MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

The Cabinet

DATE AND TIME:

Monday, August 30, 1976

10:41 a.m. - 12:28 p.m.

PLACE:

Cabinet Room

President: (Introductory comments)

Henry, why don't you tell us about Korea and South Africa?

Kissinger: Let me describe the DMZ and the Joint Security Area.

North Korea has four guard posts on our side of the line. We have none on their side. At the meetings, our troops sometimes go into their part of the zone, but rarely, especially compared to the number of times they are in our area.

(Described the tree pruning incident and sequence) They said the incident was "regretful" -- which is the farthest they had ever gone. We said that that statement was a positive sign but it was not enough -- it had to insure the security of our forces. They have proposed that each side be restricted to its side of the line. The practical effect of that is they dismantle four guard posts and we do nothing.

The ROK is now talking tougher -- in direct proportion to the reduction in the likelihood of conflict. We must either wrap this up, be willing to use force, or they will see we are bluffing and hit us in the face again.

President: I want you all to know we were prepared to take other military actions had the need developed. It is my opinion, we should wrap it up now.

How about Africa?

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BY My NLF, DATE 4/19/07

Kissinger: There is a guerrilla war now going on in Rhodesia. There is the beginning of one in South-West Africa and the UN resolution that South African occupation there is illegal.

On Rhodesia, the guerrilla war is supported by all the surrounding states. In April, the confrontation states agreed not to let outside powers into the guerrilla war. This is to keep the Communists out. It is our and South Africa's judgment that if there is no resolution, it is inevitable that the whites will be wiped out -- it is just a matter of how long. The eventual outcome is foreordained.

If Rhodesia falls because of the Soviet/Cuban intervention, there will be an acceleration toward them and there will be a race war in South Africa. So, it is very important whether the changes in Rhodesia and South-West Africa come about through American help or through Soviet/Cuban assistance -- it is decisive for Africa. This is the judgment of all the countries involved -- including South Africa. If nothing is done, South Africa may be forced to help the whites in Rhodesia, and then we will have Angola once again, but this time the whites against the blacks.

(Describes the prospects in Namibia) In Rhodesia we have to get South African support and that of the four confrontation states -- including shutting down the guerrilla war if there is a settlement. I don't want to go into the details of the negotiations, but we do have a chance -- a better one in Namibia than in Rhodeisa.

I realize we don't need more African turmoil in a campaign, but if it doesn't come off now, we are faced with an increasingly brutal war, with the eventual loss of Rhodesia and a race war against South Africa.

Bush: We clearly agree with Secretary Kissinger's view. The trend is inexorable if nothing is done. The black guerrilla leaders are divided but united on the principle that a white Rhodesia is anathema. We had an earlier extimate of six months; now we think it is more like a year to 18 months.

<u>Kissinger:</u> South Africa thinks the year can be cut down if the other side has foreign officers and even more if they have foreign troops. To do it, the moderates have to get Machel on board and then get the guerrillas together. And there is a powerful predisposition to let nature take its course -- with the tragic results I have indicated.

<u>Bush:</u> We can't say how many Cubans are there, but there are some in Mozambique. But we just don't yet have precise data.

<u>President:</u> Let me just make one overall observation. We have a tough campaign ahead. I said we were ready to do more in Korea, if necessary, despite the embarrassment of having it come right after my acceptance speech. If we needed to, we could have done it. Also here, it is right and we are going to do it. We will take whatever political consequences there are, although I think in the long run they will be good.

This is true across the board. Don't just make recommendations based on the campaign. Tell me what is right to do.

(Kleppe on National Parks improvement)

(Marsh on Congressional activities)

(Greenspan on the Economy)

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