

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 1.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/88, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, *State Review*
BY lala, NARA, DATE 12/12/03 *12/2/03*

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

President Nicolae Ceausecu of Romania
George Macovescu, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Vasile Pungan, Counsellor to the President
Corneliu Bogdan, Romanian Ambassador to the U. S.

President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
and Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Amb. Harry Barnes, U. S. Ambassador to Romania
Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME:

Wednesday, June 11, 1975
3:00 p. m. - 4:15 p. m.

PLACE:

The White House
The Oval Office

SUBJECTS:

Bilateral economic relations; CSCE;
Middle East; Korea; Spain; Disarmament.

[The press took photographs]

Ceausescu: You had quite a trip.


President: You have just completed a trip to Brazil and Mexico.

[The press was dismissed]

President: Let me say, Mr. President, it is very nice to see you. It is particularly nice of you to stop so we could have this opportunity to discuss matters of mutual interest on your way back to Romania after your trip to Latin America.

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

CLASSIFIED BY HENRY A. KISSINGER
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B (1,3)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to Det.



Ceausescu: I, too, am pleased, Mr. President, to have this meeting on my way through and I hope there will be positive results from it.

President: I do want to thank you for sending an emissary right after I became President. It happened rather suddenly and I appreciated your gesture.

Ceausescu: Since this is our first meeting after you became President I want to extend to you my most sincere congratulations. I hope you occupy this post for a long period of time. I have heard that you will be a candidate next year, and I hope that we will be able to continue our collaboration in the period that follows.

Bilateral Economic Relations

President: Thank you. I will be a candidate. I think we will win so I look forward to working with you in the future. I am most anxious that we, during my Presidency, expand the relations established by the U. S. -Romanian Declaration of 1973.

We are of course most anxious, Mr. President, to implement the Trade Agreement between Romania and the United States. I have submitted the necessary documents to the Congress to get Congress to take the action which would bring about the benefits of the Trade Agreement which are important to the United States and to Romania and to our relations.

Ceausescu: Of course we await with great interest the entry into force of this Agreement. I can guarantee to you there will be no opposition to it in Romania, and I hope that it will be approved in the United States as well. We would want the results of our good economic collaboration over the past four years to continue, and if this agreement will come into force would expect our two-way trade to reach a billion dollars.

Kissinger: The President is meeting with some Congressional people this afternoon and also with some Jewish leaders.

President: If I might make a suggestion, but first let me comment. We are most anxious that Congress approve this Agreement which we submitted on April 24. They have until July to take the necessary action. We do want MFN for Romania. We want Export-Import Bank credits and trade benefits for Romania. I think I have to be very frank and say that the Congressmen will probably raise difficult questions with you, as they have with our own people.



They are very interested in Jewish emigration to Israel and the United States. We of course disapprove of that requirement in the law. We think it is unnecessary, but it is the law and we must go through these procedures. The way to get favorable action by Congress is to get some evidence that there is some increase in emigration to Israel and to the United States.

Ceausescu: I will be very frank. As far as the United States is concerned, there is no problem. There are still some humanitarian cases. We will solve these as we have been solving others.

As far as Israel is concerned, there are not very many Romanian citizens left who are of Jewish nationality. The great majority of these are married to Romanians. Therefore the problem is that it is not likely that a substantial emigration will continue.

In the last four years 18,000 people applied. And there were a couple thousand more who applied in the years just before that. 18,300 have left. Right now there are still about 2,000 who have been approved, some of them as much as two years ago. But with the tension in the area and the war, although they have approval to depart in their pocket, they have given up the idea or put off their departure. Therefore, in this instance too there is no longer a major problem. We will try to solve those cases that remain favorably.

As a matter of fact we have now a fairly large number of cases of those who want to return to Israel and we haven't been able to find a solution to this situation yet.

I have discussed these questions already with Deputy Prime Minister Allon and at his time of departure he made a favorable declaration. He even met with the Chief Rabbi.

President: This is very encouraging, Mr. President. I just believe it is very important that you are able to provide this information, this factual data, to the Congressional people and to the Jewish leaders because they could hamstring and make it difficult for us to get the necessary action by Congress.

Ceausescu: I hope that with your efforts, Mr. President, and with the explanations which I will be giving we will convince the Congress to give its approval more rapidly.



Kissinger: When the President finishes, he will have convinced the Congressmen to adopt an amendment to permit free immigration into Romania.

Ceausescu: No thanks. I am not interested.

President: I know you are concerned about the European Security Conference and about the problems that held up the agreement. We of course have had some reservations about Baskets I and III. I would appreciate hearing your own appreciation about the prospects and what you anticipate.

Kissinger: Macovescu and Gromyko are the only ones who have read all the documents.

Ceausescu: First of all, I would like to come back to some bilateral questions in connection with your forthcoming visit to Romania.

Aside from the problem of this Agreement which I hope will be adopted by the Congress, perhaps it would be well on the occasion of your visit to Romania to resolve other problems also. I previously raised the question of concluding a long-term economic cooperation agreement and had also raised the matter of granting Romania the special conditions of trade given to developing countries. I do not want to get into a discussion now, and do not insist on an answer now, but in connection with your visit I would hope to be able to solve these problems, to give your visit to Romania concrete content. I had previously extended an invitation for you to visit Romania, to be sure, but I wanted to use this occasion to make the invitation personal.

President: Mr. President, I appreciate your personally delivering the invitation to come to Romania. There is a distinct possibility and I would like to do it. If there is a European Security Conference Meeting in July or August it might be possible to stop for a visit in Romania after the conference in Helsinki.

Ceausescu: Following the European Security Conference?

President: Yes.

Kissinger: Mr. President, on the question of long-term cooperation, we have discussed this previously and agreed on it in principle and we can announce it at any point you consider desirable. Our plans have been to get MFN through Congress first without any extraneous debate, so this would fit in with the schedule you are discussing.



President: If the European Security Conference is in late July and Congress would act on the Trade Agreement for Romania by August 1.

Amb. Barnes: It could come out of committee by July 15, but they may not take action until early September because they have 60 legislative days and the August recess may intervene.

Kissinger: You do not have to link these two things that closely for your visit.

President: But it would be helpful to get the Trade Agreement done and not have it complicated by any announcement. This reinforces the need to get favorable consideration and action before the Congressional recess.

Otherwise there will be five weeks delay. So it is important to get Congress to act, preferably prior to the visit, and then we could announce we would be having a long-term agreement.

CSCE

Geausescu: As far as European Security is concerned, we are concerned not so much by the fact of delay as by the content and expected results of the Conference. For us, it is not a problem of the dates, but of the results of this Conference. Of course, if it can take place in July, that is fine, or if it is in August or even September, that is fine. The principal thing is to get results which will contribute to the strengthening of confidence and will enhance detente. Therefore, it is not Basket III which is essential, the question of how many journalists or artists travel. That is for the experts. This isn't what is so essential. As far as we are concerned, let as many as want travel around. The essential problems are in the first Basket. On this hangs the movement toward detente and for that matter the conditions of things like cultural exchanges.

In connection with this we see some problems which must be solved if the Conference is going to wind up with good results. First of all there should be firm engagements of states on the renunciation of force and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states. Secondly, there is the problem of certain military aspects. Granted it is not a question of resolving basic problems, but we have sought nonetheless to make sure that there will not be interference in the internal affairs of other states. It is a question for example, of these engagements regarding military maneuvers. And even here it is not so much whether it will be 250 or 180 kilometers or 10 to 20 thousand men, but the very fact that the content of these measures should be obligatory and not something voluntary. Therefore if all these problems

are going to be reduced to something voluntary, it no longer makes any sense to waste time and energy over 100 kilometers of distance here and there. But what we are doing is introducing into international law certain rules which have existed up to now. When a group of states arrives at certain understandings, these would be mandatory and not voluntary. That is important.

Macovescu: One of the other principal problems is that connected with continuity of the Conference, the follow-up.

Ceausescu: I don't know what your opinion is but we believe the most dangerous situation is still in Europe where there are the two military blocs with modern armaments, huge concentrations of troops, atomic weapons as well. Therefore we would want to have the summit meeting represent not the conclusion but rather the beginning of European security. For this reason we are in favor of an organism, a process for assuring the continuity of this conference.

President: How often do you see it meeting? Every year, every two years?

Ceausescu: Once a year, once in two years, any time when it is necessary. If there should appear some tense situation, if something should happen, then it could discuss what might be done to prevent things getting worse.

Kissinger: What do you think of the idea of a review conference in 18 months or two years?

Ceausescu: In our opinion that is a good idea. We think as a matter of fact that this sort of permanent organism could have the role of preparing such a conference. I don't have in mind something that would be set up with a lot of bureaucracy, but rather something that would meet periodically once a year or every six months. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of one of the countries would have the role of coordinator, and this could be on a rotational basis.

Kissinger: For example, rotating?

Ceausescu: United States, Soviet Union, Romania.

President: [Smiling] Romania.

Kissinger: We have explained to Romania and we have been in close touch with the Romanian delegation to the Conference, that the very reason Romania wants this is why we are not agreeable. We are not eager to grant to



countries the right of permanent interference in the West. Quite frankly, this is the problem with a permanent mechanism. I understand why you want something to which you could appeal, but we do not want established structures in the West to be exploited. We are sympathetic, though, to your concerns.

Ceausescu: We don't think of this organism as having any sort of right to do this, and in order to avoid this problem we could regulate the basis on which it would act to exclude such possible intervention. We see it as preparing for new conferences and for solving such problems as will appear. We don't want any Eastern intervention in the West or Western intervention in the East or Western intervention in the West or Eastern intervention in the East. I would ask you to reflect ~~some~~ more on this problem and to review your position.

[Both Presidents and the Secretary nod agreement.]

Middle East

Ceausescu: With regard to the Middle East, you are now having discussions with the Israeli Prime Minister.

President: We tried very hard to keep progress going last March, but unfortunately the negotiations had to be suspended. We are now doing our reassessment. We want to avoid any stagnation or stalemate. I have just finished talking with President Sadat. Today and tomorrow we will be discussing with Prime Minister Rabin his observations on the situation.

Ceausescu: Of course the problems, as you know even better than I, are very complicated. We will certainly welcome it if any new steps towards disengagement can be realized. There are conditions now in which agreement could be achieved. Egypt and Syria are in favor of reaching a solution. We know very well the situation can change very rapidly, that the present favorable conditions might no longer appear. I think that Israel too has understood this very well. We have told them our views.

President: You met with Foreign Minister Allon recently.

Ceausescu: Yes, I talked with him for four hours.

Aside from the question affecting Egypt and Syria there is the Palestinian problem and the need to achieve the formation of an independent Palestinian state. There can be no solution unless this problem is resolved.

The PLO has in mind setting up a state consisting of the West Bank and Gaza with the necessary guarantees of the UN and others. This in fact would mean the recognition of the state of Israel. The US would have a great deal to gain if it would enter into direct discussions with the PLO. For that matter the Israelis too would have something to gain.

Kissinger: What did Allon say?

Ceausescu: He took a step forward. He recognized that there exists a Palestinian people which has the right to an independent existence.


President: Did Foreign Minister Allon agree that the Palestinians should have part of the West Bank, and if so did he ask for guarantees for Israel's protection?

Ceausescu: He sees the solution of the problem through involving Jordan. The Israelis' main problem is the fact that the PLO proposes the elimination of the State of Israel, while the PLO complains that Israel will not recognize them. We think that the PLO and Israel have to begin to understand that they must discuss these things with each other. I believe that discussions with Arafat and other PLO leaders would lead to better understanding and would provide some advantages. I have talked a lot with Arafat and he has told me that he truly wants to assure independence for his people so they can live in peace and that this problem of a democratic state is something for the future, not now. In any case there is no truth in the idea that they are playing somebody else's game. What they want is independence for their people.

President: We find some increase in flexibility but I would hesitate to be optimistic about the step-by-step approach. The other possibility we are examining is a broad comprehensive one covering peace, borders, the Palestinians and so on. This of course would undoubtedly bring us to Geneva. What reaction do you have to the Geneva Conference reopening?

Ceausescu: The Geneva Conference can't be anything bad in itself but it won't be able to solve the problems. The problems have to be brought there already solved in order to receive necessary juridical sanction. Otherwise they would just start accusing each other. In any case, there will have to be ways for discussions outside the Conference.

Kissinger: I agree.



Ceausescu: We think the Conference ought to be somewhat larger and that there ought to be a larger role for the UN. The Conference has to be well prepared and has to have solutions almost ready set for it.

President: I recognize all the complexities that would take place in Geneva unless in effect all was agreed upon before we got there. But I am not optimistic, Mr. President, that we can get Israel agreeing with Egypt, Israel with Jordan, Israel with Syria, Israel with the PLO. We would hope that some progress would be met in one area, but to expect on a bilateral basis progress in four areas, this is just being too optimistic.

Ceausescu: I agree. Of course it is not easy to reach such understandings. I think though it would be useful, besides the efforts of the United States and the Soviet Union, if other states could do something. I am thinking about countries which are not directly involved like some non-aligned countries. Also the UN. All in close connection with the Geneva Conference. Of course, I believe that it would be useful if the United States efforts, those of Dr. Kissinger, would enable the reaching of some understandings. Still there is room for other paths wherever possible. I don't believe Dr. Kissinger will be annoyed if I mention my belief that this Spring he might have been able to make better use of the assistance of other countries.

Kissinger: I have said that on the basis of my activities I am well qualified for the job of Director of an insane asylum and will be glad to have others join me. [Laughter] I am not talking about being an inmate. I am talking about the job of Director.

No, we favor broader efforts.

President: We will continue to work on it. If we can get the step-by-step process affirmative again, we will do all we can to achieve something. But if we see no progress we will have to propose an overall settlement, with all the complications. But we would prefer the other approach. We are insisting there be no stagnation. Otherwise there will be another war, and that no one wants. We will try our best.

Korea; Spain; Disarmament

Ceausescu: I know the time is limited and I only wanted to mention other problems in passing on which we might reach some understandings or solutions in connection with your visit.



I would mention Korea, the visit of the President of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea in Romania. I had some discussions with him. I know you have some contacts with them yourselves. He told me that he doesn't want any sort of tension in the area, that he realizes that unification can come only through peaceful paths, and that he understands that he needs a durable peace and that will take some time.

The second problem has to do with Spain. [There was an exchange between Ceausescu and Macovescu over the question of the person with whom some discussions had been taking place in Mexico. Apparently the American Ambassador there had talked with a Spanish group to which Ceausescu was about to refer.]

During my stop in Mexico I talked with a delegation of the Democratic Junta of Spain. I know they have had some meetings with a large number of Congressmen and other political figures here. The head of this group, who is a good friend of mine, wants to get into discussions with the United States on the question of the future. They want the changes that will be taking place in Spain to proceed peacefully and in such a way as not to affect relations with the United States. I just wanted to mention these things.

Finally there is the problem which I don't want to discuss now, that of disarmament. We -- and there are also tens of states situated on all continents, who think that there is no disarmament going on in the framework of the Disarmament Conference but only setting limitations on armament.

President: Do you mean SALT and MBFR?

Kissinger: I think he means the disarmament discussions in Geneva -- the 18-member conference.

Ceausescu: Vienna and Geneva, it's all the same thing. As far as the talks between the United States and the Soviet Union are concerned, at least as far as we have an idea of the situation, it is not disarmament but talk of disarmament. I hope that we will be able to discuss some of these questions when we next meet.

Ford: I hope to discuss them with you when I come to Romania.

[The meeting ended.]





EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Bucharest, Romania

1) Brent Scowcroft
2) Peter Rodman

August 18, 1975

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~/EXDIS

Lt General Brent Scowcroft, USAF
Deputy Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington

Dear Brent:

Enclosed is the final version of the June White House conver-
sation as promised in my August 8 letter. I've also sent
copies to Hal and Art.

Best regards,

Harry G. Barnes, Jr.

Encl a/s

*P.S. On rechecking my notes, I've
straightened out the one point of
confusion about what I was concerned*

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 1.5
STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, State Review 12/2/03
BY lab NARA DATE 12/2/03

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June 11, 1975

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Gerald R. Ford
Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Lt Gen Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to
the President for National Security Affairs
Harry G. Barnes, Jr., Ambassador - Interpreter

Nicolae Ceausescu, President of Romania
George Macovescu, Foreign Minister
Vasile Pungan - Counselor to the President -
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DATE AND PLACE: June 11, 1975, 3:00 - 4:15 p.m., The White House

President Ford: Let me say, Mr. President, it is very nice to see you. It is particularly nice of you to stop so we could have this opportunity to discuss matters of mutual interest on your way back to Romania after your trip to Latin America.

President Ceausescu: I, too, am pleased, Mr. President, to have this meeting on my way through and I hope there will be positive results from it.

President Ford: I do want to thank you for sending an emissary right after I became President. It happened rather suddenly and I was grateful that he came.

President Ceausescu: Since this is our first meeting after you became President I want to extend to you my most sincere congratulations. I hope you occupy this post for a long period of time. I have heard that you will be a candidate next year and I hope that we will be able to continue our collaboration in the period that follows.

President Ford: Thank you. I will be a candidate. I think we will win so I look forward to working with you in the future. I am most anxious

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STATE DEPT. CONFIDENTIAL

BY lab . WANA, DATE 12/2/03

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that we, during my Presidency, expand the relations established by the US-Romanian Declaration of 1973.

We are of course most anxious, Mr. President, to implement the Trade Agreement between Romania and the United States. I have submitted the necessary documents to the Congress to get Congress to take the action which would bring about the benefits of the Trade Agreement which are important to the United States and to Romania and to our relations.

President Ceausescu: We await with great interest the entry into force of this Agreement. I can guarantee to you there will be no opposition to it in Romania and I hope that it will be approved in the United States as well. We would want the results of our good economic collaboration over the last four years to continue and if this agreement will come into force would expect our two-way trade to reach a billion dollars.

Secretary Kissinger: The President is meeting with some Congressional people this afternoon and also with some Jewish leaders.

President Ford: If I might make a suggestion, but first let me comment. We are most anxious that Congress approve this Agreement which we submitted on April 24. They have until July to take the necessary action. We do want MFN for Romania. We want Export-Import Bank credits and trade benefits for Romania. I think I have to be very frank and say that the Congressmen will probably raise difficult questions with you as they have with our own people. They are very interested in Jewish emigration to Israel and the United States. We of course disapprove of that requirement in the law. We think it is unnecessary, but it is the law and we must go through these procedures. The way to get favorable action by Congress is to

get some evidence that there is some increase in emigration to Israel and to the United States.

President Ceausescu: I will be very frank. As far as the United States is concerned, there is no problem. There are still some humanitarian cases. We will solve these as we have been solving others.

As far as Israel is concerned, there are not very many Romanian citizens left who are of Jewish nationality. The great majority of these are married to Romanians. Therefore the problem is that it is not likely that a substantial emigration will continue.

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As a matter of fact we have now a fairly large number of cases of those who want to return from Israel and we haven't been able to find a solution to this situation yet.

I have discussed these questions already with Deputy Prime Minister Allon and at the time of his departure he made a favorable declaration. He even met with the Chief Rabbi.

President Ford:

This is very encouraging, Mr. President. I just believe it is very important that you are able to provide this information, this factual data to the Congressional people and to the Jewish leaders because they could hamstring and make it difficult for us to get the necessary action by Congress.

President Ceausescu: I hope that with your efforts, Mr. President, and with the explanations which I will be giving we will convince the Congress to give its approval more rapidly.

Secretary Kissinger: When the President finishes, he will have convinced the Congress to adopt an amendment to permit free immigration into Romania.

President Ceausescu: No thanks. I am not interested.

President Ford: I know you are concerned about the European Security Conference and about the problems that are holding up the agreement. We of course have had some reservations regarding Baskets I and III. I would appreciate hearing your own appreciation about the prospects and what you anticipate.

President Ceausescu: First of all, I would like to come back to some bilateral questions in connection with your forthcoming visit to Romania. Aside from the problem of this Agreement which I hope will be adopted by the Congress perhaps it would be well on the occasion of your visit to Romania to resolve other problems also. I previously raised the question of concluding a long-term economic cooperation agreement and had also raised the matter of granting Romania the special conditions given to developing countries. I do not want to get into a discussion now but in connection with your visit would hope to be able to solve these problems.

I had previously extended an invitation for you to visit Romania, to be sure, but I wanted to use this occasion to make the invitation personal.

President Ford: Mr. President, I appreciate your personally delivering the invitation to come to Romania. There is a distinct possibility and I would like to do it. If there is a European Security Conference meeting in July or August it might be possible to stop for a visit in Romania after the conference in Helsinki.

- Secretary Kissinger: Mr. President, on the question of long term economic cooperation we have discussed this previously and agreed on it in principle and can announce it at any point you consider desirable. Our plans have been to get MFN first, so this would fit in with the schedule you are discussing.
- President Ford: If the European Security Conference is in late July and Congress would act on the Trade Agreement for Romania by August 1 . . .
- Ambassador Barnes: They may not take action until early September because they have 60 legislative days and the August recess may intervene.
- Secretary Kissinger: You do not have to link these two things for your visit.
- President Ford: But it would be helpful to get the Trade Agreement done and not have it complicated by any announcement. This reinforces the need to get favorable consideration and action before the Congressional recess. Otherwise there will be five weeks delay, so it is important to get Congress to act preferably prior to the visit and then we could announce we would be having a long-term agreement.
- President Ceausescu: With regard to European Security, we are concerned not so much by the fact of delay as by the content and expected results of the Conference. For us, it is not a problem of the dates but of the results of this Conference. Of course if it can take place in July or August or even September, that is fine. The principal thing is to get results which will contribute to the strengthening of confidence and will enhance detente. Therefore it is not Basket III which is essential, that is the question of how many journalists or artists travel. This isn't what is so essential. As far as we are concerned let as many as want travel around. The essential problems are in the first Basket. On this hangs the movement toward detente and for that matter things like cultural exchanges.



Here we see some problems which must be solved if the Conference is going to wind up with good results. First of all there should be firm engagements on the renunciation of force and non-interference in internal affairs. Secondly, there is the matter which has certain military aspects. Granted these proposals will not resolve the basic problems, but we have sought nonetheless to make sure that there will not be interference in internal affairs of other states. It is a question of these engagements regarding military maneuvers. And even here it is not so much whether it will be 250 or 180 kilometers or 10 to 20 thousand men, but the very fact that the content of these measures should be obligatory and not something voluntary. Therefore, if all these problems are going to be reduced to something voluntary, it no longer makes any sense to waste time and energy over 100 kilometers of distance here and there. What we are doing is introducing into international law certain rules which have not existed up to now. When a group of states arrives at certain understandings, these should be mandatory and not voluntary.

One of the other principal problems is that connected with continuity of the Conference.

Foreign Minister
Macoveacu:

Follow-up.

President Ceausescu:

I don't know what your opinion is but we believe the most dangerous situation is still in Europe where there are the two military blocs with modern armaments, huge concentrations of troops, atomic weapons as well. Therefore we would want to have the summit meeting represent not the conclusion but rather the beginning of European security. For this reason we are in favor of an organism, a process for assuring the continuity of this conference.

President Ford:

How often do you see it meeting, every year, every two years?

President Ceausescu: Once a year, once in two years, any time when it is necessary. If there should appear some tense situation, if something should happen, then it could discuss what might be done to prevent things getting worse.

Secretary Kissinger: What do you think of the idea of a review conference in 18 months or two years?

President Ceausescu: In our opinion that is a good idea. We think as a matter of fact that this sort of permanent organism could have the role of preparing such a conference. I don't have in mind something that would be set up with a lot of bureaucracy, but rather something that would meet periodically once a year or every six months. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of one of the countries would have the role of coordinator, and this could be on a rotational basis.

Secretary Kissinger: For example, rotating - -

President Ceausescu: United States, Soviet Union, Romania -

President Ford: (Smiling) Romania.

Secretary Kissinger: We have explained to Romania and we have been in close touch with the Romanian delegation to the Conference that the very reason Romania wants this is why we would not. We are not eager to grant to other countries the right of permanent interference in the West. Quite frankly, this is the problem with a permanent mechanism. I understand why you want something to which you could appeal but we do not want to supersede existing structures in the West with ones which could be exploited. We are sympathetic though to your concerns.

President Ceausescu: We don't think of this organism as having any sort of right to do this, and in order to avoid this problem we could regulate the basis on which it would act to exclude such possible intervention. We see it as preparing for new conferences and for solving such problems as will appear. We don't want

any Eastern intervention in the West or Western intervention in the East or Western intervention in the West or Eastern intervention in the East. I would ask you to reflect some more on this problem and to review your position. (Both the President and the Secretary nod agreement.)

With regard to the Middle East you are now having discussions with the Israeli Prime Minister.

President Ford:

We tried very hard to keep progress going last March but unfortunately the negotiations had to be suspended. We are now doing our re-assessment. We want to avoid any stagnation or stalemate. I have just finished talking with President Sadat. Today and tomorrow we will be discussing with Prime Minister Rabin his observations on the situation.

President Ceausescu:

Of course the problems as you know even better than I are very complicated. We will certainly welcome it if new steps towards disengagement can be realized. There are conditions now in which agreement could be achieved. Egypt and Syria are in favor of reaching a solution. We know very well the situation can change very rapidly, that the present favorable conditions might no longer appear. I think that Israel too has understood this very well. We have told them our views.

President Ford:

You met with Foreign Minister Allon recently.

President Ceausescu:

Yes, I talked with him for four hours. Aside from the question affecting Egypt and Syria, there is the Palestine problem and the need to achieve the formation of an independent Palestine state. There can be no solution unless this problem is resolved. The PLO has in mind setting up a state consisting of the West Bank and Gaza with the necessary guarantees of the UN and others. This in fact would mean the recognition of



the state of Israel. The United States would have a great deal to gain if it would enter into direct discussions with the PLO. For that matter the Israelis too would have something to gain.

Secretary Kissinger: What did Allon say?

President Ceausescu: He took a step forward. He recognized that there exists a Palestine people which has the right to an independent existence.

President Ford: Did Foreign Minister Allon agree that Palestine should have part of the West Bank and if so did he ask for guarantees for Israel's protection?

President Ceausescu: He sees the solution of the problem through the involving of Jordan. The Israelis are worried because they say the PLO proposes the elimination of the State of Israel, while the PLO complains that Israel will not recognize them. We think that the PLO and Israel have to begin to understand that they must discuss these things with each other. I believe that discussions with Arafat and other PLO leaders would lead to better understanding and would provide some advantages. I have talked a lot with Arafat and he has told me that he truly wants to assure independence for his people so they can live in peace and that this problem of a democratic state is something for the future. In any case there is no truth in the idea that they are playing somebody else's game. What they want is independence for their people.

President Ford: We find some increase in flexibility but would hesitate to be optimistic about the step-by-step approach. The other possibility we are examining is a broad comprehensive one covering peace, borders, Palestine and so on. This of course would undoubtedly bring us to Geneva. What reaction do you have to the Geneva Conference reopening?

President Ceausescu: The Geneva Conference can't be anything bad

in itself but it won't be able to solve the problems. The problems have to be brought there already solved in order to receive necessary juridical sanction. Otherwise they would just start accusing each other. In any case there will have to be ways to have discussions outside the Conference.

Secretary Kissinger: I agree.

President Ceausescu: We think the Conference ought to be somewhat larger and that there ought to be a larger role for the UN. The Conference has to be well prepared and has to have solutions almost ready set for it.

President Ford: I recognize all the complexities that would take place in Geneva unless in effect all was agreed upon before we got there, but I am not optimistic, Mr. President, that we can get Israel agreeing with Egypt, Israel with Jordan, Israel with Syria, Israel with the PLO. We would hope that some progress would be made in one area but to expect on a bilateral basis progress in four areas, this is just being too optimistic.

President Ceausescu: I agree. I think though it would be useful, besides the efforts of the United States and the Soviet Union, if other states could do something. I am thinking about countries which are not directly involved like some non-aligned countries. Also the UN. All in close connection with the Geneva Conference. Of course I believe that it would be useful if the United States' efforts, those of Dr. Kissinger, would enable the reaching of some understandings. Still there is room for other paths wherever possible. I don't believe Dr. Kissinger will be annoyed if I mention my belief that this spring he might have been able to make better use of the assistance of other countries.

Secretary Kissinger: I have said that on the basis of my activities I am well qualified for the job of Director of an insane asylum and will be

glad to have others join me. (President Ceausescu laughs.)

No I am not talking about being an inmate. I am talking about the job of Director.

President Ford:

We will continue to work. If we can get the step-by-step process affirmative again, we will do all we can to achieve something. But if we see no progress, we will have to propose an overall settlement with all the complications, but we would prefer the other approach. We are insisting there be no stagnation, otherwise there will be another war. We will try our best.

President Ceausescu:

I know time is limited. I wanted to mention two problems in passing on which we might reach some understandings or solutions in connection with your visit. I would mention Korea, the visit of the President of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea in Romania. I had some discussions with him. I know you have some contacts with them yourselves. He told me that he doesn't want any sort of tension in the area, that he realizes that unification can come only through peaceful paths and that he understands that he needs a durable peace.

The second problem has to do with Spain. (Exchange between Ceausescu and Macoveanu over the question of the person with whom some discussions had been taking place in Mexico. Apparently the American Ambassador there had talked with a Spanish group to which Ceausescu was about to refer.)

During my stop in Mexico I talked with a delegation of the Democratic Junta of Spain. I know they have had some meetings with a large number of Congressmen and other political figures here. The head of this group, who is a good friend of mine, wants to get into discussions with the United States on the question of the future. They want the changes that will be taking place

in Spain to proceed peacefully and in such a way as not to affect relations with the United States. I just wanted to mention these things. Finally there is the problem which I don't want to discuss now, that of disarmament. We, and there are also tens of states situated on all continents, who think that there is no disarmament going on in the framework of the Disarmament Conference but only setting limitations on armament.

President Ford: Do you mean SALT and MBFR?

Secretary Kissinger: I think he means the disarmament discussions in Geneva.

President Ceausescu: Vienna and Geneva, it's all the same thing. As far as the talks between the United States and the Soviet Union are concerned, at least as far as we have an idea of the situation, it is not disarmament but talk of disarmament. I hope that we will be able to discuss some of these questions when we next meet.

President Ford: I hope to discuss them with you when I come to Romania.

J P/ Cavanaugh / Unicef (Perry) /
K/Barnes

11 June 75

C Pleased
you had quite a trip
P You have just completed a trip to Brazil & Mexico
less out

P Very nice to have opportunity to visit w/ you on
your way back from your trip to Brazil &
Mexico.

C Also I am glad you accepted this visit on way
back to Romania & I hope we will have
positive results.

P I was ^{was} pleased b/c knowing you sent
right offer & became Pres. It was expected
development & I appreciated your gesture.

C In our first meeting after your arriving particular
I would like to convey my deep respects. I hope
you will keep just a long time & I understand
you will be candidate & I hope & people will
accept

P Thank you, I will be candidate & I ^{think} hope
will be successful. I hope both forward to
working w/ you & expanding our relations
along a line of a agreement of 1975.

C We are most anxious to implement a trade
agreement but as I have submitted
a necessary documents. I would like to
in a date being about a benefits of increased
trade between 2 countries

C Of course we want all great interest for that
document to be adopted. There is no one in
Romania against that agreement & I hope

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 2.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/96, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES State Review 12/2/03
BY lak, NARA, DATE 12/2/03

time in U.S. It was desired that all part of
our own relations began as a part of yes be
continued + reach 1 bit in future

K Party w/ Cong going + Jewish leaders this
option

P If tonight make say. First let me say
we want explain that Cong appears + does - they
have til July. We do not want + call visits
for Romania. I want to make, however, that
Cong will raise questions all year a day how
w/ our people about Jewish emigration to US + I.
We are disappointed of this discussion + know, but
it is a law + we must abide by it. Way to
get approval is to show some improvement
in emigration to US + I.

C In connection w/ emigration to US there
is no part. To Israel, there are only a few
Romanians of Jewish origin. In this situation
not a big part of mass emigration of Jewish
pop. In last 4 years we have used application
for 1,000. ~~There~~ Already 1,300 left Romania.
There are now 2,200 applications approved +
some are years old. But w/ it in a case
some w/ approval in their part we really
for it to get better. There is no part solving
part you said, but there are already those
who want to come back to Romania. I discussed
this w/ Allen + when he left Romania he
made a very good statement on it.

P That was good. I hope you will present this factual info to Cong groups because they could make it very diff. to get favorable action by a Cong.

C I will make this clear. As David it is not just.

P I know you are interested in CSCB. As you know we have had questions on Budget I & II. I would be interested in your approach.

K Unions & Congress are only one who read all documents.

C I would like to raise some questions on bilateral relations connected w/ your visit to Moscow.

In addition to this agreement it might be good occasion to solve other prob. There is question

of a agreement on long term loan from USSR as a developing country - we would like to receive

conditions of trade you grant to developing countries.

I don't insist on answer now but hope you would consider it to give your visit to Moscow

concrete content. I want to reiterate my invitation to visit ASAP

P Appreciate your delivery it in person. If there is a CSCB summit, it might be possible to visit your country after a meeting in Helsinki.

C Following CSCB

K On this year it is long time since Cong, we can communicate in principle

at any point. We wanted to get ^{final} M.F.N. then
Cong w/o any Xtransverse debate. It would
fit in well w/ that schedule.

P If CSCF held late July, Cong would hopefully act
on trade agreement by 1 Aug

Bonus It could come out of credit by 15 July, but would
go thru Cong before Syst. takes 60 days

R We don't have to make a 2 that closely.

P But we wouldn't want anything to interfere w/ M.F.N.,
so it is important to get Cong to act as quickly as
possible. Temp we can't announce in Executive
the long term agreement.

C In connection w/ CSCF, we are concerned, not
so much about a delay as about the content
words. For us a date is not a significant thing
but a content. I propose July would be good, but
August also good, and Syst. most important
is about making a measure of compliance. For
us it is not the way contents of 2nd basket
are important. That for a experts. We are in
favor of traveling as much as possible. The 1st
basket is a important one because on that depends
debts & a condition of a national & change, for
connection of this, there are some parts which
absolutely must be solved to go to a conf. We
need 1st concrete contracts for states next to
interplay in internal affairs of others, 2nd
is not, aspects, which of course is not
setting basic parts, but it can give

assurance that states will not interfere
in others' internal affairs. Voluntary
measures, for example. Here too it not
question of 100 - 200 km or 10 000 - 20000
soldiers, but for it that they will be unarmed
& obligatory not voluntary. ~~It~~ as / good will
of a state it not see, & fight over 10000
km km. It would interfere into with
laws & measures not existing at now, when
group of states agree on this it can become
obligatory not voluntary. That important.
Another is a continuity of a conf. We think
EU still - most dangerous set in world.
Those huge concentration of troops - modern
armament. Because of that, we want a
unitarity & we a beginning not end of
a EU conf. So we in favor of creation of
organization which will continue work of a conf.

P. Another? >

C. Once a year or 2 yrs, or whenever prob
appears for a change, then prob appears, &
group could meet & deal w/ it

K. How about a review conf after 5 or 10 yrs

C. I like it but that don't support permanent
organization which could ~~prepare~~ prepare for any such
a unit. The states of EU could meet. Organization
of EU could meet annually every 6 mos
w/ rotating chair.

K. For ~~the~~ very reason Commission seeks it in EU

and we agree, we don't want that kind
of interference w/ some of structures in the West.
But we very sympathetic w/ your concern

C I believe such an organization would not have
right to interfere. We can establish a rights
of such an organization & persuade it from doing from
such a thing. We need a body to prepare
for meetings to solve a problem which they appear.
I would like you to look again at such proposals
& advise your position again.
I would like to raise a question of NE because you
have I PM here.

P We tried very hard last month to buy negot going
on, but unfortunately they were suspended. We
have working hard at next stage - about w/ Soviet
& Italy & France - be early w/ ~~Soviet~~ Robin.

C You know well the process are very complicated.
We welcome such new steps of change agreement but
a most essential thing is to reach countries & summit
to peace. E & Syria are in favor of a solution. But
you know that can change very quickly & maybe
favorable countries won't exist tomorrow. We told
E that

P You saw other?

C Talked 4 transcription. In a date a w/ chosen
part is that of Pales. W/ understanding of the
Pales state, a sit can't be solved. The idea
of a Pales is an E & W bank state w/ UN
government. I believe it would have much to gain

by talking directly to PLO - also if I could.

K How did Allan react

C He made step forward. Really there was some
push & should have a handshake.

P Did Allan mention at all did he
have any proposals for guarantee of their
happening

C He thinks Jordan is the key. But he thinks a
PLO wants to liquidate I - & E interim.
But the best is for 2 to come together & discuss.
Discussion of draft would help produce some
aid. I discussed at length w/ Anwar. He
seemed to want to live in peace. Part of this.
Also it's for future but now, I see who
thinks the PLO is acting for anyone but PLO
is wrong. →

P I would hate to make prediction, but
there are signs of flux. We considering an overall
approach, w/ details. This would take us to Geneva.
What are your chances.

C Geneva couldn't be wrong but it can't take a job.
You have to go there w/ a job solved, except for
legal approval. In pub conf they would just
start to discuss each other & you would have to
find a way outside conf to do business. I found
longer conf. w/ ~~the~~ greater role for UN. It
has to be well prepared.

P I see a big at Geneva makes all eyes on
him. But I not optimistic I don't get it & eyes

as/any are able. We would hope for progress in
Tanzania, but I think to expect progress in
all areas & then go to America as two optimists.

C Of course it not easy to reach such understandings.
in addition to efforts of US & SC, other states not
involved in conflict employ a useful role, esp
non-aligned countries. Numerous states efforts
of IC to remove parts of mine should continue. I think
K would not be helplessly resigned to that.

K US, we ~~for~~ have broader efforts.

P We will continue to work on it. You cannot
sit opposite an will do everything possible to
improve it. If not, we will have to choose other
alternatives. We resist the suggestion ^(c) that would
lead to another war & that no one wants.

C I know time is short & only want to mention
other probs - we can discuss when you come
to Romania. One is Korean prob. N Korean pres
was in Romania & discussed w/ him. He
declared he wants no tension & conflict only
by peaceful means & that will take time.

2nd prob is related to Spain. In Madrid I
met delegation of democ front of Spain. I know
they have not go here to. The Pres of this group
said he wants to discuss w/ US a question of
future relations. They want a change in Spain which
will happen to take place peacefully & not against
opposition of US.

Last is prob of arms, which I only want to

Clinton - We & many others behind what
is happening now is not business but an
attempt for business again.

P Salt or MBE R (18 months)

C Government Commission exp. but MBE R to case also.

Don't want to discuss now but would like

to discuss it in future

P When I come to Remind

George Packard - former
ed Phil Bulletin is
w/ Remind if you
want to meet him