

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~/NODIS/XGDS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State  
and Assistant to the President for National  
Security Affairs  
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant  
to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: May 16, 1975 - Friday  
9:25 - 10:38 a.m.

PLACE: The Oval Office  
The White House

SUBJECT: Mayaguez; NATO Schedule; Sadat meeting;  
the Shah; CSCE

President: My recollection is I told Hollaway to continue the strikes until I said to stop.

Scowcroft: That is my recollection. And you told Schlesinger.

President: I want a detailed summary of the orders which went out and any changes which were made. I want an assessment of the operation -- including the time sequence of takeoffs and what happened.

Kissinger: You should ask for all the orders that were issued from the beginning of the operation.

President: That should include the orders from the Pentagon to CINCPAC and from there to commanders on the scene. I want the DOD submission compared with the orders issued in the NSC.

Kissinger: I think Schlesinger, when he heard the Congressional attitudes, changed the orders.


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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 11/24/98, State Dept. Guidelines  
By lt, NARA, Date 12/4/00

~~SECRET~~ - XGDS (3)  
CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER



President: Or CINCPAC changed it.

Kissinger: The whole operation was conducted not as a military operation but in order to demagogue before the Congress. You got a helluva lot out of it.

President: Include what happened in the first wave, the second wave, and the other waves after that.

It seems to me that what happens in the Situation Room is being bypassed by what goes on in the NMCC.

Kissinger: Here is a draft NATO schedule. It is heavy, but if you approve it we will start making arrangements.

[Gives the President the paper.]

President: That is fine.

Kissinger: Okay. We will send cables out.

Thorn will be the President of the UN this year and it would be symbolic to meet first with one of the small ones.

I have a draft statement -- I will put it into a book for you.

On the Middle East, I have a paper I did on strategy, and a cable from Eilts on the mood.

I'll be back Friday night and have to leave on Monday. I will be available both Saturday and Sunday.

President: How did the meeting with the Shah go?

Kissinger: Outstanding. He was extremely pleased. He is afraid the Indians will attack Pakistan.

President: Have we delivered anything?



Kissinger: They haven't ordered anything because they have no money. Tell him you are very interested in the preservation of Pakistan. We would like to know his intentions, and how he thinks we can help.

President: Can I have a map?

[General Scowcroft goes out, and returns].

Kissinger: Sadat is in a tough domestic situation. He will have to do something soon. If he went Marxist, he could get money from Libya.

President: What about the Shah's comments on turning west?

Kissinger: With Sadat, it should be just you, me and a notetaker. He will maybe have Fahmy. We should sit in easy chairs, not across the table from each other. I would ask for 15 minutes alone at the end of each other. I would ask for 15 minutes alone at the end of each meeting. He is usually good for only about an hour and a half.

President: I will be meeting with the foreign correspondents and will need to study the books.

Scowcroft: You will have them.

Kissinger: AHEPA decided to press for retention of aid cutoff.

My trip to Berlin is purely symbolic. I have a speech to give to the city council.

The major problem will be Gromyko. He will have three things: CSCE, SALT, and the Middle East. CSCE is out of our hands; we are staying a step behind the Europeans. The only question is the date. The Soviet Union and France want 13 July. I would not spend more than three days. For everyone to give a speech would take 4-5 days.

[Secretary Kissinger described the map of the Pakistan area, pointing out the location of Pushtoonistan and Baluchistan.]



I'll agree to the last week of July with Gromyko, if nothing happens. You would come to the last two days and the signing ceremony.

President: Can I put in my speech that this doesn't involve territorial matters?

Kissinger: No, it does not affect the Baltic states. We can brief the press on that, but Jackson and the like will hit us on that.

On the Middle East, I will be tough with him.



News from Press to President + Secretary to Service.  
Really check off by the Sec Def.

Friday  
9:25-10:38 AM

✓ P/K 16 May 75

Check  
minutes

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strikes until I said to stop.  
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S Yes, and you told Schles

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
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(Circs & papers)

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Italians - I like w/ leave.

K Thoren will be Pres of UN + would be sympathetic to meet fact w/ one of i small ones.

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On ME, <sup>I have</sup> here is a paper I did on strategy, came from Eilat for one word.

I'll be back Friday night + back leave Monday. Will be on the 5th of Sep + 5th.

P How did a mtg w/ C. Shirk go

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P Heard we delivered any thing

K They haven't ordered any thing - no money. Tell him you're very interested in purchasing Pak. We would like to know his intentions, + how he thinks we can help.

P Cera I have a map (I left)

K Sadat is in tough domestic sit. He will have to do something soon. If he went Marxist he could get money from Libya.

P Shah's comments on turning West.

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S You will have them.

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3 things: CSCE, SALT, ME. CSCE is out of our  
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only question is date. SU + Fr want 13 Aug July.  
I would not spend another 3 days. For every act  
you a speech would take 4-5 days.

(Described maps of Pakistan area, Pushtun, Bahuch,  
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nothing happens. You would come to last  
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O. N. E., I will be tough & tell him

