

TAB I  
STRATEGY DETAILS





## STATES PLAN

### BUDGET

In considering budgets for the individual state campaigns the states were divided into four groups -- states with 4 or less Congressional Districts, states with 5-9 Congressional Districts, states with 10-19 Congressional Districts and states with 20 or more Congressional Districts.

Budgets for each group of states includes a range of high and low budgets and an average budget for each state in that group. Individual group budgets are attached.

Following the individual group budgets is a budget for the entire States program and sample budgets for individual states.

It is critically important that the state field staffs understand that this money, in most cases, is not assigned for their discretionary expenditure. They will follow the campaign plan, hire the people to carry out that plan, acquire the lists, send the mailings and make the phone calls into regions as instructed by the National Campaign.

STATES BUDGET

GROUP I

States with 1-4 Congressional Districts -- Alaska, Delaware, Nevada, North Dakota, Vermont, Wyoming, D. C., Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Montana, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Utah, Nebraska, Arizona, Arkansas, Oregon and West Virginia.

	<u>Range</u>	<u>Average</u>
Salaries*	\$2,500-4,100	\$3,800
Travel	2,000-4,000	3,000
Telephones	2,000-4,000	3,500
Mailings	1,000-4,000	3,000
Overhead	1,500-2,500	2,000
TOTAL	\$9,000-18,600	\$15,300

\$15,300  
x 21 states

GROUP I TOTAL \$321,300

\*Group I states will have two staff members each



STATES BUDGET

GROUP II

States with 5-9 Congressional Districts -- Colorado, Kansas, Mississippi, Connecticut, Iowa, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Alabama, Kentucky, Washington, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Tennessee and Wisconsin.

	<u>Range</u>	<u>Average</u>
Salaries*	\$3,700-10,200	\$ 6,600
Travel	3,000-6,500	5,000
Telephone	4,000-8,000	6,000
Mailings	4,000-8,000	5,000
Overhead	2,000-4,500	3,400
TOTAL	\$16,700-37,200	\$26,000

\$26,000  
15 states

GROUP II TOTAL \$390,000

\*Group II states will have 2-4 staff members -- a Senior

STATES BUDGET

GROUP III

States with 10-19 Congressional Districts -- Georgia, Missouri, Virginia, Indiana, North Carolina, Massachusetts, Florida, New Jersey and Michigan.

	<u>Range</u>	<u>Average</u>
Salaries*	\$4,750-34,600	\$14,000
Travel	4,500-20,000	10,500
Telephones	4,000-20,000	10,200
Mailings	4,500-20,000	10,500
Overhead	3,000-13,000	7,000
TOTAL	\$20,750-107,600	\$52,200

\$52,200  
9 states

\$469,800

Phone Banks 94,500

GROUP III TOTAL \$564,300

\*Group III states will have 2-10 staff members

STATES BUDGET

GROUP IV

States with 20 or more Congressional Districts -- Ohio, Illinois, Texas, Pennsylvania, New York and California.

	<u>Range</u>	<u>Average</u>
Salaries*	\$26,800-65,000	\$43,300
Travel	30,000-40,000	33,000
Telephones	20,000-40,000	30,000
Mailings	30,000-50,000	40,000
Overhead	20,000-30,000	25,000
TOTAL	\$126,800-225,000	\$171,300

\$171,300  
         6 states

\$1,027,800

Phone Banks          198,000

GROUP IV TOTAL \$1,225,800

\*Group IV states will have 10-15 staff members

STATES BUDGET

	I	II	III	IV	TOTAL
Salaries	\$ 79,800	\$ 99,000	\$126,000	\$ 259,800	\$ 564,600
Travel	63,000	75,000	94,500	198,000	430,500
Telephones	73,500	90,000	91,800	180,000	<del>435,300</del>
Mailings	63,000	75,000	94,500	240,000	472,500
Overhead	42,000	51,000	63,000	150,000	306,000
Phone Banks	--	--	94,500	198,000	292,500
 TOTAL	 \$321,300	 \$390,000	 \$564,300	 \$1,225,800	 \$2,501,400

	COUNTY DIST.	W STAFF	SALARIES	TRAVEL	TELEPHONE	TRAINING	CLEARING	TOTAL
	1	2	3800	3000	4000	3000	2000	15,800
E	1	2	3800	3000	4000	3000	2000	15,800
	1	2	3800	3000	4000	3000	2000	15,800
AKOTA	1	2	3800	3000	4000	3000	2000	15,800
	1	2	3800	3000	4000	3000	2000	15,800
	1	2	3800	3000	4000	3000	2000	15,800
F COLUMBIA	1	2	3800	3000	4000	3000	2000	15,800
	2	2	3800	3000	4000	3000	2000	15,800
	2	2	3800	3000	4000	3000	2000	15,800
	2	2	3800	3000	4000	3000	2000	15,800
	2	2	3800	3000	4000	3000	2000	15,800
SHIRE	2	2	3800	3000	4000	3000	2000	15,800
	2	2	3800	3000	4000	3000	2000	15,800
CO	2	2	3800	3000	4000	3000	2000	15,800
LA	2	2	3800	3000	4000	3000	2000	15,800
KOTA	2	2	3800	3000	4000	3000	2000	15,800
	2	2	3800	3000	4000	3000	2000	15,800
	2	2	3800	3000	4000	3000	2000	15,800
	3	2	3800	3000	4000	3000	2000	15,800
	4	2	3800	3000	4000	3000	2000	15,800
	4	2	3800	3000	4000	3000	2000	15,800
	4	2	3800	3000	4000	3000	2000	15,800
GINIA	4	2	3800	3000	4000	3000	2000	15,800
	5	3	6500	4900	6000	4900	3300	25,600
	5	3	6500	4900	6000	4900	3300	25,600
PI	5	2	6500	4900	6000	4900	3300	25,600
UT	6	3	6500	4900	6000	4900	3300	25,600
	6	3	6500	4900	6000	4900	3300	25,600
	6	3	6500	4900	6000	4900	3300	25,600
OLINA	6	2	4400	3300	4000	3300	2200	17,200

CONG. DIST. # STAFF SALARIES TRAVEL TELEPHONE'S MAILINGS OVERHEAD TOTAL

ON  
A  
A  
E  
N.  
ROLINA  
SEPT'S  
BY  
NIA  
A

CONG. DIST.	# STAFF	SALARIES	TRAVEL	TELEPHONE'S	MAILINGS	OVERHEAD	TOTAL
7	2	4400	3300	4000	3300	2200	17,200
7	3	6500	4900	6000	4900	3300	25,600
7	3	6500	4900	6000	4900	3300	25,600
8	2	4400	3300	4000	3300	2200	17,200
8	4	8500	6400	8000	6400	4300	33,600
8	4	8500	6400	8000	6400	4300	33,600
8	4	8500	6400	8000	6400	4300	33,600
9	4	8500	6400	8000	6400	4300	33,600
10	2	6100	4600	4000	4600	3100	22,400
10	4	11500	8700	8000	8700	5800	42,700
10	4	11500	8700	8000	8700	5800	42,700
11	4	11500	8700	8000	8700	5800	42,700
11	4	11500	8700	8000	8700	5800	42,700
11	4	11500	8700	8000	8700	5800	42,700
12	2	6100	4600	4000	4600	3100	22,400
15	8	20500	15400	16000	15400	10000	77,300
15	8	20500	15400	16000	15400	10000	77,300
19	10	26000	19500	20000	19500	13000	98,000
23	10	39500	30000	20000	30000	20000	139,500
24	10	39500	30000	20000	30000	20000	139,500
24	10	39500	30000	20000	30000	20000	139,500
25	10	39500	30000	20000	30000	20000	139,500
39	15	50800	39000	30000	39000	26000	184,800
43	15	50800	39000	30000	39000	26000	184,800

STATES PLAN

PROPORTIONAL BUDGET BREAKDOWN

\$200,000 PLAN

Salaries	20%	\$40,000
Telephones	15	30,000
Overhead	10	20,000
Mailings	30	60,000
Travel	20	40,000
Miscellaneous	5	<u>10,000</u>
		\$200,000

\$50,000 PLAN

Salaries	30	\$15,000
Telephones	10	5,000
Overhead	10	5,000
Mailings	20	10,000
Travel	15	7,500
Miscellaneous	5	<u>2,500</u>
		\$50,000

NOTE: Campaign materials provided by the National PFC



Targeted States: West - Southwest - Border - Midwest

California  
Washington  
Oregon  
Texas  
New Mexico  
Colorado  
Kansas  
Missouri  
Nebraska  
Iowa  
Illinois  
Indiana  
Ohio  
Kentucky  
Tennessee  
Virginia  
Florida  
Maryland  
Michigan  
Wisconsin

Targeted States: West - Border - Midwest - Northeast

California  
Oregon  
Washington  
Ohio  
Indiana  
Illinois  
Michigan  
Wisconsin  
Iowa  
Nebraska  
Kansas  
Missouri  
Minnesota  
Maryland  
Florida  
Massachusetts  
New Jersey  
Connecticut  
Pennsylvania  
New York



NATIONAL CAMPAIGN PROJECTIONS

Media (Including Campaign '76)	\$10,000,000
Presidential Travel	500,000
Vice Presidential Travel	1,450,000
Advocates Travel	500,000
Polls	800,000
National Headquarters (Including Special Groups)	3,000,000
Closing Costs	250,000
Reserve	2,800,000
States	2,500,000
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>\$21,800,000</b>



NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS

Payroll/Consultants - 190 (including taxes)		\$1,150,000
Staff Travel*		200,000
Chairman (20 trips)	\$10,000	
Political (150 trips)	75,000	
Press (50 trips)	25,000	
Other (150 trips)	75,000	
Misc.	15,000	
Newsletters/Mailings		200,000
Special Groups Programs		900,000
Overhead		550,000
Rent	\$ 60,000	
Telephones	180,000	
Postage	40,000	
Telegrams	15,000	
Supplies	50,000	
Equipment	40,000	
Insurance	75,000	
Furniture	60,000	
Misc.	30,000	
		-----
TOTAL		\$3,000,000

\*Average Trip: Economy class round trip to Dallas(\$240.00),  
three days @ \$75/day = \$465.

HEADQUARTERS PAYROLL PROJECTIONS

<u>Staff</u>	<u>Now</u>	<u>Gen.</u>	<u>Est. Payroll</u>
Chairman	7	8	\$ 24,000
Hughes	1	2	5,000
Treasure	12	16	32,000
Treas. - Reg.	-	30	48,000
Gen. Counsel	4	6	12,000
Press	5	10	24,000
Special Groups	8	30	60,000
Administration	12	37	40,000
Scheduling	4	10	18,000
Research	3	6	10,000
Volunteers	2	5	5,000
Political	14	28	87,000
Consultants	4	4	18,000
Total		192	\$383,000/month
Three-month Total			\$1,149,000

Campaign '76 -- unknown staff size/location



SPACE

Suite 250 - 6,000 sq. ft.  $\searrow$   
Suite 1002 - 5,000 sq. ft.  $\swarrow$  \$10,000/month

8,000 sq. ft. addition space

\$20,000/month for three months -- \$60,000

TELEPHONE

Out WATS - \$1675 x 25	\$41,875
In WATS - \$1700 x 5	8,500
Long Distance	14,000
Basic bills	7,500
TOTAL	\$71,875/mo.
CAMPAIGN TOTAL	\$179,700



PRESIDENTIAL TRAVEL

Definition of an average trip: Total of 8 hours flying time on Air Force One, helicopter from White House to Andrews AFB and return, 10 political people accompanying and six events/locations scheduled.

Average Expenses:

• AF-1 and Helicopter	\$ 4,300
White House Advance (12)	9,000
Press Advance (4)	3,000
Advance Staff Office	3,000
Events/Locations @ \$4,000 ea.	24,000
Overnight	<u>1,500</u>
TOTAL	\$44,800

President can make ten average trips for less than \$500,000.



VICE PRESIDENTIAL NOMINEE'S STAFF AND TRAVEL

Staff -- 8 full time

Advance -- 6 full time and 10 expenses only

One Advance (including press function) per event

Three events/day at \$1,500 per event

Per-month costs:

Aircraft	\$250,000
Salaries	
Staff (8)	24,000
Advance (6)	12,000
Event expense (90 events)	135,000
Per diem (@ \$75/day max.)	
Staff	18,060
Advance (16)	36,000
Air fare (16 @ \$500/wk.)	34,400
Misc.	25,000
V.P. Salary/Expenses	<u>7,500</u>
Total	\$541,960/month
Campaign Total	\$1,083,920



ADVOCATE TRAVEL

These expense estimates are based on first-class air fare (for one person) and per diem expenses (one person, one overnight).

Average Air Fare	\$350.00
Average Per Diem	<u>100.00</u>
Total/Trip	\$450.00

Cost for 1,000 trips (for one person) \$450,000

This includes advocacy-type appearances by PFC leadership.





ENVIRONMENTALISTS are down on the Ford Administration. Some of them need to be won back. There are many middle-class conservationists and working-class sportsmen who lean toward the Republicans on other issues. We must at least avoid allowing the environmental issue to become so aggravated that environmentalists will vote against Ford on that issue alone. A part of this is going strongly on record in support of a clean environment with a minimum of modifying conditions. We should make the point that our economic policies provide for the kind of investment that will be needed to pay for environmental protection, accompanying growth. We should make more of the ongoing environmental activity being carried on by the Administration. I am told that the environmentalists' current top priorities are: amendments to the Clean Air Act; the toxic substances control bill; and strip mine regulation. I am not familiar with the policy issues involved, but wherever we can responsibly lean toward them, it would be politically helpful. The "Clean Up America" proposal should also be favorably received by environmentalists.



## CONSTITUENCY ANALYSIS

First, let me make a few general points about constituency groups. ~~The first thing to keep in mind about constituency groups is that they do not exist.~~ Voters exist--constituency groups are generalizing labels that help us think about how and why voters behave, but the groups have no objective reality of their own. All so-called blocs have many divisions within themselves. Most differ only in emphasis from the general populations. It is worth recalling that 41 percent of Catholics favor the Supreme Court ruling on abortion, and a narrow majority of blacks oppose busing -- or at least did until the controversy heated up. (Such gross figures do not of course measure the intensity which either side brings to their feelings on the subject -- an issue that strongly motivates a relatively small group, such as opposition to gun control or aid to parochial schools, may be politically more important than an issue which attracts moderate or passive support from the great majority.)

Most people belong to a number of constituency groups, and the most that can be said is that their voting is to some extent influenced through their identification with some of these. There is no "Catholic vote". There are Catholic voters who are to varying degrees influenced by identification with the values and attitudes of their church. This should always be kept in mind when we speak of the Catholic votes, etc. as a shorthand.

Constituency identification is generally most influential when



members of a group feel that a candidate is hostile to their group's interests. Few Jewish voters, for instance, would be likely to vote for a candidate perceived as anti-Israel. Labor unions have been able to exert considerable control over their members in state elections where right-to-work was a burning issue. But if all candidates are perceived as more or less friendly to Israel, or if right-to-work is not a clear and present issue, voters identifying with the groups aroused by these issues make their choices on other grounds.

The closest thing we now have to constituency groups that are actual electoral forces, rather than helpful generalizations, are voting blocs that are simply voted by their leaders. But these are now few and far between, particularly in general elections. Remember, Charles Percy came close to carrying Chicago four years ago against a loyal adherent of the Daley machine. And even blacks -- the most cohesive voting bloc -- are increasingly selective about which candidates they will support.

The second thing to remember is that President Ford's greatest single advantage is his appeal to the American people as a whole. The most important thing that the President has going for him is that he has been a good President -- his foreign policies have improved chances for peace, his economic policies have worked, he has acted -- and promises to continue to act -- in the best interest of all the people. If he should be perceived as diverting from this course to favor a particular group or groups, his chances for election would be greatly reduced. Our most important political, as well as governmental, objective, therefore, is that the President should continue to be regarded as the representative

of the national interest, in contrast to our opposition's tendency to speak for particular, special interests.

We particularly should avoid the temptation to cast ourselves in the role of spokesmen for special interests that appear to be antagonistic to special interests that are pushed by the Democrats. If the Democrats, that is, claim to be the Party of the blacks, we should not counter by trying to become the Party of the whites; if the Democrats claim to promote women's rights, we should not aim a contrasting appeal to male chauvinists; if the Democrats claim to represent labor, we should not agree to become the Party of business. The President, again and again, should stress that he acts for the good of all.

This being said, it must be conceded that the President's overall record, plus the solid Republican vote, brings us up to only about 40 percent. The extra 10 percent -- or 10.1 percent -- must be won by motivating people to vote for Ford because they believe that he will advance concerns that are of special interest to them. The most important group to which we have to appeal is of course the loose group that is concerned by the effect of Democratic liberalism. (This is not the same as hard core conservatives -- a group that comprises no more than 30 percent of all voters.) Polls consistently show inflation to be the number one concern of the nation's voters. Taxes are a somewhat less urgent concern just now, but there is no doubt that many middle-class and working-class voters are strongly resistant toward any further rise in taxes. The implications of the liberal Democratic program are not lost on most voters. To take only three major items, the

combined costs of Humphrey-Hawkins, Kennedy-Corman health insurance, and federalization of welfare would be astronomical. (We should have -- if we do not have -- exact figures.) These costs can be paid only through inflation or higher taxes or both. If Humphrey or one of the liberals had been the Democratic candidate, I think the President could have won on voter rejection of the liberal program almost alone. With Carter, the problem is more difficult. Carter has edged toward the left, but he is still perceived as significantly more moderate than Humphrey, Kennedy, and friends. We should hang the liberal program on him to the extent that we can. We should nail him with Humphrey-Hawkins, which he privately opposes but publicly endorsed after "ethnic purity". Humphrey-Hawkins, as the Democrats have begun to realize, is a political loser -- I understand they are now afraid to bring it to a vote on the House floor. Carter has publicly stopped short of endorsing Kennedy-Corman, but Leonard Woodcock is circulating a letter to liberals saying that the Democratic platform, which Carter accepts, endorses it.

Carter is also ambiguous on welfare, but the Democratic platform promises that welfare will be "substantially financed" by the Federal government. We should tie all of this to Carter, and ask how he plans to pay for it. (I think the attack role, at least in the early stages of the campaign, should be carried out by somebody other than the President.) The fact is, however, that Carter is more moderate than Humphrey, et al. We should not lose credibility by becoming too strident in attempting to portray him an extreme liberal.

are Republicans or lean Republican in state and local elections. Endorsement of Carter by the NEA would be a very serious blow, which we should seek strongly to head off. Obviously, the President is not going to meet the NEA's demand that the federal government pay one-third the cost of education - but neither is Carter. The Supreme Court, fortunately, has taken federal regulation of state and local employee relations off our backs -- the President should say as little as possible about strikes by public employees; it is now mainly a state and local issue.

Since the President favors the teachers' position on portability of pensions, we should turn out a proposal on that subject -- unless the Supreme Court ruling prohibits that, too. I think we should consider proposing a separate Department of Education -- I realize it goes against the Administration's position, but I think the need to appeal to teachers, at least symbolically, is exceptionally important.

NURSES are another middle-class group, leaning Republican in the past, now growing increasingly militant, increasingly Democratic. I don't know specifically what they want from the federal government, but we should try to meet their reasonable aims.

FARMERS obviously must be kept heavily Republican to hold the Plains and Mountains States, and also are important in most of the key heavy population states from New Jersey to Minnesota. The politics of agriculture are beyond me -- although some of the farmers in the Middlewest are said to be mad at us.



Against Carter, we will have to present positive reasons why it would be a good thing to have Gerald Ford President for another four years. Again, the chief answer to this need is that the President's policies are good for the entire country. But to win, we will also need some additional specialized appeals. This is where the constituency groups come in.

There are several ways to divide the country into constituencies: states, income groups, age groups, religious groups, ethnic groups, sexes, issue groups, etc. Let's begin within the states, as these are the actual counters in Presidential electoral politics.

#### STATES

The New Majority strategy was to build a coalition based on the so-called Sun Belt, stretching from Florida to California, adding the basic Republican strength in the Mountain States and the Plains States and Upper New England, picking up most of the Border States, and counting on the conservative, mainly Catholic blue-collar vote to tip a few of the industrial states such as Illinois and Ohio Republican. This is still Reagan's strategy today. Against Carter, it will not work. I think Carter is almost assured of carrying the Deep South -- Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Arkansas, and South Carolina, and probably North Carolina as well. We must fight for Texas, Florida, Virginia, and the Border States -- but all will be tough. Carter appears weak in California, but the state is bound to be a battleground.

For d will have a better than usual chance, for a Republican, of carrying Lower New England against Carter (Reagan would have no chance), but realistically it will be a long-shot proposition, except perhaps Connecticut. This means that the key to the election will lie in the belt of industrial states that stretches from New Jersey to Minnesota.

If either candidate carries most of these states, he will win the election. Logic therefore suggests that these industrial states, plus California, should be primary targets. Texas, Florida, the Border States, and the Northwest should be secondary targets. Upper New England, Lower New England, the Mountain States, the Plains States, and the Deep South, for various reasons, should be tertiary targets. New York City, whether or not the state is winnable, will be important to the campaign as the media capital of the nation.

Concentrating then, for the moment, on the industrial states -- how can they be won? Consider the kind of Republicans who in recent years have won elections in these states: Ogilvie, Percy, Bill Scott, Milliken, Romney, Griffin, Knowles, Taft, Scranton, Shafer, Scott, Schweiker, Case, Cahill. These individuals differ in many ways (some, of course, eventually lost), but they share in common the quality of projecting an essentially progressive image -- not of runaway spending, or of extending government controls, but of holding out a positive vision for their constituencies' future. The New Majority strategy has almost never worked in these states. Jim Lackley doesn't count, since he represents New York -- a state with characteristics and problems that set it off from the rest

of the industrial states of the East and Middlewest. (Anyhow, Buckley won with less than a majority in a three-way race.) Jim Rhodes is perhaps an exception, but his particular formula is too highly individualistic to have general application. Nixon's victory in 1972 is the only real exception -- but the nation's rejection of McGovern was too universal to tell us much about any particular region; anyhow, Carter does not arouse the kind of fears that McGovern caused.

The answer then seems to be that the best way for the President to carry the industrial states is to hold out a progressive image of the nation's future. This does not mean contradicting the basic conservatism of his economic approach, but showing ways in which this approach can lead to economic and social progress in the future. The primaries show that this goal can be achieved. These are all states (except Indiana, the least typical among them) in which the President ran well -- and progressive and moderate Republicans were the mainstays of his support in each of these states. Characteristics that most of these states have in common are: above average proportions of Catholics, Jews, blacks from the north, second generation Americans, persons over 65, and political independents. It should be noted, however, that the largest single ethnic or religious group in all of these states, except New Jersey, is composed of white Protestants. Special thought, therefore, should be given to the interests of these constituency groups. Obviously, there is something to be gained through attention to the direct economic interests of these states, wherever this can be done consistent with the



genuine priorities of the government and the overall national interest. More fundamentally, however, the Ford effort in these states can be aided by programs and appeals shaped to attract their internal constituency groups.

#### ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS GROUPS

Ethnic and religious groups are among the most important constituency groups in the U. S. Their internal structures and attitudes are, however, much more complex and subtle than is sometimes imagined. The groups split on economic and social issues on the basis of income, education, and age, though often in different proportions from group to group. Among politically independent Catholics, for instance, 39 percent of non-college graduates over 35 regard themselves as conservatives on economic issues, compared to 27 percent economic conservatives among non-college graduates under 35. (Among Northern white Protestant non-college graduates, the figures in these two categories are 51 percent economic conservatives over 35 and 30 percent economic conservatives under 35.) Prominent "leaders" of ethnic and religious groups are often quite unpopular with large parts of the groups they are supposed to represent.

This being said, the following generalizations may be applied:

WHITE PROTESTANTS remain, of course, not only the largest single ethnic-religious group in the United States, but also a majority of the total -- roughly 55 percent. They are the largest group

in most of the key industrial states. They are also the most diverse, dividing not only on lines of economic interest and age but also of denomination. Roughly the denominations divide among the doctrinally more conservative, though politically more liberal, so-called "main line" groups, such as Episcopalians and Presbyterians; and the more evangelical fundamentalists, such as Baptists; with Methodists and Lutherans, two very important groups falling somewhere in between. The main-line groups are more common in metropolitan areas and small cities, while the fundamentalists are more common in rural areas and small towns; but both are found in both geographic areas.

Republicans, to win, must carry the Protestant vote by very large majorities -- Nixon received 70 percent in 1972. What polling evidence we have shows Ford and Carter now running about even among Protestants. Some of this is due to Carter's disproportionate strength among Southern Protestants, but we must substantially improve Ford's standing with Northern Protestants. Carter appears relatively weak among suburban, main-line type Protestants, who recently have shown the greater tendency to swing Democratic. But he has special appeal, because of his Baptist religion, for the rural fundamentalists, who have generally been the most staunchly Republican. In the primaries, he swept the rural counties and small towns - without this vote he would have been soundly beaten in Michigan and Wisconsin. This vote must be denied him in the general election -- without large majorities in the "upstate" counties, Republicans have no chance of carrying Pennsylvania, Ohio, Illinois, Michigan, or Wisconsin.



Protestants have a tendency to be moralistic in their political attitudes -- they like to believe that they support a cause because it is "right." This is particularly true of rural fundamentalists, but also of Methodists and Presbyterians. It will be well for the President to stress the moral objectives of his politics -- not only that they enhance the individual voters self-interest, but also that they will help to make a better world. This should not be leaned on to the point of becoming sanctimonious, obviously.

Rural and smalltown Protestants, in particular, feel that they are being shut out by the current trend of national politics. Remember, this group virtually dominated the first 150 years of our national history. It was not until the twentieth century that the Episcopalian Roosevelts and the Catholic Kennedys were able to break their near monopoly on political power. Recently, they have felt that Republicans in particular, in their efforts to reach out to other groups, are passing them by. This is particularly true in the northern industrial states which are among our primary targets. The President can achieve much with this group simply by showing that he values their support -- that his origins are close to theirs, and that his attitudes are shaped by the same basic beliefs that they hold.

This group can also be reached through an economic appeal. Though population is now moving as a result of natural forces back to small cities and small towns, many of these areas still



have serious economic problems. Helpful farm policies have political importance here, but a declining proportion of the rural and smalltown populations are tied to the farm economy. Most of these areas are now seeking other forms of economic development. A Ford "rural development" program would be most helpful. But most of all, the President should show, without slighting the cities, that he regards the small cities and small towns as the areas where much of the nation's future growth lies. (Remember, polls show that a majority of city-dwellers and suburbanites would prefer to live in small towns.)

CATHOLICS, while still leaning Democratic, have been increasingly open to Republican appeals. Nixon carried 52 percent in 1972 -- the first time in this century that a Republican candidate for President had a majority of Catholics. Polling evidence now shows Carter about ten percentage points ahead of Ford. Catholics, generally, did not vote for Carter in the primaries, but they do not seem to view him with the same hostility as they regarded McGovern four years ago. They are a key element in most of the industrial states, and we must cut substantially into Carter's current margin.

Any attempt to appeal to supposed anti-Baptist feelings among Catholics would of course be most ill-advised. Religious differences among Catholics and Protestants have not disappeared, but they are now much less pronounced than they were even ten years ago. Catholics who are not particularly religious probably have little feeling about Baptists one way or another. Religious



Catholics, like religious Protestants -- and to some extent religious Jews -- are tending to draw together in a common "religious front," to combat what is viewed as an increasingly secular society. Carter's religion is a plus with most religious Catholics. We should aim to make the President's basically religious outlook a plus for us as well.

Catholics have some special concerns -- particularly abortion and parochial schools. (Abortion, incidentally, is not exclusively a Catholic issue. Many Protestants, particularly of the older generation, view abortion with horror -- though not in so uncompromising a way as the official Catholic position. On the other hand, it is a mistake to think that Republicans have nothing to lose by taking a strong stand against abortion. Many middle-class Republicans and independents, particularly among women, are strong pro-abortionists, and some will vote on this issue alone.)


The President's position on abortion does not satisfy the extremes on either side, but I think it seems basically right to most people who take some kind of religious view of the subject. He can go a long way toward satisfying Catholic opinion by indicating that he believes the unborn baby -- I would not say fetus -- has some kind of "rights."

Aid to parochial schools, to the extent that Supreme Court rulings leave it still an issue, is a difficult subject. It still arouses strong opposition among many Protestants, Jew and public school teachers of all denominations. On balance,

I think there is more politically to be gained than lost through favoring some kind of aid, if a constitutional means can be found.

Catholics are located predominantly in metropolitan areas -- though there are many rural Catholics in Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Michigan -- and are therefore particularly concerned about city issues. We should push the crime package much more strongly than we have so far done. More fundamentally, some kind of coordinated program to "save our cities" is most desirable, politically as well as governmentally. Our approach is that this must be done basically at the state and local levels, but we should set forth a program on how it is to be done -- telling how much of the cost can be borne by the federal government, how much locally. We should claim more credit for this year's housing initiative. The busing issue is important to many Catholics, though some are insulated against it by the parochial schools. My feeling is that the President's position on the busing issue is essentially right, is shared by the great majority of Americans -- but we should not proceed as though we viewed it as the major domestic issue in the campaign. It should be one element in an overall array of Ford legislative initiatives.

Most of all, Catholics -- as well as Protestants and Jews -- can be reached through appeals to family values. Much of this is a matter of setting limits beyond which government should not intrude, but also government should contribute to a moral atmosphere in which cohesive families can flourish. Bill Baroody has written with great insight on this subject.



Some comments on particular predominately Catholic ethnic groups:

IRISH, despite their long ties to the Democratic Party, are now most tending toward the Republican Party. The Irish are basically conservative, very patriotic -- concerned about maintaining a strong defense; angry over pornography, other manifestations of "permissive" society. We can appeal to them on some of these issues. For foreign policy reasons, if for no other, the less said about Northern Ireland, the better.

ITALIANS have always been more politically independent than the Irish, are now more upwardly mobile. Many respond to economic conservatism, are concerned about erosion of family values. I would handle saving Italy from the Communists with care -- again primarily on foreign policy grounds, of course; but many Italians in this country as well as in Italy regard the Christian Democrats as incompetent crooks. But prominent Italian-Americans should of course be brought in on any projected aid program.

POLES are a tough nut for Republicans to crack, except in some areas where the Democratic Party has been dominated by the Irish. Best way to appeal is through arguments for economic, social conservatism -- joined to generally progressive vision of the future.


GREEK ORTHODOX, who are not of course Roman Catholics, are deeply concerned over the Cyprus issue -- which is tough to deal with on foreign policy grounds. I suggest that the President might

give the Medal of Freedom for religion to Archbishop Iakobos.  
It would save us the problem of choosing among the three major  
faiths, and would be much appreciated among Greeks.

Needless to say, appearances at ethnic festivals, conventions,  
etc. -- any form of recognition -- will be most helpful.

JEWs edged toward Nixon last time, and are now disturbed over  
Carter -- but polls show them going for Carter over Ford by about  
three-to-one. Though relatively few in number, they are articulate  
and strategically located in such target states as California,  
Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Illinois. We should definitely  
aim to build Ford strength in the Jewish community. Jews are  
basically concerned about recognition (like all other groups,  
ut particularly those that have traditionally felt insecure),  
Israel (toward which we should stress our friendship, within  
limits set by national policy), and a progressive attitude toward  
government. Jews tend to be liberals. They will not agree with  
us on many issues, but I think against Carter we can win a signi-  
ficant number of them to our side.

Let me here express some thoughts about liberals in general. I  
think we can -- and must -- win a portion of the liberal vote  
against Carter. To win, a Republican must obviously capture a  
large share of the independents and also win over a sizable number  
of Democrats. In the primaries, the Democrats divided, roughly,  
into a Carter vote, a Jackson-Wallace vote, and a Udall-Brown  
ote. (I am not sure where Church fits in.) I would argue



that the Jackson-Wallace vote is the least budgeable Democratic vote in November. The moderate-to-conservative Democrats most available to a Republican appeal -- those who voted for Nixon in 1972 -- voted predominantly for Carter. We would have had them again against Humphrey. Against Carter, whom some of them supported in the primaries (many did not vote), this group will be hard to crack. We must and will win back some of them; as we point out Carter's leaning toward liberal measures, but Carter will probably keep many of them. We need to get Democrats from one or both of the other two blocs. The Jackson-Wallace vote, outside the South, are the hard core Democrats, who vote Democratic in November, regardless of who the Democrats put up -- a liberal, a conservative, whatever. The South Boston Irish who voted for Wallace in this year's primary voted for even McGovern four years ago. Carter goes down comparatively easy with them. The Democratic liberals, the Udall-Brown voters, on the other hand, are deeply disturbed about Carter. We should aim to get some of them -- not so much on the issues, as on the ground that if Carter wins, they are likely to be frozen out of control of the Democratic Party for eight years. Similar considerations have led liberals in Texas to vote for John Tower in several elections. Our part should be mainly to keep in mind that part of this vote is now available, and not campaign in such a way that Democratic liberals would feel it impossible to cast a vote for Ford. (They would certainly never vote for Reagan.) Getting even a small share of this vote in the industrial states could be critical.



BLACKS are very difficult for any Republican, and appear to have a special affinity for Carter, with whom many of them share a common Baptist background. It is noteworthy, however, that polls show Ford doing a bit better among blacks -- about five percentage points -- against Carter than Nixon did four years ago. Some of the black leadership is suspicious of Carter, and some -- in Philadelphia and Cleveland -- were able to turn substantial blocs of black voters away from him in the primaries. We should do what we can here, again, through recognition, and by stressing opportunity for black businessmen. Pushing aid for Africa also probably helps some. The "Clean Up America" proposal would help with the problem of unemployed black teenagers. To hold on to even that five percent gain among blacks would be extremely valuable in almost all the industrial states.

#### AGE GROUPS

Poll evidence shows the President doing best against Carter among the middle-aged, ages 36-55. The advantage that he enjoyed among young voters against Humphrey disappears against Carter. Ford also does not do well among older age groups.

To recapture support of youth, Ford needs to stress the underlying idealism of his program -- also how his economic policies will lead to a more prosperous future. The peace issue is also important among young people.



Among older voters, we must overcome the impression that Ford has slighted the elderly. We can appeal to underlying social conservatism, but we should also push much harder on catastrophic health insurance. The President should make this one of his top priority legislative items, and hold the Democrats' feet to the fire if they fail to pass it. We also should stress the President's proposals to assure the fiscal soundness of the Social Security system.

### SEXES

The President receives about the same poll ratings from men and women -- but Carter's rating is almost ten points lower among women than among men! I have noticed among my own acquaintances that many women seem to distrust Carter -- the smile turns them off. Obviously, we will just have to hope that this chemistry continues to work.

Mrs. Ford is very helpful to the President with women -- also the Ford family. The President clearly should not take extreme feminist positions. His support for ERA is well known. I think we should make more of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act. The strong presence of women in the Ford Administration should be publicized. Beyond that, the President should stress his support for family values -- still the most important consideration with a majority of women.



## SPECIAL INTEREST GROUPS

BUSINESS in general supports the President -- or Reagan -- but businessmen are not particularly frightened of Carter, as they were of McGovern. We must hammer home the remarkable job the President has done for the economy. Committees of business groups should be organized in all industries and all over the country, if this is not already under way. The President should always stress that his economic policies are designed to benefit the entire country -- not business alone. But our economic approach, unlike that of the Democrats, rests on encouragement of growth and investment in the private sector.

ORGANIZED LABOR, by the large, will be for Carter -- though in some sectors with considerable suspicion and without marked enthusiasm. Fooling around with the kind of insurgent labor leaders who for their own purposes can sometimes be persuaded to support Republicans has never seemed to me to be very productive. Our main objective should be to appeal to the rank-and-file on the basis of the President's general program, and keep the established union leadership from building too much of a head of steam for Carter. Above all, we should not embark on a "crusade" against "union bosses."

SCHOOL TEACHERS are a key group moving closer to the unions and the Democrats, but with strong ties still at the member level to the Republicans. At least half of the nation's school teachers





MEXICAN-AMERICAN/SPANISH AMERICA

Mexican Americans hold the balance of power in four (4) states -- California, Texas, Illinois and New Mexico. They could have an impact in Colorado and perhaps the numbers generally are "not sufficient to influence the outcome of any Presidential election in Arizona." However, I would point out that old voting habits may change in 1976 and the Colorado and Arizona population could make the difference.

This analysis is directed at the Spanish/Mexican-American and does not refer to the Hispanic potential in New York (Puerto Ricans) or Florida (Cubans) etc.

Let me emphasize that a strategy should not be based on the assumption that the group is monolithic. For example, the Hispanic population in New Mexico is different in southern New Mexico where the heritage is Mexican in origin compared with Northern New Mexico where the ancestry is of Spain.

A profile of the Spanish/Mexican origin population reveals:

1. They are younger. U.S. Department of Commerce, May 10, 1974, press release reveals that they are "about 8 years younger than the rest of the population. The Spanish origin median age was 20.1 years in March of 1973 compared with 28.4 years for persons not of Spanish origin. Persons of Mexican and Puerto Rican origin were even younger, each group having a median age of 18.8 years" Interestingly, Cubans are mostly of adult age, 35.3 years.
2. They are more likely to work in blue collar and



service occupations. Over 2/3rd of Spanish origin Americans fit this category.

3. The median family income is lower than the 1972 U.S. figure of \$11,120.00

Spanish-Americans	\$8,180.00
Mexican-Americans	7,910.00
Puerto Rican	7,160.00

4. Over 80% of the families live in metropolitan areas.
5. They are almost all Catholic with larger families
6. Education levels are lower, but rising dramatically.
7. There has been a "tremendous decrease of the number of persons of Central or South American origin"
8. They are more likely to be unemployed than white workers. But more likely than blacks to work or look for work (press release from U.S. Department of Labor Bureau Statistics, April 1974).
9. "Adult Spanish women participate in the labor force to a lesser extent than both white and black women" -- a reflection probably of the strong family responsibilities they feel.
10. They are mostly Democrat.



PROBLEMS:

As we develop a strategy to deal with this extremely important voter, we should keep in mind some of the following:

1. Jimmy Carter allegedly speaks Spanish and has already plowed some important turf in the Spanish-origin strategy by meeting with 40 representatives of various Hispanic groups in Houston -- promising them he would be totally accessible to them. In fact, they would have his private White House phone number -- the one besides his bed. I'm told he has travelled extensively in Mexico.
2. President Ford may not be sufficiently informed on Spanish-Mexican culture --e.g. the tamale incident in Texas.
3. Spanish surrogate capacity for the Administration is limited. We have Phil Sancher, Congressman Manuel Lujan, Al Zapanta, Alex Armanderiz and the White House Spanish-American Advisor. The Democrats have two Governors, neither of whom is up for re-election; Castro of Arizona and Apodaca of New Mexico. They have several Congressmen. Senator Montoya (in a tough re-election effort) and a score of locally elected public officials.
4. They are largely opposed to abortion contrasted with Mrs. Ford's position.
5. They are Catholic and our ticket will probably be Protestant
6. They tend to vote Democrat because of their registration and socio-economic status.
7. Virtually impossible to get non-Republican Spanish origin Ford supporters to work with the Republican Party at the local levels.



8. Heavy emphasis from organized labor in the Southwest to register minority voters- e.g. Southwest Voter Education Project.

A Suggested Ford Strategy For the Spanish-Mexican Origin Voter:

A. Pre-Republican Convention

1. Research on Presidential accomplishments in this area:
  - (a) Hispanics (include Puerto Ricans & Cubans, etc.) appointed to Administration positions and Advisory Boards.
  - (b) Legislation that has affected them as an ethnic group or a socio-economic voter, e.g. Signing of legislation to guarantee Spanish Heritage Americans are not under-counted in future Census Counts. Important data used from Census data can affect federally funded projects.
  - (c) U.S. foreign policy initiatives that impact on the voter's heritage.
2. Pressure of Republican National Committee for high visibility at the Convention for Spanish Americans.
3. Consideration of possible platform convention initiatives that can impact on this voter group.
4. Courting of Spanish Representatives from the media (radio/T.V./newspapers) for their potential coverage of the Convention, and then assuring there is some Hispanic color.
5. You may want to consider invitations issued to various Hispanic American groups' leaders to be the President's special guests (at their own expense) at the Convention. e.g. Mannie Fierro with El Congreso; President of LULAC, et
6. Research compiled on Hispanic voter media outlets. Which newspaper/radio/ and T.V. stations have Spanish



formats. Program times? Audiences? Spanish? Cuban? English? What is the language. Who controls them? Is the Editor a possible friend?

7. Research compiled on the demographics on the Hispanic voter in each metropolitan area.
8. Survey Research (preferably in the field) to determine Hispanic Voter attitudes. This may be a post-convention rather than pre-convention activity.

#### B. Convention Strategy:

Some things that might be considered here are:

1. One of President Ford's nominating speeches by a Spanish American. Congressman Lujan did one for Nixon in 1972.
2. Use of Ford Spanish-American delegates in various ways- an example might be a caucus of such delegates approving a caucus resolution of support because of the President's record in this area.
3. Convention Resolution addressing the Hispanic-Catholic?
4. A meaningful plant in the Platform.

#### C. Campaign Strategy for Hispanic Voters:

1. Hispanic input immediately after the Convention- if not sooner -...a brainstorming session of Hispanics should rendezvous to discuss a game-plan, not formalize ...

I personally feel this is critical as too often strategy is formulated at a level highly removed from the group to be impacted.

2. It's important to remember that Spanish Americans who are Republicans are very often out of the main stream of thought of the typical Hispanic voter. Usually they



are better educated and higher on the socio-economic scale.

The discussion group should cover a wide range of the social scale . . Perhaps it should include:

1. Al Zapanta - who understands the potential of the office of the Presidency/Administration potential and campaign capacity.
2. Young, La Raza , activist
3. Someone active in Spanish organizations -like Joe Benites who was head of LULAC
4. Hispanic, non-working mother
5. Spanish-American active in a Veterans group. Hispanics dominate many of the American Legion Posts, DAV's, etc.
6. Traditional/Hispanic- active Catholic - Priest?
7. Spanish-American active in a poverty program
8. Spanish American businessman
9. Maybe there are others that should also be included.

The analysis should cover President Ford's strengths and weaknesses with the Spanish community --- possible voter issues -- presidential strategy -- Administration response possibilities.

### 3. Staffing:

The allocation of your resources will have to depend on where this voter group fits on the campaign priority scale. I would have to have more input from someone who has worked on the ethnic program for a National campaign, but sure as hell most of the staff's time is spent stroking the egos of your ethnic state leaders.

At a very minimum -- put someone at a high campaign policy level who is Hispanic and give him (or her) a top notice Spanish secretary.

4. Budget

Depends on Hispanic brain-storming and your voter priority, but it seems that the largest bulk ought to be to the Hispanic media outlets if the survey data supports that it has the impact.

Since the group is not monolithic -- different messages will be needed for different markets.

5. The Volunteers

The Ford Committee's Grass Roots Hispanic Program:

FORD CAMPAIGN STATE ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE:

1. A Spanish-American to be appointed to serve as State Chairman of (Hispanic) Affairs for President Ford.

Interchange Spanish/Mexican/Cuban etc. as appropriate.

a. Functions and Responsibilities of State Chairman:

1. Seek local Spanish-American to assume the campaign activities on a local/target area district within a County.
2. Provide local contact with an outline of responsibilities - goals to achieve/ game plan for creating a Ford movement within the local area.
3. Develop a voter registration plan for each local chairman to implement. Emphasis on G.O.P. registration.
4. Develop a system for distribution of literature/ issue papers, etc. for local use and input.
5. Make press contacts within local communities of Spanish-American media outlets.
6. Develop a plan to identify and follow-up with Republicans Spanish-surnames to get them to the polls.



7. Working with local contact in the area --an attempt should be made to work with Senior Citizens/Youth/ Church auxiliaries/ veteran groups to develop a volunteer group of activists in each special interest group.
- b. State Chairman to appoint an Advisory Committee to be representative of all classes of Spanish-Americans citizens within State ...This Advisory Committee should promote activity within their State organizations such as LULAC- American Legion--G.I. Forum--Cambio--SER --
- c. A direct mail program to be developed to special interest groups that are predominately Spanish-oriented with specific issues (expressed in layman's language) that would appeal to the particular special interest group (e.g. -- day care centers for working mothers to residents residing in low-income housing developments). Letter to be signed by a woman that would be known in the neighborhood to her neighbors. Another example would be an ex-president of the GI Forum writing to all members in his chapter on the issue of veterans' benefits.

I think it is important to remember the local area you are attempting to organize--- and recruit a local contact for the area that best represents the overall resident. For instance, in low income/ blue collar "across the tracks" Spanish communities, you cannot establish rapport or build a working unit, if you use the Spanish American building contractor that has moved up and maybe sits on the City Commission ..he will be resented ..It's best to go to one of their own .. for instance the local barber has a lot better relationship with the residents.




Besides the regular sources of Spanish-American community leaders and average neighbor-to-neighbor type, the Chicano Affairs Programs at the different Universities should be contacted. These offices could also be a source for volunteers and the development of a Youth Hispanic Program.

6. Talk about the Republican Record and the Spanish American, Emphasize the past eight years of Hispanic influence in Government, if the record supports it. The appointments made compared with the LBJ and Kennedy Administration.

The Presidential Strategy for the Hispanic Voter:

1. What can the President/Vice President/Vice President candidate/ Secretary of State do with other countries to impact on America's Hispanic voters?
  - a. Mexico - What can we do with this country's leaders, economy, people to show our concern? One of the staff members reminded me that in 1972, Nixon brought the President of Mexico to the United States on a "Mission of State" and toured him through Chicago, Texas and Los Angeles.
  - b. Spain - Any possible Presidential follow-ups on King Carlos' visit to America?
  - c. Puerto Rico? Cuba? South America?
2. What can Vice-President Rockefeller do? He speaks Spanish-- travelled extensively in South America - owns a ranch in Venezuela. Knows the Hispanic culture. What kind of ideas does he have for Hispanic strategy?

Possible Presidential appointments for high level Hispanic jobs? The White House six months ago was collecting resumes of Spanish Americans. Are they trying to match up ethnics



with all jobs that are supposed to be available?

4. As Commander-in-Chief, what can the President do?

Hispanics have a great deal of pride in this country and greater percentages than Anglos served in the World Wars, the Korean and Vietnam Wars.

Has there ever been a Hispanic Admiral? General?

Is there a World War 1 Spanish American Veteran whose veteran's rights have been screwed up by the V.A.?

5. How about a Spanish American Cabinet Member? Has there ever been one? Is anyone leaving the Cabinet? Federal Judge vacancies?

6. Does any of the Ford family speak Spanish? Maybe Jack or Susan should learn. Does the Mexican Ambassador to the United States have a daughter that Jack can date?


7. Should the Administration set out a bold, new, Mexico-South-American thrust. The Alliance for Progress was a political hook for the Kennedy Administration.

8. Is there a political hook on international athletics to appeal to Hispanics? Olympics? Will there be an American Hispanic gold medalist? Has there ever been one? Other ethnics?

9. Cultural exchanges with Mexico? Spain? South America? O.A.S.?

10. Set up an early brainstorming session of politically astute guys who really know the nuances of Presidential power, prerogatives and protocol who can kick around what a President can do to impact on Hispanic and other ethnics.

11. Think about Gerry Ford, the guy and Gerald Ford, the President, and what he or the Administration can do vis a vis the Catholic Church. Relations with the Pope?



The Vatican? American Cardinals? Archbishop Robert  
Robert Sanchez of Santa Fe -- the first Spanish American  
Archbishop in the United States?

What issues can the President address that concern  
Catholics? Abortion? Aid to Private or Catholic Schools?

12. Presidential activity re-enforcing the strong family  
unit as he did with the H.E.W. insanity on Father-sons/  
mom-daughter banquets. Spanish -Americans have extra  
strong family loyalties.
13. Presidential activity that appeals to "social conservatism"  
of the ethnic and blue collar worker.

#### Some Miscellaneous Thoughts

Young Spanish-Americans are much more active now. Basically  
liberal with lots of ethnic pride, but much more practical. There  
is a glimmer of awareness in New Mexico, for example, that the  
Democratic Party has used the Spanish American and the Democrats  
have taken them for granted for too long. There is a feeling that  
the two-party system offers them something -- political leverage  
on the parties for Spanish support.

The President's support from Spanish-Americans is hindered by  
the perception of ethnic and blue collar workers of Republicans  
in general. Republicans, they believe are insensitive to the  
wage earner and minority citizen. Republicans are the Party of  
big business and the rich.

