The documents in this folder continue from the previous folder.
In connection with the Early Warning System referred to in Article IV of the Agreement between Egypt and Israel concluded on this date and as part of that Agreement, (hereafter referred to as the Basic Agreement), the United States proposes the following:

1. The Early Warning System to be established in accordance with Article IV in the area shown on the attached map will be entrusted to the United States. It shall have the following elements:
   
a. There shall be two surveillance stations to provide strategic early warning, one operated by Egyptian and one operated by Israeli personnel. Their locations are shown on the attached map. Each station shall be manned by not more than 250 technical and administrative personnel. They shall perform the functions of visual and electronic surveillance only within their stations.
   
b. In support of these stations, to provide tactical early warning and to verify access to them, three watch stations shall be established by the United States in the Mitla and Giddi Passes as will be shown on an agreed map. These stations shall be operated by U.S. civilian personnel. In support of these stations, there shall be established three unmanned electronic sensor fields at both ends of each Pass and in the general vicinity of each station and the roads leading to and from those stations.

2. The United States civilian personnel shall perform the following duties in connection with the operation and maintenance of these stations.
   
a. At the two surveillance stations described in paragraph 1a. above, United States personnel will verify the nature of the operations of the stations and all movement into and out of each station and will immediately report any detected divergency from its authorized role of visual and electronic surveillance.
to the Parties to the Basic Agreement and to the UNEF.

b. At each watch station described in paragraph 1 b. above, the United States personnel will immediately report to the Parties to the Basic Agreement and to UNEF any movement of armed forces, other than the UNEF, into either Pass and any observed preparations for such movement.

c. The number of United States civilian personnel assigned to functions under this Proposal shall not exceed 200. The number of such personnel physically present at the early warning stations shall not exceed 100 at any one time. Only civilian personnel shall be assigned to functions under this Proposal.

3. No arms shall be maintained at the stations and other facilities covered by this Proposal, except for small arms required for their protection.

4. The United States personnel serving the Early Warning System shall be allowed to move freely within the area of the System.

5. The United States and its personnel shall be entitled to have such support facilities as are reasonably necessary to perform their functions.

6. The United States and its personnel shall be accorded appropriate status under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.

7. The United States affirms that it will continue to perform the functions described above for the duration of the Basic Agreement.
8. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Proposal, the United States may withdraw its personnel only if it concludes that their safety is jeopardized or that continuation of their role is no longer in the national interest of the United States. In the latter case the Parties to the Basic Agreement will be informed in advance in order to give them the opportunity to make alternative arrangements. If both Parties to the Basic Agreement request the United States to conclude its role under this Proposal, the United States will consider such requests conclusive.

9. Technical problems including the location of the watch stations will be worked out through consultation with the United States.
U.S. won’t need Congress okay for guaranteeing Israel’s oil

By DAVID LANDAU
Jerusalem Post Diplomatic Correspondent

The U.S. Administration will not need formal Congressional approval for its undertaking to guarantee Israel’s oil supplies in a crisis situation. This is the firm opinion of State Department legal experts, and it emerged during the U.S.-Israel negotiating session yesterday in Jerusalem.

The U.S. is to undertake, as part of the interim settlement complex, to ensure Israel’s oil needs if Israel’s other foreign sources fail. Washington has also agreed to “compensate” Israel in cash for the loss of Abu Rodis and to help build a subterranean oil reservoir in the Neger which would hold a one-year emergency supply.

Yesterday’s five-hour session ended in mid-afternoon, and Dr. Kissinger flew to Alexandria leaving his wife Nancy here and pledging to return late last night to resume the negotiations this morning. He said progress was continuing and he wanted to get in as much work as possible before the Sabbath.

Israel officials now predict that the accord will be initialed on Sunday evening, after the Cabinet has given its final approval.

Israel is urging that M. Sadat and M. Rabin themselves initial the accord, to give it the greatest possible political weight. Failing that it will be initialed by Foreign Ministers D. Allen and Pahlavi.

It will come into effect, officials said, only when the “technical protocol” is signed by the two sides - probably in three weeks time in Geneva, after the diplomatic military working group has convened to draft final details.

Before the full signing, Israel may send a cargo of non-military goods through the Suez Canal to test Egypt’s undertaking under the 1976 disengagement accord to permit such cargoes to pass. This undertaking is to be a formal clause in the “new” interim agreement.

With the oil guarantee now relied within the Administration’s legitimate purview, the only component to the interim settlement package requiring Congressional approval is the U.S. presence in the Sinai.

The Israeli negotiating team has made it clear that Israel will not sign the final part of the interim settlement until Congress has debated the issue and given its approval. Israeli experts tend to endorse Dr. Kissinger’s prediction that after some heated debate the Congress will eventually approve the U.S. presence.

Congress resumes next Tuesday after the summer, and the experts say it will take up to two weeks until the issue has moved through committee hearings and come up for the vote on the floors of both Houses.

Administration officials will stress at the hearings that the envisaged U.S. contingent of 200-odd men will be a technical force operating strictly to gather intelligence information and pass it on to the two sides. While the contingent will hopefully make a contribution to the process of transition from war to peace, it will not itself be part of the peacekeeping process, the officials will stress.

The Administration has already shown itself wary of any hint that the U.S. contingent might have a territorial or peacekeeping responsibility beyond that of information-gathering.

The Israeli embassy in Washington.

(Continued on page 3, col. 1)
U.S. won't need Congress

(Continued from page one)

Egypt Agreement. (The Annex will specify the lines of withdrawal and advance and the UNEF and American roles. It will be accompanied by a map.)

Israel sources said yesterday they still hoped there would be three manned American surveillance stations in addition to the American supervisory presence at the Umm Kasheba-Israeli manned station and at the parallel Egyptian manned station. So far Egypt has agreed to only two manned U.S. stations and to four unmanned "sensors."

Points still outstanding between Israel and Egypt yesterday included: "semantic" questions in the formal public agreement; staggered use of some sections of the coastal road to Abu Rudeis; Egypt's undertakings — indirectly through the U.S. — to moderate the economic boycott and diplomatic action against Israel.

Israel sources hoped these matters would be quickly wrapped up, leaving today's talks chiefly to bilateral U.S.-Israel issues. These include a memorandum of understanding on future political coordination in advance of the Geneva Conference (though none of the Geneva parties seems overly keen at present to resume the Peace Conference, with Syria angling for its own interim settlement), and also Israel's aid request for the coming year.

Before yesterday's long working session, Dr. Kissinger spent two hours with Mrs. Golda Meir who is vacationing in Jerusalem. They met

There will also be a reference to the American presence in the Annex to the formal, public, Israeli-Arab,
ANNEX TO EGYPT-ISRAEL AGREEMENT

Within ___ days after the initialling of the Egypt-Israel Agreement, representatives of the two governments shall meet in the Working Group of the Middle East Peace Conference at Geneva to begin preparation of a detailed Protocol for the implementation of the Agreement. The Working Group will complete the Protocol within ___ weeks. In order to facilitate preparation of the Protocol and implementation of the Agreement, and to assist in maintaining the scrupulous observance of the ceasefire and other elements of the Agreement, the two parties have agreed on the following principles, which are an integral part of the Agreement, as guidelines for the Working Group:

1. Definitions of Lines and Areas

   The deployment lines, areas of limited forces and armaments, Buffer Zone, other designated areas, road sections for common use and other features referred to in Article IV of the Agreement shall be as indicated on the attached map (1:100,000 - U.S. Edition).

2. Buffer Zone

   (a) Land access to the buffer zone will be controlled by the UNEF. Provision will be made for civilians to cross
through or remain in the Buffer Zone according to procedures to be detailed in the Protocol.

(b) Aircraft of either party will be permitted to fly freely up to the forward line of that party.

c) Authorized personnel shall have access to the Buffer Zone for transit to and from the Early Warning System; the manner in which this is carried out shall be worked out with UNEF.

3. Area from Line E to Line Terminating South of Abu Rodeis.

(a) The United Nations Emergency Force will assure that there are no military, para-military or irregular forces, military fortifications and military installations; it will establish checkpoints and have freedom of movement necessary to perform this function in this area.

(b) Unarmed Egyptian civilians and third-country civilian oil field personnel shall have the right to enter, exit from, work, and live in the above indicated area. Egyptian frontier guards shall be allowed in the area to perform normal police functions among the civilian population in such numbers and with such weapons and equipment as shall be provided for in the Protocol.

c) Entry to and exit from the area, by land or by sea, shall be only through UNEF checkpoints. UNEF shall also establish checkpoints along road, the locations and number
to be included in the Protocol.

(d) Access to the airspace and the coastal area shall be limited to unarmed civilian vessels and unarmed light civilian helicopters involved in the operation or support of the oil fields.

(e) Israel undertakes to leave intact all currently existing civilian installations and infrastructures.

(f) Procedures for use of the common sections of coastal road along the Gulf of Suez shall be determined by the Working Group and detailed in the Protocol, including a timetable for periods of alternate use by Israeli and Egyptian personnel.

4. Aerial Surveillance

(a) There shall be a continuation of aerial reconnaissance missions by the U.S. over the areas covered by the Agreement (the area between lines F and K), following the same procedures already in practice. The missions will ordinarily be carried out at a frequency of one mission every 7-10 days, with either party or UNEF empowered to request an earlier mission. The USG will make the mission results available expeditiously to Israel, Egypt and the Chief Coordinator of the UN Peacekeeping Mission in the Middle East.

5. Limitation of Forces and Armaments

(a) Within the Areas of Limited Forces and Armaments (the areas between lines J and K and lines E and F) the major
limitations shall be as follows:

I) Eight (8) standard infantry battalions

II) Seventy-five (75) tanks

III) Thirty-six (36) artillery pieces (including heavy mortars) whose range shall not exceed twelve (12) km.

IV) The total number of personnel shall not exceed eight thousand (8,000)

(b) The major limitations beyond the Areas of Limited Forces and Armament will be:

I) A prohibition on the emplacement of artillery pieces or other weapons within an area of thirty (30) km behind the main defense lines with a range capable of reaching lines J and E respectively.

II) The Parties will not place anti-aircraft missiles within an area of 10 km east of line K and west of line F, respectively.

(c) The UN Force will conduct inspections in order to ensure the maintenance of the agreed limitations within these areas.

(d) Any other limitations shall be as may be agreed by the Working Group.

6. Process of Implementation

(a) The detailed implementation and timing of the redeployment of forces, turnover of oil fields, and other arrangements called for by the Agreement, Annex and Protocol shall be
determined by the Working Group, which will agree on the stages of this process.

(b) The basic stages of the process shall be as follows:

I) Implementation shall begin within ____ days after signature of the Protocol.

II) The movement of Egyptian forces from line A (in accordance with the Disengagement Agreement of January 18, 1974) to line E shall take place within ____ weeks after signature of the Protocol.

III) Turnover to Egypt of the Abu Rodeis oil fields and the southern part of the ECA area shall take place within ____ weeks after signature of the Protocol.

IV) Implementation shall be completed within five months after signature of the Protocol.
August 29, 1975

H/A

Remarks of Foreign Minister Allen and Secretary Kissinger to Press After Meeting at Prime Minister's Office, August 29, 1975

Secretary WASH DC IMMEDIATE 672

Embassy AMMAN

Embassy CAIRO

Embassy DAMASCUS

Embassy JIDDA

Embassy TEL AVIV

Embassy ALEXANDRIA

UNCLASSIFIED SECTO 10139

DEPARTMENT PASS NSC FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT AND HESSEN

Sec. Kissinger: Let the Foreign Minister speak.

FonMin Allen: Ladies and Gentlemen: I believe that we have reached the final phase of the negotiations. We had quite a useful day. We worked a lot. There are certain points which still need some clarification. A lot of paper work is still in front of us. Nevertheless, we have the feeling that we are approaching the conclusion of our work. We shall meet again tomorrow night. So, tomorrow night we shall know where we really stand.
Q: Do you think, sir, that the agreement will be
initialled early next week, Sunday or Monday, the way
it looks now?

PomMin Allon: Well, I will be candid with you.
Unless some unforeseen problems arise on the other
side of the line, I do not want to say more than that
in the presence of the Secretary, I am tempted to
believe that it is possible to do it early next week.

Q: Sir, could you tell us how you felt about
today's negotiations?

Sec. Kissinger: I agree completely with what
the Foreign Minister has said. We are in the final
phases of the negotiations. There is an enormous
amount of paper work that has to be done in terms of
a basic agreement and various annexes, all of
which are progressing well and in a very good atmo-
sphere. I share the judgment that we should aim for
completion by the early part of next week.

Q: What did you talk about mostly today? Is it the American-Israeli relationship?

Sec. Kissinger: We really went through all the paper work connected with the agreement - the basic agreement and the various annexes. We had an extended discussion also, of the American-Israeli relationship, all of which was conducted in a very positive and very friendly atmosphere.

Q: Dr. Kissinger, have you had to readjust your previous timetable - the schedule through Saturday night? Or are new arrangements?

Sec. Kissinger: Well, so far I have not had to make new arrangements. I am hoping that I can come pretty close to my timetable.

Q: Can you remind us, sir, of your travel plans - where to and when?
Sec. Kissinger: Well, I believe that given the enormous amount of detail work that is involved in this agreement, that I now should stick with it until we have come to a conclusion. I expect that before I leave the area, I will visit Jordan and Saudi Arabia. But I do not expect to take any side trips until we conclude our work.

Q. Have you decided upon the American presence?
Sec. Kissinger: We have made very good progress on this. We are in the drafting phase of that issue.

Q: Are you spending Shabbat tomorrow in Jerusalem or in Riyadh?

FonMin Allon: This is a secret.
Q. Just tell us.
Sec. Kissinger: Well, I will probably go to Alexandria.

Q: Do you come back tomorrow night?
See. Kissinger: I will come back tomorrow night.

Yes.

KISSINGER
**TELEGRAM**

**FROM:** USIS, JERUSALEM  
**TO:**  
**CLASSIFICATION:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**DATE:** 29/08/73

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**TAGS:** PFOG US

**SUBJECT:** Remarks to Press by Secretary Kissinger at King David Hotel Following Meeting at Prime Minister's Office, August 29, 1973

**ACTION:** Secret

**INFO:**
- Embassy AMMAN
- Embassy CAIRO
- Embassy DAMASCUS
- Embassy JIDDA
- Embassy TEL AVIV

**UNCLASSIFIED SECTION:**

**DEPARTMENT PASS NO. FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT AND NESSON**

Q. Mr. Secretary, is the agreement as of now ready for initialing?

Sec. Kissinger: No, not completely. We are in the final phases of the negotiations, which means we were spending most of our time working on documents, the basic agreement, the various annexes. We are making good progress on all.

Q. Would you care to speculate, sir, on what day the agreement might be initialed now -- Sunday, Monday?

Sec. Kissinger: I do not want to speculate on

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**Clearance:**

USIS: 3/8 Sherman

**USIS:** 3/8 W. Vogel

**Classified by:**

USIS: 3/8 W. Vogel
the day. We are aiming for the early part of next week.

Q. Mr. Secretary, was the bulk of your work today dedicated to the U.S.-Israeli papers that will be involved in this agreement?

Sec. Kissinger: No. The bulk of our work was dedicated to the agreement and its annexes, and the various associated papers. But we did have a very useful discussion on U.S.-Israeli bilateral relations.

Q. Mr. Secretary, would it be fair to say at this point that since the President obviously has to make an announcement in Washington, are you really not in a position to tell even when you have reached an agreement until such time as the announcement is made in Washington?

Sec. Kissinger: From what I have seen since I came to this area, with even the tightest security precautions occasionally things leak. I think it...
we approach that point you would hear it.

Q. I mean a certain amount of surprise still has to remain?

Sec. Kissinger: No. This is not done for effect. This is not done to maintain surprise. When we are concluded, it will be obvious, and the announcement will be made whenever it is appropriate to make it.

Q. Mr. Secretary, are you certain that it is going to be concluded?

Sec. Kissinger: I am very optimistic now that it will be concluded.

Q: Mr. Secretary, has the U.S. aid level to Israel been determined yet?

Sec. Kissinger: There is no final figure yet.

Q. Mr. Secretary, just for clearing up a couple of things. Do you expect as of now that Congress
will approve the proposal for an American presence in the Sinai passes?

Sec. Kissinger: Yes.

Q. Number two, what would happen if Congress does not approve such a proposal? Do you expect that Israel and Egypt would both proceed to sign that agreement?

Sec. Kissinger: Well, they will have to sign the agreement before the Congress can act. But then there are a number of associated protocols which will bring it into effect.

Q: The Israelis, sir, are saying they will not sign the agreement until Congress does act.

Sec. Kissinger: I am under the impression that they will sign the agreement. Then there is a question of protocols. But I expect the Congress to act, and we will face that issue when it arises.
Q. What is your schedule for the next two days?

Sec. Kissinger: My schedule is that I will go
to Alexandria tomorrow, and return tomorrow night.
Then we will see what remains to be done.

Q: When do you now expect to make your U.N.
speech?

Sec. Kissinger: Tuesday or Wednesday.

Q. And will you then come back and complete the
agreement?

Sec. Kissinger: Unless I complete it before then.

Q. Mr. Secretary, did you mean initial or sign
when you said you were under the impression that
they will sign the agreement?

Sec. Kissinger: Look, if there is an agreement
which does not yet exist — but if there is an
agreement, it will be initialed and then signed shortly
thereafter.
Q: My understanding of it till now was that in the interim period between initialing and signing that was the time you were going to try to get Congressional approval.

Sec. Kissinger: My understanding is that initialing and signing will take place fairly close to each other. Let us see whose understanding is correct.

Q. Where do you expect the signing in that case, Mr. Secretary? Would it be after the talks in Jerusalem?

Sec. Kissinger: If you remember the previous agreements, they go through a phase: First, of negotiation with American mediation, after which there are direct negotiations to implement the agreement. After the agreement is signed, there would have to be technical talks before the agreement could be implemented. These technical talks would describe the
specific manner in which the agreement would be carried out and the timing in relation to it. So, the implementation of the agreement cannot start until the protocol is completed.

Q. When you talk about those talks, Mr. Secretary, you are referring only to the military, physical moves or also to political moves?

Sec. Kissinger: No. This will deal primarily with the technical implementation of the military matters that have been agreed to, or that will have been agreed to.

The Press: Thank you.

KISSINGER
SECRET/SENSITIVE

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM
INFORMATION
August 29, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: BREN'T SCOWCROFT

Secretary Kissinger asked that I pass you the following report:

"In the longest session of this shuttle -- nine hours of unbroken negotiations with Rabin and his team -- we widened the area of agreement and I believe we have broken the back of all major hurdles, subject to further discussions with Sadat tomorrow. The prospects are good that this agreement can be initialed on Monday or Tuesday by the two sides and signed in Geneva about Wednesday.

"We are tentatively planning on a simultaneous announcement by you, Rabin and Sadat, and I will be sending you a recommendation on timing as well as a suggested draft text which you might wish to make on the three major networks.

"Here is a current rundown on the productive results of today's nine-hour session.

"A. A text of the agreement is now agreed with both Egypt and Israel except for one point -- Israel's insistence that reference to the right of the parties to self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter be eliminated. The Israelis feel this waters down the Sadat commitment not to resort to the use of force and resolve all issues by peaceful means. I will make a major effort with Sadat tomorrow in Alexandria to try to get him to drop it.

"B. We are in full agreement with Israel on the concept and the details of how the early warning system will work. We have an agreed text in the form of a U.S. proposal to which each side will send its acceptance. I expect to get Egypt's final approval to the text tomorrow.

"C. We agreed on a text with the Israelis on an annex which will describe the guidelines and framework for the technical group which will meet in Geneva next week after the signing to work out the
detailed implementation of the agreement. The implementation, of course, will be on a phased basis and we are trying to arrange it so that the Egyptian takeover of the oil fields comes in the first month or so after the signing and the passes are turned over within six months of the signing. Rabin has made it very clear that no implementation of the agreement can start without the prior approval of the Congress of the U.S. participation in the warning system in the passes. From here the reaction from the Congress seems to be of a mixed character; however, the Israelis are very anxious to make a major effort along with the Administration to assure overwhelming support of the American presence in the passes. I continue to share your previously expressed judgment that the Congress will support you on this matter.

"D. Finally, we made some progress in the area of bilateral assurances which the Israelis expect from us. I dug in strongly in resisting any far-reaching assurances which would tend to tie our hands politically and diplomatically in what we would expect to do in the future in the Middle East. Moreover, the Israelis have been pressing me to go beyond 2.1 billion on aid, but I have continued to maintain the line at this figure.

"E. I concluded the long negotiating session tonight with a meeting alone with Rabin, Peres and Allon at their request. It was somewhat of a hand-holding, hand-wringing sort of discussion which reflects the unsure leadership at the helm of this country. Rabin did a good job at the meetings today of deflecting numerous inane suggestions of both Peres and Allon. Each in his own way is ambivalent about the agreement, but each equally in his own way sees no better alternative. They seem to have a feel for the disastrous situation which would ensue if this present effort were to fail."

SECRET/SENSITIVE

SECRET/SENSITIVE
AGREEMENT BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL

The Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Government of Israel have agreed:

ARTICLE I

The conflict between them and in the Middle East will not be resolved by military force but only by peaceful means.

The agreement concluded by the Parties January 18, 1974, within the framework of the Geneva Peace Conference, constituted a first step towards a just and durable peace according to the provisions of Security Council Resolution 338 of October 22, 1973; and

They are determined to reach a final and just peace settlement by means of negotiations called for by Security Council Resolution 338, this agreement being a significant step towards that end.

ARTICLE II

The Parties hereby undertake not to resort to the threat or use of force or military blockade against each other.

ARTICLE III

(1) The Parties shall continue scrupulously to observe the ceasefire on land, sea and air and to refrain from all military or para-military actions against each other.

(2) The Parties also confirm that the obligations contained in the Annex and, when concluded, the Protocol shall be an integral part of this Agreement.

ARTICLE IV

A. The military forces of the parties shall be deployed in accordance with the following principles:

(1) All Israeli forces shall be deployed east of the lines designated as Lines J and M on the attached map.

(2) All Egyptian forces shall be deployed west of the line designated as Line E on the attached map.
(3) The area between the lines designated on the attached map as Lines E and F and the area between the lines designated on the attached map as Lines J and K shall be limited in armament and forces.

(4) The limitations on armament and forces in the areas described by paragraph (3) above shall be agreed as described in the attached annex.

(5) The zone between the lines designated on the attached map as Lines E and J, will be a buffer zone. In this zone the United Nations Emergency Force will continue to perform its functions as under the Egyptian-Israeli Agreement of January 18, 1974.

(6) In the area from Line E to the line terminating at the coast south of Abu Rodeis on the attached map, there will be no military forces, as specified in the attached annex.

B. The details concerning the new lines, the redeployment of the forces and its timing, the limitation on armaments and forces, aerial reconnaissance, the operation of the early warning and surveillance installations and the use of the roads, the UN functions and other arrangements will all be in accordance with the provisions of the Annex and map which are an integral part of this Agreement and of the Protocol which is to result from negotiations pursuant to the Annex and which, when concluded, shall become an integral part of this Agreement.

ARTICLE V

The United Nations Emergency Force is essential and shall continue its functions and its mandate shall be extended annually.

ARTICLE VI

The Parties hereby establish a Joint Commission for the duration of this Agreement. It will function under the aegis of the Chief Coordinator of the United Nations Peacekeeping Missions in the Middle East in order to consider any problem arising from this Agreement and to assist the United Nations Emergency Force in the execution of its mandate. The Joint Commission shall function in accordance with procedures established in the Protocol.
ARTICLE VII

Non-military cargoes destined for or coming from Israel shall be permitted through the Suez Canal.

ARTICLE VIII

(1) This Agreement is regarded by the Parties as a significant step toward a just and lasting peace. It is not a final peace agreement.

(2) The Parties shall continue their efforts to negotiate a final peace agreement within the framework of the Geneva Peace Conference in accordance with Security Council Resolution 338.

ARTICLE IX

"Reference Article 51 of UN Charter still under negotiations"

ARTICLE X

This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature of the Protocol and remain in force until superseded by a new agreement.

Done at 1975, in four copies.

For the Government of Israel For the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt

Witness
CHECKLIST
Alexandria, Saturday, August 30

Your documents for this visit to Alexandria are set up as follows:

--- Attached to this checklist at the tabs indicated are copies of the documents for you to give to Sadat or Fahmy. (We will have extras in case needed.)

--- We suggest you use the documents in your book as your working copies.

Your objectives are:

--- to show the Egyptians the complete range of documents involved in concluding the negotiations;

--- to get their final agreement on the main documents (or their counterproposals in the case of the Annex);

--- to pin down a timetable through the signing of the Protocol.

Hopefully, you can get all the documents but the Annex out of the way quickly; some of that you can do with Fahmy. Then most of your time will need to be spent on the Annex. You will probably want to discuss the key issues with Sadat so that he can instruct Gamasy. Then we will need to spend time with Gamasy.

I. The Agreement

(The text at TAB A under this checklist which you will be handing Fahmy has Article IX on the right of self-defense in brackets as Eilts gave it to him yesterday. The text in your book does not have this article.)

--- Tell Sadat the Israelis have agreed to freeze the text if Article IX on the right of self-defense is deleted.

[Redacted]
If Sadat agrees, you can freeze this text.

II. The Proposal on Early Warning System (TAB B)

-- The Israelis proposed very few changes, so most of the changes that have been made since you first showed Fahmy a text were made by us to reflect Egypt's interests. (Eilts has given Fahmy a text as it now stands, so he has had time to study it. In case you wish to review the changes with him, a line-in/line-out text is in your book showing in one color the changes made in Alexandria Thursday night and, in another color, the changes made in Jerusalem, Friday.)

-- If Sadat and Fahmy agree, you can freeze this text.

III. UNEF Letter (TAB C)

-- Check whether Fahmy can accept the words "at least."

-- Whatever his decision on those words, you could freeze the text.

IV. Letter on Cargoes and Bab al-Mandab

-- This will be a new draft for Sadat and Fahmy (TAB D).

-- It might help sell them if you told them President Ford would send Sadat a letter containing Israeli assurances that they would not send military cargo through the Canal (TAB E).

-- You will notify them through Eilts when the Israelis are ready to send a ship with Israeli cargo through the Canal.

That will complete the easier documents.

V. The Annex

You may wish to talk your way through the main points (TAB F). These are the main issues (Gamasy's paper is at TAB G).
The first paragraph will be your occasion for discussing the timetable for concluding the negotiations the next month.

You promised the Israelis you would raise the level of initialing.

Note that arrangements for civilians in the Buffer Zone can be worked out at Geneva. (Gamasy made a point of this.)

There is written assurance that Israel will leave all civilian facilities intact.

You will want to get Egyptian reaction to both sides flying reconnaissance missions up to the middle of the Buffer Zone. You could put this idea forward with the thought that maybe Egypt would like to keep an eye on Bir Gifqafa and Bir Hasana which the Egyptian surveillance station might not cover too well because it will be "behind" the mountains.

Procedures on the road in the Gulf of Suez area will be worked out at Geneva.

Israel does not want "frontier guards." You could suggest that they create an Abu Rodeis police force.

The Israelis want their naval vessels to navigate freely in the international shipping channel on an agreed schedule. They also want to overfly periodically.

The limitations on armament and forces will be the toughest.

Sadat and Gamasy want a three-month implementation period.

VI. Map in the Coastal area

The new map will be in your folder. You will want to explain:
VII. Announcement of Agreement

You will want to explore with Sadat when an agreement might be announced. The main factors to be kept in mind are:

- If the Israeli Cabinet approves the Agreement, late Sunday leaks are certain.
- President Ford will want a White House announcement. (As of midnight Saturday, Jerusalem will be six hours ahead of Washington. As of midnight Sunday, Cairo will be six hours ahead of Washington.)
- You will want your travelling press to have time on the ground to file.
- This seems to suggest a Sunday evening announcement. (Possible text at TAB H.)

You might tell Sadat you will be in touch with Waldheim.

VIII. Egyptian Assurances Israel Wants Conveyed "Through Us"

A. Assurances Already Received

1. Egypt will not use lack of progress at Geneva Conference as a pretext to break the Interim Agreement.

2. Egypt undertakes to reduce hostile propaganda in its Government-controlled media. Also
   - Our present language says that we will bring to Egypt's attention the desirability of Egypt being restrained in its official pronouncements on the understanding that Israel will be equally restrained.
As an alternative to this assurance, Peres has suggested that there be an exchange of letters to the effect that "both sides will reduce hostile propaganda and do their utmost to advance the cause of peace."

3. Egypt has given assurances that it will ease the boycott of American companies on a selective basis and that it will not discriminate against any American company that wants to do business in Egypt regardless of whether this company is on the boycott list.

-- Israel still wants us to encourage Egypt to expand the foregoing to include European and other companies.

4. Egypt has given an assurance that it will refrain from measures that might inhibit or obstruct the maintenance or resumption of diplomatic relations between Israel and any other state and that it will not raise objections with states considering establishment or resumption of diplomatic relations with Israel.

-- Rabin suggested and we agreed to explore practical possibilities of encouraging selected African countries to reestablish relations with Israel.

-- You agreed to add a second paragraph to this section to the effect that the U.S. will seek from all states an assurance that they will not initiate or support moves against Israel in international bodies.

B. Assurances We Have Said We Will Seek

1. Precise timing and beginning of the annual renewals of UNEF. Israel wants them to begin at the time the redeployment of forces under the Interim Agreement has been completed.
2. Egyptian Agreement to add to the side letter on Bab el-Mandab a phrase that it also covers flights over the Red Sea.

3. An Egyptian assurance that ships and aircraft and the passengers and crew of either party in distress will be given assistance by the other and be permitted to continue on their route.

--- Peres suggested as an alternative seeking to include this in the Protocol to be negotiated by the parties at Geneva.
The documents in this folder continue into the next folder.