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after ERFCO
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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

September 16, 1975

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES T. LYNN

SUBJECT: Synthetic Fuels Commercialization Program

Issue:

In January you announced a million barrel a day synthetic fuel goal by 1985. A decision is now required on the Administration position on an amendment in the ERDA authorization -- now in conference. Proposed by Senator Jackson, the amendment would facilitate a synthetic fuels commercialization program, principally through use of a \$6 billion loan guarantee program.

Background:

- January 1975 -- You announced the million barrel a day synthetic fuel goal by 1985.
- February 1975 -- Synthetic Fuels Task Force formed under OMB chairmanship to assess options for achieving goal.
- July 1975 -- Senator Jackson amended ERDA authorization bill to facilitate million barrel a day synthetic fuel goal by adding "synthetic fuels" to the Nonnuclear Energy Research and Development Act of 1974 and by authorizing loan guarantees up to \$6 billion.
- You -- from Helsinki -- authorized Administration effort to modify Jackson amendment on Senate floor to mesh with Task Force recommendations, subject to consultation with the Vice President.
- The Vice President advised against attempting such modification in view of ERFCO proposal.



- August 1975 -- Task Force completed six-month study (involving over 50 contractors and 100 government personnel) and sent four volume Report to the Energy Resources Council (ERC) with recommendation to start immediately on 350,000 barrel a day program, to be run by ERDA, with a decision in 1978-1979 on whether to go to a one million barrel a day program.
- You requested ERC to provide full scale "mock-up" of ERFCO which would include responsibility for a synthetic fuels program.
- ERC staff received and analyzed comments on the Task Force Report from nine agencies; further work toward completion, including circulation among your advisors, of a Presidential decision memorandum would take about a week, but has been deferred in view of your consideration of the ERFCO proposal.
- September 1975 -- Western Governors Conference requested and received access to Task Force Report.
- You received ERFCO decision memorandum and the views of your advisors on ERFCO.
- In view of upcoming Conference on ERDA authorization, Committee staffs requested Task Force Report, and Chairman Teague today requested Administration witnesses and position on Jackson synthetic fuels amendment on Thursday of this week.

Issue:

Since Administration officials have already made the Task Force Report available to the Western Governors Conference, I believe that, as a matter of law, we will have to make it available to anyone who wants it. Further, in view of the copies that are already "out" (Jack Anderson claimed to have a copy last Sunday), I think it would be counterproductive to try to "scrub" the Report. A brief summary of the Report is at Tab A.



Now the question is:

Should the Administration

- o oppose the Jackson synthetic fuel amendment and encourage the House Conferees not to accept it,
- or o support a modification to the Jackson amendment to accommodate, as nearly as possible, the Task Force recommendations?

The modification contemplated would

- o limit the scope of authorized projects to synthetic fuels
- o expand loan guarantee authority to nonrecourse arrangements
- o extend 75% of project cost limit on loan guarantees to construction period as well as operating period
- o eliminate requirement to report each project approved to Congress for a 90-day "wait-and-see" period.

Even if we do get the above modifications, plus some other technical changes, we will still need

- o dollar authorization for price supports (although we already have price support authority in organic act), and
- o appropriation action both to make funds available and to set borrowing authority limits.

Oppose the Jackson amendment:

Pros

- Since neither ERC nor you have yet accepted Task Force recommendations, nor have you decided the ERFCO issue, support of modification of the Jackson amendment would be premature.
- You could make the synthetic fuel initiative more visible by proposing new comprehensive legislation either for ERDA or, more broadly, ERFCO.

Cons

- A comprehensive piece of legislation is likely to be Christmas-treed and will take considerable time to go through the legislative process.

Support of modification of the Jackson amendment:

Pros

- Will minimize the risk of Christmas-treeing.
- Would permit early calendar year 1976 supplemental appropriations to get program moving in 1976.
- Would probably result in completing most of the legislative groundwork for a comprehensive three-part -- Nuclear Program, Synthetic Fuels Program and Coal Program -- energy supply program to address the post-1985 liquids and gases "energy gap". (You will recall that this three-part program could be implemented by a mini-ERFCO -- including establishment of a high level (Simon, Zarb, Seaman, etc.) board -- either within or without ERDA; my evaluation of the pluses and minuses of this approach are spelled out in my comments on ERFCO, attached at Tab B.)

Cons

- Your decisions on a synfuels program could dictate different modification than we would ask for now.
- You will have to defer your taking credit for the Conference action until later when you announce your comprehensive energy supply initiative.

In my view, the risk of Christmas-treeing a comprehensive Administration bill is so great (especially in comparison with the risk that you will change the Task Force recommendations in a way we cannot fix) that I would recommend your supporting a modification to the Jackson amendment in the Conference.

To be blunt, unless we can dispose of the ERFCO question -- either by tabling it indefinitely or by scaling it down in size and locating it within ERDA or possibly FEA -- I am not optimistic that we can get the kind of synthetic fuels program that you are likely to want -- at least within any reasonable length of time.

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BRIEF SUMMARY OF
RECOMMENDATIONS OF
INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON SYNTHETIC FUELS

See page 2 for financial incentives

Background:

- An incentive program for Synthetic Fuels Commercialization was announced by the President in his 1975 State-of-the-Union Message to support a goal of developing an equivalent of one million barrels per day of synthetic fuels by 1985 from coal and oil shale.
- In response to the President's goal, an Interagency Federal Task Force was established in February 1975 to evaluate economic and environmental costs and benefits of alternative-size programs, develop detailed financial incentive program plans and to formulate budgetary, legislative, organizational, management and other measures needed for expeditious implementation.
- In conducting the analysis, three alternative-size synthetic fuels programs were considered:
 - o a 350,000 bbl/d "information" program designed primarily to gain technical, economic, environmental and other data on various generic fuel/resource types (e.g., gas from coal);
 - o a 1,000,000 bbl/d program which, in addition to providing the information gained in the smaller program, would provide additional information on the cost of alternative processes in each generic fuel/resource area; and
 - o a 1,700,000 bbl/d "maximum" program which represents the largest feasible synthetic fuels program in 1985.

Need for a Synthetic Fuels Program:

- Based on extensive analysis of U.S. energy supply and demand through the year 2000, it appears certain that synthetic fuels will be needed in quantity (5 million bbl/d or more) in the 1990's unless the U.S. is willing to increase imports of foreign oil.
- Based on present information about industry plans, it is concluded that, in the absence of Federal incentives or other policies creating a stable and favorable synthetic fuels investment environment, no significant amount of synthetic fuels is likely to be produced in the U.S. by 1985 and therefore, because of lead-times in initiating a new industry substantial quantities will not be available by the 1990's.
 - o This conclusion stems primarily from the present cost of synthetics and from the risk associated with large synthetic fuel plant investments in light of the future uncertainty of future world oil prices.

Recommended Program Size:

- Based on the results of the cost/benefit and the environmental analyses, it is concluded that a fully committed synthetic fuels commercialization program at the 1.7 million bbl/d or 1 million bbl/d level is not justifiable at this time.
- In view of the relatively small risk and expected cost of the 350,000 bbl/d option and its benefits, particularly in gaining economic, environmental and other information needed for future synthetic fuels expansion, the Task Force recommended immediate initiation of the 350,000 bbl/d program .
- This option would permit achieving the President's 1 million bbl/d goal by 1985 but would defer the commitment to the full program pending more complete information on environmental effects, future world oil price and extent of industry participation without Federal incentives.

Recommended Financial Incentives:

- Financial incentives evaluated were: loans and loan guarantees; purchase agreements and price supports; tax changes including investment tax credit, construction expensing and accelerated depreciation; construction grants or subsidies; Government financed and owned; and, selected combinations of above.
- For oil shale, syncrude and unregulated electric utility or industrial fuels, the recommended incentive is a combination of a Federally guaranteed non-recourse loan for up to 50% of the construction cost plus a competitively bid price support.
- For high Btu gas from coal, the recommended incentive is a competitively awarded non-recourse loan guarantee for up to 75% of the project cost.
- For regulated utility/industrial fuels (i.e., low Btu gas, boiler fuels, etc.) the recommended incentive is a competitively bid construction grant.

- The principal advantage of loan guarantees and price supports are that they require no immediate Federal outlays and assuming no defaults and the world oil price continues to slowly rise, they may not require any future government payments.

Government Liability and Potential Cost:

- If the recommended incentives were offered, the loan guarantee liability to the Government for outstanding loan guarantees would be about \$3 billion in undiscounted 1975 dollars for the 350,000 bbl/d program and \$8 billion for the 1,000,000 bbl/d program.
- The cost in support price payments would depend heavily on the future world oil price. The 350,000 first phase would cost nothing if world oil price rises to \$15 (1975 dollars) would cost \$7-9 billion over 20 years if world oil remains at \$11/bbl (no tariff); would cost \$13-17 billion over 20 years if world oil drops to \$7/bbl.

Implementation:

- Because most of the authorities for financial incentives are vested in ERDA, the Task Force recommended that ERDA be the implementing agency.

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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
 OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503
 August 29, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES T. LYNN

SUBJECT: Energy Resources Finance Corporation

The Domestic Council has correctly highlighted the lack of public perception of significant Presidential initiatives on the supply side of the energy issue.

We have all experienced the difficulty of convincing the public -- to say nothing of the Congress -- of the need for conservation measures, especially when conservation is to be effected by price increases.

At the same time, what has not occurred this year is a general public perception that you are taking positive measures on domestic energy supply. Last January, you charted the Nation's course toward energy independence -- zero vulnerability to import disruption. Among your proposals were several designed to increase domestic energy supplies by 1985 by means other than raising prices:

	IMPORT SAVINGS		
	<u>1975</u>	<u>1977</u>	<u>1985</u>
NEAR TERM PROGRAM (MMB/D)			
Production from Elk Hills	0.2	0.3	
Coal Conversion (clean air amendments)	0.1	0.3	
MID-TERM PROGRAM			
OCS Leasing			1.5
NPR-4 Development			2.0
Coal Conversion (surface mining, leasing, clean air amendments)			0.4
Synthetic Fuel Commercialization			0.3

OTHER SUPPLY-RELATED ACTION

Electric Utility Tax Incentive
and Regulatory Measures
Nuclear Power Acceleration
Energy Facilities Siting
Establishment of ERDA
Minimum Floor Price
Labor-Management Tax Incentives
Increased Uranium Enrichment Facilities

Notwithstanding that your supply proposals are comprehensive and sound, there are a number of reasons why America does not seem to be listening

- Since January the almost exclusive focus of Congressional attention has been on energy tax increases and decontrol.
- Your supply initiatives are not, by themselves, particularly dramatic and have often been presented as an unquantified "laundry list" that has not been time-phased, making it impossible, without careful analysis, to understand how you propose to get from here to there.
- America really does not understand how precarious jobs and income are in the case of an embargo because supplies of energy have been relatively plentiful (except for natural gas) and gas station lines have ended.
- Jackson, Dingell and Ullman have dealt mainly in generalities -- as a result, America neither understands what "the other side" is proposing now why it is inadequate, but may generally agree with the opposition that price increases are a bad idea.

Speaking politically, domestic energy supply measures are certainly more attractive (except with the environmentalists) than are energy conservation measures.

- America will accept some energy conservation measures but will essentially demand -- at least for the next generation -- unlimited energy at as low a cost as possible. Why? Because it has always been that way in the past.

- Consumer price increases are not perceived to be involved in supply increase efforts.
- Congress usually can share in the credit for establishing a new "program" -- and get the chance to spend some more money, besides.
- The average American probably doesn't care much for the economics involved in energy supply and demand and tends to react to OPEC pressures aggressively with sanctions of one kind or another. That we may be currently impotent to certain OPEC behavior only frustrates the situation and encourages the attitude: if we can't force "them" to provide us with oil at reasonable prices, let's try to produce it ourselves. Rarely is the option of "doing with less" given much credence by the public, especially as a way of handling OPEC.

Accordingly, even though most domestic supply strategies have lead times of a decade or more and will not reduce vulnerability to an embargo in the years just ahead, public perception of Presidential "we can do it" initiatives on the supply side are likely to strike a most responsive chord. As I understand it, the Domestic Council's suggestion of an Energy Resources Finance Corporation to act as a Manhattan-project type catalyst would be, most importantly, an effort to capture and direct public attention along these lines.

I concur that every effort should be made to crystallize for the public Administration initiatives on domestic energy supply-- in addition to the increasingly effective measures you have taken to lessen demand pressures. At the same time, however, I believe this crystallizing can better be done in an alternative way to a free-standing ERFCO as proposed by the Domestic Council -- better because the alternative would at the same time have greater likelihood of success in being implemented and not derailed or maimed by the Congress and when implemented, would have less likelihood of creating some unmanageable problems.

The Problem with ERFCO

Understood in its most basic terms, establishment of ERFCO would allocate -- principally from the private sector -- to a single, free-standing entity both substantial financial resources and decisionmaking responsibility for making judgments on encouraging growth in domestic energy production.

To my mind, the most serious problems with such an allocation of decisionmaking responsibility and financial resources are

- No convincing case has been made for a need for ERFCO; indeed, as CEA has argued in its comments, there is sufficient capital in the private sector to finance energy development over the next decade. Where subsidies are clearly needed, as in nuclear and synthetic fuel areas, they are better administered as programmatic initiatives rather than by a financing institution.
- Even if there is a need, ERFCO will not create new capital, simply divert it from other uses such as housing and municipal finance.
- ERFCO would result in substantial Budget outlays in future years (see Tab A).
- By taking energy policy-making responsibility away from the private sector and a number of existing agencies (except in the R&D area) and putting it all in a free-standing entity, ERFCO will be far less responsive both to the free market and to your direction on national energy policy, especially with respect to Budget.
- Since many of the deals contemplated by ERFCO supplant the private sector, ERFCO does not comply with your State of the Union principle of using the private sector to the maximum extent feasible. Moreover, ERFCO is contrary to your uranium enrichment privatization proposal and inconsistent with the Administration's initiatives on public utility financing and capital development.
- The 12 month limit on regulatory process is unrealistic -- either in the sense that Congress would do anything like this, or, in view of court reviews, in the sense that it would have much effect -- and if it is effective, it will create a monopoly since borrowers will line up only at ERFCO as a prospective lender in order to get on a faster regulatory track.

- Most important, pushing ERFCO through will divert Administration efforts from other really needed constraint removal activities in the energy area over the next year. By and large, America's energy problems do not stem from unavailability of capital -- or lack of institutions to provide it. Rather, we ought to be focusing on the constraints that keep parts of the energy sector from earning a rate of return that will attract capital.

Equally significant, the ERFCO presently conceived will not be the ERFCO we are likely to get because the ERFCO legislation, as compared with program-specific type legislation, is likely to be Christmas-treed beyond recognition. In particular, it will emerge with

- a perpetual life
- significant Congressional control
- significant limitations of Civil Service, Davis-Bacon, etc.
- mandated proportional uses of its funds, e.g., solar, geothermal and other Congressional favorites
- little, if any, effect on regulatory process
- emphasis on public ownership of energy facilities -- such as uranium enrichment and oil and gas exportation.

That this kind of Christmas-tree action is likely is indicated by the kinds of ERFCO-like proposals we have seen in the past:

<u>Proposal</u>	<u>Sponsor</u>	<u>Status</u>
- Energy Production Board	Chairman Jackson	Committee
- Federal Oil and Gas Corp.	Rep. Boland	Committee
- Trust Fund Review Board	Chairman Ullman	Passed House
- Energy Development Board	Sen. Bentsen	Committee
- Federal Energy Production Corporation	Sen. Schweiker	Committee
- Oil Shale Mining and Energy Corporation	Rep. Mink	Committee

By contrast, the true subsidy activities of ERFCO -- e.g., commercialization of synthetic fuels -- that will not be available from the private market could, in my view, be carried forward with relatively modest legislative changes.

An Alternative to ERFCO

The Energy Resources Council is very near to making recommendations to you on synthetic fuels commercialization -- a major initiative in your State of the Union Message of last January. In addition, substantial new Federal initiatives are needed to assure accelerated use of nuclear power plants, including special attention to elimination of such "fuel cycle" constraints as uranium enrichment and waste disposal. These initiatives will require not only substantial amounts of Federal money but also a capacity for commercializing Governmentally developed technology. More important, after any across-the-board look at where public, as distinct from private, resources should be used, it is likely that these two supply initiatives would be judged the most appropriate places for public money. And unlike solar, geothermal, biomass and other Congressional favorites, they can be expected to contribute very significantly to meeting America's energy requirements from 1985 onward -- provided they are started now.

Rather than establishing a semi-independent, free-standing entity such as ERFCO and letting it decide whether such items as synthetic fuels, nuclear power, improved rail beds or solar energy are appropriate places for public funds, I suggest that

- the decisionmaking authority on whether and to what extent Federal Government resources should participate in essentially commercial projects be retained within the Energy Resources Council/Presidential decision framework
- prompt decisions be reached on substantial Government involvement in synthetic fuels development and acceleration of nuclear power plant development, emphasizing the promise of these technologies for solving America's energy dependence for the foreseeable future
- establishing under the ERDA Administrator or FEA Administrator a body corporate called the "Energy Resources Finance Corporation." The Corporation would have responsibility for "commercialization" (including financing) of the technologies -- such as synthetic fuels -- you decide (with Congressional participation) should have heavy Government involvement in the start-up period. The Corporation could have a separate set of officers and either an advisory board or board of directors.

In my view, this alternative provides for

- focus of public attention upon very important domestic energy supply initiatives by you
- focus of public attention on a new financing entity -- which makes good sense organizationally -- to accomplish these supply initiatives
- because rather minimal changes in existing legislation would be required
 - o implementation of your supply initiatives have substantially better chance of success than if Congress, with the multitude of Committees likely to be involved, wrestles around with a free-standing ERFCO, and
 - o the opportunity for Christmas-treeing would be minimized
- retention by you of
 - o substantially better control over Budget outlays
 - o power to limit inappropriate incursions into the private sector
 - o power to limit inappropriate diversions of capital from other uses
- minimizing confrontation with environmentalists by not proposing relaxation of environmental-based constraints in connection with financing -- an effort that has very little chance of success in any case.

Packaging a Technology-Specific ERFCO

Recognizing the need for dramatizing your domestic energy supply initiatives so that the public can compare your proposals against those of your opponents, I suggest that the following list of rather easily understood points could be sold:

- The central problem of America's energy system is that it relies most on the least plentiful domestic energy sources -- and least on the most abundant resources. After 1985, America's energy options will be, if anything, more limited than they are now because

domestic production of energy liquids and gases -- our least abundant resources -- which can be accelerated through the 1975-1985 period will, by all estimates, begin thereafter to fall off in the face of rising demand -- creating what may be termed as a true energy gap.

- There are only two feasible approaches for resolving America's post-1985 liquids and gases gap:
 - o switch those users, who are able, from oil and natural gas to direct use of coal or nuclear power and discourage new use of oil and gas
 - o produce synthetic liquids and gases from coal and oil shale for those users who cannot easily switch from use of oil and natural gas.
- In order to accomplish these objectives, America has to start doing three things now:
 - o accelerate the output from nuclear power
 - o initiate the commercialization of synthetic fuels
 - o assure adequate
 - production of coal for direct use and for conversion, and
 - availability of nuclear fuel.
- Accordingly, you propose a comprehensive
 - o Nuclear Program
 - o Synthetic Fuel Program
 - o Coal Program

each of which would seek to remove those particular constraints -- whether by providing more research and development, commercializing known technologies, accelerating regulatory processes, or whatever -- to achieving continued energy independence beyond 1985. (See Tab B for a table describing preliminary program impacts and costs.)

-- To respond to the need for commercialization in these programs -- as in synthetic fuels and uranium enrichment -- an Energy Resources Finance Corporation would be established.

-- The following table summarizes the outputs of your Nuclear Program, Synthetic Fuels Program and Coal Program and compares those results with doing nothing:

	<u>Quadrillion BTU's</u>		
	<u>1974</u>	<u>1985</u>	<u>1995</u>
Demand	73	106	136
Domestic Supply			
Do Nothing	60	95	119
President's Program		101	136
Domestic Energy Surplus (Deficit)			
Do Nothing	(13)	(11)	(17)
President's Program		(5)	0

I recognize that to some extent my suggestion amounts to repackaging what you proposed last January. However, what I have tried to do is spell out -- in understandable form -- the way you propose to get from here to there. For example, you said in January that you wanted a million barrel a day synthetic fuel program by 1985. Legislative proposals on synthetic fuels by you now would show the country how you intend to do that.

Hopefully, the suggestion

- replaces the "laundry list" approach with three key programs having a crucial post-1985 effect
- dramatizes the seriousness of the energy gap if we do nothing
- postures you as an energy supplier -- not an energy withholder
- works toward reducing consumer price increases and preserving and creating jobs

- gives Congress a chance to spend some money
- appeals to the innate American "we can do anything" attitude.

In January you told America how by increasing in the relatively mid-term production of liquids, gases and coal, you could reach energy independence by 1985. In the fall/winter of 1975-1976 you would be telling America how we can continue energy independence in the more difficult post-1985 period by starting three key energy supply programs.

TAB ASummary of Cost (in \$ Billions) of Energy Development Programs

	<u>Average per Year (76-82)</u>	<u>Total 76-82</u>	<u>Total 83 and Beyond</u>
Costs of Actions Administration has Taken or is Likely to Take			
1. ERDA's Energy R&D Program (Outlays)	2.3	16.4	10.0
2. Electric Utilities Financing Package (Labor-Management) (Outlays)	1.5	10.3	2.4/year thereafter
<hr/>			
Additional Costs of			
1. ERFCO - Domestic Council recommendation			
Package A - high guarantee level			
(Net Budget Outlays)	7.8	54.6	34.0*
(Net Operating Losses Under Private Sector Accounting Principles)	2.9	14.6	4.4
Package B - high direct loan level			
(Net Budget Outlays)	15.0	102.9	87.9*
(Net Operating Losses Under Private Sector Accounting Principles)	2.1	12.9	1.5*
2. OMB Recommendation			
(The Nuclear Program The Synthetic Fuels Program The Coal Program (Outlays)	0.5	3.5	8.5

*Indicates a net revenue

TAB B

Impacts and Costs of President's Nuclear, Synthetic Fuel and Coal Programs

	<u>1985</u>	<u>1995</u>
<u>Synthetic Fuels Program</u>		
Number of Plants	20	100
Energy Output (Quads)*	2	10
Cumulative Government Costs (\$ Billions)	2.5	9.8
<u>Nuclear Program</u>		
Number of Plants	200	640
Energy Output (Quads)*	10	32
Cumulative Government Cost (\$ Billions)	2.2	2.2
<u>Coal Conversion Program</u>		
Additional domestic energy (Quads)*	1	1
Cumulative Government Cost (\$ Billions)	negligible	negligible

*Quadrillion BTU's

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dick -

President might
wish to see this.

He's aware of
vote result but may
want background.

Jim

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 23, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: JACK MARSH
MAX FRIEDERSDORF *M-6*

FROM: CHARLES LEPPERT, JR. *CLJ*

SUBJECT: House Action on H.R. 12112,
the Synthetic Fuels Bill

The House of Representatives today (9/23/76) defeated the rule providing for the House consideration of H.R. 12112, a bill to provide loan guarantees and demonstration of new energy technologies. The rule was defeated by a vote of 192-151, denying the Members of the House an opportunity to debate this legislation under an open rule providing for four (4) hours of debate.

A summary of the vote defeating the rule is as follows:

	<u>Yeas</u>	<u>Nays</u>	<u>Present</u>	<u>Not Voting</u>
Democrats	110	151	-	24
* Republicans	<u>82</u>	<u>42</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>20</u>
Totals	192	193	1	44

The rule was debated for approximately two (2) hours prior to debate being cut off at 11:40 a.m. for the recess of the House to hear the address of President Tolbert of Liberia in a joint session of the Congress.

Speaking for the passage of the rule were Representatives Sisk (Calif.), Teague (Tex.), Wright (Tex.), Anderson (Ill.), Rhodes (Ariz.), Johnson (Colo.), Myers (Pa.), and Brown

(Ohio). Congressmen Sisk, Anderson, and Teague made strong statements in support of the rule.

Congressman Jim Wright gave an impassioned plea for the granting of a rule pointing out that the Congress had failed to face up to its responsibility in the energy field. Wright said that Congress had done some minor things in the energy field relating to conservation but that this didn't work because consumption has gone up, to pricing which has had little or no effect, and that Congress has done nothing regarding the domestic supply of energy in this country. At this point, Wright pointed out that all the energy experts agree that the United States will, at present rates, exhaust our domestic energy supplies but the experts differ on the time in which the U. S. will exhaust its domestic supply of energy. Wright asked the House to pass this rule as the last opportunity of the 94th Congress to face up to its responsibility to provide an adequate domestic supply of energy for this nation and its future generations.

Leading the opposition on the rule was Representative Ottinger (N.Y.) and Madden (Ind.). Madden and Ottinger both made strong statements against the passage of the rule. Also speaking against the rule were Representatives Hayes (Ind.), Broyhill (N.C.), and Collins (Tex.).

* We lost 42 Republicans
on this vote.
John

ROLL NO. 803

H RES 1545

YEA-AND-NAY

CLOSED 23 SEPT 1976 12:01 PM

AUTHOR(S): MR. LONG OF LA.

ON AGREEING TO THE RESOLUTION PROVIDING FOR CONSIDERATION OF H.R. 12112,

SYNTHETIC FUELS

	YEA	NAY	PRES	NV
DEMOCRATIC	110	151		24
REPUBLICAN	82	42	1	20
OTHER				
TOTAL	192	193	1	44



ROLL NO. 803

DEMOCRATIC

OTHER

REPUBLICAN

DEMOCRATIC	**OTHER**	REPUBLICAN
ALABAMA		
BEVILL	YEA	BUCHANAN
FLOWERS	YEA	DICKINSON
JONES (AL)	NV	EDWARDS (AL)
NICHOLS	YEA	
ALASKA		
		YOUNG (AK)
ARIZONA		
UDALL	NAY	CONLAN
		RHODES
		STEIGER (AZ)
ARKANSAS		
ALEXANDER	YEA	HAMMERSCHMIDT
MILLS	NAY	
THORNTON	YEA	
CALIFORNIA		
ANDERSON (CA)	YEA	BELL
BROWN (CA)	YEA	BURGENER
BURKE (CA)	NAY	CLAUSEN, DON H.
BURTON, JOHN	NAY	CLAWSON, DEL
BURTON, PHILLIP	NAY	GOLDWATER
CORMAN	YEA	HINSHAW
DANIELSON	NAY	KETCHUM
DELLUMS	NAY	LAGOMARSINO
EDWARDS (CA)	NAY	MC CLOSKEY
HANNAFORD	YEA	MOORHEAD (CA)
HAWKINS	YEA	PETTIS
JOHNSON (CA)	YEA	ROUSSELOT
KREBS	NAY	TALCOTT
LEGGETT	NV	WIGGINS
LLOYD (CA)	YEA	WILSON, BOB
MC FALL	YEA	
MILLER (CA)	NAY	
MINETA	NAY	
ROSS	NAY	
PATTERSON (CA)	NAY	
REES	YEA	
ROYBAL	NAY	
RYAN	NAY	
SISK	YEA	
STARK	NAY	
VAN DEERLIN	YEA	
WAXMAN	YEA	
WILSON, C. H.	YEA	
COLORADO		
EYANS (CO)	YEA	ARMSTRONG
SCHROEDER	NAY	JOHNSON (CO)
WIRTH	YEA	

ROLL NO. 803

DEMOCRATIC

OTHER

REPUBLICAN

CONNECTICUT

COTTER	YEA
BODD	NV
GIAIMO	NV
MOFFETT	NV

MC KINNEY	NV
SARASIN	NV

DELAWARE

DU PONT	YEA
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FLORIDA

BENNETT	YEA
CHAPPELL	YEA
FASCELL	NAY
FUQUA	YEA
GIBBONS	NV
HALEY	YEA
LEHMAN	YEA
PEPPER	NV
ROGERS	YEA
SIKES	YEA

BAFALIS	PRES
BURKE (FL)	YEA
FREY	YEA
KELLY	NAY
YOUNG (FL)	NAY

GEORGIA

BRINKLEY	YEA
FLYNT	NV
GINN	YEA
LANDRUM	YEA
LEVITAS	YEA
MATHIS	YEA
MC DONALD	NAY
STEPHENS	NV
STUCKEY	NAY
YOUNG (GA)	NAY

HAWAII

MATSUNAGA	NV
MINK	NV

IDAHO

HANSEN	NAY
SYMMS	NAY



ROLL NO. 803

DEMOCRATIC

OTHER

REPUBLICAN

ILLINOIS

ANNUNZIO YEA
 COLLINS (IL) NAY
 FARY NAY
 HALL (IL) NAY
 METCALFE YEA
 MIKYA NAY
 MURPHY (IL) NAY
 PRICE YEA
 ROSTENKOWSKI NAY
 RUSSO NAY
 SHIPLEY YEA
 SIMON NAY
 YATES NAY

ANDERSON (IL) YEA
 CRANE NAY
 DERWINSKI YEA
 ERLBORN YEA
 FINDLEY NAY
 HYDE YEA
 MADIGAN NAY
 MC CLORY YEA
 MICHEL YEA
 O'BRIEN YEA
 RAILSBACK YEA

INDIANA

BRADEMAS NAY
 EVANS (IN) NAY
 FITHIAN NAY
 HAMILTON NAY
 HAYES (IN) NAY
 JACOBS NAY
 MADDEN NAY
 ROUSH YEA
 SHARP NAY

HILLIS YEA
 MYERS (IN) YEA

IOWA

BEDELL NAY
 BLOUIN NAY
 HARKIN NAY
 MEZVINSKY NAY
 SMITH (IA) NAY

GRASSLEY NAY

KANSAS

KEYS NAY

SEBELIUS YEA
 SHRIVER YEA
 SKUBITZ YEA
 WINN YEA

KENTUCKY

BRECKINRIDGE NAY
 HUBBARD YEA
 MAZZOLI YEA
 NATCHER YEA
 PERKINS YEA

CARTER YEA
 SNYDER YEA

LOUISIANA

BOGGS NAY
 BREAUX YEA
 HEBERT NY
 LONG (LA) YEA
 PASSMAN YEA
 WAGGONER YEA

MOORE YEA
 TREEN NY

ROLL NO. 803

DEMOCRATIC

OTHER

REPUBLICAN

MAINE

		COHEN	NAY
		EMERY	YEA

MARYLAND

BYRON	NAY
LONG (MD)	NAY
MITCHELL (MD)	NY
SARBANES	NAY
SPELLMAN	NAY

		BAUMAN	NAY
		GÜDE	NAY
		HOLT	NAY

MASSACHUSETTS

BOLAND	NAY
BURKE (MA)	YEA
BRINAN	YEA
EARLY	YEA
HARRINGTON	NAY
MOAKLEY	YEA
O'NEILL	YEA
STUDDS	NAY
TSONGAS	NAY

		CONTE	NAY
		HECKLER (MA)	NAY

MICHIGAN

BLANCHARD	NAY
BRODHEAD	NAY
CARR	NAY
CONYERS	NAY
DIGGS	NAY
DINGELL	NAY
FORD (MI)	NAY
NEDZI	NAY
O'HARA	YEA
RIEGLE	NY
TRAXLER	NAY
VANDER VEEN	NAY

		BROOMFIELD	YEA
		BROWN (MI)	YEA
		CEDERBERG	YEA
		ESCH	NY
		HUTCHINSON	YEA
		RUPPE	NY
		VANDER JAGT	NAY

MINNESOTA

BERGLAND	NAY
FRASER	NAY
KARTH	NY
NOLAN	NAY
OBERSTAR	NAY

		FRENZEL	NAY
		HAGEDORN	YEA
		QUIE	NAY

MISSISSIPPI

EDWEN	NAY
MONTGOMERY	NAY
WHITTEN	NAY

		COCHRAN	NAY
		LOTT	YEA

ROLL NO. 803

DEMOCRATIC

OTHER

REPUBLICAN

MISSOURI

BOLLING	YEA
BURLISON (MO)	YEA
CLAY	NAY
HUNGATE	NAY
ICHORD	YEA
RANDALL	YEA
SULLIVAN	NAY
SYMINGTON	YEA

TAYLOR (MO)

YEA

MONTANA

BAUCUS	NAY
MELCHER	NAY

NEBRASKA

MC COLLISTER	NV
SMITH (NB)	NV
THONE	YEA

NV
NV
YEA

NEVADA

SANTINI	NAY
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NEW HAMPSHIRE

D'AMOURS	NAY
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CLEVELAND

NAY

NEW JERSEY

DANIELS (NJ)	NAY
FLORIO	NAY
HELSTOSKI	NV
HOWARD	NAY
HUGHES	YEA
MAGUIRE	NAY
MEYNER	NAY
MINISH	YEA
PATTEN (NJ)	NAY
PODINO	NAY
ROE	NAY
THOMPSON	NAY

FENWICK	NV
FORSYTHE	YEA
RINALDO	NV

NV
YEA
NV

NEW MEXICO

BUNNELS	YEA
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LUJAN

YEA



ROLL NO. 803

DEMOCRATIC

OTHER

REPUBLICAN

NEW YORK

ABZUG NAY
 ADDABBO NAY
 AMBRO YEA
 BADILLO NAY
 BIAGGI NAY
 BINGHAM NAY
 CHISHOLM NAY
 DELANEY NAY
 DOWNEY (NY) NAY
 HANLEY YEA
 HOLTZMAN NAY
 KOCH NAY
 LAFALCE YEA
 LUNDINE YEA
 MC HUGH YEA
 MURPHY (NY) YEA
 NOWAK YEA
 OTTINGER NAY
 PATTISON (NY) NAY
 PIKE NAY
 RANGEL NAY
 RICHMOND NAY
 ROSENTHAL NAY
 SCHEUER NAY
 SOLARZ NAY
 STRATTON YEA
 WOLFF NAY
 ZEFERETTI NAY

CONABLE NAY
 FISH NAY
 GILMAN YEA
 HORTON YEA
 KEMP NAY
 LENT YEA
 MC EWEN YEA
 MITCHELL (NY) YEA
 PEYSER NY
 WALSH YEA
 WYDLER YEA

NORTH CAROLINA

ANDREWS (NC) YEA
 FOUNTAIN NAY
 HEFNER NAY
 HENDERSON NY
 JONES (NC) NY
 NEAL NAY
 PREYER YEA
 ROSE NAY
 TAYLOR (NC) YEA

BROYHILL NAY
 MARTIN YEA

NORTH DAKOTA

ANDREWS (ND) YEA



ROLL NO. 603

DEMOCRATIC

OTHER

REPUBLICAN

OHIO

ASHLEY	YEA
CARNEY	YEA
MOTTL	NAY
SEIBERLING	NAY
STANTON, JAMES V.	YEA
STOKES	NAY
YANIK	NAY

ASHBROOK	NAY
BROWN (OH)	YEA
CLANCY	NV
DEVINE	NAY
GRADISON	NV
GUYER	YEA
HARSHA	YEA
KINDNESS	NAY
LATTA	YEA
MILLER (OH)	YEA
MOSHER	YEA
REGULA	YEA
STANTON, J. WILLIAM	YEA
WHALEN	NAY
WYLIE	YEA

OKLAHOMA

ALBERT	
ENGLISH	NAY
JONES (OK)	YEA
RISEHOOVER	YEA
STEED	NAY

JARMAN	NV
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OREGON

AUCOIN	NAY
DUNCAN (OR)	NAY
ULLMAN	NAY
WEAVER	NAY

PENNSYLVANIA

DENT	YEA
EDGAR	NAY
EILBERG	NAY
FLOOD	YEA
GAYDOS	YEA
GREEN	NV
HOORHEAD (PA)	YEA
MORGAN	YEA
MURTHA	YEA
NIX	NV
ROONEY	NAY
VIGORITO	NAY
YATRON	YEA

BIESTER	YEA
COUGHLIN	NAY
ESHLEMAN	YEA
GOODLING	YEA
HEINZ	NV
JOHNSON (PA)	NV
KC DADE	YEA
MYERS (PA)	YEA
SCHNEEBELI	YEA
SCHULZE	YEA
SHUSTER	NAY

RHODE ISLAND

BEARD (RI)	NAY
ST GERMAIN	NAY



ROLL NO. 803

DEMOCRATIC

OTHER

REPUBLICAN

SOUTH CAROLINA

DAVIS NAY
 DERRICK NAY
 HOLLAND NAY
 JENRETTE NAY
 MANN YEA

SPENCE YEA

SOUTH DAKOTA

ABDNOR YEA
 PRESSLER YEA

TENNESSEE

ALLEN YEA
 EVINS (TN) YEA
 FORD (TN) NAY
 JONES (TN) YEA
 LLOYD (TN) YEA

BEARD (TN) YEA
 DUNCAN (TN) YEA
 QUILLEN YEA

TEXAS

BROOKS NAY
 BURLESON (TX) YEA
 DE LA GARZA NAY
 ECKHARDT NAY
 GONZALEZ NAY
 HALL (TX) NY
 HIGHTOWER YEA
 JORDAN NAY
 KAZEN YEA
 KRUEGER YEA
 MAHON YEA
 MILFORD YEA
 PICKLE YEA
 POAGE YEA
 ROBERTS YEA
 TEAGUE YEA
 WHITE YEA
 WILSON, (TX) NY
 WRIGHT YEA
 YOUNG (TX) NY

ARCHER NAY
 COLLINS (TX) NAY
 PAUL NAY
 STEELMAN NY

UTAH

HOWE NY
 MC KAY YEA

VERMONT

JEFFORDS YEA

VIRGINIA

DANIEL, DAN NAY
 DOWNING (VA) YEA
 FISHER NAY
 HARRIS NAY
 SATTERFIELD NAY

BUTLER NAY
 DANIEL, R. W. NAY
 ROBINSON NAY
 WAMPLER YEA
 WHITEHURST YEA



ROLL NO. 803

DEMOCRATIC

OTHER

REPUBLICAN

WASHINGTON

ADAMS	NAY
BONKER	NAY
FOLEY	YEA
HICKS	YEA
MC CORMACK	YEA
NEEDS	YEA

PRITCHARD

YEA

WEST VIRGINIA

HECHLER (WV)	NAY
MOLLOHAN	YEA
SLACK	NAY
STAGGERS	NAY

WISCONSIN

ASPIN	NAY
BALDUS	NAY
CORNELL	NAY
KASTENMEIER	NAY
OBEY	NAY
REUSS	YEA
ZABLOCKI	YEA

KASTEN
STEIGER (WI)NAY
YEA

WYOMING

RONCALIO	YEA
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