

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Ford
Louis deGuiringaud, Minister of Foreign Affairs of France
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Amb. Jacques Kosciusko-Morizet, Ambassador of France

DATE AND TIME: Friday, October 1, 1976
10:35 - 11:25 p.m.

PLACE: The Oval Office

(The press came in to take photos. Small talk about press photos, campaigning, etc, The press left.)

President: I was in Hamburg in 1960 when they had an election. It was interesting to see their procedures.

DeGuiringaud: It is much different.

President: Not really, but the one poll was in the back of a beer hall.

Congratulations on your appointment. Please give my regards to the President. I very much treasure my relations with him. I think his state visit here did much to reaffirm the traditional and close relations between us.

DeGuiringaud: Thank you. I am conscious of the importance the President has put on me in appointing me his representative. The President has spoken to me of his visit and he thinks very warmly of you and prizes his relationship. I saw you at a distance on the 4th of July ship celebration.

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NBC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINE: *State Review 3/13/04*
BY H NARA DATE 7/20/04

CLASSIFIED BY Henry A. Kissinger
EXEMPTED FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5 B (1,3)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp to Oct.

President: I think our relations have constantly improved since I came into office and I see nothing which will change that.

DeGuiringaud: I agree completely Mr. President. I have already established an excellent working relationship with Secretary Kissinger.

Kissinger: I took the liberty of telling the President of our discussion of Africa and my request that Giscard weigh in with the Francophone leaders to support the accord. We have worked closely with the French on this and there is no one with whom our views are more parallel.

President: You can tell Giscard that this initiative is not a partisan matter in this country. It has received almost unanimous support here and we will pursue it. It is a high risk affair, but it is the right thing to do.

Kissinger: The alternative is inevitable radicalization of Africa.

DeGuiringaud: Houphouet-Boigny has great influence with Kaunda. I will especially get to him.

Kissinger: That is great. Kaunda is coming under pressure from Nyerere. Strengthening him would be most helpful.

DeGuiringaud: My consultations with my former colleagues at the UN indicate we cannot postpone the debate on Namibia. I understand there will be pressure for sanctions next week.

Kissinger: What would you do?

DeGuiringaud: We would veto sanctions under Chapter VII.

Kissinger: We would have to veto, and further, it's senseless. The outcome of our arrangements is inevitable and it's the only way really to get it. Fighting will take them 10 years anyway. Some of these African leaders have to prove to their people they are fighters. I think we have to sit on them. I would veto and sit back until they came to their senses.

DeGuiringaud: We will try to help. We will not try to influence you. You have taken the responsibility and you should have the freedom you need.

Kissinger: I am against giving concessions while the debate is going on. It will just whet their appetite for further concessions. We have gotten them 300% more than they asked for in June.

President: We have already gone further than many wanted us to. We will not be pushed around. They shouldn't think they can run over us with extreme demands.

Kissinger: If they push it for a vote, I propose we stop everything and wait for them to see they can't win over us. Then in January, after the UN session, we can move.

DeGuiringaud: Another subject. Ismail Fahmy made a quick trip to Paris and is meeting with President Giscard. As soon as I have a report, I will tell Secretary Kissinger.

President: Is it Lebanon?

DeGuiringaud: I don't know, but Sadat asked for it just after the Syrian offensive started.

President: Could it be a request for French troops?

DeGuiringaud: I wouldn't speculate. I personally am not anxious for French troops to go in there, and I don't think the President is.

We don't have great influence in that area, but we are doing what we can and I think our objectives coincide with yours.

President: I think the President made a very forceful speech, and I applaud him for it.

DeGuiringaud: I am resentful, because he did it the same day as I spoke to the UN. (Laughter)

Kissinger : President's have a way of doing that.

President: Was it well received?

DeGuiringaud: I think so. The President makes a very good impression on television.

Kissinger: I told Mr. deGuiringaud about our non-proliferation policy. He will discuss it and comment back. He mentioned the desirability.

DeGuiringaud: We will study it and my impression is we will find it compatible. We have established an export policy council to review and control this.

I would like to make one point. We would like it to appear that our policy in this area is independent even though it is coordinated with you. It would be impossible for President Giscard to appear to accept a line already set out by the United States. Otherwise it will paralyze us. So if you are going to make a statement, we would like to know beforehand so we could issue something beforehand.

Kissinger: How much time do you need?

DeGuiringaud: Ten to twelve days. We are going to Iran and could do it after that. We will not sign any commitments with them on reprocessing. We will tell them that we are reviewing policy. Maybe we will sign for two reactors, but not anything on reprocessing. We will assure them we will reprocess in France the fuel from the plants we give them.

President: Our constraints are doing it far enough ahead of the elections to be of benefit.

DeGuiringaud: I think we could do it by the 13th. That would give you over two weeks.

President: Henry, you get the letter to Giscard.

Kissinger: I think if we can work it out with France, we can have an agreement by February, and if we do it together, the Germans cannot resist us. We will get you the letter -- if you could do something by the 13th, maybe the President could wait until the 16th, then he will make his statement and it will be seen as a cooperative effort, as opposed to Carter wanting to go unilateral -- and against our allies.

French. Fort Meun
P/ de Guerny and
10 at 25

Fri
10:35 11:25

Person

June talk about press photo, emergency etc
Person

P I was in Hamburg in 1960 when they had
an election. It was interesting to see their procedure.

G I get much info.

P Not really, but one poll was in a back of a
beer hall.

+ G - we have

P Congratulations on your report. Please give my
regards to P. I very much treasure my relations
with him. I think his state visit here did much
to improve a habit + close relations between us.

G Thank you. I am sure of a step + P has
put on me in copying me his report. The
P has spoken to me of his visit and he
thinks very much of you + prizes his
relationship. I am sure you ^{at the} ~~will~~ of July
stay in Hamburg.

P I think our relations have constantly
improved since I came to office + I see
nothing which will change that.

G I agree very much Mr P. I have already stated
our equal but working relationship w/K.

K ~~was~~ I talk about of things P our division
of Africa + my request that General Giscard
in w/ P. I am sure leaders to support a
accord. We have worked closely w/ P. in
Africa + there is no one w/ whom our views are
more //.

P You can tell Giscard that this initiative is
not a partisan matter in this country. It
has used almost universal support



them & we will pursue it. It's a high risk affair, but it is right thing to do.

K The alternative is inevitable reorganization of Africa

G Houghton-Bailey has great influence w/ Kanda. I will esp get to him.

K That great. Kanda is ~~giving~~ under pressure from Congress. Strengthening him would be most helpful.

G My consultations w/ my former colleagues at UN indicate we cannot postpone & debate on Namibia. I understand there will be pressure for something with work.

K What would you do?

G We would want something under ~~the~~ ^{Chapter II}

K We would truncate it & further it is senseless.

The outcome of our arrangements is inevitable & early way really to get it. Fighting will take them 10 yrs anyway.

Some of these African leaders should prove to their people they are fighters. I think we have to set our terms. I would cut & set back until they come to their senses.

G We will try to help. We will not try to influence you. You have to make a call & you should have freedom you need.

K I am against giving concessions while a debate is going on. It will just whet their appetite for further concessions. We have gotten them 30% more than they asked for in June.

P We have already gone further than many would expect. We will not be pushed



overhead. They shouldn't think they can run over us w/ y theme demands.

K If they push it for a week, I propose we stop everything + wait for them to see they can't run over us. Then in Jan, after UN session we can move.

G another subject. Fabiani made a quote trying to Paris + is not w/ G. As soon as I have a report I will tell K.

P Is it ~~below~~

G I don't know, but ^{Supt} ~~it~~ asked first after Lygia's speech started

P Could it be request for F-1 troops

G I would not speculate. I probably am not anxious for F-1 troops to go in there, + I don't think K is.

We don't have great influence in that area but we are doing what we can + I think our objectives coincident/young.

P I think P made a very good speech, for I applaud him for it.

G I respect that, cause he did it some day as I spoke to UN (Langhans)

K P's have a way of doing that

P Was it well received?

G I think so. That P makes a very good impression on TV.

K I told G about our non-prob. policy. He will discuss it + comment back. He mentioned + desirability

G We will study it + my impression is we can't find it easy to take. We have established a policy council to review + control this.



G I would like to make 1 point. We would like it to appear that our policy in this area is edged even though it is understood w/ you. It would be impossible for us to accept a line already set out by a U.S. Official if it will paralyze us. So if you are going to make a statement we would like to know beforehand so we could issue something beforehand.

K How much time do you need.

G 10-12 days. We are going to Iran + would do it after that. We will not sign any statements w/ them on reprocessing - will tell them that we are pursuing policy. Maybe sign for 2 reactors, but not anything on reprocessing. We will assure them we will reprocess in 15 years a fuel from a plant we give them.

P Our constraints are doing it for energy ahead of the electrons to be of benefit.

G I think we could do it by c 13th that would give you over 2 wks.

P Hey, you get a letter to G.

K I think if we can work it out w/ F, we can have an agreement by Feb, + if we together, ~~we~~ a Congress cannot resist us.

We will get your letter + if you need do something by 13th, maybe a P would emit that ~~the~~ then he will make his statement + it will be seen as a cooperative effort, as opposed to Carter wanting to go unilaterally against our allies.

