

~~SECRET/NO DIS/XGDS~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Gerald R. Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and
Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs.
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs.

DATE AND TIME: Thursday, October 16, 1975
9:33 - 10:44 a.m.

PLACE: The Oval Office
The White House

President: I thought I would fill Henry in on the talk with Schlesinger.

Kissinger: I haven't had a chance to talk to Brent about it.

President: He asked for the meeting, but I don't know if we got to his subjects. We started on personnel. It looks like we will lose Ellsworth. I offered a couple of jobs to him but he wanted to stay where he was, but with a higher title. I said I couldn't see making two deputies in Defense. He asked about an undersecretary rank. I said send me the papers.

Kissinger: I have no problem with that, but DOD should get out of foreign policy.

President: Then I hit him on the Dentente article by Dr. Winifred Joshua a classified analytical paper, criticizing dente, which was I said it was amateurish and shouldn't have been released. He agreed. Then I said he hadn't done his work on the Hill on the Defense budget. He said no organic harm had been done, but I said it was not perceived that way. Then Brent came in and we discussed the budget cut I wanted him to take. Then Brent says he went back and talked to him for some time.

Scowcroft: [Described Schlesinger conversation with me]

Kissinger: There is something every day. Today it is Les Gelb. Vladivostok was a real achievement. They are after me but it is going to get to you.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4.

MR 97-15, #56; NSL ltr. 9/15/98

By lt NARA, Date 10/8/98

~~SECRET-XGDS~~(3)
CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER

President: That is correct.

Kissinger: When we were at Vladivostok they didn't have us push on Backfire. On missiles, they just asked us to protect the SRAM, not cruise missiles. [See exchange of messages from Vladivostok, Tab A]. Schlesinger is making it tough for you with the Regan bunch, but if you move to the right, the liberals will kill you in the election for sabotaging detente.

President: Are we working up anything new on our SALT position?

Kissinger: I don't think we should until the Soviets respond to us.

President: What does Haig think about cruise missiles?

Kissinger: He is not all that enamored with them. He thinks Schlesinger's objective is to get all the tactical nuclear weapons out of Europe. Except on SALT, Schlesinger is on the very liberal side.

If we don't cap the cruise missiles, the Democrats will kill you with the claim there is a gap you can drive a truck through.

In Canada, he is saying we are falling behind in Defense with the Soviets. That is okay with a Congressional committee but not with foreigners. He also told them about using cruise missiles in response to an attack in Northern Norway. That is dangerous -- indicating we would not respond to an attack with the full force of NATO.

The Democrats will have a field day if you support his SALT position and there will be no agreement.

President: I want a SALT agreement. I want to let my conversation with Jim sink in and then talk to him next week.

Kissinger: I think you must tell him that what should be coming from the Pentagon is simply support for your position. I earlier did some talking points to that end, but you don't really need them.

President: Give them to me. I want to pursue my talk with him in a more general sense.

Kissinger: Haig says he [Schlesinger] wants to be President.
[There is discussion of whether or not Schlesinger will resign.]



President: Give me the talking points.

Kissinger: On your China trip, your advance people have a schedule which would kill you. And you can't stop in Japan without meeting with them.

President: Even at the air base?

Kissinger: That would raise extraterritoriality issues. [Discussion of different schedules, advance office versus Department. Anchorage at 9:00 a.m. Sunday; arrive in Peking 3:00 p.m. Monday p.m.]

On the return, they wanted you for eight days. You can cut it to five days, but I think you shouldn't leave before Saturday, or Friday night.

President: All we want to do in Hawaii is go to the Arizona and lay a wreath.

Kissinger: I don't know how the Japanese will feel about that. I will check.

President: I think we should leave Saturday morning.

Kissinger: On Sadat, I understand they want you down to Jacksonville and back on Sunday.

President: Is that manageable?

Kissinger: Yes. How about a dinner event by Askew?

President: He is a good guy.

Kissinger: On the Economic Summit, your people don't think you should leave from a fund raiser. I don't understand that.

President: Neither do I. I will leave from Atlanta.

Kissinger: On Turkey, we have new problems. Ecevit says he will support Demirel on Cyprus if they didn't become foolish. But they are being resistant on the bases. I have asked Brent to have Haig call Sancar. There is a Turkish NSC meeting on the 20th. Demirel is being very cagey.

We apparently won a victory in Angola on the road between Caxito and Luanda.



We are constantly being approached by the North Koreans at the UN. I personally favor talking to them one time and telling them we would talk if the South Koreans are present and would gauge their attitude in the UN debate as to the prospects.

President: I think the story on your response to the Pike subpoena played well.

Kissinger: UNEF could be a problem. Egypt says that Israel has no right to write to the UN on UNEF because it's on Egyptian sovereign territory. That is not a problem unless the Soviets get in.

Lebanon is another problem. There is talk of an inter-Arab force going in to pacify the country. I doubt the Israelis will stand still for it.

President: How can we justify Arab intervention?

Kissinger: Lebanon would ask for it. We better ask Israel what their intentions are. We have told them not to initiate action, but not about acting in response.

President: What would they do?

Kissinger: They would clean out the guerrilla bases and probably stay in southern Lebanon.

President: Could we do in '75 what Ike did in '58?

Kissinger: No way. The political situation is different and we then had Turkey and Wheelus. We could physically do it, but even Sadat couldn't accept it.

President: Then we have to keep anyone from intervening.

Kissinger: That's right. Lebanon is quiet for the moment, but it could blow up.

P/K 16 Oct 75 ✓
9:33 - 10:44

P I think I would fill Henry in on a talk w/ Sells.

K I haven't had a chance to talk to Brent about it

P He would see entry but don't know if we got to his contacts. We started on personnel, he's like we will look E. Ellsworth. I offered a couple of jobs to him but he wanted to stay where he was but w/ higher title. ~~Then~~ I said I couldn't see making 2 departures in Sep. He asked about an unnecessary work. I said send me a paper.

K I know the prob w/ that but DOD should get out of FP

P Then I hit him on a Daniels article - said it was amateurish & shouldn't have been released. He agreed. Then I said he hadn't done his work on a Hill on a def budget. He said no organic harm done but I said not perceived that way. Then Brent came in & we discussed a budget cut I wanted him to take. ^{Start} Then Brent says he went back & talked to him for some time

S (Described Sells error, w/me)

R There is something every day. Today it is the Alb. That was a real achievement. They are after me but it is going to get to you

P That is correct

K They don't have no proof on Barkin. On ^{unsub} ~~the~~ the ~~7~~ just asked us to protect a SRAM, not @ms. Sells is making it tough for you w/ a Reagan branch, but if you were to report a bribe would bill you in a election for subterfuge

debtors.

P Are we making up anything new. are we on
Salt position

K I don't think we should until we've responded to us.

P What does King think on EMS

K ^{He} is not all that impressed w/ them. He thinks
Schles objective is to get all two mics out of
E. Except can I call ~~the~~ Schles is ~~on~~
on its very liberal side.

If we don't cap EMS & Demos will bill you w/ a
claim that is a ~~set~~ gap you can drive a truck
thru.

In Canada he says we are falling behind in
response w/ a Sec. That is OK w/ a long time but
not w/ foreigners. He also told them about EMS in
response to attacks in N. Norway. That is dangerous
indicating we would not respond to an attack w/
a full force of NATO.

P ~~He~~ Demos will have a field day if you support
his last position + there will be no agreement

P I want a Salt agreement. I want to let my
cow w/ Jim sink in + then talk to him next
week.

K I think you must tell him that what should
be coming from a Porteyan is simply support
for your position. I earlier did some talking points
to that end, but you don't really want them

P Come then to me. I want to know my
talk w/ him in a more general ~~point~~ sense.

asked for a driver
See 2 Sabowitz cabin & P 110
Flying this from Atlanta

K Heavy says he wants to be P. (Discussion
of whether or not Schlo will resign)

P Give me a talking points.

K On your China trip, your advance people
have a schedule which would tell you. You can't
stop in Japan w/o visiting w/ them.

P Estimate on loss?

K That would raise what-entirely issues.

(Discussion of day schedules. Air office no
dept clearance at 8:00 on Sunday am in
Peking 3:00 pm Monday pm

On return, they would give you 8 days. You can
cut it to 5 days, but I think you shouldn't leave
before Saturday, or Friday night.

P All we want to do in Hawaii is go to a Arizona &
have a workout.

K Don't know how many will pull about that. I will
check.

P I think we should leave Sat. morning.

K On Sat, I understood they want you down
in back on Sunday.

P Is that manageable?

K Yes, how about a dinner with by Arthur

P A good guy

K On the Ever Summit, your people don't think
you should leave from a final session. I don't
understand that

P Whether do I. I will leave from Atlanta.

K On Turkey, we have new jobs. E. might say to

Army -
Doubting - you
and right.

will support Duvalier on the basis of the fact
because of that. But they are being resistant
on a basis. I have asked BIA how they will
There is a F-115C in the air
Soviet. Duvalier is being very cagey.

~~Let's~~ Let's apparently have a meeting in Angola
on road but Castro + Havana.

We being constantly approached by N. Koreans at
UN. I personally favor talking to them + telling
them we would ~~take~~ take up + Koreans present +
would gauge their attitude in a UN debate
as to prospects.

P I think a story on the Pake and the U.S. was
played well.

K UNEF would be a job. E says I have no right
to write to UN on UNEF. That would be a job unless I
Says get in.

Belgium is another. There is talk of an inter-
Arab force going in to pacify a country. I doubt
I could stand still for it.

P How can we justify Arab intervention

K Belgium would not be it. We will see if
what their intentions are. We have let them
not to initiate action, but not in response.

P What would they do?

K They would clear out a guerrilla base + put
it in southern Belgium.

P Could we do in 75 what they did in 74

K The way. Pal set up + we then had Turkey
+ Chileans. We could physically do it but we

Kelso & K & Check on block to ensure - highly unusual - lots of questions
What about whether coming! would be asked

Sad but inevitable ~~later~~ accept it.

- P There are how to keep anyone from intervening
- K That's right. Lehman is great for movement but it could blow up.