

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/NODIS/XGDS~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Harold Wilson, Prime Minister  
of the United Kingdom  
James Callaghan, Secretary of State  
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs  
Sir John Hunt, Secretary of the Cabinet

President Ford  
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State  
and Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs  
Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant  
to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Wednesday, May 7, 1975  
4:06 - 5:16 p.m.

PLACE: The Oval Office  
The White House

SUBJECTS: CSCE; Middle East; Energy;  
Concorde; Commodities; EC Poll

CSCE

The President: I gather the Commonwealth Conference was a success.

Wilson: Yes, it was a good meeting.

President: We are looking forward to the meeting in Brussels and we appreciate your taking the lead.

Wilson: I think it is a good time. We will be able to decide whether or not we should go to Helsinki.

~~SECRET/NODIS/XGDS~~



~~TOP SECRET - XGDS (3)~~

CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, SEC. 3.1  
NSA MEMO, MARINA, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, State Dir. ewj 3/19/04  
BY J... MARA, DATE 5/14/04

Callaghan: It could be a very constructive week -- with important meetings of the IEA, the OECD and NATO.

President: Also to firm up the situation on the security conference.

Wilson: That's right.

President: What is your view on CSCE?

Wilson: We have got some way to go. We need to get from Jim the details on what the sticking points are. Brezhnev is obviously in a hurry. He wants three things: the CSCE Summit, a world Communist conference, and his visit here. I think they told him he could stay until next February.

Callaghan: That gives us leverage. To come here before the CSCE or vice versa.

Kissinger: We can't meet [for his visit here] before September because we won't be ready until then. I think the later the better on CSCE -- so long as we don't seem to be stalling. But we told him July.

Callaghan: I am more pessimistic about a meeting in July. I don't mind him coming here in September and having the CSCE in October.

Kissinger: That's all right with us.

President: Is there a chance he would be more flexible if we said July?

Kissinger: We said that if there was progress, we'd have the summit.

Wilson: It means more to him than to us. He needs it.

Callaghan: His success is the recognition of the legitimacy of East Europe. He will have that if there is a CSCE Summit conference.

Kissinger: I suspect they will make all reasonable concessions to have it in July.

Middle East

President: You might be interested -- and I am grateful for your observations -- we are very disappointed in the setbacks in the Middle East. We are undertaking a broad reassessment of our Middle East policy.



I will see Sadat and Rabin in June. Sometime shortly after that, we will announce where we think most progress can be made. We are very concerned about stagnation and we think it would be very risky to permit it. The step-by-step is in suspension the other alternatives would be a comprehensive approach, using Resolutions 242 and 338. Some argue this is the proper approach. I would appreciate your observations.

Wilson: You aren't planning to complete the review before you see Sadat and Rabin?

President: Yes. They are part of the process.

Wilson: I know Allon very well and got a good account of what they think when he came to London. I laid out to him that a stalemate is not on their side. There were different accounts -- Israeli and Egyptian -- of what transpired. They feel they made an offer -- I thought it was like a free kick after the game was over. I gather they haven't offered anything since.

Kissinger: No, we have asked four times if they had anything more to say. At no time have they deviated from their previous position.

Wilson: Allon's main point to me was, how does he know Sadat will survive or that the UN force won't be vetoed?

Kissinger: That negotiation is so hopelessly confused, I don't see how it can be resurrected. But Sadat had pledged non-use of force, an agreement that it would be valid until it was superseded by another agreement, that annual renewal of the UN would be automatic, and there would be a mixed Israeli-Egyptian commission to supervise the disengagement. They asked about a Soviet veto of the UN force, but we could have gotten around that. The real difficulty was between non-use of force and non-belligerency. Sadat felt that if he gave non-belligerency for the passes, he would have no leverage for further movement.

Callaghan: Peace.

Kissinger: What is the difference?

Callaghan: We go around like squirrels in a cage on this. A comprehensive approach is certainly worth considering. But can't we resurrect it with some magic ingredient? What could Egypt put in the pot? Financial support, more on the Canal? Israel could give the passes.



Wilson: If the UN were pushed out, could there be an automatic return of Israeli troops to the passes?

Kissinger: They never gave us a line, but it went through the middle of the passes. The other issue was unbroken Egyptian access to oil fields. The difference between the middle and the end of the passes is Israeli domestic politics, because it would be a zone of limited arms anyway. Egypt didn't care if they moved out of the passes, how far. But I think the Israeli government was in no condition to make an agreement in March.

Wilson: That is the point. They don't have a united Cabinet at all.

Kissinger: The Presidential letter was to arrive after the Cabinet decision, not to influence it. I said never again would they have a chance like that for only eight kilometers in the passes. Rabin said give us 24 hours, but that I think was because they couldn't get their propaganda organized on the Sabbath. So he said, "While we are waiting, why not ask Sadat if there was more he can offer." Of course, Sadat said no. So there was no new Israeli offer.

Wilson: That is my point. There is no real Cabinet.

President: It seems to me an evident hardening. Rabin is being praised for being firm. They are generating the American Jews, and it doesn't appear to me there is any flexibility in the step-by-step.

Wilson: I have heard stories about horrible infighting in the Cabinet. I spoke to our Jews -- very frankly -- and I said there was a crisis of confidence between the U.S. and Israel. I think they are worried -- not only can Sadat survive, but is there an Israeli Cabinet?

Callaghan: Then is there an alternative Cabinet which can be built? Is there a good movement? If it is, and the Israelis can't move, can't you get Egypt to move? Turn the heat on the Egyptians. They need economic help; they could let Israeli ships through the Canal.

Kissinger: Our Ambassador -- who is very sharp -- felt that Sadat had already gone too far for his domestic situation. Now we have a Syrian problem. I think one reason Israel turned us down is because they are not willing to move on the Golan.



Callaghan: Our Ambassador thinks Sadat may fall because of the economic situation.

Wilson: Is one of the options an ultimate guarantee by the superpowers and others, so there would be no UN veto? Is that ruled out?

President: I wouldn't rule anything out but I don't know that that is the most attractive.

Wilson: I know we want to keep the Soviets out and that is a problem.

Kissinger: We might have a real problem getting an American guarantee through Congress. It would be difficult if we had to explain in detail when we would or would not intervene.

President: There is a very different and difficult situation in Congress. It is not the way it was, even with respect to aid.

Callaghan: Maybe you have to put it all on the table, instead of being kicked around as the middleman.

Wilson: Would Geneva ever happen?

Kissinger: It would be a nightmare. Having the Egyptians and the Syrians together, it reduces the flexibility of both; then you have the problem of the PLO, etc.

Callaghan: Couldn't you make it a condition only to meet for four days and then go to subcommittees?

Kissinger: The Soviets are so rigid and legalistic that they would produce a stalemate even if they wanted to be helpful.

Callaghan: I think you must go back to the step-by-step.

Kissinger: Let's see what the President sees in the meetings.

Callaghan: We would welcome knowing before your public announcement.

Kissinger: We had told the Israelithe minimum terms on which Sadat could settle. They didn't ever accept, but they led us on. Rabin told us that failure would be a Greek tragedy; unintentionally, people bring about the consequences they most fear, because of their natures. But he has gone from 38% to 80% popularity for views he doesn't support.

Wilson: Yes. He as acclamation and Knesset support but it has put him more and more into a corne

Callaghan: Is there anything we can do?

Kissinger: Give them a sense that the President is serious, which I don't think they appreciate.

President: We honestly don't think the step-by-step is feasible except under the umbrella of a comprehensive proposal.

Kissinger: Unless one side or the other changes its position.

Callaghan: It is worth considering, because then we would see where we were heading.

Energy, etc.

Wilson: Let's talk about energy. I think we got some acceptance of our trying to bridge the consumers and producers. There wasn't total support for tearing down the IMF, etc. We have some committees set up on commodities.

I would like to talk about Concorde.

The Queen's visit is all set for 7-11 July.

I think we are moving on energy.

Callaghan: I think we won't break even the reasonable countries from the 77, but beneath that I think we can move on specific schemes -- on food energy and commodities. I think we can move them.

Kissinger: I think your commodity position is very constructive. We are trying to work up a commodity position now. I hope to have it by the time of the OECD. I hope we can be responsive.

President: I notice the polls indicate you will prevail on the EC poll.

Wilson: I think so. We are keeping a low profile. But the polls are unanimous that it's more than 2-1. The vote is by countries and the poll was by countries -- 2-1 in every country.



President: How about the press?

Wilson: It is too good. It embarrasses us.


[The meeting ended]



✓ P/ Wilson / Callaghan / K / Hunt  
~~Walters / K~~

7 May 75

- P. Igortina - Conf was a success
- W. Yes, it was good. ~~So~~
- I. We looking forward to Brussels & we appreciate your taking a lead.
- W. I think it is a good time to decide whether or not we should go to Helsinki.
- C. It could be a very constructive week - w/c EC, OECD & NATO.
- I. Also to firm up a bit on security conf.
- W. That's right.
- P. What is your view on CSC?
- W. Got some work to do. Had to get from your details on sticking points. ~~But~~ Bug is obviously in a hurry. He wants 3 things: SCE, Coast conf, & visit here. I think they told him he could stay til next Feb.
- C. That gives us leverage. To come here before SCE a nice reason.
- K. We can't meet before Sept because we want to really tell them. I think a later a better on SCE - so long as we don't seem to be stalling. But we told him July.
- C. I am more pessimistic about meeting July. I don't mind him coming here in Sept & SCE in Oct.
- K. All night w/ us.
- P. Is there a chance he would be more flexible if we said July?
- K. We said that if there was prog.



W I know more to him than to no. He needs it.

C His success is a legitimizing of E Em. He will have that if a conf.

K I suspect they will make all reasonable concessions to have it in July.

P You might be interested - I'm grateful for your observations - <sup>very</sup> disappointed in setbacks in NIE. We embarking broad reassessment of NIE policy. I will see Salat + Robin in June. Sometime shortly after that we will announce where we think most progress can be made. We very concerned about stagnation + think it would be very risky. So is in suspending other alt would be expansion approach, using 242 + 338. Some argued this is proper approach. I would appreciate your observations.

W You aren't planning to enlighten a meeting before Salat + Robin

P Yes. They are part of a process.

W I know Allan very well - got a good account of what they think. I laid out to him that statements not on their side. There were diff accounts - I & E - of what transpired. They feel they made an offer - I think it was like a free kick after a game was over. I gather they haven't offered anything since.

K No, we have asked 4 times if they had anything more to say. at no time have they deviated from

new position.

H

W All the main point to me was how does he know Sadat will survive or that UN force might be vetoed.

R That negot is so hysterically confused I don't see how it can be resurrected. But Sadat had pledged non-use of force, a guarantee which till superseded, annual renewal of UN would be automatic, which I-E chosen to supervise during. They asked about 50 veto of UN force, but we could have gotten around that. The real obj was det non-use of force + non-bellig. Sadat felt if he gave non-bellig for a pass he would have no leverage for further movement.

C Please

R What is a dig? >

C We go around like squirrels in a cage on this. Europe approach is certainly worth considering. But could we resurrect it w/ some energy ingredient. What could E put in a pot? French support, more or less. I could give a pass.

W If UN pushed out, could there be auto. return of I troop to pass?

R They never gave us a time, but it went thru middle of pass. The other issue was unbroken access to oil fields. Dig bet middle & end of pass is I domestic politics, cause it would be goal of limited armistice. E don't care if they ~~was~~ moved out of a pass, how far.

But I think I got away in no end, to make  
an agreement in haste.

W That's a point. They don't have a united cabinet at all.

K The P letter was to arrive after a Cabinet decision, not  
to influence it. I said once again would they have  
a chance for only 8 hours in a process. ~~It~~ Kabin  
said give us 24 hrs, but that I think because  
they couldn't get their propaganda signed on Sabbath.  
So he said while waiting why not ask Sadat  
if more he can offer. Of course he said no. So  
there was no new I offer.

W That's my point. There is no real cabinet.

P Seems to me an excellent heading. Kabin being  
puzzled for being firm. They are perpetrating  
Annoyance, & doesn't appear to me there is any  
flex in a sto cause >

W I have heard stories about horrible infighting  
in a cabinet. I spoke to some Jews - very frankly -  
& said there was a crisis of conf. but US + I, I  
think they are worried - not only can Sadat survive  
~~it~~ and is there an I cabinet.

C There is then an alt cabinet which can be built?  
Is that good movement? If it is + a I cabinet now,  
can't you get E to move. ~~There~~ - There is heat on  
C E. They need some help, they could let I ships  
through canal.

K One Arab - who very sharp - felt Sadat had already  
gone too far. Now we have a Syrian job. Sadat  
I think one reason I turned no down is because



They not willing to move on Berlin

C One Arab thinker Sadat may fall because of fear set.

W Some of options are ~~to~~ ultimate guaranteed by a superpowers + others, so no UN role - Is that ruled out?

P I would not rule anything out but I don't know that is most attractive.

AS I know we want to keep a Secret out + that is a favor.

K Wx might want to have real job getting a guarantee thru Cong. Would be diff if we had to explain in detail when we would or would not intervene.

P There is a very diff + difficult set in Cong. It not a way it was, even w/ respect to aid.

C Maybe you have to put it all on table, instead of being kicked around as usual.

W Would Geneva ever happen?

K It would be a nightmare. Having E + Syria together is always plus of both, part of PhO, etc.

C Couldn't you make it a condition only to meet for 4 days + then go to subcommittee.

K The Secs are so rigid + dogmatic that they could produce statements even if they wanted to be helpful.

C I think you must go back to sbos

K Let's see what P. Asks in a mtg.

C We would welcome knowing before your public announcement.

K We had told C I a minimum tension which Sadat



could settle. They didn't even accept but they  
led us on. Robin told us that partners would be  
a quick tragedy. But he has gone from 30% to 50%  
for crisis he doesn't support.

W Yes. He has aclamation + Kresset support ~~but~~  
it has put him more + more into a corner.

C Is there anything we can do?

R Give them a sense of P inroad, which I don't  
think they appreciate.

P We basically don't think it's possible except  
under umbrella of energy proposal.

K Unless one or other changes its position →


~~It's a matter of time~~

C It's worth considering because they <sup>all</sup> would  
see where we were heading.

W Energy. I think we got some acceptance of our  
trying to bridge e + p. ~~But~~ There wasn't total  
support for taxing down IANF, etc. We have  
some entities set up on entities. Would like to  
talk in-ude. Inulin's visit all set for 2-11 July.  
I think we moving on energy.

C I think we want banks even a reasonable  
countries from 77, but be aware that I think  
we can work on specific schemes, on fuel,  
energy + entities. I think we can move  
them.

K I think your entity position very construction  
was trying to work by a entity position now  
Hope to have by OECD. Hope we can be responsive



P I notice polls indicate you will prevail on a  
EC poll.

W I think so. We keeping lower profile. But polls are  
consensus at more than 2-1. Vote is by  
countries + a poll was by countries - 2-1 in every country.

P How about a press?

W It is too good. Evidences.

W

