

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Gerald R. Ford
 King Hussein I of the Hashemite Kingdom
 of Jordan
 Secretary of State Kissinger
 Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
 for National Security Affairs
 Zaid Rifai, Prime Minister and Minister of
 Foreign Affairs and Defense
 Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary of State
 for Political Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Wednesday, March 31, 1976
 11:02 - 12:35 p.m.

PLACE: The Oval Office



The President: Is there anything new on Lebanon?

Kissinger: Murphy is supposed to see Asad but I have no report yet.

Hussein: I spoke to Asad. I think there is a bit of misunderstanding. The French have told him that the U. S. was against any Syrian involvement. Now he hears that the Americans are telling Jumblatt that we are urging them on.

Kissinger: That is totally wrong. [American charge] Lambrakis is a novice but we told him to say that we want an immediate ceasefire and Jumblatt should stop.

Hussein: It is an unfortunate misunderstanding and it should be straightened out.

Kissinger: Can't you tell Asad? And we will have Murphy do the same. We are totally behind him on the settlement and Jumblatt.

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Hussein: Otherwise, Asad says we must stop this madness. Positions are changing.

Kissinger: We hear Arafat is wavering.

Hussein: Asad is putting maximum pressure on him.

Kissinger: We want to build confidence with Asad.

Hussein: The other point is Egypt got in touch with us to participate in an Arab force. It is not feasible but it was nice of him to do it.

Kissinger: That is an Arab problem. We would be in favor, but it is really your problem.

Hussein: We had a meeting yesterday with some Congressmen and will have another today.

The President: How did it go?

Hussein: I think it went well. I told them about Lebanon and my Far East trip.

I told them that American domestic problems are not domestic problems, that the world is concerned about you; they don't know what to expect and what they can count on. In Africa, I told them they should not let a situation develop where the Soviet Union would appear to be the friends of black Africa.

The President: I am delighted with what you said. I got the same questions on my Far East trip. I said we would keep our commitments, we would maintain our leadership role. We do have handicaps compared to previous Presidents, but I think the situation will improve after the election.

Kissinger: Our biggest problem is not our strength -- it is our resolve. We are strong enough.

The President: For you to tell this to the Congress is good. It looks self-serving for me to say it.

Kissinger: But when you win the election on the stands you have been taking, you will be infinitely stronger.



The President: Let me say a word on our Middle East peace efforts. We are trying to get Israel to move in bilateral efforts with Egypt, Jordan, Syria, rather than taking a procedural approach which would bog down. What would your reaction be?

Hussein: We must avoid a stalemate. Some movement on the Golan following Sinai II would have helped. It is my feeling that if there was movement on the Palestinian issue, everything would fall into place. I met with the Israelis. They wanted a limited withdrawal and I said the time is past for that.

I asked if they were willing to go back to '67 borders. They said no, so I think they will just have to deal with the radicals.

Kissinger: It is clear but the more we stalemate, the more only the PLO can make concessions, so the Israeli strategy drives them into dealing with the PLO.

Hussein: Asad doesn't want a war, but he wonders what would justify renewing UNDOF.

Kissinger: There are two basic approaches: One is to convene Geneva. This gets us a brawl over the PLO. The PLO is considered by the American people as a group of murdering terrorists. In an election year, the Israelis can give us real problems over this. Even if we brutalize the Israelis to get Geneva convened, that only buys an admission ticket -- there is still the substance to go to.

You know Israel won't now talk about the '67 borders. We are thinking of a very major withdrawal simultaneously on all three fronts, in return for non-belligerency. We are thinking of 80-90% of the Arab territory being returned. We think if the Arabs could accept this concept, we think we could force a debate on this issue. We could then be making progress on a peace. It appears a more useful process than some gimmick to get UNDOF renewal.

Hussein: The problem is like Sinai II. We would give up everything in return for only part of our lands.

Rifai: If this is the only idea for movement, it won't work. It will not defuse the situation or break the deadlock. To the Arabs, the end of belligerency is the same as making peace. That may be wrong but that



is the way the Arabs think. That is the problem with the Sinai. In the West Bank, who would take back the territory? Not us. And how can we give non-belligerency when it is not our land to get back. We would ignore all the other Arabs only for the return of all the West Bank and East Jerusalem.

This proposal would be turning the clock back and it won't work in Syria and Jordan. It might work in the Sinai because Sadat has already given non-belligerency. So if he can get more back, why not?

Kissinger: We won't move with Egypt alone.

Hussein: Let me talk about our relations with Syria. We have moved closer. We are neighbors. The government is not so extreme. We are cooperating on five-year plans -- for water sharing, industry, education. Any decision taken must be on the basis of joint consultation and agreement.

Lebanon is the most serious problem at the moment. Also Iraq and Libya. The Sahara is also a problem. Egypt faces big problems. We wish Sadat every success. We have done our best to bring Egypt and Syria together, but it has been difficult. With the Saudis we are cooperating on contingency plans.

Kuwait is a source of potential instability.

These are the general problems in the area.

Kissinger: What do you think would work this year?

Rifai: His Majesty suggested that if Israel could withdraw a few kilometers on the Golan -- not as result of negotiations but unilaterally.

Kissinger: What are you saying -- give up settlement or just a few bombed yards short of the settlements?

Rifai: It has to be a straight line. It would have to include some settlements. They have said they need territory so their people won't be fired on, then they put settlements right on the line -- so theoretically they need more territory to protect the settlements.

Kissinger: What else?



Rifai: Why not Geneva? Even if nothing gets done, it would get the PLO involved in the talks. Another thing would be to change your policy in the UN. Why did you veto? It was an innocuous resolution -- just talked about violation of what Israel was doing, If you would just do something, make some gesture

Kissinger: We made a good speech.

Rifai: It was great, but the veto ruined it. In May at the renewal of UNDOF, what if the January resolution were repeated with the extension of UNDOF added.

Kissinger: We would have to veto.

Rifai: Then you kill UNDOF.

Sisco: Why would Syria do that? UNDOF is in their interest too.

Rifai: That is true, but it was a temporary force just for an interim period until more progress was made. He can't keep renewing for nothing.

Kissinger: As a realistic matter, for us to take on this proposal this year is impossible. But next year it is in our interest to move rapidly to resolve this agony. But this year we can't deliver on this year and it comes at a time of our maximum weakness.

If you want the Democrats to come out against the 1967 borders, just have us come out for them. We came within a hair's breath of going comprehensively last year. We narrowly decided we didn't have the power to carry it off.

To force us on something this year we can't deliver on would be a disaster. If we don't move next year, you can still go to war, you can still do whatever you want. But why now when we are so weak?

We really think we have a common problem -- getting through this year so we can make a massive effort for peace next year.

Actually, the President could have a tremendous success this year in a crisis supporting Israel against the Soviet Union and Syria.



Rifai: We agree with you. The last thing we want is to see the Democrats come in. But give Asad some assurance. If you will tell him you will be for total withdrawal next year in exchange for peace.

Kissinger: We can't discuss these things through diplomatic channels. We tried twice to meet with Asad. The two would get along well. Then the President could tell him some things privately. But that would have to be in connection with some trip or Asad coming to the UN. What we should really work at is to get the President and Asad together.

Hussein: That would be very, very good.

Rifai: Asad won't come to the UN.

Kissinger: We can always arrange a trip to Europe for some ceremony.

You don't want a debate on final peace in this country this year. The outcome would be a disaster in this irresponsible climate.

Hussein: We will take these things back with us.

Kissinger: We are ready to try to work out something to save face.

Rifai: Could we raise just a couple of bilateral issues?

On military equipment. You requested \$100/25 in aid and Congress is cutting it badly. We hope you can help, because even if we got everything, it would be peanuts. And for 1977 it is down to 75 MAP.

Kissinger: The problem is the Congress keeps mandating termination of MAP.

Hussein: In a few years, two-thirds of our tanks will be obsolete unless we modernize. In aircraft, we aren't getting at all what we need. We just must be stronger. If there is a Palestinian state, we have to be stronger, and for our relations with Syria. There is no option but to seek a minimum adequate military posture.

The President: You know my position over the years. It is a tough problem in this environment but we will do our best.



Kissinger: We will look at the figures again. Maybe we can project more into the future.

Rifai: We need 240 more REDEYE. [Describes]

The President: Brent, you talk to Rumsfeld.

Rifai: Anything which can be done to advance delivery dates. We have to wait until 1978 or 1979. We would hope you could improve on these.

The President: We do have a serious budgetary problem in 1977. I cut some popular domestic programs drastically so I wasn't able to do all I wanted in security assistance.

Rifai: Our people say we are your old friends and Johnny-come-lately Egypt and Syria get more.



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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

TIME: 11:00 A.M. to 12:30 P.M., March 31, 1976

PLACE: The White House

PARTICIPANTS:

U.S.

~~TOP SECRET~~
CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER
JORDAN

The President	Lt. Gen Scowcroft, His Majesty, King Hussein
Secretary Kissinger	NSC Prime Minister Rifai
Under Secretary Sisco	Amb. Thomas R. Pickering, Notetaker

The President: It is nice to see you again, Your Majesty.

Is there anything new on your side on Lebanon?

The Secretary: Our Jordanian friends have told me they

have some news. Murphy has arrived in Damascus and will be seeing Asad shortly.

King Hussein: I spoke with Asad a short while ago. I sent him a message yesterday to report the gist of our meeting. It seems a little misunderstanding has cropped up. I find this one a little difficult to handle. Asad's French contacts have given the impression that the United States is totally against Syrian involvement. They did not speak to him about guarantees at all. Worse than that, Jumblatt is saying to the Syrians that he met with the U.S. and that they are encouraging him to go ahead and resist a ceasefire.

The Secretary: That is total, absolute nonsense. We have not the most experienced man in Beirut. But our instructions were clear. We told him to urge Jumblatt to make an effort to conclude an immediate ceasefire. We have told Dean Brown



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to tell Jumblatt that one way or another a ceasefire must come quickly. He is to be brutal with Jumblatt and pass the same word to the PLO. He will have contacts with the PLO for this limited purpose. Could our Charge in Beirut have done this?

Under Secretary Sisco: This is a deliberate ploy by Jumblatt. He is using everything he can find to circumvent having to move toward a ceasefire. We are totally opposed to Jumblatt on this and completely behind Asad on the political settlement. Can you help us to find a way to convince Asad that this is a ploy by Jumblatt?


King Hussein: I am sending him an answer right away and will explain your position.

The Secretary: We have not told Murphy about this because it just never occurred to us that this would happen.

The President: We feel strongly about getting a ceasefire and we want to be sure Asad knows that.

Mr. Scowcroft: That was exactly what Murphy had instructions to say.

The Secretary: If Jumblatt says anything else, you can count on it as being pure psychological warfare. We are going to weigh in very heavily with Jumblatt. We are sending a message to the PLO that they will be destroyed if there is no ceasefire. We are telling Jumblatt that he must move ahead in the efforts toward a ceasefire.



King Hussein: May I present an opinion? It would be much better if someone else got in touch with Asad to tell him exactly what you think. It might be well for you to have Murphy also tell this directly to Asad. I am afraid he might be losing some confidence in your relationship. Therefore my recommendation is that you also approach him directly.

The Secretary: Your Majesty is right. If he holds doubts in his mind we will do it directly. (To Mr. Sisco) - Do a letter to Asad. Tell him we are totally behind an immediate ceasefire. Tell him we are behind him also in his position with Jumblatt.

King Hussein: You know, Sir, we have to stop this madness immediately. Asad has told me that he now believes things are a little bit better. He implied that certain elements now realize that things have changed. The left is still pushing, but apparently not as hard. He was definite about some change in the position.

The Secretary: It seems that Arafat has become uncertain.

King Hussein: Yes, Asad seems to be pushing him hard.

The Secretary: Brown will be absolutely brutal with Jumblatt. As I mentioned we have told him it is o.k. for him to be in touch with the PLO for this limited purpose. He is going to tell them they will be destroyed if they persist in their support for Jumblatt and against a ceasefire.

The President: This is our position and has been, and there has never been any deviation from it.

The Secretary: We do not want to lose the confidence of Asad. He and Syria are key in the area. We consider it absolutely essential that we maintain our relationship with him.

King Hussein: Egypt has come back again to us on the Arab force idea. We appreciate their nice gesture in getting in touch with us, but we believe that the idea is complete nonsense.

The Secretary: We will have to welcome the idea. But it is ^{primarily} Asad's problem. If it can be made to work we would be happy about it.

The President: Has Waldheim's statement on the subject brought any reactions in the area?

The Secretary: We have made a public statement calling it an appropriate action. There is no immediate action possible in response to it. He wants political negotiations to begin.

The President: You have have seen that one political candidate last night said that if he had been President he would have sent in the Marines. In this day and age it is obviously too late to do something like that.

The Secretary: It would be a total mess if we did something like that, Your Majesty.

The President: Too bad that candidates have to feel they must talk both ways about things like this.

Have we gotten anything back yet from Dean Brown?



The Secretary: No, he is just getting there now and will be getting together with Frangie later and some of the others.

The President: I suggest we stay in constant contact with you. We are making a maximum effort now to achieve a ceasefire. We will check with you while you are traveling around.

The Secretary: We will say publicly as little as possible on the suggestion about the Marines.

The President: I have been in touch with Ron Nessen, and we will handle it that way.

King Hussein: We had a good meeting with members of the Senate this morning.

The President: How did it go?

King Hussein: Well, I gave them my impressions on the Lebanese situation. I also passed on to them the results of my recent tour to Iran, Singapore, Australia, Japan, and the Philippines. I told them that I had been asked by all of our friends in that area to convey to you and their American friends the impressions that they now have. I told them rather frankly that our friends are now disturbed. They have a disbelief in what is happening in America. U. S. domestic problems are reflecting badly on U. S. will and resolve in foreign affairs.

All of our friends, Sir, do not know whether they can continue to count on you and your support in a crisis.



We have talked together and we recognize that we must do more together on our own.

However, Lee Kuan Yew in Singapore is particularly worried about the serious danger in Thailand. It seems that they face an immediate threat. But our friends here in America are under pressure to move out of the area. Lee Kuan Yew says it seems as if one group has taken the helicopters and left and the other group is being pushed over the cliff. Lee Kuan Yew expects in a few years to have the Communist threat on his doorstep. They have been close to you and are behind you but are concerned.

In Japan it seems that they have followed a policy which you helped set of putting into their Constitution that they are to have no Army or military force. Now they face a threat and such elements are needed, and they are going to have to work hard to develop them. We are all looking at more cooperation among ourselves, but we want to know where we stand with you. I conveyed to the Senators what was happening. The Soviets seem to be moving into Black Africa, and now into Lebanon.

They took it well this morning, at least from what I have heard in the way of feedback.

The President: I am delighted that you did this. Henry and I in public and on the Hill are saying the same things. When I was in the Philippines and Indonesia last year the same questions were raised with me. I assured them that

this Administration was going to help and was going to keep its commitments. There will be no retreat into isolation. We are determined to continue our role of leadership.

We admit that we have been hamstrung and blocked from time to time in several instances in the past. There would have been different results with the free hand that other Presidents have had in the past.

Now it is a question of time. Once the election is over the situation will be considerably better.

The Secretary: On the Hill they are more cautious these days. They are treating me with more care. When we came out with the Cuban threats, they did not come back with a resolution condemning them. I consider that the mood is turning on this point. The President and all of us are calling attention to demonstrating resolve in handling all of our biggest problems.

The President: The perception overseas is our problem.

King Hussein: That is certainly true and it is very serious, Sir.

The President: We will do it with Your Majesty's help. We want to assure all of our friends that we recognize this issue and that we understand their disappointment. We hope that you will tell them when you are here in the United States of your perceptions. I am sure it will have a good impact. I hope you will pardon what I say because it sounds self serving, but I believe it is important for you to do this.



The Secretary: If you will pardon me, Mr. President, for speaking frankly, if you win in your campaign, based on carrying out a strong foreign policy, you will be a great deal stronger after November.

The President: We have one more matter on the Middle East to discuss with reference to possible Israeli movement toward a political settlement. As you know, following the war and after the Sinai agreement we have been using all of our influence to get the Israelis to move forward. We do not think the Israelis are likely to be easy to move. We do not believe a future step lies in trying to work through all of the procedural problems with a conference like Geneva. There is every possibility that there will be a stalemate over the PLO. We have, however, considered the possibility of getting the Israelis to move in bilateral negotiations with Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. We recognize fully the problems that a move on a broad front might cause. But we believe we should move in a meaningful way.

The Secretary: We do not, of course, Your Majesty, exclude some multilateral steps.

King Hussein: The feeling in the area is very clear. A stalemate is very dangerous for all of us in the long run and also for the immediate period. We have had several ideas on this in the past. One of our thoughts was that we could concentrate on one aspect of the problem. There must be something for Syria on the Golan. We suggested the possibility of getting

a unilateral Israeli move there in favor of Syria. But there has been no response to our suggestion.

We believe also, Sir, that if this is not possible, the area to concentrate our efforts is on the Palestinian problem. We feel that a concentration on that problem might help other parts of the solution to fall into place.

We had a meeting with the Israelis just before Rabin came here earlier this year. They spoke to us about some disengagement on the Jordanian front. With all respect, Sir, we cannot turn the clock back. All of this aside, if you want Jordan in the negotiations, cannot you come out for total withdrawal. We certainly cannot consider entering the negotiations without the assurances of total Israeli withdrawal. It is the only circumstances under which we can consider this.

The Secretary: Not even on the Sinai?

King Hussein: That would only give the extremists the chance they want to destroy any effort. If that is the Israeli attitude then stress to them that they should talk to the extremists. Let the PLO make the concessions, or try to make them. We certainly can't do it. Maybe if the PLO fails, we can turn to some moderates in Palestine (West Bank). Or we can consider this ourselves. But we do not want to take the responsibility for making the concessions.

The Secretary: This is an important point, Mr. President. The longer the stalemate goes on, only the extremists can break the deadlock. Israel's policy in this instance enhances the role of the PLO.



In 1973 and 1974 His Majesty proposed a pullback which the Israelis rejected. If it had been achieved, the situation in the Middle East would be vastly different now.

King Hussein: We do not see much give on the Israeli side. Their treatment of the West Bank seems to be a case in point. They have created a serious problem there and they are now reacting violently to it which makes the matter serious. They have enflamed and influenced emotions in the area. My information is that all the West Bank Arab community leaders have resigned. An election is supposed to be coming and we do not know what will happen. Israeli publicity came openly from the West Bank. We do not understand what the Israelis think they are doing.

As for the Syrian position on the UN presence question, Asad sees a real problem coming up. He does not want war and does not want to go to war. But he does not feel he can extend the mandate without knowing against what hope it is to be extended. What are the directions in which you are thinking?

The Secretary: What we have thought about is that it would be very unhelpful if President Asad did not appreciate that we cannot have a problem of facing blackmail every six months on this mandate renewal. On the one hand we know you appreciate that if we talk about Geneva we will be involved in endless debate over the cause of the PLO. This is the worst possible issue for us in an election year. This year we must be realistic

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in facing the problem. There are six or eight candidates for the Presidency. But I must be completely frank with you. A crisis produced in the foreign policy area would not be detrimental to the President. On the other hand, in an election year we cannot be subject to threats and we cannot solve the problems of dealing with the PLO. The American public thinks they are terrorists under the control of the Soviet Union. If we move toward the PLO we will hurt the Arab cause more in this country. We will hurt the Arabs and be helping the Israelis.

To do this we must beat up and blackmail the Israelis. It will take us at least six months to take such a step. We cannot move before an election, and even if we do the Israelis will wait to see if another President gets elected. Getting the PLO into any conference buys us all a ticket of admission to another stalemate. What is it that we can possibly get started after that? We might get started on the question of territory and peace conditions. Israel will not take the 1967 lines as a matter of principle. Why not get them to move back very substantially on their territory in exchange for something short of the end of the state of war on all three fronts at the same time.

On the Golan it is not possible for Israel to go back without taking away most of the settlements. They will have to go in the long run. Rabin agreed that he will be prepared to move on the settlements. Once we get the settlers off, it will

be a lot easier, because the settlements are also the biggest obstacles in the West Bank, as you know.

In the Sinai we have had some experience. Under this approach 80 or 90% of the territory might be returned in a relatively brief period after our elections. What is left can be debated and negotiated for in return for peace. We think the Arabs can accept this kind of a step. We are willing to force a decision on territory on all three fronts. We can spend the year usefully. This is not an unreasonable proposal for the Israelis. We can move ahead to get them to accept it.

But if we try to go for an overall move next year what good is it for Asad except as an empty formula. It is no good for him in May.

King Hussein: Steps toward an ultimate solution/^{are}worth considering. Sinai II cannot remove the right to get the territory back and we will not do so until we get it back.

The Secretary: If you get some kind of a commitment on territory or guarantees of return you will actually achieve that.

The President: The Israelis see a great difference between the end of the state of war and peace.

The Secretary: Yes, Your Majesty, you can continue to struggle in every way even though you have given up belligerency.

Every war that we know of except in the Middle East has broken out between countries at peace. The peculiarity of the Middle East is that war has broken out between countries in a state of war. You have a quarrel with Iraq although you are at peace.

You have not given up your sovereign right to use force. The Arab right to struggle does not depend on a state of war in the area.

Prime Minister Rifai: I want to speak frankly. If this is all you have we are not going to have any progress. This will not work. The Arabs are not going to take this stalling. We have here what I call motion without movement. The Israelis themselves want to stall. This will not see us through the year, defuse pressure or break deadlocks. We need some actual withdrawals.

For the Arabs the end of the belligerency is the same as peace. We ran into it in Sinai II. It is immaterial whether the Israelis withdraw 50 kilometers or 500 kilometers if it excludes total withdrawal. In the Arab mind if it is accepted it becomes a peace arrangement. It is even more complicated in Syria. And in the West Bank the withdrawals will be in favor of whom? Jordan cannot take territory back. We are committed to hand it over to the PLO. Who will give the non-belligerency commitment? In Jerusalem, Jordan is not responsible. Will there be a new UN mandate on the West Bank? How can Jordan start? Our position in the process is excluded. We would have to stand against all the other Arabs. Only if we can get all of the territories and Jerusalem back can we go back on the Rabat Conference, and then we are willing to stand in the face of all the other Arabs. But we cannot give concessions for part of the territory.

What the Secretary has mentioned, the Israelis have given to us before--95% of the territory and 90% of the population. The Israeli's don't want the people. They will keep Jerusalem and their positions along the River. They told us the same thing after 1967. They made the same proposition again to us a few months ago. When they had a chance for some withdrawals they refused. We cannot turn the clock back now.

Frankly, our views are that your proposal will not work in Syria and Jordan. Sadat might go for it in the Sinai. Sadat has already accepted non-belligerency and with him you might have a positive result.

The Secretary: We will not go separately with Sadat.

King Hussein: Egypt is annoyed with us, because they wanted us to move in a way which would try to shield and help them. We cannot do that. We want to dispell any doubts about it. The Egyptians are not happy about our relations with Syria. But we believe our relations with them are constructive. We believe the Syrian leadership now recognizes that they will have to consult with us if they went to war. Lebanon is also an example. With the Syrians we plan to start with the simple, fundamental steps. We are coordinating economic planning in both countries. Both of us have five-year plans. We are cooperating in areas such as water, power and education. Syria took the Jordanian syllabus for its primary school children, for example. In Lebanon we have had a chance to discuss the problem. We both agree that any decision should be made as a

result of joint consultation and agreement. As a result we both are assuming that no actions will be taken until they are carefully looked at and studied. We have tried to rule out impulsive actions and we feel this has been of genuine benefit. We look upon the possibility of eventually having this touch on a broader scale in the area.

Lebanon is our most serious problem. Iraqi and other extremists from Libya and Algeria are aggravating the situation. In the Sahara we believe that the Summit Conference decided and the Algerians agreed to renounce their rights in favor of Morocco and Mauritania.

Egypt has its problems. We wish them every success, but we believe their weakness is a great danger. We have always believed Egypt is important, but not the shepherd to push the flock of sheep around as it wished. Recent developments with Egypt are sad for us. We have tried to dispell some of Egypt's negative views toward us. We wish for the good of the Egyptians and the Arab world. We tried to bring Sadat and Asad together, but their quarrel is personal and is not subject to patching up at this point.

In Saudi Arabia we believe the situation is dangerous. There
* is not the degree of organization and progress that there was under Faisal. We have tried to coordinate with them on such issues as contingency planning in the area. Iran has the same problem in dealing with Saudi Arabia. Faisal was strong and dominated his advisers. Fahd is able, but he cannot do all that

he wants. He is having trouble implementing some agreements. Our impressions are that some of the other advisers have gotten out of hand. There is internal disarray.

Kuwait we believe is a potential trouble spot of the first order.

In the Gulf, Oman is stable. In the UAE we have sent a new Jordanian Chief of Staff. He has instructions from me that there must be a firm agreement to reorganize and centralize the military or he is to return.

In North Yemen we have good allies, a military mission, and fine cooperation.

These are our area problems. There is of course still the Israeli issue.

The Secretary: What do you recommend that we do.

Prime Minister Rifai: There are a number of things. First, we have suggested a unilateral move on the Golan. There cannot be negotiations. Territory does not have to be returned to Syria. We can extend the UNDOF Zone. It would demonstrate your good intentions and would be a realistic move. The UN could go in.

The Secretary: What realistic moves are really open to us. What you suggest might be a few hundred yards but that would be more insulting to Asad. If we get them to accept the principle of moving the settlements, that will be a very difficult problem. Do you suggest we get them to move the settlements?

Prime Minister Rifai: What I am suggesting is a straight line along the front.

The Secretary: In that event we would have to move settlements.

Prime Minister Rifai: I am suggesting only a few kilometers to the West; some of the settlements would stay.

This is the problem, Henry. The reason the Israelis claim they wanted to hold on to the military occupation was that it gave them protection for their settlements along ^{old} the/cease-fire line. Now they are beginning to push their settlements up to the new ceasefire line. That just means that they will be asking for more territory to defend those settlements. Under this thesis they could take over the world.

The Secretary: What movement can we get?

The Prime Minister: You can still get Israel to move.

The biggest argument against a peace settlement is Israeli settlements. We must keep working on this. I am sorry we have this difference, but something must happen.

The Secretary: What else?

The Prime Minister: We want no war in 1976. We need to look from day to day. Any movement will help. If a second Geneva is possible, why not put pressure on the Israelis to accept the PLO. We are not asking for recognition. Presence at the conference implies recognition of Israel and 242. We could go on talking in 1976 and 1977. There is no harm in that. If nothing is done in Geneva then why not some change in your position in the UN. Why did you veto the resolution on Jerusalem? Your vote did not correspond with your statement.

The Secretary: We had the impression the emphasis in our speech was well received.

The Prime Minister: It was an excellent and positive speech with good results in the Arab world. I told your Ambassador in Amman the Soviets could work for 10 years and you could better them in a day.

The Secretary: The speech was more important than the vote.

The Prime Minister: I disagree. You had 14 members of the Council against. You could have abstained. Why not make the U.S. the champion of justice in this kind of thing. The U.S. has become

isolated and differs with the whole world. Any gesture would be a good move forward. Now in May we will have the UNDOF renewal in the Security Council. What the Syrians have in mind is a resolution similar to the one you vetoed in January with all of the prerequisites on withdrawal, peace and the final paragraph on renewal of the UNDOF. You cannot obtain a paragraph-by-paragraph vote. They will have enough votes to defeat that.

The Secretary: We will have to veto a resolution like that:

Under Secretary Sisco: Why should Syria torpedo UNDOF?

They need it.

The Prime Minister: They feel it was created as a temporary measure for a disengagement agreement until further discussions brought about more progress. It has been there for two years and renewed three times. Asad loses credibility unless he gets something for renewal. What will he tell his people, his army, and the Arab world. He will only have to renew it again in November but in return for what? He needs political cover himself.

Last time His Majesty convinced Asad to extend the mandate. He sent a message about the need to extend it. Asad needed an excuse. Asad then agreed to send a division to the Iraq border on a pretext. There were no Iraqi soldiers there. He renewed it again a second time on a pretext of Lebanon. He can defend himself now without UNDOF. If Israel attacks it will suffer heavy losses. We have told him he can't do this. Jordan has a 600 kilometer border and cannot defend it. Asad needs some real cover.

The President: What other provisions were in the resolution?

The Prime Minister: Our interpretation of 242, withdrawal from all territory, Palestinian rights, having their own state, guarantees for all states in the area, those elements in the basic formula for peace. There are two differences from 242, total withdrawal and Palestinian rights. The problem is that without this we believe there will be no peace.

The Secretary: Let's be realistic about this matter. What you are asking for this year is impossible. Next year it is in our interests to begin moving. We cannot live under constant blackmail. This year we cannot deliver and there will be an explosion if we exert maximum pressure. You must know that in one week we face primaries in California and in six weeks the Democratic convention. If we come out in favor of this, the Democratic platform will come out against the 1967 borders. Doing it six weeks before the Democratic convention would be a disaster. We would have done it last year. The President decided on our advice that if he took it on we would lose. Then the whole area would explode.

The President: We came within a hair's breadth of doing it.

The Secretary: We did Sinai II instead. I did not like it. But it was the preferred route on the basis of our recommendations. The President decided we did not have the power to carry the Senate should it decide to vote a resolution against us. It was bad last year. It is totally inconceivable this year.

What does Asad get from what you suggest? This time next year the Arabs will note whether we still have the power to move on or not. To force something on us now is a disaster because you will get part of the country irreconcilably committed against it.

I hope Asad can be made to see that we need peace and quiet before the election. The best thing for the President is that we should all act with great care. But a crisis would not be a great liability for him. I say frankly if there is a war and he pushes somebody around it will help him. Israel will claim Syria is a Soviet stooge. Israel will win and it will push back our chances for any progress for a long time. We are ready to stand up in a confrontation with the Soviets if necessary.

We and Asad have a common problem. He must get through this year. We can make a massive effort next year at an overall peace. But we have to remain open minded.

The Prime Minister: We understand this very well as partners and allies. Frankly the last thing we want is a Democratic administration here. What the Secretary has just said might help you to avoid a crisis. What kind of movement can we expect? We must talk to Asad and convince him and give him something. He is not convinced that your interest will be in obtaining total withdrawal. He does not believe that next year you will be able to get Israel out. It is a case in his judgment of "nothing for nothing." What position do you really take on the end objective of negotiations?

The Secretary: We cannot do this through diplomatic channels. We want Asad and the President to get together.

The President: We have tried on two occasions.

The Secretary: I think the President and Asad will like each other and get along well. You can also tell him, Mr. President, privately what their objectives are. They will be along the lines that we have already explained. Asad can make his own judgment face to face. We can do

this on a trip to the Middle East or to Europe, or Asad can come to the UN. There are any number of ways. We have always thought a meeting would be absolutely essential.

The President: I tried on two occasions to meet him. The reasons were never clear why we could not do so. We were very close last March, after the breakdown, to a comprehensive statement about our policy on peace. We were going to go directly to the American people. But it was not feasible then.

The Secretary: The President considered all of this in February. We tried to give him our best judgment. But the problem was difficult then and it is now worse.

We need to get the President and Asad together, Asad is straightforward and so is the President. The two should sit together and talk directly.

The Prime Minister: This is good.

The President: We had considered a trip to the Middle East, but only on the basis of having no opponent in the primaries.

The Secretary: Maybe we could consider June.

The President: If he stays in that will be difficult. Maybe we could do it after November, or Asad could come here for the UN.

The Prime Minister: He will not come for the UN.

The Secretary: If we decide to have the President meet him he can always go to Europe. We could find an excuse for meeting Asad there.

Under Secretary Sisco: Mr. President, it will be important for His Majesty to give his positive impressions to Asad on the realities of this. If he moves in May it will be very clear that

it will set mediation back.

The Secretary: You wouldn't want this crisis here. For the Congress this is the worse time. In my judgment it would be extremely bad this year and we could well get a resolution against it.

The President: They would never do this against a newly elected President. He would have far more flexibility and public support.

The Secretary: If there is this sort of crisis it will help our opponents. It cannot help us.

The King: We will take all this back to Asad and give him our firm impressions.

The Secretary: We are prepared to try to work out some face-savers for Asad, and we should bring the two Presidents together.

The Prime Minister: We hope to get the President over to the area. It would put the U.S. back in play.

The President: We were actively talking about this until Reagan muddied the water. It depends on whether he stays in the campaign.

The Prime Minister: This will be especially important if you can make your intentions known to Asad.

The Secretary: It cannot be in every newspaper in the country.

The Prime Minister: There have been no leaks from Syria. All the leaks come from Washington.

The Secretary: Syria doesn't leak.

The President: Is there anything else we should discuss?

The Prime Minister: There are a few bilateral problems. In the area of military aid we are slipping behind. Only Lebanon is weaker in the area. It is bad and getting worse. This year we were put up for \$100 million in grant aid and \$75 million in FMS credit. The House has cut the grant aid to \$70 million and the Senate cut it to \$50 million. We are in conference now and we hope it will come out alright. But some of the Senators have told us the Administration has moved too late on the issue.

In the 1977 request for our ^{grant} military aid we are down from \$100 million to \$75 million. / We would like some projection of where we are going.

The Secretary: As you know there has long been an effort to cut down on the MAP. The Congress is bent on reductions.

The Prime Minister: We would like to know the scope for the future. Are we going down to zero?

The President: As you may know, we have tried to make the relationship on the Middle East on the basis of a formula. A certain amount to Israel, with a comparable amount to Jordan and Egypt. We have not done as well as we would have liked. We are taking a strong position on this. I had the Chairman of the sub-committees up here yesterday and made some bitter complaints. They cut the total MAP from \$400 million to \$225 million.

The Prime Minister: It would not be so bad if they cut proportionately, but Israel was cut from \$2.3 billion by only \$500 million, while we were cut by half.

The King: There is a serious problem in addition to the HAWK and air defense. In 3 years over two-thirds of our armor will have to be scrapped unless we begin modernization. We will need one hundred seventy-six new aircraft for our new bases.

Prime Minister:

/ At 8 or 10 per year it will not be before the year 2000 until we get them.

The Secretary: I just wanted you to know that your cynical comment was not wasted on me!

The King: We look at Israel and how strong it is. We have to tell our own people that we can improve our strength. If we are not strong, we cannot do much. Suppose there is a Palestinian state on the West Bank. We must be strong to be sure it does not get out of hand. Even our own situation with Syria brings certain dangers. If the situation in Damascus ever changed we would have a large state with great resources against us. Even if things continue in the same way, we cannot be a week state in the Middle East. There is no ^{other} option for us. We must seek our minimum needs.

The President: I am worried by the reductions. I am spending my personal time on this. I have not changed my view over the years. This is a tough problem and we have had to keep a careful eye on our own budget.

The Prime Minister: Can you take another look at 1977, review the figures? Can we see about an increase to offset the reductions?

The Secretary: We will take another look at this and review the figures to see if there is anything in the MAP monies that can be picked up. We will also see about projections. We have done this for Spain and Turkey and we should be able to do this for you.

The Prime Minister: Also we need your help in getting permission for the Pentagon to release immediately to us 270 Redeyes. They are not produced now, so we cannot get them from production. We have asked for the Stinger, but they will not release that to us. It will be a year or so also before it is in production.

The President: Brent, will you talk to the Pentagon about this.

The Prime Minister: We also had a delegation here led by our Commander-in-Chief last month and they had good talks, but the Pentagon was unable to release a number of things. They were first told that it would be 1980, then 1979 and now 1978. We cannot pay now and then only get delivery in 1978.

The President: Are they M-60s and M-48s?

The Prime Minister: Yes, they are.

The President: We have managed to increase our production.

Ambassador Pickering: Jordan is mainly concerned about tracked artillery as well.

The Secretary: We do not know about this here, but Brent can talk with the Pentagon.

The Prime Minister: Thank you. This is always a problem of comparison for us also.

The King: We know about Israel, but Syria too is getting massive assistance.

The Prime Minister: Many people are saying that the comparison is not favorable. Your other allies are looking on and so are our friends. Egypt is getting \$800 million and Syria \$250 million.

Undersecretary Sisco: That is too high a figure for Syria. It is only about \$80 or \$90 million.

Prime Minister: We are also disturbed by getting nothing in the transitional quarter.

The Secretary: The Congress will probably give you the transitional quarter money.

The President: We are going to have a massive confrontation with the Jewish community. They are not satisfied with our generosity and want \$500 million more. I do not intend to capitulate.

The King: We will pay you the \$12 million which we owe on the HAWKS when we get the \$300 million from Saudi Arabia.

The Secretary: We are in touch with Saudi Arabia. We are urging them most strongly to pay for the full program for your HAWKS.

The Prime Minister: We do not expect that you will be able to budge them.



The Secretary: The Shah told His Majesty that we were exasperated and had asked the Saudis to cut off funds for Jordan. There is no conceivable way we would do this. We in fact have done just the opposite.



P/King Hussein
31 Mar 76

✓

3

P. Is there anything more on Lebanon.

K. Murphy is supposed to see Assad but I have no report

H. I spoke to Assad. I think there is a bit of misunderstanding

The Fe have told him that a US was against any Syrian involvement. Now he hears that a Arms are taking Jumbhatt that we are urging them on

K. That is totally wrong, handbooks is a noise but we told him to say that we want an immediate CF - Jumbhatt should stop.

H. It is an impat. misunderstanding - it should be straightened out.

K. Can't you tell Assad, and we will have Murphy do a same. We are totally behind him on a settlement - Jumbhatt.

Otherwise, Assad says we must stop this madness. ~~That~~ Factors are changing.

K. We hear Assad is warning

H. Assad is putting more pressure on him

K. We want to build confidence w/ Assad.

H. The other point is Egypt in touch w/ us to participate in an Arab force. It not feasible but it was nice for him to do it.

K. That an Arab force. We would be in /over, but it is really your move.

H. We had a mtg yesterday w/ some Cong & will have another today.

P. How did it go?

H. I think well. I told them what Lebanon & my Far East trip.

I told them that some domestic problems are not domestic prob, that a world is concerned about us; they don't know what to expect &

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, DEC. 31, 2003

NSC MEMO, 11/24/03, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, State Rev. 02/12/04

BY 111, NARA DATE 6/17/04



Wm. Thoms - bid to raise w/p.

What they can count on. In Africa, I told them
~~we~~ they should not let a set delay where SU
would appear a friend of Black Africa.

P I am delighted w/ what you said. I got a number
questions on my F-E trip. I said we would keep our
contacts, we would enter our leadership role. We
do have handbills compared to previous P's, but I
think it will improve after a election.

K Our biggest problem is not our strength - it
is our resolve. We are strong enough.

P For you to tell this to a group is good. It
looks self-serving to me.

K But when you voice election on the streets
you have been talking, you will be infinitely
stronger.

P Our ~~the~~ ME peace efforts. We are trying to get
I to move in bilateral efforts w/ E, Jordan, Syria,
rather than taking a procedural approach which
would lay down. What would your reaction be?

H We must avoid statements. Some movement on
Custom following Session II would have helped.

It may feel that if there was movement on
Kallo. issue, many things would fall into place.
I met w/ c I. They wanted a hand w/ chronol + I
said time is past for that.

I ~~was~~ asked if they were willing to go back to '67.
They said no, so I think they will just have
to deal w/ a radicals.

K It is curious but a more or statements a more
only a PHO can make missions, so c I
feeling drives them to ^{negotiate} w/ PHO.
Asad doesn't want war, but wonders what would



Justifying running UNDOF

K There are 2 basic approaches: One is to convene Geneva. This gets us a hand over PLO. The PLO is considered by the US people as a group of wandering terrorists. In an election year, I can give no real push over this.

Even if we had this, I'd get Geneva convened, that only buys an admission ticket - there is still a roadblock to go out.

You know I don't ever talk about G? borders. We're thinking of a very major withdrawal, on all 3 fronts for non-bellig. We're thinking of 80-90% of Arab territory being returned. We think if Arabs could accept this concept, we think we could find a debate on this issue. We could then be making prog on a pace. It appears a more useful process than some gimmick to get UNDOF renewed.

H The prob is like Sinai II. We would give up everything in return for only part of same lands.

~~RK~~ If this is a only entry for agreement, it won't work. It will not expose a set a bank a deadlock. To the Arabs, end of bellig is a serious making plan. That may be wrong but that is a way the Arabs think. That is a prob w/ Sinai. In W. Bank, who would take back the territory? Not us. And how can we give non-bellig when it not our land to get back. We would require all other Arabs only for return of all W. Bank & E. Jerusalem.

This proposal would be turning a clock back & it won't work in Syria & Jordan. It might



work in Sinai course Sadat has already given
now - holding. So if he can get more back, why not?

K We want more of E's arms.

H Let's talk about some relations w/ Syria. We
should move closer. We are everywhere, effort
is not so extreme. We are on eye plans,
water sharing, industry, education. Any decision
taken must be on basis of joint consultation &
agreed.

Libanon is not serious problem anymore. Also
Iraq & Turkey. Sahara is also a prob. E
faces big prob. We wish Sadat very success.
We have done our best to bring E & Syria together,
not at all diff. G/Sandis are are easy on
contingency plans.

Kennan is a source of potential instability.

~~On E's side~~ These are a good prob in case -

K What do you think would work this year?

R N/A suggested if E could withdraw a few km
on Golan - not as result of negot but unilaterally.

K What are you saying - give eye settlements
a just a few hundred ^{yards} short of a
settlements.

R Has G to a straight line. We'd have to include
some settlements. They have said they need
territory so their people won't be fired on, then
they put settlements right on a line - so theoretically
they need more territory to protect a settlements.

K What else

R Why not Geneva? E even if nothing gets done,
it would get a PhD awarded in talks. Another
thing would be to change your policy in a

UN. Why did you veto. It was an unanimous resolution - just talked about continuation of what I was doing. If you could just do something, make some gesture

K We make a good speech

R It was great, but a veto ruined it. In way at renewal of UNDOF, what if a joint resolution were adopted w/ extension of UNDOF added.

K We would have to veto

R Then you bill UNDOF

Since why would Syria do that? UNDOF in their interest too.

R True, but it was a temporary face just for an interim period until more was made. He can't keep renewing for nothing.

K As a realistic matter, for us to take on this prop. this year is impossible. But next year it is in our interest to move rapidly to resolve this agony. But this year we can't do better on this year & it comes at a time of our max weakness.

If you want to come to some agreement 67 books, just have us come and for them. We came w/ in a hairs breadth of going completely last year. We narrowly decided we didn't have a power to carry it off.

Too far us on something this year we can't deliver would be a disaster. If we don't move next year, you can still go to war, you can still do whatever you want. But why move when we are so weak.

We really think we have a common best - getting



thru this year so we can make serious effort
for peace next year.

Actually, c P's could have tremendous
success this year in a crisis supporting
I against S & Syria.

R We agree w/ you. The last thing we want
is to see Demos come in. But give Assad
some assurance. If you will tell him
you will be for total w/ drawal next year in
4 months for peace.

K We can't discuss these things publicly. Chomsky
we tried to meet w/ Assad. ~~From~~ Then
I would get along well. Then c P would tell
him some thing privately. But that would have to be
in consultation w/ some trip or Assad coming to UN.
What we should really work at is to get c P & Assad
together.

H That would be very very good.

R Assad won't come to c UN.

K We can always organize a trip to Europe for some
reasoning.

You don't want a white or final peace in this country
this year. The outcome would be a disaster in this
unpredictable climate.

H We will take these things back w/ us

K We are ready to try to work out something to save peace

R Would we raise first a couple of bilateral issues
On mil. equip. You requested 100/25 in aid
& Cong is cutting it badly. We hope you can
help, cause even if we got every thing it would be
practical. And for 1977 it is down to 75 M/AP

K Push is Cong changes in delaying termination of M/AP.



H In a few years 2/3 of our tanks will be obsolete makes
 no sense. In fact we aren't getting at all what
 we need. We just must be stronger. If a Pako starts
 we have to be stronger & from relations w/ Syria.
 There's no option but to make a ~~minimum~~ adequate
 unit position.

P You know my position over 1 year. It is a tough
 job in environment but we will do our best.

R We will look at figures again. Maybe we can't
 project more into future.

R We need 200 more DeSolve. (Desolve)

P Brent will talk to Pennfield.

R Anything which can be done to advance delivery dates.
 We have to wait til 28 or 29. We would ~~like~~ hope
 you could improve on that.

P We do have a serious land getting job in 77. I want
 some popular domestic prog drastically to demand
 able to do all I wanted in security assis.

R Our people say we could friends & Johnny were
 lobby E + Syria get more.

