

CAMPAIGN STRATEGY

FOR

PRESIDENT FORD

1976



I - BACKGROUND

OVERVIEW

This book presents an analysis of the problems you face in your efforts to win the 1976 election. It concludes that there is a "best chance" strategy to win.

The book consists of this memorandum, followed by tabs broken into two parts. Part I contains some details on the strategy. Part II contains background materials, such as analysis of constituency groups and historical analysis.

This memorandum is broken into the following chapters:

I - BACKGROUND

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As the following analysis shows, you face a unique challenge. No President has overcome the obstacles to election which you will face following our Convention this August. For example, President Truman trailed Dewey in August 1948 by 11 points, whereas we expect to be trailing Carter by about 20 points after our Convention.*

Of course, the Ford-Carter gap will begin to close (perhaps even before our Convention) on its own almost irrespective of what we do.** However, although the point

*There really is very little similarity between the Truman situation in 1948 and President Ford today. Truman's challenge was markedly different and, accordingly, so were his strategy options. See Tab II- for an analysis of the Truman campaign and excerpts from Clark Clifford's 1947 election strategy memorandum.

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There are three important caveats -- the gap could widen if (1) the President makes a highly visible mistake; (2) the Convention turns sour and the TV viewers see the President portrayed unfavorably; or (3) Carter is able to go back on offensive.




spread may close over time fairly easily down to a point where Carter is 5 to 10 points ahead, the remaining distance to victory will be very difficult.

Because you must come from behind, and are subject to many constraints, no strategy can be developed which allows for any substantial error.

We firmly believe that you can win in November. During times when you and your Administration pulled together and projected a positive image of action and accomplishments, your standing in the national polls rose accordingly. Furthermore, your national support has solidified somewhat. However, although you have been able to positively influence the voters, efforts to do this in the past have resulted in very limited and temporary increases. Most importantly, your national approval rating declined during the periods when you were perceived as a partisan, particularly when we campaigned. (See Chart 1.)



TREND OF APPROVAL RATINGS
(Gallup & Harris)



== Intensive campaign/political activity

If we avoid past errors and improve upon our many strong points, the primary campaign will have made a very positive contribution to your election chances.

It is possible that Jimmy Carter will go through much the same phenomenon as you did: his rapid rise in national popularity will be followed by a steady and pronounced decline. Notwithstanding Carter's enormous (media) popularity at the present, it must not be forgotten that he never got more than 54% of the vote in any of the contested primaries, and never won in a head-to-head race. Furthermore, Carter was beaten in eight out of the last eleven contested primary fights. There is ample historical precedent for the proposition that such a rapid rise in national popularity (one of the most rapid ascendancies according to Lou Harris) is generally followed by a decline. We believe that much of Carter's rise in the polls is due to his "media" image as a winner. However, between now and the election, he will not be able to rely on these "victories".

There are six points that we wish to emphasize at the beginning:

1. The Nation is at a crossroad. We are in the process of making a choice (consciously or not) between



greater self-reliance to govern our lives, or even greater reliance on government. There can be little doubt about which road we will travel under the leadership of a Democratic President and Congress. For many Americans who believe that unconstrained government is a threat to individual freedom, your election in November is a national imperative. For them and for us, the campaign is not simply a fight for power. We are fighting for principle. Your supporters welcome whatever discipline and hard work is necessary to win because they believe in you and because you stand for the principles they think are important.

2. If past is indeed prologue, you will lose on November 2nd -- because to win you must do what has never been done: close a gap of about 20 points in 73 days from the base of a minority party while spending approximately the same amount of money as your opponent.
3. You cannot overcome the Carter lead on your own no matter what you do. Of course, your "offensive" campaign is a crucial element, but to win, Carter's position must be changed by a strong attack launched by the Vice Presidential nominee and others.



4. You are not now perceived as being a strong, decisive leader by anywhere near a majority of the American people. Our campaign must change this perception, but it cannot unless some current problems such as in-house staff fighting are corrected.
5. You cannot possibly win without a highly disciplined and directionalized campaign. The first step is to develop and adopt a basic strategy. Once adopted, your strategy must not be changed unless clearly justified by hard data. If the strategy is not followed, or if it constantly changes, your campaign will become chaotic.
6. In preparing this memorandum, we have tried to be completely candid. We have viewed our strengths and weaknesses in the context of the election challenge. We recognize that a "weakness" in this context may be a "strength" in normal times. Thus, this paper is not intended as criticism of anyone, but rather we have tried to present a hard, realistic analysis of the obstacles to your victory and how they can be overcome. We firmly believe that you can win.



MAJOR CONSTRAINTS

The purpose of this section is to outline the major constraints facing the President's campaign. We believe that the campaign strategy must accept these constraints as given, and not attempt to attack them as solvable problems. With the very limited resources available to the President, it is crucial that all our efforts and funds be directed at achieving clearly defined objectives which can be accomplished and which are selected solely on the basis of their contribution to the election effort.

By way of providing perspective, President Ford faces almost the reverse situation that Richard Nixon confronted in '68 and '72. In both cases, Nixon had a substantial margin over his challenger (12% points in '68 and 25% in '72) going into the general election. Thus, the Nixon strategy of holding onto his lead or, more accurately, managing the inevitable erosion, simply is not applicable to today's problem.

The President's strategy must recognize and deal with the following constraints:

1. The Democratic Party enjoys a 43% to 21% advantage. A GOP candidate will always have difficulty closing a large gap on a Democratic opponent.



2. Campaign expenditures for both candidates will be the same. We no longer have the previous advantage of being able to outspend our opponent. This is a particular handicap when we are behind.
3. Given the dollar limitation, any dollar wasted cannot be recouped. Limited resources is a major restraint.
4. The GOP Convention is late; the Party will be divided after the nomination fights and will have little time to bind its wounds.
5. A campaign designed to woo various voter blocs through extensive government programs and patronage is not in the cards in 1976.
 - a. Budget dollars are not available to fund extensive new program initiatives.
 - b. The broken promises of 1972 have made the buyable voter blocs wary of promises.
 - c. The President's most basic philosophy has been to ask the people to sacrifice short-term benefits in return for long-term gains. Changing this philosophy now is too late:
 - to be credible to the recipients
 - to escape a media storm.



DEFINITION OF PROBLEM

As a basic approach, it is helpful to view our electorate in two parts:

1. The base of our support, which is made up of Republicans and Republican-type Independents.
2. The "swing vote" which can be attracted from a position of neutrality or pro-Carter into our column.

In the following section, we analyze the specific elements of the problems we face. Although we have organized this section by dividing the elements among the two general classes of voters identified above, it's important to remember that there are substantial interrelationships and trade-offs between the two groups.

Our election goal must be to win enough popular votes in enough States to get over 270 electoral votes. In broad terms, we have to close a nearly 3-to-2 gap in seventy-three days from the base of a minority party.

On the other hand, Carter's popularity is based almost exclusively on his awareness factor. His support is very thin and clearly vulnerable to deterioration. See Tab II-D for analysis of Carter's current popularity and weaknesses.



Accordingly, a major shift in the national polls is possible. In all likelihood, Carter has reached his peak of popularity and will now begin to show signs of erosion. If the Republican Convention is perceived by the television viewer as positive for the President (or at least neutral), we should expect to see a closing of the gap, and thus the building up of momentum in favor of the President.

President Ford's perception must change and Carter's perception must change. In order to win, we must persuade over 15% (or about 10 million people) to change their opinions. This will require very aggressive -- media-oriented efforts. We must pull together and wage a very active and determined fight. If the President sits back as Richard Nixon did in '68 and '72, he will certainly lose. As demonstrated in the following pages, the President can run hard without relying on the traditional campaign "hoopla". Thus, he can be an active candidate and yet be perceived as a working President.



ELEMENTS OF THE PERCEPTION PROBLEM

Any campaign strategy, to be successful, must deal with perceptions. Voters do not make up their minds on an understanding of the actual strengths and weaknesses of candidates; rather, their choice is made on the basis of their perception of the candidates.

Personal perception is several times more important to voting than the perceived position on issues. But, particularly for an incumbent, the determinants of perception are (1) the candidate's agenda of issues -- which issues he chooses to talk about, and (2) how he handles them. The selection of the issues may well be of greater importance than his position on the issues.

* * *

In the following "perception" analysis, we have tried to capture the current perception of the President and Carter, using descriptions commonly used by those polled or interviewed by the press. We have attempted to use descriptions which may best reflect the perception held by the voter who is not a hard partisan for the President or Carter. In short, we believe that these



are the perceptions of the people in the "middle".
These perceptions do not necessarily reflect your
true character or style as President. They are a
reflection of how the TV viewer and newspaper reader
"sees" you. We have presented this with the "bark"
off because we must solve this perception problem in
order to successfully communicate your leadership quali-
ties. This obstacle must be overcome or there is no
chance for victory.



Perception of Carter

POSITIVE

- A winner who has "it". A man with real personal appeal; "I like him."
- A man with strong spiritual and moral values; an honest man of character.
- A family man.
- A man who cares about the common man and his problems.
- A new kind of politician who is against the corrupt Washington system and will not lie.
- A man concerned about government efficiency and dedicated to making the government work better.
- A man who seems to deal with and resolve issues in a non-controversial way.
- He is seen as an economic liberal and a social conservative.
- He is a man with quiet strength; he will not let the politicians run over him. He is in control and will run the country with authority.
- Seen as responsible Democrat -- not a maverick; not extreme.



NEGATIVE

- An arrogant man.
- A man who wears his religion on his sleeve; he is very self-righteous. Lacks humility.
- A man who tries to be all things to all men; we don't know where he stands on the issues.
- A man about whom we don't know enough; we really don't know who he is as a person.
- A Southerner.
- May not be experienced enough to be President.

Causes for Perception of Carter

The principal reason Carter appears so favorably in the polls (39-point lead over the President) is because all others in the field are perceived so badly. It is Carter's "newness" and his image as a winner that has carried him to the heights he has reached thus far. Virtually all other national political figures -- including President Ford -- are not perceived positively by the voters, and this accounts for Carter's high rating. This is a very important point, because it suggests that there is nothing intrinsically strong about Carter -- either in terms of personality or substance -- but rather, he comes across favorably only relative to the alternatives:

- He is a winner; winners are admired and respected.



- He has a strategy and he lets it guide his campaign and used it to help him achieve the correct public perception. He is consistent in his campaign and uses it to help achieve the correct public perception. He is consistent in his campaign and behavior; he consistently projects the same image.
- He has built up those characteristics that he thinks the public wants.
 - Acts Presidential; handles himself with coolness, with dignity.
 - Is confident and in charge -- can make things happen.
 - Makes few errors in public and (so far) his team is tight and doesn't leak damaging information.
 - Is perceived to be a moral man, will make government work better, has a vision of the future, and will be open with the people.
- In terms of the few negative indicators concerning Carter, these appear to be related to some extent to his "trust me" approach to issues. His unwillingness to be specific is a form of arrogance.



- His religiosity raises suspicions among Catholics* and Jews.

Perception of the President

POSITIVE

- I like him; he is a good man who tried hard. I hope he succeeds.
- He is safe and will do the right thing.
- He came in under horrible circumstances and the situation in the country has gotten better under him.
- An honest man who will try to do the right thing; he has restored honesty in government.
- He will keep the activists from taking over and springing another Great Society on us.

NEGATIVE

- Not decisive
- Not really on top of the job.
- Doesn't seem to have a clear view of where he is going and why; doesn't seem to understand our problems or have solutions for them.

*Events at the Democratic Convention probably aggravated the anti-Carter potential among Catholics (e.g., the dispute with Cardinal Cooke, their abortion controversy and the rejection of Muskie for Vice President.)



- Spends too much time on politics, too worried about election, doesn't seem to spend enough time on the people's business, too much of an old politician.
- Seen as part of the old-time, do-nothing Washington establishment.
- He is politically expedient; he seems inconsistent -- swings one way and then another.
- Not strong enough to lay Reagan away; does this reflect on his abilities?
- Not in control of government. HAK and others seem to be able to control him; he is their puppet. He doesn't seem to want to use his power and authority.
- Makes errors, may not be smart enough to do the job.
- Fights with Congress while problems remain unsolved.
- Boring; not exciting.
- Appointed by Nixon, whom he pardoned.

Conclusions on Perception of the President

One positive thing is that we are not working against a hard, anti-President Ford feeling. Even the disapproval in the Gallup (although high) is not firm. There is not



a hard, negative feeling. It is just that not enough voters have a strong, positive feeling about the Ford personality and character.

There is one disturbing factor beginning to show up in Bob Teeter's latest data. Some of those polled are beginning to raise the question of whether the President is considered smart enough for the job.

Also, he apparently has lost a great deal of his perception of being open. This has contributed to the President's decline. This is linked to the President being perceived as becoming more political (especially when he goes on the attack in a partisan, strident manner). This is why the primary campaigns have really hurt the President's national standings.

Also, there is a clear public perception that no one is in control of this Administration -- no one at the White House, in the campaign, or anywhere. This is a major negative.

The following are some specific conclusions on the perception problem:

- Many do not see the President as a leader -- they perceive that he has:
 - Limited vision
 - No will to control his Administration
 - No compassion



- He also looks like a loser to many:
 - Can't lay Reagan away.
 - Many errors by the campaign and White House staff.
 - Seems befuddled in the face of campaign and Congressional challenges.
 - Doesn't seem to be able to get anything done.
- After a promising start, he is coming to be seen as just another politician.
- To some, he doesn't seem good enough to be President:
 - Indecisive
 - Reactive
 - Not smart

Causes for Poor Perception

- The struggle with Reagan.
- Overexposure on political matters, transparent campaigning techniques.
- Inability to communicate a vision of what life in America should be, and a well-articulated, logical program to get us there.



- Inability to articulate goals and programs effectively.
- Serious White House, Administration and PFC organization and personnel problems.
 - Not bringing strength of incumbency to battle.
 - Press considers speeches too poor to report seriously.
 - Error rate is high; poor execution by campaign and government officials.
 - Lack of team play. No control over prima donnas. In-house bickering among the staff receives extensive attention of the press.

* * *

It is important to consider the perceived strengths and weaknesses of the candidates, along with their perceived reasons in the context of what is real. The following is an attempt to briefly identify the key actual strengths and weaknesses of Jimmy Carter.



Carter's Actual Strengths and Weaknesses

STRENGTHS

- He is bright, intelligence and disciplined.
- His strategy is on target with the mood of the electorate, and he plays the strategy effectively (vision, character, morality, spirituality).
- A good political mind, good instincts. He's "new" -- not from Washington.
- A good, well-knit organization which executes effectively. So far, does not leak. Low error rate.
- A favorable public perception, on characteristics and issues important to the voters. By avoiding specifics, his actual positions appear to be conservative on social issues and liberal on economic issues.
- He has united the Democratic Party, which will work on his behalf.
- He promises change, that he has solutions to the problems.
- He is subtle; he can send political signals with a light touch. These signals don't seem political.
- His religious background.



WEAKNESSES

- Overly ambitious, which may make him devious.
- Personal makeup is not in tune with public perception. He appears to be vindictive, arrogant, egotistical, bull-headed.
- Position on issues is to the left of a rightward moving electorate -- Humphrey-Hawkins, and many others.
- He has the support of the Democratic Party which brought us our current problem of a big, unresponsive federal government; he will either have to defend the Congress, or Party, or reject it -- either of which will give him problems.
- He is inexperienced.
- He is a "winner" only because he has had weak opponents thus far.

President Ford's Actual Strengths

- His decency and honesty.
- His record; the country is in good shape.
- His experience and understanding of the issues -- he has done the job and handled the Office.
- The power of the incumbency; he is the President. People will have to want to kick him out.



- People have empathy with him.
- His family.
- His personal makeup; he isn't vindictive, mean or an egomaniac. He can listen to others, take advice. In short, he is human.

Weaknesses Which are Persistently Attributed to the President

- Does not think in terms of vision and quality of life, and articulate these.
- Seems unwilling to take charge and discipline his Administration and campaign, even when it is in his interest; is a poor organizer.
- Is a poor communicator -- especially via television.
- Decisions often lack political subtlety -- both sides are angered.
- Administration decision process is often incapable of bold, rapid action; in seeking the "safe" course, we often miss opportunities when timing is critical.



SUMMARY CHART

FORD/CARTER PERCEPTION -- NATIONAL SURVEYFORD

<u>Positive:</u>	Honest and decent	But primaries raise problem of political honesty
<u>Question:</u>	Intelligence	Is he competent or intelligent enough to be President? Is he sensitive to how all this relates to average individual?
<u>Negative:</u>	Leadership	Weak, indecisive, lacks vision

CARTER

<u>Positive:</u>	Religious, ethical, conservative, regular Democrat	He supports traditional American values -- he has a conservative life style. He's a Democrat, but not an extremist.
<u>Question:</u>	Deceitful	Is he some kind of fanatic who might be dangerous?
<u>Negative:</u>	Inexperienced, lacks record of accomplishment and is vague and not specific	Is he up to the job? We don't know enough about him. Why is he avoiding clear expression of issues?



Currently, the President's positions on issues have not helped him in terms of electability. We believe this is a problem for two reasons:

First, voters are far more influenced by the perceived personal traits of the candidates than their substantive position on even that issue which a given voter considers most important. Thus, because the President's perception as a leader is so poor, any potential benefit due to the objective "correctness" of his substantive position on an issue gets no recognition.

Second, in far too many cases we have communicated the President's position on issues with political incompetency. For example, many issues are presented as legislative proposals or in veto messages, in which case the substance is overshadowed by the strong perception of the President as a part of the old Washington establishment. Also, substantive positions are presented in speeches which are so poor the press simply does not report them. We have been unsuccessful in packaging the President's positive programs for campaign advertising. (The "slice of life" ads prepared for California are an example of extraordinarily bad advertising. For



example, they stressed inflation which was not an issue in that primary, and they demeaned the Presidency -- by using crass commercial advertising techniques -- thus forfeiting the advantage of incumbency.)

Third, we have been communicating the wrong points. Often our communication capability works just fine, but we send the wrong message. For example, the Homemakers speech in North Carolina.

However, this problem can be corrected.* Issues can be a potent weapon in this year's Presidential campaign. Indeed, a fundamental element of the recommended strategy will be to break with traditional campaign wisdom and attempt to rely heavily on the use of issues as a fundamental element in our attack.

*We must improve our communications effort by (1) choosing our message, simplifying it and repeating it; and, (2) improving the speeches and tying them to the overall strategy instead of continuing to develop speeches in an organizational vacuum.



We believe that President Ford is in a better position on the issues than Jimmy Carter, for the following reasons:




- The President's positions have far greater substantive integrity. On many issues Carter is either overly vague, or has taken positions based on a weak analytical base.
- For the most part, we have "discounted" the negative political response which necessarily results when the President takes a firm position on controversial issues.
- Although undercut somewhat by the anti-Washington mood of the country, the President nevertheless has a clear advantage in discussing issues by virtue of the Office he holds.

We believe that the substance of President Ford's position on the issues is far closer to the political center of gravity of the Nation than are the positions taken by Jimmy Carter. This is particularly true if we are successful in tagging Carter with the record and Platform of the Democratic majority. Nevertheless, Carter is now perceived as slightly liberal by Democrats, moderate by ticket splitters, and slightly conservative by Republicans. Thus, he is all things to all people.



MARKET OPINION RESEARCH

I'm going to show you a seven-point scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal to extremely conservative.




MAPS OF OPINION RESEARCH

I'm going to show you a seven-point scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal to extremely conservative.



	<u>Self- Classification</u>	<u>Perception of Jimmy Carter</u>	<u>Perception of Robert F. Kennedy</u>
Extremely liberal	2%	2%	9%
Liberal	13	7	15
Slightly liberal	13	10	14
Moderate	33	22	20
Slightly conservative	15	23	9
Conservative	13	21	11
Extremely conservative	3	6	3
Don't know/Non-scaleable	<u>8</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>16</u>
	100%	100%	100%
Number of Cases	(1537)	(1442)	(1442)



For the most part, the President has already taken positions on the most controversial issues. Thus his national standing in the polls already reflects the displeasure of the various groups opposed to his positions. Therefore, to a large extent, he has already "discounted" the downside of being specific on the issues.

Carter has not done this. Even to the extent he has taken positions on the issues, he has done so with regional selectivity and in a manner that has not fully been communicated to those who disagree with his positions. Accordingly, we must develop a campaign strategy which includes as a major objective the dissemination of Carter's positions to the groups adversely affected and forcing him to be specific.

Of course, the President also brings to his substantive position on the issues the full force and power of the Presidency. Especially in the areas of foreign policy and national defense, there is generally a presumption that the President's position is at least factually correct. Although this "presumption of Presidential accuracy" is still a potent force, it has been substantially diminished as a result of Vietnam and Watergate.



Notwithstanding the apparent advantage the President has on the issues, it is obvious that this is not reflected in the national head-to-head Ford-Carter polls. We believe this is due largely to the fact that the issues have not played a significant role for the President in the campaign thus far (as a matter of fact, in the President Ford-Carter contest, they have played almost no role at all).

As a last element of our perception analysis, we will look at Presidential travel.

It is true that some of the President's primary campaigning did result in an increase in his local popularity in the area campaigned in (and this shows up on election day), but these examples would be very misleading if applied to the general election. There is no question that people who actually see the President are influenced by that event, and local press has its beneficial impact. However, for the general election, Presidential campaign events are not significant in terms of their impact on the people who attend. These



people are mainly important as backdrops for the television viewer.* During the general election, all Presidential travel must be planned for its impact on those who learn about it through the media. Thus it is important to keep in mind that while selected campaign stops by the President during the primaries helped him in those locations, cumulatively, they had a negative impact on his overall popularity rating throughout the country. (Refer to chart on Page 4.)

* Besides the fact that TV reports of the President campaigning impact the viewer negatively, there are the following additional reasons for not relying on traditional campaign stops:

- 1) At most, the President could probably only sustain a schedule of 2-1/2 stops three days a week. If this were done beginning in mid-September, the cost would be well in excess of \$1 million.
- 2) Only about one million people would actually see the President (including hard-core Carter and Ford supporters).



TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY

The objective of this section will be to present an analysis of the States and key constituencies within each State in the perspective of an electoral strategy for the President to win.

As a general proposition, there is a base vote for each candidate in a two-way Presidential election, consisting of:

- 35% for GOP
- 40% for Democrats

The election is thus decided by the 25% "swing vote" made up of Republican and Democratic defectors, the Independents and ticket splitters.

Because of our electoral college system, "swing voters" in target States which we believe can be won, are the only "swing voters" we should focus on. It does no good to capture 100% of the "swing vote" in a State which goes to our opponent because of his overwhelming initial advantage.

The President must make two major decisions in the definition of his constituency in the general election. The first is the choice of target States in the electoral college. The second is the choice of a swing



constituency in the selected States. These two decisions are interrelated and the selection of our Vice Presidential nominee will alter somewhat the State strategy.

The first decision is whether to concentrate total effort on the northern industrial States from New Jersey to Wisconsin, plus California, or to devote some effort to peripheral southern States, plus California.

The second decision is whether to develop a constituency of Republicans, Independents and ticket splitters, or go after the New Majority coalition of Republicans and disgruntled conservative Democrats.

We recommend concentration on the northern industrial States, but do not have sufficient data at this time to determine whether Pennsylvania is winnable. If it is not, we must make up for it in the peripheral South. Also, we need more data on Florida, Virginia, West Virginia and North Carolina. New York is also a State which we must analyze in greater detail. If the anti-Carter potential among Catholics and Jews develops fully, New York may be winnable (depending on our Vice Presidential choice). Under all conceivable scenarios, California is essential.



Base

The base of support for the President's victory lies in the traditionally Republican areas outside of the South.

Carter's base is in the deep South and a few traditionally Democratic States.



<u>Our Base</u>		<u>Swing States</u>		<u>His Base</u>	
Nebraska	5	Alaska	3	Georgia	12
Kansas	7	California	45	Minnesota	10
Vermont	3	Connecticut	8	D. C.	3
Idaho	4	Delaware	3	Alabama	9
N. Dakota	3	* Florida	17	Arkansas	6
Utah	4	Illinois	26	Louisiana	10
Wyoming	3	Kentucky	9	Mississippi	7
Arizona	6	Maryland	10	S. Carolina	8
S. Dakota	4	Michigan	21	Mass.	14
Oklahoma	8	Missouri	12	Rhode Island	4
Indiana	13	Montana	4	Hawaii	4
Colorado	7	Nevada	3		—
N. H.	4	N. J.	17		87
Maine	4	N. Mexico	4		
Iowa	8	* New York	41		
	—	* N. C.	13		
83		Ohio	25		
		Oregon	6		
		Pa.	27		
		Tenn.	10		
		* Texas	26		
		* Va.	12		
		Wash.	9		
		* W. Va.	6		
		Wisc.	11		
			—		

*State cannot
be categorized
properly due to
insufficient data.



Swing States

From the swing State list, victory can be achieved by either candidate winning 180 electoral votes. We must be able to sharpen our focus on the swing States to those which are not winnable and which lead to victory in the electoral college. Thus, we will develop a key State list which will allow us to:

- Allocate resources effectively.
- Select and manage issues pinpointed at winning constituencies.
- Develop electoral criteria for selection of a Vice President.
- Schedule the President, Vice President and advocates.
- Take advantage of media markets.

The swing States can be prioritized in three ways. First, they are listed in order of their historical Republican vote totals in the Presidential elections from 1952-1972. Second, they are ranked in order of their winnability this year. Third, the States' historical voting pattern, winnability and electoral contribution are combined in an electoral strategy list.



<u>Historical Vote</u>	<u>Winnability</u>	<u>Electoral Strategy</u>		
Nevada	Nevada	Ohio	25	
New Mexico	New Mexico	Michigan	21	(46)
Montana	Montana	Illinois	26	(72)
Wisconsin	Alaska	California	45	(117)
Ohio	Michigan	New Jersey	17	(134)
New Jersey	Delaware	Pennsylvania	27	(161)
Illinois	Ohio	Maryland	10	(171)
Oregon	Oregon	Tennessee	10	(181)
California	Maryland	Missouri	12	(193)
Tennessee	Illinois	Wisconsin	11	(204)
Kentucky	California	Oregon	6	(210)
Connecticut	Tennessee	Washington	9	(219)
Maryland	New Jersey	Connecticut	8	(227)
Delaware	Missouri	Kentucky	9	(236)
Washington	Wisconsin	New Mexico	4	(240)
Pennsylvania	Connecticut	Montana	4	(244)
Missouri	Washington	Nevada	3	(247)
Michigan	Kentucky	Alaska	3	(250)
Alaska	Pennsylvania	Delaware	3	(253)



Building a Winning Coalition

On our base of 93, we must surely win all the States in the middle column on the preceeding page through California: Nevada, New Mexico, Montana, Alaska, Michigan, Delaware, Ohio, Oregon, Maryland, Illinois and California. This brings our total electoral strength to 233. The final 37 electoral votes must be won from the other swing States or the unknowns:

Tennessee	10	Florida	17
New Jersey	17	New York	41
Missouri	12	North Carolina	13
Wisconsin	11	* Texas	26
Connecticut	8	Virginia	12
Washington	9	W. Virginia	6
Kentucky	9		
Pennsylvania	27		

These States can be viewed in two types: peripheral South and traditionally swing States leaning Democratic:

<u>Peripheral South</u>		<u>Traditionally Swing</u>	
* Florida	17	Connecticut	8
Kentucky	9	New Jersey	17
Missouri	12	* New York	41
* N. C.	13	Pennsylvania	27
Tennessee	10	Washington	9
* Texas	26	Wisconsin	11
* Virginia	12		
W. Virginia	6		

* Unknowns



Swing Constituency in Key States

To build a winning coalition in the swing States, the President must build on his base of rural and small town majorities with suburban Independents and ticket splitters. All successful Republican candidates in these States have won with the same constituency with the exceptions of Texas and Florida. In very general terms, the target constituency in the suburbs for the President is the upper blue collar and white collar workers, often from a family which has risen in mobility in the last generation. These are independent minded voters, many of whom are Catholic. In addition, there is a weakness in Carter's support among Catholics and also among Jews. The upwardly mobile Catholics are a group becoming more independent and conservative, and they represent the key to victory in the northern industrial States where they are from 25-45% of the voters. (See Tab I-C for analysis of Catholic strategy.) Jewish skepticism of Carter as a Southern fundamentalist provides an opportunity to strip away part of the traditional Democratic coalition.



The following is a more detailed analysis.

In our swing States, there are essentially two groups of ticket splitters:

1. Original ticket splitters - They have traditionally split their ticket; they are upper middle-class suburban from middle-sized cities. They are people who are a little more affluent, educated, little higher incomes than the average voter. Many of them came from the Republican side originally, and they are typically upper middle-class suburbanites. They are good government people who used to be strong on civil rights and fair housing, and are now anti-busing and strong against crime. They consider themselves issue voters but, in fact, they are more candidate oriented than issue oriented. Style of a candidate is very important to them. Even though they wouldn't admit it, the Ford family would have an impact on them. These people were probably squeezed in the recession.
2. Recent ticket splitters - This group has split their ticket since '66 or '68. They are upper blue collar who have just moved to the suburbs



and people from the northern States who have come from the Democratic side into the ticket splitter column. In the East they are largely Catholic, and many of them are ethnic. In the West, it's the same basic social class, but they are no longer ethnic or Catholic. These are people who have just barely made it out of the working class. Most of their wives work, and they are really threatened. They are afraid of social change, which is one reason why they moved to the suburbs. They are much closer to the New Majority people. As to those who are fairly hard Democratic, we probably won't do very well except to the extent we're able to cut the Catholics out.

These two groups have in common the fact that they are younger than the average voter (in their thirties and forties) and they are the people who are socially mobile. All of them have moved up either half or a full social class in their own time. These people are parents and therefore very concerned with anything that has to do with children, schools, and the like.



The New Majority group (second group above) tends to be socially very conservative, but still quite liberal economically.

Both groups of ticket splitters feel strongly about quality of life issues, and neither understand there is a trade-off between environmental quality and the economy. The quality of life issue combines many separate issues such as consumerism, home ownership, leisure time, environment, etc.

Also, an important point is that these voters have their individual lives and the lives of their children to get better, e.g., more income, good health, trip to Hawaii.

Just because these voters want a smaller government and one not involved in everything, we cannot jump to the conclusion that they don't want government to do things. They see government as the legitimate instrument to solve problems.

On the other hand, the hard-core Republican really does want government out of everything, and the hard-core Democrat just isn't concerned about the "too much government" issue.



In addition to the problems already outlined concerning the perception of the President relative to Carter, it must be remembered that this swing vote is most heavily influenced by issues of all voting blocs. This swing constituency is concerned about the following specific issues:

1. National Defense - This group favors a strong national defense (which is seen as a traditional American value), but is very suspicious of making deals with our adversaries. They would like more visible cooperation with our allies and a little tougher approach to the Communists. The President is well positioned on these issues, but the articulation of his policies has been insufficient. By stressing defense (but not to the extent of committing troops, the President will be perceived as being identified closer to "traditional American values".
2. Morality - This constituency has a strong commitment to government working better and doing what's right. The President's policies are appealing to this group, but they need to be characterized as doing what's right and good



for the country rather than what is politically expedient in an election year. This group also wants to feel that the country is moving again, after Vietnam, Watergate and the recession. They are cautious and will be suspicious of Carter's uncertain direction. But they need to feel that the President has character and is leading the country in the right direction.

3. Economy and Taxes - These issues are of major concern and the President's record is excellent. But public awareness of the President's policy on tax reduction and the effect on the taxpayer of the Democrat's economic policy need more effective communication. This group was strained by the recession and fears any possibility of slipping back. The vast majority are homeowners and will react negatively to Carter's proposal to eliminate mortgage interests as a tax reduction.
4. Crime - This is a major concern of these people and the President must come down hard on the issue. His programs will work and they make sense. (However, we must be very careful not to



turn the gun lobby against us because they are very active -- and effective -- once stirred up.)

5. Education - Many of these voters are upwardly mobile and owe some of their success to education. They fear that their children will not get the quality of education they deserve. The President must show awareness and concern on this issue above and beyond the busing question. Favoring more local control will be well received.
6. Quality of Life - The vast majority of the swing voters who live in the suburbs are conservationists and strongly supportive of a responsible environmental policy. In this issue area, the President is perceived by many as a pro-business, anti-environment candidate. To correct this situation, we must become actively involved in the energy and recreation areas. Above and beyond this, quality of life is a catch phrase which connotes a healthy community environment for individuals, housing, transportation, low crime rate, and quality education. There are sound Republican methods to achieve these goals and the President's blueprint for the future must clearly communicate a commitment to "quality of life" for the individual.

