

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/NODIS/XGDS~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Saturday - September 11, 1976
9:10 - 10:15 a.m.

PLACE: The Oval Office

Kissinger: The FBI made a bad mistake in releasing the hijacker's letter to the press. It isn't the substance but the policy of giving in to hijackers. [More discussion.]

I have the impression that the Soviets are on the verge of exploding at our slaps at them. We can't be soft on them but we should be careful because they could make it tough in October.

On my trip, there is no way a finished document can emerge from my trip. The best we can expect is a conference being convened, which will turn into one huge donnybrook.

On Rhodesia, we have the framework pretty well worked out with the British. I thought we would try to get Smith to put forward our plan as their proposal. Vorster would get it worked out, then the Rhodesian Cabinet would meet with me in Pretoria. They would go back home and come out with the proposal after a week or two.

The President: That seems like a good scenario. At least if it blows up it will be on their heads, not ours.

Kissinger: That is right, and there is a high chance of failure.

The President: Chiefly because of the Africans?

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CLASSIFIED BY Brent Scowcroft
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DECLASSIFIED

NSC MEMO, 11/22/99, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, State Review 3/13/04
BY: JAA NARA DATE 7/24/04



Kissinger: Yes. They are wholly unreliable. It is just impossible to predict how they will behave.

The President: What does Vorster say about his domestic problems?

Kissinger: I wish you could meet him. He is a fine man. He could stop it immediately if he acted like he did 15 years ago and killed 300 blacks in the next riot. I think he might have to create autonomous areas.

The President: Like Transkei?

Kissinger: He can't go to majority rule right away.

[Discussion of black psychology -- U.S. and foreign.]

I will be leaving Monday morning. [Discussion of the British Cabinet changes.]

The President: How about Soares? He wants a lot of aid.

Kissinger: And we should do it. But he is ineffective. The basic structure in Portugal is okay and we can assist Soares.

The President: And Spain is looking good.

[General discussion about Europe and the campaign.]

Kissinger: Have you given up on SALT? I am not recommending you proceed. If we had three months ago, we would be in good shape.

The President: As I told Brent earlier, on November 3 Ikle is going to be out of a job. I think he is in collusion with Defense.

Kissinger: Maybe not at the Rumsfeld level, but certainly at the staff level.

If you move now, you will be leaked to death and we will both be on the defensive on it.

The President: It is a damned crime. But let's have an NSC meeting anyway when you get back. I want to use that comparative chart Brent drew up. I want to hear them explain what are the differences between the two positions in terms which make military sense.

✓ P/R 11 Sept 76

K The FBI would be a bad mistake in releasing the longish letter to a press. It isn't a substance but a policy of going into big issues.

(Some more discussion)

- Show impression that a Sess are on a verge of exploding at our steps at them. We can't be soft on them but we should be careful because they could make it tough in Oct.

On my trip, there is no way a finished document can emerge from my trip. The best we can expect is a conference being convened which will turn into one huge draft book.

On Rhodesia, we have a framework pretty well worked out w/c British. I think we would try to get Smith to put forward our plan as their proposal. Foster would get it worked out, then a Rhod. cabinet would meet where in Pretoria. They would go back home & come out w/c proposal after ~~about~~ a week or 2.

P That seems like a good scenario. At least if it blows up, it will be on their heads, not ours.

R That is right - and there is a high chance of failure

P Chiefly because of Apartheid?

K Yes. They are wholly unreliable. It is just impossible to ~~say~~ predict how they will behave.

P What does Foster say about his domestic prospects.

K Don't you could meet him. He is a fine man. He could stop it immediately.

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/88, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES State Review 3/13/04

BY John NARA DATE 7/24/04

Text of Unwound speech for Bee, / Echles - first page on into
from 1947 to 1951.

What does it mean?

{ HSC only on die late 2 early parts. When it returns
They should take account of provisions

if he acted like 15 years ago & killed 300
blacks in a next riot. I think he would
have to create autonomous areas

P like Transkei?

K He can't go to majority rule right away.
(Discussion of black psychology - US &
foreign).

I will be leaving Monday morning.

(Discussion of the cabinet changes)

P How about James? He wants a lot of aid

K And we should list. But he is ineffective.

S He is now faced w/c probs of governing, as
opposed to his visionary oration.

K But we are better off than w/c alternatives.

The basic structure in Port is OK & we
can accept Soares.

P And Spain is looking good.

(Good discussion about Eur & a comparison).

K How you given up on Salt? Don't
recommend you proceed. If we had 3
months ago we would be in good shape.

P As I told Brent earlier, on Nov 3 Ikel is
going to be out of a job. I think he is
in collusion w/ Def.

K Maybe not at a Kershfield level, but
certainly at a staff level.

If you were wrong, you will be
looked to death & we will both be on
a dispensation on it.

P It is a damned crime. But let's have an RSC
with anyone when you get back. I want
to see that comparative chart Brent has

eg. I want to hear them explain what
are the diff. between a 2 partners in
terms which make military sense.