

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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MINUTES
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING

DATE: Wednesday, January 29, 1975
TIME: 4:39 p.m. to 6:19 p.m.
PLACE: Cabinet Room, The White House
SUBJECT: SALT

Principals

The President
Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff General George S. Brown
Director of Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Fred Ikle
Director of Central Intelligence William Colby

Other Attendees

State: Under Secretary of State for Politico Affairs
Joseph Sisco
Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson (SALT Delegation)

Defense: Deputy Secretary William Clements

CIA: Deputy Director of Science and Technology
Carl Duckett

White House: Mr. Donald Rumsfeld, Assistant to the President

NSC: Lt General Brent Scowcroft
Jan M. Lodal *aml*

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DECLASSIFIED - E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.1
With PORTIONS EXEMPTED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.1 (b) (1) & (2)

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SALT NARA Date 5/24/99



President Ford: It's good to see all of you. The meeting today is to review the major SALT issues and go over our general approach at Geneva. First, I would like to say that all of you know how strong and affirmative I think we should be about the Vladivostok Agreement. I think the negotiations were most successful, and I was pleased at the reaction we got at the first meeting with the Congressional leadership. I am thankful for the help I got from all of you.

The problem we face is to get through next June or July. So in this meeting, we will go over, after Carl has said a few words about the current situation, the various issues -- verification, cruise missiles, Malmstrom, etc. Carl?

Mr. Duckett: Bill will do the briefing -- I will assist him as needed.

Mr. Colby: Mr. President, the Soviet repudiation of the 1972 trade agreement and Brezhnev's physical ailments have generated questions about possible changes in Soviet foreign policy with respect to detente and the Soviet attitude toward SALT.

Moscow has provided copious assurances -- both private and public -- that, despite the difficulties over the trade agreement, other aspects of the US-Soviet relationship should go forward. Premier Kosygin was decidedly upbeat on detente, particularly on the importance of arms limitation agreements with the US, when he talked with Prime Minister Whitlam earlier this month. The Soviet press continues to say favorable things both about the arms limitation agreements reached at Vladivostok, and about you personally.

On the specific issues of Most Favored Nation, export credits, and emigration, the signs thus far suggest the Soviets hope for another round of bargaining on these issues -- although we believe they may be even tougher bargainers.

Just how fast the Kremlin moves ahead on detente-related policies may well depend upon Brezhnev's political and physical health when he emerges from the hospital -- where he has been since December 26.

We don't know exactly what put him there, but he has a history of heart trouble, has become easily subject to fatigue, and suffers from severe dental problems that may have required surgery.

In the meantime, other Soviet leaders appear to be carrying on normally, and we detect no atmosphere of political crisis in Moscow.


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Should Brezhnev's health force him to step down, the odds are that his senior colleagues would monopolize the subsequent decisionmaking. Kirilenko would probably be the nominal leader, but the leadership would be collective until age began to take its toll among the seniors, and the juniors began to inherit -- and contend over -- power.

The seniors, all in their late 60s and early 70s, are not likely to want any substantial changes in established policy directions. But they might slow down the pace in a few areas. In particular, Brezhnev's departure might reduce the Soviet incentive to complete SALT II this summer.

In any case, the Soviets are continuing to develop new strategic weapons. All four of their new ICBMs are at or near the end of their development programs. Two of them -- the SS-18 and SS-19 -- are being deployed and the SS-16 could now be ready for deployment. They are also flight testing a new intermediate range ballistic missile -- the SS-20 -- which appears to be an outgrowth of the 16.



There are three other developments in Soviet weapons related to SALT that I would like to discuss. First, a new intermediate range missile I have already mentioned -- the SS-20 --

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Secondly, the new Backfire bomber may now be entering service with operational medium bomber units. This aircraft can cover the entire US on a one-way mission from the Soviet Union. Since July, we have photographed it at both Long Range and Naval Aviation bases.

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..... A total of about 40 Backfires have now been produced. By the end of 1975 the Soviets will probably have a regiment of Backfires -- 25 planes -- fully operational, and another partially up to strength.

Cruise missiles may also impact on SALT, and since the mid-fifties the Soviets have developed an extensive inventory.

Most of these missiles are tactical, however, and the Soviets do not now appear to be developing the kind of long-range ones being considered by the US for strategic use. But they are capable of deploying strategic cruise missiles in the next decade.

President Ford: With nuclear payloads?

Mr. Colby: Yes.



Mr. President, the events at Vladivostok and since have reaffirmed our belief that the USSR will press a vigorous strategic arms competition, with emphasis on qualitative force improvements. These events provide no reason for altering the basic judgments of NIE 11-3/8, which was published just before the Vladivostok meeting.

The agreements reached at Vladivostok did, however, alter our "best estimate" of Soviet forces as presented in the NIE, and we have formulated a new one. It assumes that the Soviets take a balanced approach requiring only minimal changes in ongoing programs to upgrade their forces. We are also, of course, looking at other Soviet options.

In developing the rationale for this new best estimate, we concluded that the Soviets would continue to stress MIRVed ICBMs and emphasize qualitative improvements. They would also strike a balance between types of systems, and between survivability and counterforce capability. Finally, they would allow a slight relaxation in the pace of MIRVing from that projected in the NIE best estimate, to reduce costs and improve programming efficiency.

The new best estimate concludes that, to stay within the 2,400 limit the Soviets would deploy fewer mobile ICBMs than we projected in the NIE, dismantle silo-based launchers at two SS-11 complexes, and retire Bison bombers. We do not believe that the Soviets would be willing, in the current round of negotiations, to discuss further reductions.

Mr. President, I would like to illustrate, with a series of charts, how our new best estimate differs from the NIE in its projection of Soviet forces.

In these charts, the US force is based upon the January 75 Five Year Defense Program, with the FB-111 excluded. It contains no long range cruise missiles, or other US programs under development but not yet programmed for deployment.

This chart shows Soviets delivery vehicles. The Interim Agreement limited fixed ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers, but not land-mobile ICBMs or bombers. The projection reached around 2,600 in the 1980s, compared to the Vladivostok limits of 2,400 delivery vehicles.

If the Backfire were included -- as illustrated on this overlay -- the Soviets would be required to make significant reductions in their projected ICBM and SLBM forces, since as many as 250 Backfire



could be deployed in Long Range Aviation units by 1985. Including Backfire might also mean counting the 70 US FB-111.

The next chart, of MIRVed delivery vehicles, shows some 500 fewer MIRVed missile launchers under the Vladivostok limits than in the NIE projection. You will note that there is little difference between the "Vladivostok best" projection and the "NIE best" until 1979, when the next generation of Soviet weapons -- about which we know little -- is expected to appear.

The intelligence community disagrees on the most likely mix of MIRVed systems in the 1980s. The majority believes that the Soviets would MIRV fewer SLBMs than we projected in the NIE, opting instead for ICBMs with qualitative improvements beginning in 1983. Others believe the Soviets would place more emphasis on submarine launched ballistic missiles than in the majority view, projecting some 200 more MIRVed SLBMs and fewer improved ICBMs. Under this projection the Soviets would have more total MIRVed missile launchers in the early 1980s, as shown by the shaded area on the chart.

If, however, the majority of our community is correct, and the Soviets do plan to slow the pace of MIRVing in the early 1980s -- as indicated by the flattened portion of the curve -- there might be an opportunity to negotiate reductions in MIRVed missile launchers as well as total delivery vehicles. The US presumably would have to reduce the number of deployed MIRVed missiles, while the Soviets refrain from further deployments of MIRVs in SS-11 silos.

Finally, this chart shows the total warheads in the forces. Here we see that the total number of weapons in the US programmed forces remains above either estimate of the Soviet force throughout the next 10 years. This includes bombers, where the US comes higher.

In conclusion, Mr. President, I think we can make, with considerable confidence, some statements about the strategic situation in the next ten years.

The Vladivostok agreement, if implemented, will remove one worry: that the Soviets might achieve a numerical edge -- in launchers and delivery vehicles -- which, while not changing the basic strategic situation of mutual deterrence, could have given them a politically useful image of superiority among those who focus primarily on quantity.

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During the next ten years of numerical balance, Soviet attention will turn more and more to qualitative competition with the US. Moscow will achieve substantial improvements in counterforce capability, flexibility, and, in the near term, survivability. Soviet agreement to the Vladivostok terms may stem in part from their pessimism about the prospects of achieving dramatic advantages through numbers alone, and their consequent desire to focus resources on qualitative improvements instead.

This means that each side will continue to have many more than enough strategic weapons for assured retaliation after a first strike, or for "limited option" scenarios. At the same time, we expect the Soviets to be searching for better -- and possibly quite different -- strategic arms in the decade of SALT II and beyond.

The Soviets will, accordingly, pursue a vigorous R&D program. But we do not foresee technological advances which would sharply alter the strategic balance in the USSR's favor during the next ten years.

President Ford: Thank you very much Bill -- is that the conclusion?

Secretary Schlesinger: Bill, I have one question -- does it look as if the 17 will not be deployed, and that they will concentrate on the 19?

Mr. Colby: No, they will deploy both.

Mr. Duckett:
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..... We expect a mixed force of
17's and 19's.

Mr. Colby: They are testing both missiles.

Mr. Duckett: It looks like we were wrong earlier when we felt they might stop the 17 program and deploy only the 19. Recently, there have been more 17 tests.

Secretary Kissinger: They may have a morale problem with the SS-17s design bureau (laughter).

Mr. Colby: The testing program does not indicate any priority given to either one.



Mr. Duckett: It seems clear that both will be deployed.

President Ford: The failure rate appears to be higher on the 17 program.

Mr. Colby:

Secretary Schlesinger: Maybe we will see a token deployment of the 17.

Mr. Colby:

President Ford: Henry, would you like to sum up where we stand?

Secretary Kissinger: Mr. President, the Verification Panel has concentrated principally on the verification of the limits agreed to in Vladivostok and limits related to the definition of various types of cruise missiles.

Given the sensitive state of US and Soviet realtions, we should concentrate during the present phase of the talks on describing a number of problems which we believe could arise and attempting to elicit the Soviet position. We should reveal our own position only gradually, and not nail ourselves down to hard and fast position at the beginning. The Verification Panel has grouped the possible county rules into three categories: highly desirable, desirable but of low priority, and finally, some proposals made by various agencies which would be either undesirable or unnecessary.

I will begin with the desirable rules. For these, the Soviets would have to come up with a very strong alternative before we would abandon our position. The first rule concerns the definition of a MIRVed missile.

"An ICBM or SLBM booster of a type flight tested as a MIRVed missile will be counted as MIRVed when deployed, even if a single warhead version of the booster has also been developed."

This rule applies to the SS-17, 18, and 19. Any missile in the MIRV mode, we will consider MIRVed once it is deployed. I see no problem with the 17 and 19, but there will be problems with the 18. They have developed a single warhead version. As you remember, Mr. President



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at Vladivostok, they resisted restraining MIRV deployment of the 18; they will now resist any proposal on all 18's deployed counting as MIRVs.

President Ford: In Vladivostok, we talked about limiting deployments of 18's --

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, but unless the Soviets come up with a new device, any 18 deployed must be counted as MIRVed. Even on-site inspection would not help as much. We will tell them that if they come up with something, we will examine it with respect to the 18. For the 17 and the 19, no single warhead version exists; by definition, once the 17 and 19 are deployed, they will be counted.

Later on, the question will arise when to consider a weapon to be MIRVed.

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So we adopted the rule that after a single MIRV test, the missiles count as MIRV.

President Ford: Whether the test is successful or otherwise --

Secretary Kissinger: A single MIRV test would count. There's no reason ever to test a missile with MIRVs if one has no intention of deploying it with MIRVs. If the Soviets make a fuss over this, we may have to come back to you on it. We may have to go up to no more than five tests. But there's no reason why they should need this. For new MIRV missiles, there's no excuse -- once tested, we'll count it in the MIRV total.

I came reluctantly to this view. At first I thought we could permit more tests.

President Ford: How many MIRV missiles do they have -- the 17 and the 19?

Secretary Kissinger: The 17, 18, and 19.

Mr. Colby: How about the 16?

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Mr. Duckett:

President Ford:

Mr. Colby:

Secretary Kissinger: If they have a MIRV program for it, they will test it more than once. Only if they're trying to cheat, would they object to counting it after the first test.

Secretary Schlesinger: It's not our current assessment that the 16 is MIRVed.

Secretary Kissinger: This is a question of fact. If the Soviets present a counter argument, we will come back first to the VP and then to you. The second rule concerns counting changed ICBM silos as MIRVed.--

"Count under the MIRV limit all ICBM launchers of types modified for the purpose of permitting the deployment of MIRVed missiles."

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In my estimate, we will not have too much trouble with this rule except with regard to the 18. We know they plan to deploy the 18 with both single warheads and with MIRVs. We know they plan a single warhead deployment from their extensive testing program, and we know that they plan a MIRV deployment from the Vladivostok arguments they gave. But I don't think they realize we've established these counting rules. I don't think they have focused on them, despite the fact that I have explained to Dobrynin on many occasions how we plan to proceed.

Mr. Duckett: I might point out that the 18's we have seen deployed so far we believe to be single warhead versions; I can't imagine given their state of testing, they have deployed the MIRVed version yet.

Dr. Ikle: Is it possible they will replace the single warhead SS-18s with MIRVed versions before they reach the 1320 level, in which case this problem would go away?

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Secretary Kissinger: They have a long way to go to get to 1320, so I don't know. But for now, I believe we will have to count the 18 as MIRVed.
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..... We'll have problems with the 18, unless as Fred has suggested, they have decided the limit is so high that they can live with it.

Mr. Duckett: Frankly, Mr. President, we guessed wrong on this program. They seem to be going quite slow on their MIRVed 18 testing, and we thought maybe this might be a signal that they would be willing to limit the MIRVed version.

Secretary Kissinger: At Vladivostok, their military seemed ready to go along with limits on the MIRVed 18, but Gromyko was not. He made it an issue of principle not to have sublimits. It reminded me of some people I knew! (laughter) They refused to give up what they weren't going to do in any event.

To go on to the next counting rule, it deals with counting SLBMs with MIRVs--
"Count under the MIRV limit all SLBM launchers on a submarine if any SLBM launchers on submarines of the same class are MIRVed."

President Ford: That is, if they only MIRV- one out of ten?

Secretary Kissinger: The problem is that they have two kinds of submarines-- the Y-class, and the D-class. We believe they may be having problems developing a MIRV for the D-class, but when it's completed, it will be compatible with all D-class submarines. We will have then to count all 420 D-class launchers as containing MIRVs. We have come up with a formulation to ease the problem somewhat which would permit them to count only 200 per year --

Deputy Secretary Clements: But that helps only with the production problem --

Secretary Kissinger: Yes -- We don't believe they can deploy 420 in the first year. Our intelligence and our conversations with Brezhnev have both indicated that they do not have much confidence in their SLBMs. Personally, I do not believe they will want to MIRV 420 SLBMs. But it's hard to tell. We can start out with this rule in Alex's instructions, and he can ask them to tell us how they plan to reassure us if they don't like the rule. They're developing a stretched version of the D-class, and maybe we could count only that, but I don't know how we would tell the difference.



Mr. Duckett:

Secretary Kissinger: Brezhnev tells me that in his perception, their SLBMs are not very good. So they will probably want to deploy less than 420 MIRVs.

President Ford: How much testing have they done on SLBM MIRVs?

Secretary Kissinger: None. Last June, Brezhnev said he doesn't expect to have an SLBM MIRV until the late seventies. At that time we were discussing a five-year agreement with Brezhnev, so that implied he would have no SLBM MIRVs through that period.

Mr. Duckett: But even this would mean that it would be well toward 1980 until this system were ready.

President Ford: But they have single warhead SLBMs operational?

Mr. Duckett: They have both a single and a double warhead version,

Secretary Kissinger: They will have a large number of SLBMs to be counted in their 2400 total, but no MIRVs in their 1320 total until the late seventies -- that's when we will have a problem.

General Brown: If we propose this rule, we will penalize ourself because we will have to count our Polaris submarines. There are 180 missiles on ships which are the same as Poseidon and we will have to count them until we phase them out.

President Ford: How long will that be?

General Brown: They will have to go out in '83 so we can deploy the Trident.

Secretary Schlesinger: I don't believe I agree with you on that. The Polaris missile is completely different, and it fits into a smaller tube.

Ambassador Johnson: But they can't distinguish --

Secretary Schlesinger: They can distinguish the difference.

Deputy Secretary Clements: If we try to put the shoe on their foot, they will turn around and put it on our foot.



Secretary Kissinger: Our problem is with Minuteman, not with Polaris. As long as the missile tube is different and we have no MIRV to fit in it, we're okay. It's like the distinction between their D and Y class.

Deputy Secretary Clements: Their D-class is somewhere between our Trident and Poseidon.

Secretary Kissinger: We intend to deploy Trident missiles on Poseidon, but they already count as MIRVs. Our problem is only with the 550 Minuteman III. In our best judgment, they have to change their silos to deploy MIRV. But there are no external differences between the Minuteman II and Minuteman III silos. They will want some restrictions on us, due to the fact that our silos are the same.

Secretary Schlesinger: Ultimately, I think we will have to fall back on this issue and perhaps count only their stretched D-class, but Alex's instructions should be to hold fast initially.

Secretary Kissinger: In each case, Alex should argue that this is our position, but if they have another way, we will listen to it. I agree with Jim -- I believe they have no intention of deploying 420 SLBM MIRVs, so we will probably have to fall back, but not until Alex comes back for further instructions.

The fourth rule is "ICBM and SLBM launchers once counted as MIRVed will always count as MIRVed unless dismantled, destroyed, or converted to unMIRVed launchers under mutually agreed procedures." There will have to be a commitment that once a launcher is counted as MIRVed, you cannot say you are putting an unMIRVed missile unless this is done through agreed-on procedures.

The fifth rule is "no interference with national technical means of verification, including means for verifying the limitations of the MIRV provisions."

There is some question concerning how exactly we would interpret this. There is one school of thought which believes we should call attention to the incompatibility of encrypted telemetry with verification. Personally, I believe we would have to explain too much about our intelligence to do this -- we would have to tell them what we know.

Deputy Secretary Clements: We all agree on that.

Secretary Schlesinger: We think we might be able to come with some phraseology, such as no changes in flight test procedures, which would not require us to say much, but might give us some leverage on the telemetry.



Secretary Kissinger: The next rules are in a different category of desirability -- still desirable, but of lower priority.

The first is to "count under the MIRV limit ICBM launchers whose length or diameter are changed."

The problem is that if the Soviets attempt to modify their SS-11 silos to increase their hardness, it will be difficult to figure out if the change is to convert to an SS-17 silo, or is devised strictly to increase the hardness of an unMIRVed silo. We could go further and seek a ban on all modifications to unMIRVed silos, but this would present immeasurable problems to us so we will oppose deepening the silos.

President Ford: They're permitted a 15 percent increase in dimensions, aren't they?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, Mr. President, they are under the Interim Agreement. But if they increase the diameter, we would have to count the silo as containing a 17 or a 19. We may be able to accept some hardening, but if they start digging, we'd have to count it.

Ambassador Johnson: This is really just a tougher version of the second rule in the first category.

Secretary Kissinger: The problem will come up if they want to increase the hardness of their 11 silos.

Ambassador Johnson: Then we will have to make a judgment whether it will hold a MIRV or not.

Mr. Duckett: Of course, with the MIRV numbers so high, there is really no motivation for them to cheat like this under this agreement. But if you go for reductions, then the problems change.

Secretary Kissinger: Since there is less incentive for them to cheat, it ought to be relatively easier to get them to agree to hard rules.

The second rule in this category relates to changes in SLBM launchers --

"Count under the MIRV limit SLBM launchers which are modified to permit the deployment of MIRVed missiles, including launchers whose length or diameter are changed."

The third rule is to "count under the MIRV limit all launchers at an ICBM complex if any launchers at that complex are MIRVed."



This makes it easier for us because if we see any silos compatible with MIRVs, we would count the whole field. I think that none of us had any expectations that the Soviets will possibly agree with this -- since all the others apply only to them and none to us, I suspect that's why the Chiefs went along with it. (laughter)

But it may be something they want, since any missile we have or are thinking of having, including the MX, will be compatible with existing silos. We have played around with the idea of designating for the Soviets which fields have Minuteman III in them and letting them inspect on-site at Minuteman II silos.

President Ford: This is related to the problem at Malmstrom --

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. If we deploy the first 50 there, all 200 would have to be counted. We would be giving up 150 MIRVs. Therefore, after the sixth Trident is deployed, we would have to get rid of some Poseidon or Minuteman III's.

President Ford: The plan is to put in 50 Minuteman III now, and more later?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. We have 500 at other fields, plus the 50 at Malmstrom would complete the planned 550 deployment.

General Brown: (passes out chart) I have a chart here which shows the Malmstrom deployment (see chart attached).

Secretary Kissinger: If the deployment by complexes is not an issue, there will be no problem. If it is, we can try to separate the 50 missiles into a different area. If not, we could look for another field. But this is not a question of unilateral restraint.

Dr. Ikle: If this does not cost too much, it would gain us some flexibility in sorting out this issue.

Secretary Kissinger: We don't want to lose 150. We may be able to find a different way of accounting for 550 -- for example, by inspection -- but I don't believe they will accept on-site inspection -- Do you Alex?

Ambassador Johnson: No, they won't.

Dr. Ikle: But proposing it may make them stop pressing the issue.

Secretary Kissinger: If we could wait 4 to 6 weeks, we would see how this issue arises.



Mr. Duckett: We can often tell their MIRV deployments by seeing their support base. If they deploy by complex, when the support base shows up this is a helpful tool in verification.

Secretary Schlesinger: I am disinclined to allow our logic to carry us too far. The Soviets have never been that interested in this -- they have other means of verification, including our Congressional testimony. At Malmstrom, we have prepared to open up the balance of the silos to inspection. That leads to a deeper issue. Third, we would hold up our program, and this would reduce the pressure on them to agree.

Secretary Kissinger: That would be true if we were trying to get something from them, but we don't want anything from them. It would be true if we were talking about numbers.

Dr. Kile: It is irreversible once we start. If it's not too costly, we can always go back and put them in later.

President Ford: How far have we gone so far?

Secretary Schlesinger: Three Minuteman II have been removed -- and two Minuteman III are at the site. An erector is at the site. The ground support equipment is already in. We are pretty pregnant, but we have terminated further action as of now as we agreed last week.

President Ford: What was your schedule if you had not stopped?

Secretary Schlesinger: We would have started this week.

General Brown: We would have completed Minuteman III deployments this June.

President Ford: In about six months. As Fred mentioned, the cost is important -- What is the cost of the delay?

General Brown: It's nominal -- We did an estimate and went over it this morning, and for one month, it would be only about \$150,000.

President Ford: What would be the monthly cost after that?

General Brown: Up to three months, only about an additional \$6,000 a month. It's so inexpensive I don't believe it.

Deputy Secretary Clements: It's the contractor's expenditures.

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General Brown: But we are doing most of it in-house.

President Ford: How soon will we know where we stand with the Soviets?

Ambassador Johnson: In about 30 days, hopefully.

Secretary Kissinger: My guess is that if Brezhnev wants an agreement by June, they will put their cards on the table by mid-March at the latest. Their position will be substantially different than ours on a whole range of issues. But we will know at the latest by mid-March. If they don't raise the Minuteman III problem, and we don't accept, we can go ahead.

Secretary Schlesinger: But what if they do accept -- then what do we do?

Secretary Kissinger: We would find a smaller field with only 150 silos.

General Brown: It would cost half a billion dollars to put the missiles in another field. There's a lot of sunk cost at Malmstrom -- guidance systems, silo preparations, and so forth -- which would be wasted.

Dr. Ikle: We also have the option of separating the 50 silos.

General Brown: One indicator they might look for is the MIRV support building, and we could move it over with the silos.

President Ford: At the Shelby complex?

General Brown: It's now at the base. But if we move it to the complex, it would put the identifier at the complex. This would be something of an isolated location.

Secretary Schlesinger: That's no good in any event. You have the facility at Malmstrom anyway. Their judgment would be if they want to be suspicious, they would have to count 200.

Deputy Secretary Clements: If we start we can always pull them out later.

President Ford: Except one of the other rules is that once you have it MIRVed, it has to count --

Deputy Secretary Clements: We could negate that and take them out.

President Ford: But under one of the highly desirable rules, once they're deployed, you can't pull them out --



Deputy Secretary Clements: Oh, I see what you are saying --

Secretary Schlesinger: Of course, the building is already there.

Secretary Kissinger: They will start counting a thousand Minutemen. They will apply every one of these rules to us. If so, we will lose a thousand. Probably, after some groaning, they will accept only 550, but it will cost us somewhere else. The SS-18 problem is identical to this.

Secretary Schlesinger: If I might interrupt, I'm not sure the price will increase. My feeling is that if we maintain the program until such time as we get an agreement, we're better off. Otherwise, the negotiations will just stretch out.

Secretary Kissinger: They won't stretch out. They want an agreement by the time Brezhnev gets here. If this agreement blows up, he's in trouble, politically.

Mr. Colby: We would have two options -- count the 50 as a separate area, or count all of them, if it's irreversible once they've been deployed.

Secretary Kissinger: It's not yet irreversible, but we can't pull them out once we start.

President Ford: They will probably go by the hard rule.

Dr. Ekle: If we look at the 80's, they may wish to pull out some MIRVs and deploy mobiles.

Secretary Schlesinger: For them to push us on this would just be part of their negotiating strategy.

Secretary Kissinger: So far they haven't used verification at all to push us --

President Ford: Do we have mixed Minuteman II's and Minuteman III's elsewhere?

Deputy Secretary Clements: No.

Secretary Kissinger: George, do we have your paper -- You were going to check whether you want the Russians running around our ICBM fields?

Deputy Secretary Clements: This would be an opportune time to raise site inspection -- this could bring us several good effects.



Secretary Kissinger: But suppose they accept it -- Are we willing to let them run around?

Deputy Secretary Clements: Sure.

President Ford: That's certainly a change!

General Brown: We wouldn't let them look just anywhere.

Deputy Secretary Clements: They're not going to be running around like Henry makes it sound.

President Ford: This would give them a lot more freedom of movement than anything I've heard before.

General Brown: We could set up a program that would let them tell whether the missiles are MIRVed or not. But we are concerned about what they might see on some of our other equipment -- the electronics, and so forth.

Secretary Kissinger: How do you keep them from seeing that?

General Brown: We would have to limit their movements.

President Ford: How do we know this will satisfy them?

Secretary Schlesinger: It should.

Deputy Secretary Clements: It would be the beginning of agreements on on-site inspections --

Secretary Kissinger: They will not accept it.

Secretary Schlesinger: It will put the burden on them.

Ambassador Johnson: Even proposing unilateral on-site inspection will give them problems.

Secretary Kissinger: So far, we haven't seen one specific Soviet verification proposal. They may say that each side should designate what it wants to MIRV, and verify the other with national technical means.

Ambassador Johnson: They may not even propose designations, but national technical means only.

Secretary Schlesinger: I have not been able to learn what we gain by stopping deployment.



Dr. Kle: We gain the flexibility to respond to the evolving negotiations. If they are upset with our Minuteman II - Minuteman III problem, we can respond by moving support equipment, and so forth.

Secretary Schlesinger: Moving the support equipment would not help.

Secretary Kissinger: We could at least move to another missile field -- This would give us two more Tridents.

Secretary Schlesinger: You think we could agree to count 650 if we had only deployed 550? That's not possible --

Secretary Kissinger: I don't know, but we're not at that point. This would give us some elbow room to delay by 4 to 6 weeks to permit the Delegation to see what it could come up with. I believe there's a 50-50 chance that they want an agreement badly, so it may go easier than we think.

Secretary Schlesinger: I'm not sure that the cost of the delay is not greater than the cost of going ahead. If we are already pregnant, it's somewhat like the Spartan missile, where we were already pregnant.

President Ford: I don't see what a six week delay hurts. If we put them in now, and are obliged to count all of them, we lose. If we hold up, and there is no problem, we can proceed.

Secretary Schlesinger: If we move, it costs an additional half a billion dollars. If they respond favorably, we can give only an embarrassed response --

President Ford: What embarrassed response?

Secretary Schlesinger: If they say yes we agree, we will have to say that we will have inspection at Malmstrom. We are better off going ahead with the deployment in the first place.



President Ford: This is a judgment factor, and there's no way we can tell. But the odds are better if we hold up at least six weeks, or maybe we will know quicker.

Ambassador Johnson: I can't make any predictions.

President Ford: Let's go on to the next issue.

Secretary Kissinger: There's one other rule in the desirable category --

Secretary Schlesinger: The last rule on the chart? I have some problems with that. We may wish to change our ground support equipment. This could be so prohibitive that it might not be desirable.

Secretary Kissinger: I was going to list it in the next category -- it is desirable if applied to them, but the problem is if it is applied to us. We have to decide what we want more.

Dr. Kle: It doesn't even buy as much with them.

Secretary Kissinger: Going on into the next one, there would be no changes in test ranges except as agreed.
.....
..... To continue getting this data, we would prefer to prohibit changes in test range locations.

President Ford: Do they have fixed test ranges now?

Secretary Kissinger: They have been to date, but we don't want to be constrained by this ourselves.

Secretary Schlesinger: I don't understand the rule.

Secretary Kissinger: We considered it, but we don't want it.

The next rule is that "if new types of MIRV missiles are developed and flight tested, launchers which are compatible in size with such missiles will be counted under the MIRV limit". The problem we have is with their SS-11 silos -- we don't want them to develop a new MIRV missile which fits. But any new missiles we would develop would be compatible with our existing silos. So if Alex can get this applied unilaterally -- (laughter).



Dr. Ikle: We may want a softer rule -- such as a requirement to discuss all new missiles in the SCC. This way we might be able to walk the line between the MX and the follow-on to the 11.

Mr. Duckett: I'd like to add that we agreed that this one should come out. We just said initially that we should take a look at it, but now believe it should come out.

Secretary Kissinger: Mr. President, I don't believe there is any need to cover these other rules. No one here wants you to approve any of them.

President Ford: And they wouldn't want them.

Secretary Kissinger: There's a long list. We could go down these last four, but we decided --

President Ford: We either did not want them, or they were undesirable --

Secretary Kissinger: They would be OK for them, but not for us.

Dr. Ikle: Except that we might want to require that the discussion of new missiles take place in the SCC.

Secretary Schlesinger: Could we go back to Category I for just a second? The emphasis of the fourth rule must be on the agreed procedures in the SCC. If later on we wish to remove Minuteman III and deploy more MIRVs at sea, we may not want to destroy the silos. So the emphasis should be on SCC agreed procedures. We should not put emphasis on destruction of the silo.

President Ford: If we moved from the silo to sea, we don't want to be committed to dismantling it --

Secretary Kissinger: I suspect they would not agree to the procedure, but I agree with Jim --

The next set of issues deal with cruise missiles. The Soviets will undoubtedly say that the Aide Memoire applies to both ballistic and cruise missiles, even though we say only ballistic missiles. From the record, there is some legitimate ground for confusion. In Vladivostok, we're not sure the interpreter always interpreted the word ballistic. We have a

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strong interest in retaining the option to deploy long-range air launch cruise missiles -- I might say that I have some proprietary interest in them! (laughter) Alex could begin by saying that the Aide Memoire applies only to ballistic missiles. Furthermore, the Aide Memoire speaks only of heavy bombers -- other vehicles carrying cruise missiles are free, such as ships and transport aircraft. This is a perfectly legitimate interpretation of the Aide Memoire -- more legitimate than their interpretation of including cruise missiles. We could also propose that cruise missiles be counted above 3,000 kilometers. In return, any other aircraft carrying cruise missiles would be counted in the bomber total, and we would count them on any other vehicles. This closes a loophole in their favor. But Alex can go here from saying initially that only ballistic missiles are included. If they want to get bloody on the Vladivostok agreement, we'll just tell them that we'll put ALCMs on the cargo planes. That has its problems, but it bothers them --

President Ford: Where do we stand on the development of cruise missiles?

Deputy Secretary Clements: We plan to fly the first one in one year.

President Ford: What range will it have?

Deputy Secretary Clements: 1500 miles.

President Ford: How big a warhead?

Deputy Secretary Clements:

General Brown: With the accuracies we can get, it will be a very significant weapon.

President Ford: Could you repeat the progression, Henry -- our position at the start will be that only ballistic missiles are included?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes -- starting with ballistic missiles only, we would first agree to count ALCMs only above 3000 kilometers. Then we could agree to count any other aircraft with cruise missiles under a 2400 total, or even ban them on other aircraft.



President Ford: How would we verify them on other aircraft?

Secretary Kissinger: The verification of ALCMs is in any event mind boggling. If you say they count only if they are hanging on the aircraft, they can avoid the limit by not hanging them. If you apply the MIRV ground rules, any type of aircraft seen carrying them would have to count. We would verify by never flying them on tankers.

President Ford: Can you verify 1500 versus 3000 kilometers?

Mr. Colby:

Mr. Duckett:

General Brown: Of course, we'll tell them through our publications.

President Ford: That would permit us to verify if they were under 3000 kilometers within the limit. Do we have any information as to their development program?

Mr. Duckett:

President Ford:

Mr. Duckett: [.....]

Mr. Colby: They have an extensive program, but not the same kind as ours.

Mr. Duckett: Right. They have a lot more experience than we have, but of a different type.

Secretary Kissinger: They had long-range cruise missiles, but abandoned them when they went to ballistic missiles.

Mr. Duckett: In the early sixties, they had two programs, which they cancelled when we cancelled ours.



Deputy Secretary Clements: Our technology is such that they can't build the same thing for the next ten years. Our cruise missiles will be interchangeable -- on aircraft, ships, or submarines. It will be made the same size to fit on all of them.

Secretary Kissinger: We have a trade off we can make over launch modes -- tankers, ships, and so forth. We can get the Soviet reaction, but in this case, their reaction is totally predictable. They will insist that the Aide Memoire counts cruise missiles. But we can offer as a solution a longer limit -- counting over 3000 kilometers, together with counting them on other vehicles.

Ambassador Johnson: It's a fine point, but the Aide Memoire doesn't count ballistic missiles on other aircraft either.

Secretary Kissinger: That's right. We could put ballistic missiles on the C-5. We have enough loopholes that we could get somewhere.

President Ford: We're not in a totally defensive position.

Secretary Kissinger: It is in our own interest to close all of these loopholes; we want cruise missiles on bombers for penetration, but we don't want an arms race in cruise missiles on ships, submarines, and so forth.

Secretary Schlesinger: We need to be careful not to foreclose our tactical cruise missile options.

Secretary Kissinger: But those would be within the 600 kilometers.

Secretary Schlesinger: I'm not sure 600 kilometers does the job. We are thinking about deploying some of them in Europe.

President Ford: What range would those be?

Secretary Schlesinger: Probably 1200 kilometers.

General Brown: There's the sea case also --

Ambassador Johnson: Jim, are you talking about land based, or airborne?

Secretary Schlesinger: Airborne.

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Ambassador Johnson: ALCMs up to 3000 kilometers wouldn't be covered, so airborne would be okay --

Secretary Kissinger: In any event, it's clear that now the Aide Memoire covers cruise missiles only on heavy bombers. There's a big area in which Alex can negotiate.

Deputy Secretary Clements: We have good leverage on this.

Dr. Ikle: In the long run, the verification of cruise missiles will be difficult, and we may want to take them out and put them in a separate agreement.

Secretary Kissinger: A stalemate on this is totally predictable --

Dr. Ikle: The verification problem of cruise missiles is so severe that it might contaminate an overall agreement.

Secretary Schlesinger: I think that's right. There's no way to distinguish cruise missiles from drones, for example. We have drones on our C-130 aircraft. You probably want to put cruise missiles in a codicil to the agreement.

Secretary Kissinger: Brezhnev will be back in 1977! (laughter)

The other problem we have concerns heavy bombers. Bill, could you put up the chart with the bombers? (Colby shows chart)

The main issue is the Backfire. It's bigger than the F-111, but smaller than our B-1. It has identical range/payload characteristics with the Bison, which we have always counted as a heavy bomber. Thus, there's a good case that it should be counted.

We can expect the Soviets to strenuously resist this position. Most of their deployments so far have been with naval units, and our intelligence indicates that it is intended for peripheral missions.

Mr. Colby: There's some difference within the intelligence community, but our basic intelligence indicates that it is for peripheral missions, although it can cover all of the US on one-way missions.



Mr. Duckett: It is also refuelable, and that gives us some leverage, since it will be hard for them to explain why it's refuelable if they don't intend to use it except for peripheral missions.

President Ford: I don't understand the peripheral missions --

Mr. Colby: These are theater missions and naval aviation uses.

Mr. Duckett: It's important to remember that they built 1000 Badger medium aircraft in the 1950s. This is their largest single program ever undertaken. Thus, they may have a great incentive to get a new medium bomber, since they obviously see a considerable need for a medium bomber. But the question is why refueling --

Secretary Schlesinger: We may have to eventually fall back on this one also. But our initial position should be hard nosed. If we fall back, we still need ancillary agreements that if they deploy it with tankers or on Arctic bases that it would have to count.

President Ford: In other words, if they expand the bases and make them operational --

Secretary Schlesinger: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: Or deploy tankers.

President Ford: Do they have tankers now?

Mr. Duckett: A few that are really cludged up. They have put tanks in the Bison aircraft. They have limited experience with tankers, and limited equipment.

Secretary Kissinger: Mr. President, those are the major issues. There are others, such as mobile missiles, where they have an intermediate range missile which could cause problems. But we can come back to that later. This should not arise initially. Also, the Verification Panel was unanimous that we need to draw a limit on heavy missiles, since their new light missiles are considerably heavier than their old ones, so they don't keep creeping up.



President Ford: Defined in throw weight?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. We want them to agree that any ICBM greater than the SS-19 would be counted as a heavy ICBM.

Secretary Schlesinger: We may also want to get them to agree to define a category of "medium" ICBMs between 2500 and 7000 pounds throw weight. We are beginning to lose the concept of a light missile, and this might set the basis for some eventual limits on throw weight.

President Ford: Well, gentlemen, thank you. My impression is that we are making some headway in understanding these problems. Alex, when do you leave?

Ambassador Johnson: Tomorrow.

President Ford: When's your first meeting?

Ambassador Johnson: Friday, but that should be only exploratory. The first substantive meeting will be on Monday.

President Ford: Can you estimate any rate of progress?

Ambassador Johnson: I see two alternatives -- first, they may come back with a full-blown agreement.

President Ford: And want you to sign it! (laughter)

Ambassador Johnson: They won't want me to sign, but they may lay it on the table. The other possibility is that they will want to feel out our position. In either event, within a few days, or a few weeks, we will know their position.

Secretary Kissinger: We should then put our position forward. There is every indication that they want an agreement before Brezhnev's visit here in June. I think it may go faster than Alex expects.

Secretary Schlesinger: I would like to make one last point. Subsequent to SALT I, on every ambiguity, such as the 15% increase in dimensions, they pushed us to the limits. They will exploit every ambiguity so we should tie this down as much as possible.



President Ford: I agree. But your general thrust, Alex, is that we want to achieve success. We should aim at an understanding that will culminate when Brezhnev comes.

Secretary Kissinger: We need to get Alex out of town, before he starts meeting with the Murphy Commission to tell them how to beat the NSC system. He did it for four years when he was Under Secretary of State!
(laughter)

President Ford: Have you been up there to testify, Alex?

Ambassador Johnson: Not yet, but Bob and I play golf together every so often.

President Ford: I heard he has not been as staunch as we would like.

Secretary Schlesinger: Relative to the rest of the Commission, he has been very, very steadfast! We heard the rest of them on the intelligence business, and they were really off base; but he has been bringing them around.

President Ford: I had heard otherwise, but I am glad to hear I may have been wrong.

Secretary Kissinger: I believe he is coming around.

President Ford: Well, thank you all once again.

