to those who have a need to know.
Goals

The current attention focused on the Community provides you with the opportunity to deal with these issues. In reaching decisions on the more detailed issues, there are five goals which you may wish to adopt:

- Abuses should be eliminated and this must be clearly understood by the Congress and the public.
- The organization and management of the Community should be improved.
- The quality of the intelligence product should be improved.
- Secrecy, including sources and methods, should be protected, consistent with necessary dissemination of the Community's product to policy officials.
- Establish more effective relations with Congress involving the Intelligence Community.

To achieve these five goals, you must restore public confidence in the Community, its legitimacy and its adherence to the law. Unless this confidence is restored, the soundest decisions will never result in achievement of these goals.

The decisions necessary to achieve these goals should, if possible, be taken comprehensively and at the same time. Steps to achieve one goal will necessarily have an impact on another. For example, decisions on organization and management will necessarily affect quality. Preventing abuses
through excessive restriction of Community collection activities may lead to a demoralized and ineffective Community, thus reducing the quality of the product and of the people attracted to the Community. Lack of concern for protection of secrecy sources and methods could severely damage the continuing effectiveness of the Community.

Problems

The analysis of ways to achieve these five goals has shown that there are three underlying problems which must be solved. The first of these is the lack of adequate charters for the key agencies that make up the Community. This lack has made it possible to criticize the Community for actions taken in the past that were consistent with the needs of the time, but that are not acceptable today. Further, there have been ambiguities and imprecision in the role and functions of certain elements of the Community, as pointed out by the Rockefeller Commission. And lastly, because neither the National Security Agency nor the Defense Intelligence Agency has been created by statute, critics have been able to impugn their legitimacy. Restoration of public confidence in the Community may require a more explicit charter, and particularly a set of restrictions on the Community to eliminate and prevent abuses.

The second fundamental problem has been the relationship between Congress and the Executive. This relationship has
gone undefined throughout history, and the recent House and Senate intelligence investigations have strained relations between Congress and the Executive. Congress has asserted a need for more information to be able to judge our foreign policy, but that need must be balanced with the need of the Executive to conduct that foreign policy without necessary or damaging restrictions.

The third underlying problem is the ambiguous relationship among intelligence officials and agencies within the Executive Branch, particularly between the Department of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence. In 1971, the DCI was designated the leader of the Community by Presidential Directive, but many argue that he was not given the tools to do that job. The need to deal with the first two problems makes this a propitious time to take another look at that relationship and to decide to what degree management and organizational changes are desirable. This is an historic opportunity to make changes that probably would be impossible in normal times.

Strategy

In dealing with these three underlying problems, there are certain questions of strategy which must also be addressed. One is the degree of public discussion and attention which you should give these issues and these changes. Another is the appropriate strategy with respect to Congress and the form your decisions should take: new.
legislation, new Executive Orders, classified instruc-
tions to the Community, public statements, or combinations 
of all four. These issues will be dealt with in more 
solution detail after you have the substantive decisions.

b. THE NEED FOR A CHARTER

In discussing the charter of the Intelligence Community, 
there is a need to distinguish between two very different 
activities, policy-making and providing information and 
services.

If one views the CIA and the Intelligence Community as 
primarily policy-making organizations, ways would have to be 
found to increase the participation by the heads of intelli-
gence organizations in major policy decisions.

However, this will probably be characterized by some 
members of Congress and the Press as having unfortunate 
consequences. However, the other side of this argument is 
that the intelligence agencies are and should remain service 
agencies, and their role of providing intelligence should 
not be tainted or biased toward attempting to make their 
bosses' policies come true.

The lack of a charter for specific components of the 
Intelligence Community (such as the NSA and the DIA) and the 
lack of a detailed charter for the CIA, have led to ambi-
guities and unclear guidelines.

In dealing with the broad question of the Community's 
charter, two subsidiary policy questions can be posed:
ISSUE: Should the charter of the Community institute greater accountability?
A key concept running through the analysis to date is the degree of accountability in the Community -- accountability to the President, to statutes, to the Constitution. Accountability is at the heart of the question of achieving the overriding objective of improving public confidence. The most obvious aspect of accountability is raised by covert actions, but the concept applies to all functions of the Community and its management.

OPTIONS:
1. Visibly increase the accountability within the Executive by streamlining the chain of command to insure that specifically identified individuals are responsible for specifically defined Intelligence Community actions. This will help prevent abuses and encourage efficiency and excellence in performance. (For example, decisions concerning electronic surveillance are made throughout the Community and it is difficult to fix responsibility.)
2. Do not move toward greater accountability since the existing mechanisms (including NSC/40 Committee structure) can be improved sufficiently.

Much of the criticism of the approval of covert actions has centered on a few examples which were not in fact in any way the result of inadequate approval mechanism or staff work.

Even if the present system were scrapped, something similar would have to replace it. Some changes could and should be made administratively, but they need not alter the present system and we should oppose attempts on the part of Congress to repeal the flexibility given under the National Security Act of 1947.

The following charts demonstrate the complex relationships in the Intelligence Community and diffusion of accountability.
THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

By Lt NARA Date 3/2000
ISSUE: Do the Community's statutory and administrative charters adequately deal with covert action? This is currently one of the most controversial aspects of the Community's operations. A great deal of information has come to light on the Community's covert operations. You have addressed several aspects of them as they have emerged through your creation of the Rockefeller Commission, your public response to its Report, comments on the Assassination Report, etc.

You have defined your position on this issue in public statements. You are following two principles concerning covert actions:

First, they are necessary in the national interest and therefore should not be prohibited across-the-board by statute or Executive action; and,

Second, there have been abuses in the past (e.g., assassination planning) and you have stopped abuses and will prevent them from occurring in the future by Executive Order.

C. THE NEED TO CLARIFY THE CONGRESS - EXECUTIVE RELATIONSHIP

ISSUE: Should any new charter for the Intelligence Community be primarily statutory or administrative? The lack of a statutory charter for specific components of the Intelligence Community (such as the NSA
and the DIA), except CIA's very vague charter in the National Security Act of 1947, have led to difficulties between Congress and the Executive. The prime reason for seeking a new charter for elements of the Community would be to assist in eliminating and preventing abuses. Many argue that this is needed to rebuild public confidence in the Intelligence Community. The present charter does not adequately deal with the reporting relationship to Congress. Further, Congressional oversight is now an issue. The effect of this has been a perceived lack of accountability to Congress.

OPTIONS:

1. Arguments why the charter should be primarily statutory:
   - The Constitution requires Executive action to be based on statute in most areas of government.
   - Congress is bent on exercising its will and therefore will want to write new laws.
   - A statute is more permanent and thus the Community could better predict the standards by which it will be judged.
   - In the nature of things Congressional attempts to write a charter will essentially focus on past abuses.
- If you propose a statutory charter for the Community, you show initiative in dealing with the problem.
- In writing legislation (as opposed to the Select Committees' investigations) the necessity for a "general" charter will be recognized.

2. **Arguments why the charter should be primarily administrative** (a series of Executive Orders and guidelines by agency heads, supplementing minimal modification of existing legislation).
   - Under the Constitution, foreign policy and thus foreign intelligence, is an Executive responsibility.
   - The Community has had a mixed statutory and administrative charter for the last 30 years and it has worked well.
   - It is impossible to foresee all of the actions that will be necessary, and relying on detailed legislative authority for authorization is risky; the President must maintain flexibility to operate in foreign affairs without detailed restrictions from Congress.
   - The public will receive some assurance from the mixed charter, though perhaps not as great as from a statutory charter, depending in part on the firmness and perceived intent of the Presidential statement. (If your intent is
perceived to be to limit the Community's activities and to gain control over it, then the public will be less concerned by the form of the charter.

ISSUE: Should a new Congressional-Executive relationship provide for greater Executive Branch accountability to Congress?

OPTIONS:

1. All efforts of Congress to institute new forms of accountability should be opposed since foreign policy and intelligence is essentially an Executive Branch matter.
   - Exclusive Presidential authority over intelligence is a plausible though controversial interpretation of the Constitution.
   - With increased accountability to Congress will necessarily come greater Congressional control and interference.
   - Whatever merits of this position, it is doubtful that it can be maintained for long, given the degree of public and Congressional concern over Community abuses.

2. The Executive Branch should be more accountable to Congress, and this should be defined through negotiations between the Branches. (This may be the Hughes Amendment requiring reporting of covert actions,

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supplemented by some approval on specific actions, budget approvals, etc.)

- We have already crossed the bridge of Congressional involvement in intelligence matters, and it will be difficult to exclude Congress in the future, particularly on covert actions.

- The traditional oversight mechanisms are no longer valid (because of the collapse of Congressional leadership) and the Executive must take the lead in working out new arrangements.

- Congressional oversight is in fact not likely in the long run to prove onerous, since attention of Congress will tend to flag as these things become more routine.

- Nonetheless, there will always be a countervailing pressure of individual Congressmen to release information gathered, thus frustrating the intent of the Executive. Also, the leaks which have occurred from the Select Committees on Intelligence at the very least raise a strong presumption that sensitive national security information is compromised once given to Congress.

- The Angola matter demonstrates that the present system is inadequate. You do not have sufficient support to gain approval of your positions in Congress.

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D. THE NEED TO CLARIFY RELATIONSHIPS WITHIN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH

Many of the key issues in the Organization and Management section of this book, and in other studies, turn on the relationship between the head of the Intelligence Community (now the DCI) and the Secretary of Defense. This relationship is key because it affects:

1) the amount of "competition" in the analysis which produces intelligence;
2) where the balance is struck in allocating resources between "national" and "tactical" intelligence; and
3) the efficiency in collecting information and producing intelligence.

There are some subtle problems which this relationship raises. For example, to the extent the DCI is viewed as an adviser (and hence stripped of his managerial and/or policy-making roles) his intelligence product is more credible because he is not perceived as biased towards one institution. However, once he loses his institutional "base", he is likely to become less effective in bureaucratic struggles with the Defense and other Departments and eventually could end up with very little, if any, real control over the Intelligence Community.

Another management variable which greatly impacts the functioning of the Intelligence Community, is the process of presenting intelligence to you and your senior advisers. Here the role of the NSC and its staff is critical. The DCI
has direct access to you, but the NSC and its staff are
involved in specifying requirements for studies and production,
managing the consumer/producer dialogue, approving (through
the 40 Committee) covert operations, and using the product
as a basis for its own evaluations and assessments. The
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs is
a primary channel for intelligence to the President.

In making your Executive Branch organization and manage-
ment decisions, you may wish to use the following as guideposts:

(1) There needs to be a strong and independent head of
the Intelligence Community who is not so committed
to one bureaucracy that he loses his objectivity.

(2) The Community leader should have enough of an
institutional "base" so as to maintain his indepen-
dence vis-a-vis members of your Cabinet.

(3) There should be "competition" in the production
of intelligence, with good coordination between
the agencies.

(4) You should have direct access to an intelligence
official who does not have major foreign affairs
or defense policy responsibilities.

(5) Any organizational changes should be designed
to promote technological creativity, such as
that which led to development of the U-2's and
the Glomar Explorer.
To assist you in placing the above in context, the following charts are presented as examples of how information flows through the Intelligence Community.
FLOW OF INFORMATION THROUGH THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

Collectors
- State/FS*
- DIA/Attache
- NRO
- NSA
- SCA's
- CIA/OOD
- CIA/FBI
- CIA/DSSAT

Processors
- Collection Coordinators
- Collection Processors
- Producers Coordinators

Consumers
- Secretary of State
- Secretary of Defense
- Director of Intelligence

*The Foreign Service is not considered part of the Intelligence Community.

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E.O. 12358 Sec. 3.8

By: J. NARA, Date: 3/28/90
This chapter discusses the need to prevent abuses by agencies involved in foreign intelligence. The following issues are covered:

- The domestic jurisdictions of the FBI and the CIA.
- The method of imposing restrictions on the intelligence activities of the FBI.
- Substantive issues concerning your proposed Executive Order imposing restrictions on the foreign intelligence agencies.
- The need for more effective oversight by the Executive Branch.
- The nature of Congressional oversight and its relationship to prerogatives of the Executive.

A. JURISDICTIONAL QUESTION

You should keep in mind that in considering the FBI issues, some in the Congress have raised a question concerning the foreign intelligence jurisdiction of the FBI.

ISSUE: Should the jurisdictional arrangements between the CIA and the FBI be revised?

During World War II, the FBI had certain overseas intelligence responsibilities in Latin America. With the
creation of the CIA, the FBI jurisdiction was limited to the United States, and the CIA was given certain domestic responsibilities only with respect to protection of sources and methods (in the DCI). The CIA, of course, gathers information overtly in this country through interviews with travelers and businessmen, protects the integrity of CIA premises and conducts security investigations of its employees. The question has been raised whether the CIA should have the responsibility for gathering foreign intelligence from any source, U.S. or foreign? One argument for change is that agencies involved in law enforcement should have absolutely no foreign intelligence responsibilities or authority, therefore, give to the CIA the foreign intelligence activities currently undertaken by the FBI domestically.

OPTIONS:

1. Arguments for maintaining existing jurisdictions.
   - None of the abuses which have been uncovered would be prevented by realigning jurisdictions.
   - The geographic jurisdictional distinction is an easy one to maintain.
   - Giving the CIA domestic responsibilities is a major concern that many in Congress and the public have (although, paradoxically, the suggestion that the CIA should do foreign intelligence
activities here at home comes from liberal elements in the Senate Committee.)

- This would probably lead to duplication of efforts since the FBI would not easily give up its own activities and responsibilities; it would certainly lead to staffing duplication.
- The existing system has proved sufficient and adequate to meet both foreign and domestic intelligence needs.

2. Arguments why jurisdictions should be realigned.

- It is important for intelligence analysts to have access to all information bearing on intelligence requirements no matter where it is found.
- It was argued during Church Committee hearings that the FBI has proven to be no better at respecting individual rights and liberties, and perhaps even worse than, the CIA.
- A firm distinction can be drawn between "intelligence" gathering and "investigation for prosecution." The difference is in the use to which the information is made. Information being gathered for law enforcement purposes should be the subject of stricter control than information being gathered for foreign intelligence purposes.
The distinction drawn in 1947 is an artificial one and assumes that geography rather than purpose is the more important distinction.

The duplication would be minimized since the CIA already has domestic offices and installations, the FBI overseas installations, attaches, and connections with foreign and international police organizations.

B. METHODS OF RESTRICTING FBI ACTIVITIES

The Attorney General has under study draft guidelines imposing restrictions on FBI activities. The question arises as to whether the proper form for FBI restrictions is in a Justice Department regulation, Executive Order or a statute.

OPTIONS:

1. Justice Department regulation. This alternative leaves the most flexibility in terms of subsequent amendments. Amendments to Justice regulations can be adopted with less bureaucratic and public controversy. However, it is exactly for this reason that such a form for FBI restrictions may give the least assurance to the public that the FBI is in fact being placed under effective control.

2. Executive Order. This form provides greater assurance to the public that the FBI is being controlled.

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Since restrictions on the rest of the Intelligence Community are being imposed, the FBI should be treated similarly as to form. On the other hand, an Executive Order, as opposed to regulations issued by the authority of the Attorney General, may have the appearance of asserting direct presidential power over the FBI, circumventing and perhaps diminishing the authority of the Attorney General. In addition, if issued by the Attorney General, the guidelines would appear not only as the Attorney General's judgments of wise policy and discretion, but the judgments of the Nation's highest legal officer, the Attorney General, as to the FBI's legal authority and obligations.

If the purpose to be served by an Executive Order is to lend the weight of the President's authority to the guidelines effort, it might better be accomplished by a clear expression of support to the Attorney General, directing him to issue detailed guidelines.

Statute. Statutory restrictions on FBI authority would give the greatest assurance to the public that there are legally binding limitations on the Bureau's efforts and thus protections against abuse. They would, however, be inflexible after adoption.
could well contain unreasonable restrictions due
to "anti-FBI" forces in Congress. Furthermore, the
Executive Branch would have much less control over
its content.

4. Mix of statute, Executive Order and regulation.
The Attorney General has publicly suggested that the
guidelines now being developed by the Justice Depart-
ment should eventually take the form of a combination
of statute, Executive Order, and regulations, de-
pending on the guidelines' function and content.
Statutory enactment may be most appropriate for
defining clearly the FBI's functions and jurisdiction --
a statutory basis that is now ambiguous and deficient.
An Executive Order may be the most appropriate way
of channeling and controlling White House-FBI contacts,
while regulations may be the best way of establishing
internal Justice Department and Bureau procedures
and investigation standards.

C. RESTRICTIONS ON FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

ISSUE: What Substantive Restrictions should be
placed on Intelligence Activities other
than FBI?

The Rockefeller Commission recommended that certain
restrictions be imposed on the activities of the CIA, primarily

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related to the domestic collection of foreign intelligence and the collection of information on the domestic activities of American citizens. In early September you decided that an Executive Order imposing such restrictions should be broadened to cover all intelligence agencies except the FBI. A draft of such an Order and Press fact sheet are presented at Appendix 2.

The proposed Executive Order prohibits or imposes restrictions on the following activities by foreign intelligence agencies (or by any other agency -- except the FBI -- when engaged in foreign intelligence or counterintelligence activities):

1. Collection and analysis of information on the domestic activities of United States citizens and permanent resident aliens.
2. Physical or electronic surveillance of United States citizens and permanent resident aliens within the United States.
3. Opening of United States mail in violation of law.
4. Illegally obtaining federal income tax returns or information.
5. Infiltration of domestic groups for the purpose of reporting on them.
6. Experimentation with drugs on humans without the subject's informed consent.

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7. Operation of a proprietary company which competes with United States businesses more than the minimum amount necessary to establish commercial credibility.

8. Collection of intelligence from United States citizens and permanent resident aliens within the United States without disclosing the true identity of the collecting agency.

9. Sharing among agencies information on the domestic activities of the United States citizens or permanent resident aliens except in compliance with stringent safeguards.

10. Providing assistance to law-enforcement agencies in violation of law.

Strong substantive disagreements still exist among the various concerned agencies and your advisors with respect to some of its provisions. Most of the major disagreements concern proposed exceptions to the general prohibitions. The major issues for your decision are:

ISSUE: Whether to include an exception which would allow the collection, analysis and dissemination of information on the domestic activities of U.S. citizens reasonably believed to be involved in international terrorist or narcotics activities or working in collaboration with a foreign nation or organization, but only if collected abroad or from foreign sources. (Section II(i) (I)).
This exception was proposed by the CIA, to allow it to gather and utilize information related to Americans involved in international terrorist or narcotics activities and Americans who may not have committed any crime but are working with foreign organizations or governments. The latter category would include an American supplying non-classified information to a foreign government, for example, on the movement of civilian ships from a U.S. port.

Arguments in support of the exception.
- This exception recognizes that international terrorist and narcotics activities are legitimate subjects of interest for foreign intelligence agencies.
- It recognizes that the domestic activities of Americans working for foreign governments or organizations are of counterintelligence interest.
- It contains the limitation that the excepted information must have been collected abroad or from foreign sources. Often foreign intelligence agencies are the only elements of our government who can obtain information from these useful sources.

Arguments against the exception.
- The exception is too broad. Any person who deals with foreign corporations would be covered.
The CIA, prohibited by statute from having any "police, subpoena, (or) law-enforcement powers," should not be involved in identifying Americans participating in narcotics or terrorist activities.

ISSUE: Whether to adopt an exception which would permit sharing of information on domestic activities of U.S. citizens among intelligence agencies and other federal agencies under guidelines of the Attorney General.

This exception, proposed by NSC, is designed to permit the CIA to obtain information from other federal agencies (primarily the FBI) on the domestic activities of U.S. citizens which it would not otherwise be permitted to collect under this Order. The provision of the draft Order (Section IV) allows sharing of information only when the information is of a type which the receiving agency would itself have been permitted to collect under this Order.

Arguments in favor of this exception.

- This exception would give CIA and other foreign intelligence agencies access to data helpful in determining whether various domestic groups have contacts with foreign governments or organizations.
- Possible abuses of this exception would be limited by the Attorney General's guidelines.

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Arguments against this exception.

- It would allow intelligence agencies to receive data from federal law enforcement agencies on the domestic activities of U.S. citizens which the intelligence agencies themselves would otherwise be prohibited from collecting under the terms of this Order.

- It would permit reestablishment of Operation CHAOS. (CHAOS was the program under which CIA collected information — largely from the FBI — on domestic groups and U.S. citizens. The exposure of this program resulted in the forming of the Rockefeller Commission and the Congressional Intelligence Committees.)

- Such an exception would likely undermine the credibility of the Order.

D. EXECUTIVE BRANCH OVERSIGHT

Public disclosure of intelligence abuses have raised the question of the adequacy of Executive Branch oversight. Issuance of guidelines on proper conduct of intelligence activities will go a long way toward preventing impropriety, but there will be a continued need for mechanisms which discover questionable activities and assure adequate deliberation and accountability among appropriate policy-makers. Congress will no doubt be playing
a more active role, encouraged by its successes of the recent months of reviewing CIA activities, blocking further aid to Angola, etc.

ISSUE: Is oversight within Intelligence Community adequate and effective?

In the past, the head of each operating component in the Intelligence Community was held responsible for the propriety of its activities. Inspectors General and General Counsels assisted each operating head. The Rockefeller Commission found both the CIA's Inspector General and its General Counsel did not have adequate access to details of Agency activities. Although the DCI is charged with leadership of the Intelligence Community, he has never been responsible for inspection of intelligence organizations other than the CIA. So the question remains, who should be accountable for oversight within the Intelligence Community?

Director Colby sent to you on August 30, 1975, his proposed new regulations and managerial changes to implement Rockefeller Commission recommendations concerning the Inspector General and General Counsel.

No actions have, however, been taken with respect to a more general Community-wide inspection responsibility.

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OPTIONS:

1. Establish a Community Inspector General working for the DCI as examined in the NSC/OMB study.

(Such an Inspector would not, however, inspect the FBI, as it is outside of the foreign Intelligence Community.) Establishment of such an Inspector would create antagonism between the DCI and other intelligence organizations. Disputes could be expected over the authority and access of the Inspector.

2. Alternatively, upgrade the Inspector General capability within each intelligence organization.

All Inspectors would be ordered to report to the DCI, so that he would be in a position to advise the President on propriety throughout the Community. Again, however, antagonism could develop if Inspectors were asked to report outside of their parent agencies. If, on the other hand, neither alternative were chosen, no one person within the Community could be accountable for propriety throughout the Community.

ISSUE: Does effective oversight call for mechanism outside the Intelligence Community to advise the President on propriety?

The question is, to what person or organization should responsibility be assigned for advising the President.

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on propriety of oversight of the Intelligence Community. In the past, there has been no central focus for consideration of propriety of intelligence activities outside the Intelligence Community.

OPTIONS:
The NSC/ODS study sets forth three alternatives for Executive oversight: (1) the Attorney General; (2) a special Counsel to the President; and (3) a government-wide Inspector General. A fourth alternative could be use of the NSC structure. Each of these options could have its own inspection or staff capability, or rely on Inspectors within the Community to report questionable activities to them. Their primary purpose would be to provide independent advice to the President based on their knowledge of Community activities and consideration of legal and moral issues relevant to the activities. The Attorney General already has responsibilities as chief legal officer.

The NSC already has the statutory responsibility of integrating domestic and foreign policies, but its lack of independence from the White House might lessen its effectiveness. Further, a potential problem with any special White House adviser with oversight responsibility is the difficulty it could create for the President if the adviser...
approved actions which were subsequently found to be illegal by the Attorney General.

ISSUE: should public confidence in executive oversight by enhanced by use of non-government overseers? Should an outside advisory board be given intelligence oversight responsibilities, and, if so, should it be the PFIAB?

Both the Rockefeller and Murphy Commissions recommended that the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) be given the new responsibility of overseeing intelligence activities to prevent abuses.

Appointment of outside overseers could help reassure the public that intelligence activities are receiving adequate scrutiny and consideration within the Executive Branch. This would especially be true if the advisory board made periodic public reports. However, a group of part-time advisers, even with a full-time staff, might have difficulty learning all they needed to know to do an adequate oversight job.

A particular problem arises with assignment of this responsibility to the PFIAB. Oversight might dilute, and even conflict with, the Board's traditional role of pushing the Intelligence Community to greater intelligence collection efforts. Also, PFIAB does not have a great deal of credibility among the "foreign affairs community" and some in Congress.

An alternative would be to establish an independent oversight board. This will, however, require duplicating the staff capability of PFIAB.
ISSUE: How can adequate deliberation of covert action proposals be assured?

One type of Executive oversight -- approval of covert actions -- has traditionally been centralized in the White House. The NSC's 40 Committee has been criticized by the Murphy Commission and Congressional spokesmen for inadequate deliberation.

OPTIONS:

Greater assurance of deliberation within the 40 Committee could be achieved through:

- Reinstituting formal Committee meetings on all significant covert proposals;
- Redesignating the Attorney General as a committee member (in his legal adviser's role) and adding representation from other departments as the subject demands; and
- Adding NSC staff to provide non-departmental analysis on need, risk and potential benefits of each action.

Each of these procedural changes would help to promote more deliberative decision-making, but would also restrict flexibility and increase the number of persons involved in sensitive activities. A particular problem might arise if the Attorney General were asked to serve both as policymaker on the 40 Committee and as the President's chief intelligence overseer.
E. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

The Intelligence Community's old, comfortable relationship with a small number of senior Congressmen who had been delegated responsibility for oversight and budget approval, no longer exists. Even after the conclusion of the current special investigations, Congress is likely to be interested, at a minimum, in budgetary and financial issues, impact of intelligence agencies on the rights of Americans, covert action, and the quality of the Community's intelligence product. In addition, Congress will be demanding more substantive intelligence from the Community.

ISSUE: What principles should be important to you in developing an overall structure to work with Congress on intelligence matters?

New committee structures for oversight of the Intelligence Community are anticipated. The concept of a Joint Intelligence Committee in Congress is 20 years old, and its time may have come. It is almost inevitable that Congress will seek to remove some jurisdiction in the oversight area away from the Armed Services and, perhaps, Appropriations Committees. Of course, we have no control over the internal rules and procedures of Congress but they have a critical effect on Executive efforts to safeguard classified information.

This conflict with respect to jurisdiction may be especially troublesome in the area of authorization legislation for appropriations. At present, appropriations for CIA (and...
most appropriations for other intelligence agencies) do not require periodic authorization. However, a requirement for periodic or annual authorization may result from increased Congressional interest in controlling intelligence funding. If so, the conflict between the Armed Services Committees and any new intelligence committee as to jurisdiction over this legislation would likely be intense.

Congressional oversight is complicated by the need for secrecy. The need to limit knowledge about sensitive intelligence activities requires that both the quantity and quality of information given to Congress be limited in order to reduce the potential for damaging disclosures. Limits on information flow to Congress, however, create difficulties for oversight Congressmen. The overseer can be credible only if he is aware of the total spectrum of intelligence activities. Silence about these activities, however, can be construed as acquiescence in their conduct, even though vigorous steps were taken privately to oppose them.

A second and more difficult dilemma faces Congressmen who may oppose the propriety or efficacy of a given activity. Public opposition to a specific intelligence program will certainly cast the activity in grave jeopardy. Acceptable means are needed by which members can be assured of an adequate voice in the decision-making process within the responsible committees.

II-18
One possibility would be to include a confidential "appeal channel" outside the committee (perhaps to Congressional leaders). The provision for such an "appeal channel" would require, for effectiveness, new rules of each House which would provide for expulsion of any member who flagrantly reveals truly sensitive information. Such expulsions, however, might be judicially reviewable under the doctrine of Powell v. McCormack.

Congressional oversight of intelligence activities is ultimately limited by the Constitutional doctrine of separation of powers and the President's Constitutional duties and powers in the area of defense and foreign affairs. That is, for example, a requirement that specific intelligence operations receive prior authorization of a Congressional Committee would raise Constitutional questions.

Although it may be inappropriate for the Executive Branch to suggest precisely how Congress conducts its oversight role, it should consider the principles which ought to be important to Congress. These include:

1. Authorizing a limited number of Congressmen to act for all. The risk of disclosure of any information available to 535 Congressmen and their staffs is too great to allow such wide dissemination of sensitive secrets. Although the old system which limited knowledge to just a handful of Congressmen is no longer viable, the principle of delegation of oversight responsibility to a limited number of Congressmen remains sound.
2. Limiting the number of oversight committees. Just as intelligence is best viewed within the Executive Branch from a centralized perspective, Congress will be better able to limit dissemination of secret information and to understand the community if it adopts the same perspective.

3. Limiting access to sensitive intelligence information by committee rules and strengthening penalties for disclosure. A persistent problem in the House has been House Rule XI (2)(e)(a) that grants access of all Congressmen to all committee materials. (There is no comparable rule in the Senate.) If the need for secrecy is to be honored, this Rule needs modification.

In its final report, the Bolling Committee concluded that, "if the highest officials of the executive branch...believe that sharing [sensitive material] with Congress will lead to its public disclosure, they will not make it available, even when committees go into executive session to receive such information." "Leaks" out of the Select Committees on Intelligence have seriously undermined the argument that Congress can handle classified information in a responsible manner.

Under the Speech and Debate clause, as interpreted in the Gravel case, a member may disclose security information, without fear of prosecution, if it is done in any manner or forum which can be reasonably construed as part of his legislative duties.
However, under the Constitution (Article I, Section 5), "Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members for Disorderly Behavior, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member."

Therefore, consideration should be given to whether the rules of each House should be revised to provide for appropriate disciplinary action -- including expulsion -- for unauthorized disclosure of classified information.

4. **Avoiding the imposition of statutory requirements**
   that oversight committees be "fully and currently informed", as in the case of the Joint Atomic Energy Committee. The fully-and-currently-informed principles can encourage too much day-to-day interference by Congress and its committee staffs in agency operations.

5. **Encouraging non-statutory understandings.** Statutory guidance on Executive-Legislative relations is more likely to impede than aid good and effective relationships. Congress, too, should benefit from informality.

6. **Separating foreign intelligence from law enforcement oversight.** Intermingling of these two areas is often confusing.

**ISSUE:** What should be your substantive position concerning intelligence oversight committees?

II-21
the small number of Congressmen on Appropriations and Armed Services Subcommittees involved in oversight and budget review. This year details were more widely released to all members of those committees. A proposal this year by Representative Giamo to reveal the total amount of the CIA budget was soundly defeated. The size of the intelligence budget remains undisclosed to the public.

There is no question that intelligence oversight committees will continue as they did in the past year to require detailed analyses of the intelligence budget. The major issue is what amount of information should be presented to all 535 members of Congress.

The NSC/OMB study discussed the possibility of inclusion of a classified annex in the President's Budget, which would be available to all Congressmen, but which would include only general, big dollar information. This classified annex would encompass the overall intelligence program. Provision of this amount of budget information attempts to comply with Congressional needs without unduly risking leaks of sensitive information. On the other hand, once such information is provided, it may simply lead to demands for more and more details.

ISSUE: What substantive intelligence should be sent to Congress, and what official should be responsible for making such determinations?

II-23
Congress is quite interested in receiving more substantive intelligence from the Intelligence Community. In the past, the CIA and other intelligence producers have briefed many Congressional committees on specific subjects, and some general unclassified foreign information is regularly made available to all Congressmen. However, the National Intelligence Estimates and many other Community publications have not as a matter of course been supplied to Congress. Increasing demands for such information create new problems.

Congress has a legitimate need for -- and right to -- some national intelligence products. Informed public debate is desirable. For the national intelligence structure, however, provision of intelligence is complicated by four considerations:

1. Sensitive information is unlikely to be protected or kept out of the public domain if it is widely disseminated on Capitol Hill. Sources and methods can be difficult to separate from substantive intelligence.

2. In many situations, there are likely to be sharp, profound differences of opinion between a President and his senior subordinates and Congress over what members of Congress are proper consumers of what intelligence products.

3. No President will be happy about any component of the Intelligence Community that furnishes information which is used to oppose his policies.

II-24
4. The Intelligence Community's ability to be objective and candid can be threatened if its products are widely used in partisan political controversy. It is desirable for divergent analyses to exist within the Intelligence Community; if, however, these views become widely circulated in the political arena, internal expression of such views may be inhibited.

A particular problem arises in connection with National Intelligence Estimates. Many Congressmen have focused on these analyses as particularly deserving of Congressional distribution. Although some NIE's represent general background information that would be appropriate for distribution, others, because they deal with questions such as "what if a certain action were taken," involve policy considerations that would make distribution unwise.

Any attempt to write into law a requirement that intelligence information be systematically shared with Congress should be avoided. However, more can and probably should be done to ensure that production elements of the Intelligence Community, particularly those in INR, DIA, and CIA, give systematic, formal attention to Congressional information needs. The increasing chorus of demands for such information seems to require a centralized office for its dissemination. Only with such an office can Administration positions be coordinated and some of the dangers pointed out above avoided. The DCI, as leader of the Community, must be the focus of any such centralization.

IT-25
ISSUE: Under what ground rules should Congress be provided substantive intelligence?

OPTIONS:

1. In sorting out the problem of how Congress or its committees formally decide to publish classified information provided by the Executive (this issue is distinguished from the problem of "leaks"), it may be useful to consider the possibility of a "third entity". For example, a joint Executive-Congress board could assign security classifications to foreign intelligence information and then both branches could agree -- in advance -- to respect these designations.

2. A more promising alternative may be to expand on the "Case Act" approach. This statute requires the Executive Branch to submit certain international agreements to Congress, but classified agreements are given only to the House International Relations and Senate Foreign Affairs Committees under an injunction of secrecy. The secrecy injunction can only be removed by the President. This procedure is almost identical to the publication agreement worked out between you and the Pike Committee. While this approach has promise, its weakness was demonstrated last
weak when the Pike Committee voted to ask you to declassify
two covert action reports -- Italian elections and Angola --
but on the very same day, their contents were leaked to the
Press.

F. PUBLIC

ISSUE: To what extent is public oversight appropriate?

The extent to which the public and the Press can
play a role in the oversight of the Intelligence Community, or
even to be aware of and appreciate its value is, of course,
limited by the general need for secrecy in intelligence activi-
ties. To a great extent, however, public confidence in the
Intelligence Community can be rebuilt through greater public
understanding of the responsibilities and activities of the
Community.

OPTIONS:

There may be some actions you could take to improve public
understanding of the community. Possible examples are:

1. Require the reorganized PFIAB to issue an unclassified
   annual report on the activities and effectiveness of
   the Intelligence Community. This would require care-
   ful judgments on difficult classification questions
   but, on balance, would probably be valuable in educating
   the public about intelligence activities and their
   importance. It would also tend to reassure the public
   that the PFIAB was keeping an eye on the Community.

II-27
2. Require CIA to publish a periodic, unclassified intelligence report. This would assure the public that some product was resulting from its expenditures. However, since an unclassified report would probably have to read much like a newspaper (or be even less informative), on balance this might damage the public perception of the Community's effectiveness.
This chapter presents the issue of how the Intelligence Community should be structured. The following subjects — most of which were analyzed in the NSC/OMB study — are covered:

- The problem of leadership in the Intelligence Community.
- Management of the budget of the Intelligence Community.
- The management of resources for intelligence collection.
- Means of improving the timeliness and quality of intelligence production.
- The problem of covert activities.

A. OVERALL DIRECTION

ISSUE: What type of leadership does the Intelligence Community require (both internally and externally) to efficiently provide quality intelligence on a timely basis? Which person, or persons, shall be held accountable for leadership of the Intelligence Community?

The CIA was established by statute to operate under direction of the NSC, and questions are now being raised about the adequacy of mechanisms to guide the Agency, or more generally, the Intelligence Community.

III-1
Leadership of the Community was assigned to the DCI by President Nixon's memorandum of November 5, 1971. It charged the DCI with (1) planning and reviewing all intelligence activities; (2) planning and reviewing allocation of all intelligence resources; and, (3) producing national intelligence. He exercises, however, line and resource control only over the CIA Program. Resource and line control over more than 99 percent of intelligence assets is in the Defense Department and includes the Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP, which includes NSA and the Service Cryptologic Agencies), National Reconnaissance Program (NRP) and General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP). Within Defense, intelligence expenditures are a small part of a $100 billion plus budget, but this is large relative to other defense components.

The DCI's leadership over the NRP is exercised through chairmanship of the NRP Executive Committee (ExCom), a two-man committee made up of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and the DCI, although final resource decisions reached by the ExCom are subject to review and approval by the Secretary of Defense. The DCI's influence over the CCP and GDIP is solely advisory and is exercised through chairmanship of the Intelligence Resources Advisory Council (IRAC) and the U.S. Intelligence Board (USIB), which sets collection requirements and priorities.

III-2
See the following charts which show (1) The Percentage of Intelligence Funds Administered by Government Agencies, and (2) FY 1976 Funding.
The relationship of the DCI to Defense is crucial to leadership, not only in determination of resource use, but also in war contingency planning, provision of intelligence from national collection systems (primarily satellites) to tactical field commanders, and integration of information during crises. In each of these areas, the DCI must rely on Defense cooperation. Because of the divided line and resource authority, a maze of committees has been developed over the years to cope with problems as they arise.

Primary leadership of the Intelligence Community must start with the policy-makers outside the Community. Although committees could perform this function, the NSC already has the statutory responsibility for integrating domestic, foreign and military policies. The NSC represents the primary consumers -- the President, Vice President and Secretaries of State and Defense. The Secretary of Treasury and other top officials have been represented in NSC committees, including the NSC Intelligence Committee, when their interests were relevant.

OPTIOMS:

1. Make the NSC more effective through assignment of responsibility for guidance to the Community to a
new Deputy to the National Security Adviser;
reinvigoration of the NSC Intelligence Committee;
and/or establishment of new NSC committees.

1. Make the DCI more effective. Within the Intelligence Community, leadership is currently assigned to the DCI but, in fact, is shared with other officials, primarily the Secretary of Defense. The DCI's role has been hampered by his dual role as Community leader and head of one part of the Community, the CIA.

The Defense Department has long felt that the DCI cannot be an independent leader as long as he is so closely tied with one part of the Community. Suggestions have thus been made that the DCI should be separated from the CIA and moved into the NSC structure or the Executive Office, as an independent intelligence adviser to the President. Alternatively, the DCI could be given direct line and resource control over all national intelligence programs, including the CIAP, CCP, and NRP. The latter alternative, however, separates Defense from control of assets on which it must depend directly for tactical support to wartime forces.

3. Designate a member of the White House staff as "Special Assistant for Foreign Intelligence".

III-5
Surprisingly, the "liberal" wing among the congressional staff have proposed creating such a position and giving it Cabinet rank. One argument made is that foreign intelligence is involved in a broad spectrum of issues with increasing emphasis on matters other than foreign or military affairs, such as economic and resource issues. Thus intelligence leadership in the White House should not be controlled by the NSC.

On the other hand, it would appear that this approach could be perceived as leading to greater abuses by " politicizing" intelligence and, in any case, it is difficult to see how such an individual could be effective without any institutional base of support.

Under any of the options, significant leadership responsibilities will continue to lie with the Secretary of Defense. He should be expected to examine the organization and management of intelligence assets within his Department. He will need to focus on NSA and DIA because both the select and standing committees have raised questions concerning the authority, efficiency and funding of these agencies.

III-6
B. BUDGET AND RESOURCES CONTROL

ISSUE: What mechanism would best provide for control over intelligence resources?

The Intelligence Community has approximately a budget that must be efficiently controlled if it is to make maximum use of scarce resources. There is no single central controller now of intelligence resources, not even OMB. A number of advisory committees, including IRAC and USIB, attempt to coordinate resource allocation, but are limited by their advisory nature. OMB reviews the intelligence budget in detail but has had difficulty in making trade-offs among collection, processing and production functions. Resources tend to be allocated because collection is technologically possible, rather than because certain information is needed for intelligence reasons.

The charge to the DCI to review all resource allocation in the Community has proven unworkable, and fragmented budget allocation still remains a problem five years after the Schlesinger OMB study.

OPTIONS:

Three options have been advanced to cure this problem:

1. Charge OMB with a more active role in intelligence resource allocation. OMB, as the President's adviser on the budget, is in the right position to deal with
the cross-departmental problems of intelligence resources. It could serve as the bridge between consumers (as represented on the NSC) and producers and collectors. With reprogramming, transfer and outlay controls imposed (by the House Appropriation Committee) for the first time, OMB should be better able to integrate the budget.

2. **Support the DCI in a more active exercise of the resource role he already possesses.** Many feel that the DCI has not exercised the authority implicit in the November 1971 letter.

3. **Consolidate all national programs -- the CCP, NRP and CIAP -- under a single manager so that he has direct resource control over the bulk of intelligence resources.** Such centralization would make the manager, most likely the DCI, accountable for resource trade-offs.

The allocation of resources among targets within the National Foreign Intelligence Program is shown in the following chart.

III-8
C. ORGANIZATION OF THE COMMUNITY

ISSUE: **Should the collection organizations be consolidated to improve quality, simplify management, and achieve greater cost effectiveness?**

Collection of intelligence requires significant resources, which, given limited appropriations, must be efficiently managed. Consolidation of intelligence collection organizations has been a perennial topic for study. The possibility of resource savings from consolidations was a major theme of the 1971 Schlesinger Report. To some extent, such consolidation is no longer the central focus of attention because of tight Community budgets in the last five years.

In the case of collection -- as opposed to the production (analysis) function -- there is "general" agreement that competition is not a necessary objective.

The central challenge in collection management is efficient use of resources; duplication of facilities is of little value. At present, signal intelligence collection is conducted by NSA, the Service Cryptological Agencies and CIA; photo intelligence by the NRO, which is in both CIA and the Air Force; and human intelligence by the CIA, armed services, State Department, and various other cabinet agencies.
OPTIONS:

1. **Minor Consolidation** -- transfer of about...:
   - transfer of a small amount of clandestine collection activities out of Defense and into CIA; total consolidation of NSA and the Service Cryptologic Agencies; and consolidation of all NRO activities in Defense.

2. **Major Consolidation** -- consolidation into one agency of all the national collection programs -- the CIAP, CCP and NRP.

3. **No Consolidation** -- The current division of both SIGINT and NRO activities between CIA and Defense represents particular expertise in each agency that might be lost in any consolidations. In any consolidation, bureaucratic infighting might lead to a loss of qualified personnel and short-term inefficiency due to turmoil. Consolidation might also separate certain collection systems from consumers, especially military commanders, and thus reduce responsiveness.

FY 1976 Funds Requested for Intelligence Collection are shown in the following chart.
ISSUE: Can the production (analysis) capability of the Intelligence Community be improved through "organizational" realignments?

Production of intelligence must be timely, of high quality and responsive to consumer needs. The basic arrangement of production responsibilities at present is that CIA, Defense and, to some degree, State produce defense-related intelligence; and CIA, State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) and, to some degree, Defense produce political intelligence; and CIA, State and Treasury produce economic intelligence analysis. Each of these agencies serves both departmental and national consumers.

The Intelligence Community has been publicly criticized for failing to predict a number of recent international crises; the NSC/OMB study reported State and Treasury disappointment with the Community's longer-term estimative capabilities in economic intelligence.

Production (analysis), unlike collection, can benefit from competition and duplication. Analysts who differ in interpretation of collected information can provide valuable insight to policy-makers.

OPTIONS:

Two major realignments of existing production responsibilities have been suggested:

1. Spin off the production components of the CIA into a new national analytic capability entirely independent from any operational or collection duties.
responsibilities (NSC/OMB Study Option #2A).
This option has considerable support among the liberal wing of the foreign affairs "community".

2. Reject the concept of a national production capability and upgrade departmental intelligence capabilities. Certain key intelligence products could still be coordinated by the DCI or NSC in the manner National Intelligence Estimates are now prepared (NSC/OMB Study Option #3A).

The first alternative would free the national production capability from any taint it now has from being associated with clandestine activities. It would create an intelligence capability quite divorced from policy, thus providing independence, but also perhaps lead to less responsiveness to policy-makers. The second alternative could improve departmental support to policy-makers, but would eliminate the traditional independence asserted to exist in the CIA.

Even if neither major alternative is desirable, departmental intelligence production assets could be built up; production constitutes only 10 per cent of the intelligence budget, a reflection of the absence of the expensive hardware which makes collection so costly.

As an example to bring the production process into focus, the process for producing the key National Estimate on Soviet strategic capabilities and for producing economic intelligence is shown in the following charts. (Note: the Soviet Estimate was unusually extensive.)
THE INTELLIGENCE PROCESS: NIE 11-3/8-75
SOVIET FORCES FOR INTERCONTINENTAL CONFLICT THROUGH THE MID-1980's

CATION OF KEY ISSUES

\[ \text{3 SUBSTANTIVE RESOLUTION OF KEY ISSUES} \]

PARTICIPATING OFFICES AND AGENCIES

MIOJS/SP
CIA
CIA
DIA
NSA
STATE
NSA
ARMY
NAVY
AIR FORCE
ERDA

USIB Committees

Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee
Scientific and Technical Intelligence Committee
Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee

KEY ISSUES-SOVIET CAPABILITIES

\( \text{\bullet Anti-Submarine Warfare} \)
\( \text{\bullet Directed-Energy Weapons} \)
\( \text{\bullet Low-Altitude Defense} \)
\( \text{\bullet ICBM Accuracy} \)
\( \text{\bullet SLBM Accuracy} \)
\( \text{\bullet Backfire Bomber} \)

SUPPORTING AGENCIES AND CONTRACTORS

Missile Intelligence Agency, Army
Foreign Technology Division, USAF
TDY Systems Group
Charles Stark Draper Laboratories
United Aircraft Corp.
Hughes Aircraft Co.
General Dynamics Corp.
Boeing Corp.
Lawrence-Livermore Laboratory
Distant Research Institute
Ray Corp.
Counter-Magnetic Systems Laboratory

DELIBERATIONS BY REPRESENTATIVES OF USIB PRINCIPALS

\( \text{\bullet SIA} \)
\( \text{\bullet STATE} \)
\( \text{\bullet NSA} \)
\( \text{\bullet DIA} \)
\( \text{\bullet ARMY} \)
\( \text{\bullet NAVY} \)
\( \text{\bullet AIR FORCE} \)
\( \text{\bullet ERDA} \)

USIB Committees

Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee
Scientific and Technical Intelligence Committee
Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee

ME TOPICS

\( \text{\bullet Soviet Policy for Strategic Forces} \)
\( \text{\bullet Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Conflict} \)
\( \text{\bullet Soviet Forces for Strategic Defense} \)
\( \text{\bullet Present Capabilities} \)
\( \text{\bullet Future Forces and Implications} \)
\( \text{\bullet Force Tables} \)
\( \text{\bullet Accuracy of the New Soviet ICBMs} \)
\( \text{\bullet Directed-Energy Weapons for Strategic Defense} \)

DISSEMINATION OF USIB-APPROVED DOCUMENTS

Key Judgments and Summary
The Estimate
The Estimate
The Estimate
The Estimate
The Estimate
The Estimate
The Estimate
The Estimate

The Estimate
The Estimate
The Estimate
The Annex
The Annex

DECLASSIFIED
E.D. 12555 Sec. 3B
By: B.M. NARA, Date: 3/2000